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ABSTRACT

A conference on research relating to how children acquire their systems of values and morality was held with the overall objective toward improving the quality of human life through greater scientific understanding of the developmental processes and the support of research on these complex problems. Participants stressed that many child-rearing practices, educational methods, and social work practices are predicated on unsupported assumptions about how people evolve their moral values and ethical standards. The discussions were intended to provide an interdisciplinary effort to digest and absorb what is known about moral development and the acquisition of values and to construct a variety of working concepts of morality on the basis of the most reliable scientific and philosophical evidence now available. A single theme predominated--values can only be meaningful when examined in the full light of their psychological, social, and historical context. Numerous theories were advanced: the influence of social attitudes, kinship relationships, behavior conditioning, attitude consistency from generation to generation, rapid social change and resulting psychological experimentation in a search for stability. Lack of universal definitions is a major handicap--terms relating to values or morality are surcharged with emotion and no adequate scientific model for study exists. (JMB)

THE ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES

PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH

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THE ACQUISITION AND DEVELOPMENT OF VALUES



PERSPECTIVES ON RESEARCH

Report of a Conference
May 15-17, 1968
Washington, D.C.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
Bethesda, Maryland

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FOREWORD

When the 87th Congress established the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development in 1963, it was with the mandate to promote studies directed toward the whole life process rather than any specific disease or abnormality. The overall objectives of the Institute are the improvement of the quality of human life through greater scientific understanding of developmental processes and the support of research on these complex problems. For this reason, when the National Institutes of Health, then under the directorship of Dr. James A. Shannon, decided to sponsor a conference on research relating to how children acquire their systems of values and morality, it was natural that NICHD should be asked to undertake its planning and organization.

This conference, held in May 1968, was not, of course, the first examination of this topic. It was, however, unique in the fact that its sponsorship by a research-oriented Government agency underscored constructive concern about moral development and the acquisition of values as a matter of national policy.

Planning for the conference extended over two full years, during which Institute staff were ably guided and assisted by several planning groups representing many interrelating disciplines. Particular thanks are due to Dr. Lawrence Kohlberg and Dr. Abraham Edel, who gave unstintingly of their time, energies, and creative thinking in shaping the conference, and to the Pan American Health Organization which made its majestic conference facilities available for the three day meeting. This building, in which representatives of more than 40 nations strive together for the betterment of human life and health, was a symbolically ideal setting for examination of the moral principles and standards that underlie individual and social development throughout the world. The report of the conference was prepared by free-lance science writer Mrs. Leora Wood Wells.

Our appreciation for the contribution of each of the conference participants can best be demonstrated through presentation of this summary of the many thought-provoking ideas expressed.

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CONFERENCE CONCEPTS

Mankind's interest in moral values, particularly as they affect his relationship to his fellow man, his society, and his God, stretches back at least as far as historical records can carry us. The great minds of every age have sought answers about the nature, universality, and permanence of moral principles. Yet it often seems that we are no closer to definitive answers than was Socrates when he admitted to Meno that he did not know how virtue is acquired, whether it can be taught, or even what it really is.

We know that human beings are constantly being taught by what they see, what they hear, taste, smell and feel; and that from these stimuli they draw conclusions about how they should act and what they should do. Yet many of our child-rearing practices, educational methods and social work practices are predicated on unsupported assumptions about how people evolve their moral values and ethical standards. If we want to instill certain value systems, we need to understand more clearly how this part of human development takes place, and what the most cogent influences are.

Many professions have made and are making studies which can contribute to this knowledge and provide scientific bases for our practices. But too often the disciplines are so isolated from each other that studies in one area remain unknown beyond a single professional group. A principal purpose of the Conference on Studies of the Acquisition and Development of Values sponsored by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development was to provide a forum in which various disciplines could discover what they could learn from each other and what they could contribute to each other's understanding of this complex topic. An additional purpose was to identify areas in which significant research has been done and areas in which additional research is needed. It was not the purpose of the conference to say which values are good or bad, which are right or wrong, but to point directions for research which will help us understand how people come to hold the views they do.

The conference group which assembled in May 1968, under the chairmanship of Dr. Dwain Walcher, included sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, psychiatrists, nurses, theologians, ethnicists, philosophers, educators, lawyers, students of human development, and other participants whose background and work overlap many of these fields. They represented a variety of cultures, religions, races, agencies, institutions, and geographic locations, and included both established researchers and those whose promise in their fields is just becoming apparent.

A number of the principal speakers at the conference prepared background papers which were distributed in advance to the participants. Because of their length, and because they were used primarily as springboards for the conference presentations, these papers are not included in toto in the report, although free use of them has been made to clarify and supplement the less formal remarks made during the conference. The result is a richly textured carpet of ideas from which each reader may select the pattern or color range most satisfying to his own interests.

The variety is almost infinite, and as with a favorite carpet or tapestry, one could explore the totality again and again without ever mastering all its nuances. During the conference individual segments often seemed to be totally unrelated to each other; but as each was sifted down and absorbed, it became apparent that these diverse contributions had an organic unity which made them blend into a stimulating and compelling whole.

If any single theme can be said to have predominated over others, it was perhaps the frequently stressed point that values cannot be considered in a vacuum—that they are meaningful only when looked at in the full light of their psychological, social, and historical context. Over the centuries, there have been thousands of moralities, and in order to understand them, we must know what is normative for any given culture.

However, normality, in the statistical sense of representing the viewpoints or behavior of a certain percentage of people, is not in itself necessarily an indication of morality. There have been sick societies, just as there are sick individuals, and the norm may be abnormal when judged on the basis of moral principles which seem to have universal validity.

But do values and moral principles have universal validity? Is there any such thing as a moral absolute? The complex problems of our own era make these questions difficult, if not impossible, to answer. We are continually faced with paradoxes in which the same act or standard of behavior seems now right, now wrong, where public morality often seems to conflict with private morality. National and international relations must often function on a choice of lesser evils, because the key factor is not intention but the objective consequences of an act. A choice which seems moral when judged on an individual basis can lead to disastrous consequences when applied to matters of national or international policy.

This is not to say that adherence to public or social standards of values is the only moral choice for the individual. Men from Socrates to Martin Luther King have elected to place personal standards of morality above conformity to conventional values or public policy because of deep commitment to self-chosen moral principles which seem to them to transcend the principles of their current society.

Although all participants seemed to agree that both public and individual morality are dynamic rather than static, numerous theories were advanced about how the evolution takes place and what factors affect it to the greatest degree. Some participants stressed the influence of social attitudes which govern child-

rearing practices in various countries; others the effects of different patterns of kinship relationships. Some traced the moral development of individuals and societies through an unchanging sequence of stages common to all cultures; others pointed out that human beings are easily conditioned and their behavior may or may not have anything to do with a process of moral development. Some emphasized the tendency for a particular outlook to be maintained with considerable consistency not only throughout the development of an individual but from one generation of a family to another. Others emphasized that every period of rapid social change causes individuals to go through endless processes of psychological experimentation with various patterns of behavior in the search for inner stability. To some participants, this restless turmoil appeared to be an indication of individual or social pathology; to others evidence of growth and enormous creative potential.

In attempting to study values, the participants all agreed, this lack of universal definitions is a major handicap. No two people understand terms relating to values or morality the same way because all are surcharged with emotion and no adequate scientific model for study exists. The tendency to isolate facts from values as if they were totally unrelated phenomena is an unrealistic dichotomy which has closed off many potentially fruitful avenues of scientific inquiry. What is needed is an interdisciplinary effort to digest and absorb what is known about moral development and the acquisition of values and construct a variety of working concepts of morality on the basis of the most reliable scientific and philosophical evidence now available.

The summary of the presentations and discussions which follows will, perhaps, mark the beginning of such an effort.

PERSPECTIVES ON VALUE DEVELOPMENT

Value Systems and World Crisis: The Dialectic of Ambivalence

In international relations, the choices before decisionmakers are hardly ever choices between right and wrong or good and evil, Dr. John Stoessinger, Director of the Political Affairs Division of the United Nations, told the conference group. The decisionmaker is forced to function under a dialectic of ambivalence, the philosophy of the lesser evil.

This necessity for accepting the concept of relative ethics is alien to Americans, as it is to the people of many other nations. Most of us are brought up to win or lose. It is impossible to find a game for children, for example, the objective of which is to have a draw. The World Series has seven games. Under our cultural traditions it can't have six or eight, because—Heaven forbid!—we might end up with a draw; and we are conditioned to believe that someone, some team, some nation must win. Even the words that express the concept of draw are negative words, almost "dirty words"—like break even, stalemate, impasse.

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This is so deeply ingrained in our culture that we are hardly able to stand back and look at it any more. Yet we dare not sweep the dissonant evidence under the rug when it becomes uncomfortable to live with. We can't just pick up our marbles and go home. You don't eliminate evil from the world by "going home"; you merely blunt the capacity to distinguish among evils. And this capacity is a very valuable intellectual instrument.

The major imperative of the atomic age is that we have to refashion our concept of draw to have a positive connotation. Most wars since the coming of the atomic age have been draws, and this may be the only possible solution. No realistic scenario can be devised that will enable one side or the other to win completely and unequivocally. Each side has to give up a portion of its vital objectives. The most realistic goal is that of moving the dialectic of conflict and cooperation which characterizes relationships among nations toward the cooperative end of the spectrum. The relationship defies easy terminology, but it moves, one might say, like an accordion. It is a very dynamic affair. At times there is more conflict, at other times more cooperation.

The phenomenon is based less on changes in human nature than on common fear of negative developments—such as the rising power of another nation—which creates a common need for the first two to work together to build stronger pillars of cooperation. We need to study the nature of this psychological relationship as a dialectical phenomenon which may provide guidelines for enhancing the cooperative element as against the conflict element.

It is quite possible that there is a real difference between personal morality and political morality. In personal morality, if you ask whether someone is moral or immoral what you are really asking is: Did he mean well, or did he mean badly? What was his intention?

In international politics, this is not the question you ask. History is not much interested in the intention of a statesman. It is interested only in the objective consequences of his action. By standards of personal morality, Neville Chamberlain might have been considered a great man. "Peace in our time!"—he intended very well. But by the standards of political morality, he was not a great man, for the objective consequences of his appeasement policy made World War II inevitable.

Sometimes the political scientist must measure morality by standards other than those people use in regard to the ethics of personal morality. Without necessarily suggesting which is preferable, it is important to recognize and accept the fact that they are different. In a basically anarchic world, realism in international politics may well be more compatible with the human condition than romanticism. At least you know what you are working with and what your limitations are as well as your possibilities. Romanticism can only lead to disillusionment and cynicism.

Yet perception among nations is almost as important as reality. The struggle that goes on between two countries is not only that they struggle with each other as they are but with what each thinks the other is. The differences

between the existential realities and the subjective distortions are so great as to make one melancholy about the way they exacerbate world conflicts. We must at least begin to deal with this second layer of struggle that exists, not in the real world of battlefields and meeting halls, but in the misperceptions, distortions, stereotypes and illusions in the minds of men.

Studies of perception are of vital importance—not only studies of perception in interpersonal relationships among children, adolescents and adults, but studies of perception among nations. What are the differences between the ways human beings perceive each other and the ways nations perceive each other? What are the lines of likeness that may be drawn between personal psychology and national psychology? What are the leaps that must be made from individual understanding to national and international understanding?

In spite of the dark nights of the soul through which the nations of the world have passed and must pass, the overall trend is upward. But the participation and study and attention of sociologists, anthropologists, psychiatrists, and members of many other disciplines in addition to political scientists can be immensely helpful in moving forward the hope for moral solutions of world crises.

Value Conflict and the American Middle Class

There is a sense abroad in the land that a serious challenge to the dominant culture of capitalism and rationalistic values is in the making in the United States, and that this is largely due to the rebellion of youth. But it is perhaps a mistake to view value conflict as a generational conflict alone, suggested Dr. Richard Flacks of the Department of Psychology of the University of Chicago. First of all, although it is primarily youth who have engaged in mass movements against the dominant values, the majority of youth are not part of such movements. There is value conflict within the present younger generations as well as across the generations.

Furthermore, reported Dr. Flacks, his studies of activists and their families show a continuity between generations. Although there is conflict over specific issues, there is an identifiable tradition of humanism. The occupations of the parents of activists are almost entirely within the vocational and professional fields involved in helping relationships with people.

If there is a generational conflict in activist families, it is over the issue of optimism. Although the parents, for the most part, are not themselves activists—nor were they when they were younger—they are people engaged in careers and personal ways of life which they thought could be personally fulfilling and at the same time could make positive contributions to the larger society. Their children find it impossible to accept this optimism over the usefulness of personal occupations for really making a difference, the optimism over decent individual family and private lives as a proper central concern, and the optimism over the potential of government for dealing effectively with social problems. They

are substantially disillusioned by the way that tradition has worked out because what they observe is an increase and further entrenchment of racism, and a society which moves away from rather than toward more decent relations with the rest of the world.

Many of the conflicts in values we are experiencing in the United States derive from the fact that America is an advanced industrial society with a capitalist economy. Our culture has traditionally emphasized that individual worth is primarily measured by one's success or achievement in a competitive occupational system; that such achievement is measured by one's income and its appropriate use, and that such achievement is possible only if the individual learns to discipline his impulses and feelings in the service of personal advancement and efficient performance.

Any subculture which proposed alternative value systems has been seen as marginally exotic and probably a symptom of disorganization deserving of intervention and treatment, yet at the same time functional for maintenance of the dominant culture.

During the 19th century, the romantic literary Bohemians of Europe banded together to maintain their identity within the framework of the increasing rationalization and commercialism which accompanied industrialization. When this intellectual revolt against the new society was imported into America around the turn of the country, it took on a peculiarly American twist: the impulse to move out and reform society rather than merely to withdraw from it. With the feminist revolt, the idea developed that the key strategy for reforming society was through transformation of the socialization of children through education and family life. This became the focal point of much of the ferment during the early part of the 20th century. The idea was that the application of science to socialization would produce a new type of human being who would be more moral. The possibility of change was envisioned as coming about through the use of government as an instrument of reform, the creation of new vocations and areas of expertise centering around socialization and human development, and the creation of a new type of family with morally consistent private relations among its members.

Dr. Flacks said that his research suggests that there are now two dominant types of middle class family styles in the United States. The overwhelmingly dominant type is one which continues to adhere to the values, aspirations, and interests of the capitalist culture. It places highest priority on material comfort and successful occupational attainment. It values respectability in overt behavior and self-discipline over impulse and emotion as necessary for achieving success, security and status. It encourages educational achievement but sees it as desirable primarily because of its instrumental value. It practices conventional religion and conventional politics without enthusiastic engagement in either. It produces children who share these beliefs and aspirations to a large extent and who do not appear to be very skeptical about the American way of life they rather confidently plan to inherit.

The other dominant type of middle class family is most apt to be found among highly educated professional people. This type of family, by its own report, encourages intrinsic intellectual and aesthetic achievements more than concern for material comfort and status, which it tends to regard as somehow vaguely distasteful or immoral. It rejects, at least verbally, conventional religious identifications and criteria for respectability. It values education for its own sake, and tends to substitute the university for the church as the repository of highest values. It is strongly liberal, supporting internationalism, civil rights, and government as an instrument of social change.

There is, of course, enormous variation within these types and no family completely fits these oversimplified stereotypes. But it is, most often, out of the second of the two dominant family types that student activists develop. They follow clearly in the family tradition in their rejection of the other dominant set of middle class values.

The fact of affluence itself erodes much of the reason for commitment to the old capitalistic values. It is hard to maintain commitments to self-discipline and to achieve in occupation if one is living in an environment of received abundance. It is significant that the students who are involved in protest in their colleges are primarily from the upper income levels. The students from lower income levels are less apt to be so involved. The capitalistic culture, which Marx thought would be opposed primarily by the working class is instead being confronted by a portion of the educated middle class, not because of deprivation, but in part because of affluence; not solely out of self-interest or oppression, but because of the perception of the oppression of others.

This sentiment has strength because the emphasis on competition, success, and self-discipline in the established culture are in tension with its capacity to guarantee a decent standard of living for the members of society. The values of capitalism are scarcity values, not values for an affluent society. The puritan today is a deviant; the emphasis is on self-fulfillment rather than self-control as a central virtue. Self-discipline has come to mean the ability to express impulses in one's private life while maintaining a fully rational impersonal perspective in one's work.

The communications media have an enormous influence in making alternative values in life styles visible and attractive, particualrly through the artist who sings his avant garde humanist protests before audiences of hundreds of millions via television and records. Students in large-scale, impersonal universities may become receptive to a great variety of themes stressed by their humanist fellows, particularly if they view the administrators of the university as morally obtuse or obsolete in their attitudes toward youth.

People often seem to conclude that what is happening to youth is merely a stage in the life cycle, something they will outgrow by the time they are 30. This kind of interpretation of value conflicts attempts to see deviance as a positive phenomenon; it may be functional, the reasoning goes, for youth to

pass through a period of value crisis—provided, of course, that they can overcome it.

It is, however, also fashionable to assume that youth, being young, can somehow anticipate the future. Since the youth are adopting ideas which seem to be new, it is assumed that these are the ideas which will become established in the future.

This is not necessarily true. In fact, it is quite probable that the current aspirations of this humanist wing of the younger generation will not be fulfilled unless there is a fundamental transformation not only of the value systems of our country but in its political and economic structures as well.

STUDIES OF VALUES AND MORAL BEHAVIOR IN VARIOUS CULTURES

Methods of Child Rearing in the Soviet Union and the United States: A Comparison

To date, no systematic studies of child-rearing methods in the Soviet Union have been carried out either by Soviet or non-Soviet investigators, according to Dr. Urie Bronfenbrenner, Professor of Psychology and of Child Development and Family Relationships at Cornell University. However, he reported to the conference group on his own informal observations and field notes made during several visits to Russia, where he was given opportunities to observe children and adults in a variety of school and home settings.

In the Soviet Union, Dr. Bronfenbrenner said, babies have almost constant physical contact with their mothers. It is not unusual for a mother to get dinner with cooking utensils in one hand and a baby nestled in the other arm.

A second aspect of child upbringing in Russia is the universal solicitousness for their care. The mother makes constant efforts to protect the child from discomfort, illness and injury, and so does every stranger he encounters. Bringing up children is sort of a national hobby. Everybody is Mother. Strangers are addressed as Uncle and Aunt, and they not only get into conversations with children but they assume maternal responsibility for them. Everybody is a nurturer, and everybody is a disciplinarian. If American children are allowed to run about freely in the Russian parks, even within sight of their parents, kindly citizens of all ages will not only take them firmly by the hand and bring them back but will lecture the parents on their lack of concern for the welfare of their children. An adult riding on a bus is apt to get a child dumped in his lap without ceremony or explanation, and is expected to know how to deal with him and take care of him. A group of teenage boys, seeing a younger child, even one they do not know, may dance around him, toss him playfully into the air, and return him, smothered with kisses, to his parents.

Soviet society is a matriarchal world in which maternal care and upbringing are almost synonymous. Fathers act more in a maternal than a paternal role if compared with the customs of other modern industrial societies. This is probably in part because Russia has for generations been a society in which many fathers are absent. In virtually every other generation over hundreds of years, hundreds of thousands of men have been removed from their families by wars, purges, or imprisonment. It is, therefore, the women who are the principal upbringers.

With the mother the dominant figure and the father conforming to her opinions, there is a feminine sort of "love is everything" orientation with moral overtones: "If you take risks you will get hurt, and that will hurt me, and that is not the right thing to do." Everything is defined in terms of withdrawal of love rather than the central question of the consequences of any given act. This is unfortunate, because constructive dissonance is important in the development not only of character but of conflict capacity. Yet dissonance between parents is unacceptable. Total agreement of the parents is considered the moral model for child rearing. This lack of differentiation in the maternal and paternal roles can affect the child's development negatively, for this differentiation is what helps a child develop a mind of his own, just as the influence of the peer group helps him develop a social identity of his own.

The child-rearing climate in Russia is a very affectionate one, yet the affection and solicitousness lavished on children does not by any means imply permissiveness or indulgence with respect to conduct. On the contrary, great emphasis is given to the development of two traits which are regarded as central to the development of social morality: obedience and self-discipline. Furthermore, children are not only expected to discipline themselves to respect and obey adults, they are expected to *want* to be obedient and are taught to feel guilty even over any desire to rebel. Independence in a child is viewed as likely to take anarchistic forms which cannot be reconciled with the laws of living in a collective society. There is a deliberate polarization which implies that the only alternative to obedience is anarchy. No allowance is made for an autonomous right to challenge authority, and any challenge is interpreted to mean that you don't love your mother—or Mother Russia.

In any society where there are large communal holdings, pressure toward conformity is innate in the structural situation. This affects methods of child rearing, leading toward great stress on obedience and self-discipline. The ideological structure of a society is a product of its geographical and political structures. Because both these factors are involved, there is less disparity between the "Old Russia" and the "New Russia" than is commonly assumed. Although many changes in patterns of child rearing have been advocated since the Revolution, in actual fact, many of the practices of Old Russia go on much as before. There is a continuity which can best be understood if one has some knowledge of what Russia was like before the Revolution.

Most Russians rely heavily on the dicta of experts. The expert professor is assumed to have much greater wisdom than ordinary parents, and when he

speaks you rise up on your toes to hear him. Debate over child-rearing practices often becomes a competitive citing of authorities rather than discussion of the central issue.

There are many books on child rearing which are widely read and respected and quoted, and they are very explicit about how one raises an obedient child who is a desirable product for the collective society. One of the techniques most widely recommended and practiced is withdrawal of love. When a child disobeys, his disobedience is sharply evaluated and the parent expresses disappointment and indignation. He then remains pointedly cold and reserved until the child has clearly demonstrated repentence. For example, a mother may say ,"You disobeyed me by not coming home on time. Now I no longer wish to finish the chess match we began yesterday. It is unpleasant even for me to look at you. This is not the kind of behavior that is expected by our collective."

The cognitive explication is an important facet of the love withdrawal technique. It is highly intellectualized and verbalized in terms of the principles involved. Physical punishment is unacceptable because it does not fit into idealistic Soviet theories of the kind of obedience-centered society they wish to develop.

American research indicates that this pattern of discipline through love withdrawal is very powerful at the family level provided there is "money in the bank"; that is, love enough to withdraw. This is why it works well in the Soviet Union, for the affection Russians show toward children is very deep and very genuine.

In the Soviet Union, collective upbringing can begin as early as 3 months of age. There are probably more nursery and preschool opportunities in the Soviet Union than in any other country today. The Headstart concept is something like 50 years old in Russia. In all of these institutions—day nurseries, boarding nurseries, kindergartens, and schools of the prolonged day which operate from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m.—there is a continuity of style. Emphasis is placed on training in collective living and productive activity.

Upon entry at the age of 3 months, infants are placed in group play pens which are raised from the floor so that the child care staff is face to face with the children. There are six to eight children in each playpen, and there is one "upbringer" for every four children.

In addition to providing routine care, the upbringer daily carries out special exercises to foster sensory, motor, mental, and social development. Particular stress is placed on teaching children to share and engage in cooperative activity. It is fascinating to see a doll being held jointly by a group of six month old babies while they are told, "This is our dolly. Let's lift up our dolly. Let's put our dolly down." There is no doubt whose dolly this is, and it is surprising how quickly these infants get the message. It is as if there were a large banner above the nursery that says, "Mine is Ours; Ours is Mine."

By the age of 18 months, the infant is said to be toilet-trained and is being taught to wash, dress, and feed himself. As soon as the children are able to talk they are trained to evaluate and criticize each other's behavior from the point of view of the group. The upbringer's task is to make each collective a self-reliant unit in which the members both help and discipline each other. Even in the nurseries, the children have communal responsibilities for cleanliness of the room and the grounds, gardening, care of animals and so on.

When the children reach school age, these concepts become still more structured. Group competition is emphasized—competition between rows in the classroom, classrooms in the school, schools in the city, cities in the republic. This leads, logically to the idea of competition between social systems.

Since each child's status depends in part on the status of his collective, it is to each pupil's enlightened self-interest to watch over his neighbor, encourage his good performance and behavior, and help him when he is in difficulty. The child becomes the agent of the adult society in making children into moral citizens as morality is conceived in the society.

The individual is taught to set the judgment of the group above his own and to subordinate his interests to those of the collective. There is a great deal of continuity between the pattern of discipline used and the love-withdrawal technique used in the mother-child relationship. In essence the system says that the collective—like Mama—won't love you unless you behave as it requires you to do, because the collective is always right. Makarenko, principal innovator and social psychologist of the Soviet Union, expresses this in a familiar cadence. The child is brought up, he says, in the collective, by the collective, for the collective.

Initiative is not lacking among young people in the countries he has studied, Dr. Bronfenbrenner said, but in some cultures it is characterized by what might be called the chameleon response. The young people are full of heart and enthusiasm, but it is directed straight down the party line. They do what everybody says is the right thing to do. Being an activist means not questioning but implementing the ideals that are given public support. In countries organized around the collective system, there is a tendency to rationalize this conformity to authority by claiming that the unanimity of action represents the autonomous moral response of each child to what he recognizes as meritorious, and anything that is meritorious is "truly Communist." Anything about which he disagrees or lacks enthusiasm is dull or uninteresting because it is not "truly Communist."

In any country this kind of attitude is apt to be more prevalent among boarding school children than in the day schools where children are exposed to a greater variety of views. With no other measuring stick, boarding school children in a collective society only know that the collective is right. If the viewpoint of the collective changes, they change, because the collective is right. If adolescent rebellion occurs, it occurs much later in such countries than in the United States—in the mid 20's rather than the mid teens.

Some portents of change in Soviet society can be observed. Boarding school construction appears to be slowing down, which may indicate less faith in the

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panacean powers of collective schooling and an increasing preference for having children live at home. At the same time there are some evidences of breaking with the traditional solicitous matriarchal patterns in the attitudes of some of the younger fathers and mothers. Intellectual leaders are beginning to take a somewhat different and more flexible view of their society, shifting away from features which foster dependency and conformity toward more individuality and independence.

This does not necessarily mean Soviet culture is moving closer to that of other industrialized societies. The different social systems will continue to move on their own trajectories. It is probable that Soviet children will continue to be more conforming and also less anti-adult, rebellious, aggressive and delinquent than American children.

Comparative studies of American and Soviet children showed that American children were far more ready to take part in antisocial activity than Soviet children were. Experiments involving opportunities to participate in morally disapproved behaviors like cheating on examinations or denying responsibility for property damage were set up under three conditions. Under the first condition, only the scientist would know what the children did; parents, peers and school authorities would not. Under the second condition, the children were told that the results would be discussed at a PTA meeting; that is, the adults in their world would know how they behaved. Under the third condition, only their classmates would know.

American children cheated much more readily under the third condition and least readily under conditions in which their parents would know about it. Soviet children were least apt to cheat when their peers would know about it. In other words, the peer group was perceived by the Soviet children as supporting the values of the adult society.

Findings about the effects of father-absence or extreme passiveness have been fairly consistent in some 25 American studies. They have shown that children from homes where the father is weak or absent tend to be more submissive, dependent, effeminate, and susceptible to group influence than children in families where the father is a strongly felt presence. Fatherless children are fair game for whatever group they become a part of, adapting themselves to its patterns of behavior and interpersonal relationships. For example, among lower class Negro families where father absence tends to be a dominant pattern, the passive, dependent boy readily transfers his attachment to a gang and its social patterns. This may require him, if he is to earn and keep his place, to demonstrate his toughness and aggressiveness. But this may not be the kind of constructive dissent which is acceptable in our society.

It is important for a child to have one man in his life who is important above all others and who brings a masculine perspective to the situations of daily living, and a willingness to dissent from the views of the mother if necessary. It is important for fathers to have the opportunity to function as fathers and mothers to function as mothers. Unless there is a clear differentiation of roles, the child

lacks one of the models he needs for healthy development. This problem is not limited to the lower classes. In many middle class democratic American families you can't tell the father from the mother at 20 yards in terms of their participation in child rearing.

There is some evidence that American parents are becoming progressively more permissive. But the data which show this can be interpreted another way: over the years, American parents are spending less and less time with their children. The number of working mothers has increased substantially, and children are thrown more and more upon resources other than parental influence. Contrary to expectations, the higher the socioeconomic level of the family, the less time the child spends with either his father or his mother. Although the children of such families often rate high on variables like competence, responsibility and initiative, we need to question whether our society has let both parents and children down by failing to provide and support institutional forms that would let parents function fully as parents in relation to their children. There are too many conflicting demands on them, too many other things they are supposed to do in particular ways.

Programs like Headstart recognize this problem by placing heavy emphasis on parent involvement. The role of the professional is viewed as being to teach parents how to function more fully as parents.

One of the obligations of behavioral scientists is to be both experimental and inventive, introducing and testing out innovations in the institutions of society which will make it possible for both parents and children to function fully in their particular roles in personal and social relationships.

It is unfortunate that American society is age-segregated in so many ways because this results in polarization of viewpoints. In programs for youth, if we are to deal with realities undistorted by age perceptions, youth needs to be brought into planning from the very beginning both in local programs and in national programs. There should, for example, be commissions including both teenagers and parents to find out how the children of the community spend their time, where they go, what facilities are available to them, who is with them. There should also be a requirement that the various government bodies of the community receive and act upon the findings of such studies, giving the youth a voice in the solution of the problems.

Within the perspective of current American problems, Soviet approaches to upbringing are not without significance for our own problems. If the Russians go too far in subjecting both the child and his peer group to conformity within a single set of values imposed by the adult society, perhaps we in the United States have reached the point of diminishing returns in allowing excessive autonomy and in failing to utilize the constructive potential of the peer group in developing social responsibility and consideration for others. Moving to correct this does not mean subscribing to Soviet insistence on the primacy of the collective over the individual, nor adopting their practice of shifting major responsibility for upbringing from the family to the public institutions. On the contrary, what

is called for is greater involvement of parents, adults and older children in the lives of younger children, and greater involvement of children in responsibility for behavior in their families, their communities, and the society at large. We must teach morality through imposition of concrete responsibilities and expectations. But these demands must be consistent, not only with the welfare of all citizens, but the dignity of each.

Individualism and Social Responsibility

Concern over deterioration of the family because of the absence of the father is at least as old as the deterioration of the French autocracy in the 17th and 18th centuries, said Dr. David K. Cohen of the Joint Center for Urban Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts. Parental absence and parental permissiveness are often said to be at the root of antisocial behavior in America. The idea seems to be that parents let their children down; and the children, therefore, lose their sense of authentic authority and authentic community. As a result, they manifest their sense of loss in a variety of manners of acting out, increasing what many people consider antisocial behavior.

There are, however, paradoxes inherent in this situation. Especially since the 1930's, children in the United States have been raised in a very democratic way, and they are apt to want the rest of their society to be like their family—democratic. When they come up against social situations they feel do not meet this criterion, they either drop out of society or explode and try to change it.

In this context, social policy is involved in two very obvious ways in the relationship between child rearing and the balance between individualism and social responsibility. First of all, child development in this country as well as other countries is increasingly subject to the sanction of the State through a great variety of public programs. Second, this is not only a tender political problem but a matter of passionate moral concern to which people react with great emotion. They either express strong moral disapproval of permissiveness as leading to antisocial behavior or they express strong approval of it as leading to the development of social concern and social responsibility. In the first view, student adolescent rebellion is considered a pathologcial condition requiring treatment. In the second, it is seen as evidence of constructive individualism and social responsibility.

This raises interesting questions about which of these views is correct, or whether either of them is correct, or whether perhaps both may be true at the same time. This last viewpoint seems entirely possible; the first two views are not mutually exclusive, because behaviors and attitudes are related to cultural and political situations as well as personal development.

For example, it appears that there has been a substantial increase in social concern and involvement among Negro American youth during the past decade. This increased social activity has led, in some instances, to a decline in delinquent behavior—although it is often associated with an increase in anti-adult and

antisocial expressions. But here we get into a question of values. Where injustice exists in a society, antisocial ideas may be not only proper but an essential element in establishing a balance between individualism and social responsibility.

Discussion

In discussions of this sort it often seems to be assumed that American human beings are all alike with the same values in relation to child rearing cutting across all social classes, a participant said. This is untrue. In its warm, nurturing atmosphere and the willingness of many people to take care of everybody's children, the culture of the American ghetto resembles the Soviet pattern described by Dr. Bronfenbrenner more closely than it resembles the culture of middle class white America.

There is often a discrepancy between what we say our values are and the way we demonstrate them in this country, participants said. Americans pay lip service to the idea that their children should be autonomous and think for themselves, but in reality there is a good deal of conflict over this in many families. Parents have a strong drive to have their children conform obediently to authoritarian standards yet feel guilty about inhibiting the freedom of their development. American youth are actually just as much conformists in their own way as the youth of the Communist countries. They simply conform to different things. Youth in other countries conform to the party line; American youth conform to parental standards, peer group values, or to the values of their churches and schools or some other social structure.

In discussion of the rebelliousness of today's youth, there is an unfortunate and misleading tendency to assume that undiscipline in the colleges grows out of lack of discipline in American homes, participants said. Child-rearing practices are held to be responsible for practically everything, from student activism to homosexuality. It is worth remembering that there are student activists in many cultures from San Francisco to Berlin and Buenos Aires to Peking. Many different modes of child rearing are found in these widely scattered countries. Thus, there must be many additional variables in the world today involved in the development of activism.

Part of the problem is a semantic one, the participants and Dr. Bronfenbrenner agreed. It is popular to say that activist youth or rebellious youth are the products of permissive upbringing. But there is more than one kind of permissiveness. There is the permissiveness in which the parent simply pays no attention to the child. He has a lot of freedom; he lives, in fact, in an anarchic family. This disengagement leads to pseudo-autonomy rather than true autonomy, and is apt to produce young people who protest *against* almost anything but are impotent about asserting a position *for* something or taking any positive, constructive action.

The other kind of permissiveness is the kind in which the child is given a considerable amount of freedom to make his own decisions but knows exactly

what the position of his parents is. It is as if they said to him, "Here I stand; but you must make up your own mind." In families of this type there is a great deal of interaction between parents and children and it is often this type of family which produces the student activists with clearly defined goals. These are the reforming rebels, the ones who say, "We don't like society as it is; but we have got to remain in it and restructure it and develop a new and better set of rules."

It would be a mistake to assume that all draft protestors belong to the first type who are disengaged from society and incapable of risk-taking. They may be incapacitated for the kind of authority system which exists in the military service and unwilling to organize their lives around an ethic of violence; but many are neither submissive nor dependent, and they are capable of considerable dissent and risk-taking. Finding a discrepancy between the standards to which they have been exposed in their homes and the authority of the larger society, they resist rather than submit, and they may engage in a high level of critical thinking concerning government policy.

THE NATURE AND MEASURES OF MORAL MATURITY

Stages of Moral Maturity

In every society he has studied, reported psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg, the same ways of thinking about moral issues are to be found. Furthermore, these evolve in several stages which follow each other in the same order in all cultures. These stages express the bases on which moral judgments are made and the types of acts in which moral value resides. They are:

(1) fearful-dependent with an obedience and punishment orientation;
(2) egoistic-opportunistic with a self-serving reciprocity orientation;
(3) conforming to please with a "good-boy" orientation based on conformity to stereotypical images of natural role behavior which will please and help others;
(4) individual conformity to rules with orientation toward maintaining the social order by doing one's duty;
(5) conformity to shareable standards, rights and duties with a contractual legalistic orientation based on majority will and welfare;
(6) conformity to conscience and universal logical principles with orientation to mutual respect and trust.

In some cultures people eventually pass through all the initial stages and reach stage six, the highest level, while in other cultures the highest level achieved may be stage two or three. The order of the stages is always the same because it follows an inner cognitive logic in the individual's comprehension of society. One concept or mode of thought always presupposes another, just as one has to

understand the concepts of addition and subtraction before he can grasp the concepts of long division.'

Each stage is more differentiated, and at the same time more integrated, than the preceding ones. The inner logic of these stages is important to both philosophical questions and psychological explanations. The central issue that must be faced is in what sense the highest stage of moral maturity is the best. In general, the higher stages of moral thinking can solve problems that are insoluble and leave the individual in conflict at lower stages. It is in part because of this conflict and the need to resolve moral dilemmas that the individual moves on to a higher stage of moral maturity. Because, by definition, there can be only one universal moral principle on any issue, there is theoretically no possibility of conflict at stage six and there is therefore no stage seven.

The concept of maturity cannot, however, be used to slide around the philosophic issue of what virtue is. In their eagerness to get on with their scientific business of finding out how virtue is acquired, psychologists have tried to get around the problem of not knowing what virtue is by viewing its definition as a "value problem" rather than a "scientific problem." They have defined it merely as whatever the child's culture thinks is good; that is, as conformity to the conventional moral standards of his culture.

Since one cannot really talk meaningfully about the teaching of virtue without some notion of what it is, there is a tendency to start with a conventional set of labels of virtues and vices and set up an image of moral character as a "bag of virtues." Different people in different cultures, or even within the same culture, toss different ingredients into their bags of virtues. One person or culture may include obedience, self-discipline, considerateness, modesty; another may stress honesty, altruism, and self-control. The well-known Boy Scout bag of virtues, Dr. Kohlberg said, requires him to be "trustworthy, loyal, helpful, friendly, courteous, kind, obedient, cheerful, thrifty, brave, clean and reverent."

But one problem as Drs. Hartshorne and May discovered in their research, is that it is impossible to divide the world into honest and dishonest people. Almost everyone cheats some of the time, and cheating is distributed in bell curve fashion around a level of moderate cheating. However, if a person cheats in one situation it does not indicate whether he will or will not cheat in another situation. It is, therefore, not a character trait of dishonesty which makes an individual cheat. If it were, you could predict that he would cheat in the second situation as well as the first.

Research has also shown that what people say about honesty has nothing to do with how they act. People who cheat express as much or more moral disapproval of cheating as those who do not cheat. "Virtue words" like honesty are used primarily to praise or blame other people. Moral words are treated as if they described reality; yet behavior looks very different from internal and external frames of reference. What seems to one person an honest expression of his feelings may seem to someone else a cruel disregard of the feelings of another human

being. What seems to one person a justifiable or even meritorious bending of the truth to achieve a worthy goal may seem clearly dishonest to another.

Anyone who wants so much to be "good" that he tries to guide his behavior by a bag of virtues ends up in wishy-washy uncertainty about what his virtues are because they often conflict with each other and make clear choices impossible. Autonomy and responsibility, for example, may be virtues, but when they conflict with each other, as they often do, they cancel each other out as virtues.

Most of us retain a lot of the characteristics of the "good-boy" type represented by Charlie Brown in the "Peanuts" comic strip. He wants to be liked and approved of, cares desperately about the virtues others attribute to him, and genuinely wants to be good—but ends up unsure what is or is not virtuous. At the same time, most of us have elements of Lucy in us. Lucy functions from a base of instrumental egoism and exchange, basing her behavior in each situation on "what's in it" for her, yet giving fair measure in a sort of hard cash-exchange.

While Charlie Brown is bound by conventional morality, the gallery of character types represented in stages one through six ranges from preconventional through postconventional, with polarities of passive and active at each level. Within the scale of conventional morality, for example, behavior ranges from rigid authoritarianism to the disciplined, reliable, salt-of-the-earth type of conventionality.

Not all people who are not bound by conventional morality fail to conform because they do not understand the conventions or are incapable of conforming to them. Some people are nonconformists because they have tried adhering to conventional morality, have found it limiting, and are striving to govern their actions by some more autonomous and rational commitment to self-chosen moral principles, as men from Socrates to Martin Luther King have done. In terms of maturity concepts, autonomy as a virtue presupposes a prior conventionally responsible character.

In other people, lack of concern for conformity to conventional moral expectations may be based not on an effort to transcend conventional morality, but on a lack of appreciation of the feelings and ideas on which conventional morality is based.

In his own research, Dr. Kohlberg said, he has defined character types completely within an internal frame of reference. That is, he studied what children thought virtue was rather than focusing on how closely they adhered to his own conception of virtue.

In taped interviews, children and young people were asked to react to 10 hypothetical moral dilemmas dealing with problems like whether a man has a right to steal a drug or food which will save his wife's life if he has exhausted every other means of obtaining it. In some cases the same children were reinterviewed after an interval of several years. Efforts were made to select dilemmas which represented universal moral conflicts rather than ones which would be found only in 20th century American culture. The answers the children gave

revealed the same form of thought regardless of the child's country of origin, although the details of the responses varied with the mores of the different cultures. Knowing the ways people think about a problem tells more about cultural differences in fundamental moral principles than knowing whether an individual behavior is approved of in one culture and disapproved of in another.

As indicated earlier, the same ways of thinking were evident in all cultures and were manifested in similar stages which evolved in the same sequence. Among middle class 10-year-olds in three widely diverse countries, stage one, the fearful-dependent stage with an obedience and punishment orientation was the most used. By age 16, stage six, representing autonomous response based on conscience and principle, was most prevalent. However, in isolated villages, the more advanced stages of moral development did not gain ascendency over the stage one and two premoral modes of thought until a much later age, and stages five and six were never achieved at all. Trends for lower class urban groups were intermediate between those for the middle class youth and those for the rural boys.

Principled morality, as represented by stage six, is not necessarily restricted to modern industrial cultures. The Athens of Socrates and the Jerusalem of Jesus were very different from modern industrial cultures, but they were certainly cultures in which principled morality developed. However, there seems to be a good deal of evidence that these stages of individual rational, humanistic morality represent a trend development, progressively dominating morality in the modern world. There is no evidence of different orders of thought in other cultures.

Every child attempts to formulate a system of moral rules for himself, and children do have a morality of their own, if adults will stop trying to instill their own viewpoints long enough to recognize it. A great deal of anthropology, psychology and psychoanalysis assumes that morality is a matter of internalization of parental or cultural standards. Actually, children have many standards which do not come in any obvious way from parents, peers, teachers, or other cultural influences. For example, to an adult the idea of killing and eating other human beings is apt to seem irrefutably immoral. To a 4-year-old with strong emotional opposition to the killing and eating of animals, it may seem morally logical to kill and eat people who kill and eat animals. This is an example of a stage-one response.

Children and adults frequently disagree on such issues as stealing a drug if it is the only means of saving the life of a member of one's family. Most 10-year-olds think it is wrong to steal in this situation, while most American adults think it is right to do so and is not, under the circumstances, an indication of dishonesty.

A child who does agree that the act is morally acceptable may believe this for very different reasons than the adults. One boy, for example, based his endorsement of the stealing on the identity of the individual whose life might be saved: it might be an important person like Betsy Ross or the President of the United States. However, when asked whether it would be better to save the life

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of one important person or a lot of unimportant people, the boy shifted his evaluative base. It would be better to save the many unimportant people, he said. Why? Because they might have a lot more money and furniture than just one man. In both of these responses, the important thing is that the boy judged the moral value of an act by its utilitarian consequences; in the first, preservation of a VIP, in the second, preservation of the greatest number of material objects. The moral error here, of course, is that the boy based his estimate of the value of a human life on the prominence of the individual or on how much furniture he owns. It is likely that he had picked up the content of some adult's values, most likely his mother's. He had probably heard, "Don't scratch the furniture. Take care of the furniture." But the value he placed on it as a result was probably quite different from what his mother meant when she said it. She didn't mean that the highest value in life is furniture, and the value of a human life is based on how much furniture an individual has.

The responses of this boy, the earlier example given, represent a stage-one level of moral judgment. In both cases the responses indicate values based on direct but immature perception of life rather than internalization of the rules and values of the culture. They are based on primitive principle of cognitive balance rather than on something learned from adults.

When he reaches stage two, with its egoistic opportunistic orientation, the child is apt to argue that it is crazy not to steal if there are no police around, and the mature adult may argue in vain about the issue being respect for property rights rather than the question of whether or not one gets caught. The child's attitude, however, is closely akin to that of the adult Nazi war criminal Eichmann, who argued with stage-two moral logic that there was nothing wrong in his having arranged for deportation of Jews because all he did was carry out orders under a fuhrer whose success in achieving leadership of 80 million people in itself proved that people should subordinate themselves to him. If this led to annihilation of 10 million Jews, he added, that would be good because they were enemies of the Reich; and in any case the people on the trains meant nothing to him and it was none of his business what became of them.

The invariant order of the stages of moral development is the result of an interaction between universal structural elements of the social environment and the native structure of the organism. People do not automatically go through all six stages as an inevitable part of maturation. Most people never achieve stage six, and the cultural environment is important in determining which ones do or don't reach any given stage. What methods of moral education are effective in any given culture depends on what behavior is valued in the culture. For example, a technique of love withdrawal may be particularly well suited to enhancing the obedience and subordination considered the highest moral virtue in some cultures, but it is not effective for developing the autonomous, rational, achievement-oriented behavior valued in cultures like our own. Furthermore, in rapidly shifting cultures, the child-rearing conditions that produce one kind of response today may produce a very different response 10 years from now.

Differences in social attitudes toward the law contribute to this environmental influence on moral development. In the United States our political-legal system of constitutional law is based on the principle of protecting individual rights. This represents stage-five or stage-six moral thinking. The way individuals participate in the legal and political system of our society varies widely, but because of the principle-oriented level on which it is organized, he must reach a stage-five level of thinking in order to be able to participate fully. Other social systems do not institutionalize respect for the law at the principle level. Many societies institutionalize an authority-maintaining orientation to the law, which represents a lower stage of moral thinking. Thus it can be seen that the stage of development required to be a participating member of society differs in different cultures.

There are, however, universal institutional structures of the social environment which are basic to moral development and are present in every society—the institutions of family, economy, social stratification, law and government. In spite of diversities in the definition of these institutions, they have common transcultural functional meanings. In order to understand morality, we must understand these basic institutions and their relationship to the stages of moral development.

The primary meaning of the words "social" and "society" is the distinctively human structuring of action and thought by role taking: the tendency to react to the Other as someone essentially like the Self, and to react to one's own behavior in the perspective of the role of the Other. The six stages basically represent different levels of role taking. This interaction of Self and Other is the structure of morality. The conflicting claims of different Selves always constitute an area of moral conflict; and the basic moral conflict is a conflict of justice, because what we mean by justice is some principle for regulating conflicting claims of individuals. The level of moral judgment is related to the moral action individuals take. When justice conflicts with the expectations of conventional individual or social authority, the individual who has reached the higher principled levels of moral judgment will resolve the dilemma in favor of justice, as in the case of political activism and civil disobedience.

Paradoxically, in the colleges, the individuals most apt to engage in such acts are rebellious students who deny the existence of universal moral values yet act upon the basis of conscience and moral principles. Thus no act can be judged to be, in itself, virtuous or vicious; the level of moral principle behind the act must also be considered.

Questions about the nature of virtue are both philosophical and psychological, and each approach is indispensible to the other in studies of morality. The psychologist, sociologist, or anthropologist who studies moral development cannot work without a philosophical conception of morality. Without this, the word "moral" is meaningless. Conversely, it is immensely necessary for philosophers to look at empirical examples of how people think about moral problems. Otherwise, they simply play endless word games about imaginary difficulties.

Traditional philosophical models of morality like those outlined in Dr. Edel's background paper are ordered in accordance with a developmental logic similar to that of the stages of moral maturity in children, Dr. Kohlberg said. Although Dr. Edel suggests that the concept of these stages most nearly approximates the juridical philosophical model, stage six, the highest developmental stage, more nearly corresponds to the hairetic philosophical model. Both emphasize autonomous choice in relation to universal moral principles. The hairetic or decision-making model is more understandable if it is seen as the developmental emergent from other forms of moral judgment. Most of the time, however, men do not make moral judgments in the way this model suggests they do, any more than people function most of the time at a stage-six level of moral maturity.

Just as the relationship between the philosophical and psychological components of moral development must be understood, so, too, must one recognize the interdependence of the individual and his society. It is impossible to speak only of the rights of nations or the social decisions of groups, for the rights of nations are inextricably linked with the rights of individuals within the nations, and group decisions are composed of the individual action choices of individuals. You cannot resolve the moral issues involved in wars between nations by assuming that there is no other standard of right than the rules and norms of the society to which you belong. In the long run, the cultivation of moral development in individuals is useful for world history, because it implies the development of some kind of universal principles by which individuals within societies can make moral decisions about what sorts of action are or are not justifiable.

Affected and Cognitive Mechanisms in the Internalized Control of Social Behavior

Moral judgment is not really very important in the total economy of socialization, according to Dr. Justin Aronfreed, of the Department of Psychology at the University of Pennsylvania. Very little social behavior is formed by evaluative moral decisionmaking processes, and internal control of behavior can and often does occur without any evaluative thought on the part of the child.

Because human beings are animals and animals are easily conditioned, punishment without any cognitive structure can produce internalized control of behavior. That is, if a child is punished when he starts to engage in a certain behavior, he quickly learns to suppress this behavior. This is true whether or not he knows why he is punished, whether or not he believes an inhibiting adult is present, and whether or not he is able to verbalize any internal standards for his own behavior.

This appears to support the concept of Pavlovian conditioning mechanisms which mediate affective emotional changes in the child by attaching anxiety to internal monitors. For example, a crawling infant readily learns that he is forbidden to touch electrical outlets, even though he has no concept of the nature of electricity nor any standard of judgment about the desirability of touching elec-

trical outlets. He simply learns that an adverse effect occurs whenever he starts to reach for the outlet. However, even a simple cognitive structuring of a situation produces more effective internal suppression of punishable behavior than is obtained when punishment is used without any cognitive structure. A child who is given a specific reason for the punishment he receives, such as being told that he is being punished for wanting to pick up toys appropriate only for older children, will show more internal suppression of behavior than one who is given no clues as to why he is being punished. This is true, however, only if the verbalization of the reason for punishment is closely related in time to administration of the punishment.

The work of Piaget, Kohlberg and others assumes a developmental sequence of qualitatively distinct stages of moral development. From this point of view, moral development and socialization are essentially synonymous. They move toward maturity with the stage of their evolution judged by the form, complexity and substance of their standards of value.

In his own view, Dr. Aronfreed said, moral behavior can be induced by very specific forms of social experience which are not the product of a sequential unfolding. There appear to be many ways in which social experience can be translated into internal monitors which the child can use to control his behavior, and they may have little to do with moral judgment.

A 5-year-old girl who was annoyed by her younger brother saw him perched precariously on an ottoman. Thinking herself unobserved, she prepared to push him off. Then she hesitated and removed a sharp-edged toy from the area of the floor where he would fall. Again preparing to push him off, she noticed that she was being watched, and sheepishly withdrew from her intention. Discussing this later, she commented spontaneously that it was wrong to have wanted to push her brother off the stool, because he might have been hurt, and she was supposed to take care of him (an idea implanted in her by her mother).

Even though the child was apparently quite capable of pushing her brother off the stool in the absence of higher authority, her removal of the sharp toy and her comment about her intended act are clearly moral and reveal the presence of conscience. That is, she knew right from wrong, but this knowledge would not necessarily have been a sufficiently strong inhibitor to make her suppress the behavior without the reinforcement of the anxiety elicited by the presence of an adult.

Thus it seems that it is the nature and strength of the affective components in a situation which control behavior rather than the stage of moral development alone. People acquire more complex moral rules as they become capable of taking into account the multiple consequences of an act, but this is in part because human beings become more complex in many ways as they mature—in language, comprehension of physical environment, understanding of social roles. But the fundamental properties of moral thought, such as concern for the welfare of others and a sense of one's responsibility toward them, may be induced at early

ages by social experience independently of the sequential unfolding of a natural order of moral development. At present we know little about how this translation of social experience into standards of value and internal monitors of behavior occurs.

Two Foci of Moral Development

Christian ethics tend to be characterized by a polarity which balances morality as a byproduct of maturity against morality which grows from rational adherence to moral principles, said Dr. James M. Gustafson, Professor of Christian Ethics at Yale University. Distinctions are often made between morality which is the expression of intentions or conscience internal to the individual's outlook toward life, and morality governed by objective obligations and responsibilities to a community or moral order.

Traditionally, Roman Catholic ethics has emphasized that behavior is morally right or wrong to the extent to which it conforms to an objective moral order developed through the authoritative teaching of the Church. Currently, some writers feel the Church should encourage people to act on the basis of inner moral maturity rather than mere adherence to an external moral order.

Theoretically, there should not have to be tension between these two poles. If people were conditioned by a Utopian environment to meet their obligations in a way consistent with the environment, they would internalize values which would meet this requirement. But we do not live in a Utopian environment, and we are conditioned by many opposing forces. Or, if we accept the traditional concept that persons will be motivated to behave in a moral fashion by the natural law governing their "true" nature, there should be no dissensus between their behavior and the moral order. But people are not always motivated to behave this way.

Under the romantic concepts of traditional Protestant ethics, the problems of maintaining moral order should disappear when people are stimulated by a revivalist or pastoral therapist to have "Love in their hearts." But, of course, not all people have love in their hearts; and if they did, it is doubtful that this would be enough to settle the question of what they should do under particular sets of circumstances.

A good deal of contemporary moral philosophy and theology tends toward the practical inference that moral actions should be governed by relatively objective rather than absolutely objective moral principles. These principles can be tested by whether they can be generalized and universalized and whether they are rationally consistent with each other. Actions are governed and explained by their purposes, which are, in turn, subject to rational justification according to moral principles.

Behavioral scientists tend to explain actions in terms of antecedents; that is, motivation, and to assume that moral actions are the expression of what people have been conditioned to become. Philosophers and theologians are more apt

to explain actions in forward-looking terms; that is, intentions and purposes. This polarity of emphasis impinges upon the problems usually discussed under the headings of determinism and free will.

The implication is that behavioral scientists would assume that research should focus on how people become what they become, while the research of moral philosophers and theologians would emphasize moral principles and how they affect purposes and intentions which in turn affect actions. Behavioral science studies of moral development would range from hard determinism to soft determinism, while philosophical and theological studies would range from soft determinism toward libertarianism. The determinist would study conditions out of which certain actions would grow more or less naturally. The libertarian would study how moral principles affect self-determination.

Dr. Kohlberg's work incorporates both of these foci of moral development. His notion of maturity includes both the stages of moral development through which individuals pass and the bases of moral judgment or the criteria one would use to justify his actions. Kohlberg's stage six describes the individual who has so internalized commendable moral principles that he lives them out of his own autonomy. His personal subjective moral maturity is consistent with universally approved moral values. Such moral virtuosos are rare.

This implies the idea of certain objective ethics or more or less universally approved values which serve as criteria for justifying one's actions. Justice is an example. We would assume that a person whose behavior is oriented around a value as universally approved as justice would be more nearly the kind of person we would approve of than someone oriented around a less universally approved value. This raises questions about what moral beliefs, principles, and values should be taught as well as how they enter into the determination of particular acts.

The obedience and punishment orientation of Kohlberg's stage one seems to fall lower on the scale of moral development than the stage-six conformity to universal logical principles. But within this orientation, also, there are value variations. How much good or evil comes out of an obedience-punishment orientation depends on what moral principles underlie the resulting behavior. Even within the obedience-punishment framework, the Nazi Eichmann would have worked less havoc on the human race if his conduct had been determined by different beliefs.

Moral research cannot avoid questions of normative ethics, and both of the foci described above are involved in normative judgment. Research confined to one focus or the other cannot do justice to human experience involving moral actions. Both conscious and unconscious motives must be considered, as well as the ways that they affect beliefs, principles, emotions, intentions, actions, habits, and character. It is impossible to conceive of moral development which does not involve both the internal processes of progressive moral maturity and the external principles which affect behavior.

Discussion

The presentations of Drs. Kohlberg, Aronfreed and Gustafson triggered many questions and much discussion. In addition to looking at the philosophical bases of morality, what other factors must the behavioral scientist consider if he is to understand moral development, participants asked. Is morality universal over time? What are the effects of the era in which something occurs? For example, what is the effect on moral unity of the sense of closeness and interrelatedness among nations made possible by the ease of communication in the 20th century, as opposed to the isolation imposed in earlier centuries by the lack of quick, easy communication? How does the moral influence of the tribal unit of ancient Greece compare with the tribal unit of the contemporary ghetto?

Societies and their systems appear to go through stages of development similar to those of individuals, participants said. For example, the development of law can be traced through such stages as the tribal unit; Athenian or city law; imperialistic, social contract, and individualistic law. The Code of Hammurabi was based on a concept closely related to the stage-one obedience and punishment orientation described by Kohlberg, with status the deciding factor in measuring the crime. The master who struck a servant committed a slight offense, while the servant who struck a master committed a grave offense. Moses introduced the concept of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth in protest against the prevailing law and moved beyond this stage toward a concept of greater equality: a servant's eye was the same as a master's eye, and a master's tooth was the same as a servant's tooth.

A child moves on to a more advanced stage of moral development as his horizons expand and he is unable to meet his needs at the level at which he has been operating. So do societies. When an individual moves more rapidly than the society of which he is a part, he may end up being cast into the pit like the prophet Jeremiah, being forced to drink hemlock, or being crucified or shot.

The fact that an individual moves from one stage to another does not necessarily mean that he transcends the earlier stage, an anthropologist suggested. It is still there, inside of him, at the unconscious level. Nor does the failure of individuals or nations to move beyond a certain stage necessarily imply that they are arrested at an inferior level. To interpret their termination of advancement this way only means we are judging by personal standards of value different from theirs.

There is a stage that precedes Kohlberg's phase one, a psychiatrist said, and a dialogue that precedes the mother-child dialogue. This has to do with the role of individual constitutional makeup in the evolution of moral and value systems. Take, for example, the child endowed with a large amount of energy. He has to be on the move all the time, and this is not balanced by an ability to stop himself, so we call him hyperactive, impulsive, distractable, aggressive, destructive. He reaches for an object but knocks it off the table, so he is called destructive. He goes to pat somebody and the pat becomes a slap, and he is called aggressive.

So he begins to evaluate himself, to have a dialogue with himself, and he says, if I accept the standards of conduct that people want me to function around, that means I am bad. Or even worse, he says, I can't help it; I am helpless—and helplessness is the worst feeling an individual can have, and he has to protect himself from it. So he says, if help isn't available, I will deny my helplessness; I will say I wanted to break the object, or I wanted to hit some one. Sometimes he carries it a step further and says to himself that he did it because it is more pleasurable to break things and hurt people, and his value system begins to take shape accordingly.

Another example of the influence of individual constitutional makeup is the brain-damaged child who is often able to think only in rigid, concrete terms. This reduces his flexibility and makes it difficult for him to make the kinds of choices and shifts in behavior necessary to adapt to the moral and value systems with which he is presented by the community.

The acquisition of morality does not take place just in terms of individual ego-psychology. Personality is imbedded in and can only be conceived of as part of a larger social matrix. A child does not move from one stage of moral development to another unless he goes through certain socializing experiences outside his immediate family kinship group. One cannot reach stage six without some reliance on the wisdom of others. One must be part of a decisionmaking kinship network.

Can a normative scheme of individual moral development be used to find some common ground between nations that are in conflict, participants asked. General rules are quite empty, and formal principles are osseous. They are not even successful in resolving conflicts between individuals or between groups like management and labor. The vacuous possibility of having a perfect principle about which there would never by any conflict is wonderful, but utterly irrelevant. Is there really any such thing as a natural, universal law of ethics?

There are, Dr. Kohlberg replied, important cultural differences in what are called moral values. The limited data that are available suggest that these are not differences in ways of moral reasoning; they are perceptions of different concrete rules. Bullfighting is right in Spain and wrong in the United States. But the line of reasoning people use to reach their decisions on any given issue is much the same in different cultures.

When and how does a child make distinctions between what is moral and what is immoral, other participants asked. Is the effort to make decisions by finding likenesses and unlikenesses in disparate situations just a question of inner logic and the sequential stages of moral maturity, or are there other factors involved? Why are some people unable to learn how to move from one stage to another? Which parent is the principal transmitter of values in different societies? In the United States, it appears that the mother is the principal transmitter. What can be learned about how parents transmit their moral values to their children? How do people learn out of their past experience to make creative decisions? In other words, how do people solve moral problems?

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Conflict is the key element, Dr. Kohlberg replied. A slum kid who is a stage-two egoistic opportunist will not move out of stage two if everything in his personal world fits this "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" model. He will move on only when he has some examples of people who act in ways he can't explain in terms of self-interest. Some children can be moved up one stage by getting them arguing over concrete moral dilemmas with children in the next stage upward. The major types of experience that lead from one stage to another are roletaking, the level of general social experience and inputs, parental and peer influence, and recognition of the inadequacy of his current level in helping him achieve his goals.

Generally speaking, any type of conflict that leads the individual to feel a discrepancy between the problems he faces and the means he has for solving them tends to motivate him to move to the next level of moral development.

STUDIES OF PSYCHO-SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND MORAL CHARACTER

The Relationship of Kinship Patterns to Violence

The behavior patterns of a society are heavily influenced by its predominant kinship patterns, said Dr. Francis L. K. Hsu of the Department of Anthropology, Northwestern University. If we are to understand the differences in various societies, we need to identify what it is in the elementary kinship system—which consists, essentially, of ourselves, two parents, and whatever number of siblings we happen to have—that relates to our behavior in the larger sense. What is it in the psychological orientations created by our kinship patterns which make us functioning, operative members of our society, and what are the effects of these orientations on the development of the society as a whole over time? For example, is it possible that some kinship patterns tend to generate greater potential for violence than others?

His own definition of violence, Dr. Hsu said, is any physical or verbal movement by an individual or group that is unexpected and threatening to another individual or group and which requires immediate action in response to the threat. Within this context there are many types of violence, ranging from the kind of action that results when you feel a friend has betrayed your confidence and you have to do something about it, to the massive, all-out-kind of violence represented by the Crusades. There are many intermediate types of violence in the spectrum.

All human societies have violence. It is inherent in all human social organizations, from a direct relationship between two human beings to violence involving all segments of a society. Most anthropological studies of social patterns have not looked deeply enough into the effects of kinship relationships. They deal with topics like patrilocal residence or mother's brother's authority. This is like

trying to understand how good or bad nutrition affects the development of the human body by studying beef goulash and chop suey as entities instead of the chemical elements or vitamins contained in each. Only when this analytical step is taken can one identify the common elements in such disparate foods as goulash and chop suey which affect body development in particular ways.

We need to translate kinship into its component elements or combinations of elements that affect behavior, and see how these may be related to kinds of behavior conducive to violence.

For this purpose we can analyze kinship in terms of structure content, dyads, and attributes. Dyads are two-person relationships: father-son, mother-daughter, brother-brother, husband-wife, and so on. There are many combinations. Attributes are the intrinsic and characteristic requirements of a dyad.

According to his own hypothesis, Dr. Hsu said, each type of dyad has certain intrinsic attributes. For example, an employer-employee dyad has such attributes as hours of employment and rates of pay. But these attributes are inapplicable to the romantic dyad of a man and a woman who are thinking about getting married. In the latter situation the prospective marital partners do not ask each other how much they are going to do for what, or how long they will be involved in it, and ask for references from previous spouses or lovers.

In each kinship system there are different dyads, but some are more important than others and assume dominance. In the United States, by and large, the kinship system is dominated by the husband-wife dyad, while the Chinese kinship system is dominated by the father-son dyad. The attributes of the husband-wife dyad are discontinuity, exclusiveness, sexuality, and volition. The attributes of the father-son dyad are continuity, inclusiveness, asexuality and authority.

In any culture, even though many dyads exist, all other dyads in the kinship system will converge in the direction of the dominant dyad, and this affects the strength and quality of the attributes in the other dyads. For example, since the husband-wife dyad is dominant in the United States and this dyad has the attribute of volition rather than authority, authority is weakened in the parent-child dyad. The American father who tries to put his foot down authoritatively usually ends up with it in his mouth. The Chinese father, on the other hand, can lay down the law with impunity, not only to his son but to others, because the Chinese culture is dominated by the father-son dyad of which authority is an attribute.

Many questions are being raised about this hypothesis of dominant dyads. How can the attributes of various dyads be identified? How is it determined which dyad is dominant in any given culture? Do some kinship systems have twin dyads or no dominant dyad at all? Why does a particular dyad dominate in a particular culture? Is the dyad hypothesis applicable to all societies? How long has the present dyad dominance prevailed? These are some of the problems in Dr. Hsu's ongoing research with a number of colleagues.

In the present instance, Dr. Hsu said, he wished to examine whether the husband-wife dyad which predominates in the United States is more generative of

violence than the father-son dyad which predominates in China. This has nothing to do with whether violence is good or bad, moral or immoral. The question is, simply, is one of the two kinship patterns more generative of violence than the other?

In his opinion, Dr. Hsu said, the husband-wife dyad is more generative of violence, because in this kinship system the charateristic nature of the human relationships is one of replacement. In the father-son kinship dominated society, the characteristic nature of human relationships is additive. This is the contrast between the attributes of exclusiveness and inclusiveness.

Replacement means once you have started a relationship, you have to forget about what preceded it. In American culture, when you get married, you are expected, for the most part, to sever your emotional relationship with your father and mother. In China, on the other hand, you simply add your marital relationship to the parent-child relationship. That setup may even include a couple of ritual fathers and mothers and some uncles and aunts.

The one-to-one relationship of exclusiveness is characteristic of many aspects of American life. For example, in China the ritual-father/ritual-son relationship expands to include all members of both families; in the United States it is an exclusive one-to-one relationship between two individuals. Monotheistic Christianity is essentially a one-to-one relationship, while the Chinese religions are additive, with many gods to be appealed to for different types of need—for favorable marriages, for good crops, for relief from epidemics. The Chinese lack the idea of a clearly defined congregation. Even the doctor-patient relationship and housing patterns in the United States function on this exclusive, replacement basis. If you have gone to one doctor, you can't go to another unless he refers you. In China, you go to as many different doctors as you please, even though they may all be practicing the same kind of medicine. In the United States, everything is zoned; only certain types of houses can be built in certain areas. In China the rich live side by side with the poor.

This separation extends into age segregation in the United States. Parents and children have exclusive sets of pleasurable activities. They are expected to have their major friendships among their peer groups. This results in discontinuity and a lack of community of interest.

These are, according to Dr. Hsu, some of the sources of conflict. This conflict becomes acute when American parents, having trained their children in the attribute of volition or independence of action characteristic of the husband-wife kinship dyad, also attempt to exercise the authoritative attribute characteristic of the father-son dyad. "We must defend Viet Nam," the parents say. "You young people go fight." In the Chinese tradition, the son may take the father's place in prison or die for him if necessary. The latter kind of command would have been commensurate with the Chinese kinship system, but not with its American counterpart where children are brought up in a tradition of volition and independent thinking and do not see that the parental generation has the right to

make such demands. They protest, and the draft served as a catalytic agent which brought about protest against all kinds of things, expressing general dissatisfaction.

The peculiarly warped emphasis on sex in American society is a further reflection of the dominance of the husband-wife kinship dyad. In Chinese culture, dominated by the asexual father-son dyad, sex is simply something people do, just as they have to eat. Sex is neither enshrined and worshipped nor feared as so dangerous that it will take over everything unless rigidly excluded and denied. But the very denial of it makes it permeate every aspect of American culture. Sex is the most violent of emotions, and frustrated sex is one of the things most apt to lead to violence of one sort or another.

It is the pervasive consciousness and fear of sex that causes discrimination against professional women in the United States, Dr. Hsu said. Although women in China for centuries were considered inferior to men, Chinese men are able to accept competent, powerful professional women much more easily than American men can. Americans can never separate professional competence from sexual identity, and this heavily sexual approach affects employment, professional life, politics—every area of American life. The Chinese couldn't care less what their politicians look like or how they sound. Americans expect their politicians to have sex appeal.

The difference between the husband-wife dyad and the father-son dyad can even be seen in the differences between the Western and Eastern versions of the story of the Deluge. The story of Noah contains many sexual overtones, and the exclusiveness and discontinuity characteristic of the husband-wife dyad is evident in what Noah did. There is no reference whatever to Noah's parents; and in the old versions of the Bible, the story reaches its climax in the sharp conflict of Noah with his son who has observed him committing "an abominable act."

The Chinese version of the story of the Deluge, on the other hand, shows the attributes of the father-son dyad. The Emperor appoints a minister to control the flood. He tries for 9 years and fails. The Emperor, feeling the failure to be his own, turns over the throne to a successor. The new Emperor banishes the flood control minister but appoints the latter's son in his stead. The son labors for 13 years to control the flood, so busy that he passes his wife's door three times without entering it. But in the end he controls the flood, thus vindicating his father, and is rewarded when the Emperor names him as his own successor. He vindicated his father. Here we have all the attributes of the father-son dyad: authority, inclusiveness, asexuality, and continuity.

We need to rethink our theories of human existence. We are inclined to think in terms of individual individuals: entirely separate, unrelated to others. We trace individual development, as Kohlberg has done, through its various stages.

But no human being is individually individual. Everyone has intimate associates; everyone is part of numerous social relationships. There are many levels to our being, from the innermost core of the unconscious and preconscious

which we cannot communicate, to the inner consciousness of things that we can communicate but do not wish to reveal to others, and the outer consciousness which we can communicate readily to others. This is the level where social personality begins. Beyond it lies our relationship with our intimate culture and society—our spouses and parents and children and best friends. Then comes our operative society and culture—employers, employees, neighbors; people who affect us directly but not intimately. At the next level is the wider society and culture containing tremendous numbers of people and things that we have nothing to do with. At the outermost level of being—like the last concentric circle in a pond, is the outer world where we create scarcely a ripple and which is far away from the inner core.

At a minimum, all of us are interrelated with other human beings at the outer conscious and intimate social levels of affective functioning. This is what it means to be human. If you function only at the innermost levels, you go crazy. If you function only at the outer levels of a world without intimate relationships, you are lost.

It is at the two middle levels (one inside the individual and one in association with his intimates) where the kind of kinship system is crucial. These are what make life worthwhile for every individual.) If you are reared in a father-son dominated system, you will develop little compulsion to leave that system. In that case your need to replace your old relationships is small and you do not have to substitute alliances in the outer levels for it. Your need for intimate human relationship is not threatened. On the other hand, if you are reared in a husband-wife dominated system you have no alternative but to leave your root human relationships. In that case chances are that your compulsion to search for alliances in the outer levels will be great. But in the process your need for intimate human relationships is constantly threatened because social ties in the outer levels are much more brittle than in the kinship system. Consequently Americans, in spite of their avowed desire for independence, fear nonconformity most (and also hate it most in others). Their real fear is rejection by the precariously built circle of intimates and they see nonconformity in others as a threat to their precarious human relationship. In such a situation many individuals get hung up on relationships like the Ku Klux Klan or the White Citizens Council. Even though some of these individuals have changed their minds about the goals and methods of such clubs they may still not be able to break loose from them, since such alliances are the only intimacy they possess. To break free, to do the nonprejudiced thing, may threaten the whole basic human framework of their security such as it is. The idea of individual conversion is futile. Men are not free agents in relation to their intimate social relationships. Nor can they shift independently from one kinship pattern to another or forsake kinship patterns entirely. These will continue to be a factor in whatever changes occur.

But the father-son dominated kinship system, in contrast to the husband-wife dominated one, is less generative of internal impetus to change. In countries like China, where children have conformed for a long, long time to the authori-

tarian structure of the father-son dyad, the impetus for change comes only from external forces. Consequently, throughout Chinese history one sees rebellions but no revolution. Rebellion means changing the top (and sometimes high middle) level personnel of the government but not changing the basic ideas and ways of life among the common people. It was productive of interdynastic wars and civil disturbances but no reorganization of the districts and the villages and no inquisitions to root out heretic ideas. The latter type of change—the revolutionary type, was what characterized the West since the beginning of historical times. Speaking in a broader vein, Dr. Hsu maintained that there have been more long stretches of peace in China than Europe has ever known. Furthermore, there were no Chinese crusades to punish or convert the infidels and no significant Chinese emigration took place because of political or religious dissension. Not until after 1842, when the West first knocked down China's doors, was there any idea of the need for changing, or attempt to change, the Chinese system of government, ethics, kinship, and education. All basic social, political and religious changes are generative of more violence than changes merely in the superstructure. There are other aspects to this analysis which are impossible to cover in this short space.

The attributes of the Western husband-wife dominated kinship system are much more conducive to internal impetus to change—and therefore to violent eruptions—because the changes desired are basic to the social organization and because such changes threaten more individuals' elementary feeling of security. When that happens, the individual tends to act violently, to find a scapegoat, if he cannot solve or alleviate his problems.

If the changes that come are to be constructive, Dr. Hsu concluded, what is really needed is an intellectual revolution in thinking about what an individual is. We have to recognize that the individual can never operate on a totally individual basis, but must inevitably function, at all times, as part of a kinship network or of some other social network. Violence is not rooted in the individual; it is germinated in interpersonal relationships of which kinship is the most important.

Value Ratings in Kinship Dyads

Dr. Thomas Milburn, Associate Professor of Psychology at Northwestern University, described briefly some of his recent attempts to apply the Rokeach value scale to the kinship dyads described by Dr. Hsu. Dr. Milburn's research interests center around cognition crisis behavior and management. In relation to Dr. Hsu's hypotheses, Dr. Milburn attempted to identify the characteristics of the dominant dyads and which characteristics were rated more or less important by the study subjects, who were upper middle class college students. The values listed included such concepts as freedom, happiness, beauty, wisdom, inner harmony, mature love, self-respect, broadmindedness, honesty, respectability, ambition, capability, social recognition, national security, cleanliness, and obedience.

Although it appears to be true that the husband-wife dyad predominates in the United States, there is quite a spread of family dyads which do affect value preferences, Dr. Milburn said. The sex of the study subjects also affected the value preferences. Although indicating that it would be premature to draw conclusions about the findings at present, Dr. Milburn said that the results are interesting enough to suggest that the effort continue.

Chains of Causation in Interpersonal Relationships

In his cross-cultural research on developmental cognition and cognitive differentiation, Dr. Douglass Price-Williams, Chairman of the Psychology Department of Rice University, is coordinating a five-group study in Norway, Holland, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, and Houston, Texas. There are, Dr. Price-Williams said, a number of ways the social scientist can systematize the content of interpersonal relationships. He can start from a nonpsychological relationship such as kinship, as Dr. Hsu has done, and ask what kinds of psychological behavior follow logically from this relationship. Second, he can start from empirical observation of psychological behavior between people and note from what kinds of structure they emerge. Third, he can start from logical relationships between people which he forms into classes which he then applies in observational-experimental tests designed to determine balance and imbalance in the relationships. Fourth, the scientist can examine interpersonal relationships simply as sets of traits like sociability, autonomy, conformity and so on, without trying to formulate them into larger systems or classes.

What distinguishes Dr. Hsu's approach from that of other researchers is his connection of the psychological content of behavior to social position as represented in the kinship dyads in a chain of causation. This approach has been largely overlooked by social psychologists, perhaps because of preoccupation with Western nuclear family relationships. The categories need to be clearly specified and capable of being tested empirically.

We also need to explore the extent to which the influence of the kinship model can be extended. For example, how do the behavior patterns of a given family authority system extend into and influence political authority systems? Family authority patterns are more apt to be generalized in homogeneous cultures than in heterogeneous cultures. At the present time, there are many gaps in our knowledge of interpersonal relationships and their effects on behavior. The chains of causation need to be identified more specifically than we have yet been able to do.

Discussion

There is a certain seductive appeal in Dr. Hsu's hypothesis, said a participant who, like Dr. Hsu, is of Oriental background; but it requires some fantastic logical leaps. If we accept the idea of the husband-wife dyad being more generative of violence than the father-son dyad, the next logical step would be to

say that Asiatics are less violent than Americans. It is questionable whether we can equate violence or nonviolence with particular cultures. The Dutch, for example, were very warlike in the 16th century, yet today are a very peaceful people. China, on the other hand, has been in perpetual warfare most of the 20th century, and wars involving India, Indochina, and Japan have been devastatingly violent. The Chinese culture as described seems idealized and more like the China of a quarter of a century ago, and the cultures of countries undergo constant change.

Discontinuity in patterns of rule transmission appears to be one factor which affects the level of adjustment in a society, another participant said. The recent history of Israel, for example, illustrates the effects of such discontinuity. Fifty percent of the immigrants have come from Arab countries which have father-son structured cultures. When these families come to Israel, they are exposed to the Western husband-wife model which prevailed in Israel before this large wave of immigration. And, significantly, it is the children of these immigrant families who get into all kinds of difficulties and swell the delinquency statistics. The important question then becomes, how can a society deal with this sort of phenomenon? In Israel, where it appears that the transition from father-son kinship dominance to husband-wife dominance has created problems, the children are put in a collective upbringing situation where the peer-peer relationship lessens violence and produces adherence to rules.

The kinship analysis is a rather static framework, participants continued, if not, indeed, reductionistic. It is vulnerable to the selective fallacy of picking out only examples that verify the point one wishes to make. For example, why should one select the legend of Noah from Genesis, the First Book of Moses, as illustrative of the husband-wife dyad and attribute a whole pattern of life to a group of people over many years on the basis of this one story? What about Exodus, the Second Book of Moses, which is almost entirely a father-son genealogical listing?

All scientific exercises have to be selective, Dr. Hsu replied. A geologist won't get very far if he just goes out and looks at every rock on the beach. The tests of validity of one's selectiveness are the impact a particular situation has had and whether someone else can advance selected material that inconveniences your own thesis. The Second Book of Moses has not become a central theme in either Christendom or Judaism and is therefore of no consequence. The Noah story, on the other hand, has been of crucial importance. Similarly the Virgin Mother and Holy Infant theme is important in all forms of Western religious art but the role of the father is nearly nonexistent. In research we often have to concentrate on something small which can be argued objectively, even though we must also keep in mind the relevance of this small exercise to the larger structure.

There are a number of assumptions imbedded in Dr. Hsu's theory which draw heavily on classical Freudian concepts which have now been largely discarded,

a participant said. There seems to be an assumption that early kinship experiences are going to have an automatic effect of a particular kind regardless of intervening variables. The attributes of a father-son or mother-daughter relationship change over the years. The relationship is redefined both in the eyes of the mother and in the eyes of the child as he gets older. If the effects of the early relationships are so crucial, how can one account for social change? There are positive developmental aspects of growth which cause people and growing children to structure and restructure their situations and their relationships.

A child perceives his world in a certain hierarchial form which is affected by the kinship patterns of his society, another participant said. Furthermore, he continues to perceive these formal structures in much the same way when he becomes an adult, even though the world in which he lives may have changed a great deal during the intervening years. Dr. Hsu's paradigm is concerned almost exclusively with formal properties of behavior and predictions about how they affect a culture, but we need to question whether the changes in a culture are not changes of both the content and formal properties of behavior.

In talking of violence, another participant suggested, it is important to remember that there is more than one kind. One is instrumental and has positive overtones. The other is expressive and is negative in its consequences. Instrumental violence is a planned, strategic type of violence for the sake of social change. Expressive violence is the explosive, destructive, riot type of violence. The psychological feeling tones which lead to violence—frustration, alienation, resentment, anger, even divine discontent—are more salient than the structural patterns of kinship relationships.

The values which are primary in a society at any given time are a consequence of both the social system and the position of the family within that system, participants said. The family may have primary responsibility for transmitting values to children, but the values originate in the society itself. Therefore, as society changes, will not concomitant changes within the family structure be necessary? For example, can a father-son dyad adapt enough to produce value patterns and personalities appropriate for an industrialized society? If one looks at kinship systems as described by Dr. Hsu as the only influence in the acquisition and development of values, one leaves out all the other influences in a pluralistic society. But recognizing that we live in a complex and rapidly changing world, the important question really is what means we can devise to deal with the child or the adult in terms of conflict resolution.

A Negro group studied in Chicago showed an inversion of kinship patterns from that shown by white middle class college students, a participant reported. The mother-daughter dyad predominated with the husband-wife dyad far down the list.

This is what creates special problems for American Negroes, Dr. Hsu said. They live in a predominantly non-Negro society where the dominant dyad is different. A lot has been said about the masculinity problems of Negroes. They

have these problems because their predominant kinship dyad stresses different values from those in the mainstream of American society where masculinity is played up strongly and all men are supposed to be out playing baseball or something similar. Negroes must therefore either integrate or separate. Until recently, they had no choice. The only means they could see of grappling with their problem was to integrate. Now they are beginning to develop a sense of separate identity and trace their ancestry back nine generations in Africa.

Several participants, both Negro and white, retorted sharply that they are getting tired of hearing about the supposed emasculation of the black male. Until recently, Negroes had few black male models other than a few great scientists, educators, and singers. But the leaders of the African nations are very male men. With their emergence, American Negroes are beginning to feel proud of their identification with their mother country. Where we go from here—whether the culture will move into full acceptance of American blacks as Afro-Americans, just as German Americans or Norwegian Americans are accepted, depends on whether white Americans will look and really see, listen and really hear, what is going on around them.

The professional sports field in America—the outstanding model of masculinity—is dominated by black men. But more important, the Negro male in America is assuming his male leadership role in race relations and other related American problems. The trouble with most studies of Negroes is that very few of them are related to any kind of truthful wholeness. They deal with isolated aspects of Negro culture and behavior, in part because the Eastern or African tradition of reliance on feelings and collective unconscious wisdom is something Westerners distrust. In the Western tradition, there is over-reliance on intellectualism as opposed to feelings.

There is now a tremendously exciting revolution going on in the black community—a pride in blackness is developing. But this is not something that came about overnight. It has come about because Negroes have tried the integration route and have been foiled at every attempt. Black people have been viewed as alien bodies, creatures of soul and feeling but innately lazy; inferior because of the particular subculture of which they are a part. The white community tends to look at the Negro family and see differences from white families, and discredit the Negroes for being different. It is time we got over this and recognize that the white nuclear family is not the only acceptable model and the Negro family does not necessarily need to be just an imitation of a white family.

There is a new thrust among American black men in the emergence of the sense of black consciousness. It is becoming a good thing to be proud of your race. Black consciousness is an affirmation of the Afro-American way of life. It is the re-creation, the positive choice of a subculture that has its own validity. It is a mother-country identification which is being reflected in new ways of dress and a new sense of pride in blackness. This is one of the basic moral movements in America today. At the same time, there is a realization that American

Negroes are Westernized in some degree and that in order to have any comfortable modus vivendi, they must come to grips with the fact that they are a synthesis of what is African and what is Western. This attempt at synthesis is posing a great challenge to black people and to Western values.

ADAPTATION AND VALUE DEVELOPMENT

Self-Process in Protean Man

Drawing on his experience in studying Chinese "thought reform" or brainwashing and the psychological effects of the atomic bomb in Japan, Dr. Robert Jay Lifton of the Yale University Department of Psychiatry, presented what he called preliminary thoughts about some phenomena he has observed in the course of his research on Japan, China and America. In exploring these ideas, Dr. Lifton said, he has attempted to combine the perspectives of depth psychology and history. This is an approach greatly influenced by the psychoanalytic tradition, especially the work of Erik Erikson; by anthropological and sociological studies; and by work which emphasizes man's dependence on symbols and images.

In the study of psychology and history, one is often both hindered and helped by the Freudian tradition. Freud's ideas are a liberating path to the future, but also, paradoxically, tend to impose a rigid conceptual framework which results in a shutting off of new concepts. What one needs to do, therefore, is not to deny this paradox but put it to use.

A universally shared style of self-process is emerging in contemporary life, Dr. Lifton said. This derives from the three-way interplay responsible for the behavior of human groups: the psychobiological potential common to all mankind at any particular moment in time; those traits given special emphasis in a particular cultural tradition; and those related to contemporary historical forces. This third factor appears to be playing an increasingly important part in shaping a self-process which results in development of a new kind of man, "protean man." The key concept in this process is change and flux in the psychological patterns of the individual.

We know from Greek mythology that Proteus was able to change his shape with relative ease—from wild boar to lion to dragon to fire to flood. But what he found difficult, and would not do unless seized and chained, was to commit himself to a single form—a form most his own—and carry out his function of prophecy. We can say the same of protean man, but we must keep in mind his possibilities as well as his difficulties.

If we understand the self to be the person's symbol of his own organism, then self-process refers to the continuous psychic re-creation of that symbol. This concept moves away from words like "character" and "personality," which suggest fixity and permanence, to convey the specific idea of flow. The protean style of self-process is characterized by an interminable series of experiments and

explorations—some shallow, some profound—each of which may be readily abandoned in favor of still newer psychological quests. The pattern in many ways resembles what Erik Erikson has called "identity diffusion" or "identity confusion," and the impaired psychological functioning which those terms suggest can be very much present.

But the protean style is by no means pathological as such. It may, in fact, be one of the functional patterns of our day which may deeply affect all areas of human experience. It extends to political as well as sexual ideas, to the holding and promulgating of ideas, and to the general organization of lives. It is a psychological style which relates significantly to the way people search for values.

There are two general historical developments which have special importance for creating protean man, Dr. Lifton said, *psychohistorical dislocation* and the *flooding of imagery*. Psychohistorical dislocation is the break in the sense of connection men have long felt with the vital and nourishing symbols of their cultural tradition—symbols revolving around family, idea systems, religions, and the life cycle in general. In our contemporary world one often perceives these traditional symbols as irrelevant, burdensome, or inactivating; and yet one cannot avoid carrying them within and having one's self process profoundly affected by them.

The flooding of imagery is a phenomenon produced by the extraordinary flow of postmodern cultural influences over mass communications networks. These cross readily over local and national boundaries, and permit each individual to be touched by everything, but at the same time cause him to be overwhelmed by superficial messages and undigested cultural elements, by headlines, and by endless partial alternatives in every sphere of life. These alternatives, moreover, are universally and simultaneously shared—if not as courses of action, at least in the form of significant inner imagery.

McLuhan tends to see almost all of the revolutionary change taking place in human behavior as direct response to the flooding of imagery through the mass media. He does not deal with the historical dimensions. But really, the only way the media can have the profound revolutionary effect they do is through their impact upon individual psychohistorical development.

The reflection of these two influences in the protean style, as expressed in America and Europe, can be illustrated by examples from psychotherapeutic work with patients and from observations on various forms of literature and art, Dr. Lifton said. One of his patients, a gifted young teacher, spoke of himself in this way:

> I have an extraordinary number of masks
> I can put on or take off. The question
> is: is there, or should there be, one
> face which should be authentic? I'm
> not sure that there is one for me. I
> can think of other parallels to this,

> especially in literature. There are representations of every kind of crime, every kind of sin. For me, there is not a single act I cannot imagine myself committing.

He went on to compare himself to an actor on the stage who "performs with a certain kind of polymorphous versatility." Here he was referring, slightly mockingly, to Freud's term "polymorphous perversity" for diffusely inclusive (also protean) infantile sexuality. The teacher then asked:

> Which is the real person, so far as an actor is concerned? Is he more real when performing on the stage—or when he is at home? I tend to think that for people who have these many, many masks, there is no home. Is it a futile gesture for the actor to try to find his real face?

This patient who had sought therapy for psychosomatic complaints, was by no means a happy man, but neither was he incapacitated. Although we can see the strain with which he carried his "polymorphous versatility," it could also be said that, as a teacher and a thinker, and in some ways as a man, it served him well.

In contemporary American literature, Saul Bellow is noted for the protean men he has created. In *The Adventures of Augie March*, one of his earlier novels, his picaresque hero says, "I touched all sides, and nobody knew where I belonged. I had no good idea of that myself . . ."

A distinguished French literary spokesman for the protean style—in his work and in his life—is, of course, Jean-Paul Sartre. It is because of his protean traits that Sartre seems much an embodiment of 20th century man. An American critic, Theodore Solotaroff, speaks of Sartre's fundamental assumption that "there is no such thing as even a relatively fixed sense of self, ego, or identity—rather there is only the subjective mind in motion in relationship to that which it confronts." He characterizes Sartre as:

> Constantly on the go, hurrying from point to point, subject to subject, fiercely intentional, his thought occupies, fills and distends its material as he endeavors to lose and find himself in his encounters with other lives, disciplines, books and situations.

In his autobiography, Sartre says:

> Had my father lived, he would have lain on me at full length and crushed me . . .

> I move from shore to shore, alone and
> hating those invisible begetters who
> bestraddle their sons all their lives.
> I left behind me a young man who did
> not have time to be my father and who
> could now be my son. Was it a good
> thing or bad? I don't know. But I
> readily subscribe to the verdict of
> an eminent psychoanalyst: I have no
> Superego.

Such symbolic interchangeability of father and son becomes necessary in a rapidly changing world in which the sons must constantly "carry their fathers on their backs" and teach them new things which the fathers, as older people, cannot possibly know. Sartre's judgment of the absent superego, however, may be misleading, especially if we equate superego with susceptibility to guilt, for protean man is not free of guilt. What has actually disappeared—in Sartre and in protean man in general—is the *classic* superego, the internalization of clearly defined criteria of right and wrong transmitted within a particular culture by parents to their children. Protean man requires freedom from that kind of superego—he requires symbolic fatherlessness—in order to carry out his explorations. But this does not leave him free of guilt; it merely causes his guilt to take on a different form from that of his predecessors.

To be sure, one can also observe in contemporary man a closing off of identity or a constriction of self-process which seems to be precisely the opposite of the protean style. It is a straight-and-narrow specialization in psychological as well as intellectual life, and a reluctance to let in any "extraneous" influences. This kind of "one-dimensional" self-process has a reactive and compensatory quality which is out of harmony with today's society. Until relatively recently, no more than one major ideological shift was likely to occur in a lifetime, and that one would long be remembered as a significant individual turning point accompanied by profound soul-searching and conflict. But today it is not unusual to encounter several such shifts within a year or even a month. Idea systems and ideologies are embraced, modified, let go of and re-embraced with an ease that stands in sharp contrast to the inner struggle which has, in the past, been associated with such shifts.

Yet one encounters in protean man a strong ideological hunger. He is starved for ideas and feelings and values that can give coherence to his world, but his taste is toward new combinations. He yearns for the absolute, yet what he finds acceptable are images of a fragmentary nature. Political and religious movements are likely to experience less difficulty in convincing protean man to alter previous conditions than they do in providing a set of beliefs which can command his allegiance for more than a brief experimental interlude.

Intimately bound up with this flux in emotions and beliefs is a profound inner sense of absurdity. Protean man perceives surrounding activities and beliefs as profoundly strange and inappropriate. This stems from a breakdown in the relationship between inner and outer worlds—that is, in the sense of symbolic integrity—and is part of the pattern of psychohistorical dislocation mentioned earlier. Man is a symbol-forming organism. He has constant need of a meaningful inner formulation of self and world in which his own actions, and even his impulses, have some kind of "fit" with the "outside" as he perceives it. When he cannot find this, he takes refuge in mockery.

The sense of absurdity, of course, has a considerable modern tradition. It has been discussed by such writers as Camus as a function of man's spiritual homelessness and inability to find any meaning in traditional belief systems. But in the post-World War II world, absurdity and mockery have taken more extreme forms and have, in fact, become a prominent part of a universal life style. Their most vivid expression can be found in the work of "pop artists" who embrace the materials of the everyday world, celebrating and even exalting them, boldly reasserting a creative return to representational art and a psychological return to the "real world" of things. At the same time, everything the pop artist touches, he mocks. "Thingness" is pressed to the point of caricature. He is indeed artistically reborn as he moves freely among the physical and symbolic materials of his environment, but mockery is his birth certificate and his passport. This duality of approach is formalized in the stated "duplicity" of Camp, a poorly defined aesthetic in which, among other things, all varieties of mockery converge under the guiding influence of the homosexual's subversion of a heterosexual world. It is, however, the mockery and the subversion which are key elements in the protean style, rather than the homosexuality per se.

Current slang abounds with expressions which reflect this sense of the absurd. The "dry mock" has replaced the dry wit; one refers to a segment of life experience as a "bit," a "caper" or a "scene." One seeks to "beat the system," or else one "cops out." The thing to be experienced, in other words, is too absurd to be taken at face value; one must either keep most of the self aloof from it or lubricate the encounter with mockery.

A similar spirit of mockery has come to dominate literature and social action as well. Among the "black humorists" is found a trend which R. W. B. Lewis has called a "savagely comical apocalypse" or a "new kind of ironic literary form and disturbing vision, the joining of the dark thread of apocalypse with the nervous detonations of satiric laughter." For it is precisely death itself, and particularly threats of the contemporary apocalypse, that protean man ultimately mocks.

The relationship of mockery to political and social action has, perhaps, been less apparent, but is equally significant. There is more than coincidence in the fact that the largest American student uprising of recent decades, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement of 1965, was followed immediately by a "Filthy Speech

Movement." While the object of the Filthy Speech Movement—achieving free expression of forbidden language, particularly of four-letter words—can be viewed as a serious one, the predominant effect was that of a mocking caricature of the movement which preceded it.

But if mockery can undermine protest, it can also enliven it. There have been signs of craving for it in major American expressions of protest such as the Negro movement and the opposition to the war in Vietnam. The flagging attention of protestors becoming gradually bored with the repetition of their "straight" slogans and goals can often be revived by the use of satires and parodies. During the past decade, Russian intellectual life has been similarly enriched by a leavening spirit of mockery. Chinese leaders are now, in the reactivation of thought reform programs, fighting a vigorous but ultimately losing battle against a similar spirit in their country.

Closely related to protean man's sense of absurdity and his spirit of mockery is his deep suspicion of nurturance, which he is apt to perceive as counterfeit. Involved here is a severe conflict of dependency, a core problem of protean man. Dr. Lifton said this concept first occurred to him several years ago when he was working with survivors of the atom bomb in Hiroshima. These survivors felt themselves in need of special help, yet they resented whatever help was offered them, equating their need for help with weakness and inferiority, and feeling tainted by their experiences.

Considering the concept more broadly, Dr. Lifton said, he found that this equation of nurturance with a threat to autonomy is a major theme of contemporary life. As traditional institutions of society break down, protean man seeks replacements wherever he can find them. As he turns to the large government, business, and academic organizations which society holds out as substitutes for traditional sources of nurturance, he feels in them a threat to his autonomy, and the same can even be true of the intense individual relationships in which he longs to anchor himself. He may therefore perceive both types of relationship to be counterfeit. But the obverse side of this tendency is an expanding sensitivity to the inauthentic, which may be just beginning to exert its general creative force on man's behalf.

In his effort to transcend his feelings of absurdity and his conflicts over counterfeit nurturance, protean man turns to technical achievement. The image of science itself, however, as the ultimate power behind technology and, to a considerable extent, behind contemporary thought in general, becomes difficult to cope with. Only in certain underdeveloped countries can one find in relatively pure form the expectations of scientific-utopian deliverance from all human want and conflict which were characteristic of 18th and 19th century Western thought. Protean man retains much of this utopian imagery but finds it increasingly undermined by massive disillusionment. More and more he calls forth the other side of the god-devil polarity and sees science as a purveyor of total destructiveness. This profound ambivalence creates an extreme psychic paradox;

science, the very force he still feels to be his liberator from the heavy burdens of past irrationality, also threatens him with absolute annihilation. But this paradox may be—and perhaps already has been—the source of imaginative efforts to achieve new relationships between science and man and, indeed, new visions of science itself.

Protean man suffers considerably from guilt, but often without awareness of what is causing his suffering. He feels a vague but persistent self-condemnation related to the symbolic disharmonies of his life—a sense of having no outlet for his loyalties and no symbolic structure for his achievements. This is the guilt of social breakdown, which includes various forms of historical and racial guilt experienced by whole nations and people, both the priveleged and the abused. Rather than creating a clear feeling of evil or sinfulness, it takes the form of a nagging sense of unworthiness all the more troublesome for its lack of clear origin.

Protean man experiences similarly vague constellations of anxiety and resentment. These, too, have origin in symbolic impairments and are particularly tied in with suspicion of counterfeit nurturance. Often feeling himself uncared for, even abandoned, protean man responds with diffuse fear and anger. But he can neither find a good cause for the former, nor a consistent target for the latter. He nonetheless cultivates his anger because he finds it more serviceable than anxiety, because there are plenty of targets of one kind or another beckoning, and because even moving targets are better than none. His difficulty is that focused indignation is as hard for him to sustain as is any single identification or conviction.

Involved in all of these patterns is a profound psychic struggle with the idea of change itself. For here, too, protean man finds himself ambivalent in the extreme. He is profoundly attracted to the "mode of transformation"—the idea of making all things, including himself, totally new. But he is equally drawn to an image of a mythical past of perfect harmony and prescientific wholeness, to the "mode of restoration." Moreover beneath his transformationism is nostalgia, and beneath his restorationism is his fascinated attraction to contemporary forms and symbols. As he constantly balances these elements amidst the extraordinarily rapid change surrounding his life, the nostalgia is pervasive, and can be one of his most explosive and dangerous emotions.

It is this longing for a "Golden Age" of absolute oneness that sets the tone for the restorationism of political Rightists—the still extant Emperor-worshipping assassins in Japan, the Colons in France, and the John Birchites and Ku Klux Klanners in this country. In more disguised form it also energizes the transformationist totalism of the Left which courts violence and is even willing to risk nuclear war in its elusive quest.

All of these conditions cause radical impairments to the symbolism of transition within the life cycle—the rites de passage surrounding birth, entry into adulthood, marriage and death. Whatever rites remain seem to protean

man shallow, inappropriate, fragmentary. He cannot take them seriously and often seeks to improvise new ones with whatever contemporary materials he has available, including cars and drugs.

Perhaps the central impairment is that of symbolic immortality—of the universal need for an imagery of connection which predates and extends beyond the individual life span. The idiom of this immortality may be biological (living on through children and grandchildren), theological (through a life after death), natural (in nature itself which outlasts all), or creative (through what man makes and does). But in any case, this sense of immortality is a fundamental component of ordinary psychic life. It is now being profoundly threatened both by simple historical velocity, which subverts the idioms in which it has been traditionally maintained; and by nuclear weapons which, even without being used, call into question all modes of immortality. Who can now be certain of living on through children and grandchildren, even through teachings or kindnesses?

Protean man is left with two paths to symbolic immortality which he tries to cultivate, sometimes pleasurably and sometimes desperately. One is the natural mode we have mentioned. His attraction to nature and concern at its desecration has to do with an unconscious sense that, in whatever holocaust, at least nature will endure—though such are the dimensions of our present weapons that he cannot be absolutely certain even of this.

His second path may be termed that of "experimental transcendence"—of seeking a sense of immortality in the way that mystics always have, through psychic experience of such great intensity that time and death are, in effect, eliminated. This may be the larger meaning of the "drug revolution" and protean man's hunger for chemical aids to "expanded consciousness." Indeed, all revolutions may be thought of, at bottom, as innovations in the struggle for immortality and new combinations of old modes.

Protean man's affinity for the young—his being metaphorically and psychologically so young in spirit—has to do with his never-ceasing quest for imagery of rebirth. He seeks such imagery from all sources: from ideas, techniques, religious and political systems, mass movements, drugs; or from special individuals of his own kind whom he sees as possessing that problematic gift of his namesake, the gift of prophecy.

The dangers in the quest seem hardly to require emphasis. What perhaps needs most to be kept in mind is the general principle that renewal on a large scale is impossible to achieve without forays into danger, destruction and negativity. The principle of "death and rebirth" is as valid psychohistorically as it is mythologically. But however misguided many of his forays may be, protean man also carries with him an extraordinary range of possibility for man's betterment—or more important, for his survival.

Within the context of a conference on the acquisition and development of values, several particularly important issues must be brought up in regard to

protean man, Dr. Lifton said. First, is the protean tendency just a stage of life or part of the psychology of adolescence? No, it is not. Although these patterns are most intensively experienced and expressed in young men and women in late adolescence and early adulthood, one finds protean elements of great significance in older people as well.

Second, do women as well as men show the protean pattern? Protean tendencies do exist in women, but they are somewhat less marked than in men, perhaps because so much is demanded of women as nurturers. Yet in contemporary American culture, women are protean in that they are expected to be expert in multiple roles—as seductress, nurturer and knower. In addition, woman might be said to cover greater ground than protean man because for her the biological dimension includes childbirth and child rearing as well as the functions which are common to both men and women.

Third, has protean man existed in the past, or is he a new phenomenon? Protean man, in some form, emerges during any period of rapid social change to create a new style of life. The classic example is Renaissance man. But the tendency is particularly strong now because the breakdown of traditional cultural symbols is so rapid and so extreme, and because the mass media create a rapid shifting of symbols beyond anything that was possible in earlier times.

Fourth, if flux is a principal characteristic of protean man, what remains constant? This is perhaps the most important question of all from a psychological standpoint, for man must have elements of continuity in his life. In fact, it is often the continuity and stability of values that make possible the changes that take place. I encountered many Japanese activists, for example, who would spend their days in the streets storming the barricades of society, and yet would live at home in an intimate relationship with their parents, particularly their mothers. The mothers may not understand what the problems are all about that so concern their sons; but they assume that if their sons are involved, the cause must be pure and just, and they support them in it. This intimacy and continued dependency and closeness give the young men a framework of stability and encouragement within which to embrace their symbols of change. If one is to be an innovator, he has to have some point of anchorage. And finally, the protean quest itself—the constant seeking for change—forms a chain of consistency.

Discussion

Dr. Lifton's paper appeared to rouse reactions ranging from the enthusiasm one feels at finding the missing piece of a jigsaw puzzle to the confusion and hostility one feels when unfamiliar ideas impinge upon familiar ones. Some participants appeared to have understood that Dr. Lifton considered protean man to be a serious pathological problem in human development; others understood his presentation as an exciting commentary on man's eternal search for a better way of life.

Is Dr. Lifton somehow suggesting that adaptation is incompatible with integrity, an educational psychologist asked. Scientists concerned with psychological development view the capacity for adaptation as an asset which accounts for man's ability to survive and advance. Clinicians often find what they are looking for. Is Dr. Lifton seeing certain traits as characteristics of protean man which are, in fact, peculiar to all persons? If so, these traits have no particular relevance to development of this protean quality he has described. What is the incidence of this phenomenon? Has Dr. Lifton fallen into the trap of perceiving pathological conditions in a few patients as a dominant trend in man? Is not the real issue whether the adaptive qualities in man shall continue to function only to enable man to survive, or whether we should specifically turn our attention to finding ways to use these qualities for human betterment?

People who show changes of the sort described by Dr. Lifton represent a very small minority, a philosopher said, although a number of traits mentioned as characteristic of protean man do show up in people from time to time. But this does not necessarily mean the people have changed; it is the world that has changed. People have to make up their minds what they desire in a complex world and to what they are averse. Young people would like to be told what is right and what is good. When they have to find out by inspecting the situation themselves, they are unhappy about it; but that's the way the world is. It is not surprising that they have difficulty developing permanent attachments, since the world is unstable and the data they have about it is ambiguous. It is no wonder political commitments are superficial and subject to change.

People are faced with many more choices and opportunities than were earlier generations; naturally they are confused. But the changes they make as a result of all these factors have no particular implications for the way people's values change; there is no reason to assume that they form some kind of a connected pattern or syndrome. There is nothing in what Dr. Lifton said that suggests that psychologists should revise their theories of learning and motivation and value acquisition. The standard motivations psychologists talk about are present in everybody. Whether they are present in any peculiar degree in people Dr. Lifton characterizes as protean is not clear. He has told us how people come out in the circumstances in which they live today, but what he said sheds no light on the mechanics by which they get there.

The statistical incidence of people who show protean tendencies very vividly may be low, Dr. Lifton said, but many outwardly stable people carry this pattern internally. This internal imagery affects their thoughts and actions and is apt to emerge externally at certain points in their lives. Together, the eight or nine themes of protean man—his mockery, his guilt, his quest for imagery and rebirth, etc.—form an interconnecting constellation, although not all of the themes are necessarily present in each individual.

Some of the participants have questioned whether this has any significance; whether we should take seriously the idea of a new kind of man emerging or

whether these patterns represent merely restatements of old principles. In his opinion, Dr. Lifton said, the traditional stances and assumptions of depth psychology need to be reexamined. There is a tendency to remain closed off and disregard behavioral changes which are, in fact, of great importance. For example, nothing in classical depth psychology theory could have predicted the directions the Negro revolution is taking, because classical theory relies on static principles of adaptation which ignore the historical dimension. Many basic motivations within people do remain constant, yet behavior may change in important ways as a result of many external influences.

It sounds rather as if some of the examples of "protean man" Dr. Lifton described are people that most psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists would consider clinically sick, a psychiatrist said. They would say a character disorder is involved here. This individual is obviously immature, unstable and has authority and dependency problems. He is acting out all over the place. With Dr. Lifton's imaginative and enlarged approach to human problems based on so many fascinating books, how does one deal with the old, perhaps simpleminded question of whether a person is normal or abnormal? How does one decide whether he needs to be broadmindedly tolerated or given some appropriate kind of clinical treatment?

Perhaps, answered Dr. Lifton, this vision of psychiatry needs altering. At a recent professional meeting at which the concept of protean man was presented, members of the psychiatric community went along with the idea of exploring the phenomenon rather than simply reducing it to a character disorder. There were, in fact, evidences that the psychiatric community is sufficiently shaken up about the world that it is beginning to do some very useful rethinking of questions about its own relevance to the world. As for whether protean man is sick or healthy, bad or good, he can be either. He may move toward sickness when he loses commitment and anchorage, and may, indeed, collapse. Or his constructive, healthy side may make him capable of extraordinarily imaginative jumps in ideas and behavior. The protean style offers possibilities for many kinds of leadership to emerge.

Protean man's protest is nothing new, an anthropologist said. This is an old trend in Western civilization. Western civilization consists of a whole series of outstanding protests which brought about drastic changes. The Japanese or Chinese individual who goes from one thing to another is, however, quite different from the American protean man who is only doing in accelerated form what his ancestors did. He is protesting. The Japanese or Chinese man may have an identity problem at times, but this does not lead to protest against the culture. Nor is the deviant individual in China or Japan seen by others as a subversive element. In the West, anything that is different is apt to be viewed by the majority as subverting something. Individuals need two kinds of anchorage, personal and cultural, and the protest of the American protean man is part of the search for cultural anchorage which is characteristic of Western culture.

Much of the Chinese revolution was created by student ferment and protest, Dr. Lifton replied. This does, perhaps, reflect Western influence, but cross cultural influences are part of our world environment. This phenomenon of universal, shared history removes much of the esoteric sense that East Asia is remote from the psychic struggles of the West.

Does Dr. Lifton view protean man as someone who lacks a system of values and commitments, another participant asked, or is it a case of his having commitments but not being able to find economic, political and social systems that will fulfill his value systems? Is he primarily seeking ways of expressing his basic commitments? And finally, if he found new ways of expressing his commitments, would he be satisfied, or would he go on seeking change just for the sake of change, as an artist explores new systems of art for art's sake?

Having followed a group of 60 individuals from birth through an average age of 36, a research psychologist said, she has found that there is a certain continuity of life styles which starts early and continues into adulthood. At the same time, a great deal of change is observable, and there is more freedom to change life directions than there was in the past. For example, one young man took a computerized "interest" test when in his teens. It indicated a high level of interest and concern for people and for doing something to help them. He majored in business administration in college and became a successful salesman but was unhappy in the work; so he returned to college and became an elementary school teacher. Then he shifted to teaching science, but was still not happy. He took further training and became a school counselor, which brings him to the kind of interests that had shown up on his tests as a teenager. Thus he showed both a great capacity for change and a high level of internal consistency or continuity.

You can look at a person's life at any particular moment, a participant said, and see that he has to relate to many different situations and many different people. Each change in his environment makes a different demand on his inner life. Yet one of the most striking things one can observe in studies of ghetto children, who have so many different types of encounters, is the consistency of their style. They are consistent in the way they ask questions, in the timing of their reactions to the investigators, in their basic conceptual schemes. One child may be much concerned with a kind of "legal" frame of reference; another with problem-solving—but each one tends to be consistent about the kind of role he plays. This suggests that protean man may be consistent in his motivations and cognitive style, not only over time but at any one time in all his different types of engagements.

Internal feelings are now being expressed in different kinds of external behavior than formerly, a participant said. This is particularly notable among Mexican-American and Negro males in the United States. It brings about a need for change in how people react to these behavioral changes. Values are built on the reactions of people to other people, and in these crucial times there needs

to be a new level of acceptance. One pattern of behavior is not the pattern for all people, and they have to learn to communicate with and understand each other.

In order to understand the link between changing values and changing social structures, we need a new frame of reference for interpreting innovation, a sociologist said. We need to distinguish between conscious and unconscious values. The conscious values of a group constitute a kind of mean, but some members of the group are more conscious than others of new values. Their individual consciousness indicates the scope and limits of the possible consciousness of the group. The gap between the conscious and the unconscious values—or the "real" and "possible" levels of awareness—is a good indicator of change in the social structure. Social structures can only be meaningful if they are functional. Consequently, dysfunction of an old social structure may be the sign of the necessary birth of a new structure.

Man's constant shifting and seeking for values is not just adaptation. It is growth, said a nun whose principal field is psychology. Protean man seeks values not because he lacks values but because he must find new values suitable for the changed and changing world in which he lives. Renaissance man was a kind of protean man, yet perhaps the reason he was different from today's protean man, and his values were different, is because values are always in context. Essentially values mean relationships to things and to people. Renaissance man was bombarded with new relationships to the many things afforded him by science. Today, man's problem is different. In the unique historical situation in which he finds himself, protean man must seek constantly to find relationships in common with other men—and the one common thing all men share is their relationship to death. As he moves toward this unavoidable death situation which he shares with all other men, and toward what he hopes lies beyond, he questions and seeks values which will give him a sense of direction. In today's world, he finds, these values must relate less to things and more to people. We are more often in groups; we are in constant communication with other people through the mass media. So the difficulty protean man faces is working out his relationships with other people so that he is neither alone nor submerged in the group but contributes to it.

Perhaps woman is more stable and less protean than man because she has from the very beginning, by her nurturant role, been more concerned with relationships to people than man is. As the nurturer, woman is the principal transmitter of the values which may help children move toward Kohlberg's brand of autonomy.

This conference has asked questions about values within too narrow a context, a theologian participant said. Values have been discussed only in terms of man and society, kinship systems and the like. Protean man is a symbol of what we get when we ask the question this way. Society is in rapid change; therefore protean man changes, and he has no anchor point. There is a more ancient transcendental tradition which would expand the context in which value questions are asked to intlude the scheme of nature, man and God.

What exactly, is the meaning of protean man for the development and acquisition of values? What do we mean by values? We must question not only man's relationship to society, the soil out of which he rises; but also his relationship to the ground of his being, to whatever gives him meaning, dignity, weight, and a sense that all is not vanity.

Protean man has longings in two different directions, toward the secular society and toward nature, just as we find in the hippie movement an effort to rediscover man's place within the context of nature. Perhaps these longings represent a premature closure of the context in which questions of values are considered.

The fact that the conference has examined behavioral phenomena does not mean that its focus has been narrowly nontranscendental, Dr. Lifton replied. Indeed, the concept of behavioral change is closely related to transcendental issues. The redefinition of theory about protean man's death imagery remains consistent with the scientific tradition but rejects the narrow rationalistic dimension imposed by Freud's sharp distinction between the life and death instincts. It represents not a lack of concern with ethical and transcendental issues but an illumination of them within broader psychological and historical dimensions.

SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND MORAL JUDGMENT

A Philosophic Perspective

In his philosophical perspective on scientific research and moral judgment, Professor Abraham Edel of the City University of New York explored the relationship between science and ethics. The isolation of morality from the fruitful currents of scientific inquiry has given moral judgment the character of being merely expressive or emotive, Dr. Edel said. There has been a sharp conceptual dualism in both science and philosophy between *fact* and *value*, the *is* and the *ought*. This allegedly unbridgeable gap has been used to bar attempts to study the specific relationship between science and ethics. It has been assumed that science can do no more than furnish facts and means; that it is closed out of the reckoning of ends. Yet science contains values as well as facts, and ethics contains facts are well as values.

There is no reason why sophisticated philosophers or scientists should be bound by the image of a father figure who lays down stern laws and tells people what is right and proper and good for them. There is a sharp difference between integrity of moral judgment, or what we may call moral autonomy, and ethical isolationism which puts the sciences at arm's length and says that they have nothing to say which will alter the proposition that such-and-such is good, or such-and-such is right. We must not become enslaved by categories of our own making which we have developed to serve specific purposes.

The distinction of fact and value can, however, serve useful purposes. It can prevent the smuggling of values through apparently factual concepts. For example, to declare something a "need" is an apparently factual statement—yet it contains a value element in its implication that if it is not satisfied, certain *undesirable* consequences will ensue. There is actually nothing that is put before us that we cannot ask value questions about. Nothing is closed. Everything contains the permanent possibility of evaluation.

Thus the issue which faces us is not really whether we can get philosophical values from scientific facts, but whether we can clarify values through the mediation of scientific knowledge. To the degree that one permits the insights of the biological, psychological, social and historical sciences to be used, moral judgments become more definite but less arbitrary. This should not be misconstrued as saying that science can solve all moral problems. There may not be complete answers to most of our moral problems, but at least science can help us to make better rather than worse stabs in the dark.

There is no single key, no single way that science enters into moral judgment. Many tasks are involved in moral judgment, from structuring the problems and determining which moral principles are relevant, to interpreting these underlying ideas so that an effective ordering of alternative choices can be developed for achievement of the path that is chosen. There is no touchstone of rationality by which one can say this is the correct and rational judgment. An accumulation of knowledge, methods, techniques and criteria developed over the whole long history of ethics and human knowledge is involved, and the type of answer you get depends on which of these are selected and how they are combined. For example, when Mussolini invaded Ethiopia he justified his conquest by saying that all the other great powers had colonies but Italy had none, and that this was unjust. Obviously, some moral structurings are better than others for determining what should happen in a given situation; and the question is, how can we decide which principles are relevant.

As Dr. Flacks emphasized in his analysis of certain activist movements on the American scene, to decide what is at issue is not merely to evolve a bare description of the situation but to analyze it in terms of the best available psychological, social and historical understanding. This initial structuring of the problem plays the same role in ethics as does the way a question is formulated in science, yet it is often overlooked how influential in moral judgment this structuring is. The correctness of the structure chosen hangs on the extent and scope and systematic character of the scientific knowledge applied rather than on arbitrary preference.

When Dr. Stoessinger criticized our tendency to see things only in terms of right or wrong, victory or defeat, without recognizing that there are also stalemates and compromises, he was not saying there isn't any right and wrong. He was saying that you need to know how to structure the problem—what kind of problem could be solved in what way, and what formulation would be most apt to bring about the desired result.

A second task in developing criteria for the correctness of moral judgment centers around the interpretation of moral ideas. This must go deeper than interpretation merely of central ethical concepts like right and wrong, good and bad, virtue and vice. The notion of justice, for example, cannot be analyzed purely in terms of a generalized common sense idea of fairness. To analyze justice adequately as a basis for moral judgment requires analysis of the principles operative in a given society. Questions of justice have to be judged on the basis of a full understanding of the notions of property, distribution, risk, reward, punishment, and so on in a society.

Similarly, in relation to honesty we have to understand the psychological, cultural and even historical depth of the conduct that is being assessed. Hartshorne and May's *Studies in Deceit* showed the situational character of honesty. To assess what is honest, we have to know the difference in attitude in the society toward such questions as taking from an impersonal corporation and from an individual, or toward juveniles who steal a car for a joyride and an organized group that appropriates cars for resale. Failure to distinguish specific content leaves us with the paradox of the same act now right, now wrong.

Gratitude is another example. In medieval times, the concept of gratitude was tied in with a complex social matrix of feudal attitudes and their class-residue, so that ingratitude toward those upon whom one depended for safety and support was almost equivalent to treason. It is no accident that Dante placed treason as a form of ingratitude at the very bottom of the bottomless pit.

If we stay only on the surface level, interpreting moral ideas without relation to specific content, we make moral judgments without depth and with restricted relevance. To unpack the psychological, social and cultural content in the case of concepts we employ is to sharpen our criteria for more adequate judgments.

The way that concepts are ordered also affects the validity of moral judgment. We have many status notions surrounding the concepts of natural, universal, absolute, normal, and their opposites. A pervasive or universal value is thought superior to a merely local one, a moral rule that is absolute to one that allows many exceptions. A value that expresses man's nature is assumed to have a large measure of justification.

In ancient tradition, the idea that something was natural tied together a bundle of three different ideas—universality, inherence and goodness. It was felt that species had directions in which they were moving, that these directions were inherent in the nature of the species, and that the good was constituted by the direction of their action. This bundle of disparate ideas was not broken by the passage of time but by evolutionary theory; and when it was broken, it was no longer possible to say this is the way men behave universally; therefore it is right. The ethical question becomes greater when these ideas are separated. The good is left to stand on its own without the reinforcement of universality and inherence, and must find its basis and relations in much more complex ways.

The concept of normal versus abnormal also has a built-in implication of status or order. If you say that a certain kind of behavior is abnormal, but have no scientific theory or data to support this statement, abnormal becomes an emotive or expressive term of vituperation. You are, in a sense, recommending conformity to a statistical norm just because a certain percentage of people do it; you are making conformity an ethical criterion. Kinsey, for example, found that a certain percentage of American males have a least one homosexual experience. He therefore regarded this as normal, with the implication that it is therefore all right. This remains a controversial question, with many psychiatrists regarding homosexuality as abnormal, and articulate homosexuals defending their way of life as a viable alternative value-set only made to seem distorted by cultural prejudice. It is, of course, possible that there are different types of homosexuality, some of which are abnormal and some of which are not. The point is, without deeper scientific knowledge, the judgment of such issues remains merely an emotional expression of attitudes and not an adequate basis for moral judgment. It may have sincerity and commitment, but without a base of scientific knowledge, it carries only the weight of liking or disliking, not the weight of correctness or incorrectness.

In considering criteria by which to judge the validity of moral judgment, we come to the concept of moral maturity embodied in Dr. Kohlberg's work. His stage six, the highest level of moral development, centers around a morality of individual self-accepted principles of conscience, which he sees as the culmination of a general intellectual developmental process. The character of stage six lies in the ability to make autonomous moral decisions. But this has to rest on more concrete principles than, say, the bare principle of justice. Unless the individual considers content, he has no guidelines for deciding which autonomous choice he should make.

This raises questions about Dr. Kohlberg's analysis of the relationship of justice to moral maturity. Quite explicitly he takes justice to be the core or essence of morality and sees it as a set of culturally universal values. Out of this he attempts to make a culturally universal definition of morality with the summit of moral development the child's ability to formulate his own moral principles.

But why should it be assumed that justice is the only framework for stage six? When Kohlberg finds that the last two stages in his developmental picture are not found in village peasant or tribal groups, does this not raise the question that these stages may be cultural specializations under particular conditions? Under different cultural conditions, could not any other virtue of high value equally well provide the moral structure for the highest stage of development?

In our own time, when exploitation has been so prevalent and the predatory elements of society so widespread, the cry against injustice has come from all corners of the globe. It is therefore natural that moral questions should be structured in terms of justice. But it is entirely possible that in other periods of history when other problems predominate, ethics would need to be structured

in terms of love or other human values and relations. If this is so, then it is a question whether the criteria of maturity should be cast in any one mold for all time. To what extent are criteria for moral maturity culture bound? How much are they a function of the particular stage of development of a particular world? Has not morality, while remaining within the domain of values, changed in the long history of mankind to embody central characteristics of different kinds of human aims and necessities?

The ways in which morality has been defined have built-in factual assumptions about the world and built-in human purposes and aims. There is no reason why the grand category of the moral should not submit to the same kind of intellectual, philosophical and scientific analysis as many other categories of human affairs. Many things regarded at one time as moral questions later come to be regarded as technical questions; just as, for example, primitive religious rituals which were meant to insure rainfall have for the most part given away to the pragmatic approach of seeding the clouds.

Just as religion has given up some of its functions to technology, so may some of the characteristic functions of morality change over time. To understand the moral at any one period of human thought in history, it is necessary to see what has been built into it of human aims and purposes and presuppositions about the world. As we refine and stabilize our concept of morality by seeing how the values that were put into it originally have combined with added knowledge, the concept itself will be reconstructed—as is any concept which is appraised in the light of experience.

Four Models of Morality

Historically, the moral has been conceived according to four different models: the goal-seeking, juridical, self-development and hairetic models.

The Goal-Seeking Model

The goal-seeking model says men have certain aims which they pursue by following certain rules of right and wrong. This model, with its emphasis on the good life as the central goal of man, dominated ancient ethics, especially in its Aristotelian form. This rather pat picture of fixed goals toward which man was striving was unsettled by evolutionary theory and thrown wide open by the picture of diversity in cultural anthropology. This expanding viewpoint was reflected during the conference in the discussion of Dr. Lifton's concept of protean man, in which questions were raised about the difficulty of deciding whether such a personality tendency is a pathological symptom or represents a viable alternative. As a result of psychoanalytical, anthropological, and socio-historical studies relating to morality, the goal-seeking model—which has served as quite a satisfactory conceptual starting point—has been expanded almost beyond recognition. No neat picture of human goals as the focal point of morality remains.

The Juridical Model

The juridical model of morality has its base in a system of laws or rules enjoined by men. It presupposes a capacity in men for discernment or reception of these laws and a sentiment for respecting or obeying them. This model, which dominates Western religious tradition, thus places the concept of obligation in the central place. In the traditional view, authority was seen as lying outside the individual in some divine source. With the work of Kant, the emphasis shifted from this outside authority to the autonomy of an individual will constrained by the sense of obligation to obey the law. Other psychological and sociological studies have altered the concept still further, bringing in the concept of voluntary obedience as a mark of respect of the social group and the concept of developmental stages of consciousness of and respect for moral rules. Kohlberg's magnificent work has carried the departure from the initial juridical model still further. It is no longer the system of rules which is emphasized but the way of handling them. Autonomy is now seen as a rational decisionmaking process which extends beyond the narrower moral domain of mere obedience to rules. Psychoanalytic studies of conscience and anthropological studies of variations in patterns have led to a still further breakdown of the juridical model.

The Self-Development Model

The third model of morality thinks in terms of the self and its qualities and development. Static forms of the model like those of the ancient Stoics who stressed self-control by the inner self gave way to dynamic forms which stressed self-realization and growth. Goals and rules have a derivative place in this model, expressing the basic stand on the self and its qualities.

The static form stressed configurations of character and sets of virtues; the dynamic form general strength of the self and its process of development. Any notion of separate virtues presupposes the idea of unitary character traits. Many felt that this concept had been dealt a death blow by the Hartshorne-May tests in 1928 which showed that honesty was not a unified trait in terms of which predictions about behavior of a given individual could be made, but that it was highly situational. Similar questions might be raised and tested in relation to other traits like obedience, constancy or chastity.

But even assuming that all sorts of virtues and vices turn out to be situational and therefore lacking in scientific viability at one level of analysis, does it necessarily follow that these concepts would also lack viability at a depth level? The growth of depth psychology and the psychology of personality has raised questions about whether there may not be personality elements or configurations sufficiently stable to provide an internally unified basis for judgments that something is morally desirable or undesirable.

The question is, what degree of stability is there in this segment of the human makeup. This search for stable patterns is implicit in Dr. Bronfenbrenner's analysis of the effects of different methods of child rearing in the Soviet Union and the

United States. It might be said to have reached the Heraclitus limit in Dr. Lifton's exhibition of protean man. This work makes the point quite clearly that whether or not a concept like virtue is useful in ethical theory depends ultimately on whether there is stability in the self and its characteristics.

The long-run question is whether the use of concepts like virtue and vice will guide ethics in useful directions or into a blind alley which is nothing more than sentiment, points to no action, and provides no educational guidelines. Since the great social context for a notion of virtue is the question of what kind of persons we want the educational system to produce, the utility of the concept of virtue is tied intimately to the psychology of personality and whether stable elements of the self can or cannot be demonstrated to exist.

The Hairetic Model

The fourth model of morality is called, from the Greek term for choice, the hairetic model. This is a very prevalent model today, focusing on the whole of ethical decision and moral judgment in terms of the act of choice. Everything else—goals, laws, stable qualities of the self—is relegated to the background as things which furnish material which generate problems for choice but are not, in themselves, determinative of the conceptual framework of the moral.

In moderate forms of the hairetic model like the work of Dewey, there is the assumption that problem situations will arise constantly in human life but that they will have a definite enough structure to generate criteria for adequacy of solution. Rationality or intelligent handling of decisions is the key concept. In Sartre's more extreme form of the hairetic model, the focus is more on freedom of choice than rationality of choice.

Individuals are being thrust more and more into situations in which they must make choices. Some fly from the responsibility, some accept it, some demand it; but whichever way an individual responds, the problem is still there. Questions which were once automatic are now more complex. Take, for example, patriotism. The rise of civil disobedience and of ideas like those contained in the Nuremberg decisions have thrust upon the individual the responsibility for choice even about obedience in that most obedient of all fields, the military. Individual ethics are thus being recast by the sociological and historical bases of the times in which we live. The individual can no longer be sure that his acceptance of certain values in the past is sufficient reason for subscribing to them at present. He is called upon repeatedly, as each new situation arises, to make an authentic, autonomous moral choice. With goals and desires in flux, patterns of selfhood under constant strain, moral rules too broad and clumsy, and the world, man and human life inextricably complicated, morality—at least in the current existentialist view—is left in the role of anguished decision with total responsibility and little guidance.

None of these four models of morality now appears to provide adequate answers, Dr. Edel said, but all provide fertile starting points for additional research.

Defining the Concept of Values

Much of the work of Dr. Kurt Baier, of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Pittsburgh, has centered around the history of moral and social philosophy, moral psychology, and the analysis of the concepts of ethics. One of the principal problems in studying values, Dr. Baier said, is the lack of universal agreement about what values are or what morality is. There is, at present, no scientific working model of morality. We are forced to resort to pre-scientific terms like values and moral judgment which have many different connotations. The issue is further confused by the strong emotional concern which surrounds any effort to clarify questions about values. Indeed, it is possible that values may turn out to be a bogus concept from a scientific point of view, but it is so firmly established that it would be very hard to get rid of it.

Since the concept is here to stay, we need to clarify what we mean by it. By values, what we usually mean is certain states of affairs toward which individuals or societies hold favorable attitudes and in whose beneficial effects they believe. But a favorable attitude alone does not turn something into a value. It becomes a value only if the individual devotes some of his resources to bringing about or maintaining the desired state of affairs. If he says justice is one of his values, but does nothing toward its realization, he is merely paying lip service.

The concept of values has a rational element; in theory, at least, values represent attitudes based on relevant evidence and can be modified by the discovery of relevant facts. Without the rational element, values are merely prejudices or fetishes. There are different kinds of values. There are values with moral overtones such as justice, equality, selflessness, truthfulness, freedom and the common good. There are also non-moral values such as privacy, orderliness, beauty, clean air. Thus it can be seen that values are not necessarily synonymous with virtues, although the two words are often used interchangeably.

Nor are values synonymous with norms. Norms are directives. They spell out behavior patterns with sufficient precision that we can measure the performance of an individual against the norm. Values are the evidential backings behind norms. A law prohibiting mail order sale of guns establishes a norm which is backed by such values as nonviolence, personal security and social peace. The soundness of a norm therefore depends on such factors as whether conformity to it makes realization of its underlying values possible and on whether the values themselves are sound.

Morality also has a different meaning from values. Morality is a more complex notion than values. Men may have a variety of values, but they have the same moral standing. That is to say, they are all equal morally in the same sense that all men are equal before the law. They have the same moral claims to praise or reward and the same vulnerability to moral judgments and sanctions. This is not to say they all have the same moral worth. Two men may be equal in terms of the moral bases on which they are judged, yet their moral worth may be quite

different. A Jack Ruby clearly does not have the same moral worth as a Jack Kennedy.

How, then, are values and norms related to morality? Moralities are, in effect, systems of norms. They are social practices designed to exert pressure on the members of the society to conform to the code of the group. However, morality is something both individuals and groups can have or not have. They may have customs, conventions and taboos—mores which are taken to be sacrosanct and not subject to rational scrutiny—and yet lack morality based on the complex preconditions already described, in which the norms are backed by values which give soundness to judgments.

Since children customarily acquire morality by being trained in the morality of some environmental group—family, peer group or society—we must distinguish between individual and social morality. Each individual is affected by the group moralities of his society. He is subject to negative public sanctions for wrongdoing. But in addition, the individual learns to apply private moral sanctions—condemning himself, feeling guilty, and experiencing the impulse to reform—when he knows he has violated the group code. Thus both public and private moral sanctions enhance public morality.

However, individual morality may differ from public morality in certain ways. The individual's moral code may contain elements not present in the group code but which he thinks should be there. For example, many of the followers of Martin Luther King, believing that violence is wrong, believe that this should be an element in everybody's moral code. The individual's moral code may also include precepts which he adopts purely for himself without any feeling that they should be part of a universal code. Which precepts are part of the public moral codes and which are part of individual moral codes, and what sanctions should be applied to those who violate them, is often a matter of disagreement within a society. But the complex relationship between individual and public morality is an absolutely essential one which must be considered in developing better models from which social scientists can operate in their research.

THE PRODUCT OF THE CONFERENCE: CONCEPTS FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION

In response to Dr. Edel's presentation, which had touched on so many of the high points of the conference, participants reviewed their thinking about the meaning of the conference and the ideas it had triggered about the most productive ways of studying moral development and the acquisition of values. There seemed to be a general feeling among participants that many new doors had been opened to them and that an interdisciplinary dialog had been begun which might profitably be continued in the future. Concepts about the acquisition and development of values had taken on a new breadth for many of them, and,

according to one participant, the sponsorship of this conference by the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development had, in itself, underscored one of the most important points. Value development can only be understood as part of the total cycle of human development and human relationships, he said. An infant has many rights and no responsibilities. The parents, however, have many responsibilities, including a responsibility to permit the infant to enjoy his rights. They also have rights. They have a right to demand of society the opportunity to fulfill their responsibility toward the infant.

But the infant doesn't remain an infant. He becomes a child, and he has to give up some of his freedom and some of his rights because, as he develops, he demands responsibilities. As he moves into adolescence he is in a state of confusion in which he swings back and forth, sometimes insisting upon his rights and sometimes cherishing his responsibilities. Then this infant who has become an adolescent becomes an adult and a parent with an infant of his own, and the whole cycle has been completed. A sense of this recurring cycle of infancy to parenthood, with its interrelationships of rights and responsibilties, is crucial to the understanding of the development of values.

The question of whether there is any particular moral system which a rational person would choose might be a good problem for research, other participants suggested. It should, however, be approached with an open mind and without prior assumptions about what is good or bad, moral or immoral. In the long run, it is the confrontation of differences that provides perspective and the growth of knowledge.

To grasp all aspects of problems of moral development, other participants added, it is necessary to look beyond individual development and individual human relationships to the total social structure. This requires an interdisciplinary approach. If moral theory is to be made clinically applicable, the investigator needs to extend his frame of reference to include not only the findings of philosophers, social scientists and psychiatrists but also of biological ecologists, historians and archeologists, and members of many other disciplines. This is the only way he can understand the total affective environment within which the social group must make its decisions.

What we are faced with in research on the acquisition of values is an interrelating network of psychological social and substantive questions, a psychiatrist said. Most of what is being called research on morality or values is only research on a particular aspect of these concepts. During the conference, some participants talked in terms of responsive behavior; that is, ways to inculcate the superego function. Others talked in terms of developmental stages; but these may, in fact, be stages of conceptual capacity which may or may not be related to morality. Others talked of identity problems encountered when one must make choices; but this can hardly be considered a moral dilemma for a person growing up in a culture where he is not asked to make the choices we, in our culture, call moral. Still other participants talked of the social network and the influence of social

groups as a dimension of morality. And finally, there was much discussion of how we define what our values and morals are that are going to be handled by the social-psychological complex. In order to do effective research, it is necessary to sort out these separate threads and see where they go, in what ways they are discrete from each other, and in what ways they relate to each other.

When the social, behavioral, biological, philosophical and other disciplines work together, other participants said, they all learn from each other. There is often a tendency to assume that the theological approach has the answers and the secular, humanistic approach has the problems. If anything is clear on the contemporary scene, it is that both have problems and both are looking for answers to the same kinds of questions. So there is plenty of room for working on questions from many different approaches. Conflicts do not lie along the lines of religious-secular divisions; they center on problems which are often common to both. Nearly every kind of philosophical objective, if it can be proved at all, will ultimately turn out to be translatable into some possible direction of scientific inquiry. Conversely, every kind of scientific presentation has an impact upon clarification of the concepts with which the philosopher deals.

One of the greatest contributions social scientists can make to the study of morality is to help philosophers understand the structure of social systems, a philosopher said. Clearer grasp of institutional and individual roles, expected modes of behavior in particular roles, legal systems and other factors in the whole panorama of social systems would make it easier for philosophers to give useful definitions of the elements of a moral system.

One important element often overlooked in values research is the ecological factor, an anthropologist said. This was also a major missing ingredient in the conference discussions. Yet it is possible to convert a moral problem into a practical problematic situation which can be understood and dealt with through the methods of science by approaching it in its ecological, historical and cultural context. This is particularly important in studies of decisionmaking processes, in different cultures. These can best be studied in relatively isolated communities where fewer relevant variables must be considered and the total situation of the community can be encompassed in the research. The concept of culture as primarily a group problem-solving device is fruitful in research, particularly in understanding the possible alternatives a community faces through historical developments and changes in circumstances which influence its important decisions.

The impact of research in altering various social institutions must be kept in mind as work on moral development progresses. Research has, for example, had both positive and negative effects on the law, a lawyer said. Many of the findings of research in the social and physical sciences, such as those relating to alcoholism and racial segregation, have been absorbed rather readily into law and into legal practice. Others have had an unsettling effect which has left a temporary void in the way lawyers approach a problem. The findings of psychologists and psychiatrists have caused lawyers to question the justice and appropriateness of sanctions in which they had previously had complete confidence. The old simple

sense of morality which made lawyers feel it appropriate to punish a man simply because he had done wrong is being replaced by a realization of the importance of understanding all factors which affected his behavior. The result is a new emphasis on the law as an instrument of social change. This has much more affirmative connotations than the traditional, conservative view of the law primarily as a means of social enforcement.

The field of law, Dr. Edel replied, is the great model for the decision-making process. It has worked out the process in a historical way, with controversies about every side of the process—the volitional versus the evidential side. The analysis of legal process is so rich that ethics can learn a great deal from it while recognizing that ethics may not always have to have such formalized principles as does the law.

As for the effects of the findings of social science research on the law, these can serve as a kind of test of the law. If certain concepts such as the definition of insanity or the defined limits of responsibility begin to cause trouble in the course of normal legal decisions, it is time to ask whether the legal concepts need refinement. There should be a continual two-way feedback between the social and behavioral sciences and the law, as concepts are applied to specific questions and bring about certain results and the results are analyzed in normative as well as legal contexts.

Several participants pointed up special problems involved in attempting to do research on morality. The choice of a scientific or descriptive framework in which to describe a situation, in itself structures the situation and limits the moral principles which can be included in it, one participant said. If this is true, then decisions about which framework to choose have, in themselves, a certain moral component. This implies that at least some moral principles must be prescientific in the sense of underlying scientific decisions.

Another problem is that we often confuse values with skills, another participant said, and this affects the validity of research. For example, we try to teach people how to discriminate between good and bad painting or develop musical taste, but these are skills, not value judgments in any moral sense. This is true, Dr. Edel replied, but we get a better understanding of morality by studying man and his functions. We must, however, determine in what senses the study of man is really the study of presuppositions about him. It is very important to recognize the part played by our image of man, as opposed to what he is really like, and correct our image to conform to his developmental realities and possibilities.

Efforts to utilize youth in community development programs represent important opportunities for studies of value acquisition, a participant said. Within these unique laboratories the value acquisition patterns of both the youth who organize and participate in these programs and those they are attempting to help can be studied. These efforts present a challenge to researchers to supplement such social inventions with social inventions of their own which will provide

additional promising laboratories in which a variety of experiences in value acquisition can be studied. There are some problems involved, however. For one thing, it is difficult to develop clear definitions. What, for example, constitutes a healthy attitude toward race relations? There is no consensus on this; it is a very subjective area. How can we discover what family and social situations will foster development of healthy attitudes toward racial problems or community problems unless we first define what attitudes are desirable?

Another problem in values research is the effect of the value systems of the people who happen to be doing the studies. The whole research design is inevitably keyed in to the standards and beliefs of the researcher.

Still another problem is the impossibility of establishing a variety of situations for testing because many elements in the variety would be considered politically or ethically objectionable. The ethics of experimentation are often a problem in values research as well as in other types of research. Every country in the world has a different concept of the permissible limits of manipulation which affects human beings. In the United States we have created a structure of safeguards to protect the rights of individuals which seems to us to reflect a logical, proper attitude toward human life and welfare. Inevitably, these protections sometimes inhibit the kinds of research that can be done.

This, in itself, suggests some interesting research questions. What are the factors in a society which condition different attitudes toward human life, health, and welfare? Should we attempt to influence attitudes in countries where a low valuation is placed on the life or the health and welfare of human beings? If so, what techniques and procedures can be used to instill more active concern for the well being of people both in relation to research and within the broader framework of the quality of health and welfare services that are provided?

As the conference drew to its close, the participants were both weary and stimulated. One psychologist participant might have been speaking for the entire group when he said, "I feel frustrated at this point, an hour before the end of the conference because I feel deluged with concepts. There has been a proliferation of concepts, and yet I don't know how they relate to each other." Perhaps, he added, the philosophers can help the social scientists on a practical or even rudimentary level to find the meeting ground for concepts from different universes of discourse.

These many searching questions and comments have raised issues of great importance, Dr. Edel said, which can be answered only partially at the present time, but it is possible to make some general comments about them.

Categorical morality is not necessarily going to disappear completely, as some participants seemed to feel was being implied. The borderlines are, however, perhaps becoming less clear and there may be more shifts and changes in them than there used to be, just as there have been changes in our concepts of religion, health, law and so on. Perhaps the issue of finding a sharp borderline may itself become less pressing once we begin to understand various relationships more clearly.

The idea of working out formal norms for morality is appealing, but it usually turns out to have all sorts of problems. For example, it is often stressed that moral judgment should be impartial. But what, precisely, is impartiality? Many societies are based on structures in which one group of people "counts more" than other groups; for example, the in-group or the family group may hold higher status and preference than the stranger. Our concept of impartiality has our moral universalism already built into it. Hence formal norms are not antecedent to the particular morality but expressive of it.

There have been all sorts of moralities on the face of the globe. If there have been thousands of social structures and thousands of religions, there have been thousands of moralities. From a scientific point of view, the first thing is to understand them, to see both their normative structures and their relations to their societies and cultures and the problems these are facing. It then becomes possible in a common world to work for common bases of evaluation; here the intimate relation of scientific endeavor and moral judgment becomes manifest. There is no main value in terms of which such evaluation can be made. Rather there is a complex valuational base which would include such constituents as perennial goals of men, fundamental needs, and pervasive problems at specific times. Fundamental moral judgments even have to be made at times on the basis of means that are needed to solve problems—for example, such problems as how to bring about global peace or bring an end to discrimination. In such evaluation processes, every morality in the contemporary world will find that it has much to change. We find that many of our traditional virtues have to be recast; for example, our traditional notion of patriotism is too constrictive when looked at in the light of growing conceptions of individual conscience as well as growing conceptions of a global community. In general, we have to look to the perennial goals that characterize our lives and use these as the theoretical groundwork for determining where lies the center of gravity of moral effort in the modern world.

Similarly, in dealing with theoretical questions in ethics, we can learn by experience and systematic study what is adequate and what is inadequate in our formulations. For example, there are bound to be arbitrary elements in the way one describes an initial situation, but this can be minimized by placing the inquiry in proper context. If a man says, "I am allowed to crook my finger," surely we can say this description is inadequate, if the finger is crooked on a gun and the gun is loaded and directed in a certain direction. So describing the act as if it were simply exercising his finger is less relevant, in this case, than the questions of where he points the gun and whether he fires it. In scientific work we learn to state descriptions in terms of the kinds of ideas that will yield maximum fruitfulness in prediction, control or the building up of a theoretical system. We can do the same in relation to research on morality.

There is no reason to try to decide prematurely all the categories and relationships that need to be explored through research. A linguist would be very

shortsighted to try to develop a comprehensive theory of language on the basis of only one or two languages, and a religious historian would not base his entire exposition of world religions on monotheism, ignoring atheisms and polytheisms. Nor is it necessary or desirable to limit the ways in which research is approached. All traditional models for research into morality, when submitted to philosophical analysis in the light of research which employs them implicitly or explicitly, are found to have broken down. But this is not a breakdown from poverty but from an embarrassment of results, Dr. Edel said. The progress that has been made calls not for despair but for conceptual reconstruction, for absorption and digestion of what has been learned.

Scientific research is at a stage which requires more definite conceptualization of the moral without any implication that there is only one way of proceeding. The greater clarity of concepts does not make them mutually exclusive. It would be premature to ask which is the best model for scientific research on morality. Research may make use of many models, treating them in different ways. It may approach them distinctively or combine them into new working concepts. It may examine them as different psychological or cultural configurations, or different theoretical formulations for explicating a complex common mass of material. One may dip into this mass in various ways, taking a cognitive direction or an emotive one or emphasizing any of a variety of human phenomena. Categories should not be allowed to harden; scientific research should not too readily partition off the emotional, the behavioral, the judgmental or other distinctions of different theories but remain aware of the lines of intercrossing.

Just as philosophical analysis can illuminate scientific inquiries into morality, so can scientific inquiries serve a mirror function for philosophy, pointing up philosophical questions imbedded in scientific concepts of morality. As a matter of policy, we need to develop more comprehensive working concepts which will not foreclose the results of research but encourage research on any aspect of morality.

In reconstructing and developing our working concepts of morality, Dr. Edel concluded, we would do well to proceed from those which have the greatest scientific grounding. The measure of our progress will be the extent to which our criteria of morality come to reflect the growth of knowledge in our day.

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