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ABSTRACT

During 1970-71, the Select Subcommittee on Education of the House Committee on Education and Labor held 8 days of hearings on the establishment of a National Institute of Education. This document is the second of three appendixes on the hearings and contains essays by scholars who have studied the aims of education, the issues of educational research, and ways of improving methods of teaching. Subjects covered include the philosophy of American education; aims, forms, and techniques of education; educational reform; nonverbal communication; early childhood intervention; home visiting programs for parents; competence motivation; accountability; home background and school performance; innovative planning; and the aims and methods of the School Council in England. (Refer to James Report SP 005 637 for additional information on School Council.) A list of contributing authors is included. (Related documents SP 005 695 and SP 005 697 contain appendixes 1 and 3.) (MJM)

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2d Session } COMMITTEE PRINT

PURPOSE AND PROCESS: READINGS IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

APPENDIX 2 TO HEARINGS ON H.R. 3606 AND RELATED BILLS TO CREATE A NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON EDUCATION BEFORE THE SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION

COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION AND LABOR
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JANUARY 1972

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CARL D. PERKINS, *Chairman*

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

In volume one of this series of background papers to the House Select Subcommittee on Education of the Education and Labor Committee hearings on the proposal to create a National Institute of Education, there were published a series of essays on the record and problems of Federal educational research. In this volume that series continues.

Here, however, the essays are more than a catalog of subjects for research and reports on work that has been done. One of the most important tasks in education is the continual redefinition of purpose, and this is a field in which there can be significant disagreement.

Two essays reprinted here make this point acutely vivid. Walter Karp, a philosophical young New York editor, maintains with ferocious directness that since the founding of the American Republic education has strayed from the ideal of "education for free men," a theme echoed by Ivan Illich in his paper "The Breakdown of Schools: A Problem or a Symptom?"

Whether one shares the views of these writers or not, one must recognize in their writing a conviction which represents a strong challenge to define satisfactorily what are our goals.

Kenneth E. Boulding, in an address to the American Educational Research Association reprinted here, inquires whether the "schooling industry" is a pathological sector of our economy. Pointing to the rise in the costs of education, the problematical nature of its benefits and the consequent difficulty in knowing what processes are cost effective by what standards, Boulding outlines issues which will be the grist for much hard thought for years to come.

David Reisman, a Harvard sociologist, is equally wide-ranging in his paper adapted from his recent Festschrift to Erich Fromm. Taking Fromm's psychological work as his guide, Reisman explores the wide array of criticisms made of American higher education, and some of the solutions being tried at the moment and weights these alternatives.

All these papers have considered American education philosophically, looking to aims and considering whether the forms and techniques of education are in fact suited to those aims.

In his contribution Prof. Forest Harrison of Claremont Graduate School compares American education at the elementary level with that of five other countries and assesses the ability of each educational system to provide equal learning opportunities regardless of home background or learning ability.

Harrison's intercultural assessment of educational opportunity leads us naturally to consider another manifestation of intercultural education, our own multiplicity of cultures in the schools. The gulf of opportunity between white and black Americans has narrowed in the past decade, but for all of this it is nonetheless an urgent subject for our study, particularly to the extent that errors of omission or commission in our schools may contribute to that gulf. Paul and Happie

Byers contribute the results of their most interesting study of the differences in communication styles between white and black children and draw some conclusions in the form of suggestions for working assumptions in our schools. Steven and Joan Baratz, examine the underlying assumptions of intervention programs that tacitly label Negro behavior as pathological and suggest that failure to recognize and utilize existing cultural forms of the lower class black community dooms such programs to failure.

Following are papers by Susan W. Gray and Michael Lewis who report their views and research results in very early childhood programs. Norman D. Kurland gives a graphic report on innovative planning that failed and innovative planning that seems on its way to success in the New York State educational system.

Robert Weber brings a State official's viewpoint to his overview of proposals for advancing accountability in education, and Geoffrey Caston, the Joint Secretary of the English Schools Council, writes about the aims and methods of the organization in which he works.

Because the relationship of scientific research to governmental policy is often a most difficult problem, volume II closes with a thoughtful essay on just that subject, Sheldon White's "Human Research and Human Affairs." I feel that his paper lends depth to our thinking about the purpose and process not just of education but of the scientific knowledge base upon which it must rest.

JOHN BRADEMAS,
Chairman, Select Subcommittee on Education.

John Brademas

PURPOSE AND PROCESS: READINGS IN EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

FREE SCHOOLS AND FREE MEN

By WALTER KARP

Miseducating children in our schools is not a difficult task but it raises large and difficult questions about American education.

In the black ghetto elementary schools of a certain large eastern city now teachers are warned by their superiors that they will be judged by how well they keep order in their classrooms. This warning, which is not given once but underscored in innumerable ways, achieves two significant results with notable efficiency. It subtly informs the teacher that his students are not expected to learn, and it turns the children into the teacher's enemy, for unruliness is presented as a direct threat to the teacher's job. Conditions of fear and authorized failure are created and under these conditions ghetto schooling proceeds, while educational spokesmen inform us that black children fail to "achieve" in school because of the "socioeconomic" handicaps of their ghetto backgrounds.

Miseducation is scarcely confined to black ghetto schools. In the same city's schools, middle class white children are frequently told, for example, that their misdeeds are indelibly recorded in "the permanent records," an archive which will follow them through life and be consulted by officialdom when they later apply for colleges or jobs. Such warnings about the permanent records (to alter by one jot or tittle, children are reminded, is a major felony) provides impressionable nine-year olds with an awesome picture of the adult world: a sort of universal bureaucracy leading from the highest authorities to one's third grade teacher, which inexorably rewards and punishes on the basis of imperishable dossiers.

The question raised by these two examples is why? Why should ghetto school principals deliberately put obstacles in the path of their young charges? Why should teachers try to cow young children with a slave's picture of the world they will one day enter, ostensibly as free citizens?

That educators might deliberately and systematically miseducate children—and the two examples merely suggest the range and subtlety of prevailing miseducation—is difficult for many people to accept. Yet consider the ramifications of just these two examples. The first shows ghetto school managers instilling mutual fear between children and teachers, while relieving their staffs of responsibility for their resulting failure to teach. Is this pernicious practice exposed by educational leaders, by state commissions of education, by teachers unions, professional associations, by the U.S. Commissioner of Education? Far from it.

To explain the failure of ghetto children to "achieve," which frequently means failure to achieve literacy, our educators have recently been propagating a new theory of educational sociology, to wit: that a black child finds it difficult to learn how to read (although he found it easy enough to learn how to speak, a far more intricate task) because of factors in his "socioeconomic" background. Instead of blaming the schools for their failures, they lay the blame for the schools' failures on the children they fail. The ghetto school managers are held to be equally blameless by more "radical" educators who declare that there is no chance whatever for black children in school until "social justice" is established—in effect defending the status quo while calling for the millennium.

This is not all by any means. The recent sociological explanation for the academic failures of poor and black children was formulated, interestingly enough, soon after a former explanation had fallen into disrepute. This was the explanation provided by the IQ tests, which beginning in the 1920's purportedly measured the genetic endowment of educability in every child and proved until 1957 that perhaps half the school population (including the poorer and darker-skinned part) were biologically incapable of ever learning much in school. In 1957, however, Russia sent up its Sputnik; government officials hotly demanded that our schools produce more scientists, engineers, and mathematicians. The increment had to draw on that portion of the school population hitherto deemed biologically incapable of learning even a vapid academic program in high school (as late as 1955 official educational circles were debating whether as much as 20 per cent of the high school population was "gifted" enough to learn even one physical science). Since the nation's needs came first, the educators had to shelve the IQ results as quietly as possible. Overnight hundreds of thousands of formerly "stupid" boys and girls became "college material." Unfortunately this made the educators' judgment about who can and who cannot be educated look exceedingly arbitrary indeed; for the IQ, after Sputnik, was no longer convincing. To replace it the new sociological rules of educability were coined to account for the considerable number of poor and black children who were still not being educated.

Nor is this all. When the educators, after some initial confusion, worked out this educational sociology, the federal government stepped in with its enormous authority, influence, and financial resources to underwrite it. This is what the contemporary Head Start and Follow Through programs are: billion dollar financing of the new official line that certain children, because of their lowly social backgrounds, are not good enough for the schools.

Such are the immediate ramifications of the first example. They can be summed up succintly: It is deemed by the highest authorities—which are political, not educational—that only a certain proportion of the less affluent is going to be educated. (Why we shall see see later.) Leading educators then blame miseducation on the children foredoomed to ignorance and semi-literacy, because obviously the schools cannot be held responsible for it. Finally, the highest authority accepts, propagates, and even finances the new educational doctrine. Down at the battlefront where the children are, ghetto school managers, making the "facts" fit the "explanation," run their schools so that those children who are not supposed to be taught have a difficult time trying to learn.

The ramifications of the second or middle-class example are more subtle and ideological; the non-poor and non-black must be handled, for obvious political reasons, more tactfully. The lesson "the permanent records" propound is that society is a unified and tightly organized enterprise, that its leaders can cooperate with each other by inter-office memo, as it were, and that in such a system want of the cooperative spirit will be unfailingly detected and dealt with. This degrading lesson, scarcely, unique, is simply a dramatic compression of the educational "philosophy" that has officially prevailed in most of our public schools for half a century and more.

The decisive element of modern educational doctrine lay in its radical reformulation of the purpose of education in America. The new purpose, as its pioneer theorists laid it down after the turn of the century, was that education must be adapted, as John Dewey put it, to "the requirements and opportunities of an industrial society." What that industrial social order required must determine the form, the content and the spirit of public education. By that standard, the children in the schools would be looked upon, perforce, as future workers and members of industrial society, a view echoed in a 1969 Presidential budget message wherein the purpose of public education was officially deemed to be that of helping students increase their "earning power."

Given the requirements of industrial society, the specific goal of education, again in Dewey's words, was "the forming of a socialized disposition" in the children, a disposition toward the kind of cooperative "social living" that the new industrial order required of its members—especially the lowlier ones. Since most children would be employees in the new order, another educational pioneer, Jane Addams of Hull House, suggested in her 1902 work, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, that children be made to study the industrial development of the country and taught about the modern division of labor. Made aware of their future role as cogs in a giant cooperative enterprise, these future workers, she pointed out, would not only feel cooperatively disposed, they would find their work "much more exhilarating." Given a rising concern to adapt the industrial workers to emerging industrial society, it is little wonder that the first public school system to adopt the new educational philosophy (in 1909) was the town of Gary, Indiana, a company town created and controlled by the U.S. Steel Corporation and named after its president.

On the same principles, the new educational pioneers added to the school curriculum a subject hitherto unknown in the history of education. Designed to replace that study of history (and actually replacing it in many public schools, for history was deemed irrelevant to social living in the new era), it was called "social studies." Its purpose was to enable children to glimpse something of the complexity and interdependence of industrial civilization. Students would make "reports," for example, on "how milk is brought to the city," a topic which, like many other social studies "projects," was designed to impress juvenile minds with the awe-inspiring division of cooperative labor required just to supply him with his daily drink.

Social studies were also intended to impress children with the sense that things were constantly improving and such topics a "the evolution of transportation" were highly regarded by the new educational

theorists. Not only improving but already benign. In the social studies program of the trail-blazing Gary schools, children in that smoke-fouled steel town were asked to make reports on the topic: "The City: A Healthful Place in Which to Live"—a piece of mendacity which did not prevent Dewey from singling out Gary for praise in his book, *Schools of Tomorrow*. Actually it was a double piece of mendacity, for the reason the new educators deplored the old-fashioned study of history was that the past, being past, did not present children with the "real life situations" they allegedly required in order to learn at all.

To demur that American children were future citizens as well as future workers, that America was a republic as well as an industrialized civilization, that Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany too, after all, was an industrial civilization, the new educational philosophers had a ready answer. "Democracy," Dewey declared, "is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living." What distinguished democracy from other forms of associated living, Dewey argued, was that it was more intensely cooperative than others. Thus by an easy transition, the same requirements of cooperativeness that industrial civilization set for the schools, "democracy" also set for the schools.

This conception of "democratic education" was so suitable to those actually wielding power in the Republic that from 1917 onward, the leading supporter and propagator of the new educational doctrines was none other than the federal government, which also in 1917 began to support vocational training, the first federal intervention in local schools. Since local communities which elected their own school boards were at that time still less than enthusiastic about adapting their children to "industrial civilization," state legislatures with federal support all over the country began a titanic effort, starting in the 1920's, to "consolidate" several score thousands of local school systems into larger, less locally controlled units. At the same time they passed laws which put real control over education in the hands of state educational associations, teachers' colleges, and state education commissions which could be relied on to institute the new educational doctrines.

So, clearly, teachers in the large eastern city who frighten children with the bogeyman of the permanent records have not pioneered in miseducation. They have fully accepted the task of disposing children for their places in a highly cooperative industrial civilization. They have merely added a final dramatic touch: industrial civilization keeps continuing dossiers on its members. The 13-year old student in that same city, who, in a newly published anthology of "radical" high school writings, adjudged the United States to be "a horrific beast, who will suffer not the slightest defiance, the merest disobedience," has not summed up any personal experience of politics. He is simply repeating what his teachers have taught him.

Again the question is why. Why should American schools deliberately practice disguised class education? And the answer is, because they cannot practice open class education in this Republic. Why should our children be treated as little more than future recruits for the industrial army? And the answer is, because they are much more: they are future citizens. The kind of education we have today was designed expressly to prevent us from having the kind of education we were supposed to have in this Republic. Until we understand this, we

will not be able to understand the nature of contemporary miseducation; indeed we would have no standard for judging that it is, in truth, miseducation.

The kind of schools a republic must have was understood clearly by the founder of the Republic and described for all time by Thomas Jefferson. Whatever education might be under other political systems, the goal of republican education, he said, was "to enable every man to judge for himself what secures or endangers his freedom." *That* is the principle of republican education. Let us explore several ramifications of this principle, for to grasp its meaning is to understand why in 1970 our schools are what they are.

First, those to be educated would appear in republican schools as future citizens and nothing else, least of all as future jobholders. It cannot be otherwise, for the one thing no child will ever learn in any school that treats him as a future member of an industrial civilization (i.e., a jobholder) is how to judge for himself what secures or endangers his freedom. Jobholders have to know many things but this surely is not one of them—ask any employer. A citizens on the other hand, is not a mere member of an industrial civilization. The citizen and the jobholder are two orders of being that cannot be merged—except in the equivocations of John Dewey, who accomplished the merger by redefining democracy as a form of social life.

A citizen is a member of a republic constituted for self-government. He is one who holds a regular share in public power, a regular voice in his own government, and thus has the capacity to act for himself in public concerns. It is that capacity to share in self-government which constitutes the freedom of the citizen. Without that share he is not truly free; he becomes instead a mere subject of power that is out of his reach and unanswerable to him.

The question of education posed itself to the founders precisely because they knew that even in the Republic men of ambition would try to usurp the citizen's share in power. From the perennial ambitions of would-be oligarchs, in short, the freedom of the citizen is always in danger. It would be up to them to defend their own freedom for who else but they could be expected to defend it? The best way to make sure that every citizen could defend his republican freedom would be to establish schools that would enable every man to judge for himself what secures or endangers it. Such republican schools would help educate a body of citizens who would know to ask of any public action the ultimate republican question: does it enhance or impair the citizen's share in his own government? When the first organization of American workingmen, the Mechanics Trade Union of Mechanics Associations, began calling for education for their children, it was republican education they demanded, the kind of education which, in their words, would teach the nation's children "to be jealous of naught save the republican character of their country."

Second, it follows from its principle that republican education must be available freely and equally to all, for all are future citizens. A republic in which only the affluent are educated is one which, as Jefferson noted, the rich and the well-born would easily monopolize public office and pervert the republican character of the country. To prevent the rise of such a governing class in the Republic it was obvious to earlier Americans that free schools could not be charity schools, mere supple-

ments to the private schools of the well-off, for their object was not to educate the poor as such, but to educate free citizens. They would have to be public institutions for the overwhelming majority of future citizens. "common schools" as they were called in the 19th century.

Third, to the question what must every future citizen be taught in order to play his public role as a citizen, Jefferson replied they must learn history, by which he did not mean the "evolution of transportation" or the "industrial development" of the country. By history he meant political history, history which would teach future citizens to "know ambition in all its shapes." Such an understanding, as republicans like Jefferson never doubted, was not narrow and sectarian, but the basis of a true liberal education. As Montaigne long ago observed, "the liberal arts are the arts that liberate." The "educated" man who pretends to culture and an appreciation of literature without having any grasp of politics and power is a twaddler and, it is worth remarking, was always thought to be one. Such a man cannot even understand the world's literature, for the greatest novels, epic poems, and plays, most notably the plays of Shakespeare, turn to an eminent degree on considerations of power, authority, rulership and usurpation—a truth that may suggest to those who perhaps think of politics as the narrow pursuit of "politicians" how deep and humane is an education which teaches young people "to know ambition in all its shapes."

Other features of republican education, too, follow logically from its principle. Schools which are to look upon their charges as future citizens must treat them equally, for citizens are equals, however different their social destinies or biological capacities may be. Indeed there is no way children can be treated equally in school *except* as future citizens, for they are unequal in every other way. Schools which provide republican education must also treat children with gravity and respect, for they are future citizens who must one day have the courage to "judge for themselves." There is no place in republican education for inculcating the spirit of patriotism; a citizen, in Lincoln's words, loves his country because it is free, not simply because it is his. There is no place in republican education for indoctrination in servility, or for moral bullying in general. Citizens who must be prepared to enter the public arena to defend the republican character of their country are not to be taught as children to look on "their betters" with awe and submissiveness. In general there is no room in republican schooling for any lesson useful to those who wish to perpetuate irresponsible power at the expense of self-governing citizens.

The converse of this is equally true. Those who would wish to wield irresponsible power do not want the citizenry to be able to judge for themselves what secures or endangers their freedom. For this reason Americans wanted their schools to be, in the words of the Mechanics Trade Union, "under the immediate suffrage" of local citizens. Who else could be entrusted to see that children were taught what a free citizen must know except self-governing citizens themselves? To give control over public education to any wielders of power more remote than the chosen representative of the local community would be to place one's trust in those least to be trusted with the education of future citizens. The free public schools of the Republic would be community institutions, not arms of the government; public schools but not, as in other countries, government schools.

Such is the framework of republican education and in accordance with its principle our system of public education was, in part, laid down during the 19th century. Our schools were the common schools of the citizenry, not charity schools for a particular social class. They were under the immediate suffrage of local communities (except in cities and Southern states). They taught children to read. They taught little more however, since they did not teach history and introduce children to "ambition in all its shapes." On the other hand they did look upon their charges as future citizens since there did not yet exist any rationale for doing otherwise. In short, if the common schools were not fully republican they were not antirepublican either. That is no small thing considering what would come in the years between 1896 and the First World War.

During that period, the political leaders of the country faced two related challenges, one political, the other educational. The political challenge was a vast and growing insurgent movement directed against the power of political party machines, against irresponsible government and the special privileges and interests it created and fostered. It was a movement to protect and restore republican institutions and it was strong enough in 1912 to almost—but not quite—capture control of the Republican party. What that insurgency made clear was that even without republican education, a great many Americans still judged for themselves what secured or endangered their freedom.

The educational challenge was the nationwide demand for public secondary education (still negligible at the turn of the century). Since there was no way in this Republic to leave that demand unanswered, it was the almost unanimous verdict of the political leaders and their educational spokesmen that the great majority of future citizens must be denied a liberating education once they got to the secondary schools. As J. E. Russell of Columbia Teacher's College asked in 1905: "How can we justify our practice in schooling the masses in precisely the same manner as we do those who are going to be their leaders?" In reply, Charles W. Eliot, president of Harvard said in 1908: "Here we come upon a new function of the teachers in our elementary schools, and in my judgment they have no function more important. The teachers of the elementary schools ought to sort the pupils and sort them by their evident or probable destinies." Concurring in this, Woodrow Wilson declared before the High School Teachers Association in 1909 that "We want one class of persons to have a liberal education and we want another class of persons, a very much larger class of necessity in every society, to forego the privilege of a liberal education and fit themselves to perform specific difficult manual tasks." What the foregoers of privilege should get had already been outlined in 1905 by the influential Douglas Commission on education: the inculcation in future schools of what the Commission rightly called a "new idea" in education, namely "the diffusion of industrial intelligence."

In short, the nation's educators were told that they must somehow prevent "the masses" from learning enough to compete with their natural "leaders" for public office and power. To accomplish this three things were required. First the educators would have to devise some acceptable means to sort children out by their social backgrounds (accomplished after 1920 by the IQ tests). Secondly, they would have

to develop a new kind of educational curriculum which would prevent the great majority from learning what a future citizen must know. Thirdly, they would have to make this new system presentable as the fulfillment of "democratic ideals."

The challenge was met by the previously cited pioneers of the new educational philosophy—"progressive" educators as they were called. It was they who justified education that diffuses "industrial intelligence" by proclaiming that it was industrial civilization and not the Republic itself that set the goals for public schooling. It was they, too, who provided the theoretical justification for treating children according to their social backgrounds. They did this with their novel notion of a "child-centered" education, one in which, it was said, "the interests, needs, capacities and social heredity" of the children would determine the content of their education, while the educators of course would determine what the children "needed," namely a "socialized disposition" and the habits of cooperation.

By 1929, state and federal governments succeeded in "reforming" the nation's schools along the lines of the new philosophy; they are the kind of schools we have today. What kind of schools they are now becomes clear; they are schools which are not merely non-republican, they are deliberate and systematic inversions of republican education.

Republican schools were intended to compensate the many for the political advantages enjoyed by the few. Our public schools resort to endless subterfuges to track the poor and the black into ignorance, semiliteracy and "vocational training." Republican schools were to educate future citizens. Our public schools treat children as future jobholders and tell them, indeed, that the very purpose of education is to "get a better job." Republican education was to be based on the study of history. Our public schools provide social studies, the exact opposite of history, or else they provide jingo history texts in which dangerous political ambitions are seen only as threats from outside. Republican education teaches future citizens that republican institutions are always in danger. Our high school civics courses teach students that the very opposite is true, that a system of "checks and balances" automatically preserves democracy and without any help from them. Republican education encourages students to be judiciously independent; our public schools try to train children for unthinking docility. So deliberately do our schools work to prevent anyone from learning about the republican character of their country, that the writings of Jefferson, Madison, and Lincoln, the three greatest republican thinkers in our history, appear in virtually no public school curriculum from one end of the Republic to the other—all this while our educators cant of "relevance" and "enrichment." "There's richness" as Dickens' Mr. Squeers observed while passing out watered milk to his students.

One last thing needs to be said. Some will deem that this is too one-sided an indictment of our schools, that the single standard of republican education is too narrow a basis for judging contemporary education. Some may think that republican education is not needed today as urgently as it might have been in earlier times. These are understandable contentions, but the answers to them are provided by our schools themselves. It is they which demonstrates the importance, the comprehensiveness, and the undying relevance of republican education, for they have been formed by contravening it at every turn.

THE BREAKDOWN OF SCHOOLS: A PROBLEM OR A SYMPTOM?

By IVÁN ILLICH

Schools are in crisis and so are the people who attend them. The former is a crisis in a political institution; the latter is a crisis of political attitudes. This second crisis, the crisis of personal growth, can be dealt with only if understood as distinct from, though related to, the crisis of school.

Schools have lost their un-questioned claim to educational legitimacy. Most of their critics still demand a painful and radical reform of the school, but a quickly expanding minority will not stand for anything short of the prohibition of compulsory attendance and the disqualification of academic certificates. Controversy between partisans of renewal and partisans of disestablishment will soon come to a head.

The breakdown of schools, since it affects all members of the society, will become a fascinating and consuming preoccupation of the public forum. As attention focuses on the school, however, we can be easily distracted from a much deeper concern: the manner in which learning will be viewed in a deschooled society. Will people continue to treat learning as a commodity—a commodity which could be more efficiently produced and consumed by greater numbers of people if new institutional arrangements were established? Or shall we set up only those institutional arrangements which protect the autonomy of the learner—his private initiative to decide what he will learn and his inalienable right to learn what he likes rather than what is useful to somebody else? We must choose between more efficient education of people fit for an increasingly efficient society—and a new society in which education ceases to be the task of some special agency.

All over the world schools are organized enterprises designed to reproduce the established order, whether this order is called revolutionary, conservative or evolutionary. Everywhere the loss of pedagogical credibility and the resistance to schools provides a fundamental option: shall this crisis be dealt with as a problem which can and must be solved by substituting new devices for school and readjusting the existing power structure to fit these devices? Or shall this crisis force a society to face the structural contradictions inherent in the politics and economics of any society which reproduces itself through the industrial process.

The problem-solving approach to de-schooling could serve as a means to tighten the alliance between the military, the industrial sector, and the "therapeutic" service industries. De-schooling, as a merely administrative program, could be the accommodation which would permit the present political structure to survive into the era of late 20th century technology.

On the other hand, the crisis of school could be understood as a breakdown of the most important, respected, non-controversial sector

of society, the branch which employes 60 of the 140 million full-time institutionally active Americans as either pupils or teachers.

In the U.S. and Canada huge investments in schooling only serve to make institutional contradictions more evident. Experts warn us: Charles Silberman's report to the Carnegie Commission, published as *Crisis in the Classroom*, has become a bestseller. It appeals to a large public because of its well documented indictment of the system—in the light of which his attempts to save the school by manicuring its most obvious faults palls to insignificance. The Wright Commission in Ontario had to report to its government sponsors that post-secondary education is inevitably and without remedy taxing the poor disproportionately for an education which will always be enjoyed mainly by the rich. Experience confirms these warnings: Students and teachers drop out; free schools come and go. Political control of schools replaces bond issues on the platforms of school board candidates and—as recently happened in Berkeley—advocates of grassroots control are elected to the board. On March 8, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the unanimous opinion of the court in the case of Griggs et al vs. Duke Power Co. Interpreting the intent of Congress in the equal opportunities section of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Burger Court ruled that any school degree or any test given prospective employees must "measure the man for the job" and not "the man in the abstract." The burden for proving that educational requirements are a "reasonable measure of job performance" rests with the employer. In this decision, the court ruled only on the use of tests and diplomas as means of racial discrimination, but the logic of the Chief Justice's argument applies to any use of educational pedigree as a prerequisitie for employment. "The Great Training Robbery" so effectively exposed by Ivar Berg must now face challenge from a congeries of pupils, employers and taxpayers.

In poor countries schools rationalize economic lag. The majority of citizens are excluded from the scarce modern means of production and consumption, but long to enter the economy by way of the school door. The legitimization of hierarchical distribution of privilege and power has shifted from lineage, inheritance, the favor of king or pope, and ruthlessness on the market or on the battlefield to a more subtle form of capitalism: the hierarchical but liberal institution of compulsory schooling which permits the well-schooled to impute the lagging consumer of knowledge the guilt for holding a certificate of lower denomination. Yet this rationalization of inequality can never square with the facts, and populist regimes find it increasingly difficult to hide the conflict between rhetoric and reality.

Upon seizing power, the military junta in Peru immediately decided to suspend further expenditures on free public school. They reasoned that since a third of the public budget could not provide one full year of decent schooling for all, the available tax receipts could better be spent on a type of educational resources which make them more nearly accessible to all citizens. The educational reform commission appointed by the junta could not fully carry out this decision because of pressures from the school teachers of the APRA, the Communists, and the Cardinal Archbishop of Lima. Now there will be two competing systems of public education in a country which cannot afford one. The resulting contradictions will confirm the original judgment of the junta.

For ten years Castro's Cuba has devoted great energies to rapid-growth popular education, relying on available manpower, without the usual respect for professional credentials. The initial spectacular successes of this campaign, especially in diminishing illiteracy, have been cited as evidence for the claim that the slow growth rate of other Latin American school systems is due to corruption, militarism and a capitalist market economy. Yet, now, the hidden curriculum of hierarchical schooling is catching up to Fidel and his attempt to school-produce the New Man. Even when students spend half the year in the cane fields and fully subscribe to fidelismo, the school trains every year a crop of knowledge consumers ready to move on to new levels of consumption. Also, Dr. Castro faces evidence that the school system will never turn out enough certified technical manpower. Those licensed graduates who do get the new jobs destroy, by their conservatism, the results obtained by non-certified cadres who muddled into their positions through on-the-job training. Teachers just cannot be blamed for the failures of a revolutionary government which insists on the institutional capitalization of manpower through a hidden curriculum guaranteed to produce a universal bourgeoisie.

This crisis is epochal. We are witnessing the end of the age of schooling. School has lost the power, which reigned supreme during the first half of this century, to blind its participants to the divergence between the egalitarian myth which its rhetoric serves and the rationalization of a stratified society which its certificates produce. The current collapse of schools is a sign of disaffection with the industrial mode of production. The dropout manifests consumer resistance, which rises faster in the service industry than in the market for manufactured goods. The loss of legitimacy of the schooling process as a means of determining competence, as a measure of social value, and as an agent of equality threatens all political systems which rely on schools as the means of reproducing themselves.

School is the initiation ritual to a society which is oriented towards the progressive consumption of increasingly less tangible and more expensive services; a society which relies on worldwide standards; large-scale and long-term planning; constant obsolescence through the built-in ethos of never-ending improvements; the constant translation of new needs into specific demands for the consumption of new satisfactions. This society is proving itself unworkable.

Since the crisis in schooling is symptomatic of a deeper crisis of modern industrial society, it is important that the critics of schooling avoid superficial solutions. Inadequate analysis of the nature of schooling only postpones the facing of deeper issues. Worse still, superficial reforms can ease present tensions, only to promote a smooth transition from antiquated industrial forms to a post-industrial society which would lack even the saving graces of the present system.

Most school-criticism is pedagogical, political, or technological. The criticism of the educator is leveled at what is taught and how it is taught. The curriculum is outdated, so we have courses on African culture, on North American imperialism, on Women's liberation, on food and nutrition. Passive learning is old-fashioned, so we have increased student participation, both in the classroom and in the planning of curriculum. School buildings are ugly, so we have new learning environments. There is concern for the development of human sensitivity, so group therapy methods are imported into the classroom.

Another important set of critics is involved with the politics of urban school administration. They feel that the poor could run their schools better than a centralized bureaucracy which is oblivious to the problems of the dispossessed. Black parents are enlisted to replace white teachers in the motivation of their children to make time and find the will to learn. Still other critics emphasize that schools make inefficient use of modern technology. They would either electrify the classroom or replace schools with computerized learning centers. If they follow McLuhan, they would replace blackboards and textbooks with multi-media happenings. If they follow Skinner, they would compete with the classical teacher and sell economy packages of measurable behavioral modifications to cost-conscious schoolboards.

The pedagogical, the political and the technological critics of the school system do not call the institution itself into question. Nor do they recognize the most important effects of schooling.

I believe that all these critics miss the point, because they fail to attend to what I have elsewhere called the ritual aspects of schooling—what I here propose to call the hidden curriculum, the structure underlying what has been called the certification effect. Others have used this phrase to refer to the environmental curriculum of the ghetto street or the suburban lawn, which the teacher's curriculum either reinforces or vainly attempts to replace. I am using the term hidden curriculum to refer to the structure of schooling as opposed to what happens in school, in the same way that linguists distinguish between the structure of a language and the use which the speaker makes of it.

The Hidden Curriculum

The traditional hidden curriculum of school demands that people of a certain age assemble in groups of about thirty under the authority of a professional teacher for from 500 to a thousand times a year. It does not matter if the teacher is authoritarian so long as it is the teacher's authority that counts; it does not matter if all meetings occur in the same place so long as they are somehow understood as attendance. The hidden curriculum of school requires—whether by law or by fact—that a citizen accumulate a minimum quantum of school years in order to obtain his civil rights.

The hidden curriculum of school has been legislated in all the united nations from Afghanistan to Zambia. It is common to the United States and the Soviet Union, to rich nations and poor, to electoral and dictatorial regimes. Whatever ideologies and techniques are explicity transmitted in their school systems, all these nations assume that political and economic development depend on further investment in schooling.

The hidden curriculum teaches all children that economically valuable knowledge is the result of professional teaching and that social entitlements depend on the rank achieved in a bureaucratic process. The hidden curriculum transforms the explicit curriculum into a commodity and makes its acquisition the securest form of wealth. Knowledge certificates—unlike property rights, corporate stock or family inheritance—are free from challenge. They withstand sudden changes of fortune. They convert into guaranteed privilege. That high accumulation of knowledge should convert to high personal consumption

might be challenged in North Vietnam or Cuba, but school is universally accepted as the avenue to greater power, to increased legitimacy as a producer and to further learning resources.

For all its vices school cannot be simply and rashly eliminated: in the present situation it performs certain important negative functions. The hidden curriculum, unconsciously accepted by the liberal pedagogues, frustrates his conscious liberal aims, because it is inherently inconsistent with them. But, on the other hand, it also prevents the takeover of education by the programmed instruction of behavioral technologists. While the hidden curriculum makes social role depend on the process of acquiring knowledge, thus legitimizing stratification, it also ties the learning process to full-time attendance, thus illegitimizing the educational entrepeneur. If the school continues to lose its educational and political legitimacy, while knowledge is still conceived as a commodity, we will certainly face the emergence of a therapitic Big Brother.

The translation of the need for learning into the demand for schooling and the conversion of the quality of growing up into the price tag of a professional treatment changes the meaning of "knowledge" from a term which designates intimacy, intercourse and life experience into one which designates professionally packaged products, marketable entitlements and abstruct values. Schools have fostered this translation; they might not be its most effective agents. The news media people might be able to distribute knowledge packages more rationally, more efficiently and more intimately; many of them would like nothing better than to eliminate school administrators out of touch with the latest technology.

Personal knowledge is unpredictable and surprising with respect to both occurrence and outcome, whereas official knowledge must be anticipated and directed to measurable goals. Personal knowledge is always incomplete, because there are always further questions to be asked. Official knowledge is always unfinished, because there are always newer packages to consume. The progress of personal knowledge is governed by intrinsic rules of inquiry. The acquisition of official knowledge is measured by compliance with extrinsic rules of attendance. Personal knowledge is confident even while incomplete because it obeys its own restlessness. Official knowledge rests uneasy because its current value depends on institutional acceptance. Official knowledge only can solve puzzles within the present framework—only personal knowledge can lead to investigation which aims at change.

Schools are by no means the only institutions which pretend to translate knowledge, understanding and wisdom into behavioral traits, the measurement of which is the key to prestige and power. Nor are schools the first institution used to convert knowledge to power. The Chinese mandarin system, for example, was for centuries a stable and effective educational system in the service of a class whose privilege depended on the acquisition of official knowledge. About 2200 BC the emperor of China is said to have examined his officials every third year. After three examinations he either promoted them, or dismissed them forever from the service. A thousand years later, in 1115, the first Chan emperor established formal general tests for office: music, archery, horsemanship, writing and arithmetic. One in every hundred who presented himself for competition with his peers—and not for

competition against some abstract standard—was promoted through the three degrees of "budding geniuses," "promoted scholars" and those who were "Ready for Office." The selection ratio of the exams to three successive levels were so small, that the tests themselves would not have had to be very valid in order to be useful. Promotion to a scholarly rank did not provide entitlement to any of the coveted jobs: it provided a ticket for a public lottery at which offices were distributed by lot among the mandarins. No schools, much less universities, developed in China until she had to begin waging war with European powers. Voltaire and many of his contemporaries praised the Chinese system of promotion through learning acquired. The first civil service examination in Europe and the U.S. used the Chinese system, directly or indirectly, as a model. Civil Service testing was introduced by the revolution in 1791 in France, only to be abolished by Napoleon. The English Civil Service system began as a selection for service in India by men familiar with the Chinese system. Congressman Thomas Jenckes, one of the fathers of the U.S. Civil Service, sold his program to Congress in 1868 by praising the Chinese system.

For a while, public schools parlayed the consumption of knowledge into the exercise of privilege and power in a society where this function coincided with the legitimate aspirations of those members of the lower middle classes for whom schools provided access to the classical professions. Now that the discriminatory effects of the use of schooling for social screening become more apparent, a new mandarin system becomes an appealing alternative to many people. Christoper Jencks, misread by uncritical followers, could easily turn "tuition vouchers" into identification tags of the new mandarins. It becomes equally tempting to use modern techniques for seducing individuals to the self-motivated acquisition of packaged learning. This can be done without the protection of schools in a society already trained to conceive of valuable learning as a commodity, rather than as an act of total participation by an individual in his culture.

An Expansion of the Concept of Alienation

Since the Nineteenth Century, we have become accustomed to the claim that man in a capitalist economy is alienated from his labor: that he cannot enjoy it, and that he is exploited of its fruits by those who own the tools of production. Most countries which appeal to Marxist ideology have had only limited success in changing this exploitation, and then usually by shifting its benefits from the owners to the New Class and from the living generation to the members of the future nation state.

Socialist failures can be explained away by ascribing them to bad readings of Marx and Engels or to inadequacies of the original theory. Then again, blame can be transferred to war, blockade or invasion. Or it can be interpreted in terms of inherited sociological conditions, such as a particular type of rural-urban balance. Whatever the argument, however, Marxist orthodoxies and revisionist heresies and value-free rebuttals now put up smokescreens against independent analysis.

The concept of alienation cannot help us understand the present crisis unless it is applied not only to the purposeful and productive use of human endeavor, but also to the use made of men as the recipients

of professional treatments. Language reflects this alienation when it translates these verbs into substantives, which make it possible to say that "I have" leisure, learning . . . transportation, rather than that "I do enjoy, learn, move, or communicate. An expanded understanding of alienation would enable us to see that in a service-centered economy man is estranged from what he can "do" as well as from what he can "make", that he has delivered his mind and heart over to therapeutic treatment even more completely than he has sold away the fruits of his labor.

Schools have alienated man from his learning. He does not enjoy going to school; if he is poor he does not get the reputed benefits; if he does all that is asked of him, he finds his security constantly threatened by more recent graduates; if he is sensitive, he feels deep conflicts between what is and what is supposed to be. He does not trust his own judgment and even if he resents the judgment of the educator, he is condemned to accept it and to believe himself that he cannot change reality.

The mutation of the concept of revolution cannot occur, however, without a rejection of the hidden curriculum of schooling and the correlative attitude toward knowledge, for it is this curriculum and this attitude which turns out disciplined consumers of bureaucratic instructions ready to consume other kinds of services and treatments which they are told are good for them. The converging crisis of ritual schooling and of acquisitive knowledge raises the deeper issue of the tolerability of life in an alienated society. If we formulate principles for alternative institutional arrangements and an alternative emphasis in the conception of learning, we will also be suggesting principles for a radically alternative political and economic organization.

Just as the structure of one's native language can be grasped only after he has begun to feel at ease in another tongue, so the fact that the hidden curriculum of schooling has moved out of the blindspot of social analysis indicates that alternative forms of social initiation are beginning to emerge and are permitting some of us to see things from a new perspective. Today, it is relatively easy to get wide agreement on the fact that gratuitous, compulsory schooling is contrary to the political self-interest of an enlightened majority. School has become pedagogically indefensible as an instrument of universal education. It no longer fits the needs of the seductive salesmen of programmed learning. Proponents of recorded, filmed and computerized instruction used to court the schoolmen as business prospects; now they are itching to do the job on their own.

As more and more of the sectors of society become dissatisfied with school and conscious of its hidden curriculum. increasingly large concessions are made to translate their demands into needs which can be served by the system—and which thus can disarm their dissent. I here describe some of these attempts under the general label of "cooperation."

As the hidden curriculum moves out of the darkness and into the twilight of our awareness, phrases such as the "deschooling of society" and the "disestablishment of schools" become instant slogans. I do not think these phrases were used before last year. This year they have become, in some circles, the badge and criterion of the new orthodoxy. Recently I talked, by amplified telephone to students in a seminar on deschooling

at the Ohio State University College of Education. Everett Reimer's book on deschooling* has become a popular college text, even before it is commercially published. Unless the radical critics of school are not only ready to embrace the deschooling slogan but also prepared to reject the current view that learning and growing up can be adequately explained as a process of programming, and the current vision of social justice based on it—more obligatory consumption for everybody—we may face the charge of having provoked the last of the missed revolutions.

The current crisis has made it easy to attack schools. Schools, after all, are authoritarian and rigid; they do produce both conformity and conflict; they do discriminate against the poor and disengage the privileged. These are not new facts, but it used to be a mark of some boldness to point them out. Now it takes a good deal of courage to defend schools. It has become fashionable to poke fun at Alma Mater, to take a potshot at the former Sacred Cow.

Once the vulnerability of schools has been exposed, it also becomes easy to suggest remedies for the most outrageous abuses. The authoritarian rule of the classroom is not intrinsic to the motion of an extended confinement of children in schools. Free schools are practical alternatives; they can often be run more cheaply than ordinary schools. Since accountability already belongs to educational rhetoric, community control and performance contracting have become attractive and respectable political goals. Everyone wants education to be relevant to real life, so critics talk freely about pushing back the classroom walls to the borders of our culture. Not only are alternatives more widely advocated, they are often at least partially implemented; experimental schools are financed by school boards; the hiring of certified teachers is decentralized; high school credit is given for apprenticeship and college credit for travel; computer games are given a trial run.

Most of the changes have some good effects. The experimental schools have fewer truants; parents have a greater feeling of participation in the decentralized districts; children who have been introduced to real jobs do turn out more competent. Yet all these alternatives operate within predictable limits, since they leave the hidden structure of schools intact. Free schools which lead to further free schools in an unbroken chain of attendance produce the mirage of freedom. Attendance as the result of seduction inculcates the need for specialized treatment more persuasively than reluctant attendance enforced by truant officers. Free school graduates are easily rendered impotent for life in a society which bears little resemblance to the protected gardens in which they have been cultivated. Community control of the lower levels of a system turns local school board members into pimps for the professional hookers who control the upper levels. Learning by doing is not worth much if doing has to be defined as socially valuable learning by professional educators or by law. The global village will be a global schoolhouse if teachers hold all the plugs. It would be distinguishable in name only from a global madhouse run by social therapists or global prison run by corporation wardens.

In a general way I have pointed out the dangers of a rash, uncritical disestablishment of school. More concretely, these dangers are exempli-

*Everett Reiner. An Essay on Alternatives in Education, available from CIDOC, Apdo 679, Cuernavoca, Mexico.

fied by various kinds of cooption which change the hidden curriculum without changing the basic concept of learning and of knowledge and their relationship to the freedom of the individual in society.

The rash and uncritical disestablishment of school could lead to a free-for-all in the production and consumption of more vulgar learning, acquired for immediate utility or eventual prestige. The discrediting of school-produced complex curriculum packages would be an empty victory if there were no simultaneous disavowal of the very idea that knowledge is more valuable because it comes in certified packages and is acquired from some mythological knowledge-stock controlled by professional guardians. I believe that only actual participation constitutes socially valuable learning, a participation by the learner in every stage of the learning process, including not only a free choice of what is to be learned and how it is to be learned, but also a free determination by each learner of his own reason for living and learning—the part that his knowledge is to play in his life.

Social control in an apparently deschooled society could be more subtle and more numbing than in the present society, where many people at least experience a feeling of release on the last day of school. More intimate forms of manipulation are already common, as the amount learned through the media exceeds the amount learned through personal contact in and out of school. Learning from programmed information always hides reality behind a screen.

Let me illustrate the paralyzing effects of programmed information by a perhaps shocking example. The tolerance of the American people to United States atrocities in Vietnam is much higher than the tolerance of the German people to German atrocities on the front, in occupied territories and in exterminaton camps during the Second World War. It was a political crime for Germans to discuss the atrocities committed by Germans. The presentation of U.S. atrocities on network television is considered an educational service. Certainly the population of the United States is much better informed about the crimes committed by its troops in a colonial war than were the Germans about the crimes committed by its SS within the territory of the Reich. To get information on atrocities in Germany meant that you had to take a great risk; in the U.S. the same information is channelled into your living room. This does not mean, however, that the Germans were any less aware that their government was engaged in cruel and massive crime than are the contemporary Americans. In fact, it can be argued that the Germans were *more* aware, precisely because they were not physically overwhelmed with packaged information about killing and torture, because they were not drugged into accepting that everything is possible, because they were not vaccinated against reality by having it fed to them as decomposed "bits" on a screen.

The consumer of pre-cooked knowledge learns to react to knowledge he has acquired rather than to the reality from which a team of experts have abstracted it. If access to reality is always controlled by a therapist and if the learner accepts this conrtol as natural, his entire worldview becomes hygenic and neutral, he becomes politically impotent. He becomes impotent to know in the sense of the Hebrew word "jdh" which means intercourse penetrating the nakedness of being and reality. Because reality, for which he can accept responsibility is hidden for him under the scales of assorted information he has accumulated.

The uncritical disestablishment of school could also lead to new performance criteria for preferential employment and promotion and most importantly for privileged access to tools. Our present scale of "general" ability, competence and trustworthiness for role assignment is calibrated by tolerance to high doses of schooling. It is established by teachers, and accepted by many as rational and benevolent. New devices could be developed, and new rationals found, both more insidious than school grading and equally effective to justify social stratification and the accumulation of privilege and power.

Participation in military, bureaucratic or political activities or status in a party could provide a pedigree just as transferable to other institutions as the pedigree of grandparents in an aristocratic society, standing within the Church in medieval society or age at graduation in a schooled society. General tests of attitudes, intelligence or mechanical ability could be standardized according to other criteria than those of the schoolmaster. They could reflect the ideal levels of professional treatment espoused by psychiatrist, ideologue or bureaucrat. Academic criteria are already suspect. The Center for Urban Studies of Columbia University has shown that there is less correlation between specialized education and job performance in specialized fields than than there is between specialized education and the resulting income, prestige and administrative power. Non-academic criteria are already proposed. From the urban ghetto in the United States to the villages of China, revolutionary groups try to prove that ideology and militancy are types of "learning" which convert more suitably into political and economic power than scholastic curricula. Unless we guarantee that job-relevance is the only acceptable criterion for employment, promotion, or access to tools, thus ruling out not only schools but all other ritual screening, then deschooling means driving out the devil with Beelzebub.

The search for a radical alternative to the school system itself will be of little avail unless it finds expression in precise political demands: the demand for the disestablishment of school in the broadest sense and the correlative guarantee of freedom for education. This means legal protections, a political program and principles for the construction of institutional arrangements which are the inverse of school. Schools cannot be disestablished without the total prohibition of legislated attendance; the proscription of any discrimination on the basis of prior attendance and the transfer of control over tax funds from benevolent institutions to the individual person. Even these actions, however, do not guarantee freedom of education unless they are accompanied by the positive recognition of each person's independence in the face of school and of any other device designed to compel specific behavioral change or to measure man in the abstract rather than to measure man for a concrete job.

TOUCHSTONE FOR REVOLUTION

Deschooling makes strange bedfellows. The ambiguity inherent in the breakdown of schooling is manifested by the unholy alliance of groups which can identify their vested interests with the disestablishment of school: students, teachers, employers, opportunistic politicians, taxpayers, Supreme Court justices. But this alliance becomes unholy, and this bedfellowship more than strange if it is based only on the

recognition that schools are inefficient tools for the production and consumption of education, and some other form of mutual exploitation would be more satisfactory.

The insurmountable problem of inefficiency, consumer resistance and political scandal which the school system can no longer hide, could be solved by more rational, attractive and specific learning packages, the diversification of educational procedures and a cloud-like dispersal of production centers. A new educational lobby could even now be organized on behalf of more effective training for jobs and social roles, more job-related measurements and more benevolently cooperative acculturation. The hidden curriculum of schooling could be transmuted into the unseen mask of a therapeutic culture.

We can disestablish schools or we can deschool culture. We can resolve provisionally some of the administrative problems of the knowledge industry or we can spell out the goals of political revolution in terms of educational postulates. The acid test of our response to the present crisis is our pinpointing of the responsibility for teaching and learning.

Schools have made teachers into administrators of programs of manpower capitalization through directed planned behavioral changes. In a schooled society, the ministrations of professional teachers become a first necessity which hooks pupils into unending consumption and dependence. Schools have made "learning" a specialized activity. Deschooling will only be a displacement of responsibility to other kinds of administration so long as teaching and learning remain sacred activities separate and estranged from fulfilling life. If schools were disestablished for the purpose of more efficient delivery of "knowledge" to more people, the alienation of men through client-relationships with the new knowledge industry would only become global. Deschooling must be the secularization of teaching and learning. It must involve a return of control over what is learned and how it is learned to persons, and not a transfer of control to another, a more amorphous set of institutions, and its perhaps less obvious representatives. The learner must be guaranteed his freedom without guaranteeing to society what learning he will acquire and hold as his own. Each man must be guaranteed privacy in learning, with the hope that he will assume the obligation of helping others to grow into uniqueness. Whoever takes the risk of teaching others must assume responsibility for the results, as must the student who exposes himself to the influence of a teacher; neither should shift guilt to sheltering institutions or laws. A schooled society must reassert the joy of conscious living over the capitalization of manpower.

The touchstone of mutation in education is the honest recognition that most people learn most of the time when they do what they enjoy doing. Most people are capable of personal, intimate intercourse with others unless they are stupefied by inhuman work or snowed under by treatment with programs. Once this is admitted, we will understand that to increase learning opportunities means to facilitate communication between the learner and his world, between the learner and his fellows, between the learner and those who can point him towards traditions and methods tested by their experience. Once we take hold of the simple insight that personal knowledge is always unpredictable but never unconnected, we will undertake the real task of setting up

institutional arrangements which guarantee the freedom necessary for independent inquiry. We will multiply the roads, bridges, and windows to learning opportunities and make sure that they are opened at the learner's bidding.

THREE RADICAL DEMANDS

Any dialogue about knowledge is really a dialogue about the individual in society. An analysis of the present crisis of school leads us, then, to talk about the social structure necessary to facilitate learning, to encourage independence and interrelationship and to overcome alienation. This kind of discourse is outside the usual range of educational concern. It leads, in fact, to the enunciation of specific political goals. These goals can be most sharply defined by distinguishing three general types of "intercourse" in which a person must engage if he would grow up.

Get at the facts, get access to the tools, and bear the responsibility for the limits within which neither can be used. If a person is to grow up, he needs, in the first place, access to things, places, processes, events and records. To guarantee such access is primarily a matter of unlocking the privileged storerooms to which they are presently consigned.

The poor child and the rich child are different partly because what is a secret for one is patent to the other. By turning knowledge into a commodity, we have learned to deal with it as with private property. The principle of private property is now used as the major rationale for declaring certain facts off-limits to people without the proper pedigree. The first goal of a political program aimed at rendering the world educational is the abolition of the right to reserve access necessary for the purpose of teaching or learning. The right of private preserve is now claimed by individuals, but it is most effectively exercised and protected by corporations, bureaucracies and nation states. In fact, the abolition of this right is not consistent with the continuation of either the political or the professional structure of any modern nation. The end of property protection would mean the abolition of most professional secrets and the consequent removal of the rationale for professional exploitation. This means more than merely improving the distribution of teaching materials or providing financial entitlements for the purchase of educational objects. The abolition of secrets clearly transcends conventional proposals for educational reform, yet it is precisely from an educational point of view that the necessity of stating this broad—and perhaps unattainable—political goal is most clearly seen.

The learner also needs access to persons who can teach him the tricks of their trades or the rudiments of their skills. For the interested learner, it does not take much time to learn how to perform most skills or to play most roles. The best teacher of a skill is usually someone who is engaged in its useful exercise. We tend to forget these things in a society where professional teachers monopolize initiation into all fields, and disqualify unauthorized teaching in the community. An important political goal, then, is to provide incentives for the sharing of acquired skills.

The demand that skills be shared implies, of course, a much more radical vision of a desirable future. Access to skills is not only restricted by the monopoly of schools and unions over licensing. There

is also the fact that the exercise of skills is tied to the use of scarce tools. Scientific knowledge is overwhelmingly incorporated into tools which are highly specialized and which must be used within complex structures set up for the "efficient" production of goods and services for which demand becomes general while supply remains scarce. Only a privileged few get the results of sophisticated medical research, and only a privileged few get to be doctors. A relatively small minority will travel on supersonic airplanes and only a few pilots will know how to fly them.

The simplest way to state the alternatives to this trend toward specialization of needs and their satisfaction is in educational terms. It is a question of the desirable use of scientific knowledge. In order to facilitate more equal access to the benefits of science and to decrease alienation and unemployment, we must favor the incorporation of scientific knowledge into tools or components within the reach of a great majority of people. These tools would allow most people to develop their skills. Any peasant girl could learn how to diagnose and treat almost all the infections which occur in rural Mexico if she were introduced to the use of techniques which are now available but which were undreamt of by the doctor of a couple of generations ago. In poor countries most people still build their own houses, often using mud or the covering of oil barrels. Now, we want to give them low-cost, prepackaged housing—thus "modernizing" them into regarding housing as a commodity rather than an activity. We would better provide them with cement mixers. Certainly the tools used in learning—and in most scientific research—have become so cheap that they could be made available to anyone: books, audio and video tapes and the simple scientific instruments in whose use is learned those basic skills which form the basis for the supposedly advanced skill required of the very few who might have to operate an electron-microscope.

Insight into the conditions necessary for wider acquisition and use of skills permits us to define a fundamental characteristic of post-industrial socialism. It is of no use—indeed it is fraudulent—to promote public ownership of the tools of production in an industrial, bureaucratic society. Factories, highways, heavy-duty trucks (. . .) can be symbolically "*owned*" by all the people, as the Gross National Product and the Gross National Education are pursued in their name. But the specialized means of producing scarce goods and services cannot be *used* by the majority of people. Only tools which are cheap and simple enough to be accessible and usable by all people, tools which permit temporary association of those who want to use them for a specific occasion, tools which allow specific goals to emerge during their use—only such tools foster the recuperation of work and leisure now alienated through an industrial mode of production.

The development and wide dispersal of simple and durable tools would discredit the special privileges now given to technocrats. The growth of science would not be jeopordized but the progress of complex scientific technology at the service of technocratic privilege would become scandalous. This style of progress is now justified in the name of developing a necessary "infrastructure." A new style of research would reveal this infrastructure as the foundation of privilege.

To recognize, from an educational point of view, the priority of guaranteeing access to tools and components whose simplicity and

durability permits their use in a wide variety of creative enterprises, is to simultaneously indicate the solution to the problem of unemployment. In an industrial society, unemployment is experienced as the sad inactivity of a man for whom there is nothing to make, while he has unlearned what to do. Since there is little really useful work, the problem is usually "solved" by creating more jobs in service industries like the military, public administration, education or social work. Educational considerations oblige us to recommend the substitution of the present mode of industrial production which depends on a growing market for increasingly complex and obsolescent goods, by a mode of post-industrial production which depends on the demand for tools or components which are labor-intensive, repair-intensive, and whose complexity is strictly limited.

Science will be kept artificially arcane as long as its results are incorporated into technology at the service of professionals. If it were used to render possible a style of life in which each man can enjoy housing himself, healing himself, educating, moving and entertaining himself. then scientists would try much harder to re-translate the discoveries made in a secret language into the normal language of everyday life.

The level of education in any society can be gauged by the degree of effective access each of the members has to the facts and tools which—within this society—affect his life. We have seen that such access requires a radical denial of the right to secrecy of facts and complexity of tools on which contemporary technocracies found their privilege, which they, in turn, render immune by interpreting its use as a service to the majority. A satisfactory level of education in a technological society imposes important constraints on the use to which scientific knowledge is put. In fact, a technological society which provides conditions for men to recuperate personally (and not institutionally) the sense of potency to learn and to produce which gives meaning to life, depends on restrictions which must be imposed on the technocrat who now controls both services and manufacture. Only an enlightened and powerful majority can impose such constraints.

If access to facts and use of tools constitute the two most obvious freedoms needed to provide educational opportunity, the ability to convoke peers to a meeting constitute the one through which the learning by an individual is translated into political process—and political process in turn becomes conscious personal growth. Data and skills which an individual might have acquired shape into exploratory, creative, open-ended and personal meaning only when they are used in dialectic encounter. And this requires the guaranteed freedom for every individual to state, each day, the class of issue which he wants to discuss, the class of creative use of a skill in which he seeks a match—to make this bid known—and, within reason, to find the circumstances to meet with peers who join his class. The right of free speech, free press, and free assembly traditionally meant this freedom. Modern electronics, photo-offset, and computer techniques in principle have provided the hardware which can provide this freedom with a range undreamt of in the century of enlightenment. Unfortunately the scientific knowhow has been used mainly to increase the power and decrease the number of funnels through which the bureaucrats of education, politics and information could be used to make peer-matching, meeting and printing as available as is now the private conversation over the telephone.

On the other hand, it should be clear that only through the definition of what constitutes a desirable society arrived at in the meeting of those who are both dispossessed and also disabused of the dream that constantly increasing quanta of consumption can provide them with the joy they seek out of life—can the inversion of institutional arrangement here drafted be put into effect—and also with it, a technological society which values occupation, intensive work, and leisure over alienation through goods and services.

THE SCHOOLING INDUSTRY AS A POSSIBLY PATHOLOGICAL SECTION OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

By KENNETH E. BOULDING

The schooling industry may be described as that segment of an economy which maintains the institutions of formal education—kindergartens, schools, colleges, universities, and so on. One should really include private schools, technical schools, occupational schools and perhaps little more doubtfully training programs in industry, especially where these have independent organizations. As a segment of the American economy, this is now between 6 and 7 per cent of the total. It has risen from somewhat under 3 per cent in the last thirty years. It is now a larger segment of the American economy than agriculture, and there are good reasons for supposing that it will continue to grow at least until the end of the century.

Like the war industry, which is that segment of the economy which produces what is purchased with the military budget, it is supported mainly through public or private grants, that is, one-way transfer payments rather than by the sale of services in an open market. The war industry, incidentally, at 8 per cent, is not much larger than the schooling industry.

I have used the term "schooling" rather than "education" deliberately, "schooling" being what is done in schools and other places of formal education, whereas "education" is a much larger phenomenon, which includes all human learning. The education industry would include not only schooling but would include a great deal of child rearing, travel, books, newspapers, television, radio, public speeches, meetings, churches, all situations in human life indeed where some kind of change is effected in the cognitive structure of the human nervous system. Fritz Machlup [1] has devised an even larger concept which he calls the "knowledge industry" which includes not only all forms of human learning, but entertainment and any situation where some kind of communication passes from one human being to another. Machlup in 1962 estimated the knowledge industry as some 29 per cent of the American economy, compared with the 7 per cent which is devoted to schooling. What happens to the schooling industry, therefore, must always be considered in the light of the larger educational and knowledge industry, of which it is an essential part, but still only a part.

The schooling industry has a number of peculiarities. In the first place it is producing a product or rather a set of products which are hard to define, measure, and even to identify. Its first product is knowledge, that is, changes in the cognitive structure of the nervous system of particular individuals which increases that structure in extent and hopefully in realism, that is, in correspondence with some outside

[1] Fritz Machlup, *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*, Princeton University Press, 1962.

reality. An unlettered lady from Appalachia who was asked if she had ever heard of France said, yes, she thought it was a place somewhere the other side of Asheville. Every person who has been through the eighth grade probably knows that France is a country on the eastern side of the Atlantic Ocean, that its people speak a language called French, and so on, even though 99 per cent of the people who have this knowledge may never have been to France. Without schooling our knowledge is confined very largely to what our unaided senses bring into us and it is therefore confined to our specific environment. One of the major purposes of schooling is to expand knowledge into a larger environment to include the whole earth and indeed the universe, and to expand it also back into time far beyond the direct personal experience of the individual, so that he knows not only about his own contemporaries, but about people who lived thousands of years ago and thousands of miles away.

The quantity of knowledge acquired by any person can be investigated by examination, that is, by asking questions to which the person has to respond. Examinations, we all know, are imperfect samples of the knowledge of any one person, but they are usually better than nothing. Schooling is frequently criticized that its only product is examinations and examination results and there certainly are types of schooling, perhaps less important than they used to be, which are directed towards passing examinations rather than acquiring knowledge, in which case the measure is usurping the thing which it is supposed to measure. I am not sure, however, that this criticism is a very severe one, for the ability to pass an examination is certainly positively related to the amount of knowledge which the examinee possesses, and furthermore is in itself a skill which is not valueless.

This suggests that the second product of schooling is skills, which is not quite the same thing as knowledge. I can have knowledge about France without knowing how to get there, or without this knowledge requiring me, or even enabling me, to do anything at all. There are many kinds of knowledge, however, such as literacy, knowledge of other languages, and knowledge of practical skills, which are of importance mainly because they enable the possessor to do things that otherwise he would not be able to do—to read, to write, or to make pottery, weld, or to mend clothes, or to do any of the innumerable things which life requires of us. There is a certain tendency among psychologists especially to identify knowledge with skill under the impact of behavioral notions. This identification seems to me to be unwarranted, but we could always get around it by defining knowledge as the skill in passing examinations and a skill is the ability to do other things. It is possible, however, to have knowledge without skill; it is not possible to have skill without knowledge, even though the knowledge may be at the level of the lower nervous system rather than at the higher, as in the kind of knowledge which is required to play tennis. It should be noted that schooling usually includes this non-verbal kind of knowledge, especially in the athletic department and in vocational education. Know-how, however, is just as much knowledge as know-what, and it is just as much a legitimate part of schooling. The teaching of practical morality, incidentally, can easily be regarded as a kind of skill. It is the know-how of how to get along in the particular society in which one is placed. This also is clearly a part of schooling.

The production of knowledge and skill may be regarded as the most legitimate products of schooling. There are, however, other products which are not usually mentioned as much, and which perhaps have a certain flavor of illegitimacy about them but which are nevertheless important in determining the willingness of the society to expand or contract the schooling industry. One of these less legitimate, or perhaps merely less recognized, products is custodial service, or "child-sitting." In an industrial urban society, especially, children are something of a nuisance to their parents if they are around the house under foot all day. The schools by taking the children off their parents hands and by taking young people off the streets into high schools and colleges perform a public service somewhat akin to the garbage collector, in the sense that they remove sources of disutility and segregate them away from the rest of the society at least certain hours during the day, which releases parents for productive activity of some kind, either in a job or in preferred leisure time activities. The actual economics of the schooling industry may be more closely related to this by-product than to its main products of knowledge and skill. The willingness of people to raise their school taxes is remarkably enhanced by a school system shutting down for a few weeks and delivering the children to the tender mercies of their parents and the streets, or even by going on double sessions so that the children are released into the outside world at unusual times. It may be indeed that the great virtue of the traditional summer vacation, even though it may have originated in an earlier agricultural age, is that by the end of the summer the willingness of adults to get children back to school is considerably augmented. A wise school district indeed will always put up its tax votes just before Labor Day. I would very much like to see a study indeed of the success of school bonds and millage increases related to the time of year in which they are voted on.

The custodial role of the school industry, while it has undoubted positive aspects in releasing adults from the worry and inconvenience of having children and young people around them, also has considerable social costs, which we are only just beginning to realize. It is impossible to exercise custodial care of any group of people without segregating them. We see this, for instance, in the most extreme form in prisons, which are optimistically called reformatories, but which are usually schools for crime. It is likewise impossible to segregate children and young people in schools, colleges and universities without creating a "youth culture," which may easily become pathological. In all human societies, almost before the last hundred years, schooling was the privilege of a very small elite, typically perhaps not more than 1 per cent of the population. Most children lived around the house with their parents; when they became young people they lived in an essentially adult world, working with adults and developing a "youth culture" only in their free time, which was not very much. By 1900 most Western countries had virtually all children in the schools up to the age of fourteen. In the United States we have gone from about 10 per cent of the corresponding age group in high schools in 1900 to about 80 per cent today, with an even more striking proportional increase in students in college. This is an absolutely unprecedented change in the condition of society, the full consequences of which have by no means been worked

out. Some of the consequences, of course, are very desirable, in the shape of a much better informed and highly skilled population. Other consequences, however, in terms of segregated youth cultures may be quite undesirable and may produce startling social changes, perhaps considerably for the worse in the next thirty years. The "generation gap" which is so much observed and is unquestionably pronounced today, is precisely a result of the fact that the older generation, as it were, is a product of an age in which schooling was much more a privilege, whereas the younger generation takes it for granted and perhaps therefore values it less.

Another slightly disreputable, but extremely important, product of the schooling industry is certification. A high school diploma and a college degree are worth something in the job market and these equivalences have been studied in some detail. Certification, of course, is not the same thing as either knowledge or skill, although it is presumably positively correlated with these desirable products, even though the correlation may not be as high as we would wish. Certification is like the stamp on a coin. Once it is the certificate that has become important rather than the knowledge or skill which it is supposed to represent, there is always danger of inflation. A high school diploma today, unless one looks behind it to the actual course of study which has been taken, is a very different thing from what it was in 1900. It now may represent a great deal more semi-vocational skills in basket weaving, and shop, than it does knowledge of even quite small segments of the universe. The rise of students to political power in the colleges and universities is almost certain to result in an inflation of the college degree. After all, if one can get certification with less work this looks like an improvement in productivity. The only physical product of the teacher is a grade sheet and the only physical product of the school or college is a piece of paper, or maybe parchment or vellum, with some sort of certification inscribed on it.

Certification may be overvalued, as well as undervalued. It may be an inflated measure of the achievement that it is supposed to certify, but it may also be overvalued, especially in the job market, as a surrogate for detailed inquiries into the real capabilities of the job applicant. High school diplomas are frequently required for jobs of a relatively unskilled nature, which clearly do not require the high school experience as a prerequisite for their performance. The same may be said of college degrees. I frankly do not know what can be done about this. It is a very puzzling question in social policy. Some of the imperfections in the labor market raise very serious problems, especially in American society, such as hindering us from achieving full employment without inflation, may be attributed to the overemphasis which is placed on certification. On the other hand, unless there is some distinction between the certified and the uncertified the incentive to obtain certification is considerably lowered, and if the incentive to acquire knowledge and skill is less than the incentive to acquire certification, certification may be the major avenue in society through which a demand for knowledge and skill is encouraged. I am afraid I do not hold the optimistic view that in the absence of any reward structure young people will spontaneously engage themselves in the arduous and frequently unpleasant task of acquiring knowledge

and skill. Just what the optimum relative reward structure should be, however, is a very difficult problem which we are still a very long way from solving.

A fifth, and more positive product of the schooling industry is that its institutions are often the focus for community activity. The high school especially in an American community often plays something of the role that the church did in the Middle Ages as a focus for the community, as a symbol of its pride and as a place where people gather for school concerts, school plays, and so on, or as a center for adult education. This is a positive aspect of the schooling industry which is often overlooked by its critics.

The second great peculiarity of the schooling industry is that its revenue, unlike that, say, of the steel industry, is not derived from the sale of its product in the market, except in relatively small segments of the industry, but is derived mainly from what I have been calling the "grants economy," that is, by essentially one-way transfers. A "grant" differs from an exchange, in that an exchange represents a reciprocal transfer of conventionally equal values, so that in an exchange the net worth of the exchanging parties does not change in total, although their assets change in structure, whereas in a grant the net worth of the granting party is reduced and the net worth of the grantee is increased in the moment of the transaction. Outside of a rather small private sector of adult education, such as Berlitz language schools, secretarial schools and so on, where the student himself buys the education out of his own money and the product of the school can therefore be considered as being sold in a market, the schooling industry is almost wholly financed by grants, either public or private.

Even in the case of private schools, it is usually parents who pay the bills, and the children who receive the schooling, so that what we have in fact is a grant of money from the parent to the school and a grant of schooling from the parent to the child. In the case of the public schools, the grants element is even clearer. Taxes are a grant from the taxpayer to the taxing authority, in the sense that when a person pays his taxes his net worth diminishes and that of the recipient increases. Schools may be financed directly out of school taxes, in which case the school system itself is the taxing authority and there is no intermediary, or they may be financed by grants from other taxing authorities, such as states or cities. In any case, the persons who receive the product whether this is knowledge, skill, custodial care or certification, are not the people who pay for it. This divorce between the recipient of the product and the payer of the bills is perhaps the maqor element in the peculiar situation of the industry which may lead to pathological results. It is hard to resist quoting from Adam Smith at this point, who held a low opinion of a situation in which the producers of a product were effectively divorced from its consumers: [2]

"Those parts of education, it is to be observed, for the teaching of which there are no public institutions, are generally the best taught. When a young man goes to a fencing or a dancing school, he does not indeed always learn to fence or to dance very well; but he seldom fails of learning to fence or to dance. The good effects of the riding school are not commonly so evident. The expense of a riding school is so great, that in most places it is a public institution. The three most essential parts of literary education, to read, write, and account, it still con-

[2] Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Modern Library Edition, p. 721.

tinues to be more common to acquire in private than in public schools; and it very seldom happens that any body falls of acquiring them to the degree in which it is necessary to acquire them."

The schooling industry, and indeed one might even add the whole educational industry to this, is notoriously unprogressive when it comes to productivity. It is hard indeed to measure the productivity of the industry. A rough measure of its backwardness relative to the rest of the economy, however, may be gathered from Table 1, in which the schooling industry as a percentage of the total product, in current dollars, is compared with almost the only measure of its physical product which we have, which is the number of school years as a proportion of the school population. It will be seen that the schooling industry as a proportion of the total economy has risen much faster than its physical product, suggesting that there has been a substantial increase in the "real price" of education, that is, in education's terms of trade, which has almost doubled since 1950. This is to be expected if it is an industry which is not increasing in productivity as fast as the rest of the economy, because the sheer pressures of the labor market will force up wages in the schooling industry to something which is comparable to the rest of society and if productivity is not increased this means that the real price of schooling will have to increase in order to pay the increase of real wages, and other costs.

TABLE 1

Year	Total school expenditure as a percentage of gross capacity product	Percent of children (age 5-19) in school year	Index of terms of trade of schooling
1930	3.3	0.80	100
1940	2.7	.85	77
1950	2.9	.91	77
1960	4.7	.90	127
1969	6.0	.93	156

Note: Table provisional and subject to revision.

Whether we regard this as "pathological" or not depends on our estimate of the extent to which the failure of the schooling industry to increase its productivity is something fundamental and unavoidable in the nature of the industry itself, or whether it is related to the particular form of social and economic organization which the industry possesses. I frankly know of no way of making a very accurate judgment in this matter. If there is in fact no way in which the productivity of the schooling industry can be increased in the sense that there are simply no other techniques which are possible which would result in, let us say, more knowledge and skill acquired per real dollar of expenditure, then there is nothing pathological about the present situation, just as there is nothing pathological in the inability of a human being to jump a hundred feet up into the air. I use knowledge and skill, incidentally, as the measure of productivity, simply because the custodial function obviously is not capable of any increase in productivity, except at the sacrifice in the increase in knowledge and skill. We could I suppose simply build very cheap huts in which we keep young people under sedatives all day. Indeed, where

the attitude of the public toward education is primarily concerned with its custodial aspect, this is often the real meaning of "cutting out the frills" of the classroom being a cheap and respectable sedative.

The certification aspect, also, can only be subject to pathological changes in productivity if it is unrelated to the development of knowledge and skill. The kind of certification which consists of a diploma from Groton, Eton or Harrow may have very little to do with knowledge, though it may have something to do with the skill of belonging to the upper class. It is, however, the kind of certification which is incapable of generalization without defeating itself. There is a good deal of evidence indeed that high prestige universities, colleges, and schools produce certification rather than knowledge and skill, in the sense that it is only in certification that they have a comparative advantage over the low prestige institutions, who seem to produce about as much knowledge and skill as the high prestige ones. This all the more underlines the principle, however, that certification is not subject to developments in productivity, and from this point of view it is only productivity in knowledge and skill that is significant.

One would have to be a very great pessimist indeed, however, to believe that no further improvements in the productivity in schooling in terms of knowledge and skill per real dollar expenditure could possibly be achieved. It may well be that the major obstacle to any substantial increase in this productivity is the absences of any adequate theory regarding the nature and machinery of the human learning process. Almost all that we really know about human learning could probably be put on a page. We know it may be discontinuous, that it exhibits problems of "readiness" rather like the imprinting phenomenon which is well documented in some animals, we know that it is related to the system of rewards and punishment in the perception of payoffs, that knowledge tends to grow towards the payoffs. On the other hand, we also have to learn what the payoffs are, so that this makes the whole process remarkably unstable dynamically. We know that emulation sometimes produces greater productivity and sometimes produce less, and we don't know very much about when it does one and when it does the other. We know a little about reinforcement and the acquisition of skill, we know astonishingly little about the acquisition of knowledge and concepts and we know still less about motivation towards the acquisition of knowledge.

It is this absence of a basic theoretical framework which I think makes most educational research have the fatal quality of lack of cumulative additivity, so that we are by no means sure that we really know much more about how to educate people than we did, say, fifty years ago, in spite of all the educational research which has been done. Educational practice exhibits fashions and cycles, but one does not get the impression that it has the kind of strongly increasing trends in productivity that some other industries do. The trouble here is that it is impossible to predict technical change. It is, in particular, impossible to predict undiscovered ideas, otherwise, we would have them now. It is, therefore, extremely hard to estimate the potential for increasing productivity of any industry, and it is particularly hard in the case of education, where there is very little history of increasing productivity, so that we do not even have any trends to project.

What I think one can assert is that if an increase in productivity were better rewarded than it is now the probability of productivity increase would certainly be greater, even though there is no way of knowing by how much. The present system certainly militates against any increase in the productivity of education. Educators receive their incomes mainly, let us be frank about it, from the by-products of custodial care and certification, and that if an educator develops an exceptionally productive method of increasing knowledge and skill, he is not likely to be particularly well rewarded for it. The same goes for educational institutions. There is really no way in which the educational "firm," that is, the school district, even the private school, or the college or the university, can make the public aware of any substantial increase in its own productivity and so increase its share of the market. In industries in which the revenue is derived mainly from the sale of product to people who directly consume it, if the product is not good people will not buy it, subject to some modifications of this proposition by the arts of Madison Avenue. If a firm discovers a substantially improved method of production which increases its productivity, it can sell its products cheaper so that it will have a competitive advantage and will expand. We even have a patent law to give people property in innovations, which is presumably more in the public interest than secrecy, which would be almost the only other alternative.

In the schooling industry, by contrast, price competition is very ineffective. The difference in price, for instance to the parent, of private schools versus public schools, or private universities versus state universities, is a striking example of the dominance of certification over knowledge and skill, for there is very little evidence that private schools or private universities produce a much better knowledge product than many of their public equivalents. There are outstanding teachers at all levels of education who inspire an abnormal proportion of their students to go on to acquire increasing amounts of knowledge and skill. Their reward all too often is, in the words of W. S. Gilbert, "the satisfying feeling that our duty has been done," and though this internal satisfaction may be a substantial reward it is neither patentable nor duplicable. One of the most frustrating things about the schooling industry indeed is this apparent almost total incapacity of good teachers to be able to pass on this particular skill to others. There is a parallel indeed in many other fields, in music, for instance; music schools can teach the elements but they cannot undertake to produce a great artist, and the great artist is quite incapable of explaining to anybody else how he does it in a way that would enable him to transmit the skill to others. In the schooling industry, however, the difference in productivity between the great teacher and the mediocre one may be large. The bad teacher, furthermore, may have a negative productivity which leads to a positive destruction of motivation and ambition in the student. One sometimes suspects indeed that the main problem of the schooling industry is how to keep out of it those teachers who have negative productivity and who destroy the incentives and the identity of their students.

The question then remains "Are there any organizational devices which might be applied to the schooling industry which would encourage the growth of genuine productivity?" A considerable number of suggestions to this effect have been made; none I think have really

been proved. One great word these days, of course, is "performance contracting" and "accountability," as expressed particularly in the contracting education out to private firms. Theoretically one might suppose that a firm which developed unusually productive techniques would be able to patent these and would have remarkable competitive advantage. There are, however, real difficulties which cannot be laid wholly to the traditional conservatism of the teaching profession. One can certainly expect teachers who have been comfortably inefficient not to like the risk of occasionally rather plush competition. The objections of the teaching profession, however, may not be entirely a result of blind conservatism and the defense of special interests. The very peculiarities of the schooling industry unfit it to be treated as if it were a simple commercial operation like the production of fat hogs. It is not merely that students are extraordinarily complex pieces of apparatus and we do not really know what it is that induces them to perform, except very superficially, but, what is more important, schooling is something which almost always takes place in a community setting. This is something which is not always realized by technicians and the destruction of the community of the school or even of the classroom, imperfect as it is, can easily be disastrous to the total development of the student. Schooling on a slick assembly line basis may produce "results" in the short run, but it could easily have disastrous long-term consequences of which at present we know very little, and perhaps care less. I am not saying that these more subtle phenomena could not be taken care of by commercial enterprises. I am just saying that the atmosphere of commercial enterprises is very different from those in an educational institution, and that the fulfillment of clearly defined short-run objectives may easily be contrary to certain very important and large long-run objectives which are hard to pinpoint but which have been developed over long years of experience in what might be called the "folk knowledge" of the schooling industry.

Another proposal which is receiving some favorable attention at the moment is the so-called "voucher plan" by which the student is subsidized rather than the school, the student being given a voucher of so many dollars a year which can be exchanged for education at any recognized establishment. We have had experience with something like this, of course, under the GI Bill of Rights, so it is not wholly unfamiliar, and that experience was by no means adverse, even if it did produce a few fly-by-night educational operations. The great virtue which is claimed for the voucher plan is that it permits the student (or parent) greater freedom of choice in the selection of schools and also it forces the schools to compete for students, so that here again a school which achieves a greater productivity may be able to attract a larger number of students and hence will expand. Likewise, methods which have proved themselves in one place will have to be imitated in others if the competing institutions are to survive. There is enough logic in this proposal to make it seem worth a try and some experiments in this direction are now being proposed.

This proposal also meets with substantial opposition from the educational establishment. In this case, however, one is a little afraid that the opposition of the establishment is not wholly unrelated to its unwillingless to move out of a highly protected market, for which after all it can hardly be blamed. Perhaps the principal argument against

the voucher plan is that it would permit too much variety in education, would permit, for instance, the development of parochial schools and subcultural schools of all kinds, and that it would fragment the society. In the United States, especially, we have always visualized the educational system as an Americanizer, especially for the enormously diverse subcultures which have populated this continent. In the early days one could make a strong argument for this point of view; today, however, the society seems well enough established that it can afford diversity and indeed it may be more threatened from an enforced conformity than it is from a tolerated diversity. If the state retained the power of licensing the approved schools which could compete for students, this would seem to be enough regulatory capacity to deal with any extreme cases which went beyond the bounds of the acceptable middle ground of public and private custom.

The voucher plan would still leave the revenue of the school systems pretty much in the hands of the grants economy, especially the public grants economy. It would permit the development of supplementary markets at the edges, where parents who wish to put a little extra would be able to do so. It might be argued that this would interfere with the equalizing function of the public school system. This, however, is not too strong an argument even now, simply because of geographical segregation by income which permits the rich suburbs to have expensive school systems and the poor areas to have poor systems. If the voucher were generous enough it could act as an equalizer far beyond what the present system does, although it is a little doubtful whether this would be politically feasible. The great problem here is the problem of the grants economy in general, in that its total size reflects the strength of the community and the willingness of individuals within the community to sacrifice for public goods, especially those which they may not enjoy personally.

There are several reasons for supposing that the grants economy, especially as applied to the schooling industry, is likely to run into increasing difficulty in the next few decades. One reason for this is the changing age composition of the population. As the birth rate declines and as the older age groups fill up we may find that the proportion of the population which consists of parents with children is quite likely to decline, particularly once the present "bulge" of births from 1947 to 1961 has passed through the age of child bearing, which is now just beginning. A voting population which is heavily weighted toward those past child rearing, or even those before it, is less likely to vote large sums of money for the schooling industry whether directly through a public school system or indirectly through a voucher plan.

It may well be, therefore, that we will have to look for some way of getting the educational industry out from under the grants economy, or at least to get a larger proportion of it into something that looks more like a market exchange economy than it does now. One very interesting proposal for this I have been calling the Killingsworth proposal, originated by Professor Charles Killingsworth of Michigan State University.[3] This proposal is to set up educational banks, federally financed, which will lend the student the full cost of his educa-

[3] Charles C. Killingsworth, testimony to the United States Senate on Employment of Manpower, September 20, 1963. Also, "How to Pay for Higher Education." Presidential Address to the Economic Society of Michigan, 1967, mimeo.

tion, the loan to be repaid by a surcharge on his income tax for the rest of his life. This scheme is particularly valuable perhaps for college and beyond, as in this case education is very clearly an investment to the individual whose income does not happen to be increased by his why an appropriate financial system should not be devised to take care of what is essentially a private investment. We cannot, of course, use the chattel mortgage system, as this would put too great a burden on the individual whose income does not happen to be increased by his education. If an individual's income is increased by his education, however, there seems to be no reason why he should not use part of this increase to pay for the education itself. In a rough way, of course, this is what already happens insofar as the progressive income tax is used to finance education.

Actually, however, at present the finance of education comes far too much out of regressive local taxes, especially property taxes, so that all too often it is the poor who are really subsidizing the education of the rich and the middle classes. The Killingsworth proposals are not so appropriate at the high school level or below, mainly because we have the ideal at any rate of educating everybody up to this level, in which case education is no longer a privilege which provides a higher income, but a kind of standard base which is, as it were, a ticket of admission to the system in general. For some time to come, however, higher education is likely to be an investment for the individual, and under these circumstances something like the Killingsworth proposal seems to me sensible and may be almost the only way of averting a major economic crisis in colleges and universities in the next generation.

In any consideration of the economics of the schooling industry it must never be forgotten that it always is embedded in the larger educational enterprise, much of which is conducted in the family. One of the most striking of all educational statistics is the relationship between the number of years schooling which is obtained by any individual, and the number of his siblings on the one hand, and the educational level of his parents on the other. The larger the family, the poorer the educational achievements of its members, and the poorer the educational achievement of the parents, the poorer the educational achievement of the children. This effect is probably more significant in determining the distribution of education and even its total quantity than all the reforms we might make in the schooling industry.[4] These relationships relate to the demand for education perhaps rather than to its supply or to its productivity, but they do suggest that the self-perpetuating character of poverty subcultures and large family subcultures may be the greatest source of what might be called "educational wastage," that is, unused capacities for knowledge and skill. We certainly cannot rest content with the present situation in seeking for a solution of the very difficult problems which lie ahead however; we must look at the educational industry or even the knowledge industry as a whole, as well as that part of it which is comprised by schooling. Otherwise, we may find ourselves trying to provide a supply for which

[4] See Beverly Duncan, "Trends in Output and Distribution of Schooling," *Indicators of Social Change*, edited by Eleanor B. Sheldon and Wilbur D. Moore, Russell Sage Foundation, 1968, especially pages 645–653.

there is quite inadequate demand and we may find ourselves destroying the subcultures within our society which actually keep the schooling industry alive and prospering.

It now looks as if we are at the beginning of a great outburst of research in educational matters, something which is long overdue. Our educational statistics, and the whole information system in this regard, is woefully inadequate, as we all know. The theoretical basis in human learning, as I have suggested, is even more inadequate. Nevertheless, it does seem to be an area where a substantial intellectual effort would have very substantial results and I would put it myself as virtually the highest priority of our society in the next generation.

NOTES ON EDUCATIONAL REFORM*

By DAVID RIESMAN

Keeping in touch with efforts at educational reform in American universities has become increasingly difficult. Several years ago only a few pacesetter institutions were experimenting with interdisciplinary courses, field study programs, student-initiated courses, and independent study in their undergraduate programs. But today these innovations have spread throughout academia in response to changed faculty attitudes and the newer youth subcultures.[1] Exceptional places like St. John's Colleges at Annapolis and Santa Fe fight a continuing engagement in defense of traditional curricula resting on a program of Great Books which must be accepted in their entirety. Elsewhere, however, students as well as faculty, who have been in constant communication with each other, have helped to spread experiments begun in one locale all over the academic map—generally with the consequence of minimizing the traditional curricular requirements or eliminating them altogether.

Understandably, educational reform also reflects the attack on science as stultifying, "irrelevant," or dangerous to mankind. It reflects the aim of doing something about white racism or ghetto poverty, perhaps by giving a high priority to black studies or urban studies on a campus. Furthermore, student and faculty proponents of participatory *educational* democracy, who bring to voluntary associations both on and off the campus the principle of "one man, one vote," contend that participation per se is a more important reform than any substantive changes in styles of teaching and learning. The consequence has been drastically to reduce the legitimacy of authority, whether this be the authority of scholars and professionals, of curricular programs, or of the core traditions of learning. In the place of the older authority there has arisen what Erich Fromm in *Escape from Freedom* and *Man for Himself* described as anonymous authority: in this case the authority of whatever is described as relevant, participative, guilt-reducing—in short, whatever extra-curricular preoccupations students and faculty now press upon their institutions.

Though I do not agree with Erich Fromm in some of his specific judgments on education, in particular his reflections on Summerhill School in England, I believe that the implications of his general philos-

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[1] Both the sheer magnitude of change and the degree to which it may promote homogeneity are suggested by Harold L. Hodgkinson, *Institutions in Transition: A Study of Change in Higher Education*, a publication of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, 1970 for discussion of change in some pioneering liberal arts colleges, see Morris Keeton and Conrad Hillberry, *Struggle and Promise: A Future for Colleges* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1969).

ophy of education are important. Indeed, my own thinking about education and my work over many years as an educational reformer have benefited from his work and personal example from the time of our first meeting in 1939. His distinction between rational and irrational authority, analogous to the one he draws between rational and irrational affects or emotions, has been useful to me in understanding current conflicts over authority in higher education.[2] When he first drew the latter distinction—he argued that hate as well as love could be rationally based—most academic intellectuals tended to regard rationality as completely affect-free, therefore, as generally good and trustworthy and somehow not simply a screen for passion. Now as we move unevenly into an era which regards irrationality as life-giving and rationality as merely a hang-up (to put it in an extreme way), the distinction has taken on a new meaning: that irrational anger has as much legitimacy as rational hate.[3] Fromm's thought is syncretic, not only with respect to this ancient dualism of thought and feeling, but also with respect to the differences among the great world religions and such civic (or nonreligious) religions as patriotism, socialism, or humanism. It is characteristic of him to insist that the past should not be junked (an impossible attempt in any event), while one is making every effort to move toward a more hopeful future; thus he has recently written: "For many of the young generation who belittle the value of traditional thought, I should like to stress my conviction that even the most radical development must have its continuity with the past; that we cannot progress by throwing away the best achievements of the human mind—and that to be young is not enough!" [4]

Beyond this, he has led me to a greater appreciation of the importance of moral qualities in the scholar and teacher. Just as he asks scientific investigators to be open to impressions and hunches, as well as careful observations, so too he argues for openness that lessens defensiveness and the need to impress others both in teaching and in psychoanalysis. Contrary to the ideology of many Americans, especially males, he stresses the importance of vulnerability as one of the qualities of humaneness.[5] While I know that in dealing with sullen or actively hostile students my own resiliency leaves much to be desired and my good humor often deserts me, Fromm's model of unsentimental openness is something I try to attain. I believe that this attitude does not imply seeking a false humility with students on the ground that the teacher possesses no special expertness or experience, but rather a willingness to admit error, confusion, and self-doubt—although in all such ventures there is the danger of a kind of moral one-upmanship disguised as fallibility. In Fromm's view, creative intellectual work

[2] Many social critics, when they encounter what they regard as excesses of reason, are tempted to turn against reason itself and to defend irrationality as somehow more deeply human. Fromm's distinction preserves reason as essentially human, undercutting the despair that tends to praising irrationality per se. Cf. the candid, troubled discussion in George P. Elliott, "Revolution Instead—Notes on Passions and Politics," an essay principally concerning education, *The Public Interest*, 20 (1970), 65–89, especially pp. 85ff.

[3] These distinctions are not simple ones. Fromm considers rational those affects which are conducive to the optimal functioning of human beings, to the growth and unfolding of life; irrational affects are those which diminish or weaken the capacity for the art of life. Love might then be rational if not based on masochism or possessiveness. Hatred would generally be irrational, markedly so when it is of an idling kind, as in an idling motor, waiting for targets of opportunity—but arguably rational when reactive to a specific threat to life. Whether an affect is rational or not says nothing about its comprehensibility through reason; both alike can be in principle understood.

[4] See Erich Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968). Foreword, p. xxvii.

[5] See *ibid.*, p. 85 and elsewhere.

demands moral qualities such as courage and faith; intelligence unanchored in the effective life is in my own view as limited as the extreme of those proud proclamations of subjectivity that one hears today from some social scientists who boast of their commitment.

CURRENT THEMES OF EDUCATIONAL REFORM

During the academic year 1968–1969, while on leave from Harvard, I discussed educational reform with students and faculty at various places of widely differing styles: Stanford University (then engaged in a large self-study); the University of California at Davis and at San Diego; the University of North Carolina (where the first two undergraduate years were being examined by a student-faculty committee); the new College of the State University of New York at Old Westbury which had just opened that year; Oakland University in Michigan; and, briefly, Pitzer College in the Claremont group of colleges. In addition, I perused the student press at a number of colleges and followed the discussions of reform in the educational journals. I have already indicated the similarity of concerns that one meets from coast to coast. Everywhere one encounters the desire for a more egalitarian university. Meritocratic distinctions are under attack and so is the apparatus of grades, course prerequisites, and selective admissions. One often finds encounter groups or sensitivity training sessions praised as the optimal situations for learning, on the ground that if faculty authority and expertness can be reduced, true mutuality will result. Some encounter groups do succeed in opening people to themselves and to others, at times intrusively and at other times creatively when done with care and tact; more often, however, they are likely to be what a friend terms counter- or anti-groups.

There is a parallel effort to get students and faculty out into field situations, such as community organizing.[6, 7]

The rural and small-town poor tend to be neglected in comparison with inner-city ghettos and other pockets of poverty. This reflects a search for what is regarded as authentic experience and an effort to overcome the specifically American forms that the guilt of the privileged tends to take. These moral, often polemical convictions and searchings lead students to ignore suggestions that they involve themselves, for instance, in the life of a suburban church, a business corporation, or a small non-exotic town.

In any event, the trend is away from what is regarded as alienated learning and toward first-hand experience. An amateur spirit prevails, which has its benign sides but also certain dangers. The frequently

[6] Of course, I am not implying that learning could not occur in field settings: I do my best to encourage my own students to do manageable pieces of empirical work, for instance some enterprise of participant-observation or a small-scale interview study. However, many newly developed programs that boast of putting students out into the field do not provide the kind of preparation that a good anthropology department would. Moreover, as implied in the text, students may not be willing to dress or behave in the manner required by the field setting, justifying the refusal in terms of their own need for authenticity. Even in the best case, the educational consequences of a field work project, like those of classroom work, cannot easily be predicted; and feedback is often lacking as to what actually occurred as against what was planned. (For a further note on encounter groups see footnote 20.)

[7] The term "community" comes up constantly in these discussions: there is the academic community, the black community, the student community, the Third World community, etc. The term carries none of the tentativeness with which Erich Fromm speaks of the formation of Groups in the last chapter of *The Revolution of Hope* (pp. 158–162). There is instead in these discussions a naiveté in assuming that people who share contiguous turf will have something in common, and that they already form a community rather than a series of competing barrios or fractionated sects.

stated belief that theoretical work gets in the way of experience shows a naive neglect of the epistemological problems of experience itself. Related to this is the rejection of rationalism and objectivity already mentioned, an attitude which assumes that spontaneity requires irrationality and that cognition is necessarily deadening. The effort to categorize is denounced and is taken as a sign of something close to a necrophilic tendency.

These ideas of educational reform originated in the elite colleges and among articulate critics, and often had the support of the student press. But they have spread to many campuses in what were once provincial parts of the country, including the "provinces" of large cities, where most students are the first generation in their families to attend college.[8] The vocal students, who have been the carriers of educational change, are apt to be the more affluent, to be majoring in the humanities or the "softer" social sciences, and to be male and white.[9] These students contend that the educational system oppresses them, though most are not as despairing as the violent activists who see in the university the symbol of "the corrupt society" and seek to stop its operations altogether. Nonetheless, even moderate student reformers and their faculty supporters share with anti-university activists an ignorance of the history of American higher education.[10] This lack of historical knowledge helps sustain the mythology that American higher education was once uncorrupted by commercialism, careerism, or other worldly constraints.[11] It is ironic that many in other industrial societis are seeking to incorporate the American practics now under attack in order to strengthen and liberate their own systems of higher education.

Many students continue to read. When I ask them what books have influenced their ideas of educational change, they mention the writings of John Holt, George Leonard (*Education and Ecstasy*), Herbert Marcuse, Norman O. Brown, A. S. Neill, Edgar Friedenberg, Paul Goodman, and others.[12] The students draw from these a critique of

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[8] The same is true in the high schools. See *How Old Will You be in 1984: Expressions of Student Critique from the High School Free Press,* Diane Divoky (ed.) (New York: Avon Books, 1969).

[9] Black students on the white campus may come together to demand Black Studies programs and greater "relevance" to the urban scene or to the problems of blacks; but in general they do not favor radical educational reform, but feel more secure with traditional "collegiate" structures both in the curriculum and the extracurriculum; they are often at odds with white radical students who, the blacks feel, can afford to dispense with universities whereas they, as members of a previously deprived group, need all the educational benefits they can get.

I know no coed campus where women have taken the leadership in educational reform, and I believe they suffer as blacks do from some the current temptations of reformers, since the women need to make full use of their undergraduate years to establish quasi-professional competence if they are not to remain dependent on the chances and mischances of marriage and to have the opportunity to enter careers outside the prevailing range of "Women's jobs." See David Riesman, "Observations on Contemporary College Students—Especially Women," *Interchange,* vol. 1. 1970, pp. 50–63.

[10] There are some notable exceptions. Thus, three years ago Ira Magaziner and Christopher Coles at Brown University compiled a massive dossier on educational reform: impressing many faculty members with their seriousness, they succeeded in many of their aims of loosening the curriculum, abandoning traditional grading, etc.

[11] The best historical work I know is that of Laurence Veysey, *The Emergence of the American University* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); Thorstein Veblen's *The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by Businessmen* (New York: Viking Press, 1918) is a caustic account of philistinism and seemly pedantry.

[12] A few mention the writings of Judson Jerome, Professor of Literature at Antioch College; see for instance, "Portrait of Three Experiments," in *Change* 2 (July–August, 1970), 40–54, included in *Culture Out of Anarchy* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970). Some students draw from my own writings on education what I would regard as overgeneralized or misapplied conclusions. Thus, they scan Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, *The Academic Revolution* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1968) in order to find ammunition—and there is plenty there!—to throw against the graduate schools and the hegemony of academic departments. (Others read the book, also too simplistically, as a complacent defense of the educational status quo.)

prevailing educational practice joined with an attack on the research-oriented university as an enterprise run for the benefit of the faculty and not of the undergraduates. They think there are no problems of scarcity, either of talented teachers or of other human resources; they see faculty as willfully refusing to teach, and they believe the society insists on dehydrated and irrelevant learning.[13]

Many faculty members, and not only the younger products of the graduate schools, agree with these condemnations. Bored by their own research in many cases, excited by the cultural revolution, eager to identify with what seems to be youthful and energetic, they read into the student movement support for their own educational ideals. Students can also find in Fromm's writings passages which support the way they view matters; consider the following from his contribution to a symposium on Summerhill School:

> What is the student rebellion all about? The phenomenon is somewhat different within each country. In some, it represents socialist demands; in others, a fight for greater student participation in the deliberations and the decisionmaking of the university establishment. In these struggles, some groups have rejected violence; in others, various degrees of force have been employed. In some cases, institutional methods have been attacked; in others particular individuals have been damned. Yet behind all these apparent differences, all the marching, sitting, and shouting students have something in common: *they are all experiencing a deep hunger for life.* They feel that their education is being bureaucratized, and that at best, they are being sufficiently prepared to enable them to earn a good living. But paramountly, they also feel they are not being offered stimulating intellectual food in large enough portions to enhance their sense of aliveness. These students insist that they do not want to be dead in the midst of plenty; they insist that they do not want to study in institutions which, in their yielding to the vested interests of professors, administrators, and governmental forces, pay too little attention to their generation's need for a critical examination of today's conventional wisdom.
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> The campus rebels, even though sometimes misled through political naiveté and lack of realism, and even though sometimes motivated by destructive drives, at least draw attention to the fact that today's processes of higher education are deemed unsatisfactory by a large number of the young element.
>
> The educational failure of our high schools is even worse. By his very action, each drop-out casts a vote against the education he has been receiving. Who would deny that juvenile delinquency is related to the failure of our educational system to provide stimulation and meaning for our adolescents.[14]

Fromm might not make exactly the same statement today, and taken as it stands, it seems to me a considerable overgeneralization. Indeed, reformers like Fromm are apt to suppose that protesters largely share their agenda, especially if they say they do.

The litany of attack on bureaucratized education and on the vested interests of academia got a good deal of its start among the campus rebels of the Free Speech Movement at Berkeley in 1964–1965. But careful studies of the protesters show they were more appreciative of their courses and education and less critical, except for public rela-

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[13] There is a more somber note that occasionally crops up in the discussions I have had with students, especially on the more avant-garde campuses; this is an insistence that the heights of culture are in themselves an offense to the impoverished masses of the so-called Third World, and that the heights should be pulled down in the hope (a vain hope, in my judgment) of filling up the abysses. Sometimes the theme is explicit; if not everyone can share in the joys and illuminations of high culture, then no one should.

One can hear this expressed in a very primitive form by many young students; and also expressed in a veiled, highly sophisticated form, in the writings of H. Marcuse. [C.f. the critique of Herbert Marcuse in *The Revolution of Hope,* pp. 106–107, and the critique of relativism on pp. 87–88.]

[14] See Harold H. Hart, ed., *Summerhill: For and Against* (New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1970). pp. 251-252

tions purposes, than the inactive students; what originally led them into action was neither a demand for greater student participation in university affairs nor a search for "stimulating intellectual food," but the civil rights movement in the Bay Area and their desire to use the campus as a platform for it.[15] When after the Movement began, Martin Myerson came in as the new Acting Chancellor and asked students for suggestions about educational reform, hardly any responded.

Berkeley's story has been pretty elaborately covered both by the media and by social science researchers. Many other campuses have picked up the slogans developed there, but not necessarily the same gamut of motivations or the same array of political and pedagogic coalitions. What Fromm terms "the student rebellion" has been changing even in the months during which I have been working on this essay. But the tedency of both educational and political radicals and reformers to use various versions of rebellion as leverage for their own educational or political programs does not abate.

I am similarly critical of Fromm's statement that each dropout can be seen principally as a vote against our high schools, although surely many are just that. Such a notion is apt to lead the dedicated and idealistic high school teacher toward the pedagogic equivalent of therapeutic despair because it vastly overestimates the impact of formal education as against the more compelling influences of the home and the street, as the Coleman Report suggests.[16] Many students and many teachers experience a deep hunger for life, and many resist conventional notions of career and consumerism. But some in my observation, in rejecting what they see as mindless and puritanical work for meaningless ends, have relied on a counter-cultural repertoire which also turns out to be limited, lacking in imagination or constructive ideas. Decency, ingenuity, sensitivity can often be found. But I see a fair amount of drug-inspired aliveness which, though sometimes angry, commonly turns sullen and despairing. Indeed, so rapidly do the student movements change their mood and style and so intermittent has been the interest in educational reform (as distinguished from reforms in governance and politics) that it is hard to know what the impact of the changes already taking place has been on the great majority of uninvolved students, or what the consequences have been for the majority of uninvolved faculty.

Were Fromm writing about the student movements today he might well put even greater emphasis on destructive drives than appears in the quotation above. Indeed, toward the close of his contribution to *Summerhill: For and Against* he writes very critically:

> And then there are many of the young who believe that freedom means absence of tradition, absence of structure, absence of plan: what is desirable is unstructured, spontaneous action. They often believe that "the old ideas" and values are of little or no use today, that to know tradition, not to speak of accepting some of it, is in itself an obstacle to freedom.[17]

Similarly, the Fromm who writes in *The Revolution of Hope* about the literacy campaigns of Professor Paolo Freire in Latin America

[15] There is a large literature. See, e.g., Robert H. Somers, "The Mainsprings of the Rebellion: A Survey of Berkeley Students in November, 1964," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Sheldon S. Wolin (eds.), *The Berkeley Student Revolt: Facts and Interpretations* (New York: Doubleday-Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 530–559; see also the discussion in Nathan Glazer, *Remembering the Answers* (New York: Basic Books, 1970).

[16] For a full discussion, see Christopher Jencks, "The Coleman Report and the Conventional Wisdom," prepared for *On Equality of Educational Opportunity*, Frederick Mosteller and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.), to be published by Random House.

would not be sympathetic to some affluent white radicals whom I overheard saying to black underprivileged students, "Man, you have a great oral tradition, what do you want to learn to write for!" Such comments convey the impression that much of the counter-culture is unconsciously designed to ignore the possibility of downward mobility by the already arrived—although many other affluent students precisely aim to be downwardly mobile.

In a recent discussion at Harvard with student educational reformers, I suggested that students could actually become freer by learning tangible skills and accomplishments, and so be able to do something and earn their own living rather than continue to remain dependent. To counter this, one reflective student cited *Summerhill*, saying that it didn't matter if a student sat around for a year or so because eventually he might want to do something, and then he would do it under his own motivations and without pressure. This is fine of course for those who do find themselves, but many become utterly lost. Another student cited Erich Fromm to support his contention that contemporary social science consisted of a series of pigeonholes for compartmentalized disciplines which bear no relation to the problems of the great world.[17] Again, this is an exaggeration. Not all social science is like that. Moreover, I suspect that such students have missed or misconstrued Fromm's dichotomy between order, which he regards as mechanical and dead, and structure, which he defines as a property of all living (and indeed, nonliving) things and as essential for growth and creativity.[18] Professor Robert Gorham Davis has called my attention to the increasing interest of many American radicals in Levi-Strauss and other versions of structuralism, an interest that may eventually moderate their antagonism to structures in general, including those in higher education.

What is evident to me in many discussions is an idealism about the way learning should go on which can find some support in Fromm's work. It is idealism that tempts us to believe that we can get rid of all the mixtures of motives with which most of us live, and that then we can find our way to a purity of humane experience unmediated by ordinariness, structure, or routine. An education is worthless which is in any degree compromised by imposing schedules or by the desire to win approval or to get into graduate school; and the fear of having a "corrupt" or impure motive leads to a great watchfulness rather like that of the Puritans. But unlike the Puritans, work is not therapeutic or seen as indicative of election; it is apt to be seen as repressive. Thus, this idealism appears in some students to lead to vacillation between self-contempt for not living up to the ideal and a somewhat passive waiting to be captured by some all-encompassing activity.

The ways in which such students scrutinize themselves and each other have been influenced by popularization of both psychoanalytic

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[17] Fromm is not always seen as an ally by critical students. An SDS leader at a state university, on being introduced to me, launched into a vehement attack on Fromm's "revisionism" of Karl Marx. This student said that Marx was lulling the bourgeoisie in his early humanistic writings; these were purely propagandistic in intent; Fromm was robbing Marx of his toughness and turning him into a soft bourgeois romantic!

[18] See *Summerhill: For and Against*, *op. cit.*, pp. 262–263; note also in Fromm's Foreword to A. S. Neill, *Summerhill: A Radical Approach to Child Rearing* (New York: Hart Publishing Co. 1960), p. xvi, his emphasis on the importance of Neill's own extraordinary qualities as a caution against assuming that a school like Summerhill can be built anywhere, any day. On the peer pressures that may exist at Summerhill at the present time in the relative absence of adult controls, see the account by a visiting educator: Mary Keohane, "A. S. Neill: Latter-Day Dewey–" *Elementary School Journal*, 70 (1970), 401–410.

and Marxist thought. Either line of interpretation, though it can debunk the other, can also be called in to demonstrate how rationalizations masquerade as reasons. Things are never what they seem: they are always worse than they seem. I have already mentioned that many students and faculty consider encounter groups as ideal settings for education because they supposedly get away from "excessive" cognitive emphases and formal relations and allow people of different ages and backgrounds to experience each other directly. These devotees are generally unfamiliar with Erich Fromm's insistence that what is repressed and what is evoked in a particular setting is not some panhuman flow of sex and aggression, but rather what a particular culture and a particular social character find no way to categorize or to use.[19] Fromm is critical of the common notion that what is "real"—as in the expression "the real me"—is an underlying aggression or racism or rampant sexuality: in encounter groups it often happens that people manipulate their aggressions or, indeed, their sexuality, sometimes in fake humility, in order to establish a new moral hegemony in which the most apparently candid come out on top. What then may be repressed is sensitivity of feeling, delicacy (or snobbery) of reactions to other people, since one would be made to feel guilty for such reactions.[20]

Many of the adult and student educational reformers have had expensive secondary and university educations (I include myself here) and start their critique from their own backgrounds of cultivation and literacy. Many have had an interest in ideas since childhood and could have managed to educate themselves in the absence of requirements. In talking in recent years with such reformers, I have recognized that many are aware that their own college careers are unlikely to be affected by their proposed reforms; they are seeking to be generous to their successors. Yet they may not fully appreciate how high is the platform on which they themselves are standing and how hard it is to reach if one comes from a family that is not only nonaffluent but also skeptical of ideas and of education.

Because these students come from families that have arrived, and, indeed, at times from professional and intellectual families, they are apt to say to themselves that they want to "be" rather than to "do." They have a point when they declare that America and perhaps the whole Western world have been undone by an excessive emphasis on performance and achievement, but given the populous world we inhabit, it is an ambivalent and complicated point. To reject competence will not help the Western world to survive or to become more humane toward other parts of the world and its own deprived. It is a common fallacy to lump together rivalry with others and what might be called competition with the *ding an sich*—with the damned thingmanship of a discipline or an instrument, a violin, for example. Because much

[19] Cf. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud* (New York: Pocket Books, 1962), chap. 9, "The Social Unconscious."

[20] I do not intend here to be making blanket statements about all encounter groups in all sorts of social strata and contexts. I am talking about liberal arts colleges where the manipulative tend to get involved with the shy. Consequences might be quite different among a group of older people of lower middle class origin where everyone is inhibited, if not always shy. Furthermore, I do not speak out of personal experience with such groups, but out of observing instances on television, reading some of the literature, and talking with many devotees. The evangelism of some proponents of the movement reminds me of the similarities of some encounter groups, at the extreme, to Chinese thought reform sessions as described in Robert J. Lifton *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1961).

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envy and rivalry seek to pull others down rather than to raise one's own standards of performance. some student and faculty critics have been inclined to reject any kind of strenuous effort as an ego trip. Sometimes they wait to fall in love, as it were, with a topic or a vocation or a craft, rather than making an active effort out of which a further commitment might develop.

Sometimes I have asked students of this persuasion whether they believed that there are any skills at all that their culture is justified in making them to acquire. Some do not think there are. And if I inquire whether in their own development there is any point up to which they believe that they need the counsel of adults, some don't think there is such a point.

The analogy sometimes offered me is the finding that neonates will, like other animals, know how to feed themselves properly, to find the right amount of salt and other nutriment, when faced with a choice of possible edibles. Similarly, students claim that they will know what it is they want and need and that in due course they will provide it for themselves. At the extreme to which these students often push the issue, there is implicit here a denial of the concept of culture itself: a belief that people will grow up into some pan-human protoplasm able to communicate with other protoplasm without either the freedoms or the restraints of a cultural inheritance. The unanthropological and unhistorical nature of such a view is striking.[21]

Between these ideologically defended positions that some students take and what they actually do, there is of course a good deal of slippage, as with the rest of us. Most do welcome adults as teachers and friends. They make exceptions. Furthermore, the overlap between political, cultural, and pedagogic conflicts tends to sharpen each of these and to hide the very great differences in the conduct and outlook of students and faculty when not facing each other across a polemical barrier. Nevertheless, taking into account these shadings and mutings of view, it seems fair to say that authority is more openly challenged now.

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: AUTHORITY DELEGITIMIZED

In pondering such discussions with students, I have kept looking for settings in which they are faced with an authority that cannot easily be personalized and, hence, where issues of fighting against fears of being dependent would be less likely to interfere with education. One example is the responsive reaction many students have to a coach of a sport such as track, tennis, skiing, or fencing: they see this person as their ally in improving their skills or pleasure in the sport, especially if he is critical of them for indolence and failure to practice. Another is the response of students performing in orchestras or chamber music groups, where the conductor may be seen as the transmitter

[21] In the discussion of educational constraints that harass them, students quite commonly attack the language requirements in colleges and graduate schools, and everywhere these are being abandoned. My response has sometimes been to say to such students that their criticism of the inadequacy of most language requirements is quite correct and that they should insist on a language-immersion program in Peace Corps style in which they will be exposed to another culture so intensely that they will for a period not be able even to swear or to make love in their mother tongue, and in which all aspects of the non-American culture will be available to them from its literature to its vernacular slang and songs. Students tend instantly to reject such a demanding alternative. I fear that many faculty members would also reject it.

of the imperative imposed by the score, rather than as an authority in his own right (and, therefore, wrong). Of course, a coach or a conductor may exercise irrational authority and subordinate players to himself rather than to the rules of the game or to the score. Players are very sensitive to this. Yet, at their best, musical groups get sorted out by competence so that the first violinist or solo French horn does not have to be elected or chosen by lot.[22]

Perhaps as late as 1967, it was still true that most students in the better colleges sought to perform well in regular academic terms because they did not really question the curriculum, and because even if they did, they wanted to be able to enter good graduate and professional schools.[23] Students were coming to a growing number of avant-garde colleges with ever more precocious intellectual equipment. In the middle-1960s, college presidents of such institutions saw their task as a struggle to recruit college professors in a market extremely favorable to the latter. Few, if any, observers suspected that major institutions would by the end of the 1960s face declining public esteem, financial bankruptcy, and more to the point here, moral delegitimation and loss of authority.

However, when in June, 1970, I attended the annual Institute for incoming college presidents run by the American Council on Education, most of the men and women in attendance were deeply troubled over the issue of legitimacy. They were aware that many state legislatures expect them to act like other corporate executives (or, rather, as the latter are in fantasy supposed to act) and to be able to control campus turmoil and fire dissident or destructive faculty and students. Inside the institution, in contrast, faculty, students, and staff expect them to be egalitarian and infinitely accessible, and they are constantly being told that they must maintain "dialogue," or that "better communications" are the answer to all conflicts of interest. Most shrink from the accusation of being authoritarian or high-handed. The distinction Erich Fromm makes in *Man for Himself* between rational and irrational authority is almost impossible for them, as for many other Americans, to make—understandably, of course, when it involves their own conduct. And like most people, they consider it part of their job to be well liked as well as to be respected.

If authority is not to lie in themselves and their own behavior, does it then perhaps lie in the curriculum which has been handed down to them? Can they defend the curriculum even while recognizing its undeniable biases and limitations? A handful of the men and women at the Institute were of this persuasion, believing that in the prevailing vogue of irrationalism, they had to defend the authority of scholarship and of cultural traditions, even if the particular carriers of these traditions on their campuses are all too human, fallible in their

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[22] To be sure, such settings also come under student attack for their competitiveness and their insistence on equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcome. Students tell me that in some schools which recently had active madrigal and chamber orchestra groups, the only performed music that now prevails is that of the guitar, plucked and sung in an untrained and casual way. And in some colleges of music and art, there are students who will insist that their creativity would be stunted if they had to submit to supervision and criticism—they declare that no one is entitled to evaluate them except themselves. It is possible that this kind of collective narcissism is past the peak of its influence, perhaps reflecting the inevitable change of fashion, perhaps also the decline in the economy.

[23] At Harvard College, for example, the "gentleman's C" of the insouciant aristocrat was no longer an admired goal but a depreciated legacy. For a picture of Harvard College in this period, critical of its complacencies while aware of its advances, see McGeorge Bundy, "Were Those the Days?" in *Daedalus*, 99 (Summer, 1970), 531–567.

pedantry, their vanity, their rationalism, and all the other sins charged over the centuries against scholarship. In being prepared to make such a defense, these presidents are only too well aware that they can readily be defeated and ousted, and they know they will be attacked as reactionaries. Most of these men and women did not regard themselves as stand-patters—of course few Americans do!—but rather as what might be called Tory reformers.

Yet another cadre of presidents is taking quite a different road, namely, to form an alliance with radical young faculty and students in opposition to that segment of scholarly faculty who insist on the authority of the curriculum over students and of the academic professions and their standards over faculty members. The convictions of such presidents in favor of participatory democracy outweigh such convictions as they have about the claims of scholarship or the importance of inherited cultural traditions. Indeed, within this small but growing group, the presidents, like many faculty, believe that to take any other position would be elitist—and the accusation of "elitism" has in many university circles become almost as damaging as the accusation of racism (the two are often interchangeable).

Another problem that the presidents face in a situation of increasingly strained or diminishing resources is the judgment by many students and a number of faculty that lectures are by definition authoritarian and that they compel the listeners to be passive receptacles—and the speakers to be oracles. The small discussion group or rap sessions that are preferred are almost always more costly; so in most instances is Independent Study, which tends to be cannibalistic of faculty time if it is to amount to more than pro forma licensing of whatever students want to do or not do. The presidential problem of how to optimize the limited talents, resources and spaces of students and faculty are grave enough even when ideology does not dictate that only certain kinds of grouping will provide real learning.[24] It is a common error to suppose that one can tell a priori what forms of learning are active and what are passive. The assumption that listening to a lecture or a concert is necessarily passive, while "rapping" or even a one-to-one tutorial is active, seems to derive from an old-fashioned American judgment about strenuousness: ironically, a judgment voiced by many who regard themselves in politics and culture as "anti-American." Students could vastly improve their own educational experience, whatever the deficiencies of their institutions, by learning how to learn in less than optimal settings. This would require overcoming the narcissism of supposing that one can only get along with "the best."

SOME STRATEGIES IN UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION

I can offer no solution, even a partial one, to the educational problems that beset us. The great social and cultural shifts of our time have unsettled educational institutions as they have unsettled the

[24] Such considerations have led me to an interest in the effort of Parsons College in Fairfield, Iowa, to limit the number of courses taught by faculty while paying high salaries and laying on a large amount of remedial work. When Joseph Gusfield and I examined the Parsons College story a few years ago, we concluded that the venture miscarried more because of the bombastic entrepreneurship of its former President than because of inherent weaknesses in the basic plan. See Joseph R. Gusfield and David Riesman "Innovation in Higher Education: Notes on Students and Faculty Encounters in Three New Colleges," and Howeard Becker, Blanche Geer, David Riesman and Robert S. Weiss, Eds., *Institutions and the Person: Essays in Honor of Everett C. Hughes,* (Chicago, Aldine, 1968).

churches and many individual families. In such a fluid setting my own recommendations tend to be conservative. I am often asked about starting a new experimental college, and having observed a few such colleges in recent years, my inclination is to say that in the present climate they are apt to attract both faculty and students who are visionaries with competing sectarian visions, and that one needs an extraordinarily firm leader to avoid repeated fission. As I have just said, I am more sympathetic to innovations within relatively stable settings. I have seen student-led courses which have been useful because of the particular group involved and their dedication; I have seen others turn into therapy sessions or rapidly disintegrate. And I have seen some of the most hopeful innovations occur in denominational colleges, such as Immaculate Heart in Los Angeles or Florida Presbyterian in St. Petersburg. Of course, these colleges and others like them quickly lose their denominational restraints and may come to float like many others upon the counter-cultural tide.

It seems to me wrong to tear down given educational structures and curricula, no matter how inadequate, unless one has something one believes can be put in their place. The attack on arbitrary custom and inherited tradition, in education as in other spheres of life, has gained an extraordinary momentum in our time. One approach is to insist that schools and colleges are inherently stultifying, "total institutions," and that young people would be better off without them. Another approach is to set against the existing institutions the vision of new ones which would be staffed by wholly devoted, wholly empathic teacher-learners, not committed either to the political or the pedagogic status quo. However, proponents of the counterculture tend to oppose institutions as, such, and to believe that free-form education requires no planning, no organization.

In my first book on education I argued that it was a mistake for high-brow critics to assail secondary school teachers for not being geniuses of empathy and paragons of wisdom when the result was chiefly to demoralize those who listened to the critiques.[23] Many academicians and critics grow up in the United States with the view that they live in a profoundly anti-intellectual country and are virtually without influence; but in fact, as I have argued, intellectual fads can spread with extraordinary speed, and over time, have a cumulative impact. We see in our secondary schools and colleges many demoralized instructors who concluded that the subjects they teach are too compartmentalized and that the reforms of which they are capable are miniscule. They see themselves condemned as Apollonians when their secet sympathy is with the Dionysians.

Naturally, what has been said just now can readily become an alibi for complacency; one has to examine the social context before coming to a decision as to the appropriateness and the tone of criticisms. Since a system of higher education with 600,000 faculty members and seven million students is not capable of making quantum jumps, the effort at instant transformation will bring chaos rather than creativity.

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[23] This discussion was first published as "Teachers Amid Changing Expectations," *Harvard Educational Review*, vol. 24, 1954, pp. 106–117; and then as "Secondary Education and 'Counter-Cyclical Policy'," in *Constraint and Variety in American Education* (University of Nebraska Press, 1956), chap. 3.

We are presently moving from a system of mass higher education in which half the age-grade goes beyond high school and in which enrollments more than doubled between 1960 and 1970, to a system of near universal higher education up to the fourteenth grade. Our problems would be somewhat less grave if it became general practice after high school to enter on a period of employment or of voluntary service and to rely on adult education rather than on an automatic assumption of post-secondary education for many students who are neither mature enough nor eager enough to profit from college. The majority of these students are pursuing vocational or preprofessional curricula which will lift them socially from blue collar to (often more poorly paid) white collar work:[26] the status of students, their families, and their prospective occupations (along with the draft) all press in the direction of college. For most of these "first-generation" students, college is seen as a somewhat less boring option than its alternatives, and the programs and prospects for educational reform seldom come from them. Intensive teaching and advising might in some cases help such students redefine their aims while they are in college without necessarily pulling them way from attainable post-college goals. Just this occurs in some fortunate encounters. But while such colleges often have devoted teachers and hard-working counselors, the matching between these and any particular student is usually fairly accidental. The advice such students get often depends on the tilt of the curriculum and the ever-present grapevine.

In more favored settings with carefully selected student bodies and the cushion of private endowments, I am inclined to think that it makes sense to shift resources toward more intensive advising, even at the expense of course work. I have in mind here Erich Fromm's comment in *The Revolution of Hope*,[27] already quoted, concerning the futility of complaining about student dissatisfaction and the need for faculty members to become, in his term, "vulnerable," and responsive to student interests.

By "vulnerable" I do not mean "apologetic." Many student are capable litigants and rhetoricians, used since childhood to discovering and exploiting adult weaknesses. What I do have in mind is the openness to listen to the student in order to catch the latter's concerns and preoccupations as possible foci for more systematic learning and exploration. "Vulnerability" may also mean recognizing how threatened one is by student antagonism and attack without having to suppress these reactions to appear to oneself impregnable and unaffected. Vulnerability might require a decision that other faculty members, less threatened in this particular way, could be more help to particular students. At the same time a college of modest size whose faculty took seriously the demanding enterprise of teaching would also need to ask itself how students could be helped to become more vulnerable, more open to an awareness of their limitations as well as their strengths.

Children have been taught from their earliest years to play always from their strengths and to conceal what they or others regard as their weaknesses. When this life-long habit is coupled with narcissism, it

[26] The decline of blue-collar work that was assumed to follow upon the rise of automation has been greatly exaggerated. See Robert S. Weiss, David Riesman, and Edwin Harwood, "Work and Automation: Problems and Prospects," in Robert K. Merton and Robert A. Nisbet (eds.), *Contemporary Social Problems*, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1971).

[27] *Op cit.*, p. 115.

becomes difficult to persuade students to listen to a faculty adviser who urges them to confront areas from whose risks they had previously protected themselves. Such a conference could come only after there had been an assessment of the students' capacity in a variety of areas of cognitive and emotional functioning. The aim here would be less to make them "well rounded" in some abstract and standardized sense than to encourage them to develop their potentialities and to discover new modes of enjoying their own activity. If students were simultaneously given the chance to continue in areas of achieved competence, they might better be able to endure fallow seasons or areas of (hopefully diminishing) vulnerability.[28] Such an adviser might help students focus on their possible career aspirations, and I would like to see many begin at once as freshmen on a professional program studied in a broad, liberal way. (I recognize the bias against preprofessional education prevailing among both elite college faculties and their students: however, much education in the liberal arts is actually preparation for a career of an academic or literacy sort, and need not in fact be "liberal" in the sense of emancipating, whereas preprofessional work in medicine or engineering or law does not have to be narrow. However, the development of such programs for undergraduates would seem to be a long-term task, presently adumbrated in a number of efforts in engineering, nursing, and education but not as yet in the post-baccalaureate professions.)

Ideally, the adviser would help students become aware of ways in which they can learn from educational settings previously defined as utterly dismal or boring. Especially today, when there is such an animus against all large and allegedly impersonal milieus, students need to learn how to listen to lectures with what in *The Revolution of Hope* Erich Fromm terms "activeness," mixing their own thought with that of the lecturer and attending to what the anthropologist Edward Hall calls "the silent language" as well to the spoken words.[29]

In the state universities and in many private colleges, teaching and advising have become increasingly separate. Faculty do academic advising, using the curriculum as a guideline; some venture into more personal advising with the understandable misgiving that they will be swamped with students in search of a guru. However, few faculty members are equipped either for academic or more directly personal counseling. They often know too little about their own or other institutions, at least outside of their own specialties. And they are understandably hesitant to be candid in talking with students about other faculty members, since this power could so easily be exploited

[28] A number of colleges have abandoned or minimized their traditional grading systems in hope of overcoming students' inhibitions against venturing into new terrain based on their fear of not making the grade and, hence, penalizing themselves in terms of further work. For an empirical dissection of the ways in which grading policy in an earlier day at the University of Kansas influenced students' choice of courses, levels of work and of effort, see Howard Becker, Blanche Geer, and Everett Hughes, *Making the Grade: the Academic Side of College Life* (New York: John Wiley, 1968).

[29] A handful of colleges such as Sarah Lawrence and Bard approach the model here sketched. There, the personal authority of the don or counselor takes the place of the complete absence of formal curricular requirements. The don seeks to encourage students to explore the curriculum and to abandon self-protectiveness. Since until just now Sarah Lawrence has been a woman's college, and since a great number of the faculty have been lively and talented young men, the dons have had a certain authority: they have only rarely met students whose mask of independence truculently declares: "You can't make me . . ." In my own observation of coeducational settings, women students have been more responsive and responsible—though these qualities sometimes are disadvantageous to their education and development, and frequently are too easily dismissed as mere docility.

in a vindictive or self-serving way.[30] Furthermore, a student may have ample reason not to be candid in talking with a faculty member who is also an adviser, for he may want a recommendation to graduate school from the latter—or may fear an effort at seduction. (The latter is one generally unstated reason why attractive women students sometimes wish for more women faculty members to whom they can talk without the risk that their confidences will be taken advantage of.)

Faute de mieux, the advising function comes increasingly to be located in a separate group of counselors (who are sometimes also dormitory residents) who are frequently trained in Rogerian methods of sympathetic reassurance and occasionally in a more psychoanalytic mode. This division of labor, unavoidable as it may be, tends to rob faculty members of feedback concerning the extent of their impact, perhaps especially on the shy and unself-confident students who feel more at ease in talking about their dilemmas with unthreatening counselors than in talking back to preoccupied faculty members. And the counselors, because they are clearly not academic, can only at best bind up the wounds, not change the rules of the game. In the present climate on the campus, counselors may join with other academically marginal people such as campus ministers to support students in opposition to faculty expectations and curricular demands. They may thus serve less to bind up wounds than to show themselves as swingers, in sympathy with student hedonism and a variety of antirational cults.

Of course, it would be wrong to make a sharp dichotomy between faculty scholars and anti-academic counselors: as pointed out earlier, many faculty have themselves become anti-academic, and there are many counselors who take seriously the academic side of college life and seek to show students what it takes to profit from that side.[31]

I can illustrate from an experience of mine several decades ago in the College at the University of Chicago how the interweaving of academic and personal concerns may escape both faculty members and counselors. I had in a section a young woman of seventeen who since the age of eleven had belonged to a radical Zionist youth movement which prepared people to go to Israel to live in a kibbutz run by the same movement there. When she had expressed her desire to come to college, her fellows had insisted that Israel had no need of college-trained women and that, if she did attend college, she would be lost to the Movement. She had pleaded to be allowed to attend only for a year, promising that after that she would go to Israel. She came by chance into my section of a course on "Culture and Personality"[32] which focused on multi-ethnic societies: we discussed in a common

[30] I am not sure what would be the consequences on a particular campus of breaking down the privacy of the classroom and encouraging mutual visiting and criticism so that faculty members could advise students better as well as learn something substantively about other fields. I am inclined to think that faculty members who wish to be retained or promoted principally because of the quality of their teaching cannot rightly insist on privacy, nor should they be asked to depend on hearsay even when combined with student evaluations as the sole bases for judgment. There have not been enough experiments of the side-effects of visiting to give me confidence that the tact and generosity requisite for such a procedure will be found.

[31] See William G. Perry, Jr., *Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), describing the work of the Harvard Bureau of Study Counsel: the Bureau not only seeks to help students grapple with the demands of their academic work but also offers faculty members the opportunity to have their classes recorded and played back under the sympathetic criticism of a counselor, in the hope of helping them to become better teachers.

[32] See for a contemporary discussion, David Riesman, "Some Problems of a Course in 'Culture and Personality,'" *Journal of General Education*, V (1951), 122–136.

vocabulary Black Muslims, Zionists, French-Canadian Nationalists, and so on. The young woman did not speak in class, and I was not aware of her inner turmoil, though she was evidently attentive. Discovering that she could not study, she consulted a psychiatrist who, according to her own later report, told her she was suffering from an Oedipal conflict. Dissatisfied with this diagnosis, she went then to the Counseling Center; there, again according to her report, a young woman counselor listened to her in a non-directive way, reflecting back the strength of her ambivalences, but unable to interpret these. One would have had to be intensively immersed in or vicariously sensitive to the College setting to grasp more fully the ideological impact of the course on the student's continuing work in the Movement. One would perhaps have had to take ideas more seriously than either faculty members or therapists are generally apt to do. Certainly I could have been more alert to her conflicts even though this might not have led me to alter my conduct of the course.

Strategies of teaching and advising, as of therapy, must change as the cultural context changes. When I was working on this paper (summer, 1970), a researcher came to consult me about criteria for innovative, liberal arts programs, and I think I startled him by saying that the two St. John's Colleges in Annapolis and Santa Fe, along with Shimer College, had to be seen as among the most innovative because when everything else was changing, they had stayed the same! As readers will know, St. John's at Annapolis developed in 1937 a totally required curriculum including music, languages, mathematics, and science, and the famous seminars on the Great Books.[33]

In the eclectic atmosphere of Berkeley in 1965, Joseph Tussman, professor of philosophy, sought to provide a structured and wholly required curriculum for one hundred and fifty freshmen and sophomores. Recruiting five colleagues from different parts of the University and some teaching assistants, he presented freshmen with an intensive introduction to Greek (largely Athenian) civilization in its cultural, political, aesthetic, and religious aspects; the second year was similarly devoted to American civilization.[34] Tussman faced hostility from some faculty members who believed that mixing together materials on Greek politics, art, and styles of life was unprofessional, especially if one was not at home in the Greek language. Many students and teaching

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[33] Cf. Harris Wofford, Jr., *Embers of the World: Conversations with Scott Buchanan* (Santa Barbara Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1970). In *The Revolution of Hope*, *op. cit.*, p. 115, Erich Fromm has a passing comment on this type of program, speaking of "our college students [who] are literally 'fed up' because they are fed, not stimulated." He continues, "They are dissatisfied with the intellectual fare they get in most—although fortunately not in all—instances, and, in this mood, tend to discard all traditional writings, values, and ideas. It is futile simply to complain about this fact. One has to change its conditions, and this change can occur only if the split between emotional experience and thought is replaced by a new unity of heart and mind. This is not done by the method of reading the hundred great books—which is conventional and unimaginative. It can only be accomplished if the teachers themselves cease being bureaucrats hiding their own lack of aliveness behind their role of bureaucratic dispensers of knowledge; if they become—in a word, by Tolstoy—'the co-disciples of their students.'" I think that indeed there are problems in the Great Books formula and that the textual analysis that colleges have built on that formula can become routinized. In discussions at both St. John's colleges, I have made similar criticisms. Moreover, neither of the St. John's colleges nor Shimer escapes from the conflicts discussed in this article. Nevertheless, it can be refreshing to see the seriousness, even solemnity, with which students and faculty frequently read and analyze the set texts, especially in contrast to many other small, experimental liberal arts colleges where, for example, a complicated vocabulary exposes students to the charge of being pretentious or insufficiently earthy.

[34] See Joseph Tussman, *Experiment at Berkeley* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

assistants regarded as authoritarian the very idea of a prescribed curriculum. In their view, a curriculum could be arrived at, if at all, only through participatory democracy; and while Tussman was willing to discuss and argue indefinitely with students, he was not prepared to submit to their decision as to what they should learn. Of course, many felt that Greece was "irrelevant." The noise of these political-cultural struggles tended to conceal the actual accomplishments of the College for many of its students, fewer of whom dropped out of Berkeley than the general lower-division norm.

None of these experiments in General Education came about through academic laissez-faire. All present the entering student with a sharp profile of the themes to which all are to be exposed, though few expect that students will expose themselves in all areas with equal intensity and talent. The General Education component at my own institution is much less ambitious. It offers students a great variety of ways to meet the requirement that they venture into a course or two in the Humanities, the Social Sciences, and the Natural Sciences. No agreement among faculty is expected as to what an educated American ought to know. Many students seek to meet their requirements on a minimal level. A student with an interest in literature who is hostile to science may cast around for that introductory Natural Science course—it is Astronomy this year, or Geology?—that is least taxing and least threatening. (The natural scientists at Harvard are much more ready to explore the other culture.") Nevertheless, even such a minimal program may expose students to different ways of thought and different modes of inquiry. However, the present tendency in most liberal arts colleges is to abolish or relax requirements, so that, despite the frequent attack on pre-professional education as fitting students into slots for a world they disparage, General Education also suffers from a crisis of legitimacy.

I began teaching in Harvard's General Education Program a dozen years ago, offering a one-term course on American character and social structure and recruiting a staff of ten or a dozen men and women who shared an interest in problems of learning and teaching, and who have come from sociology, political science, history, law, clinical and social psychology, comparative literature, and anthropology. When we began, we found it extremely difficult to persuade Harvard undergraduates that, in writing their papers for the course, they could make any serious contribution to the understanding of society. A great many had had the disheartening experience of finding themselves as Harvard freshmen no longer the brightest stars of their respective high schools, but surrounded with hundreds of outwardly impressive fellow valedictorians. Many came to doubt their own powers; they reacted guardedly to their courses and to each other; their curiosity concerning the world was dimmed by the fear of revealing their inadequacies. The great majority knew their way around the libraries, and we sought to persuade many to embark on a small-scale empirical investigation, perhaps drawing on his access to a particular segment of our society: a school, a job, a dormitory floor. We published three volumes of student papers, not necessarily the most elegant, in order to suggest that it was possible for a neophyte to add to the limited stock of knowledge about the details of various social worlds; we tried to make clear that these papers were intended as illustrations, and not as fixed guideposts.

The political and cultural revolutions on the campus have in the last few years altered what many students bring to such a course and what they expect from it. Whereas our principal problem once was to encourage self-confidence in students, a growing problem today is to broaden their curiosity. Paradoxically, not only too little but too much self-confidence inhibits curiosity: some precocious students arrive at college believing that they already know what society is like—and that it is utterly vicious. To spend any energy exploring the details appears to them a delaying tactic at best, at worst a kind of counter-insurgency. Many of these students have been exposed to ideas of liberation from very early on: some have been taught in secondary school by young radicals avoiding the draft or by young anticareerists avoiding what they regard as the rat race of university life. They may not actually have read Nietzsche, Sartre, Camus, Fromm, Fanon, but they have been exposed to the ideas of such writers osmotically in a kind of post-McLuhan way. In many areas where most adults are uninformed, these students are quite sophisticated. Yet in some respects they are provincial while regarding themselves as fully cosmopolitan. Because their emotional and, hence, intellectual interest is so largely focused upon America's underclass, it is difficult to evoke their interest in the full range of human experience. Many say that they want to share "the black experience," assuming that there is only a single experience and that in any case it is only of suffering and debasement on the one soide and joyful naturalness on the other. It is hard to get such students to extend disciplined empathy and curiosity to a wide variety of life in this country (though the tiny minority of active revolutionaries among them talk about contacts with the "working class").[35]

Now we have much less of a problem of persuading students to do some piece of empirical work outside the library—our problem is often the opposite, of getting students to look at books at all, if they do not fall within the current canon. Reactions to our reading Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* are especially revealing. Many students and some staff members tend to dismiss him as a French aristocrat, a liberal-conservative, who is abstract and out of another century. They cannot identify with this young Frenchman and his remarkable experience of America. Some resent his detachment (not seeing that he was passionately arguing with his fellow French aristocrats and conservatives as to how they might respond creatively to the coming democratic world rather than dig in their heels for rear-guard action).

Tocqueville would not be astonished at some aspects of the cultural revolution insofar as it is a reaction against hierarchy, tradition, and elites. Because egalitarianism has always been stronger in America than in other industrial societies, the cultural revolution forces faculty members to confront not only resistant student but also ambivalence within themselves to the degree that they identify with students. Indeed, if one looks around the world at the student movements elsewhere, one might surmise that the cultural revolution is strongest in the United States. It is a postindustrial phenomenon in the quite concrete sense that many affluent American students believe that hard

[35] Michael Lerner, a former Harvard College student, describes such elite student snobberies in "Respectable Bigotry," *The American Scholar*, 38 (Autumn, 1969), 606–617.

scientific and technical work, or work in organizational harness, is no longer necessary in the affluent society. Here they share Herbert Marcuse's view of surplus repression.

Even at an avant-garde institution like Harvard College, however, such judgments, at once hedonistic and despairing, are widely voiced but less widely shared. My colleagues and I have continued to find students who are interested and alert. Sometimes they feel guilty because their interests do not appear to respond to the great causes of war and peace, racial conflict, urban decay or environmental protection. They may need to be sustained in the hope and belief that it will not help the abysses of our society to pull down the heights of culture.

And faculty members also need to be sustained against the dangers of complete dependence on a student audience. This is especially true among that growing group of graduate students who have come to deprecate specialized research and who seek out positions in liberal arts colleges where they can devote themselves wholeheartedly to undergraduates. This very dedication is one source of the factionalism and schismatic tendencies in many small liberal arts colleges whether they are self-consciously experimental or not. Faculty members may engage in a competition to show themselves more pure, more devoted, than their colleagues—perhaps with the end result that their loss of visibility in their discipline may mean that their institution is stuck with them just because they have been so evidently devoted.

Such considerations have led me increasingly to believe that colleges need to protect their faculty members against the temptation of becoming missionaries in the cause of anti-specialist teaching and total involvement with undergraduates and with the institution. I think it is often of doubtful value to students to face mentors who have no other constituency than the local one. Yet when I have raised these misgivings with faculty members and administrators, many have contended that no one has the authority to interfere with their decision to make a complete commitment to undergraduate teaching. Like some young pepole attempting to develop new styles of life in communes, these faculty members see themselves as building an international community, uncorrupted by pressures to publish or otherwise to maintain visibility in a larger world.

In a different kind of society, which gave teachers at all levels higher status and greater authority, and in which values and concepts changed rather slowly, it might be possible to sustain a life as a college teacher with less anxiety about losing one's single constituency altogether. But in the American academic world, that seems a very distant vision. It is my judgment that those colleges have fared best over a considerable period of time where faculty members have been encouraged not to limit themselves to their undergraduate teaching but to seek other sources of stimulation—which need not necessarily take the form of regular publication of standard academic output. For example, both Bennington and Sarah Lawrence have made places where faculty were involved in the arts or in community and political work, or who have other ties to adult society.[36]

[36] The late William Fels, former President of Bennington College, once reported to me that on the whole his faculty who had such connections were also regarded by students as better teachers than those who were confined to their teaching. His judgment was based on student reports of the quality of teaching which he then compared with faculty performance in extra-mural work of all sorts. For further discussion. Cf. David Riesman, Joseph Gusfield, and Zelda Gamson, *Academic Values and Mass Education: The Early Years of Oakland and Monteith* (Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday & Co., 1970), chap. 12 and 13.

What I am suggesting in these last remarks is that we must guard against the victory even of our reforms, for while it is on the whole a benign development that there is now more concern for teaching than was the case a few years earlier, we must recognize that any social advance turns up new problems or uncovers unsolved old ones. We must continue to adapt our experiments to the local landscape, resisting innovations that have come out of a different academic turf. This means that we academicians need to decide what are the essential issues on which we are prepared to stand firm and if necessary to be defeated, and what are the arenas in which we can compromise and temporize without giving way to the excesses of the cultural revolution. At many points my own position, immersed in ambiguities, lacks the solace of clarity. My hope is a modest one, that what can be discovered will become cumulative, and that even our failures, if we do not deceive ourselves as to why they occurred, may help our successors avoid our errors before they invent their own.

OPPORTUNITY AS IT IS RELATED TO HOME BACKGROUND AND SCHOOL PERFORMANCE [1]

By FOREST I. HARRISON, Claremont Graduate School

One of the major problems, if not the major problem, confronting the educational researcher is an understanding of the nature of inequities in educational opportunity and its effect on achievement. The acquisition and immediate application of this understanding have become primary objectives for many of us involved with education. Stated operationally, the issue of concern is that if all students are to succeed in school, then each must be afforded the educational opportunity to do so.

The study reported here represents an attempt to understand further the nature of the relationship between achievement and opportunity, not just here in the United States but in other countries as well. The foremost purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the opportunity afforded academically successful students differed from that afforded nonsuccessful students within six countries.

Additionally, we know from such major works as those by Bloom, Davis, and Hess,[2] and Coleman *et al.*,[3] among others here in the United States, that opportunity is related not only to performance in school but to the home background of the students as well. In the Coleman report,[4] it was concluded that what children in the United States bring to school with them accounts for more of the variation in their achievement than any other factor. Opportunity, however, was found to be significantly related to achievement. Thus, a further purpose of this study was to determine the extent to which the opportunity afforded the students from advantaged home backgrounds within each country differed from that afforded the disadvantaged students in that country.

One additional purpose, of no lesser importance than the others, was to explore the implications of studying educational opportunity as a process. While Coleman *et al.*[5] have used the usual omnibus measures of opportunity—pupil-teacher ratio, expenditure per pupil on teaching, and the like—the procedure used to measure the variable opportunity in this study was an attempt to measure educational opportunity as a process.

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[1] The research reported herein was performed pursuant to a grant from the U.S. Office of Education, OEG–3–6–068260–1626. I would like to gratefully acknowledge the Standing Committee of the International Project for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (I.E.A.) for providing, as data source, the I.E.A. Data Bank. This study was reported to the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, in Chicago, February 8, 1968.

[2] B. Bloom, A. Davis, and R. Hess, *Compensatory Education for Cultural Deprivation* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965).

[3] James Coleman *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966).

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*; Coleman, "Equality of Educational Opportunity Reconsidered" (paper presented before the Symposium on Operations Analysis of Education, Washington, D.C., November, 1967).

Before turning to a discussion of the procedures of the study, it needs to be emphasized that the focus of this study was on specific group differences within each of the countries, not on the differences between countries. Insofar as possible, the conclusions of the study were reached only after generalizations were drawn from the results of the analyses within each country.

Procedures

To resolve the problem as posed, an international data source with extensive information on a large number of students was needed. This requisite was satisfied through the use of the data bank of the International Project for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (I.E.A.). The I.E.A. Data Bank resulted from a recent international study of achievement in mathematics.[6] This bank contains information on over 130,000 students in twelve countries. With these data, it was possible to secure student samples and approximate estimates of their home background, school performance, and educational opportunity in selected countries.

Educational Opportunity

Opportunity was measured by qualifying the teacher's perceptions of the students' opportunities to study a particular topic in mathematics. The teachers had been asked to judge the extent to which their group of students were afforded an opportunity to learn to solve the types of problems presented by the mathematics achievement test administered to the students. Each teacher rated all of the seventy test items as to their appropriateness for his group of students. For each item, the response alternatives available to the teacher were as follows: (*a*) all or most, at least 75 percent, of this group of students had an opportunity to learn this type of problem; (*b*) some, 25 per cent to 75 per cent, of this group had an opportnity to learn this type of problem; and (*c*) few or none, under 25 per cent, had such an opportunity. The teacher's ratings were then scaled by assigning a value of 87.5 per cent to the first alternative, a value of 50 per cent to the second alternative and a value of 12.5 per cent to the third. The rating given by a teacher to each of the seventy items in the test taken by his students were averaged. Thus, for each teacher this was a measure of the opportunity his students had been afforded to learn the content covered in the mathematics achievement test. This score was assigned to each of his students, and it was interpreted as that percentage of the content of the mathematics test which the student had the opportunity to study.

Home Background

As an indicator of the student's home background, the educational levels of his parents and the status of occupation of his father, taken in combination, were used. These variables are ones traditionally used to estimate home background. The educational levels were number of years of education completed by each parent; the status of the father's occupation was represented by a coded occupational scale consisting of seven ordinal categories.

School Performance

A cognitive variable, mathematics achievement, and an effective variable, interest in mathematics, also in combination, were used as an

[6] Torsten Husén (ed.), *International Study of Achievement in Mathematics*, Vols. I and II (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967).

indicator, albiet gross, of performance in school. The achievement level for a student was his corrected score on the 70-point mathematics achievement test. The variable, interest in mathematics, was an 11-point index, derived from the student's desired occupation and his interest and grades in mathematics.[7] The larger scores on this index indicate greater interest in mathematics.

Samples

The samples selected for this study were thirteen-year-old students in six countries: the United States, England, France, Japan, Scotland, and Sweden. In these countries, nearly all thirteen-year-olds are still in school. From the representative national samples taken by the I.E.A., the samples for this study were drawn selectively, using the multiple criteria: father's education, mother's education, status of father's occupation, mathematics achievement, and interest in mathematics. To detail the selection process in the United States, the advantaged students who were selected were those students both of whose parents had completed at least thirteen years of education *and* whose fathers were in occupations in the four highest-status occupational classes. The disadvantaged students were those students both of whose parents had completed no more than ten years of education *and* whose fathers had occupations in the three lowest-status occupational classes. Within these groups of advantaged students and disadvantaged students, the successful and non-successful students were selected. The successful students were those students who had achieved a score of 16.25 or higher on the 70-point mathematics test *and* a score of 7 or more on the 11-point interest in mathematics index. The non-successful students who were selected were those students who had a mathematics achievement score of less than 16.25 and also a score of less than 7 on the interest index. The application of the process resulted in the formation of four groups of selectively sampled thirteen-year-olds in the United States: the advantaged-successful, the advantaged-non-successful, the disadvantaged-successful, and the disadvantaged-non-successful.

This process was repeated for each of the remaining five countries. The criteria for selecting the groups of students were adjusted, however, for each of the countries. Such adjustments were necessary to assure that, with respect to all other students in their country, only those students who were distinctly advantaged or disadvantaged and who were either the most successful or non-successful were included for study. The parents' educational levels of the advantaged students were ten years or more in England, eight years or more in France, nine years or more in Japan and Scotland and seven years or more in Sweden. The disadvantaged students in each country were those students whose parents' educational levels were less than the levels established as criteria for membership as advantaged students. And, in all countries, the advantaged students were those whose fathers were in occupations in the four highest occupational classes; the disadvantaged were those whose fathers were in the three lowest classes.

Within these advantaged and disadvantaged groups, the successful students selected in England were those who had achieved a score of 19.50 or higher on the mathematics achievement test; selected in France were those students who scored 18.50 or higher, 31.25 or higher

[7] *Ibid.*, I. 212.

in Japan, 19.25 or higher in Scotland, and 15.75 or higher in Sweden. And, the successful students in England, France, Scotland, and Sweden were those who scored 6 or higher on the interest in mathematics index; in Japan, the successful students had interest scores of 7 or more. The non-successful students in each country were those whose achievement and interest scores were less than those required for membership as successful students.

Method of analysis

In the statistical analysis for each country, home background—either advantaged or disadvantaged—was crossed with school performance—either successful or non-successful. An exact two-way univariate analysis of variance for non-orthogonal designs was performed to test these main effects in each country. Also of interest were (*a*) differences in opportunity between advantaged and disadvantaged students, and (*b*) differences in opportunity between successful and non-successful students. The method of analysis developed by Bock [8] and programmed for the computer by Finn [9] was used. The estimate of error in the analyses was the pooled within-cell variation. Opportunity to learn was the dependent variable in each of the analyses in each of the countries.

Results

In each country, the test of the effect of school performance, contrasting the opportunity of the successful students with that of the non-successful students, was considered to be the test of the central query of the study. To reiterate this problem: to what extent does the opportunity to learn afforded the successful students differ from that afforded the non-successful students? In the tests of the effect of school performance, it was found, in fact, that the successful students in the United States, England, France, Scotland, and Sweden had been afforded greater opportunity than the non-successful students to learn the mathematics covered by the achievement test (statistically significant at $p < .05$). The differences in opportunity between the successful students and the non-successful students (and of the differences in opportunity between the advantaged students and the disadvantaged students) in each country are graphed in Figure 1.

The length of a bar is the difference in opportunity between the groups named at either end of the bar. Differences which were found to be significant in the analyses of variance are so indicated. The mean differences represented in Figure 1 were constructed from the statistics in Table 1.

Elaborating on these results, in the United States the successful students had been offered the opportunity to learn more than half of the content covered while the non-successful students had been afforded the opportunity to learn less than half. In all countries except Japan, the advantaged-successful students were afforded more opportunity to learn than any of the other three groups of students (see Table 1). In Japan, the non-successful students had been afforded the same opportunity as the successful students, the opportunity to learn more than 60 per cent of the content covered in the test.

[8] R. Darrell Bock, "Programming Univariate and Multivariate Analysis of Variance," *Technometrics*, V (February, 1963), 94–117.

[9] J. Finn, *Multivariance—Univariate and Multivariate Analysis of Variance and Covariance: A FORTRAN IV Program*, Version 4 (Buffalo: State University of New York at Buffalo, 1968).

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

FIG. 1.—Group differences in each country

Though the effect of school performance was of primary interest, the effect of home background was also tested in each of the countries. In four of the countries, the United States, England, France, and Scotland, the students from advantaged home backgrounds had been afforded a greater opportunity to learn the mathematics content than that afforded the students from disadvantaged home backgrounds. In Sweden and Japan, such was not the case. In these two countries, the disadvantaged students had been afforded the same opportunity as that afforded the advantaged students. The differences in opportunity between the advantaged students and the disadvantaged students in each country are represented in Figure 1.

The interaction effects of home background and school performance in all countries were non-significant in the analyses. Hence, they are not presented here.

TABLE 1.—DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR EACH GROUP, BY COUNTRY, ON THE STUDENT'S OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN (MEAN ENTRIES READ AS PERCENTAGES)

Country	Group											
	Advantaged successful			Advantaged nonsuccessful			Disadvantaged successful			Disadvantaged-nonsuccessful		
	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	N	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	N	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	N	$\bar{X}$	S.D.	N
United States	54.66	13.71	283	50.68	14.48	94	49.73	12.98	89	44.71	11.74	212
England	70.46	9.03	413	56.87	18.86	37	61.84	14.38	139	47.68	17.97	135
France	60.00	12.31	229	54.53	12.99	79	48.16	9.67	74	43.12	8.48	87
Japan	63.04	5.54	150	62.90	6.93	46	63.67	6.09	95	63.58	6.06	150
Scotland	66.96	9.09	307	45.85	13.50	155	50.51	11.41	21	44.53	15.16	41
Sweden	39.57	8.49	229	37.57	8.38	60	38.91	9.48	120	37.44	9.62	203

Discussion

One conclusion of this study is that most non-successful students are not given the opportunities to learn afforded successful students. This conclusion is supported by the results of the analyses in five out of six countries: the United States, England, France, Scotland, and Sweden. Furthermore, a second conclusion is that most disadvantaged students are not given the opportunities to learn that are afforded advantaged students. This conclusion is supported by the results of the analyses in four out of six countries: the United States, England, France, and Scotland.

In Sweden, the disadvantaged students had been afforded the same opportunity as the advantaged students, and in Japan all students had been afforded equal opportunity to learn. The lack of relationship between home background and opportunity in Sweden and Japan can be plausibly explained by the centralized core curriculum offered all students through at least age thirteen in both countries. When a homogeneous educational program is offered to all students, we should not expect to find opportunity related to the home backgrounds of the students, or to any other characteristic for that matter.

In Japan, the homogenous educational program would also account for the lack of relationship between success in school and opportunity. In a non-differentiated system with a homogeneous educational program, opportunity to learn is a constant, not a variable. Thus, the differences between the successful students and the non-successful students in Japan must be attributed to something other than inequities in opportunity. The explanation for these differences in success rests on future research.

The aforementioned conclusions have decided implications for educational practices in the school systems of all countries. For one, while the possibility remains that all students will not be able to benefit from such opportunities, the opportunities offered advantaged-successful students should be offered to all students if success for most is valued. Postlethwaite [10] has also offered similar advice.

The definitiveness of the results of this study are attributable, to a great extent, to the exploratory way in which the variable, opportunity to learn, was measured as a process variable. Our understanding of the nature and implications of educational opportunity would be greatly increased if improved measures of process were developed. Serious consideration should be given to this measurement procedure in studies that are, hopefully, generated from this one.

In generalizing from the results of this study, there are certain cautions to be acknowledged. Socioeconomic-status characteristics were used to determine home background rather than variables which reflect the processes which are occurring in the homes.[11] Furthermore, only mathematics achievement and interest in mathematics were used as indicators of success in school. In spite of the limitations, the major conclusion of this study remains viable: educational opportunity is related to performance in school and to the effect of one's home background, not just here in the United States but in many other countries as well.

[10] Neville Postlethwaite, *School Organization and Student Achievement* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 130.

[11] E.g., R. Wolf, "The Identification and Mensurement of Environmental Process Variables Related to Intelligence" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1963); R. Dave, "The Identification and Mensurement of Environmental Process Variables that are Related to Educational Achievement" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1963).

NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION

By PAUL and HAPPIE BYERS

We want to suggest some of the implications of a new understanding of human communication for education in general and for the classroom teacher in particular. We will begin by contrasting an older and a newer view of human communication. In the recent past the so-called "behavioral sciences" were more focussed on behaviors or parts of people than on whole people. Doctors were concerned with diseased organs or organ systems; psychologists studied reactions to stimuli, psychiatrists looked for and exorcised neuroses; teachers were trained to get the information into children which would enable them to score high on assorted tests and, presumably, then *perform* well in college and life. Human communication was taken to be the study of messages and almost always thesse were language messages. While animals might howl, growl, bristle, or dance, people used language as their principal, if not their only important, communication system.

The stuff of communication was information, organized as facts, concepts, or beliefs and taught as knowledge. Each person was seen to have a kind of filing cabinet where this information was stored. Ideally each person's filing cabinet should contain the greatest possible amount of this knowledge in a well-ordered and usefully cross-indexed filing system. Much of a person's social worth and perhaps all of his education was assessed in terms of his capacity to produce this information, competently encoded, on demand. If some children were difficult to teach, it was because their filing cabinets (at the onset of education) were both impoverished and chaotic or because they suffered from a motivation deficiency.

However one looked at communication or education, the key seemed to be language. Parents competed to have their children speak and read early. Schools still use reading scores as their most significant index of success or failure in the early years. We have come to put such great emphasis on language as our chief communication modality, and we offer such great rewards to children who can construct elaborate and sophisticated messages, that it is possible for some people to believe that even human relations is a verbal-message enterprise.

Today the human sciences are broadening their focus to include the "whole man" and the milieu of his life is not only the technological extensions of man but a human environment of other live people. Where once doctors specialized in organs, they now also specialize in family and community medicine. Psychiatrists and psychologists are increasingly concerned with a person's relationship to his family and society as the milieu for his mental health. Teachers are now reading about and attending conferences concerned with "Open Education," where children learn in an interactional milieu more nearly resembling a socially interacting world of people engaged in discovery.

Human communication is coming to be seen as the processes by means of which people relate to each other.

The disadvantage of the older approach to communication is that we tended to think that messages were somehow an equivalent of people who produced them. Our communication research told us a great deal about the human capacity to generate, encode, transmit, receive, decode, and act upon messages—as though messages *caused* behavior. But it told us little about human relations. Since the easiest messages to find and analyze were verbal messages, we tended to suppose that verbal messages caused behavior and that nonverbal communication was probably only the unlearned reflection of inner emotional states. It was difficult if not impossible to discover the "meaning" of nonverbal behavior and without "meaning" it was difficult to think of messages or communication. Even today one finds popular articles which discuss language-use in great and even scientific detail, but the same publications do little more with the so-called nonverbal behavior than amuse (or embarrass) the reader with psychological interpretations based on flimsy correlations.

When we study communication as the process by means of which people relate to each other, we must look at the context in which it occurs—the human relationship. And when we examine a human relationship—such as a simple conversation between two people—we almost immediately discover that there are multiple modalities operating in addition to language. We discover that the modalities, verbal and nonverbal, are learned as patterns of the culture (as language is learned) and that they are systematic (language has grammar, for example). Furthermore we discover that they all fit together: they are systematically interrelated.

A mother holds and feeds her baby; two people enjoy "talking to each other"; a community of mathematicians contribute articles and books to their academic community; a whole society maintains a particular political system. Each of these enterprises requires the participation of two or more people who have learned the required cultural codes with some degree of code-competence. A person's competence in using the cultural patterns or codes *is* his ability to participate in society's life. When we use this point of view or model of human communication, we can say that all of education is a matter of teaching children to participate in the communication of their human world. And we can begin to see that the fact of participation itself is more deeply important than the content of the messages involved. When we teach children how to participate in communication with others, we are teaching them how to learn. And whatever is learned serves to provide the child or person with the *process* for learning still more through increasingly higher levels of participation. This is, of course, a chicken-and-egg cycle in which the content learned at one point becomes the process for learning on the next step upward. One must know numbers to learn how to count, must know how to count to learn arithmetic, must know arithmetic to learn algebra—and so on to become a mathematician who can master still higher forms of scholarsmanship. The basic elements of human communication, through all modalities, must be learned with an appropriate competence before that which is being communicated (the subject matter) can be placed

in the appropriate human context. If we look at the content as the end product of learning, we see people as filing cabinets of information. But when we focus, instead, on the process, we see people as increasingly competent participants in human society.

Let us look at some actual examples of behavior in communication. In the sophisticated and subtle communication of the adult world we recognize that two people coming together establish a tone that to a large extent determines the quality of the interaction that follows. The expression "we got off to a bad start" implies a recognition that beginnings are important, that they strongly influence the nature of the interchange that follows, and that there are occasions which a tone is interchange that follows, and that there areoccasions whena tone is find themselves trapped in. This tone or quality appears to be set so quickly, perhaps in the first fraction of a second of an encounter, that it is difficult to observe or study; it is usually thought by each person to be the fault of the other person when, in fact, both are participating in it and neither finds it easy to change.

One morning a child came into the classroom "with a chip on his shoulder." The teacher apparently picked this up without realizing it, and the day started badly between herself and the child. It is possible—even probable—that the child had no "chip on his shoulder" but that, in fact, it got there in the first moment of the encounter. At any event both teacher and student, in fact, found themselves in communication of an unpleasant and even hostile nature. After several minutes, the teacher called the child over and said, "Billy, we started all wrong today, didn't we? Please go outside and come in again and we'll start over again." Billy went out the doors, closed it behind him, and after a few seconds opened the door again. This time the teacher greeted him with a smile and a cheery "Hi, I'm glad to see you this morning." Billy grinned broadly, and the day started again quite differently.

We believe that the success of such a procedure may be possible only when it is clear that the teacher does not blame the child. If she had said, "Go out and when you come in again have a smile on your face," it is quite possible that Billy would have gone outside and cried. But when the nature of the communication was acknowledged as something between the teacher and child, as a matter of participation, then the child could expect to participate in the new beginning. In popular language this is called "trusting the teacher." Viewed as communication, it means that the teacher is not dealing with particular messages from the child but with a situation that exists between them and to which they both contributed.

American, Puerto Rican, and children in many African societies—and presumably children everywhere—learn how to behave appropriately when being instructed or chastised by parents, teachers, or other adults entitled to instruct or chastise them. American children are required to look at the instructing or chastising adult. If the child looks away, he may be accused of not "paying attention," or of "being disrespectful," and we have seen American parents hit children who have violated this rule of behavior. The Puerto Rican child, however, may be expected to look at a teacher or other adult instructing him, but he is expected to look "respectfully" down when being chastised. To look a chastising person "in the eye" would be seen as disrespectful, challenging, or arrogant. Many Puerto Rican children in mainland schools have been thought disrespectful for doing the very thing that

signalled respect in their own culture. The African child (this is a generalization that is not true always and everywhere in Africa) is taught to respect people of higher status by *not* looking directly at them. Higher status people in colonial Africa included parents, chiefs, and all white people. This meant that when schools were introduced and white teachers were brought in, the teachers faced classes of students who could not and did not look at them.

(It is possible that the different significance of eye-contact to white Americans and people from African societies has played a part in the history of the relations between white and black Americans—and continues to play some part today. No doubt slaves brought to America did not look directly at their white masters. Insofar as they were excluded from participation in white society this cultural practice could continue to be a source of hidden conflict. That is, the whites could observe that the blacks were "shiftless, untrustworthy, and unreliable" on the evidence of their avoidance of eye-contact. This "evidence" would also support the social mythology that accompanied slavery and would be thought to have no special discriminatory significanc since whites also interpreted avoidance of eye-contact as evidence of mistrust even when whites did it. The problem is, then, a circular one. Communication is a systematic, culturally learned difference and it is not possible to adopt the cultural practices of another group except through participation in the other culture.

We do not mean to say that race prejudice stems from different associations assigned to eye-contact. But it is probably true that differing cultural practices which are quite out of the awareness of the people involved may act as the seeds of misunderstanding. When one of the authors once told a class of graduate students that Arabs tend to stand closer to each other in certain contexts, and that they look more "piercingly" into the other's eyes, one of the students expressed his relief on realizing that a former Arabic roommate had not actually been homosexual—an American interpretation of such behavior—but had been only a normal Arab. It is perhaps worth remembering that for every misinterpretation of non-American communication behavior by Americans there is a commensurate possibility of misinterpretation the other way. To the "inscrutable" Chinese the American is equally "inscrutable.")

Some years ago a teacher-training institution was asked to arrange for a teacher and four children in her nursery school class to come to the classroom on a Saturday morning to be filmed while going through a series of customary nursery school activities. The teacher is considered by the institution to be a good nursery school teacher. Of the four children, two were from white middle-class backgrounds and two were Negro children form Harlem. All the children were 4-year-old girls, regular members of the nursery school class. They were filmed (and the sounds were recorded) for an uninterrupted 33 minutes. Simultaneous film records were made by two cameras, so that the scene was recorded from two opposite directions and any person moving out of range of one camera could be recorded by the other. We examined this film only to describe cultural contrasts we might find between white children and the teacher and black children and the teacher. It is important to understand that the people in our film record cannot be taken as a valid sample of white behavior, Negro behavior, or nursery school behavior. We limited our observations in this film to two kinds of non-

verbal communication. Since eye-to-eye contact is, in most contexts in white American society, a necessary element in initiating communication exchanges, we counted the times each child looked at the teacher and counted the times in which eye-contact was achieved and followed immediately by some exchange of expressions. We also examined those instances in which there was any form of physical contact between a child and the teacher.

Observations: The children are sitting around a small table. The teacher moves around the table, often bending down at the waist and sometimes crouching beside a child for a while. Her movements—walking, gesturing, moving chairs—are smooth, even, unhurried. The rhythmic character of her movements and the rate at which she walks, moves, gestures, nods, smiles, varies little throughout the 33 minutes. All the children exhibit a greater variety of movement than the teacher, but the white children's rhythms are more like those of the teacher. The Negro children follow the general pace, but punctuate it often with small quick movements. When walking or moving around the room the white children occasionally jump or run and the Negro children, in addition, break intermittently into what appears to be dancing movements. On a few occasions a white child appears to try bits of dance movement in imitation of the Negro children.

In the first ten minutes of the film the children are cutting, pasting, and drawing. The teacher, after moving around the table behind the children, sits first at one side of the table for awhile and then moves to the other side. The children have about equal opportunity to see the teacher in this period. One white child is considerably more active than the other and one of the Negro children is considerably more active than the other. In the first ten minutes (at the table) the more active Negro child looks or glances at the teacher 35 times and "catches her eye" and exchanges facial expressions with the teacher four of those times. Each of these exchanges lasts from one to three seconds. The more active white girl looks or glances at the teacher 14 times and "catches her eye" and exchanges expressions eight of those times.

Comments: At first it appears that the teacher does not pay as much attention to the Negro child as she does to the white child (and that she does not pay as much attention to the less active children of either color). This is true insofar as one is looking at the number and length of interactions. Actually the teacher appears to be trying to distribute her attentions equally among the children. But if one looks closely at the Negro girl's attempts to establish communication, it appears that they are not timed to catch the pauses or general "searching-the-scene" behavior of the teacher. When the active white child wants to get into communication with the teacher she appears either to wait for pauses or, after glancing at the teacher, to watch the person with whom the teacher is talking. By watching that person she is not only being "polite" in American terms, but she can anticipate the moment when it will be appropriate for her to initiate her own communication with the teacher.

Both the Negro girl and the teacher look toward each other often (more often, in fact, than the white girl and the teacher), but they rarely achieve eye-contact and the exchange of expressions which would follow. This situation might be summed up by a casual observer as "the Negro child gets less attention," but it is more useful to see that there is a mismatching of communication systems. Research in

human communication is not sufficiently advanced to describe the details of the mismatching. But we can observe that the white child's initiation of communication is both quite different and more successful than that of the black child in terms of subsequent communication.

Observations: Throughout the film the teacher occasionally touches, pats, strokes, or otherwise makes physical contact with the children. Between the teacher and the white child there is little trial-and-error behavior; touching occurs in a smooth flow of events. The teacher, for example, is standing and leaning over the table to look into a small terrarium and as the white girl snuggles slowly between the teacher and the table, the teacher's hand moves to the girl's waist and rests there awhile. The teacher and the Negro girl almost never manage to achieve this. A common sequence is one in which the Negro girl approaches the teacher, the teacher reaches out tentatively, the girl wiggles or twists and the contact is broken; the teacher tries again, brushes the girl lightly, and the encounter ends with only fleeting physical contact.

Comment: If we ask "who is doing what to whom," we can say with equal justification that the teacher *avoids* contact with the girl or that the girl *resists* contact by the teacher. But neither view allows for the probability that the teacher and the Negro child do not share a communication system in which the same pattern of cues leads to physical contact. We cannot yet be explicit about what those cues are in either communication system, but we can see that there is a difference and realize that systematic communication differences can result in confused personal engagements. We suggest that when communication systems are systematically different, it is difficult if not impossible for the people involved to get into communication *at the level* on which the difference exists. As we will see in a final set of observations, there are, however, other levels of communication at which cultural disparity may not be significant.

Observations: The Negro girl has looked or glanced at the teacher more often than her white counterpart but with less ensuing personal involvement. She has also moved toward physical contact on several occasions and each time the contact has been missed, or fleeting. Near the end of the 33 minute film the same girl went to a corner of the room and pinched her finger slightly playing with a toy shopping cart. She stood quite still in the corner (in contrast to her usual continuous movement) and there was an expression on her face which the teacher eventually saw as "I'm hurt." She went to the girl, picked her up in her arms, and carried her to a chair. The girl did not wiggle or move away but embraced the teacher around the neck with both arms. The teacher sat down with the girl in her lap and with both arms around her, as the girl smiled visibly and nestled her head in the teacher's bosom.

Comment: Here, at last, was a full, successful engagement. It did not, incidentally, begin with the direct initiation of eye-contact by the child, but flowed from a situation in which the teacher sought eye-contact with the girl, who was then in a situation the outcome of which both could predict. One is at liberty to say either that the teacher or the girl initiated the involvement. But the more important point is that both had learned the classroom procedure for dealing with "injured" children in the same way: no fine, low-level cues involving precise expression and timing were involved.

If two people do not speak a common language, we do not blame either one for their failure to communicate through speech. But we do tend to assign "fault" when the problem lies out-of-awareness in nonverbal communication. When a child makes a mistake in using language, we can correct his mistake. But we cannot correct a mistake when the child does not know the language as a whole system. Similarly when a person is communicating nonverbally according to a different cultural system, it is not possible to change the behavior by changing only some visible component. No single item such as the eye behavior of the Negro child can be pulled out and "corrected" for this is only one item in a whole pattern and the only possible "correction" is in terms of that whole pattern.

Nor is it possible to change single items of nonverbal behavior easily when they are small and out-of-awareness. The reader can test this by trying a simple experiment. When he is in eye-contact with another person he can try to prolong that contact for half-second more than normal for the occasion. A woman walking along a busy street may glance at or sweep her eyes across passing strangers and, occasionally, she will be in eye-contact for a small fraction of a second with a stranger. If she were to prolong this eye-contact by half a second, this prolongation alone would be interpreted by some men as an "invitation" even without the additional bits of expression that would normally accompany such an invitation. Other people might observe only that the woman was behaving strangely.

No two people even within the same culture learn and use their communication codes in the same way. As the psychologist would put it, no two people have the same personality. But within any one culture the communication systems allow each user to correct for the individual variations of others. If in doubt an American listener can ask, or he can signal his doubt, perhaps, by a slight head tilt accompanied by a slight lowering or compression of his brows, and the American talker will repeat, restate or whatever necessary to restore ongoing comprehension. Although this is quite visible, people may not be explicitly aware of it. But this meta-communication system (that is communication about communication) allows for continuous corrective feedback and means that people in communication are continuously engaged in a mutual teaching-learning situation.

If, however, two people have different cultural backgrounds, they will also have different meta-communication systems. That is, one person may understand the other's words but not the accompanying signals. This is the nature of the problem in the white teacher-Negro child communication. The two share the same language with differences that do not seem significant to them and they certainly share the classroom procedures represented by "a hurt child gets picked up and held." But when we looked at deeper or more out-of-awareness levels of communication we found that the patterning of elements that make up the whole of an encounter were different between people with different cultural learning.

It is accepted now that all of man's behavior and all of his knowledge is organized in such a way as to make it possible for man to learn relatively great amounts of knowledge. It is assumed that this is related to the structure of the human brain, which is common to all men. If all knowledge were to be learned as separate pieces of in-

formation, and organized only by immediate association, the learning task would be impossible. Instead, there is order in a multi-level, hierarchial system. The organization of human communication in any culture is the template for the organization of knowledge or information in that culture.

We know a great deal more about the structure of language than we know about the structure of non-verbal communication. We teach language performance throughout the formal education of children, but we do not teach communication competence in the sense that we cannot teach a person to be friends or to love another person. This comes about, when it does, *between* two people and is not something that one person learns to perform and which he then performs for another. So it is with human communication. It happens *between* people and the competence required is that gained throughout life by participating in communication with other people.

There are, clearly, cultural rules of communication: rules of language use, of mathematics, of manners, politeness, and social deportment in general—even rules that make the institution of marriage work for those who share them and fail for those who do not. The rules are not to be judged by the criteria of right and wrong but by the extent to which they enable the participants in a conversation, a marriage, or a whole culture to be predictable to each other and hence to cooperate.

Whether we are concerned with children, college students, or members of an excluded minority, the extent to which people can be (and see themselves as) members of a culture is the extent to which they can participate in the culture. Participation is communication taking place between them. It is *not* the messages that pass from one to the other. The fact of talking together is, itself, more humanly significant than the messages exchanged. The authors believe that the special less-than-adult behavior that is called "children's behavior" in any society (apart from obvious developmental factors) is determined by the nature of the adult participation in communication with children in that society. And, of course, the same view can be taken for college "children" or members of an excluded minority.

Learning a skilled performance or accumulating knowledge is not a substitute for acquiring competence in managing human relations. When this is applied to the education of children, we believe that the only way nonverbal communication is learned is through the full participation of the adult, the parent or the teacher, with the child. To talk to, read to, lecture at . . . these are not participation. These are performances by adults for children. In order for a child to acquire competence in the full range of human communication, some adults in his world must share their competence with him by direct human involvement. Only then can a child discover the meaning and value of the messages and the subject matter he is being taught and only then can he discover himself in the world of people.

As Alan Lomax has written in *Folk Song Style and Culture*, "In the end a person's emotional stability is a function of his command of a communication style that binds him to a human society with a history."

EARLY CHILDHOOD INTERVENTION: THE SOCIAL SCIENCE BASE OF INSTITUTIONAL RACISM *

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To understand the present political and academic furor over the efficacy—and therefore the future—of such early-intervention programs as Head Start. it is necessary first to examine the basic concepts and assumptions upon which these programs are founded and then to determine whether existing data can support such an approach to the problem of educating children from black ghettoes.

This paper attempts (1) to present an overview of the interventionist literature with particular emphasis on the role of the social pathology model in interpreting the behavior of the ghetto mother, and (2) to illustrate how the predominant ethnocentric view of the Negro community by social science produces a distorted image of the life patterns of that community. The importance of this distortion is that, when converted into the rationale of social action programs, it is a subtle but pernicious example of institutional racism.

This paper is concerned with the goals of intervention programs that deal with altering the child's home environment, with improving his language and cognitive skills, and most particularly with changing the patterns of child-rearing within the Negro home. These goals are, at best, unrealistic in terms of current linguistic and anthropological data and, at worst, ethnocentric and racist. We do not question the legitimacy of early childhood programs when they are described solely as nursery school situations and are not based on the need for remediation or intervention; nor do we question such programs when they increase chances for the employment of economically deprived Negroes. Finally, we do not question such programs when they are described as opportunities to screen youngsters for possible physical disorders, even though followup treatment of such diagnostic screening is often unavailable.

We wish to examine in more detail, however, the social pathology model of behavior and intelligence in Head Start [1] projects. We shall attempt to demonstrate that the theoretical base of the deficit model employed by Head Start programs denies obvious strengths within the Negro community and may inadvertently advocate the annihilation of a cultural system which is barely considered or understood by most social scientists. Some thirty years ago, Melville Herskovits

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[1] We recognize that no two Head Start projects are exactly alike. Head Start is used here as a generic term for intervention programs designed for under-privileged pre-school children.

(1938–39) made the following insightful observation when talking about culturally related behavioral differences:

> [We need to recognize the existence of] . . . the historical background of the . . . behavioral differences . . . being studied and those factors which make for . . . their . . . existence, and perpetuation. When, for instance, ones sees vast programs of Negro education undertaken without the slightest consideration given even to the possibility of some retention of African habits of thought and speech that might influence the Negroes' reception of the instruction thus offered—one cannot but ask how we hope to reach the desired objectives. When we are confronted with psychological studies of race relations made in utter ignorance of characteristic African patterns of motivation and behavior or with sociological analyses of Negro family life which make not the slightest attempt to take into account even the chance that the phenomenon being studied might in some way have been influenced by the carry-over of certain African traditions, we can but wonder about the value of such work. (Herskovits, 1938–39, p. 121)

It is one of the main contentions of this paper that most, if not all, of the research on the Negro has sorely missed the implications of Herskovits' statement. Rather, research on the Negro has been guided by an ethnocentric liberal ideology which denies cultural differences and thus acts against the best interests of the people it wishes to understand and eventually help.

SOCIO-POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND STUDIES OF THE NEGRO

Though it has seldom been recognized by investigators, it has been virtually impossible for social science to divorce itself from ideological considerations when discussing contemporary race relations. As Killian (1968) has pointed out with reference to the social science role after the 1954 Supreme Court Decision:

> Because of their professional judgment that the theories were valid and because of the egalitarian and humanitarian ethos of the social sciences, many sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists played the dual role of scientist and ideologist with force and conviction. Without gainsaying the validity of the conclusions that segregation is psychologically harmful to its victims, it must be recognized that the typically skeptical, even querulous attitude of scientists toward each other's work was largely suspended in this case. (Killian, 1968, p. 54)

Social science research with Negro groups has been postulated on an idealized norm of "American behavior" against which all behavior is measured. This norm is defined operationally in terms of the way white middle-class America is supposed to behave. The normative view coincides with current social ideology—the egalitarian principle—which asserts that all people are created equal under the law and must be treated as such from a moral and political point of view. The normative view, however, wrongly equates equality with sameness. The application of this misinterpreted egalitarian principle to social science data has often left the investigator with the unwelcome task of describing Negro behavior not as it is, but rather as it deviates from the normative system defined by the white middle class. The postulation of such a norm in place of legitimate Negro values or life ways has gained ascendance because of the pervasive assumptions (1) that to be different from whites is to be inferior and (2) that there is no such thing as Negro culture. Thus we find Glazer and Moynihan (1963) stating: 'The Negro is only an American and nothing else. He has no values and culture to guard and protect" (Glazer, N. and Moynihan, D., 1963).

Billingsley (1968) has taken sharp objection to the Glazer and Moynihan statement, pointing out:

> The implications of the Glazer-Moynihan view of the Negro experience is far-reaching. To say that a people have no culture to say that they have no common history which has shaped and taught them. And to deny the history of a people is to deny their humanity. (Billingsley, 1968, p. 37)

However, the total denial of Negro culture is consonant with the meltingpot mythology and it stems from a very narrow conceptualization of culture by non-anthropologists (Baratz and Baratz, 1969). Social science has refused to look beyond the surface similarities between Negro and white behavior and, therefore, has dismissed the idea of subtle yet enduring differences. In the absence of an ethno-historical perspective, when differences appear in behavior, intelligence, or cognition, they are explained as evidence of genetic defects or as evidence of the negative effects of slavery, poverty, and discrimination. Thus, the social scientist interprets differences in behavior as genetic pathology or as the alleged pathology of the environment; he therefore fails to understand the distortion of the Negro culture that his ethnocentric assumptions and measuring devices have created. The picture that emerges from such an interpretive schema may be seen as culturally biased and as a distortion of the Negro experience.

Liberals have eagerly seized upon the social pathology model as a replacement for the genetic inferiority model. But both the genetic model and the social pathology model postulate that something is wrong with the black American. For the traditional racists, that something is transmitted by the genetic code; for the ethnocentric social pathologists, that something is transmitted by the family. The major difference between the genetic model and the social pathology model lies in the attribution of causality, *not* in the analysis of the behaviors observed as sick, pathological, deviant, or underdeveloped. An example of the marked similarity between the genetic and the social pathology perspectives can be found in the literature concerning language abilities of Negroes.

LANGUAGE ABILITIES OF NEGROES

Language proficiency is considered at length in both the social and the genetic pathology models. This concern is not accidental, but is the result of a basic assumption shared by both the social pathologists and the genetic racists that one's linguistic competence is a measure of one's intellectual capacity.

Thus we find Shaler (1890), who believed in the genetic inferiority of the Negro, writing:

> His inherited habits of mind, framed on a very limited language—where the terms were well tied together and where the thought found in the words a bridge of easy passage—gave him much trouble when he came to employ our speech where the words are like widely separated steppingstones which require nimble wits in those who use them. (Shaler, 1890, p. 23)

And later, Gonzales (1922) describes the language of the Carolina coastal Negroes called Gullahs in a similar manner:

> Slovenly and careless of speech, these Gullahs seized upon peasant English used by some of the early settlers and by the white servants of the wealthier colonists, wrapped their clumsy tongues about it as well as they could, and, enriched with certain expressive African words, it issued through their flat noses

and thick lips as so workable a form of speech that it was generally adopted by other slaves and became in time the accepted Negro speech of the lower districts of South Carolina and Georgia. With characteristic laziness, these Gullah Negroes took short cuts to the ears of their auditors, using as few words as possible, sometimes making one gender serve for three, one tense for several, and totally disregarding singular and plural numbers. (Gonzales, 1922, p. 10)

Hunt (1968) provides a similar description, but from the social pathology perspective, when he writes of the parents of Negro children:

These parents themselves have often failed to utilize prepositional relationships with precision, and their syntax is confused. Thus, they serve as poor linguistic models for their young children. (Hunt, 1968, p. 31)

And Deutsch (1963), writing on the same subject, states:

In observations of lower-class homes, it appears that speech sequences seem to be temporally very limited and poorly structured syntactically. It is thus not surprising to find that a major focus of deficit in the children's language development is syntactical organization and subject continuity. (Deutsch, 1963, p. 174)

Green (1964) gives us another example of the deficit orientation of social pathology thinkers:

The very inadequate speech that is used in the home is also used in the neighborhood, in the play group, and in the classroom. Since these poor English patterns are reconstructed constantly by the associations that these young people have, the school has to play a strong role in bringing about a change in order that these young people can communicate more adequately in our society. (Green, 1964, p. 123)

Finally, Hurst (1965) categorizes the speech of many Negro college freshmen as:

. . . [involving] such specific oral aberrations as phonemic and sub-phonemic replacements, segmental phonemes, phonetic distortions, defective syntax, misarticulations, mispronunciations, limited or poor vocabulary, and faulty phonology. These variables exist most commonly in unsystematic, multifarious combinations.

Because of their ethnocentric bias, both the social pathologists and the genetic racists have wrongly presumed that linguistic competence is synonymous with the development of standard English and, thus, they incorrectly interpret the different, yet highly abstract and complex, non-standard vernacular used by Negroes as evidence of linguistic incompetence or underdevelopment (Baratz, J., 1969). Both share the view that to speak any linguistic system other than standard English is to be deficient and inferior.

Since as early as 1859, when Müller (1859) wrote the *History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, the racist contention has been that languages (and their cognitive components) could be hierarchically ordered. Müller himself offered German as the "best" language for conceptualization, but it will not surprise anyone to learn that at various times and according to various writers, the "best" language has been the language of the particular person doing the thinking about the matter. Thus, the ethnocentrism of the social pathology model, which defines a difference as a deficit, forces the misguided egalitarian into testing a racist assumption that some languages are better than others.

THE LOGIC OF INTERVENTION

It is important, then, to understand that the entire intervention model of Head Start rests on an assumption of linguistic and cognitive deficits which must be remedied if the child is to succeed in school.

The current linguistic data, however, do not support the assumption of a linguistic deficit. The linguistic competence of black children has been well documented in a number of recent investigations (Stewart, 1968; Labov and Cohen, 1967; Labov, 1969; Dillard, 1969; Baratz, 1969; Wolfram, 1969). Many lower-class Negro children speak a well ordered, highly structured, but different, dialect from that of standard English. These children have developed a language. Thus one of the basic rationales for intervention, that of developing language and cognitive skills in "defective" children, cannot be supported by the current linguistic data.

Nonetheless, the first intervention programs assumed that the causes of a Negro child's failure in school could be counteracted in those months prior to his entrance into school. Data soon became available concerning the effects of Head Start, indicating that three months was not enough time for intervention to be effective (Wolff and Stein, 1967). The social pathologists reasoned that the supposedly progressive deleterious effects of the early environment of the Negro child were so great they could not be overcome in a few months. This argument provided the basis for the extension of Head Start to a full year before school—and by extension into intervention programs which begin earlier and earlier in the child's life and which eventually call for interference with existent family and child-rearing activities.

This expanding web of concern is consistent with the deficit model. Postulation of one deficit which is unsuccessfully dealt with by intervention programs then leads to the discovery of more basic and fundamental deficits. Remediation or enrichment gradually broadens its scope of concern from the fostering of language competence to a broad-based restructuring of the entire cultural system. The end result of this line of argument occurs when investigators such as Deutsch and Deutsch (1968) postulate that "some environments are better than others."

With the recognition of failures and limitations within Head Start and like programs with a social pathology base, proponents of intervention call for earlier and earlier intervention in the child's life. This follows from an interlocking set of assumptions which they frequently make:

1. that, upon entering school, the Negro disadvantaged child is unable to learn in the standard educational environment;
2. that this inability to learn is due to inadequate mothering;
3. that the ghetto environment does not provide adequate sensory stimulation for cognitive growth.

The first premise is buttressed by the continued reports of failure of black children in our schools. Indeed, they do not benefit from the standard educational environment. (That does not, however, say anything about whether they are capable of learning generally.) The second premise is an extension of the earlier work on mothering of institutionalized children as reported by Spitz (1945), Goldfarb (1955), Rheingold (1956), and Skeels and Dye (1939). Much of this literature, however, is predicated on the total absence of a mother or mothering agent. Indeed, the Skeels follow-up study (1960) indicates that a moronic mother is better than no mother at all. The difficulty in extending this logic to the ghetto child is that *he has a mother*, and his behavior derives precisely from her presence rather than her absence.

Then too, the sensory stimulation assumption was an over-extension of the earlier work of Kretch *et al.* (1962), where animals were raised in cages with either considerable sensory stimulation or *none* at all. Again, the model was that of absence of stimulation rather than difference in type and presentation of stimulation.

THE INADEQUATE MOTHER HYPOTHESIS

It is important to understand that the inadequate mother hypothesis rests essentially on the grounds that the mother's behavior produces deficit children. It was created to account for a deficit that in actuality does not exist—that is, that ghetto mothers produce linguistically and cognitively impaired children who cannot learn. Black children are neither linguistically impoverished nor cognitively underdeveloped. Although the language system is different and, therefore, presents a handicap to the child attempting to negotiate with the standard English-speaking mainstream, it is nonetheless a fully developed, highly structured system that is more than adequate for aiding in abstract thinking. Hence, children attempting to speak standard English are at a linguistic disadvantage; they are not linguistically deficient. Speaking standard English is a linguistic disadvantage for the black youth on the streets of Harlem. A disadvantage created by a difference is not the same thing as a deficit!

In addition, before reviewing some of the notions of the inadequate mother hypothesis, it is necessary to stress that the data presented in that literature fail to show anything more than correlations between child-rearing behaviors and school achievement. As has been discussed elsewhere (Baratz, S., 1968), these correlations cannot be utilized as if they are statements of cause and effect. Although available data do indeed indicate that these culturally different Negro children are not being educated by the public school system, the data fail to show (1) that such children have been unable to learn to think and (2) that, because of specific child-rearing practices and parental attitudes, these children are not able (and, presumably, will never be able) to read, write, and cipher—the prime teaching responsibilities of the public school system.

Nevertheless, the inadequate mother hypothesis has proliferated in the literature of educational psychology. Of chief concern in this literature is the mother-child interaction patterns of lower-class Negroes. Despite the insistence that these patterns are the chief cause of the child's deficits, the supporting data consist almost entirely of either (1) responses to sociological survey-type questionnaires or (2) interaction situations contrived in educational laboratories. There is almost no anthropologically-oriented field work that offers a description of what actually does happen *in the home* wherein the deficit is alleged to arise.

One of the chief complaints leveled against the black mother is that she is not a teacher. Thus one finds programs such as Caldwell's (1968) which call for the "professionalization of motherhood," or Gordon's (1968) which attempts to teach the mother how to talk to her child and how to teach him to think.

The first assumption of such programs is that the ghetto mother does not provide her child with adequate social and sensory stimulation (Hunt, 1961). However, further research into the ghetto environment

has revealed that it is far from a vacuum; in fact, there is so much sensory stimulation (at least in the eyes and ears of the middle-class researcher) that a contrary thesis was necessarily espoused which argues that the ghetto sensory stimulation is excessive and therefore causes the child to inwardly tune it all out, thus creating a vacuum for himself (Deutsch, C., 1968).

More recently, studies of social interaction suggest that the amount of social stimulation may be quantitatively similar for lower-class and middle-class children. Thus, the quantitative deficit explanation now appears, of necessity, to be evolving into a qualitative explanation; that is, the child receives as much or even more stimulation as does the middle-class child, but the researchers feel this stimulation is not as "distinctive" for the lower-class child as it is for the middle-class child (Kagan, 1968). Of course, it is interesting to note here that, except for those environments where social and sensory deprivation are extremely severe or total, a condition which is certainly not characteristic of the ghetto environment, there is not evidence to suggest that the ghetto child is cognitively impaired by his mother's sensory social interactions with him.

It has further been suggested that the ghetto mother manages here home in such a manner that the child has difficulty developing a proper sense of time and space—i.e. the organization of the house is not ordered around regularly occurring mealtimes and is not ruled by the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant maxim "everything in its place, and a place for everything." To the middle-class observer, such a home appears to be disorganized and chaotic, while it is merely organized differently. Thus we have data which tell what the mother does not do, but we are missing the data which describe what she does do and explain how the household manages to stay intact. Again, there is no extant research that indicates that the development of a concept of time is either helped or hindered by a child's growing up in an environment where there are regularly occurring meal and bedtimes. There is, however, a considerable literature concerning culture differences in the concept of time (Henry, 1965).

Further, it is continually asserted that the ghetto mother does not talk or read to her child, thus supposedly hindering his intellectual growth and language development. Despite the fact that no study has ever indicated the minimal amount of stimulation necessary for the child to learn language, and despite the fact that *the child has in fact developed language*, the ghetto mother is still accused of causing language retardation in her infant.

The mother's involvement in reading activities is also presumed to be extremely important to the child's development and future school success. The conclusions of many studies of the black ghetto home stress the absence of books and the fact that ghetto mothers rarely read to their children. Although the presence of books in the home may be quite indicative of middle-class life styles, and stories when read may very well give pleasure to all children, there appears to be no evidence which demonstrates that reading to children is essential for their learning to read, or that such reading will enhance their real language development. Although Irwin's (1960) landmark study indicates that children who are systematically read to babble more, it does not demonstrate that they are linguistically more proficient than those children who are not read to systematically.

A further factor in the mother's behavior which is continually blamed for deficits in the child is her lack of communication to him of the importance of school achievement. Although the literature presents a great many cases which illustrate that the lower-class mother verbalizes great achievement motivations concerning her children, these verbalizations are largely discredited in the eyes of some psychologists (Katz, 1968) who see little action—e.g., helping with homework, joining the PTA—underlying her statement of achievement motivation for her child. (Here, ironically, the supposedly non-verbal mother is now being penalized for her verbal behavior.) Indeed, her verbalizations tend to exhort the child to behave and achieve in class in relation to some assumed behavioral norm rather than to some educational reward; e.g., learn to read because the teacher says so, not because there are many things that one can learn from books (Hess, *et al.*, 1968). Nonetheless, there do not appear to be any data which show that preschool children resist learning, avoid schooling, or generally do not wish to achieve in the classroom; nor are there data to suggest that intrinsic motivations (learn for learning's sake) are effective for teaching reading, or that extrinsic ones (do it because I tell you) are not. In fact, the behaviorist literature tends to indicate that different subgroups (i.e. lower-class versus middle-class) respond differently to various reinforcements (for instance, food versus praise).

The recent work of Hess, Shipman, Brophy, and Bear (1968) is sure to add considerable fuel to the inadequate mother hypothesis. Hess and his colleagues collected data on 163 black mothers and their four-year-old children. The mothers were divided into four groups: professional, skilled, unskilled-family intact, and unskilled-father absent. Social workers collected data in two extensive home interviews. Later, the mothers and children came to the university where IQ and other formal tests were administered. The mothers were also presented with theoretical situations and asked what they would do or say—e.g., what would you say to your child on his first day of school. In addition, the mothers were asked to teach their children a block-sorting task and to replicate a design on an etch-a-sketch box with their children. The Hess *et al.* data furnished a good deal of information concerning teaching styles of lower- and middle-class black women. These data, however, were undoubtedly influenced by the fact that the situations in which they were elicited (i.e., interviewing and a laboratory task) are much more typical of middle-class experiences. Nevertheless, many differences in maternal language and teaching styles appeared. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that these differences in language and teaching style cause the child to be uneducable. What makes him appear "uneducable" is his failure in an educational system that is insensitive to the culturally different linguistic and cognitive styles that he brings to the classroom setting. The school, therefore, fails to use the child's distinct cultural patterns as the vehicle for teaching new skills and additional cultural styles.

One of the major difficulties with the work of Hess *et al.* lies in their concept of "educability." Superficially this refers to those skills which every child potentially possesses but which presumably are not developed if the mother's behavior is "restricted" and not similar to that of those middle-class mothers who produce children who succeed in school. Those skills which the child potentially possesses, however, are

not defined by Hess *et al.* simply as language development, but rather more subtly as the use of standard English. Concept development is not seen as the development of language for thought. (There are, of course, no languages that one cannot think in!) but rather, it is defined in terms of performance on standardized tasks or measures of verbal elaboration. Again, motivation is described not in terms of wanting to read, but rather in terms of books around the house and the use of the public library. "Educability" then, is really defined as specific middle-class mainstream behaviors rather than as the possession of universal processes through which specific behaviors can be channeled. The lower-class mother is *a priori* defined as inadequate because she is not middle-class.

In their discussions of the mothers' language behavior, Hess *et al.* rely heavily on the concepts of Basil Bernstein, who describes two different communicative styles generally used by lower- and middle-class English children. That the language and teaching behaviors of lower-class Negro mothers are different from those of middle-class mothers is beyond question. That the different behavior leads to cognitive defects has yet to be demonstrated. Carroll (1964) has discussed the methodological issue of the relationship of language style to cognition. To say that a particular language has a deleterious effect on cognitive performance, speakers of that language must be tested for cognitive ability on a non-linguistic task—such a task has yet to be developed or tested.

The Hess data, while providing considerable information on maternal behavior differences in lower- and middle-class black women, do not indicate that the children from lower-class homes are any less ready to learn than are the middle-class children, nor do they demonstrate that these children will be less able—especially if they are placed in a school that takes advantage of their experiences, as the present school curriculum does in certain crucial regards for the middle-class child. The Hess data do show, however, that the behaviors of the middle-class Negro mothers are more typically mainstream and that what these mothers teach their children is more typically within mainstream expectations; therefore, such children tend to perform better in a testing situation—and subsequently in a school situation—which requires mainstream behaviors and heuristic styles than do lower-class children, who have learned something else.

There is much to be learned about maternal teaching styles and how they can be used to help the child function better in interactions with the mainstream culture. Research has indicated how unlike the middle-class mother the lower-class mother is, but there is very little description of who the lower-class mother is and what she does

THE FAILURE OF INTERVENTION

Intervention programs postulated on the inadequacy of the mother or the lack of environmental stimulation (Shaefer, 1969; Gordon, 1968; Klaus and Gray, 1968) fail after an initial spurt in IQ scores. This appears to be an artifact of the methodology, for the first contact with mainstream educational patterns (an agent intervening in the home, a Head Start Program, kindergarten or first grade in the public school) appears automatically to cause an increase in IQ for these

children. The artifact is clearly evidenced in the "catch-up" phenomenon where non-Head Start children gain in IQ apparently as a result of exposure to a school environment. The additional observation, that increases in IQ of both Head Start *and* non-Head Start children decrease after second or third grade, is a further indication that early childhood intervention is not where the answer to the failure of children in public school lies.

Interventionists argue that what is needed are school-based programs (Project Follow-Through) which maintain the "gains" of Head Start by changing the nature of the school environment. In effect, this argument is a specious one since it was the intervention program itself which was supposed to insure the child's success in the schools as they are presently constituted. For the early childhood interventionists then to turn around and say that the schools do not do their job in maintaining the increases which the school itself has generated in non-Head Start children (as well as the increases of Head Start children) is indeed to point to the crux of the matter: the failure lies in the schools, not the parents, to educate these children. This clearly indicates that critical intervention must be done, but on the procedures and materials used in the schools rather than on the children those schools service. Intervention which works to eliminate archaic and inappropriate procedures for teaching these children and which substitutes procedures and materials that are culturally relevant is critically needed. It is important to note here that such intervention procedures—e.g. the use of Negro dialect in the teaching of reading (Baratz and Baratz, 1969)—are not ends in themselves. The goal of such procedures is to have the children perform adequately on standardized achievement tests. It is the process, not the goals, of education that must be changed for these children. *The educational problems of lower-class culturally different Negro children, as of other groups of culturally different children, are not so much related to inappropriate educational goals as to inadequate means for meeting these goals.*

It is not, therefore, a particular program for early childhood intervention at a critical period which affects IQ scores. Rather it is the initial contact with mainstream middle-class behaviors that tends to raise temporarily the scores of young children. As the test items, however, begin to rely more and more heavily on the language style and usage of the middle-class, these culturally different dialect-speaking children tend to decrease in test performance. Unlike the behaviors which initially raise IQ scores and which the child learns simply from contact with the middle-class system, fluency in a new language style and usage must be taught formally and systematically for it to be mastered. Indeed, this failure to teach the mainstream language styles and usage by means of the child's already existing system may well explain why the initial test gains of these children are not maintained.

The early childhood programs, as well as public schools, fail in the long run because they define educability in terms of a child's ability to perform within an alien culture; yet they make no attempts to teach him systematically new cultural patterns so that the initial spurt in test scores can be maintained. Educability, for culturally different children, should be defined primarily as the ability to learn new cultural patterns within the experience base and the culture with which the child is already familiar. The initial test scores of culturally differ-

ent children must not be misevaluated as evidence of "educability," but rather should be viewed as evidence of the degree to which the child is familiar with the mainstream system upon which the tests are based both in content and presentation.

Because of the misconception of educability and the misevaluation of the test data, interventionists and educators create programs that are designed (1) to destroy an already functionally adequate system of behavior because it is viewed as pathological and (2) to impose a system of behavior without recognizing the existence of a functionally adequate system of behavior already in place. (Thus it is comparable to attempting to pour water into an already wine-filled pitcher.) Education for culturally different children should not attempt to destroy functionally viable processes of the sub-culture, but rather should use these processes to teach additional cultural forms. The goal of such education should be to produce a bicultural child who is capable of functioning both in his sub-culture and in the mainstream.

However, since Head Start has disregarded or attempted unknowingly to destroy that which is a viable cultural system, we should not have been surprised by its failure in attempting to "correct" these behaviors. Head Start has failed because its goal is to correct a deficit that simply does not exist. The idea that the Negro child has a defective linguistic and conceptual system has been challenged by the findings of Stewart (1964, 1967, 1968, 1969), Baratz, J. (1969), Labov (1969), and by Lesser and his colleagues (1965, 1967), who point to the structurally coherent but different linguistic and cognitive systems of these children. Indeed, the deficit model of Head Start forces the interventionist closer and closer to the moment of conception and to the possibility of genetic determination of the behavior now attributed to a negative environment. This position is plaintively described by Caldwell (1968):

> Most of us in enrichment . . . efforts—no matter how much lip service we pay to the genetic potential of the child—are passionate believers in the plasticity of the human organism. We need desperately to believe that we are born equalizable. With any failure to demonstrate the effectiveness of compensatory experiences offered to children of any given age, one is entitled to conclude parsimoniously that perhaps the enrichment was not offered at the proper time. (Caldwell, 1968, p. 81)

Elsewhere Caldwell refers to what she calls the Inevitable Hypothesis which we interpret as backing up further and further (intervene at four, at three, at one, at three months) until we are face to face with the possibility of genetic differences between Negroes and whites which forever preclude the possibility of remediation or enrichment. We are in Caldwell's debt for such a passionate statement of the real issue at hand. All educators concerned with intervention of any kind and unaware of the culture (and the alternative conceptual framework it offers) respond at a gut level to the implications which the failure of early childhood programs has for the overtly racist genetic model. The frustration due to the failure of intervention programs proposed by the social pathologists could lead to three possible lines of responses from those watching and participating in the unfolding of events. They are:

> 1. an increased preoccupation with very early intervention, at birth or shortly thereafter, to offset the allegedly "vicious" effects of the inadequate environment of the Negro child;

2. the complete rejection of the possibility of intervention effects unless the child is totally removed from his environment to be cared for and educated by specialists;

3. the total rejection of the environmentalist-egalitarian position in favor of a program of selective eugenics for those who seem to be totally unable to meet the demands of a technological environment—scientific racism.

Suffice it to say that recently we have seen an articulation of all three of these unfeasible positions.

The clearest line of thought currently evident comes from people such as Schaefer (1969a), Gordon (1968), and Caldwell (1967) advocating the introduction of specialists into the home who would not only provide the missing stimulation to the child, but also teach the mother how to raise her children properly. Thus, the new input is an intensive attempt to change totally the child's environment and the parent's child-rearing patterns.

But the fear is that even such a massive attempt will still fail to inoculate the child against failure in the schools. Recognizing this, Caldwell (1967) provides the model for intervention programs which take the child completely out of the home for short periods of time for the purpose of providing him with the experiences unavailable to him during his first three years of life. It is only a short distance from this position to Bettelheim's statement (*New York Times*, March 1969) advocating total removal of Negro children to kibbutz-like controlled environments in order to overcome the effects of the allegedly negative values and practices of the ghetto—in short, the annihilation of distinctive Afro-American cultural styles.

Finally, the appearance of the scholarly article recently published by Arthur Jensen (1969) in the *Harvard Educational Review* represents the attempt of a former social pathologist to deal with the failure of the intervention programs. He may find his position politically distasteful but, for a scientist who lacks a cross-cultural perspective and a historical frame of reference, it is the only way to maintain his scientific integrity. Like most scholars who come to advocate an unpopular thesis, Jensen has done his homework. His familiarity with the data indicates to him the futility of denying (1) that Negro children perform less well on intelligence tests than whites and (2) that Head Start has failed in its intent to produce permanent shifts in IQ which lead to success in the educational system. Since Jensen rejects the social pathology model but retains a concept that describes Negro behavior as defective, it is not at all surprising that he has no alternative other than a model of genetic inferiority.

However, like the social pathologists who had to create an explanation (i.e., inadequate mothering) for a non-existent deficit, Jensen is also called upon to explain the reasons for a relative theory of genetic inferiority in the American Negro. His argument, similar to those of earlier genetic racists, states that the Negroes who were brought over as slaves "were selected for docility and strength and not mental ability, and that through selective mating the mental qualities present never had a chance to flourish." (Edson, 1969). Interestingly enough, this contention was decimated almost thirty years ago by Melville Herskovits (1941) in his book, *The Myth of the Negro Past*, in which he presents historical and anthropological data to reject the notion of selective enslavement and breeding. It is precisely the absence of a sophisticated knowledge and perspective of cultural continuity and

cultural change which has forced both the social pathologists and the genetic pathologists to feel that they have dealt with "culture" if they acknowledge that certain test items are "culture-bound." Such changes represent very surface knowledge of the concept of culture and, in particular, do not deal with subtle yet significant cultural differences. Many social scientists believe that they are dealing with the culture when they describe the physical and social environment of these children. One must not confuse a description of the environment in which a particular culture thrives for the culture itself.

Because historical and political factors have combined to deny the existence of a Negro culture (Baratz and Baratz, 1969), social scientists have found themselves having to choose between either a genetic deficit model or a deficit model built on an inadequate environment (the "culture" of poverty). However, our view of the current status of research on the Negro in the United States indicates that we are on the brink of a major scientific revolution with respect to American studies of the Negro and the social action programs that derive from them. This revolution began with Herskovits and is being forwarded by the linguistic and anthropological studies of Stewart (1964–1969), Szwed (1969), Abrahams (1967), Hannerz (1969), and others. The basic assumption of this research is that the behavior of Negroes is not pathological, but can be explained within a coherent, structured, distinct, American-Negro culture which represents a synthesis of African culture in contact with American European culture from the time of slavery to the present day.

Since the pathology model of the language and thought of Negroes as it is used in intervention programs has been created by the superimposition of a standard English template on a non-standard dialect system, producing a view of that non-standard system as defective and deviant, then the data gathered in support of that pathology view must be totally re-evaluated and old conclusions dismissed, not solely because they are non-productive, but also because they are ethnocentric and distorted and do not recognize the cultural perspective. The great impact of the misuse of the egalitarian model on social science studies of the Negro must be re-examined.

As long as the social pathology and genetic models of Negro behavior remain the sole alternatives for theory construction and social action, our science and our society are doomed to the kind of cyclical (environment to genes) thinking presently evident in race relations research. Fortunately, at this critical point in our history, we do have a third model available, capable of explaining both the genetic and social pathology views with greater economy and capable of offering viable research and societal alternatives.

The major support for the assertion of a revolution in scientific thinking about the Negro comes from the discovery that the urban Negro has a consistent, through different, linguistic system. This discovery is an anomaly in that it could not have been predicted from the social pathology paradigm. This finding, if we can judge from the incredulity expressed about it by our colleagues, violates many of the perceptions and expectations about Negro behavior which are built into the assumptive base of the social pathology model. This assumptive base, it is argued, has restricted our phenomenological field to deviations from normative behavior rather than to descriptions of different

normative configurations. In the present case, it would appear that the defect and difference models of Negro behavior cannot exist side by side without a growing awareness of the need for change and radical reconstruction of our modes of theorizing and conceptualizing about Negro behavior.

However, there may be resistance to adopting the cultural difference model which stems not only from the inherent methodologies of the social pathology theory, but also from the much more vague, and often unexpressed sociopolitical view of the particular investigator seeking to support his view of our current racial situation—views which are unarticulated and therefore unexamined. Thus, the resistance we anticipate may be intensified by the fear that talking about differences in Negro behavior may automatically produce in the social pathologist the postulation of genetic differences. This fear, so often expressed, is related to the real fact that the genetic model itself relied on behavioral differences as the basis for its conclusions about genetic determination. Three points can be made here to deal with this concern: (1) it has not and should not be the role of rational scholarly discourse to dismiss data and knowledge simply because it does not fit a particular ideological position extant at a particular moment in history; (2) differences, which indicate that learning has taken place, are not deficits; and (3) the view of the current social pathology position is in many ways prone to the same criticisms leveled at the genetic pathology model. The current scientific crisis will resolve itself solely on the basis of scholarly research and not ideology or polemic. The basic assumptions of scholarly research must be examined and models tried out that offer more successful and economical explanations.

In summary, the social pathology model has led social science to establish programs to prevent deficits which are simply not there. The failure of intervention reflects the ethnocentrism of methodologies and theories which do not give credence to the cognitive and intellectual skills of the child. A research program on the same scale as that mounted to support the social pathology model must be launched in order to discover the different, but not pathological, forms of Negro behavior. Then and only then can programs be created that utilize the child's differences as a means of furthering his acculturation to the mainstream while maintaining his individual identity and cultural heritage.

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HOME VISITING PROGRAMS FOR PARENTS OF YOUNG CHILDREN *

By SUSAN W. GRAY

This paper will describe some of the work we have been doing over the years with parents at Peabody College, now in the Demonstration and Research Center for Early Education, and before that, in the Early Training Project. Specifically, I shall report on certain studies which have used a procedure based on visits to the home, and shall try to pull out from these some general threads which characterize the particular approach which we use. Our approach is far from unique. It does have a certain flavor of its own, however, and it is that flavor which I shall attempt to describe.

Our first entry into the field of home visiting was rather casual in inception. In the Early Training Project (Gray & Klaus, 1970), which Rupert Klaus and I began in 1961, we provided for the children with whom we were working, an intensive program for ten weeks during the summer. This program was planned to extend through three summers beginning at age three and one half. Because we were well aware that much forgetting could take place when the child was sent back for nine and a half months to the limited environment from which he came, we planned a bridge from one summer to the next. We met with the children once a month on Saturday mornings; we sent monthly newsletters to the parents. Our most important step, however, was the introduction of a home visiting program. In this endeavor, a skilled individual, with preschool and social-work training, met in the home with each mother for approximately an hour a week. She brought materials, and showed the mother how to use them effectively with the child. We had one interesting and unexpected finding. At the home visitor's suggestion we tested the younger siblings of the children with whom we had been working and compared them to younger siblings in the local and distant control groups we had set up for our study. Here we found that the younger siblings of the more extensive experimental treatment showed IQs approximately 13 points higher than those in the two control groups.

Because of this finding, our next study under the direction of James O. Miller and Barbara Gilmer, was one in which we tried systematically to separate possible effects of a home visiting program from those of an assembled program. Our earlier study had confounded the two. This second study, now in the follow-up stage, involved three differential treatments for the children. In one group the children were enrolled for two and one-half years in a special program every day for forty weeks a year. This was in the years just prior to entrance to first grade. There was no particular attention given to the parents. In fact,

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we did as little as might be considered decent with this particular group. In the second group, the children came to a specially planned preschool in the same fashion as the first group; in addition the mothers were involved once a week in a carefully scheduled sequence of training experiences. These activities were designed to enable the mothers to take on some of the functions of the assistant teachers in the assembled preschool and also to work more effectively with their young children. There was a third group in which no one came to an assembled program but in which there were weekly home visits during the year. The whole study is a massive one and the findings are highly complex. There are three very interesting findings, however, that I will mention briefly.

With the so-called target-aged children, the age group with which we worked in the assembled preschool, the additional involvement of the mother did not increase the children's performance on usual tests of intellectual ability. Both groups, however, were superior to the home visitor group and to a comparison group that functioned roughly as a control group.

With the younger siblings, however, superiority was shown in the performance of the younger children in the group in which mothers were involved along with the target-aged children and also in the group in which only home visits were made. Both of these groups were superior to the group in which there was no involvement of the parent and to the comparison group. The highly economical treatment, then, of the home visits appears to function as well for the younger children as one in which the mother is involved for half a day and in which the older sibling is involved for five half days a week. A third finding which is only beginning to emerge is a difference in the school careers of the two groups in which the children met in an assembled program. The IQs of the group in which both mothers and children were involved in the preschool have tended to remain relatively stable—at least they are not significantly different—after the children have gone through their first two years of school. In the group in which the mothers were not involved, however, there has been a decline in IQ. Whether this sustaining effect will hold up still remains to be seen, but it does suggest to us that working with mothers may be valuable not only from the standpoint of immediate cost efficiency, but also it may have a more lasting effect.

Two follow-up studies of this large project (Barbrack, 1970, 1970a) have been concerned with training the mothers from the earlier study to function themselves as home visitors. In a subsequent year they have been trained to work as trainers of home visitors. The effects on parent and child in these two programs are modest, but have been measurable.

Currently we are working with the mothers of very young children indeed. Twenty mother and infant pairs are involved. This work with infants fits with an emphasis we have always attempted to maintain in our work, that of making our intervention programs *developmental* rather than *remedial*. We do not yet have data to report on our work with infants, but to date it seems both feasible and promising.

As a research area, home visiting, as we do it, is extremely difficult. The most obvious problem is the wide heterogeneity in family groupings. This is an acute problem when one is dealing with children under five years. There are extremely few measures that are comparable from age to age for this age span. In addition, home visiting programs are carried out over a period of time—generally eight months or more.

Thus one has problems of attrition, problems of major changes in the family group, such as the birth of a new sibling or the desertion of a father, which disrupt the effectiveness of a treatment program. We are enthusiastic enough about the promise of the approach, however, to find it well worth exploring in a research context, even if it does present a fearful array of problems in developing an adequate research design.

This brief paper is not the place to go into great detail about the specific content of our home visiting program, in terms of activities which are carried out with the child and with the parent. These are important but we think they are more appropriate for description in guides and manuals for parent workers or for parents themselves. We are actively involved in preparing such materials, and have just completed a guide for home visitors which tries to express in considerable detail what we consider the important aspects of home visiting with mothers of young children. (Giesy, 1970)

Instead it would seem useful to list what may be considered as the common threads in the approach that we have used at the Demonstration and Research Center for Early Education in our work with parents of children as old as five or six, or as young as six months.

1. There is a common general goal in our programs—that of enabling the parent to become a more effective educational change agent with her young children.

2. Our general handle to the situation is the basic interest of the parent. Our parents want what is best for their children, but are often lacking in the knowledge of the instrumental steps. If we can enlist a mother's interest in learning these instrumental steps, our battle is half won. Equally important, in our approach, is the need for respect for the dignity of the parent and a recognition of the basic worth of the child himself or herself. This sounds fairly easy, but such an awareness is sometimes difficult for an inexperienced person working in a home that is dirty and disorganized, with an apathetic or distracted parent. Creating such an awareness is often the first hurdle with a home visitor trainee.

3. Our focus is on the parent rather than the child. Our reason is that, if an hour or so a week is to have any lasting effect, there must be some way to sustain this work over the remaining hours and days between. The parent is the most available sustaining agent, and normally the one who is most interested in the child's welfare.

4. It has been our approach not to exclude any family member from the lesson during the home visit. This sometimes makes the visit difficult but we feel it is necessary for two reasons. There is obviously an important factor of rapport; often the parent cannot avoid including younger siblings. It is unfair to expect her to make special babysitting arrangements for a home visit. Our second reason is of course that of the spread of effect. Other children, either joining in or watching, benefit from the lesson, and themselves, if old enough, learn new ways of interacting with younger siblings.

5. We have concentrated on the use of easily available and easily constructed materials. We use a few purchased materials such as wooden puzzles and one-inch cubes. Typically, however, we use

materials constructed either out of inexpensive items such as outing flannel, or the things that are around the home such as discarded coffee cans and plastic containers. One reason for this takes us to our next point.

6. We attempt through a sequence of home visits to move the parent towards increasing initiative and independence in planning the educational stimulation of her child. For example, a typical procedure with us has been for the home visitor to leave with the mother each week a series of activities for the remainder of the week. At first, the activities are supplied for the entire week; then a fading technique is used, with the parent initiating and developing the activity for the last day, then for the last two days, and so on. Ideas of parents are not rejected, even if sometimes they are inappropriate. Although certain activities suggested by the parent may not be particularly educational for the child, they may have enormous value in developing the parent's initiative and independence; over time we can lead the mother to develop more appropriate activities.

7. We help the parent to understand and to use simple reinforcement procedures. Thus, parents can learn and see the effects of their own behavior. They can begin to reward the behavior in children which they wish to promote rather than paying attention only to the negative behavior, a common temptation to all of us when busy. We felt we had reached an important milestone with one parent when, after about six months of work, she said to us, "I've found out you don't have to beat kids to get them to learn." Unfortunately, the implicit learning theory of many of these parents seems to have been one of viewing punishment as the way to change behavior. We believe some concentration on the effective use of positive reinforcement is of particular importance for this reason.

8. Using the work with her own children as the starting point, we have been concerned with helping the parent toward better coping skills in all of her life experiences. For example, if she is going to have some time to spend with her children, she has to plan her schedule for the day, rather than living from minute to minute, a procedure which seems fairly characteristic in some of our homes. If we can teach her to handle what little money she has more effectively in planning her food purchases, not only will this have a direct nutritional value for the children, but it will help develop in the mother a sense of competence in her ability to cope with life's demands. This increased confidence in turn spills over to other areas of her life.

9. Our program is a highly individualized one; a major attempt is always made to adapt the home visit and the suggested activities to the parent's particular life circumstances. Most of our parents, being of fairly low education and limited experience, need suggestions that are concrete and highly specific to their own sintation. Our home visitors have become past masters at working with parents to show them how they can interact in an educational way with their young children while they are peeling potatoes, washing clothes, or cleaning house.

10. Our major effort as home visitors is to help provide more options for the mother, to enable her both to take advantage of

the options that are available and to develop new ones for herself. Some of these options relate to her whole life circumstances. Many of the objectives which have been our direct focus of concern, however, have related to her interactions with her children and to her increasing ability to shape the child's behavior rather than simply to cope with it from minute to minute.

Our program is certainly not unique. We believe that it does have some particular strengths, however, based upon our focus on enabling the parent to become an effective change agent in realizing her goals and aspirations for her child and her family.

With few exceptions the parents with whom we have worked have wanted what is best for their children. They have not always been entirely sure of what is best for them—who is in these days? For the most part, our parents include in their aspirations such things as having a child do well in school, having him able to get a good job when he grows up, and in general, his being a decent human being. The difficulty, however, is that the parents often lack the knowledge of the instrumental acts involved in realizing the goals that they see as important for their children. For example, when we asked the mothers in the Early Training Project what they could do to realize one of their stated aspirations—for their children to do well in school—the most typical answer was that they could send the child to school clean and with his lunch money. No one will deny that these are worth doing but this limited perception certainly opens up a wide field for helping the parent become a more effective educational change agent.

A second major recommendation for a home visiting program is that of cost efficiency. We have found that paraprofessionals with appropriate—and extended—training, and with a sufficient amount of consultation and supervision, can become highly effective home visitors. A home visitor, on the basis of hourly visits, can handle as many as fifteen or twenty visits a week. Furthermore, we have data in our studies which show that one can, by such technique, affect not only a given child in the family and the child's mother, but also other members of the family group, most conspicuously the younger children.

Certainly, home visiting is not a panacea for the problems of the low-income family in our present day society. Enabling the parent to become a more effective educational change agent, however, can have an important contribution to make toward improving the life style and general welfare of such low-income families.

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LEARNING TO LEARN IN INFANCY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPETENCE MOTIVATION *

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In the last decade much effort has been devoted to the study of the intellectual growth of infants and very young children. Most emphasis has been placed on what kinds of environments and what kinds of experiences are most efficacious for maximum intellectual development. Alternatively, a large amount of effort has been devoted to the study of the personality and social growth within the opening years of life, for example, Goldberg and Lewis (1969) and Messer and Lewis (1970). Attempts have been made to answer such questions as what constitutes a normal and healthy personality and facilitates proper social development.

It is clear from research with older children and adults that one cannot separate these two aspects of human behavior. Indeed, maximum intellectual development can only occur within a framework of a sound personality. Knowing this about older children should alert us to its importance for understanding and affecting infant and very young children's intellectual growth. Review of the infancy research literature on the interrelationship between personality and intellectual growth reveal relatively little interest and information on this most important problem (see Lewis, 1967). It is as if researchers in infant learning were somehow unaware of the results obtained for older children. This lack of information is surprising but, more important, it is essential to our understanding of how to effect positive change or accelerate growth in the intellectual ability of infants. To understand the importance of uncovering the personality and social factors most conducive for optimum development of mental faculties, it must be remembered that the intellectual growth and development of human beings start from birth (most probably even before—in the last trimester of pregnancy). No longer will the evidence allow us to think of the infant as an insensate, unorganized mass of confusion. The evidence is clear; in varying degrees from birth onward we have a sophisticated organism capable and willing (we shall return to this important point later) to learn and one which is influenced by his experiences in his world.

The absence of sufficient information about the relationship of personality and intellectual growth is still more disturbing in light of the recent social demands for far-reaching changes in the child rearing structure of society. What effect infant day care centers and programs will have on the intellectual and personality development of infants is still to be determined as is the optimal conditions for day care. Moreover, alternative models, such as parent-child centers with

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their emphasis on producing better parents rather than babysitting for infants, must be considered.

Of interest to this subject is the slowly growing body of information on one aspect of personality, namely the issue of motivation to learn. The remainder of this essay is directed toward this issue. It is proposed that without sufficient motivation the best intellectual climate, the finest curriculum and materials will be of no avail. The motive to learn would seem to be natural in all humans. Look how easily and effortlessly children learn. Indeed they do and it has been proposed that the failure of motivation must be due to some aspect of the child's environment which does not give this motive a chance to reach fruition. In the following argument we shall attempt to demonstrate that this motive is intimately tied up with the child's belief in his ability to affect his world and that this belief is acquired very early. A more full discussion can be found in Lewis and Goldberg (1969) where a more detailed review of the experimental literature can be found.

For parents and educators, one of the most interesting developments to emerge from the recent psychology investigations is the strong indication that the intellectual growth of an infant is closely linked to the responsiveness of the people around him. That is, a baby, whose mother or father, or caretaker pays attention to him, answers him when he cries, smiles at him when he smiles, talks to him, and plays with him, learns more and learns it faster and is generally brighter than a child who is ignored.

In a series of studies we have recently given much attention to the nature of the maternal response to the infant's behavior as the basis for his intellectual growth and have suggested that at least two dimensions of the mother's response are important in affecting the infant's development. One is the total amount of stimulation provided the infant by the mother, while the other is the relationship between the infant's behavior and the mother's response (see Lewis & Goldberg, 1969, for details).

While recognizing the importance of the quantity of stimulation provided the infant, it is the relationship between the infant's response and its outcome that is of primary concern. In this interaction an important motivational principle is established, namely, the infant's belief or expectation that his behavior has consequence in affecting his environment.

Let me present an example. The infant experiences some uncomfortable somatic sensation (call it hunger) to which he responds by crying. Assume that the mother, hearing the cry, goes to the infant, picks him up, and feeds him. If her behavior is consistent, it reinforces the event-action relation (namely, discomfort-cry) and develops within the infant an expectation. The plan or expectation built by the infant is produced in this manner: uncomfortable sensation—action—cessation of sensation. In other words, his cry or behavior was effective in relieving his pain. How much different is this from the experience of the infant who cries under the press of an uncomfortable somatic sensation and is not picked up and fed consistently or who cries and is not attended to because his mother, busy with other children, cannot reach him until several minutes after the onset of crying when he can no longer remember the event-action relationship. Or the institutionalized infant who, because of the institution's schedule, cannot be held when he wants to be and is held when he does not want to be. In other

words, although he may receive equal amounts of stimulation, these are unrelated to his action and thus the principle of affecting his environment by his action is not learned well or is delayed.

In general form, what we have been hypothesizing is that quantity and timing of maternal response to the infants behavior, and the degree of consistency of her responses have important motivational qualities, namely, the nature of the maternal response develops and reinforces the infants belief that his behavior can affect the environment.

The study of institutionalized infants provides information to support this motivational view. It has been shown that institutionalized infants differed from home-reared infants not in whether they exhibited a skill or when they reached a developmental stage, but whether they utilized the skill. For example, data indicate that the institutionalized infant stands up in his crib at about the same age as the home-reared infant. That is, the maturational sequence was unfolding at the same rate for each of the groups, but the institutionalized infants showed no desire to practice the skill. Thus, it was the motive rather the skill or structure that differentiated these groups. *It was not how much of the skill or structure that was important in differentiating the infants, rather it was the motivation to use the skill.* We suggest that the basic quality of that lack of action was the infants belief that their behavior could not affect their environment. With such a belief, it was little wonder that they gave up. This issue of giving up can be seen in disadvantaged groups at later ages. That is, if they cannot affect their environment, then what is the sense in trying? Lower class children, in a number of studies, have demonstrated that they lack the belief that their actions can affect their environment.

Moreover, data on affectance indicate that it is an important variable for predicting achievement behavior and learning such that the firmer the belief that one's actions are effective in controlling reinforcement, the greater the achievement behavior and the better the learning. It is the growing belief that individual differences in the motive of powerfulness are acquired in infancy as a direct function of the relationship between the infant and his caretaker, most often his mother.

With this in mind, it becomes clearer that the role of the mother in the child's intellectual growth is not restricted to emotional security but also rests in her ability to provide a strong motivational basis for learning.

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CHANGING A LARGE STATE EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

By NORMAN D. KURLAND

The focus of this discussion is on change in a single state education department. The effort to bring about change in the department, which has been going on for more than a decade, provides an excellent case study of the problems in bringing about large-scale change in education and of the possibilities for major change when a proper approach is taken.

Past Efforts to Change

The leadership of the New York State Education Department has been conscious of the need for change in the educational system of the State for more than a decade. In 1960 Commissioner James E. Allen, Jr. appointed an internal staff committee to look into the question of the role of the Department in promoting change. That group developed a number of recommendations, one of which lead to the appointment of Henry Brickell to do a study of change in New York State. Brickell produced a widely read publication entitled "Organizing New York State for Educational Change". He suggested a number of organizational changes for the State including the establishment within the Department of an office under the Commissioner concerned with change.

In 1964 Commissioner Allen created such an office, the Center on Innovation. Its charge was broad—across all lines of the Department responsibility, and its focus was outward toward the schools and the colleges. In a way its creation was an explicit avoidance of any change within the Department itself. There were those in the Department who opposed the Center, and most of those who did not oppose it viewed it with no particular interest or commitment. No one in the agency had to change anything he was doing to make way for the new Center and it had no authority except that which might derive by influencing the Commissioner.

Seen in retrospect, the creation of the Center was a characteristic gambit of the Department for dealing with problems and new demands—the establishment of a new unit expressly for the particular issue or new activity. Thus, over the years a wide variety of specialized offices have been created in response to new demands on the Department—offices for integration, for urban education, for Indian education, for migrant education, for reading, and for each of the Federal catagorical aid programs. This approach made it possible for the Department to be responsive to new demands without changing its old structure. No staff member, unless he were assigned to a new office, had to change anything that he was doing. No offices had their areas of responsibility altered as a result of new organizational units; and, most important, no existing program or activity had to be dropped in order to make place for the new. All of these new

programs were "add-ons" to the agency. This increased the scope of its work, made it seemingly responsive to change, made it larger, but did not in any fundamental way alter the organization itself.

One consequence of this approach was, of course, that numbers of divisions, offices, bureaus, centers, reporting to the Commissioner and his key assistants greatly increased, and the lines between their areas of jurisdiction became increasingly unclear. It became harder for the Commissioner to keep the work of his staff under control and the work load on him became very heavy. His response was to call in an outside management firm. It did a typical organization management study. It accurately described the existing arrangements in the Department and made numerous recommendations for reorganization to make the Department more able to carry out its fundamental mission. Although the study cost $100,000, involved considerable time and many Department personnel, and resulted in lengthy reports, virtually nothing happened as a result.

The reasons now seem clear. The study was an external effort: no one in the Department (other than perhaps those at the very top who commissioned the study) had any great commitment to it, and, hence, there was no commitment to see that its recommendations were carried out. Department staff were treated as subjects of the study rather than partners in an important improvement effort. Much of what was said in the current status report any perceptive members of the Department could have written, and almost everything in that part of the report came from the interviews with the Department staff. As to the proposed changes, while they may have had theoretical validity, they did not seem to most in the Department to have grown organically out of the Department needs. Furthermore, there had been no discussion in any depth about them. They were simply handed to the Department for adoption. Finally, there was no real strategy for changing from the existing organization to the new. To be sure, the report recommended a number of stages for achieving the new arrangements, but they were more mechanical changes in job titles and assignments than real changes in behavior.

Most fatally, the management firm considered its job done when it submitted the report. It took no responsibility for implementation, and with no one really committed to implementation, it is not surprising that change did not take place.

In 1965 the State government adopted PPBS and required all agencies to participate. Guidelines were utilized to acquaint staff with the system. In 1969 a study was done on the process of implementation of PPBS in the Education Department. The results were summarized as follows: "The study revealed a significant gap between the blueprint and the operation of the PPB system. The overall evaluation of the implementation of PPB indicates that there have been significant accomplishments in institutionalizing the system, yet its operational results were minimal. PPB did not have any significant impact on organizational behavior, nor did it change the way in which resource allocaton decisions were made within the Department. Furthermore, the key elements outside the Department involved in the resource allocation process—the Legislature and the State Division of the Budget—did not adapt their budgetary behavior to the requirements of the PPB system.

"One of the major reasons for the discrepancy between concept and practice lay in the strategy employed in the introduction of PPB. The data showed that there was no general hostility or resentment among the organization's members toward PPB but rather dissatisfaction with the way in which it had been introduced. PPB had been implemented essentially as a set of techniques and not as a broad framework for improving the policy making process. In addition, the implementation strategy lacked several important elements. There was insufficient training and orientation of personnel to the PPB concept, and no deliberate attempt had been made to mobilize the support of the key elements involved. The major conclusion is that PPB failed since in the way it was introduced it did not have a fair chance to demonstrate its potential."[1]

A New Approach

In early 1969 changes in the Department were initiated which do seem to be making a real difference in the way that major segment of the Department functions. First, almost all of the Department units concerned with elementary, secondary and continuing education (ESC) were brought together administratively under a new Deputy Commissioner. This meant that many offices and officials who formerly reported directly to the Office of the Commissioner now reported instead to the Deputy Commissioner. This made it possible to bring the program of ESC into sharper focus because now most ESC units were administratively together under an office that could provide direction and coordination.

Second, within the new organization planning was given increased emphasis by the creation of a Planning Group composed of all key ESC administrators, and the old Center on Innovation was reassigned as the planning office with the title, "Center for Planning and Innovation for Elementary, Secondary and Continuing Education." This change made it possible to develop new strategies for capitalizing on the opportunities created by the administrative reorganization. It also meant that an office that had been set up originally somewhat outside the main organizational structure of the Department was now put into the line organization and charged with responsibility to operating units of the Department.

A third major change was that the person who formerly headed the central planning office of the Department was made the Executive Deputy Commissioner. He proceeded to give new emphasis to formal planning procedures in the development of the Department's program and budget and gave strong support to the emerging planning and management approaches in ESC.

The result of these changes has been the gradual emergence of the new ways of thinking about the mission of the ESC Units of the Department and new ways of organizing and acting to get the mission accomplished. The balance of this paper will discuss this approach.

Putting Action Into Planning

It is one best labeled by a term used by one of our consultants, Robert Schaffer and Associates, "Putting Action into Planning".[2]

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[1] Moshe Shani *Administrative Considerations in a Planning-Programming-Budgeting System: The Case of the New York State Education Department.* Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Cornell University, June 1970.

[2] Robert H. Schaffer, *"Putting Action into Planning,"* Harvard Business Review, November-December 1967, pp. 158–164.

This term expresses simply what the thrust of our current change effort is—to put *action* into planning—to *make happen* what the Department *wants* to happen. This means formulating what we want to happen (which is all that many planners are concerned with), *deciding* that we do want it to happen, and doing what is necessary to actually *make it happen.*

Linking action to planning has as the first important consequence that those who have the authority to act must be involved in and, in reality, do planning. For only those plans will get acted upon on which have the commitment of those who must carry them out. And the best way, we believe, to gain that commitment is to have people make their own plans. This means that line managers cannot depend upon a specialized planning office to make their plans for them. If they do not plan, planning does not get done. This requires a tremendous shift in behavior. Every line manager and person involved in operations is just too busy to plan. The common point of view goes something like this: "We know we ought to be planning and that planning is a good thing. We will get around to it sometime when there is time. However, there are too many immediate pressing jobs that have to be done for us to take time out to think very far into the future. So, in the meantime, since we should have some plans let's hire some planners to do the planning for us. Of course, we know their plans are going to be difficult to implement because they just don't understand our real problems, but at least it will give us something to shoot at (and down?)."

It is clear that if planning is to become one of the integral functions of all operating personnel, this attitude must change. Somehow people have to discover that they are really not too busy to plan, that planning is really as much a part of "work" as responding to an immediate need, attending a meeting, or writing a report. Indeed, they must discover that work done without planning is far less productive and personally satisfying than work that is carefully thought through, organized, and directed to a goal—which is another way of describing the planning process.

Traditional Planning

Another way of viewing the action approach is to contrast it with another feature of planning as it is often practiced. In traditional planning, much attention is given to needs assessment, goal setting and plan making. Too often, after the list of assessed needs has been drawn up, the goals formulated, and the reports written, nothing happens. The reason, we believe, is that the gap between the goal and present behavior is neglected. People may *say* that they want to change, but unless there is capacity to change, little will occur except heightened frustration at the inability of the organization to accomplish its goals and meet the assessed needs. When individuals perceive the discrepancy between the proclaimed goal and the actual practice of the organization, the tendency is to blame others.

How common it is to hear statements like these: from administrators—"we want to change but it is those teachers who simply will not undertake anything new;" from teachers—"we certainly would like to see things changed around here but those administrators are always standing in the way and preventing improvement;" or if the teachers and administrators agree on a change—"we in the school system are

ready to change but our community just can't be moved;" while from the community we hear—"what this community needs is a lot of change in its educational system but you just can't get those educators to change."

In other words, in most organizations people generally are dissatisfied with at least some of the existing conditions and would like to change them, but they believe that is the "others" who are supporting the status quo and resisting change.

The New York State Education Department was no different than any other organizations in this respect. There were many people who wanted it to be more effective in coping with the immense problems that confront education and society today. Lots of people were ready to "throw out the rules," and do things differently. Yet little seemed to be happening. The result was that people had little confidence in the willingness of others to change. Inaction was translated as lack of commitment. People suspected that those who were in authority and professed a desire for change did not really want it, while those at the top thought that they were dealing with staff which simply was too wedded to the old ways of doing things to change. Therefore, any inclination to change at the top usually led first to a consideration of what individual or organization could be brought in from outside to do the job, while any effort to initiate change within was met with great skepticism—"here we go again; they talk a good line but nothing different will really happen."

Learning by Doing

Thus, the strategy of involving "operating" staff in planning had as a first goal developing confidence at all levels in the collective capacity of the organization to accomplish more important tasks than it had done before. To do this, we employed an old and well-tested principle of learning—*learning by doing*—learning to plan by planning and, most important, by planning the ongoing important day by day work that had to be accomplished. The first approach then, was not make "plans" but to get some current piece of work done more quickly and effectively by utilizing planning processes to organize to get it done. The first question put to a unit was not, "what do you want to plan?", but "what work do you have to get done?" As people learn how to utilize the resources within the organization to accomplish something, they develop increasing confidence and competence in this ability to undertake larger and longer term goals.

Search for Readiness

Implicit in this approach is another well-tested principle of learning—*readiness*. Only frustration can result from efforts to get people to plan who are not ready, or try to get them to plan on larger scale or over a more extended period of time when they cannot yet plan effectively to achieve limited goals over limited time. There is not much point in trying to develop ten year plans in an organization that cannot effectively plan its work for the next year, or next month, or, even, next week.

So we start with what people are ready, willing, and able to undertake and, most particularly, with something that they really are concerned with doing. In the search for points of readiness to begin, a

group may talk about many broad sweeping long term goals that everyone believes should be accomplished but no one feels immediately called upon to do anything about. As the group talks about what it is that prevents it from accomplishing these longer goals, it gradually begins to come closer to more immediate matters that all can agree really have to be done if things are going to improve. When such a point is identified, work can proceed. A realistic goal can be sharply defined, assignments made and due dates set. The discovery that coordinated cooperative effort of this kind can get a job done that had seemed to be impossible before helps give everyone a sense of accomplishment and a direct experience with what can result from time spent in planning. From such a modest beginning more ambitious projects can be undertaken with greater confidence.

To illustrate from our own experience: When the Center on Innovation first began to look at its planning role, the staff spent long hours trying to decide on long term goals that it ought to seek to accomplish. It was very difficult to settle on anything specific because there was very little clarity as to what it was that should guide the decision on longer term goals and very little assurance that there was any capacity to carry out such goals. When the discussion seemed to be faltering, our planning consultant asked the group if there were any more immediate things that might be dealt with just as a way of getting started. After some brief discussion, the staff identified several things, one of which was that a move of the office to another location was anticipated but no planning had been done for the move. It was decided that this would be a useful short term planning task. The group agreed that a subgroup should be appointed to plan the move and also to explore the possibility that in making the move the design of the new office should reflect the new planning perspective of the office.

Staff members most concerned about the move volunteered to serve on the work group. A time schedule was established and the group went to work. From that point on, the planning for the move occurred with minimum involvement of the top management of the Center. Although the usual delays occurred in accomplishing the move, the staff experienced little of the frustrations that usually are attendant upon such changes, and, most important, a totally different approach to the utilization of space was developed as a result of this effort. The experience gave the entire staff insight into factors that go into successful planning and produced an increase in confidence in the ability of the office to carry forward a joint activity toward a successful conclusion.

Since that early effort, the staff of the Center and, increasingly, the staff of the Department have been able to identify similar "break through" projects and carry them forward with increasing success. The Department is now at the point where it is contemplating a major revision of the way in which it organizes to carry forward the work of elementary, and secondary and continuing education in accordance with a totally new conception of its mission, all of this accomplished within a space of little more than a year and a half of effort.

Building on Strength

Another key concept inherent in this approach is the idea of building on strengths rather than seeking to correct weaknesses, seeking out

opportunities rather than trying to correct organizational problems. Effort is directed to exploiting the latent strength, unfulfilled aspirations and unused capabilities of the people in the organization rather than by trying to correct their weaknesses, deal with misconceptions, and overcome resistance. As people grown in competence, and as real work gets done, specific weaknesses seem to matter less, misconceptions are corrected by experience, and resistance simply disappears. This approach particularly avoids starting with the identification of problems in the organization and the development of programs to cope with them. The problems are endless and the solution of one problem is only likely to expose a dozen others. Problem hunting is, we believe, a strategy for avoiding positive action. People who want to get a job done generally find a way of coping with problems as they proceed. If there is no clear idea of the job to be done, solving problems becomes a goal in itself, and so, having problems is the way to keep feeling as though something is being accomplished.

Aiming for Success

Another key concept in this approach is the idea of beginning where the opportunity for success is high. For an organization to undertake an effort that is really beyond its capacity at the time is a sure way to create disillusionment, frustration and conflict. Instead, the planning effort should focus on a few specific goals that some people believe to be urgent or important. Around these goals projects can be organized that tap in some new and rewarding ways the untapped talents and energy of the organization. Build into the project should to some experimental testing of new management techniques and new human relations insights and understandings. That is, each project should be organized not only to accomplish its immediate aims but should also be a learning laboratory designed to create a foundation for more far-reaching, organized process of change.

Whatever the project, it is important that all who are involved have a clear and common understanding of what the task is. It is amazing to find how often, when a group runs into difficulty in accomplishing a task, it turns out that the trouble arises from the fact that the people involved have differing notions about what it was that they were trying to accomplish. Time spent talking through what is to be done is well spent even though at first it may seem to take an inordinate amount of time to reach agreement. In this process, it is good practice to put the task in writing. Verbal exchanges are too easily misinterpreted and leave room for too much vagueness.

Once agreement has been achieved on what is to be done, assignment can be made and deadlines set. Every member of the group working on a common task should know what others are assigned to do, and the assignment should cover the full task. Each person receiving an assignment should be sure he understands what he is to do and that he has the capacity, resources and time to do it. Acceptance of an assignment then becomes a commitment to get it accomplished by the due date. Deadlines are indispensable also to good work planning, for without them it is too easy to let work slide as new priorities intrude.

Help Needed

Just telling a group to adopt this approach and even gaining their commitment to it is not enough. People who have not been accustomed to the discipline of group work planning find it difficult to practice.

When the pressures of on-going work begins to mount, old habits reassert themselves: managers ask employees to whom they have already made assignments to take on new ones; workers let routine demands take precedence over task accomplishment; members of the team get disheartened when progress is not immediately evident or others seem to be failing to meet their commitments. In all of this, an outsider with experience in the process of group planning and management can be a great help. He can first help the group be sure it has really clarified its task and not just accepted a goal for the sake of agreement. He can help sort out priorities among the tasks to be accomplished so that the group has a clear notion as what is first and what follows on. He can, as work proceeds, keep reminding people of the goals that they have set themselves and can get them to review progress so that they realize where they were and how far they have come. The outsider can greatly enhance the effort, but ideally the effort should be directed to building skills in the organization to enable it to carry forward without such help. The loss of the "work" that outside consultants do, the quicker regular staff will learn the skills needed to carry on for themselves.

The approach described thus far may seem terribly unsophisticated. It is our contention, however, that only as the organization develops the capacity to use the talents and tools that it has, can it then employ effectively more sophisticated planning tools such as systems analysis. One of the great mistakes in much of the effort to improve education is thep rematurc introduction of such planning systems. No system by itself will change an organization or the behavior of people in it. People are enormously skillful in finding ways to sabotage approaches that they do not understand, to which they have no commitment, and which make them feel inferior to outsiders (often perceived as "whiz kids" with some technical capacities but little experience in the complexity of the "real world" with which the agency deals).

Our point is that before systems approaches are introduced, work should first be done in building the capacity of the organization to plan and manage more effectively with the tools that it has. Only when people find they cannot do what they want to do because they lack the necessary skills or tools will they be receptive to the introduction of new skills. Efforts to introduce them first may appear to produce initial quick results, but one only need look long enough at organizations that have tried this approach to see its futility. Unless new behaviors are embedded deeply in organization and commitment is devleoped to them, they will not outlast the initial burst of enthusiasm that brought them into existence. The approach proposed here is, to be sure, a slower one initially, but we believe that over the long run it will prove far more sure.

Summary

The essential ingredients then of the process of change that is being employed in the New York State Education Department are these:

1. Involving operating staff in planning.
2. Relating planning to the on-going work of the organization.
3. Beginning wherever there is readiness and high chance of success.
4. Emphasizing opportunities rather than problems.

5. Spending adequate time to clarify goals of each task.

6. Developing clear assignments for each individual with deadlines set for their accomplishment.

7. Judicious use of outside help to support the process, *not* to do the work instead.

The test of the adequacy of this aproach will be the extent to which the Department succeeds in truly putting action into its planning so that it rises to a new level of leadership in guaranteeing quality education to all the people of the State.

As of the date of writing (February 1971), the approach appears to be working. The Department is moving. More staff are engaged in tasks related to the central mission of the Department. There is a new sense of excitment and commitment. People can begin to see the possibility of a comprehensive redesign of the entire educational system of the State. New forms of collaboration are being developed between the Department and the field and a new pattern of intermediate arrangements is being forged. Individuals and entire units are asking for and receiving help in acquiring command of the skills needed to make the new approach work. Open, participative, objectives-oriented management is beginning to be the department norm.

This is not to say that all is perfect or that the change has been accomplished. Change is occuring; whether it will continue until the Department becomes a truly self-renewing force for educational leadership in the State remains to be seen. The task of learning new ways of behaving may be too much for people; may grow impatient with the seemingly slow pace of change; the very real and tough problems confronting education may defeat us; the public may be unwilling to support the changes they will see occuring; and we may not yet know enough about how to change large social organizations. But the effort is being made and there is broad commitment at all levels of the Department to make it work.

If the approach succeeds, it has application at all levels of the educational system. From school superintendent, to building principal, to department chairman and classroom teacher the problems of organizational change that must be dealt with are similar. The relevance of this approach at the classroom level is of special interest to us. One of the key skills that the schools must begin teaching is the capacity to cope with and manage change. How better to teach it than by having teachers who themselves are models of the desired behavior? And how better for them to learn to behave this way than to function in a system which exhibits the same behavior at all levels right up to the State Commissioner of Education? Thus do we in the State Education Department see a relationship between what we do and the place of ultimate action—the classroom.

MAKING RESEARCH FINDINGS AVAILABLE

By WILLIAM G. MONAHAN *

The proposal for inaugurating a National Institute of Education is an exciting prospect not because it is any longer a novel idea but because it is now a realizeable one. Clearly the work of the Rand Corporation, under Roger Levien's direction, which provides a preliminary set of views for guiding the structure and functions of such an institute generates some optimism within the education R and D community that NIE may indeed become a reality. For that reason, it is vitally important that as many aspects of the proposed institute as possible be critically assessed by those of us in the profession who will both contribute and benefit from such an agency. It is in such a spirit of enthusiasm and support that this brief essay is written.

It seems to me that in the field of professional education, when we have talked (and even institutionalized) *R*esearch and *D*evelopment we have not placed enough emphasis on the conjunction. Although I have not engaged in a systematic analysis of this hypothesis, I am convinced that such an analysis would disclose that the existing R and D agencies have not effectively married knowledge production with knowledge utilization. For example, the Centers funded under the provisions of PL 531 during the first half of the 60's and located on university campuses (I think there are nine of these), have generally placed more emphasis on the R than on the D, while the Education Laboratories have taken rather an opposite course—emphasizing developmental activities more than research. It is my own personal view that both of these kinds of agencies have performed their functions well and within the environments of their functions it is logical to assume that the respective emphases such agencies have pursued have been appropriate.

However, there may be some basis for asserting that of Regional Education Laboratories established under provisions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the "unsuccessful" ones (those forced to close)—some of them at least—were considered unsuccessful partly because they *did* attempt both research *and* development. Reporting on his study of the successful and unsuccessful Laboratories, David Flight stated:

> Early in their development, the more successful labs demonstrated tightly formulated process concepts . . . and narrowly focused program specifications.[1]

Referring to the unsuccessful laboratories, Flight further stated:

> A single lab would use the word *research* to refer to fundamental study leading to new knowledge at one time and to the entire range of functions including development, dissemination, and training at another time.[2]

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[1] David S. Flight, "Regional Laboratories and Educational Research and Development," *Administrator's Notebook,* Midwest Administration Center, University of Chicago, November, 1970, No. 3, pp. 2–3.

[2] *Ibid,* p. 3.

Even though Flight provides a variety of contrasts between successful and unsuccessful laboratories, there is at least some basis in his findings to speculate about the possibility that contributing to the success of laboratories was emphasis, staffing, and programming in the area of development and those that were not successful attempted to deal both with research and development. This is not to suggest that the academic R and D centers have not engaged in developmental activities nor that the Laboratories have not engaged in research but only to point out a differential emphasis between the two; moreover, and this is a point that I should like to stress, prior to 1960 there was practically no formal organization structure with the educational establishment for either research *or* development. Those that attempted to fill this need were, again, either regional consortiums of school districts generally labeled "School Development Councils" and strongly oriented to the on-going needs of school systems, or philanthropic grants which may have been either for basic research or for developmental innovations but in either case were not strategically designed to do more than initiate activity—not sustain it. The upshot of it all is that although it might be inaccurate to conclude that educational R and D is in its infancy, it would be even less accurate to conclude that such activity is very far beyond adolescence.

Because this is indeed the case, there is rare opportunity through the NIE legislation to systematically consolidate an Educational Research and Development operation of truly effective dimensions. In large measure, the preliminary document by the RAND consultants moves precisely in this direction and even though such a preliminary statement will inevitably omit important considerations not yet perceived and treat minimally others that may deserve more emphasis, there is one aspect of the document that does deserve still greater consideration; I refer to those functions concerned with making the results of both research and developmental activities more accessible and more meaningful to the Education community. This involves two significant concerns, the first of which—dissemination—is fairly obvious; the second is not so obvious but of equal importance and for lack of something better to call it, I shall refer to this function as "explication." By explication, I simply mean the systematic reinterpretation or translation of research and development data into language which can be broadly understood and efficiently utilized.

Problems of Dissemination

Dissemination is always a problem of noble dimensions and the phrase "knowledge explosion" is a current cliche at the heart of which, there is no little truth. A cursory examination of the documentation-retrieval material in any university library will attest this fact.

For a few simple examples: The National Education Association Catalog for 1970–71 which includes 62 NEA, or affiliated publishing units ranging from the American Association of Higher Education to the World Conference of Organizations of Teaching Professions contains 1,449 titles for 1970 alone. But that is a small proliferation; consider as another example that the *Monthly Catalog of United States Government Publications* issued by the office of the Superintendent of Documents included 1,494 entries for January, 1969 alone and for the whole year, there were 17,443 titles. Incidentally, these were only

documents for sale and did not include resolutions or bills before Congress. For the Office of Education in that catalog, there was an average of about 20 titles per month and, of course, there are dozens of government agencies which publish information of importance for educational research and development.

The Scholars' Guide to Journals of Education and Educational Psychology (L.J. Lins and R.A. Rees; Dembar Services, Inc. Madison, Wisc.) which is mainly just a guide for prospective authors as sources for the publication of their articles, contains a total of 135 journals and the authors state that, "... no attempt was made to list all..." such journals. As a matter of fact, *Ulrich's Guide to Periodicals*, 1963 edition, lists about 500 such journals and if one wants to include other nations, the 13th edition of that work, 1967–70, lists more than 1,550 journals throughout the world. Education *is* of international significance; Unesco's *International Guide to Educational Documentation*, 1963, which covers 95 countries (of a total of 200 educational systems throughout the world) has an index alone of 91 pages which includes more than 8,500 entries! One of the excellent sources of document retrieval is the *America's Educational Press Yearbook;* the 30th yearbook (1969) contains a classified listing of more than 2,000 national, state, provincial, regional, and local educational publishers in the United States and Canada; moreover, 338 of the periodicals listed in the 1969 edition were *not in existence* when the 1966 edition was printed. In addition there are numerous special research-documentation services available; Phi Delta Kappa International's *Research Studies in Education* published annually since 1953 is a subject-author indexed listing of field studies, research reports, and dissertations which requires the cooperation of more than 100 universities and includes in the current edition 327 pages and more than 10,000 entries.

A very conservative estimate based on a superficial analysis and excluding books, monographs, and more sizable documents leads me to conclude that each year there are more than 50,000 pieces of published educational materials that are cataloged in one way or another. There is no way of determining how much else—fugitive material—is published that never finds its way into the retrieval system as it exists today. Unquestionably this leads to impressive problems. Arvid and Mary Burke in an introduction to their *Documentation in Education* have enumerated some of those problems.[3] First, clogging of the established means for acquiring sorting, storing, and accessibility to documents; secondly, decreasing the probability of knowing what information is already available with the consequence of loss of both time and effort; third, less and less available time for critical review of new material so that an increasing volume of what finds its way into print is either worthless or of questionable quality. Finally, the scope of this productivity increases the researcher's dependence on catalogs such that searching time itself is becoming more nervating than research activity. Even the excellent *Education Index* no longer attempts to index the variety of educational publications that it did prior to 1961 and, even so, its indexing by subject of only selected periodical articles and serial publications for a single year requires more than 600 pages of very fine print. And it should be remembered that little of what I have here surveyed includes book output; the *Cumulative Book*

[3] Arvid, J. and Mary A. Bukke. Documentation in Education (4th Edition). New York. Teachers College Press. 1967.

Index—only for the English language—require over 2,000 pages to cover the output of a single year.

It is true of course, that a sizeable proportion of this output does not relate explicitly and specifically to capital "E" education but it is still something of a monumental understatement to assert that the Educationally-related output is prolific.

The fact that this output has assumed an almost entropic condition is reason enough for educational researchers to be little surprised that when he was asked in an interview about his views of educational research, Daniel Moynihan replied that he was, ". . . aware of promising projects 'although there isn't anything that has caused me to go whammee.'" [4] How could be possibly know? How could anyone?

Systematic Retrieval and Dissemination

It is precisely because of this literal explosion of content that the need for systematic retrieval has been recognized and attempts made to organize operational systems for managing it. In spite of chaotic nature of published commentary relating to Education that exists, there are a variety of operational retrieval systems providing search, classification, and dissemination services to educational researchers and these systems have been organized within both the public and private sector.

Responding to a report of the President's Science Advisory Committee, January, 1963, relating to the essential nature of information transfer for research and development, the Office of Education established the Educational Research Information Center (ERIC) in 1965. Currently, the ERIC system encompasses more than 30,000 documents, provides systematic computer search procedures, and functions through a decentralized organization of 17 regionally located "Clearinghouses" These regional Clearinghouses, each primarily concerned with a unique conceptual area (Counseling; Educational Administration; Disadvantaged; Reading; etc.) places reliance upon the abilities of experts at relatively local areas to select significant content for inclusion in the file.

Since its initiation, ERIC has been able to make its magnetic tape files available to universities or other educational agencies having access to appropriate hardware so that such institutions are capable of doing their own storage and retrieval. At The University of Iowa for example, having acquired the ERIC tapes, a procedure is now operational whereby an "ERIC Questionnaire Search Request" is submitted to personnel in the computer center with a built in search profile system using logical connectors but with what is technically known in the retrieval terminology as a "100 hit limit." This means that of all of the documents available, depending on the rigor with which the descriptions are keyed by the researcher, the program generates a limit of 100 sources related to that topic. This helps to control the costs involved and, related to that, helps to guard against non-well-defined search profiles. The costs might generally range from about four dollars to twenty-five dollars although the system is still of such recent development that reliable data on search costs are only beginning to be available. At any rate, many universities and other agencies can purchase the tapes and handle their own ERIC search and retrieval. This is an immensely efficient innovation.

[4] "D.C. Perspectives" *Educational Researcher,* September, 1970, p. 5.

There are other systematic retrieval systems that are also rather highly developed and of value to educational research. One of the more recent is a system known as "DATRIX," under the management umbrella of the Xerox Corporation. Associated with University Microfilms Library Services, DATRIX is a doctoral dissertation tape file and includes more than 130,000 theses written since 1938. This system is economical and of much value to graduate students and other researchers.

Still other similar kinds of clearinghouses for information storage and retrieval include The National Clearinghouse for Mental Health, The National Institute of Child Health and Development, and the Science Information Exchange (SIE). SIE, associated with the Smithsonian Institution provides one page descriptions upon special request which disclose the nature of a piece of research, where and when it was (or is being) done and a reasonably adequate technical description. All of these, like ERIC, are computer-based information systems.

Progress, Problems, and Prospects

All of this suggests that an impressive start has been made in the retrieval, storage, and dissemination of material of significance to educational R and D. Perhaps it is neither fair nor accurate to talk in terms of a "start" for after all, the American Documentation Institute, a non-profit organization of scientists, engineers, librarians, and others interested in such problems was founded in 1937. But just as our knowledge expands at dizzying rates so also does the number of specialized people interested in it. Manfred Kochen has suggested that by virtue of this growth, researchers must confront the need to express at least as much interest is *synthesis* as in access. He postulates that:

> If research establishes that there are signs of potential instability in the growth of knowledge, then the most important and needed information retrieval systems are those which restore stability, which help to consolidate fragments into coherent, teachable wholes, which stress *evaluation* and *synthesis* above access.[5]

To large extent, it is this problem to which the Levien draft of the preliminary NIE plan addresses itself in the section concerned with "Developing Structures for Information Transfer." [6] In that section there is a statement to the effect that,

> * * * researchers in different disciplines do not communicate, even when concerned with the same problems. Some deficiencies have to do with access to existing information; many reports never enter the accessible literature.[7]

It can be stated with some assurance that researchers *within* the same discipline 'even when concerned with the same problem' do not always communicate and frequently that is merely due to the fact that they are not aware that their interests are mutual. Effective use of existing retrieval systems alleviates that ignorance but of equal problematic proportions is a condition of habit whereby a researcher, once he becomes familiar with a particular system is increasingly dependent upon that system and not as likely therefore to make use of

[5] Manfred Kochen, "The Consolodation of Information," *Educational Researcher,* Supplement, 1967, p. 3.
[6] Roger Levien, *National Institute of Education.* Washington: RAND Corporation, December 15, 1970, pp. 87–88.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

others. This, too, is an issue of articulation but it is also a problem of allocation of time on the part of a researcher and as well a problem of becoming familiar with the ritual—both process and machine—which is necessary to make effective use of any existing computer-based retrieval system.

The activities enumerated in the RAND report dealing with these problems of information transfer and articulation are commendable and appropriate but, obviously, do not even begin to chart the territory. Clearly, the solution of information transfer and articulation problems nor even more than a superficial sample of such difficulties was not within the scope or purpose of the initial NIE document: on the contrary, it is only with the actualization of a subcomponent of the National Institute dealing with retrieval and dissemination that an accurate *description* of the problems will become practicable. But that there are immensely difficult obstacles to the fulfillment of R and D potentialities in the problem area of information processing should be axiomatic.

NIE, whatever its final form, will of necessity confront considerable organizational concern with information transfer, with search, storage, retrieval and dissemination but perhaps its major contribution can be focused in terms of articulation. Unquestionably such an agency as a national educational institute will (and should) be expected to supplement and complement all existing information retrieval systems with research-related potential whether in the public or the private sector but beyond that, the major function should be in terms of explication. As stated previously, I use the word as involving the translation of scientific language and 'bits' of information into coherent and parsimonious statements of the best currently available *status* of our knowledge about X. There are a variety of strategies by which this function may be realized—for example, the NIE should undertake a programmatic responsibility for commissioning research scholars to review the literature in a field or area; such scholars, if carefully chosen and compensated, will be expected not only to search the area but will automatically and deliberately exert their own selectivity of content upon it, thus evaluating as well as documenting. As is traditional in scholarly inquiry, other researchers who find quarrel with these commentaries should be encouraged within organized procedures to engage in dialogue and scientific argumentation with them. Also, such synthesis and articulation can be further expanded through sponsorship of high level research symposia whose subject focus may be either empirical, developmental, basic or applied, substantive or methodological, and preferably all and more. Widespread distribution of such examples as these must be economical and visible.

Intensive effort is clearly demanded; the significance of both access to and availability of research findings is not as prominent in the preliminary NIE plan as this small voice would prefer but it is implicit throughout the report. Unless it occupies a very central concern however, I think we might not get the emphasis on the vital linkage in educational R *and* D that is expressed by that significant conjunction. What perhaps all of us sometimes tend to forget is that our major interest is not specifically research, nor development, nor information but rather understanding. Inquiry leads to understanding; development and improvement flow from it.

STUDYING ACCOUNTABILITY—A VIEW FROM A STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

By ROBERT E. WEBER

Looking Back

The history of mankind has been punctuated by man's quest for greater accountability. Man began his existence unaccountable—in an environment of primal horde anarchy where he was subject to the vagaries of nature. But his human attributes empowered him to improve upon this uneasy relationship with nature until he was able to produce the surplus which made the beginnings of civilization possible. Once mere survival was no longer at stake and civilization was possible, man created the division of labor; he formulated rules to govern behavior; he devised laws; and he prescribed tasks for his society and invented institutions to facilitate the workings of society.

His dreams for the workability of society are manifest in his notions of justice, responsiveness, efficiency, fairness, economy, responsibility, ethics, equitableness, quality, reward, and trust. But most of man's institutions are imperfect and man had to devise new institutions and solutions continually in the hope that each new order would be better than the old. Moreover—and this is the astonishing thing about man-created things—man's institutions often behaved in ways that were not intended and they had the capricious facility for developing an existence of their own—something over and against man, so that his own creations became alien to him (and him to them) and caused him to experience dissatisfaction, powerlessness, and anomie, which, in turn, sometimes became the spur for increased accountability. As a matter of fact the meaning of "unaccountability" (strange, inexplicable, mysterious) overlaps with the meaning of alienation (estrangement, helpless, powerlessness).

It is the recurring unaccountability in some of the major task areas of culture—learning, governance, security, production and trade—that has generated an enormous malaise among us and causes us to raise anew basic questions about the humanity of our endeavors—whether our major institutions, although man-created and man-operated, are aloof from man and run out of *human* control or whether they are truly man-serving.

But the questions we raise are pertinent to the time in which we ask them. In other words, there are limits to the accountability that might be achieved and these limits are precisely the limits of the behavior sciences (with special emphasis on measurement); the level of evolved human consciousness: and the limits imposed by the nature of large-scale, complex, bureaucratic systems. However, sub-perfect man need not use his imperfection to escape all responsibility, for there are great historical statements of accountability—the oath of Hippocrates or the

Magna Carta, for example—which light the way for him and which reaffirm humanity. There are also ways of tempering his institutions with countervailing forces (e.g., the rule of kings by divine right tempered with *noblesse oblige* and *laissez faire* economics with enlightened self-interest) and there are mechanical procedures for achieving interim measures of accountability.

The ulitimate form of accountability or the expression of the wish to be accountable is, of course, love—it springs from pride in doing, the non-coerced giving of one's self, candor, openness, responsibility, humanness, and a natural and spontaneous feeling of what the philosophers call the "sense of oughtness." With this as something to aim for, our modus vivendi must necessarily depend on the evolution of new individual and group statements of accountability, the formulation of new human and professional standards, and the utilization of all the techniques at hand that are man-ennobling in the workings of society.

Accountability in Education

The concept of accountability in education, although not necessarily referred to as such, has been with us for a long time—students have been accountable for their courses of study, homework, attendance, punctuality, paying attention, and behaving in an orderly manner. Parents, too, are accountable, in the sense that when their children began their schooling the children had to fulfill certain basic requirements: they had to know how to talk, they had to be toilet trained, and they had to be at least minimally socialized. While it is true that chief administrators were always accountable to their Boards of Education, this has been on a process basis and it has generally skirted the question of end-products—the increments of achievement gained per dollars expended per units of time. Now, however, a shift is taking place toward greater emphasis on accountability for the system itself rather than on having the major burden placed on the student; that is, the definition of accountability now tends to be conceived as a measure of the effectiveness of achieving well-defined goals relative to costs (and sometimes other considerations, such as time) *and the periodic community-wide reporting of this performance*, hopefully in non-jargonistic terminology. This shift had its origins in the period immediately following World War II.

To be sure, there are historical antecedents. In a free enterprise economy (or in any system in which resource allocation decisions must be made) man has, of necessity, been preoccupied with profit and loss sheets, time and motion studies, quality control, inventory control, and the like, in the interest of increasing both productivity and profits. These are the more ethically neutral aspects of accountability. However, a major impetus for increased efficiency and quantified measures came with the development of techniques of cost/benefits analysis and the design of systems such as PPBS (the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System) and related systems. As this was happening, Congress became increasingly concerned over what it was actually getting for its appropriations of funds. Thus, as new Federal funding programs emerged, they contained in them a built-in constraint for evaluation, which contributed greatly to the current thrust for accountability. Examples of program areas requiring varing degrees of evalua-

tion are education, juvenile delinquency, anti-poverty, and manpower training, to name just a few.

Still another factor in the push for accountability was the beginning of a movement, a few years ago, for a National Assessment in Education in the general population. Closer to the operating schools, Dr. Leon Lessinger and his colleagues in the United States Office of Education provided major leadership by introducing us to new concepts in accountability and creating accountability training programs.

The realization of widespread educational failure, particularly as manifested in the publication of reading scores and the emergence (in the twentieth century) of a new phenomenon—*involuntary illiteracy* (functional illiteracy among persons who had attended school for twelve years)—shocked citizens into clamoring for better uses of their money. (It is worth inserting here that while it is true that the most disturbing data on reading retardation come from ghetto schools, recent information on reading proficiency in the suburbs is also bleak. For example, Prof. John R. Bormuth at the University of Chicago found, in "good" suburban schools, that "65%, 38%, and 40% of the children in the upper elementary, junior high school and high school grades, respectively, read so poorly that they were able to gain little or none of the information contained in their average textbooks and roughly 34% of the graduating seniors were similarly illiterate with respect to the average passage in a sample of passages taken from newspapers and news magazines.")[1] Lastly was the development of the so-called knowledge industry, the rapid growth in the number of private corporations partially or totally preoccupied with problems of human growth and development, and specifically education. A combination of "knowledge corporation" practices for measuring efficiency, Federal guidelines, and the desires of serious school administrators moved the concern for accountability still further. As a result of all this, parents and school board members have now taken up the cry.

How do we respond to this cry? At the State level, we are trying to get our thinking straight about accountability so that in our efforts to respond to the cries of anguish and anger we do not react with ill-conceived measures that at best have only fad value and constitute a mere sop. To begin with, concern about culpability and punishment for past educational mismanagement and failure is fruitless. It is much more important to focus our attention or redress, rectification, and improvement—how to make things right and, by definition, better. Neither is it the intent of those of us concerned with accountability to see education run on a strictly business basis. An aircraft manufacturer knows how many pounds of aluminum goes in one end of his building, how many pounds comes out the other end, and what it costs while it is in the building to bend it into various configurations. That may be well and good for his purposes, although the recent phenomenon of cost over-runs shows that this is far from being an air tight system.

The point is that children cannot be equated with pounds of aluminum nor can teachers and administrators be equated with servomechanisms. The educational system is an inherently human system and must be preserved as such. And it can be preserved as such within

[1] John R. Bormuth, *Illiteracy in the Suburbs*, Department of Education, University of Chicago, mimeo, 1970.

the framework of the accountability concept. Our main purpose is to come to an understanding of how we can be accountable and to either devise or identify evolving accountability assessment techniques and put them into the hands of administrators to be used as management tools, in supplementation of the "sense of oughtness," to increase the quality of the end-products of the system—the students. Thus, for example, we are trying to understand the differences between negative accountability—the things we are accountable not to do (e.g., damage the personalities of children)—and the things we are accountable to do.

We are also trying to discover the best ways to facilitate the accountability process. As indicated earlier, some accountability stems from the sense of "oughtness." Other accountability comes about as the result of externally imposed constraints. However, it seems to us that accountability is a two-party phenomenon, an accomplement in which one party must demand or make his wish for accountability known and the other party must respond out of the sense of "oughtness" and/or as part of a defined duty. *Accountability does not readily come if it is not asked for or mandated.* So both parties will have to become educated: the one as to the ways and techniques of being accountable and the other as to what can be expected in the way of accountability, the forms of demanding it, and the information that is needed prior to making demands.

The current academic areas receiving the most vigorous attention, in terms of accountability, are reading and mathematics. However, we should not limit our focus to these two areas even though they are, obviously, basic. The notion of accountability, in broadest terms, goes beyond measures of teaching/learning effectiveness. For example, we are accountable to the intellectual curiosity of the children and hence must provide a relevant curriculum; we are accountable for extra-academic services and therefore must improve our comprehensiveness; and we are accountable for making the right diagnosis of learner needs, interests, and styles and for formulating the right prescription and can no longer use labeling (including mislabeling) as a method of escaping responsibility. We are also accountable for functional illiterates who are high school graduates, for children needing but not receiving special education, for both de jure and de facto dropouts, and for the non-college bound student who receives no post-secondary education/training benefits.

Accountability is also an interdependent web. Thus, institutions of teacher preparation are accountable for turning out requisite numbers of adequately trained teachers; textbook publishers are accountable for the effectiveness of their materials; test makers are accountable for the applicability and reliability of their measurement instruments; administrators are accountable to teachers for giving adequate amounts of guidance and supervision and they are accountable for stating system objectives; Boards of Education are accountable to the citizenry for the nature and quality of educational program; and the State, among other things, is accountable for its own performance, particularly in the areas of leadership and technical assistance, and for providing the funds to carry out the accountability responsibility.[2]

[2] Teacher unions were omitted from this list since they face the first-order burden of resolving the apparent irreconcilability between tenure and accountability and the conflicts between union objectives and the public interest.

We are all, in differing ways, accountable. And it should be added here that we are accountable not just for failure: we are also accountable for less than *optimum* success. When we are dealing with a broad range of individual differences and abilities it makes sense only to talk about the optimal.

At the State level, we are also making distinctions between needs accountability and operational accountability, that is, accountability for meeting needs and accountability for performance in meeting those needs. In terms of operational accountability, the minimum number of parameters appear to be as follows:

(*a*) Cost,
(*b*) Efficiency,
(*c*) Quality, and
(*d*) Appropriateness.

While a program can founder when one of these parameters is inadequately addressed, it is the more likely case that in a planning or program development matrix, the administrator, because of chronically limited funds, will work out various trade-offs. He should, of course, account for these trade-offs quite explicitly.

In terms of needs accountability (pending findings of a formal Needs Assessment Project), there are over a dozen measures that school districts could be urged to take immediately (with State assistance), some costly and some not so costly, but all within the state of the art, that would meet more needs and increase the quality of education. These are stated in random order as follows:

1. Expand extra-academic service capabilities at all levels.
2. Provide inter-racial and inter-ethnic experiences requisite for living in a pluralistic democracy.
3. Establish materials and technology centers.
4. Expand evening school and adult education programs.
5. Establish special programs with increased holding power.
6. Participate more fully in all Federal and State nutritional programs.
7. Provide special education for *all* children who are in need of it, including pre-school for children with learning disabilities.
8. Inaugurate student-initiated programs of participatory education wherein released time and academic credit would be given for independent study and social service (and without eligibility requirements).
9. Modify the standard curriculum so as to make it more relevant.
10. Provide post-secondary opportunities for all non-college bound students, including student loan programs comparable to those for college students and expand vocational offerings downward and laterally.
11. Utilize all existing techniques of individualizing instruction.
12. Make maximum use of paraprofessional personnel.
13. Require all administrators and master teachers to maintain vigorous and continuous in-service training programs instead of abdicating this responsibility.

These recommendations are only illustrative: obviously a host of other recommendations could also be made. In planning for the implementation of these recommendations, the basic principles of operational accountability should be thought through. However, in attempt-

ing to fill a given need and planning its implementation relative to cost, efficiency, quality and appropriateness, it would be well to abandon the traditional posture which views the taxpayer as constituent and the (economically and politically powerless) student as client and which results in what the students call "the student as nigger" philosophy.[3] The taxpayer is the investor and the student is the resource, the co-investor, and the product of investment in a task area of civilization called culture-building.

Lastly—and this is very important in establishing accountability—we are investigating the standards of disclosure which must be set to effect more parental involvement in the accountability process. Toward this end we are following the work of Stephens Arons and his colleagues at the Harvard Center for Law and Education in establishing the informational bases and access routes that parents need. The criteria developed at the Center for Law and Education have four objectives:

First, to provide parents ready access to information about the school lives of their children; second, to provide parents and school district residents with detailed information about the operations of their school districts and the individual schools within it; third, to provide statistics by which parents and residents can make meaningful comparisons between their schools and those of other communities; and fourth, to provide machinery through which information about education can flow out and involve the community in the processes of education.[4]

According to many State statutes, this kind of information should be freely available. However, in actual practice school officials frequently fail to compile this information or, when they do, it is not sought by parent and community residents. By adding structure to this situation the accountability accouplement can be brought about. One way of providing this structure, a way which looks increasingly attractive, is the design of a Parents' Rights Handbook that would articulate various accountability concepts, mechanisms for reporting accountability, procedures for causing accountability and methods for validating accountability statements.

Prevailing Strategies To Increase Accountability

There are several current strategies for increasing accountability that are being employed in the nation which have to be monitored so that we can assess their effectiveness and their receptivity after a period of operation. These are: performance contracting, independent educational accomplishment auditing, and the use of behavioral objectives in instruction.

We regard performance contracting as a rational alternative to the traditional, often sub-optimal, expenditures of ESEA Title I and other monies for the purchase of services (training and/or instructional personnel), materials, and equipment (or combinations thereof) on the basis of learning achievement guarantees. Among our concerns with performance contracting are establishing the range of areas of

[3] John Birmingham, ed., *Our Time is Now—Notes from the High School Underground* (New York: Prager Publisher, Inc., 1970).
[4] Stephen Arons, "Standards of Disclosure," Harvard Center for Law and Education, mimeo, January 1971.

applicability (e.g., special education), assessing the "fit" after a program has been turnkeyed, identifying programs showing the highest benefits/cost ratio, determining the possibility of formulating new and possibly more permanent roles for outside contractors in school districts (e.g., ombudsman, research and development, conducting experimental programs), and in developing more precise measures of contractor performance.[5]

General educational auditing and the Independent Educational Accomplishment Audit (IEAA) are other new management science tools currently undergoing extensive application which must also be monitored to ascertain their efficacy. Our major interest here is in how accurately auditing works to identify efficiencies and inefficiencies in an educational system but we are also interested in ascertaining the range of other benefits that can be attained from auditing. Toward this end we are awaiting the evaluation of the ESEA Titles VII and VIII auditing programs and we are studying the various corporate approaches to auditing, with a special interest in the application to areas considered more difficult to measure, such as affective behavior.

Another technique to increase accountability is the utilization of behavioral objectives in educational practice. The value of this approach is that it forces teachers to think more in terms of discrete, sequential steps and it makes them more aware of individual differences in pacing and of the need for more frequent feedback. The use of planning charts, such as those developed by the New England Educational Assessment Project,[6] the formulation of terminal behavior specifications, and the establishment of performance criteria all show promise of bringing more precision to the instructional process and more learning. Again, student acceptance of and satisfaction with this approach will have to be looked at before large-scale programs are undertaken.

The three strategies discussed above—performance contracting, educational auditing, and the behavioral approach—seem to be getting the greatest attention today. However, concern with accountability is not restricted to these three areas. Some schools are adopting a Planning, Programming and Budgeting System; some schools are using Computer Assisted Instruction, which makes the computer and its programmers accountable; some are maintaining Computer Managed Instruction programs; and some are considering the concept of the performance curriculum, an administratively imposed, non-contract version of the performance contract which is tied to a merit pay system. All of these activities and newly emerging activities will have to be really studied before selecting the most attractive ones for either emulation or modified implementation.

At the State level, the increase in the amount of technical assistance, the introduction of new criteria for state aid formulas, the development of Management Information Systems (MIS), and the increase in the sophistication of planning activities should also help to effect increases in accountability.

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[5] Robert E. Stake and James L. Wradrop, *Gain Score Errors in Performance Contracting*. University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, mimeo (undated).

[6] New England Educational Assessment Project, "A Guide to Assessment and Evaluation Procedures," (Providence, R.I.: State Agency for Elementary and Secondary Education, 1967).

At the Federal level, the U.S. Office of Education is developing an operational concept of educational engineering; it has conducted educational audit institutes around the country; it is pushing the notion of the Management Support Group (MSG), whose functions are to assist schools with planning, problem identification, data collection, program design and development, proposal development, project management assistance, and so forth. The Federal people are also focusing great attention on the feasibility of the proposed educational voucher system and the ramifications of its implementation.

Looking Ahead

Articles and speeches during the past year have made repeated reference to the credibility gap between the public and its educational system: the public dissatisfaction with sub-optimal results: student unrest and rebellion; the public outrage over dropout rates and numbers of functional illiterates graduating from our schools; the establishment of storefront schools by dissatisfied parents; the public intolerance of "runaway" costs, as manifested in increasing bond issue failures and premature school closings; and, especially in the minority-group sector, increasing demands for community control, in the hope that greater accountability can be brought about; and increasing preoccupation with *equality of results*, as near as they are attainable, in addition to equality of opportunity.

This is a multi-billion dollar problem involving millions of people and it is a problem not amendable to quick and easy solution. Moreover, halfhearted measures will probably not be tolerated—the scope and intensity of public suspicion and dissatisfaction are too great. In all likelihood, then, the current push for greater accountability will not turn out to be a passing fad and it is likely that we can expect continuing demands for accountability and we can expect the Educational Establishment to both respond to these demands and to make improvements in the state of the art of accountability. How quickly and how significantly, of course, depends on all of us.

This response might involve looking at models in areas other than Education that can be analogized from or that we can pattern educational practices after—the "acceptance flight" in the Air Force (the plane is test-flown before it is accepted), for example, might have interesting implications in education in the textbook, hardware and curriculum areas. We might also look at other systems (see the chart below) and draw analogies that will assist us in the design of new programs. We might also be the beneficiaries of spill-over from developments involving legal rights of youth. The United States Supreme Court Opinion in *In Re Gault*, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) held that allegedly delinquent children were to be given the procedural safeguards guaranteed by the due process clause of the 14th Amendment. These safeguards include, the right to adequate notice of charges, the right to representation by an attorney, the right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and the right to be advised of the privilege of self-incrimination. While this decision confines itself to the fact finding portion of the delinquency proceedings where guilt or innocence is determined, one of the most provocative implications is that the Court may very well begin to exercise a reviewing function in

the area of treatment and rehabilitation. It has long been established that a right to treatment exists for mental patients. See the Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 V.A.L. Rev. 1134 (1967).

CHART

U.S. POST OFFICE	EDUCATIONAL ANALOG
1. Carriers—They *must* carry (and through sleet, and snow and dark of night, at that) letter to destination.	Teachers can't reject students; must get them to their destination.
2. Station, sub-station, 4 classes of offices.	Easy physical access to all, including isolated rural students.
3. Airmail, special delivery, first class, parcel post.	Permits some students to move slowly.
4. Third class, bulk mailing.	Permits some students to move rapidly.
5. Continuity of service (6 days a week, 12 months a year).	Allows temporal unlocking.
6. Multiple delivery systems (feet, car, truck, train, plane, ship).	Use all appropriate methods to get students to their destinations.
7. Special handling, fragile.	Broadened concept of special and/or compensatory education.
8. Numerous pickups.	Minimal lock step.
9. Postage due.	Higher per capita expenditures needed to get children to their destinations.
10. Postal Inspector.	Outside evaluation; educational ombudsman.
11. Wrong address.	Can't send student to wrong track or inappropriate curriculum.
12. Insured.	Educational insurance (when there is a gap between ability and performance, the claims adjustor appears).

The obvious next step would entail litigation which would question the quality of rehabilitative programs for the adjudicated delinquent. It would not seem impertinent to investigate whether incarcerated juveniles are receiving schooling pursuant to State Compulsory Education Acts. One can readily imagine cases grounded in the failure to remediate in education in the context of a functionally illiterate high school graduate. It would seem logical that if the right to treatment concept is extended for juveniles who are "in trouble," then suits brought on behalf of children who completed what is required of them in the educational process and remain illiterate would be even more compelling.

On this latter point, we are following with great interest the work of Stuart A. Sandow and his colleagues at Syracuse Univerity's Education Policy Research Center on Emerging Education Policy Issues in Law.[7] It is clear that even unequivocal administrative fiat cannot often bring about accountability in a bureaucracy and that either the law or the threat of litigation will have to be used to coerce accountable behavior. One shudders to think of the probable chicanery and subterfuge in the response of maladaptive bureaucrats (one thinks immediately of the possibility of an enormous increase in the enrollment of kids in special education.); however, it is one of several necessary avenues that must be pursued.

[7] Stuart A. Sandow, *Emerging Education Policy Issues in Law—FRAUD*, Educational Policy, Policy Research Center, Syracuse University, November 1970.

Another important decision; *Griggs* v. *Duke Power Co., 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971)*, successfully challenged (under the Civil Rights Act of 1964) the practice of using I.Q. and other non-job-related examination criteria as conditions of employment. This certainly has implications for education. One thinks immediately of the whole area of placement, college entry, and admission to graduate schools, eligibility requirements for electives and honors courses, and the practice of labeling in student records.

We can also expect some spillover from other youth-serving agencies. For example, there is a growing concern in mental health clinics for the problems of discharged persons and in narcotics rehabilitation centers for after care programs. Implications here are for the concept of terminal education. The futurologists among us are predicting that the emerging generation will live out its life without the educational umbilical cord being cut and that it will require many new forms of education if it is to continually adapt to, modify, and control the changing environment. The student in continuing education will, after each matriculation, resemble an astronaut on a space walk, tethered to a life-support system. But, for education truly to become a life-support system, it will have to purge itself of all its present absurdities, begin listening to the voices of the dolphins—Holt, Dennison, Goodman, Kozol, Leonard, the Schoolboys of Barbiana, Illich, Kohl, Silverman, Postman and Weingartner—or suffer the fate of the dinosaur, and create within itself an accountability commensurate with the importance of such a vital mission.

It is also possible that there will be some spillover from education back into areas such as corrections and welfare, which are also badly in need of showing themselves to be more accountable.

All of this would appear to indicate greater accountability rather than less as we move into the future. The capable educational managers, especially those with a more strongly developed "sense of oughtness," will therefore endeavor to become more knowledgeable about the techniques of accountability and take the leadership in fostering accountability measures, thereby coming into possession of more effective management tools. Where the "sense of oughtness" is poorly developed and/or the bureaucracy is particularly unresponsive and rigid, the appeal to humanistic responsibility will have to be supplemented with coercive maneuvers.

Administrators should thus become knowledgeable about the techniques of accountability, take the leadership in fostering accountability plans and programs (rather than merely allowing themselves, either passively or reactively, to be coerced) and to seize upon the opportunity to promote the development of new management tools to upgrade their professional functions and those of their teachers, enhance the achievement of their students, reverse public attitudes of disgust toward education, and entice the community to return to the fold with feelings of satisfaction, cooperativeness, and perhaps even pride.

THE SCHOOLS COUNCIL

By GEOFFREY CASTON

Educational Values

In nearly four years of work for the Schools Council I have developed strong personal aspirations for it; I want it to thrive because I believe it embodies certain educational values which I think fundamental to the kind of vigorous and compassionate society of which I want to be a member. I will summarize these values in two concepts—pluralism and professionalism.

First: pluralism. Philosophically, this means a system which acknowledges that there are many good ends, that these ends conflict, and no one of them is necessarily overriding. Translated into social and political institutions, it means that there are—and indeed ought to be—many centres of influence, and that we should not worry when these conflict.

Briefly, then, I use "pluralism" in this paper to mean "the dispersal of power in education". Education is an area of social activity in which the concentration of power can severely damage young people. They are, after all, compulsory inmates of schools, and thus, in a very real sense, their prisoners. This is so even though the purpose of their imprisonment by society is not punitive, but beneficent. It nevertheless involves the exercise of power over them; it is forceful intervention in their personal development. They can be harmed by the *misuse* of this power so as to mould them in the image of the state. Or, to put it in a less sinister way, by treating them as instruments of some national manpower policy rather than as self-determining individuals. That is the obvious danger, but in Britain it would be more probable that concentration of educational power would lead not so much to its damaging *misuse* but to a *disuse* which could be almost as bad. A centralized educational system can be too timid to experiment, too fearful of giving offence ever to allow its professional adventurers a free hand. In such a system change, if it is to happen at all, has to happen everywhere all at once. The consequences of failure are then so awful that no one ever dares to take the risk.

The second value is professionalism; and here too I must make clear my definition. For educators, the essence of professionalism lies in the exercise by individuals of choice and judgment in the interests, not of ourselves or our employers, but of our clients: in this case our pupils. These choices must be made in terms of a professional ethic which includes an obligation by the educator to provide service in an impartial way to all pupils, regardless of any private preferences between them that he may have. The obligation to the troublemaker, the drug-taker, is equal to the obligation to the academic or athletic star. Professionalism also includes an obligation to provide this service in the light of all

the relevant and up-to-date information which the practitioner can muster. Educators must always be learners, from our own colleagues, from other professions, not least perhaps from our own pupils. Within this double ethic—of impartiality and open-mindedness—the professional can deny any outside authority the right to tell him how to do his job.

Action and Reaction

In this country, as in many others, educators have been losing professional self-confidence in the face of rapid social changes that are reflected in the demands not only of governments, but of parents and students. The laymen are asserting themselves; the clients become more insistent. Faced with similar pressures some other professions have retreated into gold and ivory towers, fortified by arcane jargon and high salaries. Educators must not, cannot, respond in this way. What we must do is to keep on the move, constantly demonstrating that we are prepared to deal with young people on the basis of their needs as we, acting professionally and in co-operation with others, perceive them. There will always be legitimate professional differences in these perceptions—no one has a monopoly of educational rightness, and the science which underlies our craft is not a precise one. Nor for that matter is medicine or, still less, law. But these differences between us will remain legitimate only as long as we continue individually to make judgments that are both confident and well-informed. That is to say, as long as we are secure enough in ourselves to have these judgments challenged by our pupils and by society, to defend them rationally, but to be prepared to modify them in the light of new knowledge and new insights. And also as long as we are always seen to be putting in first place the obligation to our clients, the children. On their behalf we can, if necessary, question social norms and governmental expectations. But we cannot do so in our own interests.

It is against the background of these values that I see the present and future role of the Schools Council. It is not just a piece of machinery for spending research funds, or administering examinations. It is a witness to a certain style of running an educational system. And it is in that context that it has attracted very wide attention from educators overseas. Its essential quality lies in its potential to boost professional self-confidence in a pluralistic setting.

The Council is concerned with all those problems which involve the quality of education: what to teach and how. They are problems that loom larger today than ever before. There is a world-wide preoccupation with "curriculum development"—"the organized improvement of the curriculum". It is a platitude that the pace of Social change is everywhere outrunning the capacity of the schools to respond. This change takes many different forms, and I can only hint at a very few examples in this paper. Some are changes in the aspirations and demands of the young people themselves. Pathologically these may be expressed in resort to drugs and violence. Constructively they involve a demand by adolescents for an early and effective assumption of social obligations, an urgent clamour that their schooling be patently relevent: they are impatient with prolonged apprenticeship. The schools—like universities—cannot wishfully pretend that their stu-

dents are other than they are. They must work with the clients they have.

Other kinds of change are those concerned with knowledge itself, the nature of subjects and disciplines, the traditional "content of education". In the natural sciences, for instance, the line between physics and biology is becoming as blurred in the junior school as it is the realm of Nobel prize-winning research. In the universities the frontiers of academic disciplines are dissolving, and the schools must face this. Nevertheless, the regrouping of subjects is hard to take. As Musgrove wrote recently: "To ask a physics graduate to take general science or an historian to take social studies is not only to expose him as a narrow specialist, it is to threaten his sense of professional identity."[1] The stress is one that all heads encounter when they try to change the departmental structure of their schools—just as the Schools Council sees it in its sixteen different Subject Committees, each defending its own identity. It has an obvious effect on any development of the whole curriculum, the total range of learning to which a pupil is exposed, and how it is organized.

A third kind of change is in our knowledge of how children learn. A lot of research has since supported William James's assertion in 1892 that learning by discovery, experience, or activity is a principle "which ought by logical right to dominate the entire conduct of the teacher in the classroom."[2] But this does not dispose of the professional problem, which is just *where* to strike the balance between open-ended enquiry methods and the inculcation of those skills and knowledge which teachers know that children need to learn? As Bantock rightly suggested in Black Paper No. 2,[3] it is not a question of structure or no structure, but just how much structure, and this is a matter of delicate professional judgment.

A fourth kind of change is in the skills that society demands of its adults. As the Council Survey of Young School Leavers showed, pupils want to learn practical things, things that will help them to get a good job and then to do it.[4] But the skills that are in the highest demand today—and more so in 1990—tend to be those that are hardest to teach. The number of jobs involving personal services—waiters, barbers, travel agents, teachers, Schools Council Joint Secretaries—is increasing. Even vocationally, skills in human relations will soon be more relevant than skills in the manipulation of tools. And it is much more difficult to devise a curriculum for them. And even more difficult to examine it.

Style of Response

The Schools Council is a part of the administrative system which helps the educational profession respond to these changes—among other parts are local education authorities and head teachers. But the nature of learning is such that only a certain style of administration *can* help. It has to be supportive, and cannot be hierarchical. Administration can be defined as the arrangement of an environment in which individuals pursue purposes. In the case of education the purpose is

[1] F. Musgrove, The Contribution of Sociology in J. F. Kerr: *Changing the Curriculum* (Univ. London Press, London 1968).
[2] W. James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology* (Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1921).
[3] G. H. Bantock, Discovery Methods, *Black Paper Two* (1969).
[4] Schools Council *Enquiry 1—Young School Leavers* (H.M.S.O. London 1968).

learning; the active agent is the pupil. What counts is what happens between learner and teacher. That is where the action is. It is essential that we try to understand the nature of that action—or interaction—if the particular administrative role of the Schools Council is to be intelligible.

As a help to that understanding, I want to quote at some length from a speech made by my predecessor Derek Morrell not long before he died:

"To understand what is really going on in school, we have to come to grips with extremely complex, constantly changing and immensely particular systems of personal interaction, involving complex relationships between the experience, language and values which the pupils bring into the school from their homes and neighbourhoods, and those which are imported by the teacher. If there is positive reciprocity of feeling and aspiration between teachers and taught, satisfying to both, there is a describable curricular reality . . . If not, if there is a total absence of mutual emotional satisfaction, the curriculum remains simply an idea in the minds of the teachers. It lacks reality, even though the teachers talk and the children go through the motions of scholastic activity . . . In the curriculum we are concerned with human beings whose feelings and aspirations are far more real and immediately important to them than the cognitive development which is the educator's stock-in-trade. Value attaches to cognitive development only because it enables people to organize their feelings in interaction with those of others, to frame realistic aspirations, and to acquire know-how in giving effect to them. It is not an end in itself: it is both a tool and a product of successful living, a means of maximizing the emotional satisfactions of being alive, an aid to coming to terms with the facts of pain, suffering and death."[5]

That statement is, I believe, of fundamental relevance to the process of curriculum development. It means that curriculum development can only be something that essentially happens in a school, and that it is the mutual responsibility of teachers and pupils. The system must be organized to support and reinforce that responsibility, and not to diminish it. The Schools Council does a small, but vital, part of that job—the part which it is sensible and economical to do nationally, on behalf of all pupils, all teachers, all schools and all local authorities.

Research talent is scarce, and should not be dissipated in mini-projects all over the country, though there is a place for these. Perhaps even more important, we cannot afford to squander the creative approaches of the most inventive teachers by leaving them to work unheralded in one locality. Teams must be brought together to develop their ideas and to embody them in descriptions of new methods and in new curriculum materials. These can be tried out by groups of teachers in a variety of different situations, and the results—evidence from the experience of different teachers and different pupils—fed back to the developers for evaluation in the classic model first picked up in this country by the the Nuffield Foundation, building on the pioneering work of the Association for Science Education. Then in the light of all this experiment the results must be published so that professionals can choose to use or not to use them, as they wish.

Organized in one way or another, national development work of this kind has been going on in countries all over the world, reflecting the interest of society, as well as that of the profession, in improving the quality of education. But the views of society—expressed through various agencies outside the schools—and those of the profession have naturally not always and everywhere coincided. In the United States, for example, the curriculum development movement started as a move

[5] D. H. Morrell, Paper read to Educational Associates (London 1969).

by university scientists to transform science teaching methods. In the early days there was a certain disdain for the school teachers' part in the process, an attempt to produce curriculum materials which were rashly claimed to be teacher-proof. This is now seen to have been a fatal flaw. Whatever instructions are written down in the manual, however carefully structured the pupils' work cards may be, what is learned is inevitably the product of teacher-learner interaction. It is therefore heavily conditioned by the emotional product of that interaction. As Jerome Bruner said recently: "The effort to make the curriculum teacher-proof was like trying to make love people-proof." [6]

In Sweden, on the other hand—and I am greatly over-simplifying—national changes in curriculum have been, for the most part, based on research in which teachers are fully involved. But there they are beginning to find that even so, because the resulting national changes were prescribed to teachers, apparent compliance with them has very often masked a stubborn and understandable insistence on the part of individual teachers to go on in the same old way. And the pupils take their cues from the teachers, not from the material.

But the British approach has been different. There has been in the last five years a deliberate resort to democracy, an attempt to secure the commitment of teachers by involving them decisively at every stage in the innovation programme. This includes the making of decisions at national level on police and on the spending of money, and at local level in the management of teachers' centres and local development groups. Above all there has been a determination that national work in the development of new curriculum should be concerned only to enlarge the freedom of choice of the teacher to determine, in the light of the best available professional knowledge, what is best for his pupils in his school. Somehow we were going to dispel the notion that teachers were being forced to dance to a tune composed and played by people who knew nothing about their problems. This is not just politically convenient, in terms of pressure from teachers' associations. It is an educational necessity, because a teacher who feels professionally coerced is most unlikely to be able to contribute to a productive relationship with his pupils. They cannot learn self-confidence from teachers who have none.

This can be romanticized, of course: everything in the garden is never lovely. Teaching is full of stress, and there are elements in it that support the description of it as "the paranoid profession"—suspicious, conservative, anxious to disclaim responsibility and to find scapegoats for its failures. But the "we-they" excuse for irresponsibility which is found throughout our society, in labour-management relations, in teacher-local education authority relations and, perhaps consequently, in student-teacher relations must be dispelled. A healthy future for an educational system must lie in constantly asserting and reinforcing the teacher's own responsibility for what he teaches, and with it the pupil's responsibility for what he learns, rather than his subordinate relationship to authority or to an employer. All our educational institutions must be concerned to do this and must be run in ways which foster it. The Schools Council is an institution deliberately

[6] J. Bruner, The Relevance of Skill or the Skill of Relevance, Paper presented to *Education in the Seventies Conference* (Encyclopaedia Britannica Limited, London 1970).

constituted for this purpose, and I believe that its success in the future will be judged primarily by its success in this, and only secondarily by the ingenuity of the new physics syllabuses that it may be able to devise.

The Schools Council Analysed

So let me now try, using this criterion, to analyse the nature of the institution how it seems to me to have worked during the last few years and what might contribute to its success or failure during the next few.

Its first characteristic is the nature of the partnership between central and local government which it represents. From April 1st, 1970, the Council has received half its income in the form of a direct grant from central government through the Department of Education and Science, and the other half from the local education authorities, contributing each according to the number of pupils in its maintained schools. In the Council's early years, these respective contributions, although about equal in amount, had been tied to particular purposes, that from local authorities to research and development grants, that from the Department of Education and Science to payment of overheads, such as staff, accommodation. The Council is now free to dispose of all its income exactly as it wishes. Its independence from central government—which in policy matters was always real—has thus become manifest. This affects its public relations more than its decisions, but by the criterion I am using (getting away from "we-they") public relations are extremely important.

But the unusual nature of this functional arrangement is not so much the contribution made by central government. The more significant element—and the one which startles overseas observers—is the commitment represented by the investment of local government resources. The local authorities have a statutory responsibility "to provide education." They decided, four years ago, to back this by investing their own funds in a natural institution concerned with research and development work designed to improve the quality of that education. What they were saying was that the creation of conditions in which the curriculum can be improved is their responsibility locally, but that they recognized that there is a part of this responsibility which could sensibly be carried out nationally. For this purpose they formed a consortium, to be called the Schools Council. It would produce curriculum materials, research, working papers, bulletins and other publications which it would be for their teachers in Derbyshire, Cumberland or Exeter to adopt, adapt or discard as they wish. But—and this is even more important—the local education authorities were at the same time committing themselves to making a much larger contribution to a local development effort without which the national investment would be abortive. As local administrators they would provide time, money and other resources for teachers to meet together to discuss, to work, if necessary to re-educate themselves, so as to develop their own ideas about the curriculum and, incidentally, to make use of the material which the Schools Council could produce. Hence the Teachers' Centre movement, one of the most encouraging and exciting phenomena in British education in the last few years. They flourish in some areas and languish in others, but they are an essential feature

of the Schools Council's work. Nothing which is written is real until it is read. If you are trying to communicate something you must pay as much attention to the disposition of the receiver as to the quality of the transmitter. So from the beginning the Council has tried to stimulate local development groups which will provide teachers with a reason for using its stuff, and which will set themselves tasks for which they may find its materials useful. The Council's role here has been to stimulate and encourage. We do not ourselves finance local work, and it cannot and should not be our function to equalize, to put Loamshire's financial contribution to work in Barsetshire because Barsetshire has decided not to make proper provision for its own teachers.

So here is the first characteristic and the first strength of the Council as an institution: local authority commitment to it. My hope, and there are signs of it in the strength of support we get from many chief education officers, is that this will grow. My fear is that in conditions of continued financial stringency it is the facilities for local development work and inservice education which will be the first to be starved. There are signs of this happening too: for example the reluctance in some areas to provide substitutes for teachers who want to take part in local development work in school time. But in principle the L.E.A.s are fully involved in the Council and for this we are much envied by administrators in other countries who have not succeeded in finding a way of committing local resources to central research and development work and thereby harnessing to it the local enthusiasm without which it cannot be effective.

The second outstanding characteristic of the Council is that public agencies have been prepared to hand over control of these resources to a body which is in theory and in practice controlled by the teaching profession itself. Here I am certain that we underestimate what we have achieved. I know that there are some teachers who are so determined to be victimized that nothing will convince them that the teachers' control of our decision-making is anything but a sham and a facade. Perhaps at the beginning of the Council's life this was understandably felt rather strongly. But I think now that all of those who sit on the Council's committees and cannot always get their own way—and that is every one of us—know that it is not bureaucrats but other teachers who frustrate them. The Schools Council thus provides an opportunity for teachers to see that whatever their different perspectives as individuals or as groups they are all operating within one system which demands compromises if the interests of individual pupils are to be safeguarded. Perhaps "compromise" is rather a weak word. It is not just that—to use non-Council names—Michael Duane must trade in a bit of his mish philosophy and Tom Howarth a bit of his mash philosophy in order to produce a mish-mash to which each can quarter-heartedly subscribe. What is needed is a recognition that, in a society in which all pupils and parents are increasingly aware of all the opportunities open to all the others, the undiluted pursuit of values which may be appropriate to one group of pupils—say the academically gifted in some special field—may actually damage the educational interest of others.

There are a number of examples of this "one world" problem; one most in people's minds at the moment is that of the sixth form. The contemporary sixth form curriculum is very often seen as a set of rules

for a national competition for which there are a limited number of prizes, places in universities and elsewhere in higher education. In such a situation it is plain that what suits best the needs of one group of pupils, or group of teachers, may well penalize others. The way you set up the rules determines who will win prizes. This leads to conflicts of values and interests. One pupil's (and his teacher's) freedom to pursue high grades in three highly specialized A-level courses limits the freedom of his competitor to do something else which might be of more value to him but which would not qualify him for a prize. The Council—and its relation to higher education—provides for the first time a place in which these conflicts can be mediated and in which representatives of these interests can constantly meet each other with a brief to act collectively.

There is a great opportunity here, but I must confess that there is also great danger. All of us that have watched Council committees and working parties in discussion have been greatly heartened by the visible process of mutual education between individuals starting from quite different viewpoints. I remember with some satisfaction a moment after a recent committee meeting when a newcomer had expressed, very vigorously, views with which I happened to disagree strongly. Someone came to me afterwards and said "He must be a National Union of Teachers man." In fact he was a chief education officer. People's roles get submerged in a new co-operative Council role, and this is very encouraging. I remember also people saying when the Council was set up that nothing could be achieved by a collection of "interests", teachers' associations, local education authorities and others, all striking required attitudes. In fact, it has not been like that—individuals once appointed have modified their sets of prejudices and opened their minds.

The two sixth form working parties have offered an outstanding example of this. They have worked intensively together over a long period on problems which have baffled the profession for many years. The process of private debate has been a greatly beneficial one, but it is disheartening to see the understandings achieved in face-to-face collaboration melting away in the heat of public controversy. In a small group people have to face up to the consequences for others of what they say: on a public platform, or in a letter to the Press, they can get away with almost anything! Our hope for the Council's future must be that in time the quality of the public debate will also improve. One of the Council's functions must be to reduce the name-calling, the stereotyping, the polarization of attitudes which characterizes public debate in the pedagogical profession: Black Papers versus Red Papers, Egalitarianism versus Elitism, Half Our Future versus the Other Half, play-way progressives versus deskbound traditionalists, Pedley versus Pedley.

The Schools Council is a real test of the profession's capacity to take decisions for itself: as an instrument for professional democracy it may assist the development of rational debate about the curriculum and thus continue to ward off outside intervention. Certainly there has been no warrant so far for the early fears of Government interference in our affairs. But if, in spite of all, in the end it is professional polemic and counterpolemic that prove to be the decisive influence, the way will be left open for others to pre-empt our decisions for us. We live in a justifiably impatient society.

The first two characteristics then are central/local government partnership and teacher control. The third significant characteristic is that the Council has no authority over teachers. It may—and I hope it does—sometimes carry a certain amount of weight of professional consensus, and a great deal of the kind of authority which comes from organized knowledge. But not authority in the Oxford Dictionary definition, "the right to enforce obedience". It cannot instruct anyone to do anything. To my mind—though not always to those who command a majority in our ranks—this is a great source of strength. It means that the use of any of the materials or methods which the Council may commend requires a positive act of agreement by the teachers concerned. It is an educational axiom that if individuals do things because they have chosen to do them they do so with infinitely more effect than if they are passively acquiescing in authority. It is true for teachers as for their pupils. "The right to enforce obedience" has no place in an educational process, either between teachers and organizations, or between teachers and pupils. Once coercion creeps in, education begins to go out.

But to enlarge the range of choice open to teachers is to make their job very much more difficult. Just as for a doctor more research or drugs make possible more accurate diagnosis and more effective therapy but also require a constant refreshment of professional competence. The drug companies, however, sell pretty hard, and there are doctors who see in their brochures the easier way. So with teachers there are many who want instant prescriptions and who insist in spite of all the Council's disclaimers on regarding its words as law. This is something that I am sure we must rebut on every possible occasion. The most effective way of doing so is to issue conflicting recommendations on the same theme, and I am delighted to say that we have several times justifiably been convicted of this. By the same token I hope to see not one Schools Council project in, say, mathematics, but several, offering different schemes but offering each with objective descriptions of what they aim at and what they might achieve. Our job is to offer evidence.

The fourth significant characteristic of the Council is that it operates only in the area of the curriculum, and the organization of schools in so far as this affects the curriculum. This gives the Council wide scope, but nevertheless sets limits. It sees the curriculum as comprising all those learning experiences which the school intentionally provides, whether this be the fifth-form mathematics syllabus or its prefect system if that is intended to provide opportunities for learning leadership. The Council is concerned with helping teachers take curricular decisions in whatever school situation they find themselves, in special schools, in pre-school play groups, in comprehensive schools, in grammar schools, in direct grant schools, in independent schools, in preparatory schools, in middle schools or in sixth form colleges. It is not concerned with arguing which of these forms of organization is best, but how, given the form of organization in which he finds himself, the teacher can best do his job. We live in an educational world which is torn by arguments about finance and organization, and to be free of these is a considerable advantage.

These are the four most important characteristics of the Council as an institution: (1) central/local government partnership, (2) pro-

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fessional teacher control, (3) avoidance of authority, (4) restriction of activity to the what and how of schooling—the curriculum. I will now make a few personal predictions about the directions in which the Council will go in the next few years.

The Future

Firstly, I hope it will extend traditional Nuffield-type development work into the more difficult areas of the curriculum. In a way it is no accident that science and mathematics have come first in the United States and here. They are subjects in which teachers are much more ready, perhaps mistakenly, to accept the authority of the expert. What we must look forward to is the far more difficult experimental work in, for example, secondary school history or sixth form social sciences. In a world in which all political debate requires an understanding of sociological and economic evidence this is an essential element in the education of the seventeen-year-old; the seventeen-year-olds seem to agree, to judge from the popularity even of the rather dusty syllabuses in sociology and economics which are all we offer them at present. But at the same time the earlier work in other subjects must be re-examined. There must be no new orthodoxy. Tough though it is, the work must constantly be done over and over again, even in science. Perhaps especially in science.

Secondly, I expect the Council to act upon the increasing awareness that teacher skills and attitudes count for a great deal more in curriculum renewal than do changes in content and materials. It is not the Council's job to provide in-service education—though it is high time it became a little more clear just whose job it is—but it is our job to ensure that those who do provide it are fully acquainted with up-to-date information about new approaches and materials. So I foresee perhaps a chain of centres of in-service education and curriculum research, linked in some way with our projects, perhaps partially financed by the Council—on the model of the Modern Languages Teaching Centre at York University, the Centre for Science Education at Chelsea, or the Centre for Education in the Humanities and Social Sciences about to be set up at the University of East Anglia under the direction of Lawrence Stenhouse. Their job will be to train the trainers. The people who do it will be those who are themselves in the front line of new thought and research about teaching methods and content.

Thirdly, I hope—I am not sure that I expect—the Council to be the front runner in research and development work in new techniques of assessment, designed to achieve a situation in which assessment becomes the servant and not the master of the educational process. In this we will work closely with all the examining boards and with the National Foundation for Educational Research. A little is being done already. Much more is needed and it is probably in this respect that the Council has so far most disappointed its founders, its members and its staff.

Fourthly, and here I am quite confident in my prediction, I see increased emphasis on the stimulation and organization of local curriculum development work, and an expansion of the Council's team of field officers (mostly head teachers on secondment) and

communications services. Not only, or even mainly, communication from the centre to the circumference, but communications between one group, one school, and another. We are already getting geared up for this—though no one yet has found the best means, given the utter inadequacy for this purpose of the written word.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to show the Schools Council as an institution designed to promote the kind of freedom, both responsible and well-informed, which I believe to be essential if the professional clients of educators—the children—are to grow up in the kind of society which I suspect most of us would like to see.

There are three groups of people within the educational profession whom I would characterize—or caricature—as "the enemy" of this freedom. They are all well-meaning and there is a bit of each of them in everyone.

The first group are the lethargic ones. They do not want their job made any more difficult than it is already. They do not want to choose, and so they do not need to equip themselves to choose by reading or by going on courses. They do not mind change if change is the fashion. They will try to do what they are told, though fundamentally their attitudes will be the ones they inherited from their own schooling. As an American science curriculum developer said to me the other day "Teachers teach the way they were taught, not the way they were taught to teach."

The second group of the enemy are the complacent ones. They know they are doing a good job. They have been doing it for the last twenty years and they are damned if they are going to change it for anybody else. They know there is a lot of talk about change and they have read a few books. But it does not seem to have affected the boys in their school, and those that it has they have rejected. As for research, well they are all ready to repeat the bit about lies, damned lies and statistics.

The third group has a fancier name. The dirigistes or the technocrats. They have worked out just what the needs of the nations are in trained manpower for 1988, and they know that in Sweden research has proved that you can teach an infant Boolean algebra by the time he is three years old. They think that some teachers—not many—are competent technicians and ought to be paid more than others. But the most important thing for them is to set a few really clever people to work compiling programmes and work cards that cannot be fouled up by the teachers who operate them. Even if they do not go to that extreme the one thing they cannot stand is chaos. So let things be arranged so that somebody can sit at the centre and make quite sure that everybody in education does what is best.

In my own career, the temptation has obviously been to fall into the third group of the enemy. But it is a temptation that must be resisted. Education is power over individuals and no one is worthy of enough trust to be given that kind of overall responsibility. So we must disperse power, disperse responsibility, and find ways of providing for all of us, whatever our role in the educational system, alternative means of responding to change. From these we can choose the one that will suit our own personal style and the interests of the pupils or students

who are in our care, or the teachers for whom as administrators we provide a supporting environment.

The Schools Council is a most powerful force for decentralization and pluralism in British education today. It gives power to individuals by organizing for them access to research and knowledge which can be made available only centrally. It stimulates, but does not impose the innovation which is the necessary response to change. All this is done under professional control with local sources of finance and with no authority other than that which it derives from its own representative character and the evidence it offers. For that kind of enterprise to be backed with over £1,300,000 of public money is quite a national achievement. Its importance is not just educational. It is political, and it is in that context that the work of the Schools Council should be scrutinized.

HUMAN RESEARCH AND HUMAN AFFAIRS[1]

By SHELDON H. WHITE

We live at a time and in a society where a substantial amount of resources have been committed to research on the development of human behavior. All this seems natural to us, because it has been so within our memory and because society's support of such research rests on exactly the reasoning by which we have committed ourselves to it . . . the belief that careful scientific analysis of human behavior will sooner or later have value for humanity. Probably, most of us do not share the visions of total scientific utopias suggested by some in the past * * * Galton's eugenic prospectus of human evolution directed by scientific anthropometry, Watson's argument for a society organized towards "behavioristic freedom", Skinner's story of Walden Two. But most of us have shared a more modest faith in the ultimate benefit of human research. It comes as a little of a surprise to find that that faith is today called up for justification. We realize, with a little effort, that social support for a scientific study of human development has only existed since the turn of this century . . . since G. Stanley Hall persuaded the National Education Association to support a Child Study Movement in the late 1890's * * * and that it rests on a promissory note. Taken as a whole, psychological research with humans should sooner or later make contact with everyday human activities and everyday human concerns. It should be helpful to people in some way. Our ability to deliver on that promissory note has recently come in for some discussion by government, by students, and by some of us.

Suppose we concede some of the criticisms that have been directed at the study of human behavior to date—criticisms that not all of it means business, that some of it is ritualistic stamp-collecting, that some of it is unsophisticated, and that much of it is not relevant to human affairs and was not designed with such relevance in mind. I think we would be wise to concede those criticisms, wise in a political sense, and wise in a very personal sense. I think the criticisms have some truth to them. Nevertheless, we must now understand that psychological research is playing an increasing role in the direction of human affairs—formally, through the political machinery, and informally, through its everyday role in human activities. We may not like this. We may not feel ready for it and we may not want the scientific and human responsibility that it places upon us. But it is happening and it is impossible for psychologists as a collective group to avoid the task of controlling it and making it rational.

The stories of science tell us that basic research comes into relevance somewhat unpredictably but when it does it does so concretely

[1] Paper presented at symposium, *The Developmental Sciences: State and Fate of Research Funding*. American Association for the Advancement of Science convention, Chicago, December, 1970.

and definitively. First there is the basic inquiry and then, some possibility having been glimpsed and pursued, there is the engineering that leads us to the new product, the drug, the dye, the transistor, the industrial process, something better, something cheaper, in any case. a clean, substantive contribution. But all this may be misleading, because this may not be the way human research does come into human affairs. There are special circumstances.

Consider, as an extreme, popular psychology. Every month. dozens of middlebrow magazines and hundreds of newspaper and TV items communicate a simply astonishing quantity of purported psychological findings to the American public. The swarm of communications is very ephemeral, very mixed, and very irresponsible, and in it reasonable statements by responsible men are jumbled all together with unreasonable statements by wild men. "ESP proved" * * * "The average American has the intelligence of a 13-year-old" * * * "Children can improve their reading by crawling on the floor" * * * "Twins speak more poorly than single children" * * * "Television breeds violence in children" * * * "Scientist proves intelligence is hereditary" * * * "Anxiety seen as cause of cancer" * * * and on and on and on. The flood of information comes and it goes. Every once in a while one of us puts some serious work or some serious writing into the popular stream, but by and large we tend to ignore it. It is slightly painful and it is, on the whole, incorrigible.

Consider right next to the popular psychology, semi-popular psychology or semi-educated psychology. All around the margins of professional psychology, there are those who have had only a brief exposure to psychology, one or two selected courses, who have been exposed to legitimate psychological literature but not a great deal of it and who do not have the kind of seasoning or breadth of exposure it may take to evaluate its weight. I refer here to the teachers and social workers and nurses and business school students who now regularly get some kind of psychology during their training and, beyond them, to the hundreds of thousands of undergraduates who will now take one or two courses in psychology as part of their diversified coursework. The vast majority of them will let it all slide by and will perhaps not use their exposure in any detectable way, but some will use it and the effect can be quite startling. Anyone who lives in a faculty of education, as I do, is quite heavily exposed to it. American education is quite chronically in need of reform—everybody knows that—and no one is more fertile in proposals for reform than graduate students in education. The great majority of proposals for reform in American education that one encounters are built upon a kind of obsessional use of some restricted segment of psychological research or theorizing—salvation through the principle of reinforcement. salvation through discovery, salvation through group encounters salvation through creativity, salvation through Piaget, salvation through the self-concept, etc.. etc. This is the semi-popular psychology at work, not only in education, but in mental health and all sectors of social reform. One may disdain it or deplore it, but it would be a serious mistake to underestimate its force.

I am not here suggesting that we ought to somehow try to clean up the excesses of the popular or the semi-popular psychology, nor am I suggesting that these are the central arenas in which human

research should be directed into human affairs. I am simply trying to make a point about the way psychological research does come into application—not via the scientific discovery, signed, sealed, and delivered—but through very open channels, constantly, usually prematurely, the legitimate mixed in with the illegitimate in an often uncontrollable way. Alone among all the scientific disciplines, psychology talks to consumers who are practicing psychologists. Any random freshman in Psychology 1 is a gifted psychologist who has spent years in the naturalistic observation of human behavior and who is committed to years in which he will attempt to predict and control human behavior. The adroit teacher of Psychology 1 might contrive to avoid teaching him any psychology that he can misuse in his naive practice but Psychology 1 is only a minor forum for the dissemination of human research.

People use the results of human research because it is in some sense inescapably necessary to do so. No other discipline faces this special topsy-turvy situation, that knowledge may be generalized and applied before it is knowledge. All this comes to a head when the government takes responsibility for the betterment of human behavior and human development. Then the informal diffusion of psychological research into society becomes a semi-formal process. We have the policy maker, the politician or administrator making decisions that inescapably require him to speculate about the variables that control human behavior. It is inevitable nowadays that major policy decisions about human health, education, or welfare will involve an explicit or implicit consideration of the weight of psychological evidence bearing on that decision. Further, in the attempt or attempts to implement that decision, there will somewhere down the line be the use of some of the existing techniques of psychological observation or measurement—to establish more clearly the nature or the locus of the problem, to monitor the course of the action program, to implement it. The strengths and weaknesses of these processes do not depend upon the strengths or weaknesses of some intermediate discipline of "applied psychology" . . . I am not sure, here or elsewhere in this discussion, what "applied psychology" is. Everywhere that one examines this process in detail, its strengths or weaknesses depend upon what one understands or does not understand about the basic substrate, the nature of human development, learning, intelligence, socialization, psychopathology, etc. and, as well, on our technical resources . . . our ability to test, to measure, to observe, and to conclude.

The classic case history here, of course, is the history of recent governmental poverty programs—for developmental psychologists, those large segments of those programs that were directed at early education or early stimulation—Head Start, Follow-Through, Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and now, coming along quite rapidly, the emergent national system of day care centers. Psychologists, acting as conveyors or interpreters of research on child development, have played a continuous part in the establishment of most of these programs. How decisive has their influence been? It is extremely difficult to estimate this. Moynihan in his recent book *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* assigns to the politicized academician a very heavy responsibility for the development of the government poverty programs. Not only did he suggest way and means, he

was unprecedented in deciding that there was a problem . . . that is, in crystallizing the issue of poverty as a political issue. Certainly, it has been true since the inception of these programs that the statement of the social issues and the justification of policy have appealed heavily to the data of developmental psychology. The programs have grown upon our knowledge and techniques; they have tested them and they have made issues of them. This is not a benign process. I do not know how many psychologists understand this but I believe it to be true that in recent years the credibility and the meaningfulness of psychological research have been placed at stake in Washington, implicitly or explicitly, wisely or unwisely, necessarily or unnecessarily, by some who have spoken on behalf of that research on the major social questions of our time.

Head Start was justified through scientific arguments that human intelligence could be modified if one began early enough in the child's life. It happened that at the time of the inception of Head Start, Hunt had just completed his important monograph in which he reviewed the historical definition of intelligence and intelligence testing, discussed the early intervention studies, reviewed the psychological studies of early stimulation and Piaget's work, and argued that all these showed that one might indeed treat the development of human intelligence as more plastic than had theretofore been assumed. Hunt's monograph was a scholarly effort appealing in a sophisticated way to a broad spectrum of psychological research and, in the perspective of 1961, it was an important corrective to a tendency prevalent until that time to regard human intelligence as a fixed quantity that would not show changes during childhood except through errors in measurement. There was another important monograph of that time, Bloom's *Stability and Change in Human Performance*, which surveyed the cross-age correlations of IQ scores and which concluded that human intelligence must be least predictable, most modifiable, and most teachable in the preschool years.

In the political discussions of 1964, the Hunt and Bloom monographs, summary representatives of a great quantity of developmental research, were taken as a scientific substrate for a policy argument, the argument that society should invest heavily in the education of the preschool child as a way of breaking the cycle of poverty. Political discussion is not a moderated or a shaded discussion. It is largely conducted by lawyers and it rests upon advocacy. Psychologists might have had a hundred delicate or not-so-delicate reservations about the conclusiveness of the evidence which, on balance, they regarded as positive for the policy. They might have expressed their reservations, but shadings or hedgings were not carried forward in the surge of political discussion and action.

In 1964, the speculative argument of Hunt and the inconclusive preschool findings of Martin Deutsch took Washington by storm in one direction and then, a few years later, the speculative argument of Jensen and the inconclusive summary evaluation of Head Start by Westinghouse took it by storm in quite the opposite direction. Any psychologist familiar with the classic mover of the heredity-environment controversy could have anticipated the Jensen argument . . . he might have mentally sketched it while reading Hunt. But Jensen in 1968 was startling and surprising to some of the policy people. They

had not been led to expect it nor the negative findings of the Westinghouse evaluation of Head Start appearing at about the same time. Subsequent counterattacks showing the weaknesses of Jensen's arguments and the short-comings of the Westinghouse evaluation did not assuage the problem, but only deepened it. The policy makers had realized, by a somewhat painful and cataclysmic process, the most fundamental truth about our understanding of how to stimulate early human development: that it is inconclusive.

During the development of Head Start, there were, roughly, three foci of interaction between human research and human affairs. There has been the broad level I have just been discussing, the policy level, where general questions of the possibility and feasibility of government action have been weighed using evidence and advice taken from social science and social scientists. There has been a second level, the implementation level, where a more random and heterogeneous mingling of research and practice has taken place. When the government decided that there should be massive preschool intervention there were few people who knew how to run preschools, and there were few clear ideas about what the curriculum of an educational preschool might contain. A period of intensive local improvisation began which has not yet settled down today; much of that improvisation seems to have capitalized upon the surface topics of the developmental literature . . . and so one found heterogeneous preschools avowedly using the principles of reinforcement to achieve behavioral objectives, teaching towards verbal mediation, Piagetian conservation, more reflectiveness, field-independence, classification skills, taking the role of the other, perceptual differentiating, etc, etc. Many preschools have been oriented towards the personal and emotional development of children, but here one finds the adoption of goal statements from other streams of human research: one finds various dilutions of the psychologies of Freud, Rogers, and Erikson; one finds notions like extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation, the competence motive, self-actualization, ego strength, creativity, the exploratory drive, etc. Generally speaking, preschool programs have sought to rationalize their practice using the concepts and the data of research on human development. So far no one has had much success in curriculum development using these conceptual adoptions, and there is a perennial market for the latest idea, the latest concept, the latest data from developmental psychology.

There has been, finally, a third interface between human research and these educational programs—the level of evaluation. To an unprecedented degree, the social legislation of the recent past has called for objective evaluations, some attempt to measure the behavior of the children administered through the new programs and to estimate the program's effectiveness. Evaluations have been conducted and reported for all the major educational programs—Head Start, Follow-Through, Title I, Sesame Street, etc.—and these evaluations have generally followed a fairly standard pattern. Children given the program have been compared with children not given the program using some battery of psychometric instruments. The major thrust of the instruments has been towards the estimation of the intellectual development of the children via intelligence tests, tests of linguistic development, school achievement tests. There has been an accelerating argument about the

limitations of our capacity for psychological evaluation, about the compromises that inevitably must be made in the design of such studies and, quite generally, about the grossness of our ability to detect changes in intellectual development and our almost total inability to detect human change in the social, personality, and emotional spheres. These arguments have grown deeper and more pointed as, in most cases, the early returns from the evaluations of government social programs have failed to find strong evidence for their success.

We find, then, that in the compensatory education programs of the recent past, the interaction of human research and human affairs has been intensive but ultimately unsatisfying. At all three levels of interaction— the level of policy, of implementation, and evalaution—there has been a cycle from slightly elevated promises to slightly overreactive disappointment. I am well acquainted with this cycle in the case of educational policy. From a slightly greater distance, I have the impression that it has occurred with regard to other social questions—the need to establish whether malnutrition hinders mental development, the effects of TV violence on children, the desegregation issue, etc. The cycle of promise and disappointment need not be overemphasized. The interaction of policymaker and developmental psychologist reached a new and intense level in the last decade and, undoubtedly, both still have something to learn about what to expect from the other.

The point of all the foregoing is to assert that there is today an important transmission of human research into human affairs. What was earlier asserted to be true of the popular and semi-popular psychology is now asserted to be true of the more formal interplay between expert and policymaker. Basic research transmits into the policy sector—not technology, not methods, not simply these things—but educated guesses about how to proceed. The prudent research scientist may feel shocked when findings are rushed into practical recommendations before he is sure he understands what the findings mean, or before he is even sure they are replicable. The policymaker may feel betrayed when he gradually discovers how elusive and changing his scientific support is from year to year. Probably, in time, we will arrive at a system of interchange which will be more accurately and realistically organized around the true transmission of research into practice.

Given the history of the last decade, there has been mounting concern about the meaning and relevance of research in developmental psychology. Does basic research help? In the view I have been trying to sketch out above, this is not the right question. But still, to confront it directly, yes, basic research has helped, does help, and will help in policy determination because that is all there is. Policy decisions involve guesses, bets on courses of action; responsible administrators will seek to make their guesses as educated as possible. They are using what we now know about how the human mind and personality develop, and they will use it because they must use it.

Assuming this use, one can ask if things are now arranged that basic research can be most helpful. My belief is that they are not, for several reasons:

1. First, about the organization of basic research itself. There is no question that we must find out more about the development of the

child's thought, perception, motivation, emotion, etc. in order to better our present interventive effort. The traditional agenda of basic research on human development is fundamental for any substantial improvement of education, training, rehabilitation, therapy, or social welfare directed at children. But I doubt whether our institutionalized conceptions of how to make scientific progress, those conceptions deeply built into the way universities train students, faculty are hired and promoted, journals accept articles, and the government awards research support. I tend to doubt whether those conceptions can and should stand.

To put a complex matter very quickly and very bluntly, I tend to think that much of what we now do serves to perpetuate old, dilapidated rituals associated with an old conception of scientific development which now seems exhausted. We have stereotyped our view of what a fact, a study, a finding, a theory, ought to look like. We have divided our knowledge of human development according to topic names—perception, learning, motivation, sex differences, etc., etc.—and then we have further subdivisions according to the volume of existing research so that we now have experts on peculiar little fragmentary topics like "human verbal learning"—usually meaning "human verbal memory drum learning"—or "crosscultural studies of children's social development". This kind of expertise is not practical expertise, but it is not very meaningful in a basic sense either.

One cannot quarrel with specialization or the need for it, but it is a peculiar feature of our specializations that our sense of scientific problems and issues has become specialized as well, specialized and tiny. Some say the solution to this problem is through interdisciplinary institutes: get all the experts on sub-sub-issues together and we will resynthesize the problem of human nature. I would argue that the solution would lie in fostering the proper breadth of approach—call it an interdisciplinary approach if you like—within the mind of the specialized researcher. Consider Jean Piaget. The problems he has worked on are, in and of themselves, not broad—children's ability to give formally adequate answers to certain kinds of questions and certain kinds of problems. He has looked at these problems quite broadly, and people play the game of trying to decide whether he is fundamentally a biologist, a psychologist, or a philosopher. Some take his lack of solid professional identification as a clear sign that he is (a) really and truly a genius, (b) really and truly somewhat sloppy and muddled. My own inclination would be to believe that he is one of the few men of our time to approach his problem in developmental psychology with the proper perspective. All problems in human development involve biological, psychological, and philosophical issues.

There is now a need for more basic research in basic research, more grappling with issues and less reporting of studies. I no longer believe that we will have some satisfactory, cogent, nontrivial understanding of human learning through any imaginable extrapolation of what we now consider to be "sound" research in human learning. We can begin to sketch out interesting notions about human learning if we are willing to work with a broad range of information coming from a variety of sources—and if we are willing to estimate and synthesize. It would be helpful if the various institutions that maintain basic research could facilitate this.

Second, about the direction of basic research into policy. Given the history of the last decades, it is more and more doubtful whether basic research—in its good and proper sense—will directly recommend policy decisions. Generally, basic research is ultimately concerned with the basic texture of fundamental cause and effect and process, and the historical trend of basic research in human development has been towards an ever-increasing concern with microprocesses, processes examined in ever-finer detail, and towards an integration of behavioral and biological analyses. Policy is almost always concerned with the large movement of human development, optimal growth in the first year, the best kind of nursery school, the best kind of mental health facility for the maladjusted child.

The intelligent management of such policy decisions will require some R. & D. capabilities that are appropriately broad in scope. To comprehend and make sense of a social issue, we may need system surveys of the size of the Coleman Report, Project Talent, or the U.S. Civil Service Commission Report. To develop and compare alternative approaches to social problems, we may need projects of the size of Follow-Through, the Head Start Planned Vocations experiment or the National Laboratory for Early Childhood Education. To assess the effectiveness of ongoing programs we may need large and complex evaluate studies.

All these call for some active organization of research towards the needs and goals of policy, and it calls for new kinds of research-directing organizations such as the National Institute of Child Development and the National Institute of Education, both proposed in bills now before the Congress. Through such institutes, or through something else like them, we should arrive at a more adequately managed communication between research and human affairs. The policymaker needs to become sensitive to the complexities and uncertainties of our information about human development, and the researcher needs some sensitivity to the complexities and uncertainties of policy.

And now, third, about the development of developmental research. We may imagine a somewhat more adequate program of basic research; we may imagine certain new R. & D. facilities that can serve as breakers between human research and human affairs. Whether or not we do, it is unimaginable that we can proceed forward in any kind of reasonable manner with our present number of individuals committed to research in Human Development and with our present level of support for such research. At the present time, this country contains about two dozen people committed in any kind of serious and sustained way to studies of the development of human learning, perhaps a dozen devoted to the study of the development of human perceptions, another dozen to the development of language, another two or three dozen to the study of the development of reasoning. One hears it said that developmental psychology has been growing explosively, yes, but the growth was from a base that was near zero in the middle 1950's.

There is no quick way to rapidly enlarge the number of competent, sophisticated, seasoned individuals. If, as I believe, governmental planning on issues of human development is inescapably married to our basic knowledge, its strengths and its weaknesses, then it would seem necessary that government planning provide for strong, sustained support for the development of individuals who can build that base of knowledge.

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