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## ABSTRACT

The author examines (in some detail) five images of man--man as a bad animal, man as a blank sheet, man as a mixture of good and evil, man as naturally good, and man as able to transcend himself. Relying on the work of those like Abraham Maslow who follow the view of man as transcendent, the author sets forth her rationale for the assumption that man is a value-selecting animal, in need of a hierarchy of values. The relation of values to actuality, the foundation of a universal hierarchy of values, and the evolution and expansion of the hierarchy of values are examined in detail. A history of hierarchies is traced, leading up to a discussion of self-actualizing individuals and mass progress. The implications of the classical virtues of truth, beauty, and love for the synthesis of a value structure consonant with a self-actualizing individual are set forth. In conclusion, the author calls for a restructuring not only of education, but of all aspects of society to develop such a hierarchy and to promote institutions which foster it. (JY)

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# POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A HIERARCHY OF VALUES

By: ELIZABETH M. DREWS

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"In the affairs of men there is a system."

--Lao Tzu

"Marvels are many and none is more marvelous than Man."

--Sophocles

"Things are ever grouping themselves to higher and more interior laws."

--Ralph Waldo Emerson

"There is a way of thinking which destroys and a way which saves."

--Gilbert Murray

## PREFACE

For more than a decade I have been studying the youthful phalanx of the counter-culture, a group that expanded in both absolute and relative numbers during the 1960s and that I have called the "creative intellectual style" in my research due to be published next year in book form by Prentice-Hall. Their attitudes were harbingers of the values turmoil, the moral vacuum, and the ethical revolution that became increasingly apparent at the end of the decade. As exponents of "new values" which were related to the old, higher values of the great religions and the Democratic Dream, these young people challenged the established system for not living by the values it professed. The more vocal (and some would say, more thoughtful) accused the major society, in fact the Western World, of turning the value hierarchy upside down and placing the lower values on top. They pointed to a discrepancy between principle and practice. Greed in the name of competition, of free enterprise and conspicuous consumption, hostility in the name of power struggle, and overweening pride had supplanted the superior values of equality and fraternity, love and humility. People had forgotten how to live; certainly, they no longer knew how to live together.

My research showed that perhaps half of the intellectually superior young people in the 1960s were what Fortune has called Forerunners (in contrast to the practical-minded and career-oriented). They have emphasized style more than ideology and philosophy more than technique. In the beginning of the decade these gifted students were already muttering about the meaninglessness of much that was being taught in the schools. Already, the most able college students (I worked with honor students at Michigan State University and had contacts at the University of Michigan

where I had completed my Ph.D.) were going into Movement Work and by 1962 had drafted the Port Heron statement. Gradually the slow simmer of rebellion began to erupt volcanically, sometimes unpredictably, into revolution. Based on answers to questionnaires, classroom observations, depth interviews, and unnumbered conversations, I concluded, although the situation was so complex as to defy precise statistical analysis, that a values revolution was taking place.

My research on the creative intellectual style, together with my earlier studies of learning disability and of classroom interaction, has given me clues as well as direct information on values, attitudes, and interests. Again and again I was faced with that most basic fact of life--young people need to find themselves to become their best selves. If what they are is largely what they live for or value, then I needed to know much more about values, particularly the higher ones. Only in this way could I become a better educator and psychologist, and increase my understanding of what it means to be human. In exploring some of these ideas with Dr. Willis Harman, Director of the Educational Policy Research Center at Stanford Research Institute, I raised questions about the historical, cross-cultural, and inter-disciplinary development of values. Out of these discussions came the opportunity to prepare this paper on "the Policy Implications of a Hierarchy of Values." The experience has been a great privilege, a true expansion of consciousness, and something I very much needed in my own development. I hope that others will also find the question raised and the areas explored helpful in their own deliberations.

It has been a wonderful experience to be encouraged to do something that I very much wanted to undertake. Throughout the project Dr. Harman has provided not only support but insightful criticism. I have drawn much inspiration from his work and that of his colleagues at EPRC. Beyond

this, I have returned again and again to two major guiding influences-- the work of Abraham Maslow and of Henry Geiger. Lewis Mumford was re-discovered and found again to be a true philosopher of civilization.

After my early beginnings on the project I found a colleague, Dr. Leslie Lipson, Professor of Political Science at Berkeley, whose long term interests were similar to mine. His background in political science, the classics, and the humanities have supplemented my own in education, psychology, and the arts.



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## POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF A HIERARCHY OF VALUES

This is an inquiry into values, into their source and meaning and their relevance to Man. In the deepest sense, the inquiry is about Man himself. What is Man? That is the perennial question which every generation has asked anew. The answer we are suggesting is this: Man is what he values. By his values, therefore, you shall know him.

It is characteristic of Man to develop pictures of himself and his kind, and of his relation to the world around him. For Man is distinguished from other living creatures by the fact that he is self-conscious. Being aware that he exists, he knows that his awareness endows his life with significance. To understand what this significance may be, he paints a selfportrait or takes his own picture. Both in his thoughts and through feelings of imagination, he is given to constructing images. It is by these that he seeks to portray what he believes his species to be like. Some are monochromatic and impressionistic, but many are done with the full palette and the explicit realism of the candid camera. All are choices or values that Man, acting as his own judge, uses as a basis for self-evaluation. Because there are many styles and colors to choose from, the images vary--but there are some which stand out as particularly vivid and are repeated enough to be representative of a school of thought. Of these, five have been chosen as convincingly drawn and as having recurred throughout history. They are sketched below.

### Five Images of Man

#### Homo Homini Lupus--Man Is a Bad Animal

According to the most pessimistic view, Man is an immoral, anti-social creature whose behavior is stimulated by ever-dangerous instincts.

This is an image which in western thought is at least as old as the Greeks. Both the historian Thucydides and the philosopher Plato allow its spokesmen to express it in their writings.<sup>1\*</sup> The unflattering image of Man as basically evil and destructive received some of its least compromising portrayals amid the revolutionary turbulence of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This, for instance, is how Machiavelli sees the human kind in one passage of The Prince: "For it may be said of men in general that they are ungrateful, voluble, dissemblers, anxious to avoid danger, and covetous of gain. . . Men forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their patrimony."<sup>2</sup>

Calvin brings against all mankind an indictment for sin which he dates from the time of birth: ". . . Infants themselves, as they bring their condemnation into the world with them, are rendered liable to punishment by their own sinfulness, not by the sinfulness of another. For though they have not yet produced the fruits of their iniquity, yet they have the seed of it within them; even their whole nature is as it were a seed of sin . . ."<sup>3</sup>

Similar both in mood and mode is Hobbes who employs psychology rather than theology to construct a grimly pessimistic political philosophy. As thus depicted, Man is completely egoistic. He is concerned primarily with his own interests and security. Toward others he is aggressive and predatory, seeking to subordinate them to his will and thereby eliminate any threat to himself. But if all were left free to act in this manner, the net result would be mutually destructive anarchy, the war of every man against every man which Hobbes describes.<sup>4</sup> If that is not to happen, and if men are to coexist even minimally, they must be conditioned, restrained, and overawed. Institutions must be so organized, therefore,

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Notes and references are given at the end of this paper.

as to curb the evil inherent in human nature and minimize the savagery of which it is capable. Even these, however, cannot escape the taint they are designed to control, because institutions that are good cannot emanate from men who are bad.<sup>5</sup>

Down to modern times the pessimistic picture has continued to have strong proponents. Represented in the nineteenth century by Schopenhauer,<sup>6</sup> among others, it was powerfully redrawn and reinforced by Freud. His hypothesis is thus unequivocally stated: "The bit of truth behind all this--one so eagerly denied--is that men are not gentle, friendly creatures for love. . . . Hatred is at the bottom of all the relations of affection and love between human beings."<sup>7</sup> In this century the Freudian influence has radiated outward from the couches of Vienna and New York to many an academic chair, as well as to the stage, the canvas and the printed page. Nor was its doom-laden analysis unaided by the works of such men as Hitler and Stalin.

#### Tabula Rasa--Man is a Blank Sheet, Receiving External Impressions

In contrast to the image of Man as a slob is his portrayal as a blob. This view characterizes Man as amoral and human nature, at bottom, as ethically neutral. It follows from the psychological doctrine advanced by John Locke in his Essay on the Human Understanding. Man at birth is regarded as a blank sheet. Whatever is imprinted on him is the result of subsequent external stimuli, which are relayed to the mind by sense perceptions. Locke stated his basic principle thus:

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas; how comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an

almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE; in that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.<sup>8</sup>

The social and political consequences that can follow from the application of this principle are indeed significant. Watson and his behaviorist school were not slow at seeing the possibilities or restrained in expressing them. Man, in Watson's view, is simply "an assembled organic machine ready to run." Consequently, as he sees it, "the possibility of shaping in any direction is almost endless."<sup>9</sup> Everything therefore depends on who programs the machine or, to revert to the other metaphor, writes on the tabula rasa. A piece of paper is neither good nor bad. Good or bad is what is written on it. Since Lockean Man is the creature of his environment, if that is good his character will be molded for the good. If it is bad, he will be the same. At any rate, one can readily see why such a political personality as Chairman Mao could find the behaviorists much to his liking. The man who rules seven hundred million persons has this to say: "The outstanding thing about China's people is that they are poor and blank. On a blank sheet of paper, free from any mark, the freshest and most beautiful characters can be written."<sup>10</sup>

#### Man Is a Mixture of Good and Evil

Human nature may also be conceived as a union of opposites held together in dynamic tension. The opposites are good and evil. Man's conduct is then thought of as oscillating between the two poles of his divided nature, so that he is truly a schizoethic.

Throughout its long history, this image has been variously delineated. Not a few religions have held that Man is composed of two natures which are in eternal conflict. In ancient Persia, Zoroaster personified the opposing tendencies as Ormuzd and Ahriman, the former representing

goodness and light, the latter symbolizing darkness and evil. Within Man was the arena for their conflict. "It is the human soul," said Zoroaster, "in which the battle rages."<sup>11</sup> To the same effect is the traditional notion in Christianity that God and Satan are two forces ever competing for the capture of the soul. Dramatically, this idea finds expression in the Faust legend where Man is depicted as bartering his soul to the Devil in exchange for a few years of knowledge and power. "Two souls within me strive for the mastery," wrote Goethe in his latter-day version of the myth.

The same theme is presented as the tragedy of twentieth century Man in the Steppenwolf of Hermann Hesse, where "the wolf from the steppes" finds himself in society, but at war with his fellow men and with himself. "And so the Steppenwolf had two natures, a human and a wolfish one. This was his fate. . . . In him the man and the wolf did not go the same way together, but were in continual and deadly enmity. . . . Now with our Steppenwolf it was so that in his conscious life he lived now as a wolf, now as a man, as indeed the case is with all mixed beings."<sup>12</sup>

#### Man Is Naturally Good and Can Improve Himself

Another view is more optimistic. It envisages mankind--all men, everywhere--as basically good and continuously improvable. All have goals and purposes that they formulate and strive to realize. If some men are seen to be corrupted, this is because the goodness intrinsic to their nature has been perverted by their social institutions. Once the latter are improved, men will more readily exhibit the love, charity and cooperation that are fundamental to them.

This image is the first of those we have considered that tilts the balance in favor of the good. It differs from the preceding images in expressing trust in mankind and voicing a hope for human betterment.

Such an optimistic belief is both dynamic and developmental. It conceives of Man, whether individually or as part of a community, in terms of growth that permits indefinite improvement. This outlook was prevalent among many of the philosophers of the eighteenth century--the Age of Enlightenment--and the nineteenth, with its faith in progress. In fact, it accompanied or was used to justify such revolutions as those in the United States and France. In the latter country, Condorcet<sup>13</sup> was a vigorous champion of the belief in Man's natural goodness and in his capacity to become better than he was.

Likewise, Rousseau, in his earlier writings, contrasted Man's actual depravity with his potential goodness. "That men are actually wicked, a sad and continual experience of them proves beyond a doubt: but, all the same, I think I have shown that man is naturally good."<sup>14</sup> What has corrupted him is his institutions. Hence, if these can be drastically reconstructed, Man's natural goodness will assert itself. This faith is the common ground on which Paine and Jefferson took their stand in the United States. Paine's judgment was as follows: "As far as my experience in public life extends, I have ever observed that the great mass of people are always just, both in their intentions and their object; but the true method of attaining such purpose does not always appear at once."<sup>15</sup> Jefferson argued similarly, basing his idea on the conviction that there is a moral sense implanted universally in all. "Man was destined for society." He wrote, "His morality, therefore, was to be formed to this object. He was endowed with a sense of right and wrong, merely relative to this. This sense is as much a part of his nature as the sense of hearing, seeing, feeling. . . . State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been led astray by artificial rules."<sup>16</sup> With such thinkers it was an article of faith that the use of reason will



lead men toward tolerance, sociability, and respect for others. Later, a group of dedicated idealists and practical reformers--e.g., Jane Addams, William Morris, John Ruskin, Leo Tolstoy, the Fabians, and Mahatma Gandhi--applied this notion in society. Their aim was to design institutions in which human goodness would find an outlet.

#### Man Can Transcend Himself

The last of the five images, as its name implies, transcends the rest. Of the qualities that it imputes to Man, some build upon the usual ways of knowing and seeing; but others can only come from forces as yet dimly defined and understood. Blake has made such inferences, as have Emerson and Jung, and there is more that the mystical religions of the Orient have contributed. In Blake's words: "Man's perceptions are not bounded by organs of perception; he perceives [sic] more than sense (tho' ever so acute) can discover."

"The desire of Man being Infinite, the possession is Infinite and himself Infinite."

And again: "If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, infinite. For man has closed himself up, till he sees all things thro' narrow chinks of his cavern."<sup>17</sup> For these insights, words and logical thinking are inadequate channels. Man is believed to be endowed with potentialities beyond his experience thus far. These are said to originate in the dim forests of the past, in the deepest strata of unconscious memory, and to be evolving toward an Infinite visible only to the eye of imagination.<sup>18</sup> As his potentialities are being realized, Man continues to rise above himself. The self-actualizing person moves forward toward an integrated development of the moral, aesthetic, and intellectual sides of his nature--manifesting himself through service to the good of humanity.<sup>19</sup>

So different are these five images that one is bound to ask: which is correct? The answer is of supreme importance because on it will hinge our attitude toward our fellow men and much of our ensuing conduct. One of these images may in fact prove to be the correct one and may hold true for all persons without exception. But it is equally conceivable that each of the five has its quota of representatives in the human race--in which case we could find examples of bad animals, of blank sheets receiving their imprint from others, of good and evil mixed, and of good in the ascendancy or even transcendent. Or again, it is possible that something of each image may be present within every individual, but the combination may vary in each of us and the resulting character types be differently balanced. Some may incline toward the transcendental or the good; others to the slob or the blob. And the balance may be alterable by circumstance--by a change in events or environment. Some of Hitler's erstwhile henchmen can become gentle nurses; the choir-boy may graduate into the gangster.

Nor should it be overlooked that those who study the nature of man and formulate a general image project a portion of themselves into the image they create or suggest. What an individual says about mankind at large cannot fail to reflect something of what he is himself; and his judgments will be further influenced by the population sample he selects and studies. Freud was a doctor of medicine who spent his life studying the psychologically ill, and who held a jaundiced view of man. In contrast, Jung was a classical scholar who had read the best that has "been thought and said" and, from concentrating on creative and autonomous people, judged that man had a limitless capacity for self-realization. Maslow, as a graduate student studying and impressed by the Blackfoot Indian, became concerned with synergy (the reciprocal effect of the Good Person and the Good Society) and later did significant research on peak experiences and self-actualization. From this, he has concluded that

almost all men--unless hopelessly misdirected by bad education and other faulty socialization--can become self-aware and perhaps can even transcend themselves.

Of these five images, the first two lie on the periphery of this inquiry, since they are not directly relevant to a hierarchy of values. The reason is that, when man is considered a bad animal or, initially, a blank sheet, nothing is to be valued except power--in one case the power to avoid a violent death and survive unharmed, in the other the power to imprint what one wills on the blank sheet of another. But when power is the arbiter of life, there is no other hierarchy than the measure of power. The greater power has the greater right. Such images of Man are relativist, because they exclude any common standard of right. And they are also static, because they deny the possibility that Man can improve himself.

Only when the image of Man embraces the quality of goodness do considerations of values become relevant to human actions through the influence they exert upon motivations and goals. Hence, the last three of the images presented above are necessarily connected to the notion of a complex of values and of a hierarchy within that complex. These images are all predicated on the idea that the individual strives to grow in positive ways--thus becoming uniquely himself and also one with his fellowmen. Such concepts, therefore, are dynamic. They permit--nay, they invite--the possibility of development in the direction of something better than already exists.

## Underlying Assumptions About Human Nature

### Man Is the Value-selecting Animal

Man is distinguished from all other creatures by the fact that he is the value-selecting animal.<sup>20</sup> That is to say, he strives for goals which have value for him; and, in the course of pursuing or attaining his desires, he is consciously making choices. Anything a person does, or omits to do, involves both affirmation and rejection, a preference for A over B, a recognition that one attaches more value to this activity than to that. If we are thinking about these questions at this moment, it is because we consider it more valuable than alternative ways of using the same time.

All people hold certain things to be above others. For example, they think it is preferable to live than to die, to eat food than to starve, to be kind rather than cruel, to see beauty rather than ugliness. Under special conditions, of course, some of these priorities may be temporarily reversed. One who has become overweight from eating may decide to starve for a while--in which case he is preferring a value higher than that of eating, namely health or beauty. But, whatever the circumstance, the fact that alternatives are present means that a choice cannot be avoided. If we spend much of our time watching television, so much less of it will be left for reading or for writing a book, for nursing the sick or for teaching the illiterate. Whoever is a hard-driving, aggressive, ruthless person may obtain certain results for himself by outwitting or vanquishing others. He may show himself as superior in strength or shrewdness and win the laurels or spoils. He may also command others by instilling fear, thus reducing them to apathy. However, in this process he will doubtless forfeit their esteem--and most certainly he will not be loved. So he must make a choice, which will be influenced by his conceptions of which values he holds higher.

### Man Needs a Hierarchy of Values

It follows from what has been said that values have to be ranked in a hierarchy. When various ones are competing for fulfillment, the necessity of choosing implies a judgment that what is preferred is better than what is rejected. Without a hierarchy, therefore, no meaning would attach to the choice. Indeed, in the larger sense, no meaning would attach to life itself. If nothing is thought of as better than anything else, how can a person know which way to try to grow? How does he determine which direction is up and which is down? The individual who does not consciously formulate a hierarchy and seek to live by it does not, by such behavior, rule it out of account. One aspect of our lives about which we have no choice at all is that we must, and do, make choices continually. Indeed, to live is to choose. But what is crucial is whether we are aware that this is the case and consciously confront the responsibility of choosing, or whether we lack this awareness. In the latter case, we doom ourselves to mill and muddle along living capriciously and without clarity of purpose, and being unlikely to develop the best that is in us.

The whole point in existence is to flourish as a human being. This requires a person to think about what it means to be human in the fullest, most developed sense.<sup>21</sup> Since changes are constantly occurring in the development both of the individual and of society, without a hierarchy of values one could not distinguish in any significant way between the kind of growth which is improvement and that which is merely accretion, between the better and the different.<sup>22</sup> A hierarchy of values is needed because it endows human life with a standard for decision-making,<sup>23</sup> a rationale and a goal.

### Values Differ, but All Are Conceptions of the Good

As is already evident, a hierarchy of values has many connotations. All values, as Aristotle stressed, are what humanity--or some humans--conceive to be good.<sup>24</sup> But goodness, in and by itself, is a form--and an empty one unless it has a content. What one calls good may be an act of compassion, a statement of truth, the courage of a person of integrity, the beauty of nature, the physical and psychic energy of a healthy person, and so on. This means that the good is always envisioned in different guises--as truth for example, or as beauty, as justice or love--which may be differently ranked.<sup>25</sup> Not only must a value be valuable to somebody, but it must also be attached to something--and this latter can come in many guises. One may value a person (a saint) or a relationship with a person (one's beloved); a thing (a hi-fi set) or a relation to a thing (private property); or an ethical ideal (such as justice) or some blend of abstract ideas and concrete institutions (such as constitutional government).

A hierarchical ordering of values can be applied, as will be shown later, to the individual (in ideal form, the Good Person) as well as to the community (in ideal form, the Good Society). In addition, the hierarchy of values has been applied to knowledge itself--in the sense that it is more important to learn some things than others. Polanyi, for example, includes under his concept of "superior knowledge" the study of what the "classics have uttered and heroes and saints have done."<sup>26</sup> Plato, in outlining a curriculum for his philosopher-kings, placed philosophy at the pinnacle.<sup>27</sup> Matthew Arnold argued that poetry has an ethical purpose, that it should be "a criticism of life" and should tell us "how to live," and, to do this, should expose us to the best that has been thought and said.<sup>28</sup> And in similar vein, Northrup Frye develops the notion of the "educated imagination," the goal to which the study of great literature can lead.<sup>29</sup>



## The Relation of Values to Actuality

### Values and Facts

The connection between the subjective phenomenon of valuing and the objective existence of the thing or knowledge valued has been much debated by intellectuals and academicians. Most of the latter, as well as the logical-positivists among the philosophers, insist on their separation, denying that value judgments are rooted in facts.<sup>30</sup> Other thinkers argue the contrary; that subjective values and objective facts interpenetrate one another, that values may be derived from real life and that, conversely, experience illuminates the values and contributes to their further growth and reformulation.<sup>31</sup>

In this controversy, although many theorists cannot agree and are unable to reach a verdict, both history and everyday psychology come to a clear agreement. As we have seen, all people develop values. These, perhaps most often tacitly, are formed through experience and observation and are used as a basis for the choices people make in everyday life. Each individual also consciously formulates basic values that he professes to use as a guide for his actions. For the few who live "examined lives," these values probably do serve as a standard. But living by values which are partly conscious and partly unconscious is so complex, and the theoretical and factual are so intertwined, that it is impossible sharply to separate the objective from the subjective.

This inter-relation between facts and values, between the actual and the ideal, may be illustrated from the evolution of the concept and practice of liberty. In a specific historical situation, people may complain about the circumstances in which they are placed. They then demand freedom from abuse A and freedom from B, and advocate positively the freedom to do C, D and so on. These liberties, in the plural, they then generalize into the abstraction of Liberty in the singular. So conceived,



Liberty is an extrapolation which goes far beyond the particulars. But once conceived, it is delivered and will grow with a life of its own. For, from the abstraction, other particular liberties may be derived that can be invoked in the future as new manifestations of Liberty.

Such, in fact, has been the history of some of the most famous formulations of basic human rights. The Magna Carta was drafted by the barons of England who mobilized their power to wring acquiescence from a reluctant king. The liberties in which these nobles were primarily interested were their own--and not those of their inferiors in the English feudal hierarchy. But fortunately for the future, the barons spelled out their rights in language so general that the Magna Carta was not restricted in application to their own small social class. Other Englishmen, therefore, could later invoke the same clauses for their own protection--even against the barons themselves.

The same has been true of the history of the Declaration of Independence. When Jefferson drafted his list of "self-evident truths," the first he affirmed was "that all men are created equal." The emphatic word in that clause was "all." Its scope is universal. Every human being is included. There are no exceptions. Also, in stressing equality, Jefferson rejected the notion that there exist either submen or supermen. Humanity as such does not admit of grades or degrees. It consists of only one class--mankind, each member of which is like all others in being human. At the time when he wrote this, and when he and his colleagues appended their signatures to the Declaration, neither he nor they expected the equality of "all men" to be immediately applied in the government of the new nation, so as to embrace all persons who were female or poor or black. Eventually, however, these extensions did take place--in principle, that is to say, for reality even now still falls far short of genuine equality of opportunity.<sup>32</sup>

### Values--Absolute or Situational?

This sketch of the history of liberty and equality suggests another aspect of values that calls for comment. A value may be formulated as an absolute, that is, as a standard which is complete, eternal and unchanging. Or it may be viewed as part of a particular situation in time and place, as having already evolved from an earlier stage and being in course of evolution toward a later one. The absolute, so envisaged, is perfect; any given situation is necessarily imperfect. The absolute is final; the situation, merely transient. The absolute is timeless; the situation, momentary.

In surveying the discussion of values in American society today, particularly the point of view expressed by the new theology,<sup>33</sup> it becomes apparent that there is a pronounced shift from viewing values as absolute to seeing them as situational. Let us see what is implied in this movement.

In the nineteenth century, there was a common core of values of which most Americans were aware and most shared. For 70 years the McGuffey Readers reigned supreme and gave the majority a common foundation. These presentations to the school children of America undoubtedly were a strong factor in educating the imagination of our grandparents. Beyond this, there were other stable structures. The home was hierarchical and all its members submitted to an authoritarian father as the final arbiter. Although in principle our form of government was considered a democracy, this was belied in the practices of the school, the church, and the home. The opportunity to become an American and to conform to the common American Way was held out to European immigrants who were invited to enter the melting pot where they would be fused into a common alloy.

Among these immigrants were many who came later to make up the bulk of the prevailing structure, as well as others who joined the counter-culture. The newcomers, in other words, fall into both patterns--some conforming unquestioningly to the American Way and others resisting it. The former position had the major support; the latter was a reaction against all that was monolithic, absolute and paternalistic. Furthermore, for the pluralists--the dissidents and the individualists, the rebels and the intellectuals, whether these were new arrivals or from old families--the frontier life provided a safety valve of unparalleled dimensions for creative expression and new beginnings.

From the outset, both aspects of values, the absolute and the contextual or relative, were present in American ideas and attitudes. In fact, both are clearly illustrated in the popular conceptions of democracy. They incorporated some of the static, closely defined thinking of early utopias, thus being lineally linked to the absolutes in the Platonic doctrine of Ideal Forms. But along with this, and in anti-thesis to it, another concept of democracy reinterpreted utopian thought so that all individuals were regarded as entitled to equal consideration within a context of social fluidity. Democracy, so conceived, has been termed the first universal and secular utopia and has come to be defined as patterned flux, in the form of an open, upward, dynamic spiral. With such a notion absolutist thinking was in direct conflict. Rigid interpretations of law and unequivocal rules all demanded unswerving adherence to fixed norms that were not congruent with such fluidity.

Pluralism, in short, challenged the monolithic society. Critiques of the standard American Way came from many sources--through the European eyes of de Tocqueville as well as the American-based opinions of Emerson and Thoreau, Lincoln and Dewey. Early in the twentieth century, the

muckrakers strove to point out flaws in the conventional American interpretation of values, a trend that was carried forward strongly by the social critics of the thirties. The ancient values were and still are revered. But through all of these self-appraisals the continuing problem is how they may be reaffirmed--perhaps reinterpreted--to suit the contemporary context. In the decade of the sixties, certain radical theologians formulated new moral guidelines and a situational ethics. They expressed a new consciousness showing their concern for a larger segment of the society. Not content simply to preach the gospel to its parishioners, the new ministry reaches out to the "forgotten fifth"<sup>34</sup> and addresses itself to the fate of mankind.

The individual is influenced by the structure of his society. A monolithic order tends to shape all people into a common pattern; the pluralistic society allows for diverse and autonomous growth. Democracy's problem is to combine its personal freedom with a core of common understandings and shared values whereby each individual may feel a sense of community with his fellow men and with nature. The difference between these two conceptions becomes all important when the individual seeks to make a responsible moral judgment. One cannot answer Laney's question, "What is going on here?", unless he is an individual who is part of a larger context.<sup>35</sup>

This interest in morality and values has extended far beyond religion. Education's new romantic critics<sup>36</sup> and the leaders of the youth revolution raise many of the same questions. They point to what they regard as the hypocrisy or blindness of the Establishment--in government, in churches, in the schools, and in the military-industrial complex. They challenge Americans to live by their values and creeds, and at the same time to be sensitive to change and new occurrences. Acts that would be just and would express genuine caring for others must take into account

the living, ongoing context. There is no way that this context, and therefore justice, can be defined in advance, nor can there be any assurance that prior laws and rules will continue to apply. Basic values, however, are always applicable and ethical decisions, to be just, must take into account the total context--including the historical antecedents and the contemporary circumstance.

These conceptions closely parallel those of field theory. It holds that no part can be separated from the rest except by symbolic manipulation. In its ultimate sense, the field is without limits or boundaries, within or without, in space or time. At every moment, whether he wills this or not, the individual is changing the situation and the situation is changing the individual. As Niels Bohr has said: "In the drama of existence we are ourselves both actors and spectators."

Humanistic and existential psychologists hold views similar to those of the field theorists. They, too, envisage the individual as interacting with his context both consciously and unconsciously. Beyond this, they observe that he causes change in several ways--by what he says, by how he says it, and by what he is. Thus each individual's "educated imagination" influences the minds of others, and worlds (or force fields) are created by what each thinks or values.<sup>37</sup> What each conceptualizes not only becomes a self-realizing image for himself, but also creates prophecies and expectancies for others. Scarcely a physical scientist now sees nature as something entirely independent from himself, any more than the human scientist views other people as distinct and separate entities. And for the true ecologist, of course, everything--as Aldous Huxley said--is related to everything else.

The student of Zen, in working with his master, Yusutani-Roshi, asked what was barring his way to enlightenment. Roshi replied:

Consider these flowers in the bowl on this table. You look at them and exclaim: 'Oh, how beautiful these flowers are!' That is one kind of seeing. But when you see them, not as apart from you, but as yourself, you are enlightened.

The student still did not understand why he could not become enlightened and asked what kept him from seeing things as he should. Came the response:

Your enemy is your discursive thinking, it leads you to differentiate yourself on one side of an imaginary boundary from what is not you on the other side of this non-existent line.<sup>38</sup>

As these tendencies to more holistic and fluid thinking increase, as boundaries melt and the self and the not-self merge, Western academics are beginning to point out the inadequacy of linear thought and show more understanding of the mind frame of the Eastern mystics. McLuhan noted how our thoughts have been constricted by the two-dimensionality of the printed word.<sup>39</sup> His contention has been that the Global Village of TV images offers a more complete view of what is going on than do the printed pages of the newspaper. These multiple and simultaneous views are held to be, not only more authentic but more efficient and economical. Eastern and Western sentiments come together at many crossroads. John Ciardi's observation that "It takes less time to see a springtime than to write about one" is one variation of the ancient theme expressed by Confucius: "A picture is worth a thousand words."

Once new ways of thinking are legitimized, once it is accepted that boundaries can vanish and multiple impressions can merge, values also change in that new kinds of relationships come to be understood and prized. (At least the understanding and valuing seem new.) For example, many ecologists believe that the balance of nature is a kind of ultimate value. As Colwell said: "The balance of Nature is. . . a natural norm, not a product of human convention or supernatural authority."<sup>40</sup>

## Values--The Complementarity of the Relative and the Universal

To consider values as absolutes or as rooted in particular situations leads to another pair of aspects--the universal or the relative. These too may be illustrated from the ecological crisis that we now confront and the population crisis that is a part of its cause. All men have become neighbors on this planet before they have learned to be brothers. Can they become brothers in time to save themselves? This is indeed an urgent question. Everywhere around us the relative is immediately observable. Skins vary in color, food habits differ, marriage customs are numerous. But are there overriding commonalities? Do all men everywhere possess, or strive for, common values that can make them a single community? Are universals discernible--whether at the foundations of our existence or at the highest levels of our soarings? If there are, can they unite that which is so discrepant and diverse?

These questions lead to the large and fundamental question: Are values always relative or do some apply universally? If the former, it is impossible to speak of a hierarchy as valid for other than the person who happens to adhere to it or outside the specific culture to which he happens to conform. If the latter, then a common standard for evaluating individual and social improvement can be formulated for all mankind. In the former view, values are inescapably subjective, particular, and parochial. In the latter, some values at least are objectively based in the constituents of human nature, and are both universal (in the sense of being valid for everyone) and global (valid at every time and place).

This problem, a source of perennial controversy among philosophers and social thinkers, is probably as good an example as can be found of the intellectual propensity to draw distinctions that hold up in the categories of logic, but do not hold true in the complexities of life. For the solution to the problem propounded above may possibly turn out

to be that the question has been wrongly stated. When a dichotomy is presented--e.g., when it is initially postulated that a value is either relative or universal, the conclusions may be vitiated by the prior assumption. It may be that some values are relative and others are universal, and that these seemingly contradictory factors coexist by virtue of the complementarity principle.<sup>41</sup> Or, to state it differently, certain values incorporate aspects of both relativity and universality. Thus these two categories may not be so mutually exclusive as some logicians would have us think. In the next section, we shall see how this complementarity permeates a hierarchy of values.

### Foundations for a Universal Hierarchy of Values

#### Biological, Psychological, and Anthropological Bases

The work of biologists and psychologists has demonstrated that all human beings are different from one another but that they also share the same fundamental needs--a demonstration of the complementarity between the universal and the relative, the absolute and the contextual. These needs result from either deficiencies or potentialities. The former occur because of an emptiness that wants to be filled. When filled, such needs are satisfied--at least for the time being. Potentialities are capacities that want development. For this process, however, there is no limit. Those who are developing their potentialities to a high level are the ones we call self-actualizing.

A need is not a value. It is a need for something. The organism welcomes or approves as good whatever can meet a deficiency or fulfill a potentiality. It is this to which we attach value. Regardless of the nature of the need--be it potentiality or deficiency--there are various ways of meeting it. Since we may select from among several means, a range of choice is open to us. Such choices entail preferences and priorities--and consequently an ordering in a hierarchy.



Let us look into these points. In order that life be maintained, certain physical needs must be satisfied. These are deficiencies that want to be filled. Food, clothing, sleep, sex, and shelter are obvious examples. Each culture satisfies them differently. The Australian Blackfellow wears no clothing even during the chill nights in the Outback of central Australia but seeks the comfort of the warm ground and the glowing coals of a waning fire. In contrast, the Eskimo has walled himself off from vastly more severe climatic conditions by the world's most ingenious thermal clothing or by the protection of virtually heat-tight igloos. Both native groups survive remarkably well and both, in strikingly different ways, seek the same objective--protection against the rigors of the cold.

More remarkable and less known perhaps are the outer limits of physical potentialities. These appear, according to Dubos,<sup>42</sup> to be the common genetic heritage of Man and to be only slightly developed among most members of the species. In response to needs, these potentialities often emerge to a most remarkable degree. Through his acutely tuned senses the Blackfellow, living in an arid semidesert, can fathom out hidden water-holes and even judge accurately the amount of water before it is seen. Similarly, a blind person can measure distances and depths by the "feel" of the air. Vision, too, can be trained to go far beyond its usual range. An example is the hunter who can detect minute changes in the physical environment.

Potentiality responds to need when individuals summon unusual strength in times of crisis. Relatively small men have lifted cars or other heavy objects to release a pinned-down victim. Evidently, such physical possibilities do not have to remain inaccessible and normally unused. They do not have to be held in reserve, as it were, for those situations which exert such great demands upon the organism that they break through the

walls erected around most potentialities by habit or disuse. The same may be said of the border areas in which the physical and psychological both reside. William James, for example, writing on the "second wind,"<sup>43</sup> suggests that most men have great funds of endurance and energy available after initial fatigue is felt. The point is that the person must value the "second wind" sufficiently, and then through virtuosity make good on the choice to go the extra mile.

When we explore the realm of what is commonly demarcated as psychological, it is apparent that there are needs and possibilities of equally fundamental importance. These, too, are common to all mankind, and form a hierarchy from lower to higher, from deficiencies to potentialities. Maslow has demonstrated that human beings function at their very best, are healthiest, and are developing their capacities to the fullest when they are in the process of actualizing the values which stand highest in intellectual, aesthetic, and spiritual terms--namely, love, goodness, truth, beauty, and justice.<sup>44</sup> But, as in the area of the physical, one's potential in these spheres is apt to be disregarded, so that most of the range of psychological capacities remains too rarely recognized or used. Goodman is perhaps extreme when he claims that people characteristically use only 2 percent of their abilities, and Coleman could be overstating the case when he asserts that most high school students are learning only ten minutes out of the school day.<sup>45</sup> Nevertheless, such estimates are too common to be disregarded.

The fact remains that Man has great capacities which he could call upon at will if he so desired. The question then is why he does not choose these options. Is it that he does not even know that these are choices he could make? All too many people seem to be unaware that their capacities are needs and that, if these do indeed "clamor to be used," as Maslow says, the organism turns a deaf ear.<sup>46</sup>

If in all men there are great unused potentialities, as would seem to be the case, what are the even greater forces that dam up the springs of attribute and will? What keeps them from flowing at freshet strength? Maslow and Jourard suggest that a common barrier is erected by the fact that, as a human being becomes socialized, he becomes alienated from himself. Normality numbs him. He loses his ability directly to experience himself psychologically and biologically. In addition, he loses contact with others and with nature. He does not reach in or out, physically or psychologically. He forgets, as Read has eloquently reminded us:<sup>47</sup>

What is common to the psychic structure of mankind is the only secure foundation for a community of behaviour and aspiration.

This truth is essential for the individual organism to grasp. If we treasure health (not just the absence of illness), and the joy of intellectual discovery (not just getting our work done), we should, as Jourard says, "redefine values by which men live, to satisfy more needs and to acknowledge more self than is presently the case."<sup>48</sup>

Perhaps our theorists, researchers, and educators are at fault--at least in part. Nor can the media and the arts plead that they lack an influence, designed or otherwise, on the public. Their messages, as Krutch says, are all too often "counsels of despair."<sup>49</sup> Russell claimed that we "imagined ourselves into littleness, darkness, ignorance." It was his counsel that we "imagine ourselves back into light."<sup>50</sup> Too often, our social prophets speak of doom and apocalypse, and too rarely of promise and potentialities. As we have seen, the Freudians have mainly ignored Man's capacity for goodness and transcendence, choosing instead to focus on the sick half of psychology.<sup>51</sup> Nor can many experimental psychologists accept these higher values within the circumscriptions of their chosen frame of reference. Characteristically, their focus is reductionistic and tends to study the human being largely in piece-meal



ways and only in terms of objective evidence. What cannot be seen is often not recognized to exist, and what cannot be measured does not count.

Humanistic theorists, in contrast, have tended to give the whole person a central role and in this way to include the inner as well as the outer man. Will, purpose, and decision-making thus become important. Man is credited with an imagination, one of the qualities that not only differentiate him as a human being from other species, but also link him universally with all men. But he is also tied to his fellow man in many other ways. The structuralist anthropologist, Levi-Strauss, has shown how men are united throughout the world by myth;<sup>52</sup> while an earlier anthropologist of the philosopher-generalist cast, Kroeber, spoke of the "psychic unity of mankind." Chomsky refers to a universal syntax that is inherited by each human being.<sup>53</sup> Jung, in his discussions on the collective unconscious and universal archetypes, concluded that the individual, if free and healthy, can draw upon a "psychic non-ego" that unites him with other men and with nature.<sup>54</sup> Man can transcend himself by reaching out to all mankind and to the non-human world as well. While doing this he exhibits qualities that are inimitably human. Through possessing an imagination he is oriented to both past and future; he could and does dream of Golden Ages and envision new utopias. Characteristically he fashions a world view and simultaneously sketches in an otherworldly future. Symbols and abstractions are his media. His "world in his head" could be communicated with others and the life of the mind add richness to the artifacts and machines with which he overlays the natural world.

In all of these areas man must make choices and, as he does so, he settles upon a hierarchy that is more or less stable. Comparative studies of human societies around the world supply evidence for the point that a hierarchy of values is incorporated in human nature itself. The

anthropologists and sociologists generally agree about the data which their research has revealed, but frequently disagree over the interpretation. Observing the diversity of morals, some arrive at a relativist outlook. As Ginsberg contends after an exhaustive survey, some relativists are so impressed with the fact of variations that they either overlook or greatly underrate the prevailing similarities.

It is the universalists such as Ginsberg and Kluckhohn who stress the common factors found in all cultures. Ginsberg holds that "diversity in the actual content of morals" is not incompatible with adherence to common ethical principles. He believes congruence between cultures is far greater than divergence. Citing Westermarck, a relativist, to the effect that "moral rules laid down by the customs of savage people . . . in a very large measure resemble the rules of civilized nations," Ginsberg has drawn up his own list of the moral elements common to all known societies.<sup>55</sup> These include the prohibition of homicide within a more or less extensive, but well defined, sphere; rules forbidding bodily violence or injury to the person, in addition to insults or attacks on honor and reputation; and the condemnation of pride and arrogance. Everywhere, he finds that positive approval is given to doing good and furthering the well-being of others, to mutual aid and generosity, to telling the truth and keeping promises, and to property rights in some form or other.

The diversity observable in moral judgments can be explained, according to Ginsberg, in terms of differences in the moral importance of the "same" acts in different social situations or institutional frameworks. For example, the same act might be considered moral in one situation and either non-moral or immoral in another. Polygamy or polyandry, for instance, may be justified by societies where one sex is in oversupply.

Further testimony is accumulating from a wide variety of sources in support of the view that all men share in certain universal traits and that all acknowledge or aspire to the same higher values. Kluckhohn found that certain values united mankind across cultural boundaries and inferred that these formed "some basis for human agreement on what is desirable for the furtherance of life."<sup>56</sup> Kohlberg, writing about "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," found considerable similarity to prevail in the stages of character development of children in several cultures.<sup>57</sup> In similar vein, Kiell demonstrated from his cross-cultural study of adolescents in different historical periods that, while their experience does vary "in its more specific aspects," yet there is a "common factor in its more general characteristics." According to his findings, "the basic affective and biosocial life of the adolescent is universal for virtually all cultures and throughout time."<sup>58</sup>

A corresponding conclusion comes from Laubach's work with illiterates, in particular, their responses to teaching. He found that learners tend to coincide in their statements about what makes a good teacher-- their ideal type being the one who treats each student "like a Rajah."<sup>59</sup> A Harris poll completed in 1969 on a large sample of American high school students found remarkable unanimity in their characterization of the "good teacher."<sup>60</sup> In this light we can understand such an event as the international Odyssey which Danny Kaye undertook some years ago on behalf of UNICEF. Visiting school after school in countries where he could not speak a word of the language, by the broad universal appeal of his compassionate humor this gifted man achieved such immediate empathy with children everywhere that his message easily transcended the barriers of language.

### Ethical and Aesthetic Bases

One perennial source of values and of their arrangement in a hierarchy can be found in religious teaching and moral philosophy. All the principal religions of mankind, like all ethical systems, incorporate an image of Man as he could be if he were to develop his potentialities to the highest. These ideals are not statements of what is, but prescriptions of what ought to be. They are extrapolations beyond reality to an ultimate ideal of perfection ("Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect"). As such, the values they incorporate are envisioned as goals for human striving and as models to guide human growth. On this point, Ralph Barton Perry has written: "It is of the essence of ideals that they should be unattainable. They define not what men possess but what they seek."<sup>61</sup>

Moral philosophers and religious leaders are far from being unanimous in the ethical doctrines they teach or preach but on certain basic points, their views converge toward a consensus. In general, they envisage man as compounded of the biological and the spiritual, as an animal creature somehow kindled by a spark from a more than mortal fire. They therefore urge all men to control their desires and channel them toward the good, to live in peace and amity with their fellowmen, and to feel in their hearts that others are brothers.

That there is this degree of consensus is manifestly important, and it is something that cultural relativists do not and cannot explain. The similarities in the conception of the higher virtues held by Buddhists, Christians, Confucians, Jews, and Muslims, cannot be understood except in terms that are basic to human nature and universal to all men.<sup>62</sup> Doubtless it was this truth--a truth extending beyond the rational to the realm of the mystical--that has inspired a number of poets, philosophers, psychologists and statesmen to affirm their belief in a common bond which links men together.



This belief has been expressed in various ways--many of them non-verbal and noncognitive. Rousseau, for instance, postulated in his concept of the General Will that one and the same interest unites all members of a group (a notion whose logic can be extended to include the entire human race) and that all people would consciously will this if they were sufficiently enlightened in their judgment. Following Rousseau, Blake conceived mystically of all mankind united in the Infinite. Emerson espoused a transcendental philosophy that spoke of "the universal heart of all." Lincoln alluded to "the mystic chords of memory" and, as we have seen, Jung elaborates this into the notion of a reservoir of common experience and belief transmitted from generation to generation through a "collective unconscious." This was an idea not unlike Kroeber's concept of the "psychic unity of mankind" and the assumption of the English philosopher, Hobhouse, that there exists a "Central Mind."<sup>63</sup>

As in the case of other virtues, these universal qualities coexist with specific "rules of conduct" which are held as ethical guides for the culture that espouses them. Although the relationship between the universal ethic and the specific rule of conduct might be considered complementary, at best the symbiosis is uneasy and at times the universal and the specific are antagonistic. To illustrate this, let us consider the term social. Part of the problem can be summed up in the statement attributed to a great philosopher: "I love mankind. It's just people that I can't stand."

When philosophical and religious leaders interpret what they mean by social, they usually make it clear that they are speaking of universal brotherhood and the ability to live in peace and amity with others. This is quite different from the way that Jules Henry uses the term in Culture Against Man as he discusses the "socialization process" in the schools.<sup>64</sup> In his view, the schools emphasize competition and winning more than

working together and sharing. In such a situation the slower children come to envy, or even hate, the brighter ones and are induced to cheat as their only recourse to get the good grades demanded by their parents or their own pride. Maslow is similarly critical of the conventional morals and the values they embody. The latter, he claims, are simply an expression of the "pervasive psychopathology of the average." "The ordinary ethical behavior of the average person" he maintains, "is largely conventional behavior rather than truly ethical."<sup>65</sup>

Some who have studied the process of socialization have concluded that much that society does destroys the natural goodness inherent in the child. The Scottish psychiatrist, Laing, feels this is the case:

By the time a new human being is 15 or so. . . .  
we are left with a being like ourselves, a half-  
crazed creature more or less adjusted to a mad  
world. This is normality.<sup>66</sup>

Yet researchers and writers in the social sciences and education often seem to work from the premise that the adult knows best and that the child must be trained to be loving and good, to be honest and true, i.e., to be ethical. As Rich puts it, "Most rules are developed by adults and then transmitted to children." Although he accepts Maslow's concept of self-actualization as representing an ideal direction of growth, Rich also talks about moral growth and social orientation as being related to winning and to more clearly defined rules. "Between the ages of seven and eight," he reports, "a less egocentric and more socially oriented outlook develops. The child now tries to win . . ."<sup>67</sup> These attitudes have their effect on such a concept as brotherhood. At a universal level, this would appear to mean that all men on the face of the earth are created equal and have certain inalienable rights. Some have commented, however, on the way mankind has responded to equality: "Yes,

but--some are more equal than others." Thus the pilgrims, whose lives were presumably motivated by a desire to be both good and God-fearing have been criticized by other Americans for their lack of ethics in dealing with the American Indians. Mark Twain's trenchant statement summarizes that thinking: "First the pilgrims fell on their knees and then they fell on the aborigines."

How we erect an ethical hierarchy can be examined further. Most of the researchers and theorists develop hierarchies and apparently believe that civilized adults are more moral than children, primitive people and--of course--animals. Yet there are others who would upend the ladder or place it on the ground. Neill claims that when children are given freedom to learn in their own ways, they come to love one another more and work together better than those who live by rules, moral or otherwise. A follow-up study of Summerhill graduates seems to support his view.<sup>68</sup> Montague also challenges the idea that man is necessarily a selfish and competitive creature, arguing instead that he is by nature cooperative.<sup>69</sup>

A Micronesian chieftain was quoted by Price as saying:

Before the foreigner came we lived in peace. The forest fed us--simply but sufficiently. We did not work. Is work a virtue when nothing is to be gained by it? Neighbors were friendly. Children obedient. Life was a tradewind without gusts or squalls. But now comes struggle--struggle for money. Money for what? We do not need clothing--the sunshine clothes us. We do not need an iron roof to carry water into a cement tank. The water that streams down the trunk of a tree can be turned into a jar.<sup>70</sup>

In a natural society, as Read says, there is no distinction between the psychology of work and play.<sup>71</sup> But in the United States, following the Puritan tradition, to work is good and "the devil finds work for idle hands to do." Among primitive people, as anthropologists have pointed out, ways are found to feed all in the tribe. There is communal sharing

of the food available. Yet in recent years it has become increasingly apparent to thoughtful people in the civilized nations that many among us are allowed to go hungry. On the world level, perhaps more than half of mankind is hungry and vast numbers starve. Even in such a wealthy nation as the United States it is estimated that at least a fifth do not have enough food and many are seriously malnourished. Anthropologists have gone so far as to criticize the ability of civilized man or woman to love. Lowie claims that there is "almost a direct ratio between rudeness of culture and gentleness with children."<sup>72</sup> Read attributes what he calls "the superior cohesion of primitive communities" to the fact that they "evolve their patterns from the collective unconscious."<sup>73</sup>

Other investigators place major emphasis on the destructive tendencies of early man and his animal predecessors. They point less to cohesive patterns and more to the history of human discord. In such a context, modern man's cruelty and incessant hostilities seem almost inevitable. Not only is he a bad animal, but so were his distant relatives. Robert Ardrey, who depicts Man in African Genesis as a descendant of predator apes, asserts that war has always been the most natural mode of human expression and that Man inherited this tendency directly from his animal predecessors. He regards it as wrong to view Man as a creature with innate talent for living creatively and peacefully, but who has gradually degenerated as the race became "civilized." To speak of Man being born good, but being destroyed by the adult society and its institutions, is dangerous talk. Instead, Ardrey believes that we should congratulate ourselves on the progress we have made as we have emerged from our unlikely origins. For, as he says,

We were born of risen apes, not fallen angels, and the apes were armed killers besides. . . . The miracle of man is not how far he has sunk but how magnificently he has risen. We are known among the stars by our poems, not our corpses.<sup>74</sup>

In contrast to that view, others who have studied the lives of animals have noted the high degree of cooperation found within a given species. Animals, in fact, rarely kill wantonly or in mass the way men do. Kropotkin made extensive studies of these behaviors in the late nineteenth century. As a young man, this Russian prince became disillusioned with government-imposed discipline and had second thoughts about other issues while serving for five years with a Cossack cavalry regiment in Siberia. It was during this time that he studied the habits of wild animals. Darwin's Origin of Species was then the talk of intellectual Europe but, from his first-hand observations, Kropotkin felt the savage laws of social Darwinism did not apply to the creatures that he had observed in their natural habitat as gentle and loving. He noted that mutual aid was practiced among higher animals, even the carnivorous ones. Hence, he concluded that Man could learn lessons in wise behavior from them.

Allee felt that men might profit by modeling their own behavior on that of animals. He suggested: "An organization of the nations of the world devoted primarily to meeting these and similar human needs would be based on the great drive toward natural altruism that extends throughout the whole animal kingdom."<sup>78</sup>

The ethical characteristics that all men share in common are paralleled by the aesthetic. Not only are justice and goodness intrinsic to Man, but so also is beauty. Psychological studies have shown that people react negatively to, and are depressed in, ugly surroundings. A beautiful environment, on the other hand, is uplifting and inspiring.<sup>78</sup> The reports of peak experiences that occur in sublime settings are universal. Though there are variations in style and taste from century to century and from civilization to civilization, the love of beauty itself is endemic, ubiquitous, inextinguishable.

All literate peoples have celebrated beauty in poetry and song, particularly the beauty of nature. Likewise, in the oral ballad tradition there is much evidence that preliterate and illiterate men have always been moved by the mystery and wonder of it all. Prehistoric burial mounds have been found to contain the remains of dried plants that best answer the descriptions of flowers. This is a theme which Lydia Maria Child has universalized, pointing out that all men have blessed flowers, wreathing them "round the cradle, the marriage-altar and the tomb." A delight in flowers, she observes, unites the Indian child of the Far West and the Persian of the East.<sup>77</sup>

In the drama Prometheus Bound, when the hero is tortured for bringing to mankind the fire he had stolen from heaven, Aeschylus has him invoke the elemental forces of nature--earth, sun, sea and sky.<sup>78</sup> In similar vein, the Roman poet, Lucretius, writing On the Nature of Things, opens his work with an invocation to Venus, the symbol of life, creation and beauty both in the physical world and among humans. Duke Senior, in Shakespear's As You Like It, sounds much like a modern ecologist in praising the life of simplicity and frugality. By dropping out of the power-oriented "rat race" and rejecting conspicuous consumerism, one could return to the beauty of nature and to peace of mind. Not only would life take on new meaning (or perhaps a truer meaning), but the individual would also be more secure. As the Duke phrased it: "Are not these woods more free from peril than the envious court?"<sup>79</sup> For him, the Forest of Arden afforded the same kind of haven as Prospero had found in the enchanted Island of the Tempest. Nor should one forget that the myth of the divine creation, as it was imaginatively sketched in the Book of Genesis, places Adam and Eve, while in their state of innocence, in a garden. The human species, in other words, is conceived as being harmoniously adapted to a naturally beautiful environment.

This is a topic to which the art and thought of the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth continually returns. The conflict in values between material means (money, status, power) and spiritual ends (beauty, tranquillity, authenticity) was stressed repeatedly by the Romantic writers. Wordsworth stated it simply and directly in his poem entitled "The World":

The World is too much with us; late and soon,  
Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers;  
Little we see in Nature that is ours;  
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!

He went on to say that we are unresponsive to Nature's grandeur and that disharmony pervades our entire lives. "For this, for everything, we are out of tune."

Bryant saw the problem similarly and suggested that Nature contained revitalizing forces:<sup>80</sup>

Stranger, if thou has learned a truth  
needs  
No school of long experience, that the world  
Is full of guilt and misery, and has seen  
Enough of all its sorrows, crimes, and cares,  
To tire thee of it, enter this wild wood  
And view the haunts of Nature. . . .

Such a feeling is akin to Emerson's thought that the love of nature is a way to experience "the currents of the Universal Being," or to John Muir's belief that in nature one arrives at the center of meaning: "I'll interpret the rocks, learn the language of flood, storm and avalanche--and get as near the heart of the world as I can."<sup>81</sup> Tennyson, too, had this in mind when he reflected on the "flower in the crannied wall":

Little flower--but if I could understand  
What you are, root and all, and all in all,  
I should know what God and Man is.

For not only is the natural wonder of things revealed, in the immensity of the sky, the broad expanse of earth, or the vastness of the ocean, but it is equally contained in the smallest of nature's handiworks--in "a leaf of grass" (Whitman) or "a grain of sand" (Blake).

So interpreted, our relationship with nature remains ever intimate and inseparable. Not only the air we breathe, but all of nature, is a vital part of Man himself. Thus, unless we maintain communion with the nature which is our common birthright, we cannot become fully human. Nor for that matter can we lead lives that are healthy and enriched. "To watch the corn grow, and the blossoms set," wrote Ruskin, "to draw hard breath over plowshare or spade; to read, to think, to love, to hope, to pray--these are the things that make men happy." For it is nature that enlivens the senses, gives pungency to perception, and immediacy to experience. "Climb the mountains" said Muir, "and get their good tidings. Nature's peace will flow into you as sunshine flows into trees."<sup>82</sup>

This mood of peace and joy, which a sense of harmony with nature universally evokes, has ever been a source of inspiration to the creative arts. In the western world, that outpouring of genius in the late eighteenth century and the nineteenth which we call the Romantic movement owes much to such influences. Alike in literature, painting, and music, this movement was committed to two great themes: that, because nature and Man are good, Man lives best in harmony with nature, and that it is wholesome for us freely to express spontaneous feeling. The Romantics glorified the universal qualities which all men, even--or perhaps particularly--the most primitive and least lettered, have in common. These are the bonds that link each individual to the rest of humanity as well as the roots that tie him to nature. It is these that evince to a Romantic the unity, the rhythm and the rightness of it all.





In such beliefs, the complementarity of the universal and the relative, the nexus between the absolute and the situation, are clearly evident. For the aesthetic values of nature and of art are universal in appeal; but their myriad forms or styles are intimately rooted in culture, time, and place.

Rousseau, more than any other single person, gave romanticism its launching impetus. Both primitive men and children, as he understood them, are easily--should one say "naturally"--in tune with the natural. Only "civilized" men, who have been corrupted by society and twisted by its institutions, have to make an effort to recapture the primal essence of the world in all its original goodness and beauty. The Romantic gospel spread quickly throughout the arts, across Europe and to the emerging United States, whose omnipresent frontier made people receptive to the message. Thus Jefferson--philosopher, scientist, architect, statesman, and one of the geniuses of his age--expressed an unequivocal preference in his hierarchy of values:

Those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God if ever he had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape from the face of the earth. Corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon of which no age nor nation has furnished an example.<sup>83</sup>

The love of the soil and of the occupation closest to it leads easily to the notion that a life in harmony with nature and conforming to its ways is pure and wholesome. Thus the Romantics not only drew inspiration from the physical aspects of nature, but also extolled (idealized, perhaps) the folkculture of the peasant. Painters filled their canvases with landscapes, poets communed with the elements, and composers wove into their symphonies the melodies of the folkdance. What is more, the Romantic spirit appreciated the works of Man which bore the signs of use

and had the touch of the antique. For what was more natural than to feel in the present a kinship with our own past?

Reverence for such values can be illustrated from many of the civilizations of mankind, notably those of Asia. When the doors of Japan were opened to the West, the country's ethos was thus described by the first American envoy. "There is an equal absence," wrote Harris in his diary, "of any appearance of wealth or of poverty--a state of things that may perhaps constitute the real happiness of the people. . . . It is more like the golden age of simplicity and honesty than I have seen in any other country."<sup>84</sup>

To this end, many of the traditional elements of Japanese culture contributed. Through the practice of Zen and its rituals, especially the tea ceremony, an effort was made to relate the life of the individual to the universe. The austerity and simplicity of these practices were felt to give man a release from the material concerns of life, which were held to obscure both ultimate and immediate reality. What was wanted were the barest life possible, the life of poverty, wabi. This was the direct route to basic truth and inherent beauty and, seen from this viewpoint, the most ordinary materials--bare wood and rough clay--become works of art. A companion concept, sabi, refers to the beauty of age, and usually to a tranquil, lovely spot which has aged naturally. Engel points out that it is ". . . frequently used in Buddhist scripts to designate ultimate liberation from worldly passions and sorrows. . . . nirvana."<sup>85</sup> Through such approaches Japanese artists in their gardens, paintings, and other art forms try to present "the indescribable essence of the universe."

Man's universal quest for beauty and harmony is both inspired by the earth on which we live and is also transcendental. The latter aspect of romanticism is epitomized in the poetry and pictorial art of Blake.

Blake was on easy and apparently direct terms with the mystical and the supernatural. He moved dramatically away from the classical and the Aristotelian, reinstating the Platonic and setting the stage for the American transcendentalists. Throughout his work, the absolute could be seen to permeate the smallest manifestations and the universal coursed through unendingly relative vehicles. "To hold Infinity in the palm of your hand" refers both to the One Infinite and to the myriad hands of all mankind outstretched throughout the world in supplication or celebration.

From this, it is but a few steps to Byron and Shelley, Emerson and Thoreau, Chekhov and Ibsen, Grieg and Tchaikovsky. The universal values know no frontiers of time or space. Thus it is that for most peoples, the truly great art of all periods, representing all cultures, has strong appeal.<sup>86</sup> This is particularly true of the art of the Golden Ages, the great creative epochs--the architecture of the Italian Renaissance, the music of Austria and Germany, the paintings of Holland and Flanders and the novels of England and Russia. Great literature (The Bible, Hans Christian Anderson, the Arabian Nights, Cervantes, Goethe, Lao-Tzu, Shakespeare, Tolstoy) communicates universally, as has been shown by the fact that such masterpieces become best-sellers in many languages. It also explains why a medieval Christian cathedral, a Buddhist temple or an Islamic mosque, the Taj Mahal, the Palace of the Doges or the Alhambra, should all be venerated by people from every land and culture. If no values were universal, and if none were higher than others, how could this be possible?

It is clear that throughout history Man has celebrated beauty as a quality that enhances life. He has created this beauty or sought it out or discovered it by serendipity in his own artistic triumphs and in nature's cornucopia. These all contribute to peak moments and, as we have seen, represent universal experiences. But are there other functions of

art that all men share? In what other ways do art and aesthetics contribute to the enrichment of human life?

On this point, those who have explored the theory and philosophy of art, particularly John Dewey and Sir Herbert Read, have much to say. Art, they hold, is the great unifying force in all human communities and has been perhaps the most enduring element in human civilizations. As Camus observed, "Man cannot do without beauty."<sup>87</sup> It helps Man to make sense out of the myriad impressions with which he is bombarded in day-to-day living. Art then is more than basic to life; it is the very essence of life. Even though bread be the staff of life, Man cannot live by bread alone. Without art, individuals become alienated and the human community deteriorates.

Those who are most attuned to the aesthetic, who easily recognize the intrinsic rightness of things, are also those who are healthiest in a psychological sense. Reversing this, there is evidence that psychologically healthy people, wherever they are found and regardless of race, culture or class, not only prefer goodness (i.e., kindness, gentleness, tenderness) over evil, but like trained artists will choose beauty over ugliness. As Maslow points out:

It is only in the healthiest, most mature, most evolved individuals that higher values are chosen and preferred consistently more often (and that only under good or fairly good life circumstances).<sup>88</sup>

However, it is not just the psychologically healthy that are able to perceive beauty. Those apparently whose talent is highly developed in one area and who may not be self-actualizing may nevertheless be discriminating in their choices of beauty. Interestingly enough, those with the most highly developed sensibilities--the practicing artists--have been shown in a study by Irvin Child to be much more like one another,

in their tastes and choices of "preferred art," irrespective of their culture, than they are like non-artists in their own society.<sup>89</sup>

There is considerable agreement that the healthy community and its citizens and artists produce great art. What the latter celebrate is the drama of life and not pale shadows or hollow echoes--theories of art, grammar or rhetoric. For art is a bond among men that conveys the real meaning of thoughts and religion. Through it, the latter, as Dewey said, are "changed from doctrine into living experience."<sup>90</sup> Read contended similarly that "life itself is aesthetic" and that it is a mistake to delineate a world of art and set this apart from life. If we regard art, as Shelley did, as the ultimate way of teaching and can also concede that it works through the imagination--i.e., through empathy and love--we begin to see the inseparability of the higher values. As Shelley said, "A man to be greatly good must imagine intensely and comprehensively." Edwin Markham expressed this succinctly in his small verse entitled "Outwitted,"

He drew a circle that shut me out--  
Heretic, rebel, a thing to flout.  
But Love and I had the wit to win:  
We drew a circle that took him in!

Dewey conceived of art as a part of all living, as the heart of being. He used the following analogy to express his view:

Mountain peaks do not float unsupported; they do not even just rest upon the earth. They are the earth in one of its manifest operations.<sup>91</sup>

According to him, all people value aesthetic experiences. They enjoy doing all manner of things "in part, at least, because of their aesthetic quality." They enjoy watching fires--the great holocaust of the three alarm as well as the glowing coals of the campfire. They are captivated by life and growth--as the midwestern American farmers go out on hot

nights to "hear the corn grow," or as people record weight gains (at least of babies and children) with delight, or as cultural groups raise flowers which, with great satisfaction, they watch come into bud and bloom. All have also used decoration in many parts of their lives. Bodies are decorated in a fantastic variety of ways, from sequined cocktail gowns to well-polished nose rings; and surroundings and tools are decorated and beautified with loving care.

Art is present, Read contends, in all things that men make which "please our senses."<sup>92</sup> All human groups experience this delight in hearing, tasting, smelling, touching. Or in Yeats' words ". . . [Art] bids us touch and taste and hear and see the world." Different peoples, however, through predisposition or training, exemplify this universal characteristic in different ways. Thus certain communities may center on a particular type of sensory expression or appreciation. The Japanese, for example, greatly value tactile experiences, as Hall has pointed out.<sup>93</sup> The bowls used in the Japanese tea ceremony are artistic creations of the highest order and are particularly valued for their shape and texture. As the tea drinking proceeds, each bowl is handed from one kneeling participant to the next so that all initiates can not only partake of the fragrance and the taste of the thick green tea, but also can "feel" the bowl. These tea bowls are sometimes covered with high gloss glaze but often the most prized among them are irregularly shaped and have a rough clay outer surface.

Students of the Far East recognize that the Japanese prize the natural and all that directly or symbolically expresses nature. However, Read contends that the "form" that is basic to all the art of all people tends to relate to the elementary forms of nature. It is his conclusion that, since nature is always the base, the "formal properties" of art do not vary from country to country nor from age to age. He believes that

"the touchstone outside the individual peculiarities of human beings . . . is nature." By nature he means "the whole organic process of life and movement which goes on in the universe, a process which includes man, but which is indifferent to his generic idiosyncrasies, his subjective reactions, and temperamental variations." These forms are outer manifestations but are also intimately related to the inward. Imagination, which all men possess in all cultures, finds its best expression through their art. Art enables the individual to coordinate and give meaning to chaotic impressions, so that, as Read says, "experience falls into shape."<sup>94</sup> Beyond this, it unifies the "enduring elements in a civilization."

Throughout history, Dewey claims, art can be viewed as an enduring element:

"The glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome" for most of us . . . sum up those civilizations; glory and grandeur are aesthetic.

It was his view that art expresses the aliveness as well as the quality of life in an era. In turn, it is the most persuasive teacher. The world over, it serves as a natural, soft-spoken counselor-guide, far more effective than the pedant. In Dewey's words:

Art is more moral than moralities [since the latter tend to become] consecrations of status quo, reflections of custom, re-enforcements of the established order. The moral prophets of humanity have always been poets even though they spoke in free verse or by parable.<sup>95</sup>

### Evolution and Expansion of the Hierarchy of Values

In the course of their histories, both as concepts and in social and political practice, hierarchies of values have undergone continuous (though by no means even and consistent) evolution. Over the centuries



this evolution has taken the form of an expansion in an open, upward spiral, ever broader and more inclusive.<sup>96</sup> The expansion has occurred in two directions--the development of the individual into the Good Person and that of the community into the Good Society. Before these are explored, however, certain preliminary distinctions should be drawn to clarify the meaning of a hierarchy of values, particularly in relation to the concept of change or development.

First, one may distinguish between stages of development simply in terms of the time sequence--i.e., in virtue of the fact that something occurs later than anything else. No hierarchy is involved in this; nor is any value implied, since no necessary correlation exists between early or late and either good or bad. This should be clear if we consider the value which some persons attach to modernization, on the one hand, or to antiques, on the other. Modernization is sometimes advocated with the implied assumption that the modern way of doing things is the good one and the traditional way is bad--a clear instance of a non sequitur. Conversely, there are some who are so enamored of anything old that they may approve it, irrespective of whether it be useless or ugly or positively harmful. Novelty, as such, contains no more inherent superiority than does antiquity.

Second, there is a kind of development that consists primarily in a change of magnitude--i.e., a growth from small to large. This is a process of mere accretion or aggregation, such as heaping stone upon stone. Its effects are quantitative and are measurable on a numerical scale. As with a sequence in time, mere increase in size connotes neither hierarchy nor a change in value. Nevertheless there are some who confuse bigger with better or talk as if more goods spell the good. This is especially true of those who judge a person or a community by a materialistic calculus. According to this, an individual who owns or earns more is

"worth" more--a significant abuse of the term--and a country becomes better as it increases its GNP.

A third type of change is marked by an alteration of the internal structure and of the relations between the parts that compose the whole. This is the development from simple to complex, from an entity that is relatively undifferentiated to one that is highly differentiated--with the accompanying assumption that the latter achieves a substantial degree of integration. In this case, there is certainly an element of hierarchy. but it is not invariably true that the more complex is superior. Admittedly, if one compares the human brain with that of a bird, the greater complexity of the former is one aspect of its superiority. But certain structures, e.g., some very big bureaucracies, can grow to the point where complexity becomes self-defeating because other qualities (morale, for example) are lost in the process. Moreover, what should we say of a person whose brain has advanced in complexity to the point where he is able to conceive and construct a thermonuclear bomb? At this particular task, such a brain is superior to the majority of its contemporaries and to its ancestors of one million years ago. But is its possessor morally superior?

The fourth kind of development is the only one that may properly be characterized as a hierarchy of values. This is qualitative change which is so designated. It is marked by a progression from lower values to higher, from inferior to superior, and postulates a ranking, or set of priorities, among the values themselves. In this case, one distinguishes different stages of development (or types of change) by evaluating them, which means judging some conditions better than others. For all values, as was said earlier, always involve someone valuing--which remains true irrespective of whether they are considered relative or universal, situational or absolute.

As will become clear when we discuss the evolution and expansion of the hierarchy of values, some of these four aspects of development are sometimes confused. What appears at first glance to be a hierarchy of values may turn out on closer inspection to be simply a sequence of changes occurring through time, or perhaps an increase in size or in complexity. In certain hierarchies, as in some schemes of classification or taxonomy, the value orientation is stated explicitly. In others, values are implied in the examples that are chosen or in the allusions to other work that is clearly value-oriented. In still other cases, values are ostensibly (or ostentatiously) excluded. But even where neutrality of judgment is claimed, one will often discover an ordering or selection of the material that fits the values of the writer's culture--as, for example, the Judeo-Christian ethic is generally influential in Western Europe or North America. And it sometimes happens that a taxonomy which is labeled neutral by the theoreticians<sup>27</sup> who formulated it may be used as a scale of values by practitioners.

Keeping in mind these cautions and distinctions, let us now see how the hierarchy of values has been applied to the development both of individuals and of communities.

#### Toward an Integrative Image of Individual Growth

One of the principal ways in which the hierarchy of values has evolved has been an enlarging concept of the growth of the individual, viewed in terms of what he is and can become. This concept can properly be called integrative. It envisages the actualizing of human potentialities through a dynamic process of stages of development to higher levels, always more complete. Each part (aspect or facet) of the human being may be developed in turn, or several may proceed to grow or unfold simultaneously; and each interacts upon the others within a constantly expanding whole.

This process can be witnessed in the infant as he begins gurgling and babbling, the prelude to speech. Next he may explore walking patterns (during which the talking does not always progress but may be stored, as it were, temporarily on a shelf). Having mastered the rudiments of walking, the child may return to talking, which is integrated with walking. Later he proceeds to the more advanced stages of growth--learning, evaluating, thinking creatively and critically.<sup>98</sup> This aspect of a hierarchy of values--the integrative--is dynamic, open and upward, always in process of becoming. What occurs during the process is not merely a coordination or convergence of acts which, viewed externally, exhibit a pattern of relationships. In a deeper sense, the integration takes place subjectively within the human psyche.<sup>99</sup>

The more highly evolved man is a human being, in the fullest and most complete sense. He has such distinctly human characteristics as a respect for life as we know it, a vision of life as it may be, and a knowledge that he can make choices which will affect his own well being and that of his counterparts, both contemporary and future. His intellectual development has not become crystallized at a skill level, but has proceeded to the point where he is thinking in terms of unifying theory and is himself contributing to new integrations.

Much more is known today than in earlier times about the human personality and stages of character growth. Many of those who have studied the nature of individual development have charted it as hierarchical, but what supports the apex is not always clear. It is as if all of the mountain except the peak were wreathed with fog. In general there is much in common between World War II research findings on character growth, various hierarchical constructs relating to self-actualization or ego development, and positive mental health as described by Jahoda.<sup>100</sup> Although these depict the highest level of ego or character development

in similar terms, there are differences in their conceptions of the hierarchy itself. Some have traced a developmental sequence and a character-ology, irrespective of age level. Others have formulated steps that lead to this highest level by observing concrete stages of growth in average children.

The stages of development that will be presented here are built from a number of research studies and theoretical statements. It is important to recognize that this kind of grading in successive stages or levels (the developmental sequence) is abstract and therefore somewhat arbitrary. Inevitably, every model is a simplification. However, there is a striking convergence of views as to what is high and what is low, what is superordinate or subordinate. These formulations include hierarchies constructed to represent milestones of ego development (Loevinger<sup>101</sup>), moral stages (Kohlberg<sup>102</sup>), levels of human existence (Graves<sup>103</sup>), character development (Peck and Havighurst<sup>104</sup>), intellectual and creative growth (Drews<sup>105</sup>). The building of these schemata, although often derived from field studies, is, as noted above, a formalistic and a necessarily intellectual process. Kohlberg, Peck and Havighurst, and Drews based their classifications upon observation and research with children and youth. Loevinger, Graves, and--to an extent--Maslow<sup>106</sup> use more purely theoretical constructs. However, Maslow's highest category, the self-actualizing person, is founded on his studies of such individuals.

Not all those higher order images of man, referred to later as levels VI and VII, have been presented with supporting hierarchies, as has already been observed. Nevertheless, most of those who discuss or project various ultimates in human potential, as well as the growth ladders by which the heights are reached, hold that only a few attain the higher levels of development. Those, moreover, who regard man as basically and potentially a good animal or as a being with transcendent qualities, are convinced that the mass of humanity do not begin to approach



their potential pinnacles of personal development. On the qualities of the ideally good person--and the varying degrees in which the vast majority fall short of the ideal--there is a remarkable similarity between the twentieth century statements of Rogers,<sup>107</sup> Mumford,<sup>108</sup> A. Huxley,<sup>109</sup> de Chardin,<sup>110</sup> Polanyi,<sup>111</sup> and those made throughout the ages by the spokesmen of the great religions and philosophies.

### The Stages of Individual Development

Figure 1 on the next page lists the seven Stages of Individual Development that have been derived from the work of representative theorists and researchers.

As the Figure makes clear, some theorists and researchers have formulated hierarchies that include all of these stages. For example, both Loevinger and Graves have seven levels.<sup>118</sup> Others have the same completeness of detail, but within a more limited range or age sample. If infants are excluded, what Kohlberg has called the pre-conventional--stage 1 and what Loevinger divides into two stages--the presocial or autistic and the symbiotic--will be omitted. It is the latter's view that "the ego can hardly be said to exist prior to the end of this stage."<sup>119</sup> This first stage appears to resemble Graves' Reactive level, where the primary search is for "satisfaction of basic physiological needs." Neither Drews' Creative Intellectual nor Peck and Havighurst's Rational-Altruist was placed in Level VII, since in both cases their categories were developed in work with adolescents; and, although they could well apply to adults, this was not the intent of these studies. On the other hand, the formulations by Bucke, Arnold, Maslow and others all came about as a result of a study of adults through biographies, observations or personal acquaintance.

Figure 1

THE STAGES OF INDIVIDUAL DEVELOPMENT

<u>Level I</u>	Presocial (Loevinger <sup>101</sup> ), Reactive (Graves <sup>103</sup> ).
<u>Level II</u>	Impulse-ridden (Loevinger), Animistic (Graves), Pre-conventional, stage 1 (Kohlberg <sup>102</sup> ), Amoral (Peck and Havighurst <sup>104</sup> ).
<u>Level III</u>	Opportunistic (Loevinger), Materialistic (Level 4, Graves), Preconventional, stage 2 (Kohlberg), Expedient (Peck and Havighurst), Social Leader (Drews <sup>105</sup> ).
<u>Level IV</u>	Conformist (Loevinger), Ordered existence (Level 3, Graves), Conventional, stage 3 (Kohlberg), Conforming (Peck and Havighurst), Studious (Drews).
<u>Level V</u>	Conscientious (Loevinger), Belonging (?) (Graves), Conventional, stage 4 (Kohlberg), Irrational-Conscientious (Peck and Havighurst), Studious (Drews).
<u>Level VI</u>	Autonomous (Loevinger), Personalistic (Graves), Postconventional, stage 5 (Kohlberg), Rational-Altruist (Peck and Havighurst), Creative Intellectual (Drews), Fully Functioning (Rogers <sup>107</sup> ), Specialist (Arnold <sup>112</sup> ), Productive Personality (Fromm <sup>113</sup> ).
<u>Level VII</u>	Integrated (Loevinger), Being-motivated (Graves), Postconventional, stage 6 (Kohlberg), Gifted Generalist (Arnold), Self-Actualizing (Maslow <sup>106</sup> ), World Man (Mumford <sup>108</sup> ), Universal Man (de Chardin <sup>110</sup> ), Fully Human (Huxley <sup>109</sup> ), Arete (Socrates <sup>114</sup> ), Cosmic Consciousness (Bucke <sup>115</sup> ), Superior Person (Polanyi <sup>111</sup> ), Beautiful Person (Jewish, Chinese Traditions <sup>116</sup> ).



Level I Loevinger divides the first stage into two--presocial and symbiotic. The presocial (or autistic) stage is one in which the child does not distinguish between animate and inanimate parts of the environment. In the next stage (symbiotic) the child separates mother, but not self, from the environment. This is a pre-language (infancy) stage and seems to correspond to Graves' Reactive Level. This is a level in which the individual seeks satisfaction of basic physiological needs and predominantly values cessation of tension. Infants and mental retardates are generally placed at this level.

Level II Loevinger describes this as an impulse-ridden stage where the child lacks control much of the time. Interpersonal relations are exploitive and dependent. Kohlberg's stage 1 of his pre-conventional level probably fits here. There is unquestioning deference to superior power. Peck and Havighurst describe their amoral character type as what is often called clinically the "psychopathic personality"--a person who gratifies his whims and impulses without regard for their effects on others. Graves indicates that his Animistic stage, although ascribed to primitive people rather than children, is dominated by attempts to manipulate the world to obtain security.

Level III At this stage Loevinger speaks of an expedient and opportunistic morality. The individual attempts to get the better of others and to control them. This is much like Peck and Havighurst's Expedient Adolescent and Drews' Social Leader who seek to manipulate and to win by any means. In general, this is a level corresponding to Kohlberg's stage 2 of the pre-conventional, in which the individual's main purpose is to satisfy his own needs. "Human relations are viewed like those in the market place."<sup>117</sup> Graves seems to reverse the general order by placing his Materialistic, "will to power" stage above the conforming one (Riesman's "tradition-directed man").

Level IV In this stage, conformity is the dominant pattern. This has been particularly well documented and is the subject of wide comment and research by psychologists and social scientists. Here we have the picture of the individual as absorbing the color of his group and largely internalizing its rules and mores so that he normally conforms without thinking about it. Kohlberg speaks of this as the good-girl and good-boy orientation. One seeks approval by being nice and is rewarded accordingly. Drews noted that in the schools this was the behavior that was most often lauded by the majority of teachers as well as by administrators.

Level V Here, morality is wholly internalized. Rather than conform, the individual follows his own conscience and is less apt to respond to group pressures. People at this stage are usually self-critical and guilt-ridden. Peck and Havighurst speak of the blind or rigid superego at work. It is their view that the Irrational-Conscientious type demonstrates an alternative form of childlike morality, occurring at the same developmental level as the Conforming type. Loevinger, however, places this level above conformity in the developmental sequence. She points not only to the increase in internalization but also to a change in interpersonal relations. The latter, as she says, are now "seen in terms of feelings and traits rather than actions; they become more vivid, intensive and meaningful than in the earlier periods."

Level VI This is the stage that has been designated as autonomous. The individual has become more self-aware and recognizes many inner conflicts. He is searching for his identity and is troubled by internal inconsistencies. For Kohlberg, this is the beginning of the postconventional level and is "characterized by a major thrust toward autonomous moral principles which have validity and application apart from the authority of the groups or persons who hold them

and apart from the individual's identification with those persons or groups." But in Loevinger's conception, "Interpersonal relations remain intense." People at this stage recognize their mutual interdependence as well as the need that each has for autonomy. Drews stressed the independence of mind that characterized the Creative Intellectual adolescents she studied, while Peck and Havighurst noted the concern of their Rational-Altruist for "the welfare of others, as well as himself." Both the Creative Intellectuals and the Rational-Altruists were found to work actively for their principles.

Level VII At the highest stage, which Loevinger calls integrated, the individual has grown beyond coping or even beyond creative autonomy to an Olympian or Cosmic View. He remains responsible but now also is engaged in a "search for meaning." Kohlberg describes his postconventional level--stage 6 as a time when the individual makes decisions of conscience and chooses ethical principles that appeal to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. Maslow speaks of the "reconciliation of opposites" as achieved by the self-actualizing person. This is the individual who is realizing his potentialities in terms of what Maslow refers to as B-values, i.e., love, truth, beauty, justice. At the highest level of all, as some believe, certain rare individuals are capable of attaining a transcendental state where, as Blake thought, "everything appears as it really is, Infinite."

The ways that individuals reach the apex may vary widely. But when they have attained a very high level of development, there is much similarity in the descriptions of how they appear to others. Likewise, religions and philosophies speculating on the ideal have made closely approximating statements about what the ideal is. In other words, it would appear that at the highest levels of development, all of the more superficial differences--age, sex, social class, religion, color, or ethnic group--become unimportant.

Kohlberg discusses what he calls "The Final Step," where the individual "has disentangled his judgments of--or language about--human life from status and property values (stage 1), from its uses to others (stage 2), from interpersonal affection (stage 3), and so on; he has a means of moral judgment that is universal and impersonal."<sup>120</sup> He says he was told by anthropologists that he would have to learn "a whole new set of values for each new culture," but his research disclosed convergence both in what was valued and the ways the values were ranked. Social class and religious differences were also found to be relatively unimportant. He reports that "middle-class and working-class children move through the same sequences, but the middle-class children move faster and farther." Further, the sequence did not depend upon a particular religion since the development of morals did not differ significantly "among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Moslems and atheists."<sup>121</sup>

To present the stages of individual development in such a schematic form may appear to imply that all individuals invariably proceed through these same stages in the same sequence. Such, however, is not necessarily the case, for the patterns of individual growth are many and diverse. In fact, it is well known that no two lives--even of identical twins--exactly replicate one another. Certain researchers, such as Kohlberg who modeled his work on Piaget, contend that a maturing individual must

necessarily pass through all stages of growth in a fixed and predetermined sequence, or as Kohlberg phrases the thesis: "All movement is forward in sequence, and does not skip steps."<sup>122</sup> He recognizes, however, that children can move through these "true" stages at varying speeds and that an individual's growth may stop at any stage.

The knowledge of individual development that has grown out of other theories and unstructured observation seems to point to other equally valid conclusions. If a child is naturally good and if it is society and its institutions that corrupt him, it does not seem logical that he would follow an "invariant developmental sequence" and go through a "Lord of the Flies" stage. He might instead express brotherly love as a very young child.<sup>123</sup> In other words, if one holds that a certain inherent goodness is a characteristic of at least some very young children, all stages may not be experienced by all children. Some children will not engage in cruel behavior even "when there are holes in the power structure."<sup>124</sup> It also would appear that stages need not be experienced in the same sequence. Further, psychological or mental health is not the same as maturity. It is conceivable, and perhaps possible, that goodness (including adherence to truth, appreciation of beauty, etc.) may in some cases be already developed in the very young--as Athena in the Greek myth was said to have emerged fully armed from the head of Zeus or as a child's insights might reveal that he is attuned to what has been called Cosmic Consciousness. In that case, we would not be saying that goodness grows or matures (in the same way, for example, as a growing body can develop muscular strength), but rather that it is uncovered or revealed. Furthermore, that stages may be skipped or that several may be telescoped together is quite evident in the case histories reported by Cox<sup>125</sup> on the highly gifted--those whom society has designated as geniuses and some of whom humanistic psychologists would characterize as self-actualizing.

Despite the variety of interpretations of the way an individual fits into (or develops within) a hierarchy, the concept of growth as an upward thrust seems to be uncontested. However, all do not grow at equal rates nor do all make positive gains throughout their lives. Many may reach an apparent plateau of moral maturity at an early stage, e.g., leveling off at an opportunistic, self-centered mode in adolescence, while others may actually regress. It is equally evident that just as societies can regress, slipping backwards from civilization to barbarism, so can individuals. Charlotte Buhler has pointed out how some lead lives of creative expansion while others narrow their vision and their interests.<sup>126</sup> With some, intelligence continues to rise; in others, it appears to decline. Most researchers feel that people improve in moral terms throughout youth. But it is possible that a few deteriorate in character from birth onward and become psychopathic. The child may be naturally good, as Rousseau suggested,<sup>127</sup> but his nature may be poisoned by harmful influences in his environment. And just as some adults may undergo genuine conversion and be transformed into saintliness, others may be corrupted and decay within (a possibility that Oscar Wilde treated imaginatively in The Picture of Dorian Gray). The point is that human beings do change and some of them--for reasons and in ways not fully understood--become more highly developed, more fully human, than others. It may well be, as Cantril has stated the proposition: "that both the individual and the species appear to follow an ever ascending path."<sup>128</sup> Or possibly, that individual growth moves smoothly to the heights only in the ambience of a good environment.

#### In Search of the Good Society

Except in very rare cases, individuals cannot develop to the highest levels unless they are helped by a favorable environment. Hence, we should next consider the application of a hierarchy of values to the changing concept of a Good Society. This will require a survey of

traditional social philosophy and also of what has latterly been labeled social science. Since the approach to a Good Society is aided by ideas about its possible character, it is necessary to note what various social thinkers have said on that subject--or have neglected to say--for social development stems in large measure from the socially educated imagination.

The notion of an intimate relationship between the character of the community and that of the person who belongs to it was originally developed in schematic form by Plato in the Republic. There he sketched his ideal of a perfect community ruled in authoritarian style by philosopher-kings who were the supreme human fulfillment of his system of education and upbringing. Then, as he delineated the imperfect communities that degenerate in a hierarchy from the good to utter evil, in each case he also portrayed the psychological characteristics of the accompanying personality.<sup>129</sup>

One is naturally tempted to follow Plato's example. It would indeed be interesting if one could trace the stages of social development corresponding to the same levels of individual growth as psychologists have depicted. But this is impossible to do, for two reasons. One is that the rhythms of social and individual growth are far from identical. In part, this is because the process of biological and psychological change that occurs in the microcosm is not simply transferred to, and repeated in, the macrocosm. It makes proper sense, for example, to apply to an individual such terms as infancy, adulthood or senility--terms that connote different capacities. But the same cannot be applied to a community. The patterns of growth or decline observable during the life of one person are not like those of a continuous society numbering thousands or millions.

The second reason stems not from these differences but from the avowed preferences of those who conduct the study. In recent decades, it has been fashionable among the majority of social scientists to avoid evaluation. They have chosen to do this on the professed grounds that they wish their study of human society to be as scientific as possible, that scientific signifies basing one's findings on data which are objective and external to the viewer, and that values are a subjective judgment which, if introduced into conclusions, will render them less than scientific. Hence, it is not possible to construct a hierarchy of values, embracing the stages of social development from low to high, from recent research in social science.

Yet that in itself is a significant point. There is a brief dialogue between Sherlock Holmes and Dr. Watson, in which the master sleuth remarked to his ever faithful, but dull-witted companion: "Did you notice the unusual incident of the dog in the night?" "But," objected Watson, "the dog did nothing in the night." "That, my dear Watson, was the unusual incident." What is so revealing about social scientists, both recent and contemporary, is what they omit.

Or do they? Is it true that, in practicing a method which they advertise as value-free, they are in fact doing what they claim? Is it not possible that they may actually be deceiving themselves and others, that much of what they write in the name of value-free social science turns out to be value-laden--and, to make matters worse, that the values they implicitly assume are those of a lower order? Let us look into this more closely, since such an intellectual style is itself a commentary on our times and may help to explain much of the current malaise in Academia.

The refusal of many contemporary social scientists to pass value judgments on the empirical data they have gathered, their relegating all consideration of values to the Humanities (e.g., to philosophy or history),



has not been characteristic of the main stream of the western intellectual tradition. Quite the contrary! If there is one sure conclusion to which the social thought of two and a half millennia will point, it is this: prior to this century, virtually all who have reflected on the character of human society have judged it in accordance with philosophies in which a hierarchy of values was central. Thucydides and Plato, as was noted earlier,<sup>130</sup> presented in their writings a picture of man as a bad animal--seeking and using power and doing to others whatever that power permits. But both proceeded to condemn such behavior with a massive indictment of its observed results. Aristotle, after studying 158 city-states, compares their political systems and reduces them to a six-fold classification. In this, however, he expresses his own manifest approval for the one that he labels politeia (the rule of the majority for the good of the whole).

The Christian fathers imported into their view of society a theology that was inherently hierarchical. To Augustine, the Earthly City was as evidently inferior to the City of God as was man-made law to divine law in the thought of Aquinas. Even Machiavelli, whose more extreme passages are often wrenched from their context and then quoted as sacred texts by the Machiavellians, had an ethic that is too frequently overlooked. He is careful to distinguish between republics and monarchies, he expresses his preference for the former, praises the people for being more honest than their rulers, and himself gave service to the Florentine Republic not to the Medici.<sup>131</sup> The true Machiavelli was a candid reporter--a moralist, in fact--who stripped the veil of hypocrisy from the popes and princes of his day and age.

Likewise, the group of eminent thinkers who adorned the period from the late seventeenth century to the end of the eighteenth, although their philosophies were at variance, were agreed in subjecting the practices of

society and of its mode of government to moral values. Locke,<sup>132</sup> Montesquieu, Condorcet, Rousseau, Paine and Jefferson were thoroughly imbued with a belief in Man's natural goodness and continuing improva- bility. They were optimists; the Golden Age they envisioned is in the future. In their hierarchies, such ideals as justice, cooperation, liberty, and the dignity of the individual rank at the top.

There were exceptions, however, to this general trend. Hobbes is the clearest and perhaps the least compromising. Seeking to survive during a Civil War, he stated the highest value as security and the power that ensures it. If men are not subjected to a common power, their con- flicts will destroy them. This pessimistic note underlies the philoso- phies of conservatism that took shape at the end of the eighteenth century in reaction to the revolutions in the United States and France. Hamilton, Hegel, and Burke distrust the human kind. Admiring the elite, they fear the mass. Hence, they favor inequality and its accompanying law and order, and justify the power that is needed to maintain traditional authority and vested interests. Now, these, too, are values; no one would ever accuse the spokesmen for conservatism of being value-free. They retain a belief in a Golden Age. Theirs, however, is in the past and, as they see it, is unlikely to return.

The nineteenth century philosophies continued this traditional debate over values and Man's resulting image. But they did so with the added dynamic injected into their thought from the concept of evolution and from the daily observation of a society convulsed by scientific discoveries and technological innovation. Evolution was, of course, linked with progress, and the latter was explicitly envisaged as a type of change that spelled improvement. In the challenge that the new science leveled at the old theology, a second Copernican revolution took place.

Those who accepted the assumptions of progress through evolution rejected the dreary doctrine of the Fall of Man. Instead, they saw him rising from the ape. Even the most alienated of critics, Karl Marx, who painted his own age and earlier ones in such funereal colors, held out a utopian vision of Mankind arriving ultimately at a classless society wherein equality and justice would reign.

There was a catch, however, in this doctrine of progress and the hierarchy of values that it so unequivocally embraced. The catch was that many of its exponents were quite positive that the evolution would continue to a certain point and would then stop. Each assumed, moreover, that the finale would be the triumph of the particular ideology or culture which he happened to approve. Thus Hegel, who interpreted all history as the dialectical unfolding of the Idea in its several piecemeal manifestations,<sup>133</sup> concluded that its ultimate synthesis would be reached in the supremacy of the German Nation governed by the Prussian monarchy.

Marx stood Hegel the other way up by substituting materialism for idealism in the dialectic.<sup>134</sup> He then convinced himself that the long series of struggles between antagonistic classes (i.e., master and slave, lord and serf, capitalistic and worker) would terminate with the final victory of the proletariat ending Man's exploitation by Man. John Stuart Mill was persuaded that representative government is ideally the best form of all and that eventually its adoption would be widespread.<sup>135</sup> In other words, these three thinkers--one conservative, one communist, and one a liberal--all concurred in the naive faith that his own special preference was the wave of the future. A universal creed, but in a parochial dress!

Seen in this perspective, the kind of social thought that has gained increasing currency during the twentieth century has not signified a continuation, but rather an aberration or a reversal. One fashion has

been to follow Freud and focus on the sick half of society--which brings the pessimistic conclusion that civilization is spiraling downward. Thus, a century after Hegel there came Spengler's Decline of the West and Ortega's Revolt of the Masses. Their sentiment is nostalgic. They do not offer hope. The other fashion has been an escape from values--a flight into an imaginary value-free world of detached observation and bloodless abstractions, where Max Weber (in excerpts) is adopted as the patron saint<sup>136</sup> while the Viennese positivists furnish the logic.

It is worth noticing that much of this new wave originated in central Europe either in Austria or Germany, countries whose ambitions had been defeated and which faced a bleak future. What resulted was either a set of bad values or a pretense to have none at all. Yet paradoxically, this was occurring simultaneously with attempts by statesmen to extend some of the higher values--such as peace, justice, liberty, equality--much further than had been done before, as was apparent in the constitutions of countries born or reborn in the nineteen twenties and in the design and ideals of a League of Nations. Some practical men were acting on faith at the very time when many learned men were abandoning it.

#### The Illusions of Value-free Social Science

The crop that sprouted from these plantings was reaped in the social science of the nineteen sixties. Let us examine the fruit. Its flavor, as anyone interested in values will discover, was tasteless or tasted sour.

All of the principal academic disciplines that focus on human society--anthropology, economics, political science, social psychology and sociology--were influenced in that period by a common style. This consisted in the observation and description of how people behave both individually and in groups; in the measurement by quantitative methods of

the data thus recorded; the analysis of society as a particular species of systems in general; and the taxonomy (or classification) of the various types of social systems. The result was exhibited as value-free science-- i.e., as a picture in no way colored by whatever values the observer happened to hold.

Two criticisms can be leveled at the offspring of this methodology. First, to the extent that it genuinely succeeded in excluding values, the inquiry ceased at the point where very important questions begin. Second, insofar as it contradicted its own premises by concealing values within its assumptions, those values that it preferred were of markedly low moral quality.

In the field of sociology, an example of value-free analysis may be cited from Max Weber who has exerted so profound an intellectual influence since his death in 1920. Writing on Politics as a Vocation,<sup>137</sup> Weber drew his much-quoted distinction between three types of authority. One is the traditional kind, the authority of "eternal yesterday" deriving from habitual conformity to ancestral mores. A second type resides in the unique quality of individual leadership. This is a personal gift of grace, or charisma, that inspires an absolutely personal devotion. The third is domination by virtue of legality. It is grounded in a "belief in the validity of legal statute and functional competence" and is "based on rationally created rules."<sup>138</sup> So far, so good--and no one would cavil at this classification even though the three types mentioned do not exhaust the list of possibilities.<sup>139</sup> But more important is the question: besides being a device to clarify understanding, how is this classification to be used? Here one might echo what a President of the United States reportedly said to a group of experts, who were brought to the White House where they presented a series of learned "briefings" on the

Middle East but offered no suggestion of policy for the government to follow. After listening to it all, the President tersely inquired of the experts: "Therefore what?"

Appropriately, we may direct the same query to the sociologist who classifies the data he has observed and carefully sorts them into categories, but then declines to evaluate them. Such a method may be an aid to understanding. But life is action, as well as thought; and those who would act wisely must do so with a clear conception of the goals to which their chosen means are pointed. And what else are these goals if not values to which people attach their preference? To refuse--in the name of scientific method--to judge what is good or bad is to abdicate from responsibility. Surely Weber had his own opinion about which type of authority is best, and, if so, one is entitled to know it. Why should the analysis not be followed by an evaluation of how well or ill each type of authority serves the community in which it functions and whether it would be better to change from one to another--a recommendation which, of course, requires an ethical judgment? It is small wonder that many studies which start by being "value-free" (wertfrei) wind up as "valueless" (wertlos).

With a few exceptions, contemporary anthropologists rigorously follow the same path as the majority of the sociologists. They will report, describe, and analyze. But they draw the line at evaluating--indeed, most of them consider it mortal sin ever to suggest that one culture may be superior to another. So sensitive are they to the charge of being ethnocentric that they will lean over backward in the effort to rank all societies on an equal footing.<sup>140</sup> Classifications, yes; evaluations, no! On one occasion, an anthropologist who was an expert on Samoa presented a paper at an academic convention, contrasting the regimes that the United States and New Zealand had established in eastern and western Samoa, respectively, during the period between the two World Wars. The

New Zealanders had attempted to administer their mandate very democratically, inaugurating popular elections and a representative legislature. Numerous troubles erupted, however, and systematic opposition to the mandatory power was organized. In fact, New Zealand found it very difficult to introduce self-government, western style, on a partial and limited basis. Next door, however, on the island of Tutuila, no nonsense of this sort was permitted. The United States Navy managed eastern Samoa just as it managed its ships--with authoritarian efficiency and firm discipline. Nobody bothered about democracy in those days, except in the oratory of July 4th. Everything in eastern Samoa was orderly, quiet, paternalistic, and peaceful. When the anthropologist had completed his comparison, which continued to the end to confine itself to strictly neutral description, he was asked which regime he thought was the better. This he resolutely declined to answer and, when pressed, said he would not consider it his province to give advice to a government that might find itself in the situation of having to formulate a policy. Does not a "social science" which thus refuses to pass judgment condemn itself to sterility?

With economics and political science, the problem is somewhat different. Here one encounters the same self-conscious effort to avoid evaluation. But this is combined, perhaps unconsciously, with a host of assumptions that are shot through with values of the deepest dye. The economists, of course, take to a quantitative method like fish to water. Since figures are attached anyway to numerous aspects of economic activity--in the form of prices, wages, interest rates, coinage of money, etc.--the statistically addicted have a field day. Economic theory nowadays is a branch of applied higher mathematics in which the econometricians have taken over. "Measure for pleasure" might well be their motto and, to cap it all, they have devised a formula which is perfectly adapted to the method. This is the Gross National Product. The computing and adoration of the GNP has now become the economists' sacred rite.

The trouble is not that the economists have failed, but that they have succeeded too well. The GNP has become the measure to which other criteria are subordinated. And the result is both distortion and oversimplification. Obviously, the GNP refers only to the goods and services produced and states them only as an amount. It does not express a quality. It does not specify what is produced (e.g., housing for the poor or missiles for the military). It does not refer to the distribution of the product. In fact, it tells us hardly anything about the values that make the Good Life. But the use of this particular yardstick contains a hidden implication to which the economists readily fall victims. They invariably assume that it is good for the GNP to increase. More means better. The bigger the quantity, the better the quality. Hence, a country is told to pat itself on its collective back whenever GNP goes up, and to don the national sackcloth and ashes whenever it goes down. At the apex of the economists' hierarchy of values, there waves--a price tag.

Economists, however, can console themselves with one thought. They are not political scientists. In the nineteenth century it was economics that earned the label of the "dismal science." Today, however, it is the self-styled political "scientists" to whom that label properly applies. In order to throw the raiments of respectability around a subject whose naked presence may appear somewhat disreputable, students of politics have driven themselves to desperate expedients in living up to the pretensions of science. Except for the activity of voting at elections or in legislative bodies, little that is political lends itself naturally to quantification. But this has not stopped the computers, both human and non-human, from seeking to count the incalculable. Ill at ease in discussions of quality, they breathe more freely when they can invent quantities to be measured.



More than that, however, the fashion prevailing among political scientists which is to focus on political behavior, has cast the conception of the subject into a mold with sharp outlines and a definite pattern. While pretending to be value-free, and thus objectively scientific, the accepted orthodoxy, as practiced, has been permeated with values--and, what is more, with inferior ones. The values can be simply summarized: power, stability, and system-maintenance. In the work of the political scientists, the influence of sociology has been pervasive; but so too has been the old pessimistic tradition which views Man as the bad animal needing curbs and restraint.

The identification of politics with power was authoritatively restated during the era of Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini by Harold D. Lasswell, who leaned heavily on Freud. "Politics" he affirmed, "is the study of influence and the influential. The influential are those who get the most of what there is to get."<sup>1 41</sup> And when one inquires what it is they want, the answer comes straight back: safety, deference, and money. Political science then becomes the study of the unequal distribution of these three objects of desire, and of how the elite manipulate the mass by propaganda and force to maintain their privileges at the top of the pyramid. A dreary picture and one offering scant hope!

Similarly depressing is the view of politics that has been formulated by David Easton<sup>1 42</sup> and has had numerous followers. His theme is to interpret the characteristics of the political system. This he distinguishes from other systems by its peculiar function which he defines as "the authoritative allocation of values." What these values are he does not mention, still less what they should be. Such questions are irrelevant to his view of politics. What is relevant is strictly the process of authoritative allocation, which may consist in depriving a person of a value already possessed, or obstructing someone in attaining a value that he would otherwise have obtained, or giving to some persons an

access to values that is denied to others. Because the supply of some values is scarce, conflicts occur and hence arises the need for authority to maintain the system. From this logic comes the conclusion: "The primary goal of political analysis is to understand how political systems manage to persist through time."<sup>143</sup> Evidently, anyone who might think that the primary goal of political analysis is to judge whether the established system contributed to justice or peace or freedom or equality has the wrong idea of what political science is about.

If the system, not humanity, is the focus of political science, then it follows that human beings are meant to serve the system instead of the latter being meant to serve them. Stability occupies a central place in this scheme of values since, if it be undermined, the system will collapse. This bias has posed some obvious problems for political scientists who write about development or modernization. Quite clearly, they approve of it, since they do not stop to ask whether what is called modernization (which is generally equated with the imitation of the western industrial society) may not bring as much evil as benefit in its train. Nor do they venture explicitly to link the stages of development to a hierarchy of values, because that would admit to a moral judgment. What they do show concern for, however, is the stability of the system as it undergoes development. On this point, a leading exponent of the subject, Lucian W. Pye, has written that the aim is "to facilitate the process of modernization so that all societies can become stable states while at the same time seeking to prevent this very process of social change from disrupting the stability of the international system."<sup>144</sup> Why, one may ask, is the goal for all societies to become stable states? Is not the goal rather to become just states, to achieve both liberty and equality for all human beings within their midst, and so on? Are there not some highly stable political systems that behave tyrannically and need

destabilizing in a hurry? What reversal of values is this that is being conducted in the name of value-free science? Focusing on how people actually behave, on how systems survive, on the virtue of stability--all this glides easily to the conclusion that what is is right. Stripped of their pseudo-scientific jargon and survey data, many of the recent and current writers in sociology and the behavioral sciences present, on balance, a conservative exposition of the status quo. To this, if that be their viewpoint, they are fully entitled. But why arrive there while pretending that values are not their concern?

But this fashion, although its influence has been so strongly felt, has not succeeded in sweeping everything before it. There have been some distinguished exceptions to the prevailing trend--thinkers who have wanted to see Man humanized, not systematized, and who have asked not only how people do behave but also whether they might behave better. Here one may refer to the work of Ginsberg, Sorokin and Mills in sociology; Benedict and Mead in anthropology; Boulding, Ward and Myrdal in economics; de Chardin and Eiseley in paleontology; Julian Huxley and Berrill in biology; Dubos and Platt in physical science; Rogers and Maslow in psychology; Fromm in psychoanalysis; and Mumford and Toynbee in the philosophy of civilization. But all these writers have transcended the narrowness of the formal disciplines attached to their names. They have been generalists and humanists first, specialists second. To accomplish this, they have had to resist the influences of Academia, whose institutions tend to narrow down and pigeonhole the people inside them--as is equally true of such institutions as churches, governments, trade unions and business corporations. The creative leaps in human history usually come from those who are the emancipated critics of the structures that enshrine the conventional wisdom.

### The History of Hierarchies: Changing Priorities

When one discusses the connection between a hierarchy of values and the growth of the individual or the progress toward community, it appears self-evident that the Good Person needs the Good Society, and vice versa. A truly integrated view of a balanced relation between them, however, has rarely been formulated in theory. Still more rarely (if ever) has it been translated into practice. Customarily, the scales have been allowed to dip on one side or the other. Individualism, at times, has been rampant at the expense of society, or the demands of the latter have overshadowed the needs of the individual. A review of some of the changing fashions in philosophy and policy will make this clear.

### The Assertion of the Self and the Loss of Community

The emphasis placed on the individual is the result of a revolution in values that occurred in the sixteenth century when the medieval cast of thought and its attendant feudal order were dissolved in the corrosive acids of the Renaissance and the Reformation. In the hierarchy which emerged from that revolution, values were formulated in the context of the individual's personal achievement.

Prior to that time, virtually all the philosophies of the West had envisaged the group as being more important than the individual.<sup>1 45</sup> Both to Plato and Aristotle, the individual human was a polites, a member of a Polis (the city-state community) and all were considered organically interdependent. There is no word in ancient literature that has the same meaning as individual has in English--save possibly when the antithesis between public and private is drawn. And the Greek for the latter, idiotes, was stigmatized by Pericles in his Funeral Oration as "useless" and has degenerated in modern usage to "idiot."<sup>1 46</sup>



The medieval philosophy, like the classical, reiterated this organic concept of group membership and enveloped it in the theological overcoating of the Thomist Summa Theologica. The medieval artist seldom signed his work; he performed it as a member of his group and for the glory of God. As a man, he was a mere speck in the cosmos--a creature of the divine creation. He was held to be part of a hierarchical order forever bound together in the great chain of ascending values. These led ultimately to the throne of God.

By deed and dogma alike, the age of Copernicus and Galileo, of Machiavelli and Leonardo, of Luther and Calvin, reversed the priorities of two millennia. Renaissance and Reformation together produced a new image of Man, united in their common emphasis on the sanctity of the Individual<sup>147</sup> (let us signalize his new status by giving him a capital I). It was assumed that by his personal exertions, independence, and uniqueness, Man would unlock the door to self-discovery and the social good. The latter, however, was thought of only as a by-product of the former. The new priority was to regard the Individual as the proper or natural unit. In contrast, society was held to be a work of art--an aggregate of individuals coming together voluntarily. The whole purpose of the social contract theory, in Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, was to explain why and how a group of autonomous Individuals could be associated.

The emphasis on the exertion and autonomy of the Individual generated the new guiding vision or Protestant Ethic. The worth of an Individual was to be gauged by what he achieved for himself. He who did not try to achieve--or who tried, but failed--was worthless. What the Individual achieved was what he had earned for himself, and the simplest measure of his worth was money.<sup>148</sup> Work would bring profit; profit could be saved; savings would accumulate into capital; capital would yield position and power. Society ceased to inquire: "What shall it profit

a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" It preferred to develop the principles of double-entry bookkeeping.

At the end of the eighteenth century, the faith in the individual was linked to an optimistic belief in progress. Two great revolutions, the French and the American grew out of formulations stating the rights of all men. True, the rights of slaves and women were barely considered worth struggling for, but the great premises were laid down so that the interpretations and then the applications could begin. One of the most influential advocates of these dreams of the realization of man, the idea of Progress, was Condorcet.<sup>149</sup> In his Sketch of a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, he saw ahead to a better future. He dreamed of a Utopia that might eventually be realized, of a time when the sun would shine "on an earth of none but freemen, with no master save reason; for tyrants and slaves, priests and their stupid or hypocritical tools, will have disappeared."<sup>150</sup> Reflecting about the nature of this progress and its direction, how, he asked, could the human species advance "towards truth or happiness?" His answer was to take the progress of knowledge (i.e., Enlightenment) as basic to all social Progress. Like other Encyclopaedists, he believed social institutions to be oppressive. Not only was slavery an acknowledged evil, but his vision of a new order extended further to the abolition of war and the equality of the sexes. Finally, this equality should embrace all of the people on earth, for there were no superior or inferior races.

Condorcet was not alone in this optimistic belief. Most philosophers in the eighteenth century held that Man could improve and was, indeed, improving. Even the skeptical Hume felt that the human lot in that century was better than in the ancient world. It was at this time that Jefferson was devoting himself to the development of a social philosophy and to political action. Believing that all men were created equal, he

maintained that they were endowed with the same fundamental rights. In fact, he was able, through political means, to bring about substantial legal changes in this direction. His goal was to give each person an opportunity to be educated and thus to have the chance to develop their innate potentialities.<sup>151</sup> He felt that all men not only had rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but also were able to distinguish right from wrong<sup>152</sup> and were morally inclined to choose the former. Thus each society, in order to have a stable government, must examine and decide upon an ethics of behavior. In other words, it must reach a degree of ethical consensus. Along with his conviction that all persons are basically equal, Jefferson also recognized that there are functional inequalities--in the sense that people differ vastly in virtue and intelligence. Seeing the need for leadership, he felt that, if there were free public education, a natural aristocracy--so essential for a representative government--would emerge. Jefferson never doubted that mankind in general could and would improve, and not decline. Like most Americans, however, he was more dubious than the European philosophers of the Enlightenment about individuals being able to progress spontaneously on their own, and he departed from Condorcet in holding that laws and institutions could be conducive to good. Because of his positive attitude towards ordinary human beings, Hamilton and others saw him in his day as a demagogic radical. And, in some ways, he still is, since so many present-day writers do not share the Jeffersonian faith in Man's natural goodness and capacity for development. Contemporary theorists of human potentiality, however, go far beyond the ideas Jefferson voiced.

In the early nineteenth century, although advances were made in the philosophical groundwork, the main achievement was one of opening doors for human growth which had hitherto been closed. By mid-century people were actively demanding that the concepts of democracy be put into effect. In the words of Walt Whitman's "Song of Myself":



I speak the pass-word primeval, I give the sign of democracy. By God! I will accept nothing which all cannot have their counterpart of on the same terms.

Statements of direction, based on formulations of values and potentialities for growth, were being drafted ever more explicitly. Emerson in America, Mill in England, von Humboldt in Germany, and Mazzini in Italy, wrote on self-reliance, liberty, the free development of individuality, and equality of opportunity. Widely read at the time, their essays continue today to serve as an inspiration for democratic thought. Translating ideas into conduct, zealots such as John Brown made their points by militant actions; while practical idealists, like the British Chartists, sought to influence Parliament through public opinion, and humanitarians, as Florence Nightingale, by selfless dedication to good works.

Emerson--radical enough to be dismissed from his pulpit--took his own interpretations directly to the common man via the lecture circuit. Gentle and scholarly, his thinking departed in fundamental ways from the generally held doctrine of his times. He spoke of the power of thought and will, of inspiration and miracles. Aware of the abundant faults of American society, he was critical of the lack of courage most people demonstrated. "We are afraid of truth," he said, "afraid of fortune, afraid of death, and afraid of each other."<sup>153</sup> Yet he felt that Man, and especially the exceptional individuals, could rise above all this by sheer force of will and indomitable spirit. "Nothing great or new was ever achieved without enthusiasm." Time and time again, he revealed his strong belief in the innate goodness of man and fought for social reforms that would make it possible for man to be more truly himself. His doctrine, Transcendentalism, was widely known as "the party of the Future," and was based on growth and renewal rather than on fixity. Under his influence, religion became naturalized and democratic. He had been

appalled by Newtonian physics and John Locke's psychology of "sensation." In such a mechanical and materialistic world, men would be the hapless victims of circumstance, the prisoners of an iron-clad, deterministic universe.

Emerson gave great momentum to the American concepts of individuality and self-determination. "Whoso would be a man, must be a nonconformist." His influence reached the common man as well as the intellectual leaders of the time. Such social philosophers as William James, John Jay Chapman, and Oliver Wendell Holmes were dedicated Emersonians. It was John Dewey's judgment that Emerson ranks with Plato as one of the world's great philosophers. And at the beginning of the twentieth century, Dewey was trying to put Emerson's ideas into effect in a laboratory school and was using many of them in his own philosophical writings. He particularly appreciated Emerson's clear enunciation of democratic principles and his deep faith in the power of ideas.

Although the twentieth century is said by some to be the age of ecology, the ecological view was central to much of Emerson's thinking. Man, he asserted, was not estranged from nature, but an integral part of it. He believed in a living, pulsing nature still in the process of becoming. If he could avoid becoming separate from nature, Man could grasp its law with his creative powers of perception. Then, with the addition of his own ideas, he could "invent his future" and continually undergo self-renewal. "Who," he asked, "can set bounds to the possibilities of men?" By his example of personal self-actualization, he showed others how to unfold their genius and, finally, to accomplish the only kind of reform he valued--that of individual, moral regeneration.

### The Quest for a Universal Society

The doctrines that ascribe the values at the apex of the hierarchy primarily to individual exertions need to be balanced by the contributions of society. Since "no man is an island," what he can do (and what he chooses to value most) depends not only on himself but also on his relations with his fellow men. "The gains of commonwealths," as Charles E. Merriam has written, "are essentially mass gains."<sup>154</sup>

The view of human growth that sees the individual as personally responsible for developing his potentialities has been matched in modern times by broadening concepts of the community to which he belongs. If it was fashionable a century ago to glorify the virtues of the self and to envisage one's relations with others as a competition in self-assertiveness, much of the philosophy of the twentieth century has laid stress on Man's sociability and his need for cooperation with others of his kind. Thus, in contrast to Herbert Spencer<sup>155</sup> and the Darwinians, who saw human society as merely replicating the jungle's struggle for existence, Kropotkin emphasized mutual aid as the major ingredient in the upward course of mankind's evolution. Cooperation--and not the survival of the fittest--was the lesson that he read in nature's book.<sup>156</sup>

Hence in the twentieth century, various social philosophies have focused on what the group contributes to the individual and how the latter reciprocally serves the group, rather than concentrating on what each individual can accomplish by himself and get for himself. Philosophies of this kind have brought into prominence other values than those stressed by the individualists. Love, altruism, benevolence, self-sacrifice, service to others, humanitarianism--all these have been more extolled (i.e., ranked higher on the hierarchy) than selfishness, power, aggressiveness, and all their customary accompaniments.

Such qualities or attitudes, however, cannot be organized. Still less can they issue from fiat or upon command. They must well up spontaneously or they will not emerge at all. But as the facts bear witness, the general practice of the modern world has deviated vastly from such ideals. Already to date, this twentieth century has proven itself to be the most violent in the recorded annals of human history--and much of the worst of the violence has been deliberately instigated and fostered by governments acting with all the power that the state can bring to bear on its citizens or subjects. In our century, not only have men formulated philosophies of totalitarianism (i.e., the total subjection of an entire community to a uniform, centralized control), but we have witnessed such despotisms as those of Hitler and Stalin, beside which the tyrannies that Plato denounced seem minor indeed. The explosion of population, the complexity of the contemporary social system, and the imperatives of technology have fastened upon us all the incubus of organizations ever larger, ever more unwieldy, ever less responsive.

Nevertheless, the human spirit has not yet succumbed. Although ancient injustices persist and new tyrannies abound, the quest for a higher ethic has not been abandoned. In fact, the evidence multiplies around us that a values revolution is already under way and that its ideals are being voiced by many of today's youth and by humanitarian adults. It is highly significant that world organizations--those that transcend the nation-state--are themselves raising their sights both above and beyond the narrow limits of conventional horizons. Let us survey these latest attempts to reformulate a hierarchy of values on a broader scale and with a more comprehensive scope.

There were some famous occasions in the past when values were explicitly drafted and ratified by official agencies or groups of citizens serving in a public capacity. Together these have constituted some of the milestones in Man's uneven ascent to higher levels of civilization.

In the western world, Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the Declaration of the Rights of Men and the Citizen, furnish examples, interweaving, as they do, the political history of England, the United States, and France across a span of seven and a half centuries. Since the later of those documents were founded on, and incorporated, the experience of those that preceded, the latest at tempt in this lengthening series should be considered here. This one happens to be of special relevance to a study on the hierarchy of values, since all the previous formulations of the higher values of the human race attained their culmination and synthesis in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights--adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in December, 1948, without a dissenting vote.<sup>157</sup>

In the long history of such declarations (whether by the world's religions, by ethical philosophers, or by public bodies) this document has a place that is unique and a significance thus far without parallel. It was painstakingly elaborated after a thorough study and comparison of all similar efforts conducted earlier. It was carefully discussed and debated, clause by clause and word by word, in meetings that extended over nearly two years. It set out to be both comprehensive in content and universal in scope. Finally, it was adopted officially as a statement of principles, applying to all human beings, by the international body with the widest membership which mankind has achieved to date.

These aspects of the Declaration were stressed both at the time of its adoption and in subsequent evaluations of its importance. The Preamble itself reads as follows: "The General Assembly proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and

freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction." The 30 articles in the text that follows this preamble have been described "as an international Magna Carta or an international charter of human rights."<sup>158</sup> As such, it should be emphasized, the Declaration is not an international treaty, nor is it legally binding on the governments of member states. It does, however, possess the highest moral authority--both because it "is certainly the most comprehensive, the first Declaration in history to set forth the rights and freedoms to which men and women everywhere are entitled"<sup>159</sup> and because it expresses officially the views of the United Nations. For these reasons, in the course of the last 20 years, it has been widely cited in judicial decisions of national courts, in the texts of international agreements and in the discussions of international conferences, and its influence is equally discernible in recent constitutions and legislation.

To mark the twentieth anniversary of its adoption of the Declaration, the United Nations conducted an International Conference on Human Rights, attended by representatives of 84 states in Teheran, in April-May, 1968. This was "the first conference ever organized on a world-wide basis to consider the question of human rights in all its aspects."<sup>160</sup> The Conference unanimously adopted a proclamation which in Clause 2 affirmed: "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states a common understanding of the peoples of the world concerning the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community."<sup>161</sup>

Intentionally, the content of the Universal Declaration was phrased so as to be all-embracing--its more specific, detailed application being left to the two Covenants that were drafted later and have yet to be

adopted by member governments. The 30 articles of the text may be grouped and summarized as follows.

Articles 1 to 5. These affirm the basic right of each human being to be regarded as somebody equal, unique, and independent--namely, the rights to life, liberty, and personal security. Slavery and cruel forms of punishment are prohibited. Most importantly the United Nations has proclaimed its image of Man as a creature both intelligent and moral, an image applying to all humans equally and without distinction or exception.

Articles 6 to 12 are concerned with a person's civil rights before the law. They assert the fundamental principles in the administration of justice to which the laws, courts, and judges, must conform. Equal protection is stressed; discrimination and arbitrariness are banned.

The next three Articles cover those political rights to which an individual is entitled in the relations between states--e.g., the rights of free movement across frontiers, of asylum, and of nationality.

In Articles 16 to 20, the Declaration sets out the fundamental freedoms pertaining to marriage, the acquisition of property, and the expression of opinion. These are followed, in Article 21, by the insistence on political freedom, through government based on the will of the people.

The subsequent articles turn to another group of rights that give the Declaration its twentieth-century flavor, as contrasted with the American and French declarations of the eighteenth century. The proclamation of Teheran (1968) has stated the point this way (in Clause 13): "Since human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible, the full realization of civil and political rights without

the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, is impossible." Consequently, Articles 22 to 25 of the Universal Declaration embrace the basic rights of the individual within the economy and as a recipient of social security.

Next come two Articles, 26 and 27, whose subject is the right of all human beings to be educated and to have equal access to the cultural life of the community.

Finally, in Articles 28 to 30 the Declaration affirms not only the right of human beings to an international order in which all of these rights can be respected, but also their duties to their fellow men generally.

Grandiose and comprehensive through this Declaration is, Man's quest for civilization--his need ever to rise to higher ethical levels--will not end here. The U.N. Office of Public Information has well said of the 30 articles: "Every great act in history is a product of its age. The Declaration is no exception. It represents the spirit of the mid-twentieth century and embodies ideas and ideals of different races, cultures, beliefs or religions in the present age. As man marches forward, he will discover new horizons of larger freedom and new concepts of a fuller and better life." The ultimate apex of the hierarchy of values is a vision dimly seen, but always to be sought.

That the search continues may also be observed in the case of another institution whose name, like the United Nations, signifies a universality that its membership has not yet attained, i.e., the Catholic<sup>162</sup> Church. In the course of its history, Popes and Councils as well as individual theologians (such as Thomas Aquinas) have repeatedly expounded their conceptions of a hierarchy of values. The latest of these is the most remarkable and, in some respects, the most original. It bears the stamp of a human being of rare greatness, that astounding Pope, John XXIII, who



initiated the modernizing (aggiornamento) of an organization as encrusted with traditions as is the keel of an old ship with barnacles.

In two of the Encyclicals that marked his papacy, Mater et Magistra and Pacem in Terris, John XXIII formulated his version of the basic rights of Man, versions which, as he acknowledged,<sup>163</sup> owe much to the United Nation's Universal Declaration. Continuity with Catholic tradition is expressed in these documents in the attention given to the family ("the natural, primary cell of human society"),<sup>164</sup> as in the affirmation that human rights are grounded in a natural law<sup>165</sup> which derives from God. But to John XXIII, tradition was not a terminus but a point of departure. More than any Pope before him, he insisted on the rights of women, both within the family and outside, and on the right of each individual to be educated to the level of his or her abilities. More than his predecessors were willing to concede, Pope John extended the conception of natural rights to embrace the economic and social rights of individuals.

Further than that, this true social democrat--born of peasant stock and always at home with the common people--declared himself unequivocally for democracy as the system of government that has the most respect for the dignity of the individual and his freedom. So consistently did John XXIII accept democracy that he also applied it to the freedom of religion--of any religion, that is--something which would have sounded like heresy to most of his predecessors.

The same liberalism permeated his international outlook. Since peace was the highest ideal for the family of nations to pursue, this Pope quietly dropped the old hue and cry for "holy wars." His preference was to coexist and cooperate with other systems (despite the "errors" of their philosophies) when in practice they were following the paths of peace. The rights of men, moreover, were not of the privileged elite or of a few favored nations or peoples. There was no room in Pope John's



humanity for doctrines of a master-race or an imperial mission. All peoples everywhere had an equal right to their independence. Rights, in short, are the common stock of the human race. They are universal in range and their content is the same for all.

### Self-actualizing Individuals and Mass Progress

Visions of ideals yet to be translated into universal practice, such as those of the United Nations and Pope John, are direction signs along a journey of which the greater distance still lies ahead. It is always difficult for any one generation to assess what level of progress it has reached in comparison with the past of which there is only fragmentary knowledge and a future where potentialities may emerge that can barely be imagined at present. Compared with the whole span of life on this planet, the annals of the human race extend only a short way into the past. There are some four millennia of what can properly be called history, behind which the aeons of pre-history stretch dimly into the unknown.

How far has mankind advanced in morality during this relatively brief period? One remembers that between the seventh century B.C. and the first century A.D. such men as Confucius, Gautama, Socrates, the Hebrew prophets, and finally Jesus helped to raise men's sights to higher visions of the good. By contrast, how many such persons could one name among the billions who have lived in the twentieth century? Similarly, one would be hard put to it to prove that today's society contains a larger percentage of intellectually superior persons than were alive in the Athens of Pericles or Plato. Yet among the daily customs of ancient times, geniuses and saints notwithstanding, were cruelly barbaric practices that tradition and prevailing opinion upheld--human sacrifice, slavery, the exposure of unwanted babies to their death, superstition, savagery, and torture.

We should not overlook the truth that, if indeed Man has shown any signs of becoming more humane, his improvement did not take place in a continuous, even flow. Normally, the periods of advance have been followed by those of consolidation. On occasion, there have been periods of outright reversion--as happened, for instance, in the nineteen thirties when Nazism temporarily restored a Dark Age to Germany and to a large part of Europe. Likewise in our day, there is often a glaring contradiction between the high principles to which we pay lip service and the practices which we still condone. It is a welcome fact that some contemporary societies are making serious attempts on a national scale to care for the sick, the aged, the handicapped, and the poor. But at the same time, as we have noted, this century has been the most violent on record. Perhaps the one genuine gain that we can confidently affirm is this: even if our social systems are still far from satisfying the demands and expectations for self-fulfillment, more and more people are becoming aware of their potentialities as human beings and many appear to be aspiring toward the higher values.

It is the tragic paradox of this century that our technological development has vastly outstripped our moral growth, with consequences that have already proven calamitous. What would the future portend if this were to continue? Platt makes a telling case for the existence of an "explosion of genius" among today's youth. Gabor, too, believes we may be entering an era when intellectual gifts far exceed, both in proportion and altitude, those that appear now when the level of intelligence of a population is surveyed.<sup>166</sup> If such gifts were to be exercised in separation from ethics, the outlook for the human species would indeed be bleak. On the other hand, there are abundant signs that an increasing number of these gifted youth are motivated by high ethical ideals. Many of them, moreover, are the children of affluent fathers whose lives are

devoted to the pursuit of money, power, and status. Should this not be called a productive paradox, when the social leader parent discovers that he has reared the creative intellectual son or daughter animated by a concept of bourgeoisie oblige?

If an explosion of genius should occur and be accompanied by a parallel explosion of concern, a new dawn of hope would light the world. For the progress of humanity depends not on the unfolding of some impersonal objective forces, but on the subjective awareness of the values that guide our behavior. In estimating the outline of the future, therefore, one may mark out a pair of factors as crucial: the nature of the values that the gifted will espouse, and the ensuing relation between them and the mass of mankind.

Much of the history of humanity exhibits an oscillation between two poles characterized by different sets of values. The men who have run the world and controlled its institutions have practised, and at times preached, the worldly values of wealth, authority, and position. It is these who constitute the power structure of our contemporary civilization. They live, however, by a double standard. For themselves, they demand liberty in the guise of self-assertiveness and autonomy in the sense that each is a law unto himself. For others, they recommend order in the form of obedience to their orders, plus the freedom to conform. Egalitarians in word, they are elitists in deed; democrats "in principle," their practice is authoritarian. They engineer the system, finance and feed the computers, and are managers of men. They place the ethically inferior values high in their hierarchy--sometimes covertly, but often openly.

At the other pole are the saints and sages, humanitarians and mystics, artists and intellectuals. These have ever been, as they are today,

the rebels of history. They are the dissenters, the crusaders, the heretics, martyrs, non-conformists, and visionaries. They have been destroyed by the hemlock, nailed to the Cross, burned at the stake, stretched on the rack, immured in the dungeons, beaten by the police, and shot by the soldiers. But their ideas have lived. They have held out the ideal of Man as a free, unfettered spirit, ranging on the wings of creative imagination to the peaks of the highest values. Liberty for them is the opportunity for each to realize his potentialities to the fullest dimensions of the good. Individuality is finding the identity of one's self. Equality is the love and concern for others. Excellence is Man becoming transcendent.<sup>167</sup>

These contrasted sets of men and values produce different consequences for human society. From among the social leaders there tend to emerge the "Executive S.O.B.'s"<sup>168</sup>--the custodians of the Cave in Plato's simile. All that they want for the mass of men is to shape, fit, and place them, each in his niche. For theirs is the constrictive, molluscan system of which Dewey spoke. Creative intellectuals, on the other hand, give encouragement to spontaneity and prefer loose boundaries or none at all. They want the potentialities of each person to be fulfilled, not diminished. They believe that ordinary human beings can be trusted to develop an organic community under an umbrella of small, voluntary groupings whose structuring should be kept to the minimum.

If the second Copernican revolution is consummated, the hierarchy of values will itself have reached a new level in its development. Most early formulations of a hierarchy of values were limited by elitist assumptions. Although they may have envisaged a truly lofty ideal of the Superior Person, the elitists thought not only that few could attain it, but that those few could emerge only from a restricted segment of society. Hanging around the concept, therefore, was the aroma of class

snobbery. Jesus repudiated that notion, being the first, in Mumford's phrase, to affirm "the primacy of the person."<sup>169</sup> This meant all persons, equally and without exception. As we have seen, the earlier, oligarchical limitations of the hierarchy of values have steadily given way to democratization, as more and more persons have been conceived as participants in the same values.<sup>170</sup> The scientific, technological, moral, and social changes that originate through the impetus of one or a few creative individuals gain acceptance, win followers, and eventually are widely spread. The major religions, the path-breaking inventions, the more humane ethics, the most useful institutions, the principles of common justice--these become the heritage of all humanity.<sup>171</sup> A word once spoken, a thought once expressed, a technique communicated, ceases to belong to its author. It takes off without any other limits than those of its own utility or relevance. Mankind at large is, or can be, the beneficiary of all the good that individuals create--as also they can be the victims of all the evil.

The dynamics of this relation between the creative intellectuals and the mass of mankind suggest how the Good Person and the Good Society may eventually evolve together. There is not the circular relation of the chicken and the egg. It is possible, but difficult, for an individual to become the self-actualizing Good Person without the environmental support and influences of the Good Society. In contrast, the Good Society cannot emerge unless it be composed of, or led by, a sufficiency of Good Persons. What these are depends on the capacity to actualize the highest values. It is, therefore, to a discussion of these that we finally turn.

## The Higher Values and the Higher Synthesis

Plato applied to the individual the same concepts of goodness or evil as he did to society and when he traced in the microcosm the identical virtues or vices that the macrocosm possessed. Here similarly, we have had in mind an ideal of the good that applies equally to one or many, to the private realm or the public, to solitude or society. Such an ideal is relevant to the three images of Man which show him as a mixture of good and evil, or as basically good, or as capable of transcendence; but not to those which consider him a bad animal or as malleable by any influence, however pernicious.

In general, people choose what they value and value what they choose. This does not prevent them, however, from making choices that are perverse or later regretting a choice they have made. By their choices people give order to their lives. Those who are self-aware do this deliberately. Others are unaware of the act of choosing; and still others deny that they make choices, claiming that they are victimized by acts of God or whims of Fate.<sup>172</sup>

It is axiomatic that the highest good is composed of the highest values, and that they cluster at the top of the hierarchy. They are the triad: truth, beauty, and love. These values have been reaffirmed by every major philosophy and religion and are basic to what is known as the "perennial philosophy,"<sup>173</sup> but they have been seriously undermined and often disavowed in the twentieth century. They correspond to three basic aspects of our nature through which we relate ourselves to our environment and communicate with our fellow men. Truth is the cognitive aspect; beauty, the aesthetic; love, the affective. Functioning as a unity, it is these that make for wholeness in a human being, providing what is most essential to our humanness. These three values, which are the ideal of the highest good, also represent the deepest potentialities that an individual needs to actualize.



One of the sins of the modern world, however, is that it has over-emphasized the cognitive. Correspondingly, it has neglected the aesthetic and the affective and their related values of beauty and love. Not only has the spiritual realm been ruled out of bounds, but faith is no longer deemed a valid way of knowing. Yet there is a fundamental truth in the statements of Pope John XXIII that "human society is primarily a spiritual reality," and, "a society that is welded together by force is not human."<sup>174</sup> And when Keats reminded us that "Beauty is truth, truth beauty," he was extolling truth for its beauty and not the reverse. So too, Schiller contended that "until man, in his physical and sensuous modes of being, has been accustomed to the laws of beauty, he is not capable of perceiving what is good and true--he is not capable of spiritual liberty."<sup>175</sup>

It is particularly in our educational system that we find the distortion of values and the resulting despair that many attribute to the priorities prevailing in society at large. Silberman is one of an increasing number of writers who describe the American School as a "grim, joyless place" where children are "oppressed by petty, meaningless rules and the atmosphere is intellectually and aesthetically barren."<sup>176</sup> In other words, even the cognitive, as the schools interpret it, fails to satisfy the more inquiring minds.<sup>177</sup> "Education," Silberman continues, "should prepare people not just to earn a living, but to live a life, a creative, sensitive life. This means that the schools must provide a liberal, humanizing education."<sup>178</sup>

The priorities of our society have not included beauty (particularly that of nature) as necessarily daily fare for the growing child.<sup>179</sup> Nourishment for the soul is thought to be of less moment than keeping order and checking on attendance. If bodies are present, souls can feed themselves. When schools are designed, there is little recognition that art and nature have charms, like music, to soothe the savage breast. Similarly in the community, production efficiency and economic growth take

precedence over parks and shorelines, the preservation of wilderness and of vista points. It is all too apparent that making decisions from a rationale of cost accounting is quite a different matter from the criterion of providing aesthetic and affective fulfillment.

The affective realm has at heart that human relationship which Buber termed communion. Such a relationship enables one person to know another. "Love," Aldous Huxley said, "is a mode of knowledge."<sup>180</sup> For this bond to form, cooperation is vital. Yet the latter is rarely praised, except within an organization or team that is designed to fight against some other team or organization.<sup>181</sup> Love is never seriously proposed in public (except on Sundays) as a principle of harmonious social cohesion. Only those who try to approach saintliness--such as the late Martin Luther King, Jr.--advocate it as a life-style. When they attract followers, such apostles of love are thought to be dangerous and have often been destroyed by violence. In contrast, competition, aggressiveness, and war (the last of these euphemistically called "defense") are propagated with religious zeal by the power elite and the strident majority. Many academics study these phenomena assiduously (and often uncritically), while others apply their educated minds to the design and manufacture of the tools of violence.

As a number of contemporary observers see it,<sup>182</sup> somewhere along its course our civilization swerved off the track, detouring onto a perilous side-journey with science and individualism in the engineer's cab. The result is a values vacuum accompanying our material affluence. This, in turn, has produced a growing cynicism among many of our elite, an increasing alienation of ever larger numbers of our intellectuals and our youth, and the bewilderment of people in general. As the highest values continue to be distorted and denied, it becomes daily more apparent that only by reaffirming them can humanity survive and be ennobled and the individual find both identity and community.

Although truth, beauty, and love correspond to different sides of human nature, this does not mean that the cognitive, aesthetic, and affective exist in psychological isolation. To distinguish them helps the understanding; but in life, they are not separable.<sup>183</sup> Each serves as a way of linking the self with others. Through them, we express our relationship to the world. As ideals, they are, of course, abstractions and ultimates. Hence, they cannot be sharply defined or ever fully attained. But since Man, the "poor, bare forked animal"<sup>184</sup> that Shakespeare called him, is also an imaginative animal and, in fact, has an "educated imagination," these universal values bind all men together. By understanding truth, appreciating beauty, feeling love, we communicate with others. And does not communication create community?

As human beings, we are able to live together in society because, despite our uniqueness as individuals, fundamental similarities unite all men across the reach of space and time. When actualizing the highest values, we are expressing both our universality and our uniqueness--the principle of complementarity mentioned earlier. In the quest for truth, beauty, and love we discover that differences, instead of implying conflict, may need one another for mutual support and may thus be harmonized within a higher synthesis.

### Truth

Truth has been traditionally regarded as one of mankind's highest values. Magna est veritas et praevalabit: Truth is great and shall prevail. "Ye shall know the truth and it shall set you free." What is truth, however, has been variously conceived. If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, the route to heaven is marked with a medley of signs--all with a label of truth.

What does it mean to affirm that truth is one of the highest values to which we aspire? It means that the individual must have knowledge in order to actualize his potentialities and live a good life. That knowledge must be accurate and reliable, and should embrace as much as is humanly possible. It extends outward to the cosmos and inward to the consciousness. "Know thyself" was the injunction of the Delphic Oracle; "learn about the universe" has been the common cry of physics and metaphysics.

Truth, however, is not simple, single, or undifferentiated. There is as much truth to be discovered or invented as there is reality to be known. But not all aspects of reality have the same qualitative significance. It is true that various figures were printed in today's papers as yesterday's stockmarket prices. These are not as important, however, to the Good Person and the Good Society as the themes of the Bible, the Republic, Hamlet, or War and Peace. On this general problem, Mumford comments:

We must be prepared to recognize that "truths" do not stand together on a high and lofty pedestal: some are important and some are trivial, some are innocent and some are dangerous . . . In a modern Western European community, a sociological insight into the causes and conditions of war and peace is a needed corrective . . . and without such correction, the mere increase of scientific knowledge, of which we boast so vacuously, may be highly inimical to the practice of the good life in the community.<sup>185</sup>

It is abundantly clear, as Polanyi has asserted, that some kinds of knowledge are superior to others.<sup>186</sup> Emerson, writing on Love and Friendship, expresses truth of a higher order than the annual balance sheet of General Motors. The Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution ranks as a greater truth than data about the "kill-ratio" in Vietnam. But how shall we find that level of truth that will prevail and will set us free?

Of the many roads to truth, two are supported by a long tradition and have a special relevance today. One of these was first surveyed and sketched by Plato, was further mapped out by neo-Platonists, mystics, and transcendentalists, and is at present travelled by a growing number of humanistic scientists, philosophers, and artists. Truth, in their view, is more than an attribute of the phenomena of perception, of this sensory world of fleeting, insubstantial shadows. They think that the reality of which we can have knowledge is infinite and, in the ultimate sense, a mystery. Truth is a feat of the imagination, and not simply a matter of verified experiment or linguistic analysis.

This formulation has more the touch of the artist than of the logician. Truth is to be divined rather than defined. It may well approximate Edith Sitwell's insight about poetry as "the flower of magic, not of logic."<sup>187</sup> The Platonists prefer synthesis over analysis, the infinite over the finite. Platonic truth does not seek exact boundaries, firm outlines, or exclusive categories. As Chagall said about the painting which he executed for the ceiling of the Paris opera: "There is nothing precise in it. One cannot be precise and still be true." Each part belongs to a larger whole and everything flows into everything else.

An alternative path to truth--in fact, the main road since the Thomist Summa--starts with Aristotle's syllogism, but has taken so many forks and meanderings that the modern terminus is far from the point of origin. This route leads, via the Cartesian method and the English empiricists, to Newton's successors and so to experimental science and recent reductionism. In its physics as in its metaphysics, in logic as in language, this approach strives to be analytical (a word whose etymology means "loosening up"). Every whole, on this reasoning, is a complex that you understand only when you obtain a clear and distinct perception of its component parts. These divide into mutually exclusive

categories. Reality is either this or it is that; what is A cannot also be not A, and vice versa. Since anything that is present in the whole is assumed to lie somewhere in the parts, when the latter are reassembled, knowledge of reality results.

A further development, which the originators of this method did not suggest, has commended itself to certain latter-day descendants. If the way to acquire knowledge is by subdividing the knowable, could one not compound the logical by the psychological and also subdivide the knower? Instead of the whole person thinking, each of us would don a set of masks, as it were, in order to play several roles when reasoning about this or that segment of the truth. Thus one arrives at such fictional characters as Political Man, Economic Man, Scientific Man, Artistic Man, and so on. In this way, one ends up with a series of truths in the plural--economic truths, scientific truths, artistic truths, etc. But the whole truth, as indivisible, is reduced to a meaningless five-letter word.

This way of conceiving knowledge, and not a few of its offshoots that until recently flourished and multiplied with but few checks, are now under attack from many quarters.<sup>188</sup> The objects of these attacks include the scientific-technological mode of reasoning of the last three centuries and the values hierarchy of materialistic capitalism. Many living thinkers are keenly aware of this conceptual ferment in the contemporary world. In fact, a large number have become critics of the old patterns of thought and action, and hold that these have brought about increasing dehumanization. Such feelings are most acutely aroused by the growing awareness of society's distortion and neglect of the highest values--truth included. All of modern society's values are now being fundamentally reexamined in what is called a second Copernican revolution.<sup>189</sup>



In the original revolution of that time, the scientists had found themselves, willy-nilly, drawn into battle against the Catholic Church. For a thousand years the Church had stood as the arbiter of what was truth in the western world, and the whole weight of its authority was thrown behind any body of doctrine which it sanctioned--irrespective of whether the content was enlightened or specious or spurious. The strength of the Church was, of course, its faith. "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and ye shall be saved." But the religion which the Gospel of Jesus had inspired, and whose martyrs had resisted the power of Rome, suffered the fate of all spiritual revelations when they became institutionalized and powerful. It was a long descent from the Sermon on the Mount to the casuistries of canon law, from the transcendental love of Jesus when he touched the crippled child to sterile debates about how many angels could stand on the head of a pin.

"During the Middle Ages," Paul Wienpahl has written, "a curious but powerful doctrine appeared--the doctrine of twofold truth. The two ways to truth are faith and reason. At first it was said that, if the two conflict, we must follow the lead of faith . . . ."190 When the scientists, from Copernicus to Galileo to Newton, launched their series of discoveries and formulated new hypotheses in physics and astronomy, they did not initially seek to throw out religion but rather to prove it. Newton is said, for example, "to have written as much on theology as he wrote on 'natural philosophy.'"191

Out of this quest for new insights, however, developed what could only be called a new religion, which was what Science became for many. In its early stages it was conceived as serving a beneficent and moral purpose. The inventions, which scientific discoveries ushered in, might free mankind from the affliction of drudgery. Improved techniques of production could banish poverty by turning scarcities into abundance.



Easier means of communication would widen the horizons of the mind, thereby enlarging the human community and liberating people from parochialism. Who could estimate the practical good that would be accomplished? With such hopes, Emerson himself welcomed the new technology--that offshoot of scientific probing into the laws of the physical universe.

But the error of the scientists, as their work evolved, was that they, like the Church, went too far. In challenging the latter so that they could explore the truth, they not only discarded its theology, but disregarded the ethics which that theology had upheld. For the "sacred cows" enshrined in the papal Bulls, the idolaters of science substituted their own golden calves, in particular the worship of method. This mode of reasoning--hypothesis followed by experiment followed by verification or disproof--they professed to be objective and uninfluenced by personal preferences. The truth that would liberate was value-free.

Following this track and imbued with all the confidence of the Enlightenment, science was caught in the quicksands of its own casuistry.<sup>192</sup> Scientific leaders in the nineteenth century, and the mass of scientific workers in the twentieth, pursued method ever further afield from the older concepts of truth, until their doctrines became as narrow and rigid a dogma as earlier were those of the Church. The priesthood of the white coat too often saw the world from a one-dimensional view. Faith, along with feeling, was shunned as subjective; Man was a part of an interacting system of objective laws; the microscope, test tube, and atom smasher, could unlock every secret. In the name of science, many took for granted the basic assumptions from which they worked, and then proceeded to narrow down the larger ideas and smooth out all signs of inconsistency.

As these tendencies hardened into a ruling consensus, what prevailed was not truth but a thought-controlling orthodoxy. Method had become king and its rule was absolute. Had not Bacon said that knowledge was

power? And what knowledge was worthy of the name that was not science? From this, a new Commandment followed: Thou shalt actually do whatsoever lies in thy power to do. "I can, therefore I do" was the formula by which to live. Truth could now be simply defined as anything that worked, i.e., that was capable of producing results. Newton's Great Machine had degenerated into techniques of manipulation.

But, we remember, truth is great and will prevail. Now in these closing decades of the second millennium, an increasing number of concerned citizens and social philosophers are beginning to question a dogmatic scientism that ignored the truth of Man's humanity (including the humanity of the scientist!). The wheel has indeed come full circle--for what is most significant is that leaders of the new "Copernican Revolution" include scientists who decry the fallacies and fictions of their once-vaunted method. A contributor to Manas notes: "It is a curious development of modern physics--and more lately of modern psychology--that ancient philosophical conceptions of knowledge and of cosmology seem to be emerging from the deliberations of eminent physical scientists."<sup>193</sup> As Eddington pointed out fifty years ago, the content of science is what we put there.<sup>194</sup> Similarly, Heisenberg comments: "We have to remember that what we observe is not nature in itself, but nature exposed to our method of questioning."<sup>195</sup> Polanyi has restored to science its original metaphysical foundation in the classical humanist assumptions regarding the quest for truth. It is his view that people cannot participate in discussion unless they believe that there is a truth that all hold as a higher value and all feel capable of pursuing.<sup>196</sup> And finally, we learn that Einstein, who spent an hour every evening reading aloud in Aeschylus, Sophocles or Thucydides observed to Niccolo Tucci: "How can an educated person stay away from the Greeks? I've always been far more interested in them than in science."<sup>197</sup>

Perhaps, then, there is some point in the fact that Aristotle's treatise on the nature of reality and of knowledge was placed in the collection of his works after the Physics and thus happened to be called Metaphysics. Many of today's physicists and other scientists are rediscovering that the knower and the known are complementary and that there is no objective, external reality to which humanity is or could be alien. The profoundest truth of all has always lain in humility, in the recognition of how little we know. "In Taoist thinking," Fromm has written, "just as in Indian and Socratic thinking, the highest step to which thought can lead is to know that we do not know . . . . The ultimate reality, the ultimate One, cannot be caught in words or in thoughts."<sup>198</sup>

If Man, therefore, would seek truth, he first should heed the Delphic Oracle and know himself. He will note that he is a forked animal, but that this animal is endowed with eyes that can see the distant stars and with insight that can speculate beyond them. He can even see beyond truth--to beauty and to love.

### Beauty

Beauty and the arts expressing it are central to Man's existence. They provide at once the raison d'être and the élan vital. In the Christian era, they were held to purify Man by bringing him nearer to God. In the Renaissance, when Man was exalted, they were felt to help the individual find and express his potentialities. Throughout most of history they have been seen as transcendental agents. Man could become a better self either through expressing beauty (in an art form) or through its appreciation (whether in art or in nature).<sup>199</sup> All men in all places at all times have responded to beauty. Not only is it a universal value, as was suggested earlier, but it appeals to the human being's profoundest sensibilities, to the very core of his humanness.

No exact answer can be given to the question of how beauty and art inspire and enhance the human being and at times allow him to transcend himself. But artists and philosophers have offered suggestions as to why this is the case and how it can happen. Tolstoy provided a fundamental insight when he answered the question: What is art for? Art makes men human--"The evolution of feeling proceeds by means of art"; everyone can partake--"art is accessible to all men"; and only art will insure peace on earth--"art and only art can cause violence to be set aside."<sup>200</sup>

Individual growth, as we traced it earlier, passes through many stages. But a most fundamental advance is made in the development of mind and character when the individual begins to find pattern and form in experience. Man's search for meaning begins at birth when the infant confronts this "big blooming buzzing confusion" that William James called the experience of living. He must find some stability in this world of things or he cannot be sane. Dubos,<sup>201</sup> in fact, believes that all human beings, in order to become human as we know or would like to know it, must experience the ambiances of nature--blue skies, fleeting clouds, the shift of seasons, and the flowering of plants.

Art as well as nature supplies these patterns. As the buzz becomes a roar and the confusion turns to chaos in the Age of the High Technic, art can offer sanctuary and security. So can beauty as experienced in nature cushion and enhance the life of everyone. The joy in spring's petals and winter's snowflakes is a universal response of children. These patterns can protect from what Toffler has called "future shock."<sup>202</sup> They can supply the resources that make it possible for an individual to continue on the path of growth toward self-actualization. And the individual, interacting with the arts and with nature, will find that he can begin to give form to all that he makes and does. These patterns, both those that shape him as he reaches out in appreciation and the ones

he shapes through his own creative expression, will increase his assurance and allow him to live his life at its fullest.

Too much formless matter, aimless movement, frustrated effort, and kaleidoscopic wildness, will foster madness--as, on the other hand, will too little complexity and change. The beauty of wild nature can soothe and exalt, particularly if this is enjoyed in the company of loving guides. So, too, can art. Instead of a waking dream, life without art will slip into the shapeless incoherences and nameless horrors of a nightmare. Art, therefore, offers a way out of the wilderness inhabited by the space-age minotaurs. Guided by the artist, the individual can find symmetry in vision and harmony in sound. The world may indeed be absurd, as Camus has said, but Man has it in his power to give it order.<sup>203</sup> To do so is the task of everyman, but more importantly, it is the mission of the artist. The latter can give men eyes with which to see and ears with which to hear. As Edith Sitwell sketches the artist's task:

It is a part of the poet's work to give each man his own view of the world--show him what he sees but does not know that he sees.<sup>204</sup>

In the past, the great artists have taken as their task the shaping of a world, the intimation of a cosmology. Shelley said of his celebrated contemporaries: "They measure the circumference and sound the depths of human nature with a comprehensive and all-penetrating spirit . . . the spirit of the age." Shelley was speaking of the poets of his time, but he also included Raphael and Michelangelo and all great artists. Somehow, such creative geniuses are able to "express what (other men) do not understand." Usually unwittingly and unacknowledged, they are the "legislators of the world."<sup>205</sup>

"Great art," according to Manas, ". . . does not arise save in the presence of ennobling conceptions of man."<sup>206</sup> These conceptions, if

artists are to be inspiring legislators for the world, must teach mankind to be more generous and human, to live more graciously and joyfully. Like the teacher, the artist is a communicator. He must be concerned not only with beauty and clarity of expression, but also with the ethics of the message he communicates. On this point Geiger refers to Simone Weil who declares unequivocally that "artists must accept responsibility for the kind of influence they exert."<sup>207</sup> No more than the scientific discovery can the aesthetic creation be sent into the world an unattached orphan. Both artist and scientist are responsible for their offspring. Both must be more concerned for mankind than for egocentric activity. The "learning to learn" of the child can all too easily lead to "science for science's sake," "art for art's sake," and eventually "revolution for the hell of it." To be worthy of the name, the artist must serve humanity and love mankind. Whitman told us how this might come about:

Now that he has passed that way see after him! There is not left any vestige of despair or misanthropy or cunning or exclusiveness, or the ignominy of a nativity or colour or delusion of hell or the necessity of hell; and no man thenceforth shall be degraded for ignorance or weakness or sin.<sup>208</sup>

The "leading out" or educating, which occurs when beauty is formed and expressed by the artist, serves not only to organize chaos to meet basic security needs, but also to nourish and inspire. Great art speaks out for life and vitality, never for death and depression. Whitehead spoke of the exuberance that was Shakespeare's.<sup>209</sup> Edith Sitwell also singled out as characteristic his love of life:

To Shakespeare, only that which was too cold for hell is to be condemned. Only the hard heart offends. He sees the fundamental splendour of all living things.<sup>210</sup>

How different from art are the shriveled fruits of education, those products of an ill-tended tree of knowledge which so rarely reveal

generosity of spirit! As Gandhi said, he was troubled most by the hardness of heart of the educated. At the center of all human insight lies the willingness and capacity to face the important issues: What is life about and how should I go about living it? It is in the great works of literature, as Manas tells us, that we find this richness of mind:

. . .in the classics of high religion, the Greek myths and dramas, the Dialogues of Plato, the plays of Shakespeare, and the works of other great poets and writers who forever return us to the fundamental question of human life.<sup>211</sup>

Now we can appreciate the point made by Read that "Life, in its intimate recesses is intelligence, is creative, is art."<sup>212</sup> He felt the aim of artists and scientists alike should be what Wordsworth called "joy in widest commonality spread." This meant to Read a "society rid of its neuroses, a civilization rid of the threat of annihilating war" by an active participation in art that could perform "the unique function of uniting men in love of each other and of life itself."<sup>213</sup> Both Tolstoy and Read believed that the true education came through the direct experiencing of art--that the hands must find work, the capacity to perceive form must be exercised, and the human potential used to its fullest. Otherwise, as Read warned, "in idleness and vacancy we (will) revert to violence and crime. When there is no will to creation, the death instinct takes over and wills endless, gratuitous destruction."<sup>214</sup> This is a view in which Edman concurs, claiming that beauty makes life meaningful. Art can make "Our relations with others. . .all have something of the quality of friendship and affection. . . ." In such a life, Edman continues, "Living would be at once ordered and spontaneous, disciplined and free."<sup>215</sup>

There are occasions, however, when art moves away from the function which Shelley, Tolstoy, and Read have envisaged. If "the time is out of

joint," the artist does not always conceive it as his mission "to set it right." Instead, he may be deliberately representational or bloodlessly abstract. He may then depict violence, mirror insanity, portray ugliness or even nothingness. Our own age is one of these--observe the contemporary trends in much of the painting, sculpture, architecture, and drama. Our civilization, as was suggested before, is thought by many to have gone off the track; our elites appear to be confused; most of our creative youth are alienated; and the "hosannas that they ache to hear" are silent for most.<sup>216</sup>

Many say that in the twentieth century we have rejected the very values that have made us human. Some begin to doubt that Americans ever had their higher moments. As one anthropologist was reported to have said, "Ours is the only major culture which moved from barbarism into decadence without going through a stage of civilization." To all this, the arts have responded in the spirit of the advice of Hamlet to the Players. They choose no longer to ennoble and uplift, but rather to serve as "the abstracts and brief chronicles of the time." Their themes, then, are violence, absurdity, madness, formalism devoid of life or mere technique substituting for content. They tell us too well about the forces that surface and glower at every turn. Rarely do they conjure up the alternative vision of beauty and tenderness and joy. By neglecting these, they do not fulfill the task of the artist which Shelley and Sitwell defined as telling us what it is that we see unknowingly. This, of course, is the Socratic task of all true teachers--to show us what we already know and, as Polanyi suggests, to help us see that "we know more than we know we know."<sup>217</sup>

Creating beauty is no longer the goal of many artists. Camus believed that Man could not live without beauty, and he contrasted the ancient Greeks who took up arms on her behalf with the modern western



world which has outlawed her.<sup>218</sup> Art that at one time existed to fulfill Man's need for beauty, has now, as Read contends, abandoned its "philosophic guides." He continues:

This art without concentration, without relationship, this art which boasts of its inconsequence and incoherence, is not art at all, and though some of its practitioners are undoubtedly sensitive they are like delinquent children who destroy a beautiful object shamelessly because they are not loved, because they resent the world they did not make, a darkening world indeed--a world characterized in Heidegger's words by "the flight of the Gods, the destruction of the earth, the standardization of man, the preeminence of the mediocre."<sup>219</sup>

Yet there are signs now and then, here and there, of the rebirth of the tender and a renewed interest in the beautiful. Songs written in the sixties were often hauntingly poignant. Crafts long dormant have been taken up by young artisans. Psychedelic patterns and sounds were rounded out by the new multi-media blends. At the end of the decade these new art forms combined in "Hair"--improvisational and fluid, combining drama, dance, and song in a pulsatingly strident, joyful release.<sup>220</sup> In fact, there is recent evidence that the old values are taking on new importance. Not only the youth but people of all ages are criticizing the repeated deviations from truth, the subtle and not-so-subtle hypocrisies practised by the average citizen, the advertisers and the corporations they serve, as well as by the policy makers of the nation-states. Rejecting substitutes that are flimsy and tawdry, people not only raise basic questions but reach out for joy and beauty. In fact, increasing numbers of our most gifted youth go beyond questioning the values of the larger society to repudiate the more sterile modes of knowing. For them, at least, "mere reason is not enough." To some observers the vibrating melange that youth creates is pure chaos; but no one can deny its organic exuberance. Despite its abrasive overtones, all this bears a close

genealogical resemblance to what has been called the "poetry of cosmic consciousness,"<sup>221</sup> to the new physics of indeterminacy, and to the unitive ground of the perennial philosophy. Together and severally, each of these--the art forms, the science, and the philosophy--is, in Maslow's term, synergic.<sup>222</sup> "The Sounds of Silence" are as important as the music that connects them. The white space speaks as loudly as the brush stroke. Human beings are unconscionably diverse, but bound together in psychic unity. For between all men there is, as Thornton Wilder knew, the bridge of love.<sup>223</sup>

### Love

Man is often said to have vast, unreleased potential. But encased as he is in his institutions and his social roles, he usually leads a life of uneasy symbiosis, out of touch with himself and with others.<sup>224</sup> Love, however, can provide a bridge between the many selves within the Self and between that Self and the Others without. Not only is love one of the trinity of the highest values, flanked by truth and beauty, but for such of its students as the sociologist, Sorokin, and for people in general it is the supreme value.<sup>225</sup> Love is both at the top of the apex of values and rooted in the solid ground below. It is a basic need that must be met at the very beginning of life. Mothers seem to know that infants cannot survive without love, and research has verified their knowledge. Spitz has compiled a vast body of data to show that infants deprived of love in early life often do not survive, while those who do will probably be maimed psychologically.<sup>226</sup> Drawing on this and other evidence, Sorokin has assembled indications that children who are denied love or, worse yet, are abused and treated cruelly are commonly warped in their psychological growth. Conversely, those who are found to be neurotic, who have character disorders or who strike out at society through delinquent acts have generally been denied love.<sup>227</sup>

Love can be seen, then, as a life force absolutely essential for healthy human growth. Simultaneously, it can be viewed in the way that Jesus saw it, "as the highest manifestation of life."<sup>228</sup> It changes behavior and heightens perceptions. Beauty is enhanced and truth is seen more clearly. Love is momentary perfection, both tinder and spark, the peak experience, as Maslow describes it.<sup>229</sup> It may well be, as Goethe suggested, that "we only learn through those we love."

Empirical efforts are sometimes made to measure this elusive but omnipresent quality. Psychologists have documented the amount of attention that mothers give their children, the atmospheres of classrooms, and the attitudes of teachers toward pupils.<sup>230</sup> All these have been placed on a continuum ranging from rejection to acceptance. Undoubtedly psychological insights are gained from these studies; but those who hold the human being to be more than a reactive organism understand that the essence of love cannot be charted. For example, no one can really explain why children love one teacher and learn avidly in her ambience, while another teacher will literally leave them cold. Similarly, to predict who will fall in love and with whom is difficult, if not impossible. This is a subject on which some general observations can be made, but exact measurements and sharply defined criteria seem futile.<sup>231</sup> As one minor poet wrote:

Love will fly if held too tightly,  
Love will die if held too lightly,  
Lightly, tightly, how do I know  
Whether I'm killing or letting you go?

Despite the inadequacy of objective studies, there is a good deal of descriptive literature on altruism and love that can provide guidance in terms of higher orders of human development. Much of this is reported by Sorokin, who believes that altruism in the home is the easiest and perhaps the best way to produce the Good Person. Those who have



carefully observed the early years of human life see the mother as a key figure. Fromm speaks of motherly love as "unconditional affirmation of the child's life and his needs."<sup>232</sup> This affirmation, he continues, has two aspects. One is the care and responsibility that are absolutely necessary for the preservation of the child's life and his growth; and the other is an attitude that allows the child to engage fully with life. Fromm refers to milk as being the symbol of the first aspect of life, that of care and affirmation. Honey symbolizes the sweetness of life and love for it, as well as the sheer happiness in being alive. "Most mothers," in his words, "are capable of giving 'milk,' but only a minority of giving 'honey.'"<sup>233</sup> He comments that a child may learn either joy or anxiety from the mother, depending on her dominant attitude. Without absorbing this love for life, it is much harder for the individual to proceed to the higher levels of development or to self-actualization.

Later in a child's life a teacher may be able to carry him a step further. She can educate in the ancient sense of "leading out." Buber explains how this might be done:

It is only when someone takes him by the hand not as a "creator," but as a fellow-creature lost in the world, and greets him not as an artist but as comrade, friend, or lover, that he experiences an inner reciprocity.<sup>234</sup>

Buber makes it clear that the teacher must care a great deal about the student for the essential relationship, a constant condition of reciprocity, to develop. It is the teacher's task to think about and to bring the student into her imagination, to experience and appreciate his individuality. To do this, she must identify with the child and "feel and do as he does." As growth continues, the teacher learns to distinguish his emerging individuality and anticipate what this particular being

"needs in order to become human." Through such a conception of teaching, Buber hopes that it will be possible to overcome "oppositeness." Instead, "the teacher becomes the uniter, the mediator between the individual and his environment, the midwife through whose agency the individual is reborn into society, guided into its most vital currents."<sup>235</sup>

From his studies as to how counselors and teachers can help others become more human, Rogers concludes that it is essential that we value each human being and think of him, not as a machine or a collection of stimulus-response bonds and never as an object or a pawn, but rather as a unique individual of unconditional worth. Through such loving guidance, each child can become "a more autonomous, more spontaneous, more confident person."<sup>236</sup>

Jahoda has studied extensively this maturity, which she defines as positive mental health, and characterizes its dimensions as self-awareness, self-acceptance, and self-confidence.<sup>237</sup> Fromm, arguing that self-love is a necessary aspect of maturity, believes it to be a logical fallacy "that love for others and love for oneself are mutually exclusive".<sup>238</sup> Instead, self-love and love for others can be seen as yet another instance of the complementarity principle. He explains the paradox as follows:

The idea expressed in the Biblical "Love thy neighbor as thyself" implies that respect for one's own integrity and uniqueness, love for and understanding of one's own self, cannot be separated from respect and love and understanding for another individual. The love for my own self is inseparably connected with the love for any other being.<sup>239</sup>

There are many ways, according to Sorokin, in which the individual can discover both his own identity and his bonds of communion with his fellowmen. It is such experiences that annul our individual loneliness and bind us to others. "Love is literally," as Sorokin says, "a life-giving force."<sup>240</sup> It leads to true cognition, it beautifies life, and

it allows one to act freely. Buber, too, maintains that beyond the "instinct to originate" there is an "instinct for communion," and he sees the latter as the more important. To be united with man or with nature one must first be free and independent, but "independence is a path and not a dwelling place. . . . Freedom in education is nothing else but possession of the ability to be united."<sup>241</sup>

How then can we set the stage for this to occur? How can we help people to live together peacefully and to love one another? How can we diminish hostility and aggression? Beyond the need for a loving mother--the "lucky package" of a good family--Sorokin emphasizes that it is desirable for people to live in a group or "an agency" where altruism is the norm.<sup>242</sup> It was his finding that most of the great altruistic leaders have emerged from such groups. Here the young are most likely to discover "heroes of love" and "athletes of good,"<sup>243</sup> and to learn, through them, how to love. If our youth, or anyone for that matter, are to become more altruistic and socially concerned, they need inspiring examples with whom they can identify. It is to these enlightened men and women, Polanyi says, that we should "entrust ourselves, by trying to understand their works and to follow their teachings and examples."<sup>244</sup>

In all situations, Sorokin stresses the therapeutic value of overwhelming kindness.<sup>245</sup> At any time in his life an individual may turn away from greed and hostility toward altruistic caring as a result of a transcendent experience. For most people, this is apt to occur as a result of a love relationship. But solitude and retreats,<sup>246</sup> and even such events as great tragedies and crises, can also be precipitating forces that change the direction of a life. However, Sorokin points out, it is only the unusual person who is apt to profit from tragic or profoundly disrupting experiences. Most will respond not with serenity and compassion, but with inner turmoil--out of which comes a lowered self-

concept or even demoralization.<sup>247</sup> To weather such psychological storms, to avoid moral and mental disintegration, one needs a "strong soul"--the very quality required by those whom Sorokin characterizes as "Unattached Pilgrims of Goodness."<sup>248</sup> Those who would become effective pilgrims must have "completed self identification."<sup>249</sup> It is at this point in development that individuals can emerge as "free instruments of universal compassion and love."<sup>250</sup>

Granted that it is possible for people to develop in these ways, do they want to? Research has shown that people reveal their basic attitudes in the words they commonly use.<sup>251</sup> If this is true, the results of a recent study contain important insights.<sup>252</sup> These show that people in general prefer love over hate and express this in the words of everyday speech. The same study revealed, however, that writing and research of academics--the words they use and the subjects they choose--emphasize the opposite. Scholarly treatises and textbooks, no matter in what subject area, rarely index the word love. Year after year, senior honor students in a large midwestern university reported that none of their professors had a good word to say about man in general and even gave few accolades to individuals.<sup>253</sup> When youth, on the other hand, are so openly votaries of love in their songs, slogans, and life-styles, could this be yet another example of the irrelevance of academia?

The effects of love or its opposite can be traced in several ways. Sorokin repeatedly affirms that love begets love and hate begets hate.<sup>254</sup> Illustrative parables and aphorisms abound:

"One touch of kindness makes the whole world kin."

"There never was a bad peace or a good war."

"Those who live by the sword, die by the sword."

"The Revolution devours its children."



Sociological research and current literature contain repeated allusions to the destructive force of hate. Lloyd Warner shows that the "Executive S.O.B.'s" who are hired as professional hatchet men are nearly always done in by others who use the same weapons.<sup>255</sup> Similarly, Thurber recounts how "Proudfoot, the Tiger," who regularly mauled Mama Tiger and the cubs, ended up spread-eagle, a resplendent rug on the living room floor.<sup>256</sup>

It is abundantly clear that, as each proliferates, hate casts its blight and love spreads its bloom. Suttie discusses how love can radiate outwards in ever larger concentric circles--moving from parental love for a child, to love within the small group, to love within the community, and eventually to the love of all mankind.<sup>257</sup> In order to form good relationships readily with people outside the family, psychologists generally hold that one must have experienced a loving relationship with an adult. Fromm speaks of "brotherly love" as the most fundamental form of all. "By this," he says, "I mean the sense of responsibility, care, respect, knowledge of any other human being, the wish to further his life." This, he feels, is the kind of love of which the Bible speaks when it enjoins: "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Since it is love for all human beings, brotherly love is in no way exclusive. It is based on the belief that all are one. This develops into love for the helpless, for the poor, for the stranger, and finally for the enemy. For, as Fromm concludes: "Only in the love of those who do not serve a purpose, love begins to unfold."<sup>258</sup>

We may ask, does all of this matter? What difference does it make if one loves and is altruistic? In the first place, as we have already seen, it has some highly practical consequences. Without it, the baby will not survive and those deprived of love lead miserable lives. "The experience of a truly great love," Sorokin affirms, "is the highest form

of happiness. . . . It is the summum bonum."<sup>259</sup> Those who come from loving homes and have good experiences in school and life tend to live longer, to be healthier and happier. Students who "love" to study for the sheer pleasure of searching for truth, who feel that their teachers like them (and as evidence of this receive high marks) are generally happier and live longer than those who find school a hard grind. Carlson discovered that honor graduates of middle western universities lived the longest of all groups he studied;<sup>260</sup> Maslow reports that self-actualizing optimists are healthier and probably longer lived than other people;<sup>261</sup> Sorokin shows from a study of over 3,500 Christian saints "that they had notably longer life duration than their less saintly and less altruistic contemporaries."<sup>262</sup> And this, not discounting the fact that 37 percent of them were prematurely killed by their persecutors.

For love to prevail generally in human relationships--to become the rule rather than the exception--there is a need for radical change either in our thought patterns or our conduct, or in both. Our conduct may be wrong either because we pay lip service to the higher values and depart from them in practice, or because the practice is based on and conforms to such social "values" as expediency, conspicuous consumption, and status or to the assumed biological imperatives of aggression, egotism, and competition.

There seems to be no reason to disagree with Fromm that even "in the industrial society, the official, conscious values are those of the religious and humanistic tradition: individuality, love, compassion, hope, etc."<sup>263</sup> However, most people, even those who ascribe to these values, do not live by them. And there is much evidence that this kind of hypocrisy, even though it is unconscious, contributes to the general malaise. As Aldous Huxley said, "truth is to be lived. . .not to be merely pronounced with the mouth. . . ."<sup>264</sup> Others in this age of value confusion

have eschewed not only the behavior but the values as well. They openly support the social "values" and the biological imperatives over the traditional values. To them--if they had ears to hear--should be voiced the ancient apostolic injunction: "And be ye not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind."<sup>265</sup>

Why do principle and practice so rarely coincide and why do so many people choose the lower values? Is there some weakness in Man's thinking that distorts and limits his actions? Perhaps, as Shakespeare suggests, "The fault lies not in the stars but in ourselves."<sup>266</sup> Many scholars and philosophers who have reflected on the human condition have concluded that Man's conception of himself, despite his possession of almost unlimited capacities, is all too often negative and self-limiting. Mumford reminds us that

The "belief" that the world was flat was once upon a time more important than the "fact" that it was round; and that belief kept the sailors of the medieval world from wandering out of sight of land as effectively as would a string of gunboats or floating mines.<sup>267</sup>

Similarly, people who are convinced that they are bad animals and that this is a fact of life will live by this belief. Ignoring the body of evidence that Man is basically good and has a great capacity to grow in transcendent ways, they remain far below their potential--captives of their own misconceptions rather than "masters of their fates" and "captains of their souls."

Although the common man cannot see that his potential might extend beyond limited horizons and fears the monsters that lie beyond his ken,<sup>268</sup> there is evidence that even the most ordinary person has great unused ability.<sup>269</sup> As Julian Huxley holds, "man is still very much an unfinished type, who clearly has actualized only a small fraction of his potentialities."<sup>270</sup> The biologist, Berrill, sees Man as just beginning to be human.

It is his view that the real trouble is not that we are human, but that we are not human enough. To the question: What does it mean to be human? he answers that it means to be youthful and zestful in spirit. It is a freshness and eagerness of mind that stays with the lucky ones all of their lives.<sup>271</sup> As we have seen, however, such a self-image of joy and confidence may never develop, owing to personal fears. Too often the self-concept is warped or limited because those who interact with the individual judge him--and perhaps themselves and all men--as basically evil or as formless matter to be manipulated at will.

If it is true that we have this vast potential but use very little of it, as those who study human potentialities contend, are we beginning to understand why? Do hopelessness and pessimism spring from a belief that one is at heart a "bad animal" or a powerless bit of flotsam? If we are constrained by negative images, fear and self-doubt, will positive images, hope and confidence, bring us release? How can the individual learn to work with his strengths, to rejoice in and develop his potential? How can he reach out to and love his fellowmen? We have suggested this might be achieved through an expansion of self-awareness, a new vision of man, a cosmic consciousness. As Aldous Huxley said,

Because we don't know Who we are, because we are unaware that the Kingdom of Heaven is within us, . . . we behave in the generally silly, the often insane, the sometimes criminal ways that are so characteristically human. We are saved, we are liberated and enlightened, by perceiving the hitherto unperceived good that is already within us. . . .<sup>272</sup>

Behind all beneficial relationships, love is the animating principle. In truth, it is their breath of life (in Latin the word anima refers to the principle of life). Without love, the truth that "all men are created equal" will not be realized, nor can justice emerge or liberty survive. Without love, groups, schools, and housing projects can never be integrated except in formal terms. True integration and communion will not

be realized unless there is the bond of love. Otherwise, the classroom or the house will be divided against itself. And divided it will remain unless we shift the priorities in our thinking from the competitive to the cooperative, unless love becomes truly unselfish and not a technique for barter, unless, as Boulding suggests, we are prepared to give without counting the cost.<sup>273</sup> We can only rejoice in the triumph of others, or in their goodness, when we cease to see them as rivals. And as Emerson remarked, if no one had to take the credit, there would be no limit to what we could do.

All that Aldous Huxley called disinterestedness--including those qualities of charity and humility<sup>274</sup> that are the opposite of self-aggrandizement and aggression--expresses that kind of love which realizes itself in the service of others. Too rarely have people been able to achieve the harmonious balance that Whitman produced in his verse and lived out in his life, combining, as he did the "song of myself" with a joyous love for his fellow men in "Going Somewhere":

The world, the race, the soul--in  
space and time the universes,  
All bound as is befitting each--all  
surely going somewhere.

Similarly, few have been able to follow Emerson's suggestion that they be self reliant while at the same time reaching deeply for friendship and love. As Mumford said, these two philosopher-poets were more able than most to extend the teachings of Jesus.<sup>275</sup> The same could be said of a Florence Nightingale, a Jane Addams, or an Eleanor Roosevelt. If mankind's future is to be better than the past, those few must become not only known but numerous. It is men and women such as these who can provide a guiding vision for many today and for the multitudes tomorrow.

## Conclusion

There is much evidence to show that Western people in general are unhappy. This is true not only of those groups against whom the prevailing system discriminates, but also of many to whom its opportunities and rewards are fully accessible. Alienation is widespread among the young, as every teacher knows, and also among a large number of the highly educated adults. Violence accelerates continually and the very governments that condemn it in the untrained and usually unarmed individual are the ones that foster violence at the hands of the armed aggregate.

For more than a century, in the culture of the West and in its offshoots and imitators elsewhere, science has been applied to technology, the economy has been industrialized, and our social system, growing ever more complex, has been bureaucratically managed through large organizations. The result has not been an increase of good feelings or a closer sense of community. On the contrary, one detects today an atmosphere of doubt, a loss of confidence, an awareness that our civilization is not functioning well. For the many there is no clear understanding of why this is so. Many reflect their uncertainty in their lack of self-confidence--literally the failure of nerve. Our question is: what can we do about this? We have seen that social critics, creative intellectuals in general, the most gifted among the youth, and many ordinary people are now sensing that there must be something wrong with the values by which we live. If it is true, as Maslow says, that Man needs values just as he needs food and calcium and that it is the higher values which are the most apt to contribute to a happier and more self-actualizing individual, then how can people come to understand what it is they need? How can those trends which are working to humanity's disadvantage be arrested so that each individual can become his best self?

This is why we believe that to discuss values, and the hierarchy they form, is so important. If men need to take soundings, locate their position and then journey on, the highest values can help them find the route. Paradoxically, it is a route that points both forward and backward. The dreams of something better that people so frequently express today are a blend of nostalgia and novelty. There are in them the elements of conservatism and radicalism. Truth, beauty, and love are values that have been a part of our cultural heritage for more than two millennia. For that reason, and because they correspond to universal aspects of human nature, we speak of them as the eternal verities or as the perennial philosophy. But these same ideals are in need of continuous revitalizing. Each new generation, each person, has to rediscover them. They must be reinterpreted in the context of the present for the shaping of the future, because they are dynamic, open-ended, and infinite.

The awareness of the divergence between our ideals and our practices, and the fact that many persons, under the exigencies of modern life, have discarded the traditional ideals, compels us to ask these questions: Where have we gone wrong? How can we help the Good Person and the Good Society to emerge? What steps should we take from here to there?

If what we are doing is not working to our benefit, it would seem wise to turn to what has been so seldom attempted. Shaw's reply to the question of what he thought about the Golden Rule was: "I can't say. It's never been tried." Similarly, Gandhi answered when someone sought his opinion of western civilization: "I think it would be a good idea." Geiger reminds us that we know a great deal about the unfavorable effects on human beings of a bad and distorting environment. There is no lack of examples to study. On the other hand, "We know comparatively little about the effects of good environments for the reason that they are so few."<sup>276</sup>

We can only begin where we are now. Hence, as Mumford writes: "This is the first step out of the present impasse: we must return to the real world, and face it, and survey it in its complicated totality. Our castles-in-air must have their foundations in solid ground."<sup>277</sup> For example, it is unrealistic to suppose that we could put a stop to all further technological invention. But it would seem reasonable to slow down the rate and ameliorate the effects of technological change and plan more carefully for future changes. This is what is required by that most fundamental of all realities, the Law of Nature. But such actions lead us to a paradox: only by the most idealistic of thinking can we come to grips with these realities. Platt has flatly asserted: "The world is too dangerous for anything short of utopia."<sup>278</sup> Unless, therefore, we fundamentally revise our ways of thinking, feeling, and behaving, we are more likely to be destroyed than saved.

To begin with, we shall need different kinds of education. There is an untapped reservoir of human talent, even of genius, available.<sup>279</sup> All young children could develop sensitivities and capacities that are largely unknown and could grow at rates that are very much faster than is now customary. This would be true if we encouraged them to learn at their own pace and in their own style and to follow their interests as these unfold. Our systems of education might be designed to allow this talent to emerge, to foster and encourage it. Nowadays, too much of what is called education does the reverse. Instead of freeing, it constricts and regiments; instead of encouraging integrative thought, it parcels out bits of knowledge called "facts" and presents specialized subjects (or disciplines) in segments. It largely neglects the universal need for beauty and for love, and presents only a narrow band of knowledge as the truth. Students would undoubtedly find more meaning in their lives if, in addition to facts and objective data, they were helped to discover patterns of thought (such as the new physics and the new linguistics)



that are integrative. And they would be more able to find their better selves--become "strong souls" in the Sorokin sense--if they experienced the life-giving force of love. They must be introduced to what Rollo May has called the "mythology of caring."<sup>280</sup> Michael has written a moving statement about this kind of education.<sup>281</sup> The concepts presented and the experiences provided would introduce them to both community and cosmos so they could feel themselves part of "the total interrelationship of things." They can then grasp Francis Thompson's meaning in "The Mistress of Vision":

Thou canst not stir a flower  
Without troubling of a star.

Such thinking is necessary if the young are to discern the coherence in the complex world around them and relate themselves organically to its natural order. Thus in the cognitive sphere, both in teaching and in private reflection, we should search for a higher synthesis in order to embrace wider areas of experience. But this must be done, as Watson Thomson points out, without the hubris or the heavy-handedness that accompanies so much of our professional expertise today.<sup>282</sup> Teaching should be the whisper of suggestion, not the shout of command. For wisdom is to know how little one knows, and teaching at its best communicates both charity and humility.

In the aesthetic sphere, it is fitting to tell the artist that he has overplayed the role of holding up a mirror to the sickness of society, since this morbid preoccupation with the perverse and the absurd sets up a reciprocity of negative images. Could not the artist, without explicitly moralizing or being overly didactic, inaugurate the substitution of virtuous circles for vicious? Could he not help us to uncover the significance that resides in the world of nature and of organic forms? Could he not communicate the good through the sensuous appreciation of

the beautiful? Could he not join with Whitman in the celebration of life instead of focusing, as is so often done, on disease and death?

The need for aesthetic development is paralleled by what the affective side of our nature demands. St. Augustine's question, "What else is the state but a great robber band if it be lacking in justice?" could be adapted to read: What else is society but a chaotic collection of particles if it be lacking in love? For every occasion when someone praises the virtues of cooperation, we hear ten times about the advantages of competition--just as appeals to egoism vastly outnumber those to altruism. Since we are so often urged to assert our individuality and "get ahead," the price we have paid is the sacrifice of community. Others appear as rivals, hence as threats, and thence as enemies. What we need, of course, is to see both individuals and community in complementary terms. How is this possible? Since our mental images influence our action, everything in our relations with others depends on the character of the initial assumptions from which our thinking and our behavior proceed.

Let us assume with Hobbes that Man is a bad animal, or with Locke that he is a blank sheet. What follows? One implication is that men are dangerous. Their instincts and passions have evil consequences since each man is driven to seek power over others in order to prevent their harming himself. Fear, distrust, and suspicion are the maxims of prudence. Since others are by definition antagonistic, only by his sense of self-interest, by stratagem and surprise, will a man survive. For those who accept this Hobbesian premise, life becomes a succession of expedients for the postponement of death. Society, being the alternative to the war of every man against every man, must be organized to bridle the beast. Governments will mobilize the force of Leviathan to apply coercion from without. Education will supplement them by caging the mind, thus implanting the coercion within--the new totalitarianism of mind control. Aldous

Huxley characterized this as consisting of the techniques "which might be used by rulers for keeping their subjects in order and even loving their servitude."<sup>283</sup>

What are the consequences that follow from the Lockean assumption that men in general are malleable clay awaiting the potter's art? To those who think they know best, such an image is an open invitation to mold the soft materials into whatsoever form they will. If the hand be that of a Jefferson, a Gandhi, or a Schweitzer, the results might be good. Doubtless it was with such men in mind that Skinner put Frazier at the wheel in Walden Two. But suppose the potter is the Great Khan or a Hitler or a Stalin? Can Lockean Man avoid subjection to the authoritarian ruler? Can the ruler avoid Lord Acton's axiom--the corruption of benevolence by assumed omniscience and absolute power? How can men protect themselves from those who assume the role of "betters" but who, upon analysis, turn out to be simply more powerful? Sorokin's research, which is very much to the point, demonstrated that men in power were less good than men in general.

What is clear about all assumptions based on negative images of man is that they hold out scant prospect of improvement. "You can't change human nature," as the pessimists reiterate. Or, as the victims of conditioning contentedly intone, "I'm glad I am a gamma because the alphas have to work so hard." Whatever the image of which they stand accused or to which they have become accustomed, whether these are fostered through doctrines of "original sin," the "biological imperative," or simply through the incremental conditioning of the trainer or the Black Box, men can be trapped by the image. They can come to see themselves as evil and fear the "id" inside; or else they can become "dumb animals" who look outside instead of within to find the direction to go and what to do.

Those, however, who start with one of the more positive images can conceive of other alternatives. Their beliefs are founded on a faith in human goodness. Education they envisage as creative growth. Its goal is autonomy; its method, spontaneity. Their view is holistic. They affirm the unity of all, and the cosmic consciousness that apprehends it. They prize individuality--which, however, they see only as attainable through community. Each person is both a unique entity and a part of the universal order.

It is because we are human, according to this philosophy, that we can think in these ways and make such choices. And the choices are of our willing. If material things are indeed in the saddle and ride mankind, it is we ourselves who invited them there. The obstacles that keep the majority of the human race mired down in the Slough of Despond when we could be attempting the ascent to utopia--these obstacles are mainly in our minds. Primarily, they are man-made, the products of our faulty images and of the bad habits to which these give rise. The implication is that, if we want "the relief of Man's estate," we should recognize that the power to improve matters lies within ourselves. We can begin by changing our expectations and our images.

Given the opportunity, it may be possible for Man not only to express his natural goodness but also to move to a higher level of consciousness. Bucke wrote at the turn of the century how we could evolve from simple consciousness to self-consciousness and finally to "cosmic consciousness."<sup>284</sup> It is at this final level that Man would become one with all. At mid-century, Teilhard de Chardin projected the possibility of "universal man,"<sup>285</sup> and still more recently the biophysicist, Platt, has described how human beings might take "the step to Man."<sup>286</sup>

For such a step to occur, people must become aware of the potential within, whether this is conceived in genetic terms as Dubos has described

it, or in the power of the "collective unconscious" as Jung suggested, or in the more spiritual interpretation--the discovery of an inner peace and tranquility which the Quakers call "Inward Light." All involve the unfolding, and often the conscious perception, of that which was unperceived but "already within us."<sup>288</sup>

## NOTES AND REFERENCES

### Five Images of Man (notes 1 to 19)

1. Thucydides, in his History of the Peloponnesian War, presents the Athenian argument in the dialogue with the Melians. It is a frank statement of the naked power position--men have the right to do whatever is in their power to do. (Book VI, Sections 85-111.)

Similarly Plato, in The Republic, has the sophist, Thrasymachus, make a case for the view that "justice is the interest of the stronger." He is refuted by Socrates who argues that men who do not act virtuously destroy themselves. The Republic translated by A. D. Lindsay, Book I, Sections 336-341, Dutton & Co., New York, 1935.

2. The Prince, Chapter XVII.
3. The quotation from Calvin appears in the New Yorker for January 3, 1970 in a review by Robert Coles of Karl Menninger's The Crime of Punishment. See Manas for March 11, 1970.
4. The Hobbesian image of Man can be gleaned from these three quotations from Part I of The Leviathan: "So that in the first place, I put for a general inclination of all mankind a perpetuall and restlesse desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in Death. And the cause of this, is not alwayes that a man hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more." (Chapter XI) "Competition of Riches, Honour, Command, or other power, enclineth to Contention, Enmity, and War: Because the way of one Competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repell the other." (Ibid.) "Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a Warre, as is of every man, against every man. . . . In such condition . . . continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." (Chapter XIII.)

During times of revolution events often occur which seem to support this view. The Russian author, Boris Pasternak, alluded to this in his account of some of the events that accompanied the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent Civil War between Reds and Whites. "That period," he wrote, "confirmed the ancient proverb, 'Man is a wolf to man.' Traveller turned off the road at the sight of traveller, stranger meeting stranger killed for fear of being killed. There were isolated cases of cannibalism.

The laws of human civilization were suspended. The jungle law was in force. Man dreamed the prehistoric dreams of the cave dweller." Boris Pasternak, Doctor Zhivago, trans. by Max Hayward and Manya Harari; Pantheon Books, Inc., New York, 1958, p. 378.

5. Hobbes illustrates this exactly. The logical consequence of these psychological assumptions is Leviathan, the power of the state-- that "mortal God," as he describes it. The essence of Leviathan is its omnipotence. Their fear of it will force men to co-exist in a semblance of order.
6. Schopenhauer's parable of the porcupines is cited by Freud. "A company of porcupines crowded themselves very close together one cold winter's day so as to profit by one another's warmth and so save themselves from being frozen to death. But soon they felt one another's quills, which induced them to separate again. And now, when the need for warmth brought them nearer together again, the second evil arose once more. So that they were driven backwards and forwards from one trouble to the other, until they had discovered a mean distance at which they could most tolerably exist." Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Chap. 6.

The original can be found in Schopenhauer's Parerga und Paralipomena (1851) under the heading of "Parables."

7. To Freud life was Hobbesianly repugnant. As Horney said: "Freud left no doubt about its meaning: man has an innate drive toward evil, aggressiveness, destructiveness, cruelty." Karen Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York, 1939.

Abraham Maslow has commented that "it is as if Freud supplied to us the sick half of psychology. . . ." Toward a Psychology of Being, Van Nostrand, New York, 2nd, ed., 1968, p. 5.

Since World War II there have been a number of books published in the United States that present man as a bad animal. For example, Robert Ardrey in African Genesis develops the theory that homo sapiens evolved from Carnivorous, predatory killer apes and that man's age-old affinity for war and weapons is the natural result of this inherited animal instinct. Books such as Konrad Lorenz's On Aggression and Desmond Morris's The Naked Ape both portray man as an aggressive animal and give short shrift to those parts of man that have been said to be distinctly human--his religion, his ability to dream and plan ahead, and his symbolic talents. See later discussion under section D, part 2. For an excellent analysis of this general subject, see Henry Anderson, "The Denaturalization of Human Nature," Manas, May 6, 1970, pp. 1-2, 7-8.

8. John Locke, Essay on the Human Understanding, Book II, Chap. 1, Section 2.
9. Quoted by Floyd W. Matson, The Broken Image, Doubleday Anchor Books, New York, 1966, p. 40.
10. Quoted in an article by Sydney Liu in the San Francisco Sunday Examiner and Chronicle, December 21, 1969.
11. The same central principle was continued in Mithraism. Lewis Mumford (The Condition of Man, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1944, p. 50) quotes Cumont, the chief modern interpreter of Mithraism, to this effect: "Persia introduced dualism as a fundamental principle in religion. It was this that distinguished Mithraism from other sects, and inspired its dogmatic theology and ethics, giving them a rigor and firmness unknown to Roman paganism," Franz Cumont, The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism, Chicago, 1911, and The Mysteries of Mithra, Chicago, 1911.
12. Hermann Hesse, Steppenwolf, Bantam Books, New York, 1969, pp. 47-48.
13. For Condorcet's views, see section F, part 1.
14. Appendix to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Everyman Edition, p. 239.
15. Quoted by Vernon L. Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1927, p. 336 from Conway, Life of Paine, Putnam, 1892-1893, Vol. II, p. 4. Paine made this statement in an address to the French Assembly.



16. The quotation is from a letter to Peter Carr, written in Paris on August 10, 1787. From The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, edited by Adrienne Koch and William Peden; Random House, Modern Library, New York, 1944, pp. 430-31.
17. The first quotation is from Minor Prophecies. Section B, "There Is No Natural Religion," p. 100. The second is from "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," p. 129. Both of the above selections are from Selected Poetry and Prose of William Blake, Northrup Frye (ed.); Random House, Modern Library, New York, 1953.
18. The platonic tradition has had an influence here--both through Plato's own writings and in the neo-Platonism of Plotinus and his followers. Plato is a rationalist, whose hierarchy of values culminates in a mystical apex. His Form of the Good is truly knowable only to philosophers--who, through love of wisdom (which is what their name signifies), are able to "shuffle off this mortal coil and transcend themselves." Plato is said to have derived some of his inspiration from the religions of the East, via Pythagoras.

The transcendentalists, as Emerson defined them, were "the party of the Future," the partisans of hope and of "the newness," fighting the immemorial battle of history against "the party of the Past." What distinguished these parties was their philosophies; "mankind was ever divided into two sects, Materialists and Idealists," Emerson said. What was called transcendentalism in New England was only idealism reasserting itself. . . . Materialists stressed "experience," the Idealists, "consciousness": the former began with the data of the senses and insisted "on facts, on history, on the force of circumstances and the animal wants of man": the other began with the facts of consciousness and insisted "on the power of Thought and of Will, on inspiration, on miracle, on individual culture," Article on Emerson, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1969 edition, Vol. VIII, p. 332.

Harold Goddard has said this of the Transcendentalists: "They all showed, in widely different ways, somewhat of the feelings that through them an Absolute Truth greater than themselves was speaking." (Studies in New England Transcendentalism, Hillary House Publ., New York, 1969.) The editor of Manas in reviewing Goddard's book speaks of Emerson as exemplifying the man "who relies wholly on his inner sense, his philosophic instincts and conscience." In other words, Emerson believed that a man could gain fundamental

knowledge about the world by direct, personal inspection and could thus find his own way through his own insights and perceptions. (Manas, December 24, 1969, p. 2.)

19. Maslow defines self-actualization as follows: "We can certainly now assert that at least a reasonable, theoretical, and empirical case has been made for the presence within the human being of a tendency toward, or need for growing in a direction that can be summarized in general as self-actualization, or psychological health, and specifically as growth toward each and all of the sub-aspects of self-actualization, i.e., he has within him a pressure toward unity of personality, toward spontaneous expressiveness, toward full individuality and identity, toward seeing the truth rather than being blind, toward being creative, toward being good and a lot else." Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 155.

Underlying Assumptions About Human Nature (notes 20 to 29)

20. How central to the life of man is the formulation of values, has been clearly stated by Fromm: "Values are rooted in the very conditions of human existence; hence . . . our knowledge of these conditions, that is, of the human situation, leads us to establishing values which have objective validity; this validity exists, only with regard to the existence of man; outside of him there are no values." Erich Fromm, "Values, Psychology, and Human Existence," in Abraham H. Maslow (ed.), New Knowledge in Human Values, Harper & Bros., New York, 1959, p. 151.

Likewise, Leslie Lipson has constructed an analysis of politics around the image of man as a value-selecting animal: "Men whose wants have reached the state of inquiry and reflection about standards of living are making intellectual comparisons and taking ethical choices. When they select their pattern of life from the available alternatives, their preferences are transmuted into terms of good and bad, of right and wrong--in a word, of values. Thus it happens that upon the foundation of vital necessities man, the value-selecting animal, rears this elaborate structure of choices that stamp him as a rational and moral being." The Great Issues of Politics, 4th ed., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1970, p. 31.

Morris Ginsberg traces the origins and development of values to man's social experience: "The recognition that there must be rules does not suffice to tell us what the rules should be. These are arrived at slowly and gropingly and embody judgments of good and evil, ultimately traceable to primary experiences of value. These judgments are made at very different levels of insight and experience. The primary valuations may be combined in various ways to form higher order valuations and different peoples may find different ways of achieving similar ends." Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy, Heinemann, London, 1956-61, Vol. I, p. 119.

21. Ginsberg comments on this concept: "The notion of functional excellence is of course the root idea of Greek ethics and often modern theories of self-realization. All such theories would make the fulfillment or realization of the specifically human functions the object of conscious or deliberate striving." (Ginsberg, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 133.) This coincides with Maslow's view that each person is responsible for his own actualization. (Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed., op. cit.)

In discussing why a hierarchy is needed Mumford explains: "Utopia, as the expression of rational possibilities is an integral feature of purposive living; for no human life is fully rational unless it anticipates its own life course and controls its present actions and present needs in the light of some more general plan, some larger system of values, into which all the parts of its existence tend to fit." (Lewis Mumford, op. cit., p. 13.)

22. This point is made cogently by Scott Paradise in a critique of the underlying values of contemporary American society: "Since life's primary purpose is producing and consuming, abundant life blesses us through increasing material abundance. Goods equal the good, and nothing can quench our infinite thirst for them." For this he proposes to substitute the enhancement of human well-being. However, he continues: "The growth of the GNP does not necessarily lead to the enlargement of human well being. It may in some instances lead to the opposite." "The Vandal Ideology," The Nation, December 29, 1969, pp. 730 and 732.
23. "We are never more human than at the moment of decision." (Tillich)

24. Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Chapter I, opens his discussion as follows: "Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view of some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at the highest good." (Translated by Benjamin Jowett, Clarendon Press, rev. ed., Oxford, 1921.)
25. Joseph Wood Krutch, "The Creative Dilemma: It is From the Artist that Society Gains Its Loftier Images of Itself," Saturday Review, February 8, 1964, pp. 14-17, 58.
26. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, University of Chicago Press, 1958.
27. Plato's Republic, Book VII, Sections 534 ff.
28. Matthew Arnold is thus quoted in Louis Untermeyer, Lives of the Poets, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1959, p. 251.
29. Northrup Frye, The Educated Imagination, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1964.

The Relation of Values to Actuality (notes 30 to 41)

30. The logical positivists, whose influence radiated outward from the Vienna School of the 1920's, asserted that metaphysics is meaningless and reduced all philosophical questions to linguistics, i.e., to analysis of verbal propositions. They affirm that judgments of "what is" are of a different order from judgments of "what ought to be," and that the latter cannot be derived from the former. This doctrine has been accepted by behaviorists and other students of human society who, following what they hold to be the directives of Weber, place their faith in value-free (i.e., objective) social science. Weber's position, however, was not as clear-cut as some of his devotees would have us believe. Reinhard Bendix states that "a strategic element" in Weber was his "insistence on a 'value-free' social science. Weber's concept permitted him to assert the possibility of arriving at a scientific study of society by separating personal evaluation from scientific judgments." Article by Reinhard Bendix on Max Weber in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 16, p. 495.

According to Karl Mannheim, however, "Weber argued that human studies are different in nature from science. Therefore sympathetic understanding (Verstehen) and valuations play a decisive role, and the elaboration of the typical leads to the creation of specific concepts (ideal types). The great political thinker of the Weimer Republic, he was a firm believer in the democratic ideals of the West." Article by Karl Mannheim on Max Weber in Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 23, 1969, pp. 356-57.

Although Weber, like most great theoreticians, was not completely consistent, many seemed to have based an uncompromising position on his authority. For example, within a decade after Weber's death, von Wiese and Becker wrote unequivocally: "Value-judgments, Adieu!" Leopold von Wiese and Howard Becker, Systematic Sociology, John Wylie and Sons, New York, 1932, p. 8. One often sees that the thought of the more eminent minds, when carefully analyzed, exhibits patent contradictions. Locke, Rousseau, Machiavelli and Mill are cases in point. Some who have commented on their philosophies are disturbed to admit that such contradictions exist. They seek to reconcile them or somehow explain them away. Others prefer to conclude, in Emerson's words, that "with consistency a great soul has absolutely nothing to do." Indeed they accept these inconsistencies as signs of a larger view, of a universality of outlook through which, as Blake believes, "everything will appear as it really is, Infinite."

31. Aristotle's Politics was the first systematic treatise in the history of social thought to combine a comparative survey of empirical data with the deductive reasoning of moral philosophy. He employed the evidence from the past and from contemporary observation to clarify the validity of values, as he used values to lend meaning to factual information. From his time to the present, innumerable social thinkers have walked the same path, interweaving analysis with evaluation and holding that the objective and subjective are inextricably fused. Exponents of this view in recent decades have been the theologians, Niebuhr and Tillich, the economist, Myrdal, the historian, Toynbee, the philosopher-generalist, Mumford, and Köhler, the Gestalt psychologist. In Köhler's view: We can then say that value and corresponding insight constitute the very essence of human mental life." Wolfgang Köhler, The Place of Value in a World of Fact, Liveright, New York, 1938, p. 31.

32. Significantly, the history of political ideas comprises numerous volumes--including several classic treatises--on the subject of liberty. Much less attention has been given to equality, and even less to fraternity. Yet of these concepts, equality, which is closely allied to fraternity, is probably the one most necessary and most valued for human growth. Both are related to love which, as Kenneth Clark has observed, is needed by every infant. Otherwise, the child will not survive. (Kenneth Clark, "Intelligence, the University, and Society," in The American Scholar, Winter, 1966-67, pp. 23-32). It is Jung's observation that: "Where love stops, power begins, and violence, and terror." (The Undiscovered Self, Mentor Books, New York, 1957-58). As Aristotle noted in the Politics, the yearning for equality is a root cause of revolution, a situation only too evident in the upheavals of the 1960's. Far-reaching and long-lived movements have come about as a result of education which has presented to "the wretched of the earth" such ideals as that of universal brotherhood, a basic theme of missionaries who may not have intended their converts to apply the idea in a literal and personal sense. The same has been true of equality which was extolled in many of the British texts used to educate colonials. Book burning was commanded by fanatics such as Hitler who saw it was a necessary instrument of control over a subject population.
33. Theologians have become increasingly concerned with morality and the nature of good, especially as this applies in societies. Those philosophers who took up logical positivism abdicated from the study of morality and ethics. For a discussion of the new theology, see "The Sixties: Radical Change in American Religion," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 387, January, 1970.
34. The "forgotten fifth" is a phrase that received currency after the publication of The Other America by Michael Harrington. Penguin Books, Baltimore, 1963.
35. James T. Lancy, "The New Morality and the Religious Communities," in The Annals, op. cit., pp. 14-21.
36. Peter Schrag, writing in Saturday Review (February 18, 1967), named Edgar Friedenbergh, Paul Goodman, Jules Henry and John Holt as "education's new romantic critics." Since then, the ranks of those who strongly criticize the public schools as being inhuman and rigid have swelled considerably. This group stands in marked contrast to those reactionary critics, such as Max Rafferty, who want the schools to tighten up and bear down.

37. Departing from the Newtonian version that the world is a great machine, Sir James Jeans has said that the world is a great thought. The Mysterious Universe, Dutton & Co., New York, 1958, p. 181.
38. The source is Philip Kapleau, The Three Pillars of Zen, John Weatherhill, Tokyo, 1965, p. 154.
39. This is Marshall McLuhan's argument in The Gutenberg Galaxy, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1967.
40. From Thomas P. Colwell, Jr., "The Balance of Nature: A Ground for Human Values," Main Currents in Modern Thought, Vol. 26, No. 2, November-December, 1969, p. 50.
41. It is to Niels Bohr that we owe the formulation of the "complementarity principle." He developed it as a resolution of the controversy among physicists over the ultimate nature of matter. Is this a wave or a particle? Since there is evidence for both, but since the two are mutually exclusive and cannot be conceived as simultaneous, Bohr suggested that both exist in alternation and that each needs its "complementary opposite." (See the excellent commentary by Floyd W. Matson in The Broken Image, Doubleday Anchor, New York, 1966, p. 132 ff.).

The same principle is applicable beyond the domain of physical science. In all branches of knowledge, reductionism and the efforts to systematize coherently (this often means in closed and tight ways) make it impossible to include the diversity that is characteristic of real life situations. As Allport has said, "The reductionist is the person who solves the dilemma [desire for coherence, while recognizing the diversity that is truth] by favouring coherence over adequacy." Gordon W. Allport, "Imagination in Psychology: Some Needed Steps," in Imagination and the University, New York University Lecture Series, 1963 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1964, p. 76). Continuing with a discussion of the reductionist, he comments:

"He is willing to blind himself, permanently or temporarily, to the complexities of his subject in order to reap the rewards of rationalism. The pluralist, on the other hand, is willing to sacrifice rational coherence in order to keep alive his recognition of diversity and subtlety. The eclectic can use ideas from various systems of thought--can put two opposing theories side by side. . . . Nothing that seems true in any context can be denied, not even if these special truths fail to cohere." (Ibid., pp. 76-77).

Complementarity was well understood by William James, as Allport makes clear:

"In the psychology of William James we encounter many paradoxes of this order. His hospitable mind was able in different contexts to give assent to determinism and also freedom; to mentalism and to physicalism; to parallelism and to interactionism. He both affirmed and denied the unconscious; he expressed both hope and despair concerning the future of psychology as a science." Gordon Allport, "The Productive Paradoxes of William James," Psychological Review, Vol. 50, 1943, pp. 95-120.

Donald Michael has spoken of a direction of growth in which people will not only tolerate ambiguity, but will actually enjoy the unfinished and the open-ended. (Interview with Dr. Michael conducted by Elizabeth Monroe Drews, October, 1968.) This is the message which Emerson communicated: "Consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds."

Much of the new science recognizes the dangers of the too specific operational definition. As someone has said, we can avoid "mechanistic dead-ends by sighting the principle of indeterminacy." The physicist, Bridgman, who originally formulated the operational definition, has written extensively on the decisive subjective factor in all physical theory which results from the selective effect of the observer in choosing the data he thinks are relevant for research. P. W. Bridgman, The Way Things Are, Viking Press, New York, 1961, pp. 1-12.

Foundation for a Universal Hierarchy of Values (notes 42-95)

42. René Dubos, "Humanistic Biology," The American Scholar, Vol. 34, Spring 1965, pp. 179-198.
43. William James, "Energies of Man: excerpts from memories and studies with comments," Vogue, Vol. 153, January 1, 1969, pp. 126-129.
44. "If B-values are as necessary as vitamins and love, and if their absence can make you sick, then what people have talked about for thousands of years as the religious or platonic or rational life seems to be a very basic part of human nature. Man is a hierarchy of needs, with the biological needs at the base of the hierarchy and the spiritual needs at the top. Unlike the biological needs, however, the B-values are not hierarchical in and of themselves. One is as important as the next, and each one can be defined in terms



of all the others. Truth, for example, must be complete, aesthetic, comprehensive, and strangely enough, it must be funny in an Olympian god-like sense. Beauty must be true, good, comprehensive, etc." Abraham Maslow, Goals of Humanistic Education (Typescript of presentation at Esalen, September 1968, p. 9). Commenting further on the biological and psychological bases of man's needs, Maslow has this to say: "The need for love characterizes every human being that is born." He goes on to say that education, psychotherapy, self-improvement would not be possible without this. (Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 191). He continues: "This inner nature rarely disappears or dies. . . . It persists underground . . . it has a dynamic force of its own, pressing always for open, uninhibited expression." (Ibid., pp. 192-3.) However, Maslow feels there is more to growth than the genetic aspects or even the environmental. As he says, each person uncovers and discovers himself but also creates himself. "The person as he matures, becomes self-actualizing, is his own determinant." (Ibid., p. 193.)

45. Paul Goodman, "The Present Moment in Education," New York Review of Books, April 10, 1969, pp. 13-24. Elsewhere, he cites James Coleman's opinion "that the average adolescent is really in school, academically, for about ten minutes a day." Paul Goodman, Compulsory Mis-education, Horizon Press, New York, 1964, p. 90.
46. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 152. "Capacities clamor to be used, and cease their clamor only when they are used sufficiently. That is to say, capacities are needs, and therefore are intrinsic values as well. To the extent that capacities differ, so will values also differ."
47. Herbert Read, Education Through Art, Faber and Faber, London, 1963.
48. Sidney M. Jourard, The Transparent Self, Van Nostrand, Princeton, N.J. 1964, p. 105.
49. Krutch, op. cit.
50. R. E. Egner and L. E. Denonn (eds.), The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1961.
51. Ian D. Suttie has written: "Both Freud and Adler . . . regard the infant as 'bad' by nature and as having to be made 'good' by external compulsion, or else allowed outlet for its badness. I consider that the germ of goodness or of love is in the individual (of every species which has evolved a nurtured infancy) from the very beginning, and

that our traditional method of upbringing frustrates this spontaneous benevolence and substitutes 'guilt-anxiety' morality for natural goodness." The Origins of Love and Hate, referred to by Read, op. cit., p. 273.

52. Claude Levi-Strauss, the structural anthropologist, has advanced the theory that there is a "least common denominator of human thought." He surmises that the origin of human speech and of human society may have occurred at one time. Language--under which he includes speech, music, art, ritual, myth, religion, literature, cooking, trading, etc.--reflects a universal human need to communicate and a universal desire to attach meaning to things, to find order and thus to organize the chaos of the universe. See "Man's New Dialogue with Man," Time Essay, June 30, 1967, pp. 34-35.
53. Noam Chomsky studies language as a "mirror of consciousness" and questions whether Darwinian selection could account for language in human evolution. Although languages differ in their surface structure, "if there were no common ground between languages, it would be impossible to translate one into another. . . . It looks as though at some level all languages share a common deep structure, which, if formally defined, would represent a 'universal grammar.'" From John Davy, "The Chomsky Revolution," The Observer (London), August 10, 1969, p. 21.
54. C. G. Jung, The Integration of the Personality, Farrar and Rinehart, New York, 1939.
55. Ginsberg in his essay "On the Diversity of Morals" says that "comparative study justifies the conclusion that the diversity in the actual content of morals is consistent with a measure of similarity in certain generic ethical relationships and with a certain unity of direction recognizable in the historical development of morality." (Ginsberg, op. cit., p. 101.) He continues, "The quantitative extension of moral rules to wider groups is parallel with the change in the conception of the human person himself." (Ibid., p. 102.) "In essentials the moral systems of the world show striking similarities. A list of virtues or duties drawn up by a Buddhist would not differ very greatly from one drawn up by a Christian, a Confucianist, a Muhammeden, or a Jew. Formally all the ethico-religious systems are universalist in scope. . . . But the formal resemblance is deceptive. The universalism is never thoroughgoing and is variously limited." (Ibid., p. 106.)

"The higher religions converge in their teaching on the inward nature of morality and the universality of love and its obligations. The philosophers, after the manner of their trade, emphasize their differences from each other. But in their accounts of the good for man they move within a restricted circle of ideas--happiness, wisdom, virtue, fulfillment." (Ibid., p. 124.)

Ginsberg's reference to Edward W. Westermarck is to his Ethical Relativity, Kegan and Paul, London, 1932, p. 197.

Likewise, Kluckhohn points out that there is in all societies an interdiction against "killing, indiscriminate lying and stealing within the in-group," and in fact, against whatever might bring about dissension, disruption, destruction within the recognized social unit, thus ensuring the persistence of good relations. Quoted by Dorothy Lee in "Culture and the Experience of Value" from A. H. Maslow (ed.), New Knowledge in Human Values, op. cit., p. 166.

56. From Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture and Behavior, Richard Kluckhohn (ed.), The Free Press, New York, 1962, p. 294. Cited by Ernest Becker, The Structure of Evil, Braziller, New York, 1968, p. 391.
57. Lawrence Kohlberg, "The Child as a Moral Philosopher," Psychology Today, September, 1968, pp. 25-30.
58. Norman Kiehl, The Universal Experience of Adolescence, Beacon Press, Boston, 1967, p. 40.
59. The findings of Frank Charles Laubach are presented in such works as Literacy as Evangelism (Laubach Literacy Fund, 1955), Toward World Literacy (Syracuse University Press, 1961), English, the New Way (New Readers Press, 1962).
60. "The Life Poll by Louis Harris, 'What People Think About Their High Schools,'" Life Magazine, May 16, 1969, pp. 22-39.
61. Ralph Barton Perry, The Humanity of Man, Braziller, New York, 1956, p. 99.
62. See Ginsberg's comments quoted earlier.
63. This doctrine is presented in the Social Contract as well as in the Discourse on Political Economy. The General Will is always good. Its mistakes are due to its being uninformed and unenlightened.

Rousseau held the Socratic belief that right conduct depends on knowledge, and that, when you know the good, your will does not choose the bad.

Blake, who was writing a half century later, proclaimed that "everything that lives is holy." His was the vision that was able

To see a World in a Grain of Sand  
And a Heaven in a Wild Flower,  
Hold Infinity in the palm of your hand  
And Eternity in an hour.

Quotation from Louis Untermeyer, Lives of the Poets, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1959, p. 309. The unifying bonds among a people who share a common history were conceived as "the mystic chords of memory" by Lincoln in his First Inaugural Address. The phrase of Alfred L. Kroeber comes from his Anthropology, Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., New York, 1948. L. T. Hobhouse, the English social philosopher, is quoted on the "Central Mind" by Ginsberg, in his Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 290.

64. Jules Henry, Culture Against Man, Random House, New York, 1963. In his words, "A competitive culture endures by tearing people down," p. 303.
65. Maslow in Motivation and Personality, Harper and Bros., New York, 1954. The quotations are from pp. 231 and 210, respectively.

This general problem has been the topic of much discussion. Allport holds that certain statements of tendency in human nature seem approximately true for every mortal. For example, it is said that all value truth. Gordon Allport, The Use of Personal Documents in Psychological Science, Social Science Research Council, New York, 1942, pp. xii, 4.

The writer of an article in Manas would not agree that all hold the truth as a higher value. In comparing the power man and the philosophers he has this to say: "Yet there are two classes of men who seem well aware that the conventionally established 'facts' and the related 'seeming logics' bear less and less actual relation to the lives of great masses of men. Those who are on the edge of wisdom see this, and the seekers after power see it, too. The manipulators of power use 'facts' merely for access to the springs of

behavior. The manipulator is a utilitarian from the word go. Knowledge is only a means to power. Both sorts of men understand something of human nature, but the men on the edge of wisdom love the truth, while for seekers after power the idea of truth has no meaning." Manas, December 24, 1969, pp. 2, 7.

This Manas statement has been reinforced by the findings of Elizabeth Monroe Drews that at least one group of adolescents discounted the value of truth. Those who described themselves as Social Leaders said they were willing to lie and cheat if these actions were in their self interest. In contrast, most students who called themselves Studious or Creative Intellectuals thought such behavior was wrong in any context. Elizabeth Monroe Drews, The Creative Intellectual Style in Gifted Adolescents, Vols. I, II and III, Michigan State University, Lansing, 1964, 1965, 1966. She has also written on the subject of gifted youth and the values revolution, with a less technical treatment, in her book on The Creative Intellectual Style to be published by Prentice-Hall in 1971.

66. Ronald D. Laing, The Scottish psychiatrist, who quoted recently as saying: "By the time a new human being is 15 or so . . . we are left with a being like ourselves, a half-crazed creature more or less adjusted to a mad world. This is normality." Time Essay, "Metaphysician of Madness," February 7, 1969, pp. 64-5.
67. John Martin Rich, Education and Human Values, Addison-Wesley Co., Menlo Park, 1968, p. 111.
68. A. S. Neill, "Can I Come to Summerhill? I Hate My School," Psychology Today, May, 1968, pp. 35-40. Also Emmanuel Bernstein, "Summerhill: A Follow-up of its Students," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 10, Fall, 1968, pp. 123-36.
69. Ashley Montagu, The Human Revolution, The World Publishing Co., Cleveland, 1965.
70. Willard Price, Japan's Islands of Mystery, John Day, New York, 1944.
71. Read, op. cit., p. 308.
72. Robert Lowie, Are We Civilized? Harcourt, Brace, & Co., New York, 1929, p. 167.
73. Read, op. cit., p. 193.

74. Ardrey, op. cit.
75. Based on Encyclopedia Britannica article on Kropotkin, vol. 13, 1969, p. 495. The quotation from W. C. Allee is in his Cooperation Among Animals, Henry Schuman, New York, 1951, p. 206.
76. Maslow reports on an experiment using beautified and uglified environments with college students:
- My wife and daughter get sick in non-aesthetic surroundings. Houses just don't have the kind of intrinsic beauty required by my wife. She has to re-build them.
- She helped me with an experiment in which we tested the effect of a beautified and an uglified room. Many students could not work in crummy surrounds and others behaved in loose, course fashions. Still others became curt, abrupt and harsh. My wife greeted the students in both rooms but they saw her differently.
- In the uglified room which was narrow and long and with a single high window and everything not only filthy but the walls painted a poisonous green, they saw things very differently than in the beautiful room. (Interview with Abraham Maslow conducted by Elizabeth Monroe Drews, October, 1969.)
77. Quoted in Louise Bachelder, ed., Nature Thoughts, Peter Pauper Press, Mount Vernon, N.Y., 1965, p. 34.
78. "Oh sky divine where winds fly swift of wing;  
Ye fountain springs of rivers; and ocean waves  
Whose smiles pass counting; earth, mother of all;  
To you, and the sun's all-seeing orb, I speak--  
Behold what I, a god, from gods do suffer." Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, ll. 88-92. Translator by Leslie Lipson.
79. William Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II: I: 3-4.
80. William Cullen Bryant, quoted in Bachelder, op. cit., p. 7.
81. Ibid., p. 23.
82. Ibid., p. 7, for Ruskin; ibid., p. 58, for Muir.



83. Notes on Virginia, Query XIX. Similarly, Virgil had written seventeen centuries earlier, in the Georgics, that, when Justice departed from the earth, she walked last of all among the tillers of the soil.
84. The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris, with introduction and notes by Cosenya, Doubleday, New York, 1930, p. 360.
85. Heinrich Engel, The Japanese House, Charles E. Tuttle Co., Tokyo, 1964, p. 284.
86. Writing on Rembrandt, Katharine Kuh has this to say about the universal appeal of great art: "We ask what gives this artist such universal appeal. Why more than any other painter is he able to involve and hold his audience, an audience astonishingly wide, ranging from innocent neophytes to experienced scholars, from young to old, from abstractionists to stubborn realists?. . . What makes Rembrandt incomparable is a combination of all these attributes: his humanity, his light that is more than a physical element as it shines through and isolates apocalyptic encounters, plus--and the plus is big--his drive to expose the living core of everything he touched, the core of man and individual men, of the earth itself." Katharine Kuh, "Rembrandt, The Unrealistic Realist," Saturday Review, January 10, 1970, p. 47.
87. Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, Random House, Vintage Book, New York, 1955, p. 137.
88. Maslow; Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 173.
89. Irvin L. Child, "The Experts and the Bridge of Judgment that Crosses Every Cultural Gap," Psychology Today, December, 1968, pp. 25-29.
90. John Dewey, Art as Experience, Putnam's Capricorn Books, New York, 1958, p. 329.
91. Ibid., p. 30. The passage from Shelley is quoted by Dewey, ibid., p. 349.
92. Read, op. cit., p. 15.
93. Edward T. Hall, The Hidden Dimension, Doubleday, New York, 1966, pp. 58, 143.
94. Read, op. cit., The quotations are from pp. 16, 193.



95. Dewey, op. cit., Quoted from pp. 326, 348

Evolution and Expansion of the Hierarchy of Values (notes 96 to 144)

96. Aldous Huxley has said that "spiritual progress is always in an ascending spiral. . . . Ultimately, nothing is irrelevant to anything else. There is a togetherness of all things in an endless hierarchy of living and interacting patterns." (From "Adonis and the Alphabet," in Adonis and the Alphabet and Other Essays, Chatto & Windus, London, 1956, p. 129.) Similarly, Morison comments: "The over-all course of human development and culture has been upward in most measurable senses." Robert S. Morison, "The Need for New Types of Excellence," Daedalus, Vol. 90, Fall, 1961, p. 37.

Equally to the point are the ideas that Mumford applies to the broad concept of social progress: "Since man started on his career, there has not been merely an increase in the quantity of mind, but also in its qualitative attributes: in man's sensitiveness, his feeling, his capacity for love, and his ability to encompass with the aid of symbols a larger and fuller sense of the whole. [Man has developed] . . . a consciousness that reaches ever further back into origins and ever further forward into possible choices and possible destinies. Despite many setbacks and diversions, mind has matured, and love, which first spring out of the needs of reproduction and nurture, has widened its domain." Lewis Mumford, The Transformations of Man, Harper & Bros., New York, 1956, p. 234.

97. Conversation of Elizabeth Monroe Drews with David Krathwohl, March 2, 1970.
98. Those such as Bruner and Piaget, who suggest that mental and moral growth proceeds in orderly progression, generally hold that children cannot function at these higher levels. However, there is also evidence and supportive theory to indicate the opposite. We have noted Chomsky's assertion (p. 33) that each child has an innate "idea of language" and can use a complex syntax when very young. Is it not possible that the young could also think at a high level and in complex terms?
99. Jung, op. cit.
100. Marie Jahoda, Current Concepts of Positive Mental Health, Basic Books Publishing Co., Inc., New York, 1958.

101. Jane Loevinger, "The Meaning and Measurement of Ego Development," American Psychologist, March, 1966, pp. 195-206.
102. Kohlberg, op. cit.
103. Claire W. Graves, On the Theory of Value, Working Paper, New York: Union College, Schenectady, New York, March, 1967.
104. Robert F. Peck and Robert J. Havighurst, The Psychology of Character Development, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1960.
105. Elizabeth Monroe Drews, The Creative Intellectual Style in Gifted Adolescents, op. cit.
106. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd. ed., op. cit.
107. Carl R. Rogers, On Becoming a Person, Houghton-Mifflin Co., Boston, 1961.
108. Mumford, The Transformations of Man, op. cit., p. 246.
109. Aldous Huxley, Island, Harper and Bros., New York, 1962.
110. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, Harper and Bros., New York, 1959.
111. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, op. cit.
112. John E. Arnold, "The Specialist vs. the Generalist: Productivity vs. Creativity," in Institute for Personality Assessment and Research, Proceedings of the Conference of the Creative Person, Lake Tahoe, California, October 13, 1961, pp. 9-1, to 9-XIII.
113. Erich Fromm, Man for Himself, Rinehart & Co., New York, 1947.
114. Catherine Roberts, The Scientific Conscience, Braziller, New York, 1967, p. 26. The meaning of Arete is goodness or virtue.
115. Richard M. Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness, E. P. Dutton, New York, original copyright, 1901, 19th edition, 1959.
116. Jules Henry has said: "Creative cultures have loved the 'beautiful person'--meditative, intellectual, and exalted." (op. cit., p. 319.) Jerome Bruner specifically refers to the Jewish and Chinese concepts

- of the beautiful person. Both cultures, according to him, have held in highest esteem an individual who was richly developed both intellectually and aesthetically. On Knowing: Essays for the Left Hand, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1962, p. 119.
117. Kohlberg, op. cit., p. 26.
  118. Note that Jane Loevinger and C. W. Graves reverse the ranking of Levels III and IV. The former classifies opportunistic behavior as Level III, while the latter's description of this kind of person--Exploitative--comes under his Level IV. Loevinger places Conformist at Level IV whereas Graves assigns a similar phenomenon, Ordered Existence, to Level III.
  119. Loevinger, op. cit.
  120. Kohlberg, op. cit.
  121. Ibid., p. 30.
  122. ibid., p. 28.
  123. Ibid.
  124. Ibid.
  125. Catherine Morris Cox, Genetic Studies of Genius: The Mental Traits of Three Hundred Geniuses, Vol. 11, Stanford University Press, 1926, p. 216.
  126. Charlotte Buhler, "The Human Course of Life in its Goal Aspects," Journal of Humanistic Psychology, Spring, 1964, pp. 1-18.
  127. Appendix to the Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, op. cit., p. 239.
  128. Hadley Cantril, The Why of Man's Experience, Macmillan, New York, 1950, p. 159.
  129. The degenerate states are described in books VIII and IX of The Republic. In descending order from the ideal, they are, as he depicts them: timocracy (where those who rule are imbued with a code of honor--part aristocratic, part military), oligarchy (the

rule of the rich), democracy (the rule of the many dominating the aristocrats and the wealthy), tyranny (the despotism of one who is the slave of his passions).

130. Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, op. cit. and Plato, The Republic, op. cit.
131. The distinction between republics and monarchies is stated at the beginning of Chap. 1 of The Prince, which is a treatise on the latter. In the Discourses, Machiavelli uses Livy's history of the Roman Republic (not the Empire) as his point of departure for a favorable treatment of the virtues of republics.  
  
The Prince abounds with conventional moral judgments that readers have tended to overlook while they focus on the less conventional remarks. Chapter VIII, for example, is entitled: "Of those who have attained the position of prince by villainy." In it, he says of Agathocles, the ruler of Syracuse: "It cannot be called virtue to kill one's fellow-citizens, betray one's friends, be without faith, without pity, and without religion; by these methods one may indeed gain power, but not glory."
132. Locke's political philosophy, as voiced in the Letters on Toleration and the Second Treatise of Civil Government, has a more optimistic image of Man than the Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
133. According to Hegel, the Idea was reason, an absolute that could be apprehended by the mind and that revealed itself in the logic of nature and of human history. Man realized himself when he made his reason conform to that of the Idea. Only then, and only in that sense, could he be said to exist.
134. Marx was revolutionary in his assertion that ideas are a reflection of material conditions, whereas Hegel maintained that the logic of the Idea generates the material development.
135. Similarly, de Tocqueville came to America to inquire, not whether democracy would spread elsewhere--he knew that it would--but what it would be like when it did. op. cit.
136. Although, as noted earlier, his own practice wobbled and was not as consistent as that of many Weberians. As an example of contemporary value--free analysis, there is the essay by Edward Shils

- on "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States," in John H. Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries, Wiley, New York, 1962.
137. Translated from Politik als Beruf, and printed in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press, Galaxy edition, New York, 1958, pp. 78-79.
138. Loc. cit.
139. Besides those that Weber mentions, other types of authority have been based on military force, wealth, religious dogma, etc.
140. As a case in point, one could cite the writings of Melville J. Herskovits, e.g., Man and His Work. Knopf, New York, 1948. Very different is the outlook of the sociologist, Ginsberg, who has written this: "Relativist theories are at their weakest in dealing with change and development. They hover between moral nihilism and complete Gleichschaltung, and in order to escape they invariably resort sooner or later to principles to which on their assumptions they are not entitled. Those who think that moral judgments express attitudes, emotions, or desires tend to be individualistic in their approach, though, as they point out, there are many desires or attitudes which are common to all members of a group, and may even be universal. When desires conflict, however, the decision rests within the individual. He need not necessarily decide in accordance with the prevailing norms." Essays in Sociology and Social Philosophy, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 122.
141. The quotation is the opening of Harold D. Lasswell's Politics: Who Gets What, When, How, McGraw Hill, Whittlesey House, New York, 1936. This book has been much imitated and is greatly admired by behaviorists. Politics on this view is a zero-sum game in which somebody has to lose what the other person wins. The heart of the matter, so interpreted, is to succeed in conflict. The result is such a statement as the following: "One way to begin the study of conflict is to understand that without conflict there is no politics. If everybody suddenly decided to quit fighting and always cooperate, the political scientists would be put out of business." D. A. Strickland, L. L. Wade and R. E. Johnston, A Primer of Political Analysis, Markham, Chicago, 1968, p. 38.

142. David Easton published The Political System in 1953 and A Framework for Political Analysis in 1965. The definition of the function of the political system as "the authoritative allocation of values" appears in both. See the latter work. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1965, pp. 50-57.
143. Ibid., p. 55.
144. The quotation is from Lucian W. Pye, Aspects of Political Development, Little Brown, Boston, 1966, p. 8. With this approach, one may also bracket Samuel P. Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968.

The History of Hierarchies: Changing Priorities (notes 145 to 171)

145. An exception was Stoicism, which evolved in a time of troubles and was designed to help the individual find his identity and thus be able to face with fortitude the perils of a society undergoing profound transformation.
146. This point is made by Leslie Lipson, Democratic Civilization, Oxford University Press, New York, 1954, p. 47.
147. On the new emphasis placed upon the individual see the discussion in Jacob Burckhardt (Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, Modern Library, New York, 1954) who generally welcomes the new status of the individual. On the other hand, R. H. Tawney (Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1926) is aware that some of the gains made by the individual were losses for society. Mumford supports the latter position and points out that some of the values lost were not only in sense of community but also in inwardness and subjectiveness. As a result, man was isolated both from himself and from the group, and thus the door was opened for a "capacity for violence, brutality, deviltry." In summary, "the unfettered individual was less of a man than the man of the Middle Ages." Mumford, The Condition of Man, op. cit., p. 253.
148. This general topic is dealt with by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, Scribner's, New York, 1958, and by Tawney, op. cit.
149. This discussion is based on J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, Dover Publications, New York, 1955, pp. 206-15.

150. Bury, op. cit., p. 208.

151. He felt not only that it was the right of individuals to develop their potential, but also that such education of the masses would foster the growth of democracy (particularly liberty).

In a letter to James Madison, Jefferson wrote from Paris on December 20, 1787, "This last is the most certain, and the most legitimate engine of government. Educate and inform the whole mass of the people. Enable them to see that it is to their interest to preserve peace and order, and they will preserve them. And it requires no very high degree of education to convince them of this. They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty." Koch and Peden, eds., op. cit., p. 440.

152. Ibid.

153. This quotation from Emerson and those that follow are taken from Untermeyer, op. cit., pp. 541-544, and from the Encyclopedia Britannica, op. cit., 1969.

154. Charles E. Merriam, The New Democracy and the New Despotism, McGraw-Hill, Whittlesey House, New York, 1939, p. 37.

155. On this point let Spencer speak for himself: "Pervading all nature we may see at work a stern discipline, which is a little cruel that it may be very kind. That state of universal warfare maintained throughout the lower creation, to the great perplexity of many worthy people, is at bottom the most merciful provision which the circumstances admit of. It is much better that the ruminant animal, when deprived by age of the vigor which made its existence a pleasure, should be killed by some beast of prey, than that it should linger out a life made painful by infirmities, and eventually die of starvation. . . . Meanwhile the well-being of existing humanity, and the unfolding of it into this ultimate perfection, are both secured by that same beneficent, though severe discipline, to which the animate creation at large is subject: a discipline which is pitiless in the working out of good; a felicity-pursuing law which never swerves for the avoidance of partial and temporary suffering. The poverty of the incapable, the distresses that come upon the imprudent, the starvation of the idle, and those shoulderings aside of the weak by the strong, which leave so many 'in shallows and in miseries,' are the decrees of a large, far-seeing benevolence. . . . Nevertheless, when regarded not separately, but in connection with the interests of universal humanity, these harsh fatalities are seen to

be full of the highest beneficence . . . the same beneficence which brings to early graves the children of diseased parents, and singles out the low-spirited, the intemperate, and the debilitated as the victims of an epidemic." Social Statics, Chapman & Hall, London, 1850, Part III, Chap. 25, p. 322.

156. Prince Peter Kropotkin, while not denying the facts of struggle and competition, felt that their significance and implications had been greatly overrated. Insufficient attention had been given, in his view, to the cooperation that exists on all rungs of the ladder of evolution, and increases among the more advanced species. From his reading and observations in zoology and anthropology he was led to the following conclusion: "'Don't compete!--competition is always injurious to the species, and you have plenty of reasons to avoid it!' That is the tendency of nature, not always realized in full, but always present. That is the watchword which comes to us from the bush, the forest, the river, the ocean. Therefore combine--practice mutual aid! That is the surest means for giving to each and all the greatest safety, the best guarantee of existence and progress, bodily, intellectual and moral. That is what nature teaches us; and that is what all those animals which have attained the highest position in their respective classes have done.

That is also what man--the most primitive man--has been doing; and that is why man has reached the position upon which we stand now . . ." Mutual Aid, A Factor of Evolution, Knopf, New York, 1925. The quotation is from the concluding paragraph of Chap. 2.

Similar views have been expressed by Loren Eiseley in The Immense Journey, Random House, New York, 1957, and The Firmament of Time, Atheneum, New York, 1960, and by Ashley Montagu in Culture and the Evolution of Man, Oxford University Press, New York, 1962, and Man's Most Dangerous Myth, Forum of World Publishers, New York, 1964. As we have seen (note 18) Kenneth Clark, the psychologist, contends that no human being can survive without love. In fact, love has proved in empirical research to be as important as food in the nurture of the human infant.

157. Eight abstained, however, including the U.S.S.R., other Communist governments of eastern Europe, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.
158. From The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a Standard of Achievement, United Nations, 1958, p. 10. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which drafted the



Declaration, said that it "may well become the international Magna Carta of all men everywhere." From The Impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, United Nations, New York; 1951, p. 8. Our underlining.

159. The Universal Declaration, op. cit., p. 10.
160. International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 1968, United Nations, New York: 1968, p. 3. The quotation is from Clause 2.
161. Ibid.
162. Catholic comes from the Greek kath' holou, meaning universal.
163. In Pacem in Terris.
164. Ibid.
165. The belief that there is a law higher than that of the state and binding on all human beings has traditionally been favored by the Catholic Church. But it is by no means confined to Catholic theologians, and its origins are pre-Christian. This doctrine is very clearly expressed by Antigone, in Sophocles' play of that name, when, contrary to the edict of the King of Thebes, she buries her brother who had been slain in a battle for the possession of Thebes. The higher law has sometimes been equated with reason, sometimes with nature. Thomas Aquinas regarded it as divine. But irrespective of its supposed source, it is always assumed to stand as an eternal unchanging norm that exists as the highest court of appeal over and above the laws established by willful mortals.  
  
The purpose that this doctrine is intended to serve is clear. What has never been clear, however, is whose version of the higher law is to be presumed authoritative and who is to interpret the contents of the law in specific situations.
166. John Rader Platt, "The Coming Generation of Genius," Horizon, March, 1962, pp. 70-75. Also see Dennis Gabor, Inventing the Future, Knopf, New York, 1964.
167. In this vein, Anne Roe has written, "Our stake is more than one in the survival of the species. We want a species to survive that we can be proud of. The chances are that life, some life, would continue and evolve again into new and different species, but none

would be man. Let it be quite clearly understood that what is a source of pride is a personal bias. I am not alone in my bias, but the ideal I cherish may not be a universal one. The future I want for my species is a society of individuals each of whom plays a significant and in some measure unique role in that society. It is a society in which every man--as far as it is humanly possible--is free from outer and inner restrictions which would prevent the richest development of his unique combination of capacities. It is a society, not without tensions, but one in which no man need fear his neighbor, and no man need fear himself. It is a world society which welcomes any number of cultural subdivisions, and counts them all of value.

No such society now exists, and none can exist unless the majority of the members of it are possessors of a kind of character structure which is not now common. What is needed then is a radical transformation of personalities, not in terms of modes of adjustment, but in terms of moral character. Nothing else will serve, but it is at first glimpse an almost hopeless task to undertake in the brief time we have." Anne Roe, "The Behavioral Sciences," in Robert Ulich, ed., Education and Mankind, Harcourt, Brace, and World, New York, 1964, p. 212-3.

168. Flemming gives the description of "the corporate tough guy," drawing on data and descriptions given by W. Lloyd Warner and James Abegglen in their book, Big Business Leaders in America, Harper, New York, 1955. See Thomas Flemming, "The Organization S.O.B.," Cosmopolitan, September, 1969.
169. According to Mumford, Jesus's interest "was in the redemption of man's very humanity, in the perpetual renewal and re-dedication of the living to the task of self-development; he sought to bring the inner and the outer aspects of the personality into organic balance by throwing off compulsions, constraints, automatisms. No one else has spoken of the moral life with fewer negations and with so many positive expressions of power and joy. His mission was not to govern men but to release them." The Condition of Man, op. cit., p. 54.
170. The operation of this process is one specific sphere--the extension of the right to vote--draw this comment from de Tocqueville: "The further electoral rights are extended, the greater is the need for extending them; for after each concession the strength of the democracy increases, and its demands increase with its strength. . . ."

The exception at last becomes the rule, concession follows concession, and no stop can be made short of universal suffrage." op. cit.

His analysis applies, of course, with equal force to the similar extension of other political rights and, in a larger sense, of values in general.

Democracy is a political system that not only postulates a hierarchy of values, but rests on the assumption of man's natural goodness and his capacity for continual improvement. It therefore takes the optimistic view of humanity. Conversely, as was observed earlier, the pessimistic doctrine requires an authoritarian government to restrain men from mutual destruction.

171. Catherine Roberts remarks that ". . . until relatively recent times the desire to diminish man-inflicted suffering was sporadic and incapable of developing into a common human response, while today this desire appears to be a permanent part of the mental outlook of a good proportion of the world population." Catherine Roberts, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

The Higher Values and the Higher Synthesis (notes 172 to 275)

Truth

172. "As flies to wanton boys, are we to the gods;  
They kill us for their sport."  
William Shakespeare, King Lear, Act IV:I:38-39.
173. Aldous Huxley's book entitled The Perennial Philosophy contains an exposition of the concepts of mysticism, transcendentalism, and universality which have been developed during three millennia.
174. D.J.R. Bruckner, "U.S. Melancholy--So Deep It's 'National Disease'" from Los Angeles Times and Washington Post Service, reprinted in The Oregonian, May 28, 1970.
175. Read, op. cit., p. 284.
176. Charles S. Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom, Random House, New York, 1969, Reviewed by Harriet Van Horne, "Having No Opinion Likened to Mortal Sin," The Oregonian, May 28, 1970.



177. It is clear from studying the cognitive domain, as this is conceptualized by Bloom and Krathwohl, that most classroom teaching is at the lower levels, i.e., that of facts and information. Critical or evaluative thinking is rare. (See Benjamin S. Bloom, ed., Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Longmans, Green, New York, 1956.) Richard Hofstadter's work, Anti-Intellectualism in American Life (Knopf, New York, 1963) may explain why this is the case.
178. Silberman, op. cit.
179. Wordsworth's opinion was that the best education comes through experiencing the beauty of the world and the simple human affections. See Goodman, "The Present Moment in Education," op. cit.
180. Aldous Huxley makes the same point in The Perennial Philosophy (op. cit.): We can only love what we know, and we can never know completely what we do not love. Love is a mode of knowledge, [and] when . . . sufficiently disinterested and sufficiently intense, the knowledge becomes unitive knowledge [--the perennial philosophy], p. 81.
181. Plato observed in The Republic (op. cit.) that the members of a band of robbers are merely half bad, because they are united by a code of justice which is adhered to by group members only in relationship with each other.
182. Among these may be included Kenneth Boulding, Aldous Huxley, Lewis Mumford, Gunnar Myrdal, Archibald Macleish, Catherine Roberts, Anne Roe, and Arnold Toynbee.
183. In the engagement with life, i.e., behavior, the individual works out of a "cognitive-emotional-motivational matrix," as Scheerer points out, where no true separation is possible. Martin Scheerer, "Cognitive Theory," Handbook of Social Psychology, Vol. I, Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, Mass., 1954.
184. William Shakespeare, King Lear, Act III:IV:106.
185. Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias, Viking Press, Compass Books, New York, 1962, p. 277.
186. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, op. cit.
187. Edith Sitwell, "Experiment in Poetry" in Tradition and Experiment in Present-Day Literature, Oxford University Press, London, 1929, p. 97.

188. For example, Heisenberg and Bohr in physics, and Chomsky in linguistics, have been trailblazers in presenting new patterns. Excellent evaluations of these new departures include Ernest Becker, Beyond Alienation, Braziller, New York, 1967; Floyd Matson, The Broken Image, op. cit.; and Henry Geiger's feature articles in Manas.
189. Willis W. Harman, "The Nature of Our Changing Society: Implications for Schools," ERIC Clearinghouse on Educational Administration, Eugene, Oregon, October, 1969.
190. Paul Wienpahl, "Spiritual Values in a Scientific Age," Manas, April 27, 1966, p. 2.
191. A contributor, "The Quest for Synthesis," Manas, November 17, 1965, p. 2.
192. There were those for whom reason attained its apotheosis in the perfecting of the scientific method. In this way, what had earlier been an assault on faith, as buttressed by religion, ended in the dedication to a new faith. Something of the zealotry and proselytizing fervor which accompanied the scientific revolution may be caught in the work of Lamettrie on Man a Machine. Lamettrie advocated that men should discard religious faith and rely on scientific discoveries alone to reveal the laws of nature and of life. The new truth, thus revealed, was conceived solely in physical, and never in metaphysical, terms. See the article on "Teaching and Healing," Manas, March 25, 1970, p. 1.
193. A contributor, "The Convention of Knowledge," Manas, September 17, 1969, p. 7.
194. Manas, ibid.
195. Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, Harper & Bros., New York, 1958, p. 58.
196. Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society: A Searching Examination of the Meaning and Nature of Scientific Inquiry, University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1964.
197. A contributor, "Time to Think," Manas, January 12, 1966, p. 2.
198. Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving, op. cit., p. 63.

## Beauty

199. In The Republic, Plato insisted that his guardians be nurtured in beautiful surroundings that would provide a noble "manner of education." It was his view that the mind and nature and even the speech of an individual were influenced positively by beauty in architecture, painting and other artifacts. In Plato's own words: "We would not have our guardians reared among images of evil as in a foul pasture, and there day by day and little by little gather many impressions from all that surrounds them, taking them all in until at last a great mass of evil gathers in their inmost souls, and they know it not. No, we must seek out those craftsmen who have the happy gift of tracing out the nature of the fair and graceful, that our young men may dwell as in a health-giving region where all that surrounds them is beneficent, whencesoever from fair works of art there smite upon their eyes and ears on affluence like a wind bringing health from happy regions, which, though they know it not, leads them from their earliest years into likeness and friendship and harmony with the principle of beauty." Book III, Sect. 401, op. cit., p. 84.
200. Leo Tolstoy, What Is Art?, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1960.
201. Interview with René Dubos conducted by Elizabeth Monroe Drews, October, 1967. As Dubos says, "I believe, and it is belief based on much objective experimental evidence, that at any given time only a very small percentage of the genetic endowment is expressed. Human beings are endowed with a number of potentialities which are inscribed in a genetic code. This genetic code of man is active to only a very small extent in any given time. And that aspect or part which is active is that which has been activated by environmental stimuli," p. 1.
202. Alvin Toffler, "Future Shock," Horizon, Vol. XII, No. 2, Spring, 1970, pp. 82-89.
203. Camus continually stressed the irrational nature of the world and its fundamental absurdity. He saw the universe as chaotic, as devoid of pattern except what each individual brings to it. It is the individual, therefore, who must become responsible for his acts. He has it in himself to become autonomous and creative. Taking command of his own life, he can exercise a conscious choice and thus act on his environment. Most importantly, he can only find himself by devotion to others. In The Stranger, Camus makes this vividly clear,

when the young Algerian, who does not care enough to cry at his mother's funeral, later realizes that this lack of caring brought on his own destruction.

204. Edith Sitwell, "The Poet's Vision" in Richard Thruelsen and John Kobler, eds., Adventures of the Mind, Random House, a Vintage Book, New York, 1958, p. 117.
205. Percy B. Shelley, The Selected Poetry and Prose of Shelley, The New American Library, Signet Classics, New York, 1966, p. 448.
206. See article on, "Is 'Art' the Remedy?," Manas, January 1, 1969, p. 7.
207. Simone Weil, The Need for Roots, Putnam, New York, 1942.
208. Quoted by Sitwell, "The Poet's Vision," op. cit., p. 116.
209. Lucian Price, Dialogues with Alfred North Whitehead, Little, Brown & Co., Boston, 1954.
210. Sitwell, "The Poet's Vision," op. cit., p. 116.
211. A contributor, "Crossing the Line," Manas, August 14, 1968, p.7. See also note 20.
212. Herbert Read, "Art and Life" in Adventures of the Mind, op. cit., p. 158.
213. Read, "Art and Life," op. cit., p. 169.
214. Read, ibid.
215. Irwin Edman, Arts and the Man, W. W. Norton, New York, 1939, p. 18.
216. Dante, quoted from the end of the Divine Comedy.
217. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, Doubleday, New York, 1966.
218. Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, Random House, a Vintage Book, New York, 1955, p. 137.
219. Herbert Read, The Origins of Form in Art, Horizon Press, New York, 1965, p. 187. The quotation that Read uses is from Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1959, p. 45.



220. Perhaps emphasizing that there is a great population explosion and that most of the people in the world are young (by 1972 it is estimated that half the population will be twenty-one and under) "Hair" has been amazingly successful. To quote their own publicity "Hair has indeed become an international institution. It is on its way to breaking every known box office record in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and San Francisco, while continuing to flourish in London, Paris, Sydney, Dusseldorf, Tokyo, Stockholm, and behind the Iron Curtain in Belgrade. Yearly grosses are topping \$18,000,000 making it the most successful production in the history of the stage. New productions keep springing up around the world and several film companies have already bid well in excess of one million dollars for the movie rights." Hair, Natoma Productions, New York, 1969.
221. This poetry ranges from the writing of William Blake to Walt Whitman, from Dylan Thomas to Ferlinghetti and Gary Snyder. A careful study of this genre of writing may be found in James E. Miller, Jr., et al., Start with the Sun: Studies of Cosmic Consciousness, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1960.
222. Abraham Maslow and John Honigmann, "Synergy: Some Notes of Ruth Benedict," American Anthropologist, Vol. 72, No. 2, April, 1970, pp. 320-333.
223. The concluding sentence follows: "There is a land of the living and a land of the dead and the bridge is love, the only survival, the only meaning." Thornton Wilder, The Bridge of San Luis Rey, Washington Square Press, New York, copyright 1927, 41st printing, 1967, p. 177.

#### Love

224. See Carl Rogers and Barry Stevens, Person to Person--The Problem of Being Human, Real People Press, Lafayette, California, 1967; and also Sidney M. Jourard, The Transparent Self, D. Van Nostrand Co., Princeton, New Jersey, 1964.
225. Pitirim Sorokin, The Ways and Power of Love, Henry Regnery Co., Chicago, 1967.

226. René Spitz, "Anaclitic Depression. An Inquiry into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood: II," in Anna Freud, et al., eds., The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, International Universities Press, New York, 1946. See also Margaretha Ribble, The Rights of Infants, Columbia University Press, New York, 1943.
227. Sorokin, op. cit.
228. Mumford, The Condition of Man, op. cit., p. 54.
229. Maslow, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed., Chapter 6, "Cognition of Being in the Peak Experiences."
230. Several Harvard researchers studied the interaction of mothers and children in their homes in 1969 and have noted great differences in the way children are treated. Their conclusion is that this early experience helps the child to become competent and is directly related to his ability to learn in school. Similarly, Ned Flanders, Marie Hughes, and other researchers have concluded that the teacher's treatment of children in the classroom (listening, etc.) directly affects their ability to learn and their self-concepts.
231. Attempts to observe love would perhaps parallel those reported by physicists who observe the atom. In their effort to measure exactly, more light was used. But the atom then behaved less as usual. With less light, its behavior was more nearly normal. But because it could not be seen as well, it was less easily measurable.
232. Fromm, The Art of Loving, op. cit.
233. Ibid.
234. Buber as quoted by Read, Education Through Art, op. cit., p. 285.
235. Ibid., p. 294.
236. Rogers and Stevens, op. cit., p. 47.
237. Jahoda, op. cit.
238. Fromm, The Art of Loving, op. cit., p. 49.
239. Ibid.
240. Sorokin, op. cit., p. 11.

241. Buber in Read, op. cit., p. 288.
242. Sorokin, op. cit., p. 200.
243. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
244. Polanyi in Roberts, op. cit., pp. 30-31.
245. As Sorokin says, "The therapy of overwhelming kindness has been one of the main forces maintaining the necessary minimum of justice, peace, harmony, and altruism in all societies and at all times." Op. cit., p. 217.
246. Ibid., p. 235.
247. Sorokin has this to say about the problems that attend tragic and disrupting experiences: "The more hellish is his total environment, the lesser are the changes for [a] . . . crop of truly altruistic persons, even of good neighbors. . . ." Ibid., p. 253.
248. In Sorokin's terms, to become an "Unattached Pilgrim of Goodness [is to move above all tribal limitations and to] . . . become [a citizen] of the whole cosmos, being good and kind to everyone." Ibid., pp. 243-4.
249. Ibid., p. 245.
250. Ibid.
251. Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy, op. cit., p. 12.
252. In a word-frequency study done in 1960 by a group of psychologists at San Jose State College (R. C. Johnson, C. S. Thomson and G. L. Frincke) it was found that people generally used positive words far more often than negative ones. For example, "beauty" was used 40 times more often than "ugliness," "happiness" 25 times more than "unhappiness," and "love" nearly 10 times more frequently than "hate."
253. Elizabeth Drews started presenting the ideas of humanistic psychology and human potentialities during the decade when she taught at Michigan State University (1957-1966). Among her classes were some designed for honor students at the upper division level. Repeatedly, these students would say that this was the first time in their college careers they had heard a good word said about human beings in general.

And these were the students who, because of their excellence, had the opportunity to enroll in courses given by the most eminent members of the faculty!

254. Sorokin, op. cit.
255. Flemming gives the description of "the corporate tough guy," drawing on data and descriptions given by W. Lloyd Warner and James Abegglen in their book, Big Business Leaders in America, Harper, New York, 1955. See Thomas Flemming, "The Organization S.O.B.," Cosmopolitan, September, 1969.
256. James Thurber, "The Tigress and Her Mate," A Thurber Carnival, Harper and Row, New York, 1945.
257. Ian D. Suttie Develops these concepts in Origins of Love and Hate, London, 1935.
258. Fromm, The Art of Loving, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
259. Sorokin, op. cit., p. 79.
260. This was a statement of Anton Julius Carlson and was quoted in Robert Coughlan, "Now Within Sight; 100 Year Lifetime," Life, April 25, 1955, pp. 156-173.
261. Abraham Maslow, "Some Frontier Problems in Mental Health," Personality Theory and Counseling Practice, University of Florida, Gainesville, January, 1961. "It's certainly true that within our own area of the psychosomatic, workers have taught us that people who are happy, people who are optimistic are simply more resistant to disease. They just live longer. We know that even from white rats now, so it must be much more true for us." (p. 4.)
262. Sorokin, op. cit., p. 60.
263. Erich Fromm, Revolution of Hope, Harper and Row, New York, 1968, p. 90.
264. Hui Neng, quoted by Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy, op. cit., p. 139.
265. St. Paul, Epistle to the Romans, 12:02.

266. Cassius to Brutus, Julius Caesar, Act I:II:139-40.
267. Mumford, A Story of Utopias, op. cit., p. 4.
268. Fear of the unknown or the incomprehensible or the unusual is widespread. Rokeach shows how people may deny or refuse to consider alternatives "beyond their ken." Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind, Basic Books, New York, 1960, Toward a Psychology of Being, 2nd ed., op. cit., Chap. V, "The Need to Know and the Fear of Knowing," pp. 60-70.
269. Herbert Otto, Explorations in Human Potentialities, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1965; and Goodman, The Present Moment in Education, op. cit.
270. Julian Huxley, Galton Lecture, 1962. Cited by Roberts, op. cit., p. 19.
271. N. J. Berrill, Man's Emerging Mind, Dodd, Mead and Co., New York, 1955.
272. Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy, op. cit., p. 14.
273. In Boulding's words: "He who has never loved, has never felt the call of a heroic ethic--to give and not to count the cost, to labor and not ask for any reward--has lived far below the peak levels of human experience." Kenneth Boulding, Beyond Economics, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1968, p. 218.
274. Aldous Huxley discusses how one may practice humility, that is, not glorify the self at the expense of others "who are recognized as having the same weaknesses and faults, but also the same capacity for transcending them in the unity of knowledge of God, as one has oneself." Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy, op. cit., p. 92.
275. Mumford, The Condition of Man, op. cit., p. 55.

Conclusion (notes 276 to 286)

276. A contributor, "The Stuff of Becoming," Manas, December 17, 1969, p. 1.
277. Mumford, The Story of Utopias, op. cit., p. 281.

278. John R. Platt, "The Step to Man," Science, Vol. 149, August 6, 1965, p. 612.
279. As Aldous Huxley says: "The capacities of the human mind are almost infinitely great." The Perennial Philosophy, op. cit., p. 3. Not only does each person have great, undeveloped capacities but even among those who early show themselves to be unusually gifted, and are thus well on the way toward being more fully human, only a few emerge in the ranks of recognized genius. The rest are either deflected from their growth spiral by social pressures that curtail and destroy their personal styles or they are lost in the vast sea of mass men.
280. Interview with Rollo May conducted by Elizabeth Monroe Drews, October, 1968. In further elaboration on the importance of the mythology of caring, Dr. May has written in Love and Will: "The mythos of care . . . enables us to stand against the cynicism and apathy which are the psychological illnesses of our day." He speaks of this quality as a search for authenticity and a turning away from "money and success," seeking instead "honesty, openness, a genuineness of personal relationship. . . ." Rollo May, Love and Will, W. W. Norton, New York, 1969, p. 306. Certainly one indication of the importance of Dr. May's message is that his book was on the best seller list for many months and received a number of awards.
281. With regard to the education of the feelings, the self, and the emotions, Michael says: "We must educate for empathy, compassion, trust, nonexploitiveness, nonmanipulativeness, for self-growth and self-esteem, for tolerance of ambiguity, for acknowledgment of error, for patience, for suffering." Donald Michael, The Unprepared Society: Planning for a Precarious Future, Harper, Colophon Books, New York, 1970, p. 109.
282. As Thomson says, "Western man has been called Faustian or Promethean precisely because of his bias toward this cosmic arrogance, his tendency to think that his powers are limitless." Watson Thomson, Turning Into Tomorrow, Philosophical Library, New York, 1966, p. 57.
283. Huxley made this comment in a letter where he was referring to his dystopic vision of the kind of society towards which we seemed to be heading. The details of the controlling system were made compellingly vivid in his novel, Brave New World, and in a series of essays, Brave New World Revisited, written thirty-two years later.

For further information on Huxley's general attitude refer to Beverly Gross, "In a World of Analysis," (a review of Grover Smith, ed., Letters of Aldous Huxley, Harper & Row, New York, 1969), The Nation, June 8, 1970, pp. 693-5.

- 284. Bucke, Cosmic Consciousness, op. cit.
- 285. Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, op. cit.
- 286. John R. Platt, The Step to Man, John Wylie, New York, 1966.

