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ABSTRACT
        The purpose of this study was to determine if there
was a relationship between the organization representing the teachers
at the bargaining table and a) the salary paid to teachers, b) the
ratio of items of school districts' internal budgets, and c) the
policies associated with teacher working conditions in school
districts in the State of Illinois. A questionnaire, mailed to the
school districts with 750 or more students, requested information
pertaining to the negotiation process and fringe benefits in monetary
amounts and for a copy of the 1968-69 contractual agreement between
the teacher organization and the board of education. Information from
the Office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction showed
internal budgetary amounts, assessed valuation data and teacher
salary. The chi square statistical procedure was used to analyze
categorical variable such as educational practices. Multiple linear
regression was used to analyze continuous variables such as wealth of
the school district as measured by the assessed valuation of the
school district, size of the school district, and mean years of
teaching experience of the teachers. The residuals of the multiple
regression were then used to conduct a one-way analysis of variance.
The study indicated that a) future administrators had better be
prepared for some "hard" negotiating when they accept positions as
superintendents, b) professional negotiations involve non-monetary as
well as monetary concerns, and c) the decline in the teacher job
market and in financial support in education will place a greater
emphasis on job security. (Author/MJM)

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Effects of Teacher Organizational Membership On School Expenditures and Policies In Illinois

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Text of Summary

The purpose of this study was to determine if there was a rela-
tionship between the teacher organization represented at the
bargaining table and 1) the salary paid to teachers, 2) the
ratio of items of school districts' internal budgets, and 3) the
policies associated with teacher working conditions in school
districts in the state of Illinois.

Lists of school districts were obtained from the Illinois Federa-
tion of Teachers and the Illinois Education Association in which
they had exclusive bargaining representation. A third list was
made up of school districts not included on the two previously
named lists. A questionnaire was mailed to the school districts
on each of the lists in which the enrollment was above 750 students
requesting information pertaining to the negotiation process and
fringe benefits in monetary amounts and for a copy of the 1968-69
contractual agreement between the teacher organization and the
board of education. Information from the Office of the Superin-
tendent of Public Instruction showed internal budgetary amounts,
assessed valuation data and teacher salary data.

The statistics used to analyze the data were: 1) the chi square
on the non-monetary items as follows: a) educational practices
and policies in a school district, b) organizational rights and
benefits resulting from negotiations, and c) teacher welfare bene-
fits; 2) the multiple linear regression was used for monetary items
to remove the effects of the wealth of the school district as
measured by the assessed valuation of the school district, the
size of the school district and the mean years of teaching experi-
ence of the teachers. The residuals of the multiple regression
were then used to conduct a one-way analysis of variance. The
Fisher technique was used where the F-value was significant (.05)
as follows: a) beginning and maximum salary paid to teachers with
a B.A. degree, b) beginning and maximum salary paid to teachers
with a M.A. degree, c) maximum salary paid to teachers, d) average
salary paid to teachers, e) average fringe benefits paid to tea-
chers, f) the administrative cost per pupil, g) the instructional
cost per pupil, h) the ratio of administrative cost to instruction-
al cost, i) the ratio of supply cost to instructional cost, and
j) the ratio of instructional cost to total operational cost.

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The following conclusions seem to be justified from this study:

1. It appears that teachers in Illinois school districts in which the Illinois Federation of Teachers held exclusive negotiation rights had greater benefits than did teachers represented by the Illinois Education Association and teachers in the Independent school districts as shown by beginning salary for the B.A. and M.A. degrees, fringe benefits paid to teachers, educational practices and policies, organizational rights and benefits, and teacher welfare benefits.

2. Both Illinois Federation of Teachers districts and Illinois Education Association districts had significantly higher mean salaries paid to teachers than the Independent Districts.

3. There was no significant difference (.05) in the ratio of items of school districts' internal budgets as shown by administrative cost to instructional cost, supply cost to instructional cost, instructional cost to total operational cost, as well as, administrative cost per pupil and instructional cost per pupil.

4. Teachers in districts where negotiation rights were with the national and state organizations seemed to have several more benefits than did the independent organization group.

This study seems to indicate that future administrators had better be prepared for some "hard" negotiating when they accept positions as superintendents. Training for this could be made available through the services of a university. Likewise, it seems appropriate to mention that professional negotiations involve "non-monetary" items as well as monetary remuneration. It would seem that as there is a decline in the teacher job market and in the financial support of education there will be a greater emphasis in negotiation placed on items pertaining to job security.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF DATA

The analysis of the data was organized under three major

headings: (1) Salary and Benefits, (2) Internal Budgetary

Ratios, and (3) Educational Policies Associated with Teacher

Conditions. Schools in which teachers were represented by the

Illinois Federation of Teachers (IFT), the Illinois Education

Association (IEA), and the Independent Districts (ID), were

compared on the above categories.

Salary and Benefits

This section concerns the salaries and monetary fringe

benefits teachers received from the school districts. The

organizations representing teachers at the bargaining table

were the independent variables.

The multiple linear regression was performed between the

dependent variable and the assessed valuation per pupil, school

district enrollment, and mean years of teaching experience.

Residuals were computed and and ANOVA calculated using them.

The Fisher technique was again used when the F-value was sig-

nificant. The .05 level of significance was selected for all

statistical tests, however, the .01 level was reported when it

was obtained.

The major hypothesis to be tested was:

H_1: The amount of salary and benefits paid to teachers is

related to the teacher organizations represented at the bargain-

ing tables after the linear effects of the assessed valuation

per pupil, school district enrollment, and mean years of teaching experience have been removed using the multiple linear regression analysis. **This was used on all subordinate hypotheses,** The results of the test are shown in Table 1. The following **subordinate hypotheses using the ANOVA with controls were re-**jected because the computed F-values were insufficient to suggest that there was a significant difference (.05) between the groups:

There is a significant relationship between the teacher organization represented at the bargaining table and:

H_{1b}: The average of the maximum salary paid to teachers with bachelor's degrees.

H_{1d}: The average of the maximum salary paid to teachers with master's degrees.

H_{1e}: The average of the maximum salary paid to teachers.

H_{1h}: The average of the salaries paid to the superinten-dents.

The following subordinate hypotheses were retained because the computed F-values were sufficient to suggest that there were significant differences (.05) among the groups:

There is a significant relationship between the teacher organization represented at the bargaining table and:

H_{1a}: The beginning salary paid to teachers with bachelor's degrees.

H_{1c}: The average of the beginning salary paid to teachers with master's degrees.

H_{1f}: The mean average salary of teachers. The level of

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significance was .01.

H_{1i}: The average fringe benefits paid to teachers. The level of a significance was .01.

<center>Internal Budgetary Ratios</center>

This section of the research compares different parts of the school districts' budgets (by percentages of the budget) and teacher organization affiliation. The statistical procedure utilized was the same as discussed in the Salary and Benefits section.

The major hypothesis to be tested was:

H_2: Internal budgetary ratios are related to the teacher organizations represented at the bargaining tables after the linear effects of the assessed valuation per pupil, school district enrollment, and mean years of teaching experience have been removed using the multiple linear regression analysis.

In order to test the major hypothesis several subordinate hypotheses were developed and tested.

Following multiple linear regression analysis, the residuals for the subordinate hypotheses were used to conduct an ANOVA analysis to test the subordinate hypotheses that the unexplained variance could be attributable to organizational affiliation. The results of the test are shown in Table 2. All of the subordinate hypotheses using the ANOVA with controls were rejected because the computed F-values were insufficient to support that there was a significant difference (.05) between the groups.

H_{2a}: The administrative cost per pupil

<center>5</center>

H_{2b}: The instructional cost per pupil

H_{2c}: The ratio of administrative cost to instructional cost.

H_{2d}: The ratio of supply cost to instructional cost

H_{2e}: The ratio of instructional cost to total operational cost.

Educational Policies Associated with Teacher Working Conditions

This section of the report relates to all of the nonmonetary items which had been negotiated and appeared in the contracts between teacher organizations and the boards of education.

The statistical procedure utilized in order to test the hypothesis was the chi square. The .05 level of significance was selected for this statistical test. Three 2 x 2 contingency tables were developed for each item except for number one where three 2 x 5 contingency tables were used. An organizational comparison was made using these tables. Where insufficient variation existed to justify a chi square test the items were indicated and reported in percentage scores.

The principal hypothesis to be tested was:

H_3: Educational policies associated with teacher working conditions in school districts are related to the teacher organizations represented at the bargaining tables.

The major hypothesis was tested by the development of several subordinate hypotheses.

H_{3a}: There is a significant relationship between the teacher organizations represented at the bargaining table and the educational practice and policies in a school district.

In examining the 27 items in Table 16, seven of them had insufficient variation to justify a chi square test. However, in each case the IFT had a larger percentage of their group indicate "yes" than either of the other two organizations. Six other items had one of the three paired comparisons with insufficient variation to justify a chi square, but in each case an IFT-IEA comparison was not involved. Of the 20 items remaining where a chi square could be calculated there were signifcant differences between 18 items indicating IFT>IEA and 17 items indicating IFT>ID. The evidence seems to support retention of the hypothesis.

H3b: There is a significant relationship between the teacher organizations represen'ed at the bargaining table and the organizational rights and benefits resulting from negotiations.

Summary data for the chi square are presented in Table 4. Of the seven items where the chi square had been calculated there were significant differences between the groups. All seven items indicated IFT>IEA, while six items indicated IFT>ID. The evidence seemed to warrant a retention of the hypothesis.

H3c: There is a significant relationship between the teacher organization represented at the bargaining table and the teacher welfare benefits.

The data in Table 5 show a total of five items where insufficient variation existed to justify a chi square test.

For items where a chi square could be calculated there were significant differences between the groups as shown: IFT>IEA on 12 items and IEA>IFT on one item, and IFT>ID on all items.

The evidence seems to warrant the retention of the hypothesis.

The majority of items in this section were found to have been more successfully negotiated by the IFT organization than either the IEA or ID. Some of the items that had a significant difference favoring the IFT organization were: class size, teaching load, planning time, before and after school attendance, activity pay rate, determination of when paid, cumulative sick leave, amount of personal leave, obtaining sabbatical leave, secretarial help, teacher lounge, and pay for courses taken at universities. Only one item, "other district teacher service allowed," had a significant difference favoring the IEA.

TABLE 1

TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FACTORS AND ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING TEACHERS USING THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH CONTROLS

Hypotheses Tested	F Value	Level of Significance	Results
There is a significant relationship between the teacher organization represented at the bargaining table and:			
H_{1a}: The average of the beginning salary paid to teachers with bachelor's degrees	9.051	.01	IFT>IEA, IFT>ID, IEA=ID
H_{1b}: The average of the maximum salary paid to teachers with bachelor's degrees	0.685	n.s.	
H_{1c}: The average of the beginning salary paid to teachers with master's degrees	8.183	.01	IFT>IEA, IFT>ID, IEA=ID
H_{1d}: The average of the maximum salary paid to teachers with master's degrees	0.310	n.s.	
H_{1e}: The average of the maximum salary paid to teachers	0.537	n.s.	

TABLE 1 (continued)

H_{1f}:	The mean average salary of teachers	5.178	.01	IFT=IEA, IFT>ID, IEA>ID
H_{1h}:	The average salaries paid to the superintendents	0.507	n.s.	
H_{1i}:	The fringe benefits paid to teachers	28.322	.01	IFT>IEA, IFT>ID, IEA=ID

$p = .05$, $F(2,225) = 3.04$

$p = .1$, $F(2,225) = 4.71$

TABLE 2

TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FACTORS AND ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING TEACHERS USING THE ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE WITH CONTROLS

Hypotheses Tested	F Value	Level of Significance
There is a significant relationship between the teacher organization represented at the bargaining table and:		
H_{2a}: The administrative cost per pupil	0.372	n.s.
H_{2b}: The instructional cost per pupil	0.119	n.s.
H_{2c}: The ratio of administrative cost to instructional cost	1.454	n.s.
H_{2d}: The ratio of supply cost to instructional cost	0.750	n.s.
H_{2e}: The ratio of instructional cost to total operational cost	2.950	n.s.

$p = .05$, $F(2, 225) = 3.04$

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TABLE 3

TEACHER ORGANIZATIONAL COMPARISON AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION FOR THE EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES RESULTING FROM NEGOTIATIONS

Item	Organization	Frequency	Per cent Response	Organization	Frequency	Per cent Response	Square
1. Determination of use of state grants							
	IFT	3	(9.37)	IEA	0	(0.00)	a
	IFT	3	(9.37)	ID	0	(0.00)	a
	ID	0	(0.00)	IEA	0	(0.00)	a
2. Teacher promotion of educational programs							
	IFT	15	(46.87)	IEA	21	(17.50)	12.061[b]
	IFT	15	(46.87)	ID	5	(6.49)	24.604[b]
	ID	5	(6.49)	IEA	21	(17.50)	4.960[c]
3. Teacher recruitment, assignment							
	IFT	19	(59.37)	IEA	13	(10.83)	35.816[b]
	IFT	19	(59.37)	ID	0	(0.00)	55.370[b]
	ID	0	(0.00)	IEA	13	(10.83)	8.931[b]
4. Teacher promotions							
	IFT	14	(43.75)	IEA	16	(13.33)	14.754[b]
	IFT	14	(43.75)	ID	1	(1.29)	a
	ID	1	(1.29)	IEA	16	(13.33)	8.616[b]
5. Textbook and educational material selection							
	IFT	15	(46.87)	IEA	47	(39.16)	0.622
	IFT	15	(46.87)	ID	10	(12.98)	14.687[b]
	ID	10	(12.98)	IEA	47	(39.16)	13.634[b]
6. Use of teacher aids							
	IFT	31	(96.87)	IEA	33	(27.50)	49.879[b]
	IFT	31	(96.87)	ID	12	(15.58)	62.537[b]
	ID	12	(15.58)	IEA	33	(27.50)	3.778

TABLE 3 (continued)

7. School calendar approval

IFT	32	(100.00)	IEA	69	(57.50)	20.467[b]
IFT	32	(100.00)	ID	44	(57.14)	19.669[b]
ID	44	(57.14)	IEA	69	(57.50)	0.002

8. Pupil promotional policies

IFT	17	(53.12)	IEA	9	(7.50)	37.088[b]
IFT	17	(53.12)	ID	3	(3.89)	36.567[b]
ID	3	(3.89)	IEA	9	(7.50)	1.065

9. Teacher evaluation critieria

IFT	27	(84.32)	IEA	11	(9.16)	76.211[b]
IFT	27	(84.32)	ID	3	(3.89)	73.398[b]
ID	3	(3.89)	IEA	11	(9.16)	1.974

10. Supervision of other teachers

IFT	6	(18.75)	IEA	8	(6.66)	a
IFT	6	(18.75)	ID	0	(0.00)	a
ID	0	(0.00)	IEA	8	(6.66)	a

11. Extra-curricular activities, policies

IFT	29	(90.62)	IEA	54	(45.00)	21.215[b]
IFT	29	(90.62)	ID	16	(20.77)	45.494[b]
ID	16	(20.77)	IEA	54	(45.00)	12.012[b]

12. Racial and cultural teaching materials

IFT	4	(12.50)	IEA	3	(2.51)	a
IFT	4	(12.50)	ID	2	(2.59)	a
ID	2	(2.59)	IEA	3	(2.51)	a

13. Time and number of faculty meetings

IFT	29	(90.62)	IEA	53	(44.16)	21.948[b]
IFT	29	(90.62)	ID	34	(44.15)	20.012[b]
ID	34	(44.15)	IEA	53	(44.16)	0.000

TABLE 3 (continued)

14. Time and number of department meetings

IFT	19	(59.37)	IEA	28	(23.33)	15.364[b]
IFT	19	(59.37)	ID	16	(20.77)	15.447[b]
ID	16	(20.77)	IEA	28	(23.33)	0.176

15. Early dismissal for teacher conferences

IFT	8	(25.00)	IEA	26	(21.66)	0.162
IFT	8	(25.00)	ID	1	(1.29)	a
ID	1	(1.29)	IEA	26	(21.66)	16.452[b]

16. Teacher selection of administrators

IFT	3	(9.37)	IEA	1	(0.83)	a
IFT	3	(9.37)	ID	1	(1.29)	a
ID	1	(1.29)	IEA	1	(0.83)	a

17. Teacher transfers

IFT	24	(75.00)	IEA	29	(24.16)	28.745[b]
IFT	24	(75.00)	ID	7	(9.09)	48.250[b]
ID	7	(9.09)	IEA	29	(24.16)	7.138[b]

18. "Difficult class" assignments

IFT	11	(34.37)	IEA	3	(2.50)	a
IFT	11	(34.37)	ID	3	(3.89)	a
ID	3	(3.89)	IEA	3	(2.50)	a

19. Teacher dismissal procedures

IFT	21	(65.62)	IEA	8	(6.66)	56.880[b]
IFT	21	(65.62)	ID	1	(1.29)	56.063[b]
ID	1	(1.29)	IEA	8	(6.66)	a

20. Teacher dismissal of students from class

IFT	11	(34.37)	IEA	17	(14.17)	6.865[b]
IFT	11	(34.37)	ID	3	(3.89)	a
ID	3	(3.89)	IEA	17	(14.17)	5.424[c]

TABLE 3 (continued)

21. Review of school policies

IFT	27	(84.37)	IEA	29	(24.16)	39.358[b]
IFT	27	(84.37)	ID	9	(11.68)	53.995[b]
ID	9	(11.68)	IEA	29	(24.16)	4.691[c]

22. Organizational selection of educational policies

IFT	20	(62.51)	IEA	10	(8.33)	46.790[b]
IFT	20	(62.51)	ID	1	(1.29)	54.436[b]
ID	1	(1.29)	IEA	10	(8.33)	a

23. Development of definition of academic freedom

IFT	11	(34.37)	IEA	4	(3.33)	a
IFT	11	(34.37)	ID	0	(0.00)	a
ID	0	(0.00)	IEA	4	(3.33)	a

24. Building program of schools

IFT	2	(6.25)	IEA	6	(5.00)	a
IFT	2	(6.25)	ID	1	(1.29)	a
ID	1	(1.29)	IEA	6	(5.00)	a

25. Limited after-school activities of teachers

IFT	32	(100.00)	IEA	73	(60.83)	18.143[b]
IFT	32	(100.00)	ID	42	(54.54)	21.425[b]
ID	42	(54.54)	IEA	73	(60.83)	0.763

26. Inservice program teacher selection

IFT	27	(84.37)	IEA	9	(7.50)	82.601[b]
IFT	27	(84.37)	ID	7	(9.09)	59.694[b]
ID	7	(9.09)	IEA	9	(7.50)	0.159

TABLE 3 (continued)

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27. Right to see evaluation file

IFT	30	(93.75)	IEA	3	(2.50)	123.760[b]
IFT	30	(93.75)	ID	0	(0.00)	99.600[b]
ID	0	(0.00)	IEA	3	(2.50)	a

x^2 (df = 1)

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[a]Insufficient variation exists to justify a chi square test.

[b]Significant at the .01 level (6.64).

[c]Significant at the .05 level (3.84).

TABLE 4

TEACHER ORGANIZATIONAL COMPARISON AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
FOR THE ORGANIZATIONAL RIGHTS AND BENEFITS RESULTING FROM
NEGOTIATIONS

Item	Organization	Frequency	Per cent Response	Organization	Frequency	Per cent Response	Chi Square
1. Payroll membership deductions							
	IFT	32	(100.00)	IEA	53	(44.16)	31.950[a]
	IFT	32	(100.00)	ID	34	(44.15)	29.513[a]
	ID	34	(44.15)	IEA	53	(44.16)	0.000
2. Use of district facilities by organization							
	IFT	32	(100.00)	IEA	74	(61.66)	19.590[a]
	IFT	32	(100.00)	ID	49	(63.63)	15.659[a]
	ID	49	(63.63)	IEA	74	(61.66)	0.078
3. Use of district equipment by organization							
	IFT	30	(93.75)	IEA	63	(53.50)	18.100[a]
	IFT	30	(93.75)	ID	34	(44.15)	22.937[a]
	ID	34	(44.15)	IEA	63	(52.50)	1.307
4. Projected budget information							
	IFT	31	(96.87)	IEA	52	(43.33)	29.217[a]
	IFT	31	(96.87)	ID	8	(10.38)	73.585[a]
	ID	8	(10.38)	IEA	52	(43.33)	b
5. Participation in grievance proceedings with pay							
	IFT	17	(53.12)	IEA	12	(10.00)	30.432[a]
	IFT	17	(53.12)	ID	3	(3.89)	36.567[a]
	ID	3	(3.89)	IEA	12	(10.00)	b
6. Attend conventions with pay							
	IFT	12	(27.50)	IEA	7	(5.83)	23.162[a]
	IFT	12	(27.50)	ID	2	(2.59)	b
	ID	2	(2.59)	IEA	7	(5.83)	b

TABLE 4 (continued)

7. Teacher choice to attend conference meetings

IFT	5	(15.62)	IEA	3	(2.50)	b
IFT	5	(15.62)	ID	2	(2.59)	b
ID	2	(2.59)	IEA	3	(2.50)	b

8. New teacher orientation programs

IFT	20	(62.50)	IEA	17	(14.16)	32.046[a]
IFT	20	(62.50)	ID	5	(6.44)	40.117[a]
ID	5	(6.44)	IEA	17	(14.16)	b

χ^2 (df = 1)

[a]Significant at the .01 level (6.64)

[b]Insufficient variation eixsts to justify a chi square test.

TABLE 5

TEACHER ORGANIZATIONAL COMPARISON AND FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION
FOR THE TEACHER WELFARE BENEFITS RESULTING FROM NEGOTIATIONS

Item	Organization	Frequency	Per cent Response	Organization	Frequency	Per cent Response	Square
1. Maximum class size							
	IFT	25	(78.12)	IEA	45	(37.50)	16.782[a]
	IFT	25	(78.12)	ID	17	(22.07)	29.981[a]
	ID	17	(22.07)	IEA	45	(37.50)	5.172[b]
2. Limited teaching load							
	IFT	27	(84.37)	IEA	39	(32.50)	27.672[a]
	IFT	27	(84.37)	ID	25	(32.46)	24.415[a]
	ID	25	(32.46)	IEA	39	(32.50)	0.000
3. Minimum planning time							
	IFT	28	(87.50)	IEA	27	(22.50)	46.224[a]
	IFT	28	(87.50)	ID	9	(11.68)	57.943[a]
	ID	9	(11.68)	IEA	27	(22.50)	3.671
4. Before and after school teacher attendance							
	IFT	26	(81.25)	IEA	28	(23.33)	36.997[a]
	IFT	26	(81.25)	ID	11	(14.28)	45.208[a]
	ID	11	(14.28)	IEA	28	(23.33)	2.418
5. Military service allowed							
	IFT	11	(34.37)	IEA	37	(30.83)	0.147
	IFT	11	(34.37)	ID	8	(10.38)	9.036[a]
	ID	8	(10.38)	IEA	37	(30.83)	11.122[a]
6. Other district teacher service allowed							
	IFT	9	(28.12)	IEA	67	(55.83)	7.758[a]
	IFT	9	(28.12)	ID	17	(22.07)	0.455
	ID	17	(22.07)	IEA	67	(55.83)	21.851[a]

TABLE 5 (continued)

7. Experience outside of teaching allowed

IFT	7	(21.87)	IEA	20	(16.66)	0.469
IFT	7	(21.87)	ID	3	(3.89)	c
ID	3	(3.89)	IEA	20	(16.66)	7.418[a]

8. Payment rate for after-school activities

IFT	31	(96.87)	IEA	78	(65.00)	12.643[a]
IFT	31	(96.87)	ID	47	(61.03)	14.264[a]
ID	47	(61.03)	IEA	78	(65.00)	0.317

9. Determine when paid

IFT	32	(100.00)	IEA	85	(70.83)	12.125[a]
IFT	32	(100.00)	ID	53	(68.83)	12.790[a]
ID	53	(68.83)	IEA	85	(70.83)	0.090

10. Cumulative sick leave beyond state minimum

IFT	32	(100.00)	IEA	96	(80.00)	7.600[a]
IFT	32	(100.00)	ID	51	(66.23)	14.190[a]
ID	51	(66.23)	IEA	96	(80.00)	4.693[b]

11. Amount of personal leave allowed

IFT	28	(87.50)	IEA	59	(49.16)	15.167
IFT	28	(87.50)	ID	19	(24.67)	36.378[a]
ID	19	(24.67)	IEA	59	(49.16)	11.763[a]

12. Sabbatical leaves of absence

IFT	29	(90.62)	IEA	38	(31.66)	35.626a
IFT	29	(90.62)	ID	6	(7.79)	71.149a
ID	5	(6.49)	IEA	38	(31.66)	15.412[a]

13. Teacher secretarial service

IFT	29	(90.62)	IEA	11	(9.16)	86.450a
IFT	29	(90.62)	ID	5	(6.49)	74.549a
ID	5	(6.49)	IEA	11	(9.16)	c

TABLE 5 (continued)

14. Facilities for teacher comfort

IFT	17	(53.12)	IEA	15	(12.50)	25.086[a]
IFT	17	(53.12)	ID	1	(1.29)	44.041[a]
ID	1	(1.29)	IEA	15	(12.50)	c

15. Severance pay policies

IFT	10	(31.25)	IEA	7	(5.84)	c
IFT	10	(31.25)	ID	0	(0.00)	c
ID	0	(0.00)	IEA	7	(5.84)	c

16. Police protection in schools

IFT	3	(9.37)	IEA	4	(3.33)	c
IFT	3	(9.37)	ID	1	(1.29)	c
ID	1	(1.29)	IEA	4	(3.33)	c

17. Board pays for course tuition

IFT	23	(71.87)	IEA	41	(34.16)	14.736[a]
IFT	23	(71.87)	ID	18	(23.37)	22.658[a]
ID	18	(23.37)	IEA	41	(34.16)	2.603

χ^2 (df = 1)

[a]Significant at the .01 level (6.64).

[b]Significant at the .05 level (3.84).

[c]Insufficient variation eixsts to justify a chi square test.