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## ABSTRACT

This paper examines the importance of diverse variables in determining the political attitudes and opinions of college students in Lebanon. The independent variables in question were: (1) social origin or class, (2) secondary school, (3) university, (4) religious sect, and (5) acceptance (or rejection) and practice (or non-practice) of one's religion. That membership in a religious sect should prove to be the absolutely strongest determinant of political attitudes is no surprise given the specific sociopolitical context of Lebanon. Religion dictates the type of school one will attend, what type of office one may hold, and where, in many cases, one must live. Of minor influence over students' political beliefs is the factor of social class. This is surprising in view of the influence of religion, but this too may change with time. (HS)

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Factors Determining the Political Attitudes of  
Lebanese University Students

by

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## INTRODUCTION

Many professions are ~~inclined~~ to overvalue their own professional status. This trend may be utilized in overcoming the irritations that one generally encounters in every profession. Since a few years teachers, particularly university instructors, seem to experience considerable tensions, and compensate through overvaluation of their professional status, as well as extreme loyalty to the institution of which they are a member.

The validity of such popularized psychological reflections is not our concern here. Nevertheless, the question should be posed as to what reasons lead to the bias evident in numerous sociological and political literature on the subject, "students and politics". In fact, this literature frequently implies that the university, either as an institution or as a framework for specific socially interacting groups, determines the political attitudes of the students. Not infrequently, other societal variables receive only marginal treatment.<sup>1</sup> However, the already long known results of socialization, which has relativated previous assumptions about the importance of educational variables, should produce a certain amount of caution.

### A. Objectives of this paper

This paper will attempt to examine the importance of diverse variables in determining the political attitudes and opinions of students. Particular attention will be devoted to a variable which has been hitherto particularly neglected, that of religion.<sup>2</sup>

In a previous work,<sup>3</sup> this author attempted to show by means of an intercultural comparative study that the variable "religion", has more relevance than previously assumed. This hypothesis

will undergo further testing by<sup>a</sup> research group in Freiburg, who, after having carried out surveys in the Congo<sup>4</sup> and Lebanon, are undertaking further surveys in Columbia, Indonesia, Gabon (field research completed), as well as in India, Peru, and South Africa (in preparation).

Below we will pose the same question, but with a different methodological approach, that is, making a longitudinal comparison within the same country.

### B. The surveys

The data used here were obtained from two surveys carried out by the author in 1961 and 1971. In both cases, the questionnaires and sampling methods were identical. A 10% sample of all Lebanese university students was stratified according to university, school, sex, and religious sect. Within each stratum, a random sample was selected. In 1961, the sample consisted of 400 students, while in 1971 it increased to 1,650 due to the increase in student enrollment.

The interviewees could choose questionnaires in Arabic, English, or French. The reliability of the answers was tested and confirmed in a number of cases by marked questionnaires distributed to individuals known to the author. In order to interpret the data, the results of additional in-depth interviews were used. These interviews were made, besides at the time of the surveys, also in 1965 and 1968.<sup>5</sup>

The data were processed in the computer center of Freiburg University on a Univac 1108 computer, using the SPSS program. For this paper, only correlations with a .000 significance



were used. I am particularly grateful to Dr. Rainer Hampel of the Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institute for his cooperation during the processing of the data. Any errors are entirely my own responsibility.

C. The sociopolitical setting<sup>6</sup>

In contrast with many homogeneous national states, Lebanon is basically characterized by numerous, interdependent "communities", each possessing religious, ethnic, and cultural elements. These communities are simultaneously religious and ethnic groupings, and belong to different cultures both in behavior and in self-perception.

About half of the total population of Lebanon consists of the various Christian communities: Maronites, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenians, Syrian, Assyrian, and Chaldean Christians. The Moslem Sunnite, Shiite, and Druze account for the remainder of the population. Thus, Lebanon is composed of multifarious religious minorities. The strongest Christian community, the Maronites, represent almost a third of the population. The strongest Moslem group, the Sunnites, constitute about one-fifth of the population.

These basic social realities find a parallel in the political system of the country, a "concord democracy"<sup>7</sup> with a parliamentary basis. In 1943, a National Pact was concluded between the Moslem and Christian communities upon achieving independence. According to the Pact, the most important offices in the state are proportionately distributed among the various communities. The President is always a Maronite, the Prime Minister a Sunnite,

and the Speaker of the House, a Shiite. Each community disposes over a fixed number of seats in the National Assembly, and Ministers in the government, corresponding to its number in the total population.<sup>8</sup>

A fundamental political compromise between the Christians and Moslems is incorporated in the National Pact. Lebanese nationalism, which demands independence and a Western-oriented policy, is advocated by the Lebanese Christians. The Lebanese Moslems, however, are adherents of Arab nationalism, or inclusion of Lebanon within a Pan-Arab state. The compromise of the National Pact has required that the Moslems renounce Pan-Arab nationalism and endorse Lebanese sovereignty. The Christians, on the other hand, must recognize the Arab character of the country in a foreign policy based on Arab solidarity, while disclaiming any alliances with the West.

Besides the traditional confrontation between Lebanese and Arab nationalism, new political tendencies have developed in the country over the past few years, and especially since the June war of 1967. Both the Marxist and non-Marxist left, although unable to gain influence in Parliament and the government, have gained leverage among the intelligentsia. Whereas the classical pattern of confrontation of the two nationalisms questions the national identity of Lebanon and ultimately returns to the compromise of the National Pact, the leftists oppose the status quo, and the weakness peculiar to the "concord democracies", in introducing social and political innovations.<sup>9</sup>



D. The institutional frame of the educational system<sup>10</sup>

The Lebanese Constitution permits the Moslem and Christian communities to maintain their own schools, thus taking into account the historical development of the Lebanese school system. The schools were primarily created by the communities, and in the case of Christian schools, with the support of the foreign missionary societies. Consequently, an educational system of astonishing diversity emerged.

Today, there are four clearly distinguishable systems of education: The private schools of the Franco-Latin type, a private system of schools of the Anglo-Saxon type, an official system of government schools, and a system of Moslem private schools.

The system of the Franco-Latin type follows French educational philosophy, curriculum, and methods; the medium of instruction is French and Arabic. These schools are attended by members of the Christian communities, primarily by the Catholics; there is also a small minority of Moslem pupils. The Anglo-Saxon system similarly orients itself after British and American models; its clientele is recruited primarily from the Protestant, Armenian Orthodox, and in part from the Greek Orthodox communities. The government schooling system closely follows the French curriculum and educational philosophy; Arabic, however, predominates as the medium of instruction, and Moslems form the bare majority of the pupils. Finally, the Moslem schools are attended almost exclusively by Moslem students, and conform to the Egyptian curriculum and methods of education. They also partially resemble the government school system.

All four school systems have their own central administrations, and receive subsidies from France, the United States and Egypt. All four systems, moreover, have their own universities. The Universite St. Joseph (USJ); a French Jesuit university, and its complementary Centre d'Etudes Supérieures, a French government institution, form the highest level of the Franco-Latin system. The American University of Beirut (AUB) is the apex of the Anglo-Saxon system. These universities were established in 1875 and 1876, respectively. A government university, the Lebanese University (LU), was founded in 1952. In 1961, the Arab University (AU) was established as an institution of higher learning for the Moslem students. The students of these universities are recruited predominantly, although not exclusively, from their respective secondary school systems. The standards of USJ and AUB are considered to be quite higher than those of LU and AU.

As this brief overview demonstrates, Lebanon and its educational system presents itself as a most interesting object of social science research. A study about Lebanon may not be cross-national, but the plurality and segmentation of the population and of the educational institutions do make it intercultural.

## II. The independent variables

From among a number of independent variables that could be of significance for political attitudes among Lebanese university students, the following proved to be the most important. First,

social origin, or class, 2) secondary school, 3) university, 4) religious sect, and 5) acceptance (or rejection) and practice (or non-practice) of one's religion. Sex proved to be significant in only a limited capacity. Below, we will first attempt to briefly explain the independent variables, taking into consideration the differences between the surveys of 1961 and 1971. The most important general difference between the surveys is the quantitative increase in the Lebanese student body. Whereas, in 1961 there were only 4000 Lebanese at the four universities, there were between 16,000 and 17,000 in 1971.<sup>11</sup> The sample, therefore, comprised 400 students in 1961 and 1,650 in 1971.

#### A. Social origin and class

The overwhelming majority of the Lebanese student body was recruited, both in 1961 and 1971, from among the upper and the middle strata. In both surveys the upper stratum provided nearly one fifth, the upper and middle strata, about half, and the lower stratum, only a quarter of the total student body. One essential difference between the surveys is noticeable; while the members of the urban and rural lower strata were represented only marginally in 1961 by 3.3 %, their share in 1971 rose to almost 10%. The relative proportion of the lower- middle strata decreased only slightly.

The fact that members of the lower strata have now also found access to university education is essentially a result of the physical expansion of the Lebanese and Arab universities. The pattern of distribution of the social classes is essentially the same among Christian and Moslem students.

### B. Secondary school

The recruitment pattern from the various secondary school systems has been dramatically altered between 1961 and 1971, as is exemplified in Table 1. First, there was a substantial increase in students coming from government schools. This is due, on the one hand, to the strong expansion of the government secondary school system during the last decade, and on the other hand, to the fact that the graduates of these schools normally go to the government-administered Lebanese University. Secondly, although the share of graduates of the schools of the Franco-Latin type has decreased in proportion to the entire student body, they are still the absolute and relative majority. Thirdly, there was a relative decline in students from the Anglo-Saxon schools, while those from the Moslem schools increased slightly.

### C. University

The growth in enrollment between 1961 and 1971 has left its impact in different ways on each of the four universities.

The Lebanese University student body has grown from 20.2% to 36.8%, and has the highest number (38.4%) of its students, compared to the other universities, from the lower-middle, urban, and rural strata. The upper and upper-middle strata provide 46% of the enrollment. The greatest proportion of students with a rural background attend the Lebanese University.

Student enrollment at the Arab University also increased from 5.6% to 16.7%. The upper and upper-middle strata account for 56% of the enrollment.

Table 1. Recruitment from the Secondary School Systems

Year	1961	1971
School type	%	%
Government	8.1	29.2
Franco-Latin	71.3	48.6
Anglo-Saxon	14.5	12.5
Moslem	6.1	8.6
Other	0.0	1.1

The two foreign universities, USJ and AUB, suffered relative depreciation in student enrollment, from 51.5% to 31.1% at USJ, and from 22.7% to 11.2% at AUB. Students from the upper and upper-middle strata constitute almost three fourths of the student body at both universities.

The differences in the social composition among the universities has increased slightly between 1961 and 1971. The major reason for these differences is the fact that the tuition fees are considerably higher at the two foreign universities than at the Arab and the Lebanese universities.

Recruitment along sectarian lines was about the same at all four universities, both in 1961 and 1971. At USJ, about 90% of the students are Christian, at AUB nearly three quarters, and at the Lebanese University somewhat more than 60%. The Arab University, instead, has almost 90% Moslem students. The recruitment pattern of the four universities has changed somewhat between 1961 and 1971 with respect to the various secondary school systems.

That is to say, there is a stronger recruitment from the particular secondary school system corresponding to the university: 93% of the USJ students come from schools of the Franco-Latin type, 60.3% of the AUB students come from schools of the Anglo-



Saxon type, half of the UL students come from government schools and nearly half of the UA students come from Moslem schools.

The most important transfer trends from one system to another are the following: One fourth of the Lebanese students of the AUB come from Franco-Latin schools, as does one third of the UL students. Nearly one third of the UA students were enrolled in the government schools. Graduates of the government schools, however, are only a minute minority at USJ and AUB.

#### D. Religion

Linked with the increase of the entire number of students, there is a considerable shift in the religious composition of the student body. There has been a relative decrease in the number of Christian students from three fourths in 1961 to 60.4 % in 1971. The share of the Moslems has risen from one quarter to 36.1%. Particularly astonishing, is the increase in the Shiite students from 4.3% to 9.9%, and that of the Druze from 0.5% to 2.7%.

These changes reflect the result of the Lebanese efforts to eliminate the educational lag of the Moslem population. Nevertheless, the proportion of Moslem students in 1971 had not risen to correspond to the total proportion of Moslems in Lebanon (about 50%). Moreover, a qualitative Moslem educational lag persists, since the greatest share of the student enrollment at the two best universities, USJ and AUB, is Christian. Developments within the domain of secondary schooling, however, permit us to identify a clear trend, at least, in the direction of a further quantitative diminution of the Moslem-Christian

educational gap.

E. Degree of Agreement with and Practice of one's Religion

As stated in the introduction, membership in a religious sect in Lebanon implies simultaneous membership in a social, ethnic, and cultural group with its own identity. The significance of such group membership as a societal variable is obvious. Beyond that, however, acceptance of one's religion as a system of convictions, and the exercise of religious activities connected therewith, should also be investigated for their social significance. For this reason, a variable was introduced which was separate from mere membership in the religious group. In order to determine the degree of agreement with one's religion, the subjects were asked whether they considered religion to be important, and whether they believed in a life after death and in all their religious doctrines. Also included was a question pertaining to the importance of visiting places of worship as a measure of religious activeness.

The results of the surveys in 1961 and 1971 exhibited the greatest differentiation in the variable just described. In 1961, 68.% of the students considered religion to be important, while in 1971, only 49.9% thought so. In 1961, no fewer than 73.3% believed in a life after death, 67.2% in compensatory justice, and 61.8% in all the teachings of their respective religions. The corresponding figures for 1971 are: 51.9%, 50.8%, and 24.3%. In other words, whereas a decade ago over 60% of all students fully agreed with their religion, this was true of only a minority of 44.3% in 1971. It appears from the data, therefore, that there is a strong trend toward secularism.

Even more interesting, however, than the decrease in religious conviction is the decline in religious practice. In 1961, 28.8% of the students regularly visited places of religious worship, 26.5% did so frequently, 30.7% occasionally, and only 10% never. In 1971, 14.6 % indicated regular attendance at religious services, 16.4% did so frequently, 37.1% occasionally, while 28.7% never set foot into a church or mosque. The percentage of students who attended religious services at one time or another dropped from 86% in 1961 to 68.1% in 1971.

It is noteworthy that the proportion of those who attend religious services is higher than the proportion of those who agree with the basic teachings of Christianity and of Islam. Apparently, a number of those who no longer, or only partially adhere to the teachings of their religion, still go to the church or mosque. This may signify that the social pressure for demonstrating one's membership in a religious sect through such activity, is still eminent in Lebanon.

### III. The dependent variables

#### A. Interest in politics

The Lebanese student body has a strong interest in politics. The survey of 1961 found 81.5% to be interested in politics, and in 1971, 79.4%. The proportion of politically interested coeds was, in both cases, barely 5% below the total average. There were no differences according to social background. The graduates of government schools and of Moslem schools manifested a higher interest than the graduates of all other types of schools. Those with the least political interest were the

graduates of the foreign secondary schools. Disinterest in politics is found among students of USJ and AUB twice as frequently as among those of the Lebanese and the Arab universities. Finally, the political interest of those students who are not interested in religion, who deny the doctrines of their faith, and who do not visit places of worship, is considerably higher than that of students involved in their religion.

There were numerous reasons given for a lack of interest in politics (see Table 2). It is remarkable that the proportion of coeds who disqualify political interests on the grounds of sex diminished. There was also a number of such practical motives as "politics keeps you from studying" or ignorance, "politics is too complicated," or general hostility, "politics is nonsense". The reasons that politics keeps one from studying was mentioned much more frequently in 1961 than in 1971.

Table 2. Reasons for Disinterest in Politics

Year	1961	1971
reason	%	%
Politics		
is corrupt	0.0	34.7
prevents study	21.6	5.2
is nonsense	14.9	27.6
is too complicated	4.0	14.3
is not for girls	17.6	2.1
does not correspond to my character	0.0	16.1
Political discussion	41.9	0.0
is inopportune		

This reason however, is found above all in the students of the USJ and AUB. This can be correlated to the higher demands for achievement in these two universities.



Most important was that a major part of the students claiming to be disinterested in politics, give markedly political reasons for their apparent detachment. In 1961, 41.9% considered political discussion to be inopportune. Frequently, other reasons such as "sectarian politics prevents development", "political discussion is not good for national unity", and "economic development is more important for the country than politics", were added. The frequent mention of the inopportune of political discussions in 1961 can probably be traced to the civil war of 1958 which was rather fresh in the memories of the students. What is particularly interesting in the outcome of the 1971 survey is that the complaint about corruption in the Lebanese political system is the most frequent reason (34.6%) for resignation vis-à-vis politics. From both surveys, we can conclude that the political disinterest of those students refers merely to certain forms of Lebanese politics, but not to political problems per se.

### B. Agreement with political parties and party membership

A comparison of the two surveys demonstrates that identification with political parties as well as party membership has diminished somewhat, since 1961. Whereas in 1961, 14.7% of all students identified themselves completely, and 42.8% in general, with a political party, the corresponding figures for 1971 are 26.3% and 25.9%, respectively. Expression of agreement with a political party or movement was given by 33% in 1961, and 38.2% in 1971. Of those who do agree with a party, 25.5% were members of that party in 1961, while in 1971 there were only 22.1%. The militance of party members is less in 1971 than 1961



but among those who are strongly engaged in political activity, there is a higher degree of identification with a party.

In both surveys, it was discovered that coeds are only somewhat less engaged than their male colleagues. Social class plays a certain, but negligible role in the degree of militance. Of the members of the upper and upper-middle strata, only slightly less than half indicated preference for a party, while 58.6% of the members of the lower-middle stratum, 60-61% of the urban lower stratum, and 69.2% of the rural lower stratum did so.

The graduates of government schools, as well as of Catholic Lebanese schools, are more inclined to be politically militant than the graduates of other types of schools. There are also clear differences in political involvement in parties among the students at the various universities. In first place is the Arab University, where 37.6% of the students agree with a party or a political movement, followed by the Lebanese University with 32.8%. The corresponding figures are 20.3% for USJ, and 12.2% for the AUB.

There are also some disparities concerning religion. The Moslems are more strongly politically engaged than the Christians, while of the students who do not practice their religions, about a quarter are more engaged than those who do practice.

As already stated, slightly more than one fifth of the students who identify themselves with a specific political movement are also active members. Only 11.5% of the subjects indicated party membership in 1971, while in 1961, 14.7% did so. The composition of those students who are members of a party is

similar to those who only indicated preference for a party. The coeds are somewhat less strongly represented among the party members than the male students. In 1971, the number of female party members has noticeably diminished as compared to 1961. Students from the upper social classes are rarely party members; those of the lower social classes are more frequently party members. Among the rural-lower stratum, the share of party membership is the highest with 19.2%.

There are also differences between the universities. At the Lebanese University, 19.9% of the students are party members, at the Arab University, 18.8%, and USJ 15.6%, and at AUB only 7.7%. Relatively more Moslems than Christians are party members. Students less bound to their religion are twice as frequently members of parties than those who actively practice their religion.

#### C. PARTY PREFERENCE

A brief summary of the Lebanese political parties will be given to assist in understanding the data. The National Bloc (NB), the National Liberal Party (NLP), and the Kataeb or Lebanese Phalanges, are political groupings of the Lebanese nationalistic persuasion. They advocate complete and unconditional Lebanese independence, and thwart any attempt to integrate Lebanon into a greater Syrian or Pan-Arab state. The Kataeb<sup>12</sup> dispose over the best organization and superbly armed para-military units. The leader of this party is Pierre Gemayel, one of the most ardent Lebanese nationalists, and who is considered a politician of integrity and stature. The National Liberal Party was established during the civil war of 1958. It is led by former

President (1962-68) Camille Chamoun, who today is still one of the country's most influential politicians.<sup>13</sup> The National Bloc is the oldest political party,<sup>14</sup> founded during the period of the French Mandate by Emile Eddé, who was then President. At the present time, the party is led by his son, Raymond Eddé. The National Bloc especially advocates liberal economic policies and resists energetically all attempts at interference by the military in Lebanese politics. These three parties have their voters primarily from the Christian population of central Lebanon.

The Progressist Socialist Party (PSP) is the political branch of that part of the Druze community, which is led by the Jumblatt family.<sup>15</sup> The present head of the family, Kamal Jumblatt, is one of the most colorful figures in present-day Lebanese politics. He proposes stronger links with the Arab world, and an anti-imperialist foreign policy, in addition to a somewhat peculiar blend of socialism. His platform has attracted quite a number of the younger intellectuals of all religions, who are dissatisfied with the traditional pattern of Lebanese politics. Nonetheless, Jumblatt's actual political strength rests on his position as a Druze Emir and as a landlord.

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party is more widely known as PPS (Parti Populaire Syrien), a designation we shall retain here. It recommends establishment of a greater Syrian state including Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Cyprus. In organization and style, it somewhat resembles the European Fascist movements. The non-sectarian nature of the PPS has attracted numerous Lebanese of a secularist orientation, particularly students of the AUB, where Anton Saadeh founded and organized the party.<sup>16</sup>

Under the designation, "Leftist", we include various groups which are generally Marxist-inspired, but usually amalgamate ideological elements of Arab nationalism with those of Marxism. Such a group is first, the Lebanese Socialists, which evolved from the Lebanese adherents of the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP).<sup>17</sup> They are modeled on the Communist parties of North Vietnam and North Korea; second, the Baath Party,<sup>18</sup> and third, some groups from the New Left. The members of the latter, especially those in the French speaking environment, are strongly influenced by the ideas of the French New Left and the student revolts of 1968.

The Lebanese Communist Party, finally, represents the traditional line of the orthodox Communist parties of the Arab world, who are loyal to Moscow.<sup>19</sup>

A significant fact emerges from this brief overview of Lebanese party politics. One of the most important political orientations of Lebanon, that of Arab nationalism in its classical form, is not organized as a party. Arab nationalism, rather, manifests itself as a loosely structured movement among the Moslem population. In domestic politics, it is articulated by politicians who originate from old, important Moslem families, such as Saeb Salam, and Rashid Karamah. Otherwise, it is fixated on the leadership and personality of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and to a minor extent, his successor, Anwar Sadat.

The sympathies of the Lebanese students are distributed in an extremely diversified fashion on the above-mentioned political



parties and orientations. Moreover, between 1961 and 1971, a few significant shifts have occurred, as illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3. Distribution of Parties Among the Students

Year	Party						
	BN %	NLP %	Kataeb %	PSP %	PPS %	Leftist %	CP %
1961	23.9	25.1	39.3	5.9	5.8	0.0	0.0
1971	11.5	9.6	18.2	7.8	18.6	21.4	12.9

In 1961, the leftist groupings and the Communist Party were not represented among the students, while in 1971 they comprised one third of the students engaged in party politics. This development, is, above all, a consequence of the June, 1967 war, after which numerous adherents of traditional Arab nationalism turned to the Leftists, whom they hoped would be better champions of the Arab cause. The relative strength of those parties representing Lebanese nationalism has receded through the appearance of the Leftist group. They have not only succeeded, however, in maintaining their position quantitatively, but have also expanded it over the past ten years. The best-organized of these parties, the Kataeb, had a relatively higher share in 1971 than the National Bloc and the NLP.

Finally, a notable finding was the increase in the membership of the PPS. This party was illegal until two years ago, as it had attempted unsuccessfully to forcefully seize control of the government. It is struggling to regain its former stature in the national political arena.



The student members of the various parties manifest only minor differences according to their membership in social strata or classes. The Lebanese nationalist parties have the strongest concentration in the middle strata, the PPS and the Leftist groups in the lower-middle and urban-lower strata, while the supporters of the Communist Party are slightly over-represented in the upper and upper-middle strata.

Regarding the variable "secondary school", we find significant variations. Adherents of the Lebanese nationalist Parties are primarily graduates of Catholic schools, those of NLP are also graduates of Orthodox and Anglo-Saxon schools. Among the members of the Kataeb, finally, we find a greater number of graduates of the government schools.

The PSP recruits its members from mostly French-social and government schools, the PPS from Greek Orthodox schools, and the leftist groups derive their membership from government school graduates. The Communist Party members stem primarily from the expensive foreign laical and Anglo-Saxon schools, while only a minimal also come from the Catholic schools. The recruitment pattern of the parties becomes even clearer if one includes the university as a variable (see Table 4).

Taking account of the shifts outlined above, the party system has maintained its most important patterns between 1961 and 1971. The three Lebanese nationalist parties are primarily represented at USJ, AUB, and the Lebanese university, whereby the Kataeb is nearly equally strong at all those. The PPS is strongest at AUB. The leftist groups are strongest at USJ

Table 4. Distribution of Parties at the Universities

University	Party						
	NB %	PNL %	Kataeb %	PSP %	PPS %	Leftist %	CP %
1961							
USJ	33.3	24.2	38.9	1.8	1.8	-	0.0
AUB	7.7	30.8	23.1	15.3	23.1	-	0.0
UL	5.8	23.6	53.1	11.8	5.2	-	0.0
UA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1971							
USJ	10.1	17.2	20.2	5.1	14.1	23.2	10.1
AUB	0.0	13.9	19.5	8.3	36.1	11.1	11.1
UL	12.8	5.4	18.6	6.6	20.2	21.7	14.4
UA	0.0	11.5	0.0	30.7	7.7	38.4	11.5

because of the aforementioned influences of the French student movement, and the Communists are strongest at the Lebanese University. The absence of any figures for all parties at the Arab University in 1961 is self-explanatory since the major political orientation is not organized as an official party. The 1971 figures are high because of the small number of responses. They are significant only because they show that the leftist groups have succeeded in gaining a foothold at the University, at the expense of classical Arab nationalism.

The picture becomes more clarified after including the variables "religious sect" and religious "practice or non-practice of religion" (see Table 5). The student members of the three Lebanese nationalist parties are almost all Christians, those of the PPS predominately so. In the PSP, the Leftist groups, and the Communist Party, there is a predominant Moslem representation. The Leftist groups, however, have also taken root among the Christian students. The degree of acceptance of one's religion plays a major role in the determination of party

Table 5. Distribution of Parties According to Religion and Religious Practice in 1971

Party	Christians % (N=336)	Moslems % (N=193)	Practicing % (N=105)	Not practicing % (N=130)
BN	14.9	0.0	17.1	1.5
PNL	11.6	1.0	12.4	0.8
Kataeb	22.6	1.6	37.1	1.5
PSP	3.9	9.8	2.9	5.4
PPS	18.8	4.7	3.8	13.1
Leftists	10.7	24.9	1.9	38.5
CP	8.3	13.0	0.0	25.4
other	9.2	55.0	24.8	13.8

membership. The members of Lebanese nationalist parties are found, first and foremost, among believing Christians; those of the PPS, among Christians with a strong secular orientation; finally, the Leftist and the Communist parties hardly have any members who are strongly religious.

If one considers only the group of those students who have an obviously positive or negative attitude towards religion, then the following description is acquired. The strongly religious are engaged almost exclusively in the Lebanese nationalist parties. In the PSP, for example, the religious students predominate with two thirds and in the PPS with three fourths, while the supporters of the Left and the Communist Party are recruited almost exclusively from among the non-religious.

In conclusion, one obtains the following social profile of the student members of Lebanese parties. All Lebanese parties recruit their student members from among the middle strata, and from among the graduates of the French-Catholic, and the Anglo-Saxon private schools. These members study at USJ and AUB as

well as the Lebanese University; they are predominantly Christian and practice their religions. The student members of the PPS come from the lower-middle stratum, attended Anglo-Saxon schools, are studying primarily at AUB, and are mostly Greek Orthodox and rather unreligious. The members of the PSP pertain to no specific social stratum. They come from the French-laical private schools as well as the government schools, are most strongly represented at the Arab University, predominantly Moslem, and less likely to be practicing Moslem or Christians. The Leftist groups and the Communist Party, finally, have primarily followers from the lower-middle and the lower strata. The Communist party, furthermore, also attracts persons from among the upper stratum. It is strongest at the Lebanese University, comprises predominantly Moslems, and those students who are not religiously inclined.

#### D. THE PREFERRED LEBANESE POLITICIAN

In contrast to 1961, the survey of 1971 manifests a considerable decrease in those students agreeing with the major Lebanese politicians. In 1961, 27.7% mentioned a Lebanese politician who largely corresponded to their own ideas, and 26.7% mentioned one with whom they only more or less agreed; in 1971, 33.1% and 1.4% respectively. Whereas 45.5% indicated in the first survey that they did not agree with any Lebanese politician, this was the case by more than one half (57.1%) in 1971. The number of those students who consider the present political personalities of Lebanon generally inadequate, has also risen in the course of the last decade. This might be due to the influence of Fuad Shehab, who was President from 1958 to 1964, and his followers, who were in power till 1970. This group

attempted to weaken the power of the traditional politicians in Lebanon, and to build a stronger technocratically-oriented state apparatus.<sup>20</sup> As was shown by interviews conducted in addition to the surveys in 1964 and 1968, this tendency then seems to have been stronger than in 1971. Probably it is in the process of receding, which is also seen in the diminishing of Shehab's popularity among the students (see below).

Sex and social class are irrevelent factors in the identification with a Lebanese politician. The variable "secondary schools" is of some significance. The graduates of Orthodox, laical, and Moslem schools manifest the lowest identification with a politician. Among the students of the different universities, this is particularly true of the students of the Arab University. Of the Moslem students interviewed, 72.4% of the Moslem students interviewed mentioned no Lebanese politician as compared to 54.9% of the Christian students. The high degree of non-identification among Moslem students with Lebanese politicians could already be observed in the same measure in 1961. The seemingly perplexing response of the Moslem students is a consequence of their unique stituation; their political loyalties are primarily directed toward Pan-Arab rather than Lebanese political figures. Otherwise, identification with religion proved to be important. Students who practice their religion identify themselves twice as frequently with certain Lebanese politidans than do the non-religious.

If one considers only those students who say that they largely agree with a Lebanese politician, then we find an astonishing congruity between the 1961 and 1971 surveys. In general, the



same names are given, although there are some not inconsiderable shifts in the composition of their supporters.

Table 6 shows that Raymond Eddé, who was already leading in 1961, has advanced his position in 1971 in a spectacular manner. Eddé is considered as one of the most intelligent of all Lebanese politicians. His popularity rose, above all, when he energetically resisted all attempts, both of the army leaders and particularly of the Deuxième bureau, to interfere in Lebanese politics, during President Snehab's and his successor's, Charles Helou's term. Subsequently, he became the leading defender of republican institutions and of civil liberties, a position which had to make him particularly attractive for intellectuals. Also strongly improved is the position of Kamal Jumblatt, the politician with whom both the students of Arab nationalist and leftist orientation can most easily identify. The politicians representing Lebanese nationalism have maintained their position on the whole: 67.3% in 1971 as against 65.3% in 1961. The traditional Moslem leading personalities, who were already infrequently mentioned by the students in 1961, have lost even more influence among the students. Finally, neither the student adherents of Arab nationalism nor those of the leftist persuasion find that the Lebanese politicians convincingly represent their political ideas, with the exception of Jumblatt.

If we examine the followers of the individual politicians according to their social stratum, we find some interesting differences. Camille Chamoun, Pierre Gemayel, and other Lebanese nationalists have their stronghold among the students of the middle stratum. Eddé, however, commands numerous followers

Table 6. Lebanese Politicians Preferred by Students

Politician	Year	
	1961 %	1971 %
Raymond Eddé	22.3	35.4
Camille Chamoun	20.0	15.8
Pierre Gemayel	14.6	10.2
Other Lebanese nationalists	8.4	5.9
Fuad Shehab and Shāhabists	9.7	5.1
Kamal Jumblatt	9.6	22.6
Rashid Karamah, Saeb Salam	4.1	2.0
Leftists	0.0	1.0
Others (incl. PPS leaders)	11.3	2.0

from among the urban-lower and rural-lower strata with 57.1% and 50%. Jumblatt's adherents are most strongly represented both in the urban-lower class and, with 25.3%, in the upper social stratum. The traditional Moslem politicians, Rashid Karamah and Saeb Salam, acquire their supporters exclusively from the students of the urban lower stratum.

The variable, "secondary schools", elucidates several divergences regarding university students and preferred Lebanese politicians. Eddé has the most regularly distributed supporters among the graduates of the various systems of education. His strongest group of followers come from the graduates of Orthodox schools, schools of the French and Anglo-Saxon type, and the government schools. He is even mentioned by 8.7% of the graduates of Moslem schools. Chamoun and Gemayel have their stronghold among the former pupils of Catholic institutions. Jumblatt's followers are recruited among the graduates of the Moslem schools, and government schools; in 1971, he was mentioned by 60.9% and 26.1% of these students, respectively.

An analysis according to university generates a finer differentiation among the followers of the Lebanese politicians. As is shown in Table 7, Eddé was leading in all cases in 1971 with the exception of the Arab University. Since 1961, he has made strong gains, not only at AUB and the Lebanese University, but also at the Arab University. Chamoun and Gemayel have their main student supporters in USJ. Gemayel is not mentioned at all at the Arab University. Jumblatt's firm position at the Arab and Lebanese Universities has increased. At AUB, he is less frequently mentioned than in 1961, but at USJ, where he was not at all represented in 1961, he was referred to by 7.4% of the students.

Table 7. Student Preference for Lebanese Politicians According to the Different Universities.

Politician	University			
	USJ %	AUB %	UL %	UA %
1961				
Eddé	33.1	8.7	12.0	0.0
Chamoun	22.3	32.6	14.0	0.0
Gemayel	17.4	4.3	20.0	0.0
Leb. Nat'l list	9.9	13.1	2.0	0.0
Shehabists	4.1	13.1	22.0	0.0
Jumblatt	0.0	15.2	18.0	66.8
Karamah, Salam	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.1
Leftists	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Others	13.2	13.0	12.0	19.1
1971				
Eddé	37.9	45.2	37.4	9.4
Chamoun	23.2	19.0	13.9	5.7
Gemayel	15.8	7.1	10.7	0.0
Leb Nat'l lists	2.1	4.8	7.5	7.5
Shehabists	7.4	2.4	5.3	3.8
Jumblatt	7.4	14.3	20.3	69.8
Karamah, Salam	0.0	7.1	2.7	0.0
Leftists	3.2	0.0	0.5	0.0
Others	3.0	0.1	1.7	3.8

Christian and Moslem students manifest obviously different, if not opposite preference patterns. In Table 8, we see that Eddé has strongly gained among the Christians, but his supporters have relatively decreased. Considering the sharp increase in Moslem students among the entire student body, as well as the sample of the students interviewed, he still has a considerable absolute gain, even among the Moslem students. Kamal Jumblatt has nearly doubled his leading position among the Moslem students between 1961 and 1971 and, moreover, gained additional Christian supporters. Shehab has particularly strong losses among the Moslems. Although he was considered a politician primarily working toward the economic equality of Christians and Moslems, his style of government and subsequently, that of his associates, has resulted in heavy losses in popularity.

Table 8. Lebanese Politicians Preferred by Christian and Moslems Students (%).

Politician	1961		1971	
	Christians	Moslems	Christians	Moslems
Eddé	25.3	13.2	45.4	9.8
Chamoun	27.6	3.8	19.7	4.9
Gemayel	19.4	0.0	13.0	2.9
Leb. Nat'lists	11.2	0.0	6.3	4.9
Shehab	6.5	20.8	5.3	4.9
Jumblatt	1.2	33.8	7.4	62.7
Others	8.8	28.4	2.8	9.9

If finally, one considers the student supporters of Lebanese politicians according to the degree of religiosity, one obtains, the following picture. Chamoun and Gemayel have the majority of their supporters among students with a strong religious orientation; this is also the case with Kamal Jumblatt, who is mentioned by 55.6% of the religiously very active students.



However, he has also a considerable following among the non-religious students. Of all politicians, Eddé is most evenly distributed. He is equally preferred by both practicing and non-practicing Christians and Moslems.

In conclusion, the social profiles of the student supporters of the Lebanese politicians can be summarized as follows; religious sect is the most decisive characteristic in 1961 and 1971. Christian students tend overwhelmingly to identify with Christian politicians and Moslem students with Moslem politicians. The only exception, that of the Moslem advocacy of Shehab in 1961, has completely disappeared in the 1971 survey. Chamoun and Gemayel have their constituencies, above all, among practicing Christian students.

The most diversified following, both in religious attitude and social composition are the followers of Eddé, on the one hand, and Jumblatt, on the other. Eddé's followers constitute the broadest spectrum, as he is named by students of all social classes, especially among the lower classes, and by a substantial number of Moslem students, besides the advocacy of his own religious community. Eddé's position appears also least affected by stronger or weaker religiosity. Jumblatt's followers are somewhat more irregular in terms of social background, being more concentrated in the upper and lower strata, while weakly represented among the students of the middle class. He has less supporters among the Christians, than does Eddé among the Moslems. Nevertheless, he is preferred by more Christians than any other non-Christian politician. Raymond Eddé and Kamal Jumblatt, therefore, are clearly



distinguished as the leading politicians in Lebanon according to the political opinion of the students in 1971.

#### E. THE PREFERRED INTERNATIONAL POLITICIAN

Both in 1961 and in 1971, over 60% of the interviewees replied when asked to name an international politician whom they particularly esteemed. The graduates of government and Moslem schools replied more frequently with 83.2% and 84.9%, respectively, while students of the Arab and Lebanese Universities answered with 87.2% and 82.6%, respectively. When analyzed according to religion, the Moslems replied with 84.4% and the Christians with 71.1%. The results obtained from the two surveys is shown in Table 9.

Table 9. Preferred International Politicians

Politician	1961 %	1971 %
Charles de Gaulle	27.6	20.6
John F. Kennedy	17.8	5.3
Gamal Abdel Nasser	15.1	19.9
Mao Tse-tung	0.0	18.0
Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il Sung		
Che Guevara, Fidel Castro	0.0	6.0
King Hussein, Habib Bourgiba	7.7	3.8
Anwar Sadat	-	4.1
Leonid Berzhnev, Alexei		
Kosygin, Walter Ulbricht	0.0	3.5
Jawaharlal Nehru	9.5	0.0
Others	22.3	18.8

Two items arouse immediate attention. The leading figures of 1961, Charles de Gaulle, John F. Kennedy, and Gamal Abdel Nasser, have maintained their leading position in the esteem of Lebanese students, although they have since died. None of

the leading politicians of the Western world have been able to replace de Gaulle and Kennedy. This is likewise true for Nasser, the leading figure of Arab nationalism. Anwar Sadat, however, appears as a new figure in his own right. The most spectacular change since 1961 is definitely the high number of students who mentioned Communist politicians, and in particular, Mao Tse-tung.

The social class of students is of some significance in the preference of international politicians. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il Sung, Che Guevara, Fidel Castro, Leonid Brzhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and Walter Ulbricht are named especially by members of the lower social strata. Among the rural-lower stratum, King Hussein of Jordan, has a relatively favored position. Anwar Sadat is ususally referred to by the members of the upper strata. DeGaulle and Kennedy are cited predominantly by the graduates of the foreign schools. An extraordinarily high position is given to Nasser, both by graduates of government and of Moslem schools (24.2% and 44.7%, respectively). Mao Tse-tung likewise was cited by 23.4% at the government schools, and 21.1% at the Moslem schools. Russian politicians were mentioned primarily by former pupils of government schools.

Both in 1916 and 1971, there were significant differences among the students of the individual universities (see Table 10). Of major interest, at this point, is the shift at the Arab University.

Table 10. Preference for International Politicians According to University and Sect.

Politicians	USJ %	AUB %	UL %	UA %	Christians %	Moslems %
1961						
De Gaulle	33.6	15.5	31.7	0.0	45.9	4.6
Kennedy	22.9	14.1	11.7	0.0	29.2	4.4
Nasser	7.4	13.9	8.3	83.5	5.6	60.7
Mao	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Rest Rest	36.1	56.5	48.3	16.5	19.3	30.3
1971						
De Gaulle	22.5	24.0	27.4	5.3	32.5	8.4
Kennedy	9.3	6.3	3.0	0.5	8.7	0.0
Nasser	7.9	9.4	19.3	43.0	4.8	42.5
Mao	17.7	13.5	21.7	16.9	15.5	22.3
Rest	42.6	46.8	28.6	34.3	38.5	26.8

In 1961, before the termination of the Algerian war, De Gaulle was not mentioned by a single student of that institution. In 1971, however, his fame as the de-colonizer of Algeria and as a pro-Arab statesman, produced a shift in attitude among several students, even after his death. Of even more significance is that numerous students of the Arab university now mention, next to Nasser, Communist politicians, especially Mao Tse-tung.

The Communist politicians were mentioned most frequently at the Lebanese University. It is also surprising that Mao Tse-tung is referred to rather frequently at USJ. This may be interpreted as a phenomenon of the influence of the French student movement in Lebanon.

Table 10 also illustrates the differences between Christians and Muslims in regard to this point. It is evident that Mao

Tse-tung occupies a place next to Nasser among the Moslem students. Practicing Christian and Moslem students tend to prefer De Gaulle, Kennedy, and Nasser; non-religious students, instead, prefer Mao Tse-tung and other Communist politicians.

Because of the multitude of individual politicians who were mentioned, the names were afterwards classified according<sup>to</sup>/these basic political orientation: 1. Western and pro-Western, 2. neutral and nationalist politicians of the Third World, 3. revolutionary leaders of the Third World, 4. Russian Communist politicians, and 5. Chinese Communist politicians, (see Table 11).

Table 11. The Preferred International Politicians According to Type.

Type	1961 %	1971 %
Western and Pro-Western	45.4	33.4
Neutral and Nationalist	32.3	28.9
Third World Revolutionaries	0.0	5.9
Russian Communists	0.0	5.4
Chinese Communists	0.0	19.2
Others and unclassifiables	22.3	7.2

The extremely strong trend toward the Communist politicians, particularly the Chinese Communist politicians, is affirmed. On the other hand, the preference for Western as well as neutral and nationalist politicians of the Third World, has become relativated. Pro-Western politicians, above all, are preferred by students of the higher social strata, while the students of the lower stratum indicate a preference for the Chinese leaders. Communist and revolutionary politicians were preferred most by graduates of government and Moslem schools. The Christian students clearly favored pro-Western

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politicians (56.3%) to Communist personalities (26.1%). Among the Moslems, however, the preference for Communist politicians (35.9%) occupies a considerably higher place. Among the strongly religious students, 55.3% mentioned Western and pro-Western politicians, and 26.8% mentioned neutrals or nationalists. About one third of the non-religious students mentioned Western and pro-Western, and neutral or nationalist politicians (16.5% and 14.3%), but clearly favored Communist politicians (68.2%).

#### F. POLITICAL IDEA

Particularly interesting information regarding the political culture of the Lebanese students was obtained through the question, as to whether there was a political idea for which the student would actively engage himself, or be enthusiastic about. The most frequently mentioned political ideas appear in Table 12.

Table 12. Preferred Political Ideas According to University and Religion.

Political Idea	Total %	USJ %	AUB %	UL %	UA %	Christians %	Moslems %
<b>1961</b>							
Lebanese indep.	45.5	50.9	40.9	54.1	0.0	58.5	8.2
Arab unity	19.8	8.6	21.2	21.6	100.0	4.0	63.9
Palestine resis.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Socialism	6.0	6.1	4.6	10.8	0.0	5.2	8.2
Liberalism	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
World Peace	4.7	5.2	7.6	0.0	0.0	5.8	1.6
Others	24.0	29.2	25.7	13.5	0.0	26.5	18.1
<b>1971</b>							
Lebanese indep.	40.3	39.2	39.0	42.2	21.8	48.9	21.4
Arab unity	16.9	11.0	11.3	15.9	35.7	6.6	34.2
Palest. resis.	10.8	7.5	11.9	8.4	23.8	7.5	16.8
Socialism	6.8	8.5	8.2	7.4	4.4	6.6	7.6
Liberalism	1.2	3.1	3.1	0.4	0.4	2.0	0.4
World Peace	7.0	12.5	12.6	5.6	2.4	8.6	5.5
Others	17.0	18.2	13.9	20.1	11.5	19.8	14.1



The differences between the two surveys reflect the contrasting political situations of 1961 and 1971. Ten years ago, there was a strong polarization between the two nationalisms, Lebanese and Arab, due to the civil war of 1958. In 1971, these basic political ideas are still in the foreground, but not as strongly as in 1961. Instead, the political problem of the Palestine resistance overtly manifests itself.

It is remarkable that the number of those who are enthusiastic about socialism, and would actively work for it, has barely increased. This again indicates that the increasing fervor of leftist political groups, and the preference for numerous leftist and Communist international politicians, does not reflect a clear ideological shift among the Lebanese student body, but rather variations and partial ideological shifts within the general stream of Arab nationalism. From the Table, it is evident that the Palestine question is more important for Lebanese students than socialism.

The societal variables reflect a number of differences with respect to political ideas. In both surveys for example, more coeds indicated a major interest in world peace than did male students. Social class has again relatively little influence on political ideas. The followers of Lebanese independence are recruited rather evenly from all social strata with a slight concentration in the middle and urban-lower strata. The adherents of Arab unity and Palestinian resistance are concentrated in the urban and rural-lower strata. Socialist ideas, however, are strongly overrepresented in the upper stratum where their adherents amount to no less than 13.9%.

One might conclude that socialist ideas have a certain fashionable aspect due to, as was mentioned previously, the influence of the French New Left.

Among the graduates of the various secondary school systems, there is a rather even distribution of advocates of Lebanese independence. They are least represented among the graduates of laical schools, 30.6%, who are in favor of Lebanese independence. Arab unity is mentioned most, that is, double the average, among graduates of Moslem schools, and equally frequently by former pupils of government schools. The same is true for the idea of Palestinian resistance. Graduates of government schools have an above-average preference for socialism, while graduates of Moslem schools are below average in their preference for socialism.

The various political ideas dispersed throughout the universities are also shown in Table 12. The idea of Lebanese independence does not occupy its unique position at USJ as it did in 1961, although it is still in the majority; this is also true at AUB and UL. What is noteworthy is that in 1971, there are 21.8% of the Arab University students who declare themselves to be in favor of Lebanese independence. Arab unity, however, must share its supporters with those for Palestinian resistance. Socialism has not gained in strength at any of the universities, and even diminished slightly at the Lebanese University. The diversification of political ideas at the Arab University is of particular interest. This university is still the stronghold of Arab nationalism, but not as exclusively as it was in 1961. World peace was only mentioned by students of USJ and

AUB in 1961 and in 1971 it is second in importance at those universities. This may reflect that students of these universities, one French and the other American, may be better informed about international events and the dangers of the international conditions than the students of the Lebanese and Arab universities.

The difference in political ideas between Christian and Moslems is also illustrated in Table 12. What was implied by the data regarding the Arab university students is confirmed in the surveys. The increase in the support for Lebanese nationalism among Moslem students can only be called extraordinary. The idea of Arab unity, instead, has receded even if one adds the idea of Palestinian resistance. The confrontation between the two nationalisms is definitely present among Lebanese students, but is no longer as acute.

When the degree of acceptance of one's religion is investigated, the following picture emerges. The idea of Lebanese unity is remarkably neutral vis-à-vis the religious attitudes of its adherents. Lebanese independence is found to the same degree among both the religiously active and inactive. Arab nationalism, however, is linked with religious practice: it decreases with the degree of secularism. Socialism, finally, is exclusively mentioned by non-religious students as a favored political idea.

#### G. BASIC POLITICAL ORIENTATION

An attempt will now be made to summarize the various information, and to formulate working concepts for the interpretation of the most important political trends. Our starting point was the

existence of three basic political orientations among the Lebanese university students: Lebanese nationalism, or Lebanism; Arab nationalism, or Arabism; and the Leftist current. These three groups are defined as follows.

First, Lebanese nationalists were those who either had mentioned Eddé, Chamoun, or Gemayel, or any other Lebanese nationalist politician, or identified himself with the National Bloc, PNL, or Kataeb parties, or preferred Lebanese independence or liberalism as a political idea. Secondly, Arab nationalists were those who mentioned Karamah, Salam, or other traditional Moslem politicians, who included themselves in the Nasserite movement, presented Arab unity as a favored political idea, or admired Nasser most among international politicians. Finally, the Leftists constitute the most comprehensive group. In it are included those who preferred Jumblatt, Nasser, or other politicians of the leftist persuasion, favored the PSP, the Baath, the Lebanese Socialists, the Communist Party, or was a member thereof, or who indicated a preference for Communist international politicians.

Through this method, we find that among the entire sample, 39.5% are Lebanese nationalists, 16.6% are Arab nationalists, and 15.9% are Leftists. A bivariate correlation of this classification, with the independent variables used here, essentially provided a confirmation of the detailed results which were given above. Social class is largely irrelevant, both for Lebanese and Arab nationalism; only Arab nationalism is slightly over-represented among the upper class.



The Left, however, is more represented among the students of the lower-middle and urban-lower strata. Among the graduates of the various secondary schools the Lebanese nationalists are rather evenly distributed, although most strongly among the French Catholic school graduates. Nevertheless, one third of the graduates of the Moslem schools are also Lebanese nationalists. Arab nationalism has its major supporters among graduates of the Moslem schools and least among former Christian secondary school pupils. The differences according to the universities and religious sect are seen in Table 13.

Table 13. Basic Political Orientation According to University and Religion

	USJ % (N=216)	AUB % (N=98)	UL % (N=539)	UA % (N=203)	Christians % (N=606)	Moslems % (N=203)
Lebanism	68.5	65.3	59.6	19.7	79.4	23.2
Arabism	12.0	19.4	18.0	49.3	6.6	44.3
Leftists	19.5	15.3	22.4	31.0	14.0	32.6

The data confirm, given the socio-political context of Lebanon, the assumptions concerning the universities and students' political orientations. The Lebanese students of USJ, AUB and UL are in the majority for Lebanese nationalism, while Arab nationalism rates only among 12% at USJ, and about one fifth at AUB and UA. The Left is lowest at AUB with 15.3% and then at USJ and UL with about one fifth. Among the Arab University students, about half are Arab nationalists, nearly a third Leftists, and nearly one fifth Lebanese nationalists.

Regarding religious sect and political orientation, the following was discovered. Among the Christians, the Lebanese nationalist attitude predominates, while 14% are Leftists,



and 6.6% are Arab nationalists. Among the Moslems, 44.3% are Arab nationalists, nearly one third are Leftists, and almost a quarter are Lebanese nationalists. The degree of identification with one's religion, and the practice of one's religion is particularly significant for the leftist group. Among those students who consider religion unimportant, and who do not accept their religious creeds or visit places of worship, about 55.2% are Leftists.

#### IV. EXAMINATION OF THE MOST IMPORTANT DETERMINANT FACTORS

##### A. INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:

###### THE PROBLEM OF TAUTOLOGY

The bivariate correlation of the independent with the dependent variables has already clearly shown some patterns of relationship. We recognized, in particular, that some of the independent variables were linked in a similar fashion with the different items of political attitudes and opinions. It seems indicated, therefore, to make a closer examination of the relationships between the independent variables.

The matrix in Table 14 shows that there is a close relationship between secondary school and university, secondary school and religious sect, and between university and religious sect. The correlations between these three variables are significantly closer than those with and among all the other independent variables. The problem, however, arises as to whether statements about the significance of these variables for determining political attitudes and opinions are to a great extent tautological. The examination of the

Table 14. Correlation Matrix of the Independent Variables

	Social Class	Second. School	Uni- versity	Sect	Religious- ness
Social Class	X				
Second. School	.375	X			
University	.335	.676	X		
Sect	.222	.455	.474	X	
Religiousness	.204	.242	.242	.243	X

relationship between secondary schools and university, on the one hand, and the political dependent variables, on the other hand, may initially permit one to conclude that the secondary schools and the universities in Lebanon have a considerable impact on political socialization. Such a conclusion, however, would disregard the importance of membership in a religious sect as an intervening variable for membership in a secondary school or university.

Membership in a religious sect in Lebanon is one of the most crucial factors in the recruitment pattern of the Lebanese secondary school systems. For instance, we find only a small minority of Moslem pupils at the Christian schools, and practically no Christians at the Moslem schools. The different types of secondary schools, finally, are the decisive factor for the recruitment patterns of the universities, and as previously shown, to an even greater extent in 1971, than in 1961. In other words, the composition of the student body of the different universities is largely the result of the student enrollment at the various secondary school systems; this, in turn, is dependent on the recruitment patterns of these secondary school, a pattern overwhelmingly determined by membership in a religious sect. Secondary schools and universities, therefore, are not truly

independent variables, but are derived from another variable, that of membership in a religious sect.

The relationship between the educational and the political variables described above are of interest for monographic or comparative descriptions of the political sub-cultures in the various secondary schools and universities, but they are hardly of any use for an analysis of possible causal factors for political attitudes and opinions. It cannot be proved that attendance at a school or university determines political attitudes. At best, it can be shown that membership in such an institution partially modifies the individual's basic sectarian-based political orientation. The variations in political attitudes found among students of the same religion, who attended different types of secondary schools or universities, were relatively insignificant. This leads to the assumption that educational institutions merely produce a more refined and sophisticated articulation of basic political orientations, already determined by membership in a religious sect.

Thus, the only truly independent variables that remain are membership in a social class or stratum, membership in a religious sect, and the degree of identification with or practice of one's religion.

The relationships of these variables to political attitudes and opinions shall be further examined by ordinally scaling some of the data.

## B. SOCIAL CLASS AND INTEGRATION IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

First, we shall investigate to what degree membership in a social class or stratum determines the degree of agreement with, and integration in, the existing political system of Lebanon. Two complex variables, membership in a social class, and integration in the political system, were used since they permit ordinal scaling. A comparison of the two variables as defined below yields the data shown in Table 15.

The variable, membership in a social class, included seven major categories. Each was classified according to occupational group, and in case of doubt, the classification was also made according to the level of income.

1. Upper Class: big entrepreneurs; big businessmen; big landowners; and industrialists.
2. Upper-middle Class: doctors; lawyers; engineers; top employees; professors; directors of secondary schools; and civil servants of category 1.
3. Middle-middle Class: medium businessmen; employees of medium income, secondary school teachers; and civil servants of category 2 and 3.
4. Lower-middle Class: small businessmen, employees of low income, primary school teachers; civil servants of category 4, and independent peasants.
5. Urban-lower Class: independent laborers; specialized laborers; subordinate employees; and the private sectors, such as barbers.
6. Urban-lower-lower Class: unspecialized laborers.
7. Rural-lower Class: dependent rural workers.

Integration in the political system, the second variable, contained the categories listed below in descending order of agreement with the existing Lebanese political system. Each category was formed according to certain types of preferred parties, ideas or personalities.

1. Lebanese nationalism:

parties: National Bloc, Kataeb, PNL

ideas: Lebanese independence, liberalism

persons: Eddé, Chamoun, Gemayel

2. Reformists:

movement: al-Wai

ideas: national unity, reformism, Shehabism

persons: Shehab, Shehabists

3. Arab Nationalism:

movement: Nasserism

ideas: Arab unity

persons: Nasser, Karameh, Salam

4. Progressist Socialism:

party: PSP

persons: Jumblatt

5. Greater Syrian Nationalism:

party: PPS

ideas: Fertile Crescent, Greater Syria

persons: Saadeh, Ashkar, Raad

6. Leftism:

movements: Baath, PFLP, PDFLP, Lebanese Socialists,

Movement for Communist Action in Lebanon

persons: Baathists, Habash, Hawatmeh



7. Communist:

Party: CP

persons: Brezhnev, Kosygin, Ulbricht

Each of these political orientations are characterized by certain policy trends. The Lebanese nationalists advocate the status quo in both foreign and domestic policy. The Reformist orientation comprises a trend of basic reform with the longterm aim of stabilizing the system. This orientation became established under former President Shehab. Classical Arab nationalism considers itself a part of the present political system under the National Pact, but still believes in an eventual integration of Lebanon in a Pan-Arab state. The PSP desires both radical internal reforms, particularly the secularization of the political system, as well as a long-term participation of the country in an Arab federation. The PPS also advocates laicism, and thereby the abolition of religious proportionalism. Above all, it promotes the inclusion of Lebanon in a greater Syrian, although not Pan-Arab, state.

The more radical of these political orientations, such as the Leftist Arab Nationalists, reject both the present social structure of the country, and its independent existence. Finally, the Communist Party strives for the dictatorship of the proletariat within the framework of the present state. It considers the question of a separate Lebanese national state, however, to be irrelevant after the establishment of socialism.

A comparison of the two variables as defined above, yields the data shown in Table 15. Table 16, which forms larger categories of integration shows no outstanding differences in the social composition of these political categories.

Table 15. Political Integration and Social Class I.

Class	Lebanese Nation.	Reformism	Arab. Nat.	PSP	PPS	Left	Comm.
Upper	38.0	1.1	21.8	5.5	4.1	3.7	3.3
Upper Middle	39.4	1.7	11.3	3.0	3.5	7.4	4.8
Middle Middle	40.9	0.5	17.5	6.3	4.3	9.6	2.6
Lower Middle	39.5	1.1	14.9	4.3	6.8	12.1	3.2
Urban Lower	31.4	0.8	13.6	3.4	11.0	11.0	4.2
Urban Low. Low.	56.5	-	17.4	-	4.3	8.7	-
Rural Lower	34.6	-	15.4	-	7.7	11.5	3.8
Total sample	39.1	1.0	16.2	4.8	5.2	8.6	3.3

(Percentages of the column totals, i.e. the proportion of student ideological groups in the total number of students in a social class.  $\chi^2 = 70.41.792$ ; significance = .000; Cramer's  $V = 0.07829$ ; contingency coefficient = .216).

Table 16. Political Integration and Social Class II

Class	Total Sample (N=1433)	Lebanese Nat. (N=577)	Arab Nat. (N=235)	Leftist Ar. Nat. (N=236)	CP (N=385)
Upper	18.9	18.3	25.3	8.1	18.8
Upper Middle	16.1	16.2	11.2	13.7	22.9
Middle Middle	29.0	30.2	31.3	32.3	22.9
Lower Middle	19.6	19.8	18.0	27.4	18.8
Total Middle	64.7	66.2	60.5	73.4	64.6
Urban Lower	8.2	6.6	6.9	10.5	10.4
Urban Low.Low.	1.6	2.3	1.7	1.6	0.0
Rural Lower	1.8	1.6	1.7	2.4	2.1
Total Lower	11.6	10.5	10.3	14.5	12.5
Unclassifiable	4.8	5.0	3.9	4.0	4.1

Among the Lebanese nationalists, for example, the social classifications were practically identical with the total sample. Among the Arab nationalists, only the upper class is slightly more represented at the expense of the middle class. The upper class constitutes a minority of members of the Leftist group, but this is compensated by a stronger representation from the middle class. Among the Leftists and the Communist Party, the lower stratum is more frequently represented than among the other political groups, but hardly enough to qualify as relevant. Otherwise, the supporters of the Communist Party are almost arranged like the normal distribution.

#### C. RELIGIOUS SECT AND INTEGRATION IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Membership in a religious sect, accounts for highly significant variations in the degree of integration within the system. Table 17 shows that 51.3% of the Christians and 18% of the Moslems are fully integrated into the system as defined above. However, if we add the first three categories of the integration scale (Lebanese Nationalism, Reformism, and Arab Nationalism), which all endorse the present political system to some degree, nearly identical percentages are obtained: 56.5% and 54% for Christian and Moslem students, respectively. The majority of the student body, tend, in terms of domestic politics, toward the status quo.

There are, of course, immense differences in opinion regarding the ultimate form of the Lebanese state, as well as its national self-perception. While the Christians, as a majority of the student population, wish to maintain Lebanon in its

Table 17. Political Integration Among Moslems and Christians

Category	Christians	Moslems	Total Sample
Lebanese Nationalism	51.3	18.0	38.8
Reformism	1.3	0.6	1.0
Arab Nationalism	3.9	35.4	15.6
PSP	2.6	8.8	5.0
PPS	6.2	1.8	4.5
Left Arab Nationalism	5.5	13.4	8.5
Communism	2.9	4.4	3.4

(Percentages of column totals, i.e. the proportion of Christians or Moslems in a category;  $\chi^2 = 404.11532$ , significance = .000, Cramer's V = 0.52756, contingency coefficient = .467.

present political form, this opinion is shared by only 18% of the Moslems. In fact, 35.4% of the Moslems are in favor of Arab unity. Consequently, another influential factor is that of Arab Leftist Nationalism. The number of those students who are against the status quo, both in terms of its social structure and present political form, is much higher among the Moslems, with 13.4%, than among the Christians, with 5.5%. The most important political orientations, therefore, are distributed differently among both Christians and Moslems, and their degree of integration within the political system is greatly divergent.

#### D. AGREEMENT WITH RELIGION AND INTEGRATION IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The pertinence of the variable "religious sect" for political attitudes and opinions is explained by the specific nature of the Lebanese religious communities: each is a socio-ethnic group with a distinct and historically developed identity.

The question now arises as to what degree acceptance or rejection of one's religion, as well as the extent of

religious practice, is of significance for political attitudes and opinions, outside of membership in a religious sect from birth.

In order to examine this question, statements about religion were arranged in a scale representing various degrees of acceptance or rejection of religion, and extent of religious practice. The six classifications in this scale were defined as follows in descending order of agreement;

1. considers religion to be important, believes in all the teachings, visits places of worship regularly, and prays regularly.
2. considers religion to be important, believes in a life after death, visits places of worship regularly or frequently, prays regularly or frequently.
3. considers religion to be important, believes in a life after death, visits places of worship occasionally or never, prays regularly or frequently.
4. considers religion to be unimportant, believes in all teachings, visits places of worship frequently or regularly.
5. considers religion to be unimportant, believes in a life after death, visits places of worship rarely or never.
6. considers religion to be unimportant, does not believe in a life after death, never visits places of worship, or only rarely.

The correlation of this scale regarding religion with the scale of political integration produced the data given in Table 18. Among the advocates of Lebanese nationalism,



Table 18. Agreement with one's Religion and Political Integration

Religiosity scale	Total sample	Leb. Nat.	Arab Nat.	PSP	PPS	Left Arab Nat.	Communists
1	1.8	2.8	3.3	2.3	2.5	0.0	0.0
2	19.9	34.1	18.3	9.2	3.7	4.0	0.0
3	11.5	13.0	19.5	12.6	8.6	3.2	0.5
4	2.2	4.0	1.7	0.0	2.5	0.0	0.0
5	6.7	7.6	7.9	12.6	9.9	4.0	4.8
6	25.3	17.4	19.1	23.0	44.4	48.3	58.1

(Chi2 = 543.06943; significance .000; Cramer's V = 0.234; contingency coefficient = .498).

all the levels on the religion scale are over-represented except level 6; especially over-represented is level 2. Arab nationalists presented similar results on this scale, except that level 3 is over-represented. Level 6 leads among PPS members with 44.4%, with 48.3% among the Leftist Arab Nationalists, and 58.1% among the Communists. Lebanism and Arab nationalism correlates to a high degree of identification with one's religion, and Leftism corresponds to a low degree of identification with one's religion. Thus, the degree of agreement with religion clearly has a relationship to the degree of integration in the political system.

The interrelation of acceptance or rejection of religion and political attitude becomes clearer if only the extreme groups of the religious scale are considered. If one places those students who consider religion as important, believe all the teachings, pray frequently or regularly, and visit places of worship frequently or regularly, opposite those students

with contrasting behavior, then the most important categories of political attitudes or of integration or non-integration within the system are apparent (see Table 19). Independently of membership in a religious sect, therefore, the significance of individual identification with one's religion can be considered to be a significant independent variable for political attitudes and opinions.

Table 19. Religious Attitude and Political Orientation

Orientation	Religious	Non-Religious
Lebanese nationalism	80.5	19.5
Arab nationalism	60.5	39.5
Left Arab nationalism	11.9	88.1
Communism	0.0	100.0

(Chi2 = 168.45725; significance = .000; Cramer's V = 0.54507; contingency coefficient = .478)

#### E. RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXAMINED VARIABLES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS

In conclusion, we shall examine the relative relationship between the independent variables used, and the different items of political attitudes as independent variables, by using a matrix of contingency coefficients (see Table 20).

The following conclusions can be drawn from the table. First, of all the independent variables examined, social class correlates least with the selected political variables; in other words, the factor "membership in a social class" is least determinant for political attitudes. Second, secondary schools and universities correlate most with party preference, Since the parties at the various types of secondary schools

Table 20. Contingency Coefficient Matrix of All Variables.

	Party Pref.	Lib.Po- litician	Int. Po- litician	Pol. idea	Basic orientat.	Integra- tion
Class	.242	.345	.328	.328	.173	.216
Sec. school	.491	.461	.403	.328	.279	.363
University	.554	.485	.402	.359	.359	.439
Sect	<u>.610</u>	<u>.669</u>	<u>.547</u>	<u>.429</u>	<u>.575</u>	<u>.528</u>
Agreement w. religion	.536	.488	.379	.367	.371	.498
Religious practice	<u>.782</u>	<u>.538</u>	<u>.540</u>	<u>.480</u>	<u>.554</u>	<u>.545</u>

are organized according to different degrees of intensity, this situation can be explained without difficulty. As already stated, these two variables depend to a larger extent on the variable "membership in a religious sect", and are not truly independent variables. Third, the religious factors, such as membership in a religious sect, identification with and practice of one's religion, prove to be decisive determinants for political attitudes. Fourth, membership in a religious sect is a primary factor (since the variable "practice or non-practice of religion" only refers to a polarized sample of the student survey). More than any other factor, therefore, membership in a religious sect is the most important determinant for political attitudes. Fifth, the degree of agreement with one's religion also is highly significant as a determinant. The correlation of this variable with the political items is not as high as that of the variable "religious sect", but on the average, much higher than that of the other independent variables, particularly social class. It can therefore be considered

as substantial. The tendencies of identification with religion can be even more clearly gathered from the variable "religious versus non-religious students". Since the latter variable considers the two extreme groups on the religiosity scale in an isolated fashion, it permits the influence of agreement with religion step into the foreground even more strongly. Sixth, the factor "degree of agreement with religion" is a truly independent variable. It correlates only with membership in a religious sect, with .243. That is, whether it be Moslems or Christians, the degree of agreement with religion, and degree of religious practice determines political attitudes also in a considerable way.

#### V. CONCLUSION

That membership in a religious sect should prove to be the absolutely strongest determinant of political attitudes is no surprise given the specific socio-political context of Lebanon. This result confirms the extraordinary stability of the patterns of opinions in that country, in spite of social and economic changes over the last decade.

Remarkable is the minor influence which can be attribute to belonging to a certain social class. The fact that the most important political currents within the Lebanese student body are practically identical in social composition, show that for the present, the existing situation does not (yet?) determine the consciousness of Lebanese students. The fact that the degree of agreement with one's religion proves to be independent of membership in a religious sect, but proves to be relevant for determination of political attitudes,

confirms the theory of secularization: With decreasing agreement with one's religion, the degree of integration within the political system also decreases.

In the case of Lebanon, this means on the one hand, the formation of a left, not bound by religion, and on the other hand, a partial secularization of the two competing nationalisms of that country, who formerly were completely, but today only partially, characterized by religion. The fact that religion proves to be not only a phenomenon of group membership, but also politically relevant as a pattern of conviction and behavior, even more than membership in a social class, could perhaps be a stimulus to dedicate more attention in the future to religion in the study of political socialization.



## FOOTNOTES

1. The more recent social science literature on "students and politics" has received its most outstanding contributions from Seymour Martin Lipset and Philip G. Altbach; they provided further stimuli and new approaches to the problem. This literature focused primarily on the role of students and student movements in politics. The strong emphasis on student politics so characteristic of a great number of the available studies did not infrequently lead to the implicit assumption that institutions of higher education are relevant in shaping political attitudes peculiar to students, or that student bodies are a social interaction group which determines the generation and development of such attitudes. Hence the examination of other factors relevant in forming political attitudes, such as class, caste, ethnic affiliation, department, or religion, often did not receive due attention. Lipset suggests that such factors be considered. He insists that "influences derived from university experiences are of course, not the sole or even primary determinants of student political beliefs." See Lipset, "Students and politics in comparative perspective", in Daedalus, Winter 1968, p. 3. Altbach states: "An examination of the student movement alone is insufficient to obtain a total picture of the student population. The social class background of the students will in part determine their attitudes toward education and occupation. Caste or tribal affiliation also influence student attitudes." See Altbach, "Students and politics", in: Lipset (ed.), Student politics, New York and London (Basic Books, Inc.), 1967, p. 87. However, relatively few studies offer relevant empirical evidence. A highly interesting contribution has been provided by Aileen D. Ross, Student unrest in India, Montreal and London (Mac Gill - Queen's University Press) 1969.
2. There are some scholars who have stressed the influence of religion: Donald K. Emmerson, "Conclusion", in Emmerson (ed.), Students and politics in developing nations, London (Pall Mall) 1968, pp. 393-394 and 400-401, offers some interesting hypotheses. Empirical evidence is produced by Clement H. Moore and Arlie R. Hochschild, "Student unions in North African politics", Daedalus, Winter, 1968, pp. 44-45, and by Leslie L. Ross, Jr. Noraleon P. Ross, and Gary R. Field, "Students and politics in Turkey", Daedalus, Winter, 1968, p. 196. See also Philip G. Altbach, Student Politics in Bombay, London (Asia Publishing House) 1968, pp. 173-183, and Margaret L. Cornack, She who rides a peacock, London (Asia Publishing House) 1967, pp. 131-136. Among these titles the Ross, Ross and Field and the Moore-Hochschild studies provide some hard data relevant to the relationship between religion and political attitudes.
3. Theodor Hanf, "The Political Attitudes of Congolese and Lebanese University Students", A paper presented at the VIIth World Congress of Sociology, Varna, Bulgaria, 1970.
4. See Patrick V. Dias, Theodor Hanf, Franz-Wilhelm Heimer and William Rideout, jr., Les universitaires Congolais. Enquête sur leurs attitudes socio-politiques, Düsseldorf (Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag) 1971.

5. Useful comparisons can be made with other studies of students at some of the Lebanese universities carried out during that period. See Salem Zablith, "Les dimensions sociales de l'existence quotidienne de l'étudiant", dans le cadre de la Cité Universitaire Libanaise, Faculté des Sciences, Beirut 1969 (mimeographed). See also Halim Barakat, "Social factors influencing attitudes of university students in Lebanon towards the Palestinian Resistance Movement", in Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1971, pp. 87-112, and "How students vote", in Al-Kulliyah, Winter 1971, pp. 5-9.
6. The best analysis of the Lebanese political system is found in Michael C. Hudson's The precarious Republic, New York (Random House) 1968. See also Wilhelm Kewenig, Die Koexistenz der Religionsgemeinschaften im Libanon, Berlin (Duncker und Humblot) 1965, Pierre Rondot, Les institutions politiques du Liban, Paris 1947, and Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon, New York 1966.
7. Translation of "Konkordanz-Demokratie", a term coined by Gerhard Lehmbruch in his Proporzdemokratie, Tübingen (Mohr) 1967; see also André Lijphardt, "Typology of Democracies", in Comparative Political Studies, 1961.
8. See the superb socio-political work by Antoine Messara, "Sociologie du Parlement Libanais", unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Centre d'Etudes Supérieures, Beirut 1971.
9. See Lehmbruch, op.cit., passim.
10. For a detailed description of education in Lebanon, see Theodor Hanf, Erziehungswesen in Gesellschaft und Politik des Libanon, Bielefeld (Bertelsmann Universitätsverlag) 1969.
11. It was difficult to determine the precise number of students, because the Arab University of Beirut has only few reliable statistics. The administration only compiles the number of exams taken at the end of each academic year in order to find out how many students the university had.
12. See Toufik Mokdessi and Lucien George, Les partis Libanais, Beirut (L'Orient) 1959, p. 33 ff; Mohamed Rajzoub, "Le Liban et l'Orient Arabe" Dissertation, Aix-en-Provence, 1956, p. 103 ff.; Micheal W. Suleiman, Political parties in Lebanon, Ithaca (Cornell University Press) 1967, pp. 232-242. Pierre Gemayel, Connaissance des Kataet, Beirut 1948.
13. See Suleiman, op.cit., pp. 260-262, Kamal S. Salibi, "Lebanon Since the Crisis of 1958", The World Today, Vol. 17. no. 1, p. 42.
14. See Suleiman, op.cit., pp. 250-260; Salibi, op.cit., p. 37.

15. See Suleiman, op.cit., pp. 213-227; Arnold Hottinger, "Zu'amā' in Historical Perspective", in Leonard Binder (ed.), Politics in Lebanon, New York, London, Sidney (John Wiley+Sons), 1966, pp. 88, 90, and 95.
16. See Mokdessi and George, op.cit., p. 57 ff.; Salibi, op.cit., p. 39; Majzoub, op.cit., p. 98.
17. See Karl Ammann, "Der palästinensische Widerstand" in Emuna/Horizonte, 6 (June 1971) 3.
18. See Mokdessi and George, op.cit., p. 31 ff.
19. See Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, London 1956, pp. 144 ff.
20. See Georges Naccache, Le nouveau style: Le Chéhabisme, Beirut (Conférences du Cénacle Libanais) 1961; René Habachi, "La Mission IRFED", L'Orient, January 1st, 1961; Michael C. Hudson, "Democracy and social mobilization in Lebanese Politics", in Comparative Politics, no. 2, Jan. 1969, pp. 245-263; Jean Salem, "Biland du Chéhabisme", in Revue Libanaise de Droit et des Sciences administratives (in press).