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
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ABSTRACT

As part of a broad effort to world peace this resource kit supplies information on China and attempts to motivate people to work in their communities on concerns of China. Emphasis in the kit is upon placing equal weight on both information and action. Four background articles give the reader an introduction to China's self-image in world affairs. Respectively, these articles: survey foreign policy since 1949, which is based on a combination of security considerations, ideology, and a desire for world recognition; illuminate present foreign policy concerns which differ from United States interest and priorities; present excerpts from Chiao Kuan-hua's speech that are to be emphasized in the United States-China relations are suggested and specific programs provided for groups who want to work on China concerns. Lastly, a resource section includes a bibliography of books, pamphlets, periodicals, and also sources for speakers, films, and other programming aids for use by individuals and communities. (Author/SJM)

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COMMUNITY PEACE ACTION RESOURCE KIT

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— CHINA

IN THE
INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY



AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE
New York Metropolitan Regional Office

The Community Peace Action Program

"But what can I do?" many people ask today as they look at the international situation. They see the Vietnam war dragging on and on with no end in sight. They see the Mid-East crisis continuing. They see the SALT Talks proceeding, but no new agreements to limit arms. However, most people ask "What can I do?" not as the beginning of a serious evaluation of how they can act to put an end to war. Rather, they ask the question to confirm to themselves there is really nothing they can do. Despair and cynicism about our abilities to tackle international problems are wide-spread, touching all parts of the political spectrum from radical to conservative and cutting across all age groups.

Why do people feel that there is nothing they can do about our international problems? One reason is that the American peace movement, including the AFSC, has not provided enough leadership in suggesting specific things for people to do. In times of acute crises the movement has suggested that people attend rallies or mass demonstrations. During lulls, when crises have abated, people are advised to read literature, attend meetings, or write letters to their Congressmen. These suggestions seem inadequate to most people interested in dealing with the fundamental problems of war and peace.

In the fall of 1968 the New York Metropolitan Regional Office of AFSC began a new program--the Community Peace Action Program--to tackle the problem of what average people (not foreign policy experts) could do on the local level about war/peace issues. Through our work we hope to develop models which can be used to initiate local Peace Action Programs.

The Community Peace Action Resource Kit

Periodically we publish the Community Peace Action Bulletin to describe different aspects of our program and our experience in community-level peace action work. In addition, we publish Resource Kits to provide needed resources and information for people working at the local level for world peace.

The American Friends Service Committee

The Community Peace Action Program is one of five programs of the AFSC's New York Regional Office. Others are: a Housing and Urban Affairs Program in Elizabeth, New Jersey; a Neighborhood Initiatives in Urban Change Program in Manhattan; a Conscience, Youth, and the Draft Program; and an Information Services Program. The AFSC has Regional Offices throughout the country and a National Office in Philadelphia. In addition AFSC administers projects of social and technical assistance throughout the world and maintains International Affairs Offices in Europe, Asia, Africa, and at the United Nations.

We welcome your comments and criticisms on the Bulletin so that we can share your experiences and insights with others. Address all correspondence to:

Margot Levy/Editor

AFSC COMMUNITY PEACE ACTION BULLETIN, 15 RUTHERFORD PLACE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003

CHINA IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

INTRODUCTION

President Nixon's initiatives towards the People's Republic of China, culminating in his visit to Peking in February, made the PRC the biggest news item of recent months. There is enormous public interest in all things Chinese - clothing, food, lifestyle, art, history, and politics - and this interest is amply reflected in the media. However, while there is a lot of material available about Chinese politics, and more and more data about daily life in the PRC for Americans who visit there, we feel that there is little readily available information about China's role in the international community or about the long-range directions U.S. China policy should take. There is also a real need for material to help concerned people translate the current public euphoria and interest into a realistic consideration of the problems and prospects ahead as China and the U.S. improve their relations on the world scene.

We have produced this Resource Kit in our attempt to provide local people with the information and resources they need to work in their communities on China concerns.

The first part of the Kit consists of background articles. In the section, "China and the World", we have prepared a survey of Chinese foreign policy since 1949. "China in the World Community", written by Bronson Clark, AFSC National Executive Secretary, after his visit to Peking in the summer of 1971, further illuminates some of China's foreign policy concerns as expressed by observers within the PRC.

In "China and the UN", we have reprinted excerpts from the speech Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the PRC's UN Delegation, delivered to the UN General Assembly on November 15, 1971. In his speech, Chiao highlighted the issues that the PRC plans to emphasize in the UN. In a companion article, "Peking in the UN: What Holds for the Future?" Dr. James Hsiung, a China expert from N.Y.U., comments on Chiao's speech and interprets the issues from an American viewpoint.

All of the information in these sections, if taken together, should give the reader an introduction to China's self-image in world affairs. However, background is not enough to create meaningful action. So, in the second part of the Kit we offer policy recommendations and action suggestions. In "China and the U.S.", Margot Levy, the Editor of the Community Peace Action Bulletin, outlines some of the

steps which the U.S. government could take through an Initiatives Policy that could both improve U.S.-China relations and start re-orienting our whole foreign policy away from national interest politics and towards transnational cooperation.

In the section on "Action Suggestions", we have gathered together specific programs for individuals and groups who want to work on China concerns. The programs can be used with religious organizations, civic groups, public libraries, and local school districts, and offer good, concrete ways to encourage these groups and institutions to initiate an examination of U.S.-China relations. We think they will be extremely helpful to the concerned individual who wants to take advantage of public interest in China to develop local programs.

Finally, in the "Resources" section we have listed books, pamphlets, and periodicals useful for further information on the ideas we have introduced in the Kit. The "Resources" section also includes sources for speakers, films, and other programming aids to use in your community.

This Resource Kit is part of the series of issue-oriented papers published by the New York Metropolitan Area AFSC office. It differs slightly from previous Resource Kits and Community Peace Action Bulletins in the attempt to place equal emphasis in one issue on both information and action. We hope that our readers will send us their reactions to the Kit and their experiences in using it in their own communities.

March, 1972

Edward Doty, Director
Community Peace Action Program

CHINA AND THE WORLD

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1949

To the extent that any nation's foreign policy can be analyzed according to continuing factors, China's may be said to be based on a combination of national security considerations, ideology, and the desire to be recognized as a Great Power. These are not unlike the factors governing the foreign relations of the other nations of the world, and the varying emphasis the Chinese place on them accounts for the fluctuations in some of their policy stands. The variations are due in part to the internal economics and to power shifts within the Chinese Communist Party. Perhaps the best way to characterize fluctuations is as "pragmatic politics"; when China sees something to be gained by ideological polemics, she uses them, but just as often, when an actual situation arises where revolutionary rhetoric conflicts with issues of national interest or security, the PRC will act according to her interests, not her rhetoric.


A number of themes run through China's foreign policy and contribute to how she perceives her national interest and security. Some of these originated in the Chinese experience before the establishment of the People's Republic of China, including China's image of herself as encircled by hostile powers and forces. Another theme is the desire to return to the original boundaries of the Middle Kingdom. Specifically, this means that certain territories over which China once exercised sovereignty and which were subsequently "lost" are considered to be rightfully Chinese and must return to Chinese sovereignty. These "lost" territories include Tibet, Hong-kong, Taiwan and Macao. However, in this, as in other situations, China seems eager to avoid high-risk policies. Because so much of the PRC's policy is based on long range goals (such as being recognized as a Great Power), the leadership is often willing to make short term accommodations to avoid jeopardizing long term goals.

Since 1969, the PRC has launched a "diplomatic offensive" including establishment of relations with about 68 countries, gaining admission to the UN, and the "ping pong diplomacy" of last spring which helped open the way for a dialogue between Peking and Washington. From the American public's viewpoint, after nearly 20 years with little or no direct contact with PRC, the events of 1971 seemed to be an amazing shift in China's policy. But, on closer examination, it seems to be another pragmatic move: after the militancy of the Cultural Revolution, forces of moderation, led by Chou En-lai, have returned to power, bringing with them a return to the moderate policies of the middle 1950's and early 1960's.

It is, perhaps, easiest to look at the whole of Chinese foreign policy from the double perspectives of history and geography. China exhibits different policy emphases in her dealings with other countries depending on how close they are to China geographically, on what their past history of relations is, and, of course, on the balance between national security and ideology in a given situation.

For example, consider the countries of Asia, the PRC's closest neighbors. In this region, questions of national security far outweigh ideology in the making of policy, in part because of the ring of U.S. influence in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the countries of Indochina. China's feeling of being "encircled" by her enemies (and in particular by the U.S. whom she has seen as her most powerful enemy) makes it impractical for her to engage in ideological activities such as active involvement with anti-governmental groups. Rather, since the middle of the 1950's, her goal has been to neutralize South and Southeast Asia. In these areas, the PRC has encouraged governments which are either neutral or anti-Western. In 1955, 29 Asian and African nations, including China, Japan, India, Arab countries from the Middle East, and even members of SEATO (The Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan), participated in the Bandung Conference. This conference led to the Five Principles of Co-Existence which exemplified China's behavior toward her Asian neighbors during the 1950's and the early 1960's. They included non-aggression, respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other nations, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit in dealings among nations, and peaceful co-existence among different ideologies. However, Asian nations

like South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan, which were considered to be pro-U.S. rather than neutral were not included in the Conference, nor did China consider her behavior toward them to be governed by the Five Principles. In 1955 China initiated the first Taiwan Strait crisis by military actions against Nationalist installations there. Her goals were not new--to regain "lost territories" and to protect the PRC's security by cutting down Nationalist interference with ships bound for the Mainland. There was also the dividend of gaining prestige and sympathy from the neutral nations of Asia.



China still, to an extent, follows this policy of encouraging anti-Western regimes. The second military action against Taiwan, in 1958, ended with no gain for China comparable to what she gained in 1955, and she shifted her Asian emphasis away from East Asia and concentrated instead on South and Southeast Asia. While China continues to support anti-Western causes, her support since the Korean War has been in the form of military and economic aid, without committing Chinese personnel. An example of her policy of encouraging anti-Western regimes without demanding that they share her ideology is the PRC's continuing support of Prince Sihanouk as the legal head of Cambodia. Sihanouk is definitely

more to China's liking than is Lon Nol, but here we have the situation of revolutionary China backing a hereditary monarch-- a prime example of pragmatic politics outweighing rhetoric.

In Europe, China's policy has been to use economic means to encourage countries to be at least neutral. In Eastern Europe, for the most part, China stresses ideology. She maintains close ties with Albania, and in the late 1950's and early 1960's, obtained technicians and supplies from those Soviet bloc countries most sympathetic to China's ideology. In Western Europe, her policies have been flexible. China needed her trade with Europe, especially around the peak of Sino-Soviet conflict, in order to move away from economic dependence on the USSR. Diplomatic recognition by France in the early 1960's helped China increase her influence with the former French colonies in Africa. China's trade with Western Europe (and also with Canada and Australia) are examples of foreign policy conducted to further national interests and to move toward Great Power status, not to accomplish ideological ends. Of course, this trade, and all foreign policy in general, was severely affected by China's economic problems preceding the Cultural Revolution and by the Cultural Revolution itself, when all but one of China's ambassadors abroad were recalled to Peking.

China's foreign policy in Africa during the early 1960's showed more consideration for ideological goals than for direct national security. The geographical distance between China and Africa is such that the PRC could supply arms and organizational support to revolutionary groups without risking direct involvement on China's own borders. Her policy in general was to organize the African peoples into a revolutionary force with China at its head. To accomplish this, the PRC supported underground opposition groups in countries including the Congo, Burundi, Kenya, and Tanzania. China often found herself backing both sides, as, in 1964, when an official delegation visited the government of Niger while armed anti-government commandos who had trained in China were entering Niger through Ghana. However, this policy changed in the face of a strong negative response by many African states, including an anti-Peking campaign by the Common Organization of African and Malagasy States and the barring of PRC diplomats from a number of countries.

Chinese policy in Africa, since about 1965, follows the trend of policy elsewhere in the world--economic aid and trade rather than attempts to overthrow established governments. A key example of the policy is the Tanzania-Zambia Railroad project. In an agreement signed in September, 1967, China agreed to help construct a 1,056 mile railroad linking the copper fields of Zambia to the port of Dar Es Salaam in Tanzania. China gave the two countries a \$406 million interest-free loan, provided technicians for construction, and trained African workers in railroad management. When complete, the railroad will create some 30,000 new jobs, will help Zambia become less dependent economically on white South Africa, and, through development of iron and coal mining areas in Tanzania, will diversify that country's largely agricultural economy. Other similar projects involve the building of small scale factories which absorb some of the surplus labor in African countries. The general goals of this policy, like the policies practiced by other nations, is to win

the friendship of African governments and peoples through technical assistance.

In the future China will probably continue to take the long view of foreign relations. With Chou En-lai in power, the emphasis will be on diplomatic rather than military initiatives. China sees the world as composed of strong-nations-growing-weaker and weak-nations-growing-stronger, with the PRC one of the latter. She will not jeopardize this process by engaging in military actions against nations like the U.S. which are still much stronger militarily than the PRC. Instead, judging from her actions in 1971, the PRC will continue to expand her diplomatic relations, particularly with small and medium sized nations. There is a good chance that the PRC will successfully end her past isolation. The countries of the world who do not yet recognize the PRC (including smaller powers like Australia and large powers like the U.S.) are eager to "solve the China problem" and are more and more willing to take initiatives towards China. The 1970's may see the emergence of a new Great Powers balance with China, the U.S., the USSR, Japan and Western Europe all participating and with China assuming the role of spokesman for the smaller nations of the world.

Sources: African Report, March, 1971 and January 1972

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Twentieth Century China, by O. Edmund Club

CHINA AND THE WORLD SCENE

by Bronson P. Clark

(Bronson Clark, National Executive Secretary of the AFSC, wrote this report in September, 1971, after his return from a month-long visit to the People's Republic of China.)

With a new phase of American-Chinese relations, two egocentric societies are in the preliminary stage of meeting again after a separation of two decades. During my visit I quickly discovered that United States interests and priorities are quite different from China's and that those of us from the West will be experiencing frustration in trying to understand what it is that China believes about the world around her. For example, for most Americans it appears that the war in Indochina is winding down. The American press, therefore, regards the Nixon visit to Peking as somehow the beginning of the final stage in bringing that war to some kind of political

conclusion. The Chinese view, however, is quite different. They see the Indochina war as a very active one and they regard the latest attempt on the part of the American to guarantee the existence of the Lon Nol government in Cambodia as continuing evidence of American direct intervention into Asian affairs. It is clear that China regards a divided Korea, a divided Vietnam, and a divided Laos as intolerable imperialist intervention and it adds to her feeling that she must survive in a world with a number of hostile powers close to her frontiers.

As to the Nixon visit, one member of the Foreign Ministry told us, "In the past 16 years we have met representatives of your government 136 times. We are certainly willing to meet for the 137th time, admittedly at a somewhat higher representation level." The implication of this statement is that the Chinese see no particular reason not to talk to us although they stress that there can be no solution to the war in Indochina without American withdrawal and without Americans dealing in Paris with the parties to the dispute. Russell Johnson and I pointed out to our Chinese friend, and to members of the Foreign Ministry, that we felt Dr. Henry Kissinger had scored a point in securing a meeting almost eight months away, which in many ways made it difficult for the anti-war forces, in Congress and out, to keep the war in Indochina a live issue. When we pointed this out the Chinese fell silent and it appeared to us that this was a new idea to them, strange as it may seem.



Bronson Clark displays the flag of the Friends Ambulance Unit, a Quaker group that worked in China during World War II.

Perhaps we might start by giving an overview of how the Chinese see the world about them, as provided by Rewi Alley who has lived more than 40 years in China and thoroughly identifies with the Chinese point of view. As he put it, "The USSR has 41 divisions on China's frontier, comprising more than one million men. The USSR has betrayed Marxist-Leninism and wants to crush China's success. The USSR now has a military pact with India and is working ever closer with the United States. Meanwhile the United States, with a system based on greed and economic imperialism, cannot let China become a success. The United States intervened first in Korea, then in Vietnam, then Laos and now Cambodia. She has subverted the government of Thailand and the CIA is everywhere. Japan is becoming a U.S. puppet, is rearming, and would like to dominate Taiwan economically. However, China is prepared with arms and adequate air raid shelters. True, we do not have the kind of air force that the West has but we are prepared to fight the kind of

war which has been successful in Vietnam and we have a growing nuclear capability which must be reckoned with."

This is a rather somber view and makes one feel that the continued military intervention by the United States in Asian affairs must be brought to an end quickly. Admittance of China into the United Nations may help moderate her nationalism but even more importantly it may help to moderate ours.

James Reston was quoted in an interview, subsequent to his China visit last summer, as saying that the Chinese were "looking backward". He appeared to indicate that the Chinese are more interested in relying on their own military preparedness than on international institutions of cooperation. Of course it is difficult to see how we could expect the Chinese to feel otherwise, particularly when they were blocked for so long in taking their proper seat in the United Nations. But I think there is another sense that James Reston had in mind when he mentioned "looking backward" -- that is the immediacy of past wars. In the films we saw in stories of the Peking Opera, and in the basic attitudes of educators and government leaders it was clear that the Chinese regard the war against Japan and the Civil War as having occurred "yesterday". In every school, and indeed in almost every play and song, it is evident that China is a nation that is training her youth. First of all there is much marching in which all school children participate. Although much of this is not of a military type, it is clearly a forerunner of the military drill that is practised by the militia and the People's Liberation Army. In art and literature the lone guerilla fighter with his gun is a contemporary hero who outwits his adversary and wins the day. In this sense, the kind of war they look back to is a technologically simple one and basically defensive in nature. We learn that "imperialist are paper tigers" but one reflects how these paper tigers can wreak havoc even though they cannot ultimately win.

China is not devoid of ideological inconsistencies, and on occasion her national self interest seems to be the dominant factor. This seems to be the case vis-a-vis the East Pakistan situation and China's relationship to the rebellion in Ceylon as well. Russ Johnson is well acquainted with East Pakistan, dating from the time that he was responsible for the Conference and Seminar Programs in Southeast Asia and the Sub-Continent. He noted that the West Pakistan government is clearly not Marxist-Leninist but is in fact a military dictatorship, representing a ruling class. The movement in East Pakistan is clearly supported by the peasants, including some whose huts had pictures of Mao Tse-tung in them. Russ Johnson pointed out that both the United States and China are supplying arms to the government of West Pakistan and that these arms are being used to shoot down the peasants of East Pakistan.


In response to this Dr. Ma Hai Teh and Rewi Alley, as well as some of our Chinese friends, made the following unconvincing explanation. They indicated that the situation has "certain contradictions". They said that the Awami League has leadership which is not Marxist-Leninist and is part of the same ruling class that governs West Pakistan. They pointed out that the Awami League has violated the precepts of Marxist-Leninism by taking their

people into a "disaster". This was regarded as "adventurism" and representing thoroughly irresponsible leadership. Furthermore, they added, it is evident that other governments are now meddling into the matter and trying to split Pakistan. They were referring primarily to India. They feel that this intervention is making the situation worse and that China is not responsible for that. Russ Johnson and I could only conclude that because Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China, and they have enjoyed trade for a number of years, plus the fact that China and India have had profound differences leading to military conflict, it was almost inevitable, in any struggle between Pakistan and India, China would identify with Pakistan.

We came away from China feeling sad that the position of the American government has been hostile all these years to the Chinese revolution. Those servants in the State Department who knew the most about China were driven out of public office and their advice denied to four Presidents. The Chinese have many great contributions to make in solving the large problems facing the human family. We are grateful for the beginnings of a change in United States policy.

Perhaps we can look forward to a time when the warm friendship we felt extended to us by the Chinese and which we returned -- can move to more "official" levels to the benefit of all.

CHINA AND THE UN



UN Photo

(The following speech was delivered by Chiao Kuan-hua, the Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China to the UN. It was delivered at a Plenary Meeting of the 26th Session of the UN General Assembly on November 15, 1971.)

Mr. President,

Fellow Representatives,

...It is a pleasure for the Delegation of the People's Republic of China to be here today to attend the 26th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations and take part together with you in the work of the United Nations....

Twenty six years have elapsed since the founding of the United Nations. Twenty six years are but a brief span in human history, yet during this period profound changes have taken place in the world situation....In the past 20 years and more, the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America have waged unflinching struggles to win and safeguard national independence and oppose foreign aggression and oppression. In Europe, North America and Oceania, too, mass movements and social tides for the change of the present state of affairs are rising....Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution, this has become an irresistible trend of history.

Human society invariably makes constant progress, and such progress is always achieved through innumerable revolutions and transformations....The advance of history and social progress gladden the hearts of and inspire the peoples of the world and throw into panic a handful of decadent reactionary forces who do their utmost to put up desperate struggles....Since World War II, no new world war has occurred, yet local wars have never ceased. At present, the danger of a new world war still exists, but revolution is the main trend in the world today. Although there are twists and turns and reverses in the people's struggles, adverse currents against the people and against progress, in the final analysis, cannot hold back the main current of the continuous development of human society. The world will surely move towards progress and light, and definitely not towards reaction and darkness.

Mr. President and fellow representatives,

The Chinese people have experienced untold sufferings under imperialist oppression. For one century and more, imperialism repeatedly launched wars of aggression against China and forced her to sign many unequal treaties. They divided China into their spheres of influence, plundered China's resources and exploited the Chinese people....In order to win national independence, freedom and liberation, the Chinese people, advancing wave upon wave in a dauntless spirit, waged protracted heroic struggles against imperialism and its lackeys and finally won the revolution under the leadership of their great leader Chairman Mao Tsetung and the Chinese Community Party. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, we, the Chinese people, defying the tight imperialist blockades and withstanding the terrific pressure from without, have built our country into a socialist state with initial prosperity by maintaining independence and keeping the initiative in our own hands and through self reliance. It has been proved by facts that we the Chinese nation are fully capable of standing on our own feet in the family of nations.

Taiwan is a province of China and the 14 million people who live in Taiwan are our fellow-countrymen by flesh and blood....The spreading in certain places of the fallacy that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined" is a conspiracy to plot "an independent Taiwan" and continue to create "one China, one Taiwan", which is in effect to create "two Chinas". On behalf of the Government of the People's Republic of China, I hereby reiterate that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory and the U.S. armed invasion and occupation of China's Taiwan and Taiwan Straits cannot in the least alter the sovereignty of the People's Republic of China over Taiwan, that all the armed forces of the United States definitely should be withdrawn from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and that we are firmly opposed to any design to separate Taiwan from the motherland. The Chinese people are determined to liberate Taiwan and no force on earth can stop us from doing so.

Mr. President and fellow representatives,

The Chinese people who suffered for a long time from imperialist aggression and oppression have consistently opposed the imperialist policies of aggression and war and supported all the oppressed peoples and nations in their just struggles to win freedom and liberation, oppose foreign interference and become masters of their own destiny. This position of the Chinese Government and people is in the fundamental interests of the peoples of the world and is also in accord with the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

The U.S. Government's armed aggression against Viet Nam, Cambodia and Laos and its encroachment upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of these three countries have aggravated tension in the Far East, and met with strong opposition of the people of the world, including the American people. The Chinese Government and people firmly support the peoples of the three countries of Indochina in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation and firmly support the Joint Declaration of the Summit Conference on the Indochinese Peoples and the 7-point peace proposal put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet Nam. The U.S. Government should withdraw immediately and unconditionally all its forces and the armed forces of its followers from the three countries of Indochina so that the peoples of the three countries may solve their own problems independently and free from foreign interference; this is the key to the relaxation of tension in the Far East.

To date, Korea still remains divided....The Chinese Government and people firmly support the 8-point programme for the peaceful unification of the fatherland put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in April this year and firmly support its just demand that all the illegal resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the Korean question be annulled and the "United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea" be dissolved.

The essence of the Middle East question is aggression against the Palestinian and other Arab peoples by Israeli Zionism with the support and connivance of the superpowers. The Chinese Govern-

ment and people resolutely support the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in the just struggle against aggression and believe that persevering in struggle and upholding unity the heroic Palestinian and other Arab peoples will surely be able to recover the lost territories of the Arab countries and restore to the Palestinian people their national rights. The Chinese Government maintains that all countries and peoples that love peace and uphold justice have the obligation to support the struggle of the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, and no one has the right to engage in political deals behind their backs bartering away their rights to existence and their national interests.

The continued existence of colonialism in all its manifestations is a provocation against the peoples of the world. The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the people of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau) in their struggle for national liberation, and resolutely support the people of Azania, Zimbabwe and Namibia in their struggle against the white colonialist rule and racial discrimination. Their struggle is a just one, and a just cause will surely triumph.

The independence of a country is incomplete without economic independence. The economic backwardness of the Asian, African and Latin American countries is the result of imperialist plunder. Opposition to economic plunder and protection of national resources are the inalienable sovereign rights of an independent state. China is still an economically backward country as well as a developing country. Like the overwhelming majority of the Asian, African and Latin American countries, China belongs to the third world. The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the struggles initiated by Latin American countries and peoples to defend their rights over 200-nautical-mile territorial sea and to protect the resources of their respective countries. The Chinese Government and people resolutely support the struggles unfolded by the Petroleum-exporting countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as various regional and specialized organizations to protect their national rights and interests and oppose economic plunder.

We have consistently maintained that all countries big or small should be equal and that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should be taken as the principles guiding the relations between countries...We hold that the affairs of the United Nations must be handled jointly by all its member states, and the superpowers should not be allowed to manipulate and monopolize them. The superpowers want to be superior to others and lord it over others. At no time, neither today nor even in the future, will China be a superpower subjecting others to its aggression subversion, control, interference or bullying.

The one or two superpowers are stepping up their arms expansion and war preparations and vigorously developing nuclear weapons, thus seriously threatening international peace. It is understandable that the people of the world long for disarmament and particularly for nuclear disarmament. Their demand for the dissolution of military blocs, withdrawal of foreign troops and dismantling of foreign military bases is a just one. However, the superpowers, while talking about disarmament every day, are actually engaged

in arms expansion daily. The so-called nuclear disarmament which they are supposed to seek is entirely for the purpose of monopolizing nuclear weapons in order to carry out nuclear threats and blackmail. China will never participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries....China develops nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of defence and for breaking the nuclear monopoly and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons and nuclear war. The Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and proposed to convene a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss this question and as the first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government has on many occasions declared, and now on behalf of the Chinese Government, I once again solemnly declare that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. If the United States and the Soviet Union really and truly want disarmament, they should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is not something difficult to do. Whether this is done or not will be a severe test as to whether they have the genuine desire for disarmament.

We have always held that the just struggles of the people of all countries support each other....For this purpose, we have provided aid to some friendly countries to help them develop their national economy independently. In providing aid, we always strictly respect the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attach any conditions or ask for any privileges....We firmly oppose certain countries trying to control and plunder the recipient countries by means of "aid". However, as China's economy is still comparatively backward, the material aid we have provided is very limited, and what we provide is mainly political and moral support. With a population of 700 million, China ought to make a greater contribution to human progress. And we hope that this situation of our ability falling short of this wish of ours will be gradually changed.

Mr. President and fellow representatives,

In accordance with the purposes of the United Nations Charter, the United Nations should play its due role in maintaining international peace, opposing aggression and interference and developing friendly relations and co-operation among nations....We hope that the spirit of the United Nations Charter will be really and truly followed out. We still stand together with all the countries and peoples that love peace and uphold justice and work together with them for the defense of the national independence and state sovereignty of various countries and for the cause of safeguarding international peace and promoting human progress.

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PEKING IN THE U.N.: WHAT HOLDS FOR THE FUTURE?

By James C. Hsiung

Dr. Hsiung is Associate Professor of Politics at New York University, and author of *IDEOLOGY AND PRACTICE: THE EVOLUTION OF CHINESE COMMUNISM* (Praeger, 1970) and *LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS* (Columbia University Press, 1972).

The historic move by the General Assembly to seat the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations has evoked both exhilaration and exasperation. Critics rankled over the prospects of an early demise of the world organization. Supporters of the decision, on the other hand, argued that for the first time the U.N. became truly "universal" by the admittance of what amounts to a quarter of mankind. Subsequent responses to the "performance" of the PRC delegation at the 26th session of the General Assembly generally followed this division of opinion. Domestic politics in the United States further complicated the issue.

For example, scarcely had Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hus, who headed the Chinese delegation, finished his inaugural address at the General Assembly when he was denounced by Ambassador George Bush for his "intemperate language." Long-time China-watchers could actually find nothing in Ch'iao's policy statement that had not been known before. They, therefore, wondered whether Bush's less than temperate reaction was not meant for domestic conservative critics in an election-conscious year.

Among other things, Ch'iao reaffirmed Peking's anti-imperialist stance -- ostensibly directed against both the Soviets ("social imperialists") and the U.S., but in fact probably more against the former than the latter. On behalf of his country he expressed support of the U.N. Charter and peaceful coexistence as a principle governing international relations in general. This latter endorsement stood in contrast to Peking's position during its 1963 pelimic war with Moscow. The Chinese had then insisted that peaceful coexistence should be reserved for relations with the Third World plus those Western powers which were no longer practicing "imperialism". (The latter referred to Britain, France, etc., to the exclusion of the United States.) Ch'iao's statement in the U.N. reconfirmed a marked change in Peking's policy toward the United States that became clear in the wake of the 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. For fear that the Soviets, who have a million troops deployed along the border, might similarly intervene in China, Peking at one point in late 1968 even hinted at a possible peaceful coexistence pact with the United States. The volte-face somehow anticipated the later Peking-Washington detante positively promoted by President Nixon.

In the U.N. debates, the Chinese reiterated their standing policy on disarmament: that the nuclear powers should pledge themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. They, on the other hand, rejected a Soviet proposal for an expanded disarmament conference, accusing the Soviets of attempting to freeze the current nuclear monopoly enjoyed by the two superpowers. Ironically, the Chinese argument recalls the Soviet Union's position in the 1950's, when it was behind the U.S. in its nuclear capability. The Chinese

stand also resembles that of France, whose nuclear program is in a similar stage of development as that of China.

The Chinese open denunciation of superpower politics was, unquestionably, meant for the ears of the third-world states in the U.N. Ch'iao made it clear that the PRC would have no part in the superpower monopoly of the U.N. decision making. As a whole, the Chinese delegation maintained a low profile, keeping its participation at a minimal. It did not make a nomination, as might be expected, for the election of a new membership in the International Law Commission. Ambassador Huang Hua, the Chinese permanent delegate, deliberately emphasized the newness of his delegation. In the Security Council's deliberations over the East Pakistan (Bangladesh) crisis, Huang maintained a subdued posture, though he remained firm.

It may be noted that during the same debate, the PRC and the U.S. actually voted on the same side, against the USSR. This convergence of interest, in that both are interested in keeping out an external hegemonial power (USSR) from the Far East, will be the foundation upon which a new multilateral balance will evolve in the 1970's. In the past, non-aligned countries disillusioned with the U.S. could only turn to the Soviets. Now they have an additional rallying point to turn to. The Chinese presence, therefore, is expected to erode the Soviet influence among third-world states. The U.N. is likely to head toward some form of multilateral balance, if the trend continues, in contrast to the earlier bipolar alignment within the General Assembly. In view of the history of international relations, multilateralism is probably more conducive to stability than is bipolarity.



UN Security Officers raise the flag of the People's Republic of China at the UN for the first time on November 1, 1971.

Some of the Chinese policy statements are obviously irking to the U.S., particularly their explicit support of the claim by some Latin American countries regarding sovereignty over territorial waters extending as far as 200 miles. The Chinese backing of the Arabs in the Middle East may also pose potential trouble for the U.S. Peking's reiterated position regarding Taiwan may point to

another area of conflict with Washington. On balance, however, the outstanding and potential problem areas between Peking and Washington are not necessarily more ominous than Peking's troubles with its three immediate neighbors, Russia, Japan, and India. Nor are they necessarily less susceptible to solution than Washington's problems with Moscow, if delicately handled.

In the Middle East, for instance, the Chinese have no reasons to help the Soviets gain influence among the Arab world or to support the re-opening of the Suez, which would only lead to more expeditious extension of Soviet naval power from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean. Regarding Taiwan, the Chinese have made it known that they would be satisfied if the U.S. (Japan and others) would openly declare that the island's future is an "internal problem" for the Chinese themselves -- on both sides of the Taiwan Strait -- to work out.

The United Nations, it is true, is no longer the "private domain," as it were, of America; but, on the contrary, the U.N. may re-emerge as a more rejuvenated body in which the game of multilateral diplomacy is to be played out, if Peking continues to believe, as it obviously does, that here is a new battlefield for its running battle with the Soviets. The multilateral tussle within the world body will be but a reflection of the larger delicate multilateral balance game outside it. In the long run, it may turn out to be a better alternative than the previous bipolar stalemate. Of course, only time will tell. For the moment, it is comforting to note that the Communist Chinese, in their first year in the U.N., have assumed a rather subdued posture, as contrasted with the general boisterous and raucous performance of the early Soviet diplomats when they began to arrive on the World's diplomatic stage in the 1920's and 1930's. It is also important that the Chinese, so far as can be determined, have opted to lay all the cards on the table, hiding nothing about where they stand on issues. For those who remember the tragic consequences of secret diplomacy, this relatively "open" posture is a welcome sign.

CHINA AND THE US

by Margot Levy

In evolving a new China policy, the United States Government faces important choices that, if taken, can help move world affairs towards a world where war is no longer the instrument used by governments to settle international disputes. To move in this direction, the U.S. and the other governments of the world must begin to set new goals for their foreign policies. All nations can contribute, but now is an especially propitious time for the U.S. to work with the People's Republic of China. The PRC, just emerging from the Cultural Revolution and just beginning dialogues and exchanges with our country, has an important role to play on the international scene. If the PRC and the U.S. can reach a mutual understanding-- of each other and of the changes needed to create lasting world

peace--then we will have begun the necessary revision of our policy goals which can lead to peace.

What is this process of goals revision? First of all, we must question our frame of reference. A lasting world peace will not be brought about through conventional agreements that merely limit the use of violence to achieve national goals. Rather, world peace requires the development of new institutions which will render the use of force as a policy tool obsolete. These new institutions and attitudes do not involve narrow, national interest politics, nor are they strictly multinational in scope. They are more transnational--extending above and beyond the limiting concept of nation-states, concentrating on the needs we all share as human beings. They include institutions for disarmament, for regional development projects, for the development of effective world law, and for creating a truly international community.

At present, the policies of both the U.S. and the PRC are based on traditional notions of national interest politics and are considered highly "pragmatic" and "realistic". In other words, they deal with the world as it is, not as it should be. The pursuit of national interest politics may, through treaties and other agreements, limit the use of force, but, because such a course relies on the idea of competition among nations for "advantage" under the present system, it is unlikely to change the system itself. Until nations begin to move away from traditional concepts, the elimination of war as a policy tool is unlikely.

The process of breaking away from tradition will be long and difficult. The goals of our whole foreign policy will have to be recast to give priority to new values which can lead to a more peaceful world. This will take time, of course, but we can begin the process by changing the way in which we pursue our policies--by adopting a policy of unilateral initiatives. The theory underlying an Initiatives Policy was first developed in the late 1950's and early 1960's by Charles Osgood, who was then President of the American Psychological Association, Amitai Etzioni, a professor of Sociology at Columbia University, and others. (For an early explanation of Initiatives Policy, see Etzioni's The Hard Way to Peace, (New York, MacMillan, 1962).) Such a policy tries to move the world closer to complete disarmament, world law, regional cooperation, and the other necessary components of a truly international community. It does this through unilateral actions on issues where formal agreements do not yet exist.

Through a planned series of unilateral actions, an Initiatives Policy creates a dynamic situation in which seemingly unsolvable problems can be resolved. An Initiatives Policy attempts to change the way in which an "opponent" conceives his own goals and position. A well-planned series of initiatives creates pressure on and within the "opponent's" political system that may move that system to revise its policy in response to the initiatives.

Initiatives have already been applied to a limited extent in U.S.-China relations and with good results. President Nixon reduced restrictions on trade with the PRC and on travel to the PRC, and also suspended U.S. reconnaissance flights over Chinese territory. These initiatives, especially the last one, reduced U.S.-China ten-

sion, and indicated to the Chinese our serious interest in "normalizing" relations. Our initiatives apparently helped move the Chinese to reassess their policies, and a dialogue began.

While an Initiatives Policy could be applied in all of the U.S. Government's relations with other nations, there are still many specific points at which it could be applied in U.S.-China relations, especially considering the good responses initiatives have evoked so far. The U.S. and the PRC are now beginning to establish areas of private group communication based on shared functional needs. Students from the U.S. have gone to the PRC, and, through the efforts of groups like the National Committee for United States-China Relations, this exchange will probably become reciprocal. More important, however, will be exchanges in the areas of science, medicine, business, and education. Communication about a shared interest (for example, weather prediction which is vitally important to the agrarian portions of the Chinese economy) can transcend ideology, and can lead to personal understanding and to the attitudinal changes which precede policy changes. A good example of the results of private group communication in the past was the Pugwash Conferences. Scientists from the U.S. and the USSR engaged in high-level, functional exchanges which resulted in groups in both countries backing the Test-Ban Treaty of 1963.

In addition to people-to-people exchanges, the U.S. and the PRC are undertaking governmental communication which may lead to mutual recognition of our need to cooperate in a number of areas. President Nixon's visit to Peking was only a prelude to the exchanges of ideas, goods, and personnel which is to come. However, the U.S. must look ahead, past the initial euphoria of Nixon's visit, to the difficult problems that must be solved as the PRC becomes an active member of the world community. Two problems, in particular, must be substantially resolved before relations between the U.S. and the PRC can be put on a "normal" footing. These problems are the status of Taiwan and the U.S. military presence in Asia.

1. Taiwan

The status of Taiwan, while unsettled, delays the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC indefinitely, Peking claims that Taiwan is historically Chinese territory, and that, as the sole government of China, Peking must have sovereignty over the island. Peking has also said that any country recognizing the Nationalist regime's claim to be the legitimate government of China cannot maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC. The U.S. since 1954, has been committed to a Mutual Defense Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek's Government of the Republic of China (GRC) on Taiwan. The treaty says that the U.S. will protect the GRC against outside attack. From the U.S. viewpoint, there are four possible solutions to the problem of who should have sovereignty over Taiwan:

- A. the U.S. could recognize the PRC claim to Taiwan, withdrawing support from the GRC.
- B. the U.S. could continue to support the GRC.

- C. the U.S. could take the position that a settlement must be negotiated between the PRC and the GRC without U.S. interference.
- D. a mechanism could be found to allow the inhabitants of Taiwan (about 2 million Chinese and 14 million Taiwanese) to decide whether they want to be part of the PRC, continue under the GRC, or become an independent nation.

The American Friends Service Committee, in its statement published in August 1971, U.S. China Policy: A Fresh Start, recommends the third option: that Peking and Taipei negotiate between themselves a status for Taiwan, perhaps with UN oversight of the negotiations. With international supervision to safeguard the human rights of the Taiwanese, the result might well be modified autonomy for Taiwan with the PRC.

In the Nixon-Chou joint communique, the U.S. does come out in favor of the third option, that the Chinese settle the matter among themselves. However, the language of the communique stresses the U.S. view of the solution as being far in the future, an approach which means that the solution is still put off indefinitely.

The U.S. should take further initiatives to demonstrate our interest in seeing the situation resolved sooner rather than later. For example:

- A. All American troops should be withdrawn from Taiwan. The 8,000 troops presently on the island are a symbolic presence which serves only as a psychological irritant to U.S.-China relations and piecemeal withdrawals only prolong our involvement unnecessarily.
- B. U.S. reconnaissance flights over PRC territory which have been "temporarily" ended since June, 1971, should be permanently and officially ended.
- C. The U.S. should communicate to the GRC our intention to end all U.S. military involvement on Taiwan.

None of these steps would abrogate our treaty with the Nationalists. The troops and material on the island are neither necessary nor sufficient to protect the GRC from outside attack.

2. U.S. Military Presence in Asia

The U.S. military presence in Asia as a whole, and in Indochina specifically, is another obstacle to "normal" relations between the U.S. and the PRC. China feels uncomfortable about the presence of U.S. troops in countries on her border. The PRC feels the U.S. is trying to establish client states throughout Indochina and at the same time is ignoring the desire of the Indochinese peoples for peace and self-determination. The U.S. Government on the other hand, feels that only by continuing military support to the governments of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia can we guarantee the freedom and human rights of the peoples of Indochina. However,

reducing and finally removing our military presence in the area need not, and in fact, should not reduce our concern for social and economic change and human rights in the region. It would only rechannel the expression of these concerns. An end to the Indochina War could open the way for meaningful transnational cooperation throughout all of Asia. To accomplish this goal, the U.S. can now take the following initiatives which would end the killing and move toward the kind of political settlement that will restore peace and stability in Indochina:

- A. The U.S. should announce a firm date for complete military withdrawal from Asia.
- B. The U.S. should declare a unilateral cease-fire, except in direct self-defense, to take effect immediately. The U.S. should invite the other side to reciprocate.
- C. The U.S. should end the bombing throughout Indochina.
- D. The U.S. should press for a political settlement at the Paris peace negotiations.

Once more normal relations are established between the U.S. and the PRC, we can begin to explore with the Chinese those areas in which we can cooperate to build the new institutions necessary for ending war. Some of these areas include:

1. Disarmament

China so far refuses to recognize the legitimacy of bilateral arms control agreements, seeing them as exclusive and a form of collusion against herself and the nations of the Third World. The U.S. must realize that, if China is to participate in world disarmament talks, we must be prepared to start from scratch, multilaterally, renegotiating all prior arms control agreements. For the time being, the U.S. can take these initiatives to show our interest in complete, world-wide disarmament:

- A. The U.S. should halt the deployment of any anti-China ABM system.
- B. The U.S. should convert the DEW line (Distant Early Warning line) into an international system which would not only alert the U.S. to Soviet or Chinese attack, but would also alert them to U.S. attack.
- C. The U.S. should indicate to the PRC our willingness to participate in multilateral disarmament negotiations under UN auspices.
- D. The U.S. should respond to the PRC's pledge never to be the first nation to use nuclear weapons, by taking the same pledge.
- E. The U.S. should reduce our arms budget, perhaps by 5% initially, and apply the funds to regional development

(see below). We should ask other nations to respond similarly.

2. Regional Development

A neutral and stable Asia is an important step towards a peaceful world. Initiatives that will end the war in Indochina are important, but are not in themselves answers to the larger question of how Asia can progress socially and economically without being the ground on which the ideological battles of other nations are fought. One answer is multi-lateral projects for regional development. The U.S. could play an important role in encouraging these projects through international organizations. Specifically:

- A. The U.S. should increase her contributions to the development agencies of the UN. The UN has suggested that all the developed nations of the world set aside 1% of their GNP annually for UN development projects. At present, The U.S. gives less than .5% of her GNP, and could and should give the UN more.
- B. The U.S. should distribute all economic aid to and through international agencies such as the UN. This would eliminate the problem of economic aid having political and ideological "strings" attached.
- C. The U.S. should give preferential tariff rates to the products of developing countries, as has been suggested by the UN Conference on Trade and Development. An initial 10% tariff reduction for these products would indicate our support for industrialization projects in Asia and throughout the Third World generally.

These initiatives would have two important benefits. They would significantly increase our commitment to world organizations. The specific benefit in U.S.-China relations would be to lessen China's fears that the U.S. seeks to encircle her with a ring of client states. This would decrease tension throughout Asia.

3. Sino-Soviet Relations

There is a ten-year history of PRC-USSR tension which has occasionally flared into violent border incidents. There is not much that the U.S. can do directly to settle this ideological dispute, but there are some things we can do to help keep it from escalating further. The U.S. should be aware that both the USSR and the PRC fear U.S. collusion with one side or the other. We must make it clear to both the Chinese and the Russians that we will not take sides in any Sino-Soviet conflict, that we seek the cooperation of both in building world peace, that we oppose Sino-Soviet military clashes, and that, in the interests of all the world's people, we hope they can settle their disputes without the use of armed force.

4. International Organizations

A key element of a world where war is not used to settle international conflicts is the existence of strong international organizations and an effective system of world law. Now

that the PRC is seated in the UN, the world is watching to see how she will use the agencies of that body. Chinese and American participation in the UN programs such as the UN Volunteers or the new disaster relief agency will not only strengthen the UN, but will provide further opportunities for valuable people-to-people communication.

If the U.S. government can articulate long-range foreign policy goals that are transnational in character, and the pursue these goals through an Initiatives Policy, we may help turn the course of world affairs away from war and towards the cooperation necessary for the future well-being of all the world's peoples. The necessary changes will not come easily. It took the U.S. 20 years to overcome the concepts that led us to ignore the PRC; how much longer will it take to overcome centuries of war-oriented foreign policy and move to a more peace-oriented foreign policy? Still, each time that our government has the chance to put U.S. foreign policy on this new footing, peace concerned people must encourage it to do so. The present stage of U.S.-China relations offers one of these opportunities for pressure on the government to use a peace Initiatives Policy.

ACTION SUGGESTIONS

The past year has seen major shifts in U.S.-China relations. Public attitudes about the PRC have been pushed suddenly and hard towards a redefinition of 20 year old concepts. Of course, this redefinition is necessary, but it must be approached in a rational, long-range manner. The task confronting concerned people now is how to translate the euphoria and public interest so evident after President Nixon's visit to China into a fruitful consideration of the hard problems ahead as we "normalize relations" between our country and the PRC.

What can you, as an individual or as a member of a group, do to help in this process?

INFORM YOURSELF

This Resource Kit is only an introduction to some of the problems that need to be solved and to the directions in which U.S. policy should move.

1. For further information, you can read some of the books listed in the resources section of this Kit.
2. You can subscribe to one of the China-oriented periodicals, like the AFSC's "Understanding China Newsletter", which can help you keep abreast of new developments and their impli-

cations. The "Resources" sections has information on how you can subscribe to these periodicals.

3. You can join one of the many organizations working in the field of U.S.-China relations, like the National Committee on United States-China Relations.

However, informing yourself is only the first step in what you can do.

HELP OTHERS BECOME INFORMED


1. If you belong to a church or synagogue you can suggest your Social Concerns Committee purchase copies of this Kit and use them as the basis for a discussion program on China.
2. If you belong to a peace groups or a political club, you can survey the local candidates from your Congressional district on China issues. Design a questionnaire soliciting their opinions about President Nixon's initiatives, about recent policy changes, and, most important, about the direction in which U.S. China policy should move. You can then publish the results in your local newspaper, giving concerned people in your area another tool for evaluating the candidates. The New York AFSC Office has information to help you design your questionnaire.
3. Survey your local library to determine what information on China is available. Do the books and periodicals represent a broad spectrum of opinion? Does the library receive any of the periodicals listed in the resources section of this Kit? You can use the "Resources" section as a checklist in surveying the library. An Annotated Guide to Contemporary China, which is listed in the "Resources" section, is also a good checklist. While you cannot expect a local library to have all of the 120 books listed in the Guide, a well-stocked library should have one or two books from each of the sub-divisions in the Guide (History, First Hand Impressions, China in World Politics, etc.). You can then meet with the librarian to discuss ways to round out the library's collection on China. You could offer to ask one of the civic organizations in your community to donate new books on China to the library.
4. You can offer to supply a literature display on China for local churches, synagogues, or libraries. Such a display could include books mentioned in the resources section of this Kit, copies of one of the policy recommendations booklets, like the AFSC's U.S. China Policy: A Fresh Start, so people can purchase and read it, copies of this Resource Kit and some eye-catching graphic materials like a map of China or pictures of Chinese life. The AFSC has materials for displays available to local community groups.
5. You can offer to arrange a series of programs on China for the local Rotary Club or a group in your own church or synagogue. Such a series should include both films and speakers. The first meeting, on China's modern history could feature one of the many good films like "Mao Tse-tung" available from McGraw-Hill Contemporary Films. The second meeting, on life

in China today, could feature a report by one of the Americans who have recently visited the PRC. Many of these visitors have good collections of slides which depict life in the cities and in the countryside. For the third meeting, you can arrange for a speaker from the National Committee on United States-China Relations to talk about U.S. policy choices and directions.

If the group is not yet willing to commit itself to a series any one of the programs could be used alone as an introduction to China concerns.

6. Many organizations are developing curriculum units to teach about China in high schools. Does your community's high school offer courses on China? If so, are they balanced in their presentation of Chinese life and politics? If not, or if the school has no courses on China, you can put together a packet of educational materials on China such as Intercom #68, A Critical Guide to Curriculum Units and Audio-Visual Materials on China (by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations), this Resource Kit, the China Pac (by Maryknoll Publications), etc. You can then meet with the principal or the head of the social studies department to discuss starting a course on China. If the school has an adult education program, you could also suggest a course on the PRC for adults.

Before you approach your local schools, you will want to anticipate and recognize some of the problems you may meet. The New York AFSC office has designed a simulation game, DECISION MAKERS, which can help you decide how best to approach the schools. Play it with a group of people who share your concern about local education on China, then analyze and discuss its implications for your community. DECISION MAKERS is available from the New York AFSC Office.



GROUP PROJECTS

1. Organize a film preview for the program chairmen of your area's religious and civic organizations. First, decide on a place to hold the preview; it should be a room large enough to comfortably hold everyone you expect to attend, but not so big that discussion after the films will be inhibited. Choose two or three films to show (use A Critical Guide to Curriculum Units and Audio-Visual Materials on China for suggestions of films and where to obtain them) and then preview them for your own group a week before the program. Prepare some discussion guides on the films to use at the program.

The night of the program, have evaluation sheets for the program chairmen to fill out after each film, asking what kinds of groups the film is suitable for, their specific reactions to the film in terms of their own group, and how they think their group would respond to a program on the PRC. After you've shown all these films discuss the films and their appropriateness with the audience. You should have literature and information available on other program resources. You will find that discussion is more relaxed and open if you serve refreshments like coffee and cookies to put the audience at ease.

After the program, go over the evaluation sheets, and follow up on groups which expressed interest. Meet with the individual program chairmen and tailor a program to his or her group's special interest.

2. If your own group seems reluctant or slow to get moving on the issue of China, spend one meeting filling out and discussing a questionnaire on the group's feelings about the issues. The New York AFSC Office has sample questionnaires available. This activity can help you determine where the group needs more information and programs can be planned accordingly.
3. After your local group has had a few programs and discussions on China-U.S. relations, you should find out what your national organization has been doing on China. Write to ask them for any information or resolutions they may have prepared on China. If they don't have any, this evidence of interest on the part of a local affiliate may stimulate them to develop an official stand. Your group can help by forwarding to your national body any draft resolutions on China that you have developed locally.
4. Your group can hold a "China evening" for members of the community. Get a speaker who has recently returned from China and who has slides or films from the visit, (the New York AFSC Office has information on how you can contact such speakers). Before the program, have a Chinese meal with chopsticks and authentic food. People from your area can come to dinner, meet the speaker informally, and then see the film, with discussion afterwards. This is a good way to reach those people who do not belong to any organization that could expose them to China concerns.

5. In your church, synagogue, or local group's meeting place you can set up a continuing bulletin board display. Each week, you can post news articles about China, or recent editions of periodicals or newsletters. This ever-changing display will help keep China in people's minds.

The above list of programs is far from exhaustive. The AFSC, and other groups listed in the "Resources" section of this Kit, have other materials and program ideas available.

RESOURCES

The number of books, journals, and magazine articles available on China precludes our making a complete list here. Instead, we have tried to indicate some of the basic works on the subject. For the most part, the books and pamphlets listed here have bibliographies of their own which can serve as a guide to further resources.

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

Background and History

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, China After the Cultural Revolution. Random House, Vintage Books, 1970. 247 pp. \$1.95 paperback.

Focuses on the causes and consequences of the Cultural Revolution. Has sections on major events in the Cultural Revolution, its impact on economics and foreign policy, and Mao's scientific education policies. On the whole, useful material for both specialists and general readers.

Clubb, O. Edmund, Twentieth Century China. Columbia University Press, 1964. 470 pp. \$2.75 paperback.

A political history of China from the fall of the Manchu Dynasty through the first four years of Communist rule. Provides a good general introduction to the key people and processes active in 20th Century China. Contains a chronology, maps, and a bibliography.

Fairbank, John K., The United States and China, 3rd edition. Harvard University Press, 1971. 500 pp. \$2.45 paperback.

A general survey of China's historical development and political traditions, based on the assumption that U.S.-China policy must take account of China's own social change process. Considered to be the essential introduction to Chinese history and politics.

Okenberg, Michael, China: The Convulsive Society. Foreign Policy Association. Headline Series #203, 1970. 78 pp. \$1.00. ✓

A concise introduction to the Cultural Revolution and its impact on China's political and social life. Includes a discussion of the foreign policy implications of China's domestic politics.

U. S. - China Policy

American Friends Service Committee, U.S. China Policy: A Fresh Start. AFSC. 1971. 33 pp. 50¢. ✓

A review of the history of U.S.-China relations and recommendations for future policy directions.

Barnett, A. Doak, A New U.S. Policy Toward China. The Brookings Institution, 1971. 132 pp. \$2.50 paperback.

Examines the whole range of issues which the U.S. must face in developing a new China policy, taking good account of the difficulties that lie ahead.

Cohen, Jerome, et al, Taiwan and American Policy: The Dilemma in U.S. China Relations. Praeger, 1971. 176 pp. \$2.50 paperback.

Six papers and edited discussion which resulted from a conference cosponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations and the League of Women Voters. Illuminates the various dimensions of the most immediate obstacle to "normalization of relations".

First Hand Reports

Durdin, Tillman et al., Reports From Red China. Quadrangle Books, 1971. \$6.95.

A compilation of the articles written by New York Times reporters Tillman Durdin, James Reston and Seymour Topping during visits to the PRC in 1971.

Snow, Edgar, Red Star Over China, Grove Press, 1961. 529 pp. \$1.75 paperback.

In 1936, Edgar Snow travelled to the Chinese Communist strongholds in Northwest China, and spent 3 months interviewing Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants. This report of the early years of Chinese Communism represents invaluable information.

Snow, Edgar, The Other Side of the River, Random House, 1962. 810 pp. \$13.00.

Another eyewitness report by this sympathetic observer, this time of a visit in 1960. Very readable, with some good accounts of daily life in the PRC.

Educational Materials and Bibliographies

A Critical Guide to Curriculum Units and Audio Visual Material on China. National Committee on United States-China Relations, 1969. 50¢.

This valuable guide includes a comprehensive view of the strengths and weaknesses in materials for junior and senior high school students. Also for program planners an annotated listing of the films, filmstrips, slides, and other audio-visual materials are available.

An Annotated Guide to Contemporary China, National Committee on United States-China Relations, 1971. 50¢.

A very useful layman's bibliography of 120 books and seven periodicals on modern China. Thoroughly annotated.

Basic Bookshelf on China for High Schools, National Committee on United States-China Relations, 1971. no fee.

A list of 37 books and publications considered basic for teaching about China in high schools. Available from the National Committee Field Staff Representative, Center for Chinese Studies, 104 Lane Hall, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104.

"Understanding U.S.-China Relations", Intercom #68. Center for War/Peace Studies, 1971. \$1.50.

Includes 3 high school social studies units on China and a comprehensive list of teaching materials, books, and films. Extremely valuable for social studies teachers and other educators.

PERIODICALS

The China Quarterly, Research Publications, 11 Nelson Road, London, SE 10, England. Quarterly: \$7.50 per year.

An international scholarly journal devoted to the PRC and the history of Chinese Communism. Includes book reviews and current documents from China.

Peking Review, Peking China. Weekly: \$4.00 per year. Available from China Publications, 95 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003.

Documents, speeches and articles giving the official PRC view of developments in China and in international affairs.

Understanding China Newsletter, American Friends Service Committee
P. O. Box 203, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48107. Bimonthly: \$3.00 con-
tribution.

Contains short articles of interest to the general reader ex-
amining recent events in the PRC and U.S. Policy.

FILMS

In addition to the lists of films mentioned above, McGraw Hill Con-
temporary Films (330 West 42 Street, New York City 10036) has a good
selection of films on China available for rental.

SPEAKERS

The National Committee on United States-China Relations maintains a
New York City speakers bureau through its Columbia University Field
Staff. Contact the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New
York, New York 10027.