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STANFORD CENTER
FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
IN TEACHING

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THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT ON CAMPUS: A STUDY
OF THE STANFORD APRIL THIRD MOVEMENT

James Stam and J. Victor Baldridge

School of Education
Stanford University
Stanford, California

September 1971

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Introductory Statement

The Center is concerned with the shortcomings of teaching in American schools: the ineffectiveness of many American teachers in promoting achievement of higher cognitive objectives, in engaging their students in the tasks of school learning, and, especially, in serving the needs of students from low-income areas. Of equal concern is the inadequacy of American schools as environments fostering the teachers' own motivations, skills, and professionalism.

The Center employs the resources of the behavioral sciences--theoretical and methodological--in seeking and applying knowledge basic to achievement of its objectives. Analysis of the Center's problem area has resulted in three programs: Heuristic Teaching, Teaching Students from Low-Income Areas, and the Environment for Teaching. Drawing primarily upon psychology and sociology, and also upon economics, political science, and anthropology, the Center has formulated integrated programs of research, development, demonstration, and dissemination in these three areas. In the Heuristic Teaching area, the strategy is to develop a model teacher training system integrating components that dependably enhance teaching skill. In the program on Teaching Students from Low-Income Areas, the strategy is to develop materials and procedures for engaging and motivating such students and their teachers. In the program on Environment for Teaching, the strategy is to develop patterns of school organization and teacher evaluation that will help teachers function more professionally at higher levels of morale and commitment.

The project on Organizational Change, a part of the Environment for Teaching program, is attempting to identify and describe the political forces that bring about change in educational institutions. The report that follows describes the birth, life, and death of a student political movement that resulted in a major change of policy by the trustees of Stanford University.

Contents

Abstract

The paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing campus conflict and crisis as a social movement. The authors argue that "political" frameworks are necessary to understanding the dynamics of interest group activities which are directed toward influencing policy. Using this political framework a number of propositions are advanced about interest group activities, the political motivations of partisan groups, the "social control" activities of authorities, and the cycle that the conflict goes through. A case study of a student conflict at Stanford University is used to give plausible support to the propositions. Although such a case study is in no sense "proof" of the propositions, it nevertheless clarifies issues and helps locate weaknesses and strengths in the theoretical framework.

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INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 1969, Stanford University experienced a rash of
student activism unprecedented in its history. During this period a
partisan interest group that became known as the April Third Movement
(A3M) dominated the pages of the Stanford Daily and completely captured
the attention of the university community.

The movement began on April 3 when some 800 people gathered in a
university auditorium to discuss alternative means for controlling the
Stanford Research Institute and influencing its research policies. SRI,
formed in 1946 as an applied research affiliate of the university, had
been in the center of controversy for months because of its alleged
involvement in war-related research, including research in counterinsur-
gency and chemical-biological warfare. Under considerable pressure from
students, the university Board of Trustees seemed to be on the verge of
selling SRI. At that point, however, student opinion shifted consider-
ably. Fearing that an independent SRI would actually do more war-related
research than a university-owned SRI, the students who assembled on the
night of April 3 voted almost unanimously to demand that the Stanford
trustees "discontinue all plans for severance of the Stanford Research
Institute from the University . . . that instead SRI be brought under
tighter control by the University and that guidelines be established for
socially acceptable research."[1] The next day a rally was held at noon,

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Baldridge, ed., Academic Governance: Research on Institutional Politics
and Decision-Making. Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan Publishing Corporation,
© 1971.

[1] The Stanford Daily, April 4, 1969.

demands were formally presented to President Kenneth Pitzer, and a few committees were formed. The April Third Movement was under way.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the conflict over the Stanford Research Institute, primarily focusing on the A3M as the critical student pressure group. This paper hopes to answer the following questions about the crisis at Stanford University:

1. What was the nature of the policy decisions, and how did it affect the controversy?

2. What were the background factors that caused the A3M to attack SRI?

3. What were the characteristics of the group dynamics that held the A3M together and made it a strong political force?

4. What tactics did the A3M use in its fight against the trustees, the administration, and SRI?

5. What responses did the authorities make, and how did this affect the A3M?

6. What did the whole cycle of conflict look like, and what were the consequent decisions?

7. What factors contributed to the breakup of the A3M?

The reader will note that these are essentially sociological questions concerning group dynamics, organizational decision making, and conflict dynamics. This approach is in marked contrast to the majority of research on student revolutions, which focuses on the social-psychological characteristics of the students and their personal dissatisfaction with society.[2] The authors were concerned with the processes of conflict and the nature of the policy-making system in the university.

This research began with the fundamental premise that policy making in a complex organization such as the university is often a political process, not merely a bureaucratic one.[3] The university is splintered into many interest groups. These groups have different goals for the community, different life-styles, different career channels, and different levels of interest in university policy. This splintered community

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[2] See J. Victor Baldridge, ed., Academic Governance (Berkeley, Calif.: McCutchan, 1971), Part 4.

[3] See J. Victor Baldridge, Power and Conflict in the University (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971).

is naturally prone to conflict, and it is normal that such a volatile situation should occasionally explode over policy issues. Given a critical policy decision to be made, many interest groups with different values, and a wide variety of tactics available for applying pressure, then the critical analysis concerns the dynamics of conflict that finally result in a decision.

In order to collect data on the April Third Movement and the Stanford conflict, a study was conducted during the spring and summer of 1969. Three sources were used primarily: participant observations, which continued throughout the life of the movement and covered nearly all meetings and activities of the group; documentary study, including an examination of all available news releases on the movement, all issues of a movement periodical entitled Declassified, many position papers and leaflets published by the A3M, and a wide variety of administrative and faculty memoranda, communications, and position papers; and interviews with scores of active participants in the movement, and many hours of discussion and group meetings, which gave valuable insights into the nature and goals of the movement. Key administrators and faculty members also provided vital information.

Using case study techniques, our analysis tries to answer each of the questions posed above concerning background factors, the nature of the policy at issue, and the cycle of conflict. Throughout the paper the same procedure is used. First, a series of abstract propositions is made about specific variables that affect the conflict. This point is critical, for we are trying not only to study A3M as one case, but to develop an analytical scheme by means of which similar events can be studied. After the abstract propositions are discussed, they are used as a conceptual screen through which the Stanford events are sifted. Figure 1 shows the five stages in the analysis; each will be discussed in turn.

Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	Stage 5
Introduction of a stimulus event-- a potential decision	Background factors affecting conflict development	Mobilization of partisans	Cycle of conflict	Policy formula- tion

Fig. 1. The five stages of conflict development.

STAGE ONE: A POTENTIAL DECISION

In order for conflict to occur there must be a catalyst, a potential decision that inflames the community. There are basic characteristics which that potential decision must have in order for conflict to be gener- ated. Without these conditions the probability that a conflict spiral will develop is low.

First, there must be action possibility. That is, the strain must be of a sort that can be alleviated by human action and be within the control of the organization (a flood or natural disaster would not be considered within the organization's control). The members of the A3M were well informed about the charter of SRI and knew that the trustees of Stanford University had the power to take action and make the binding decision on the issue.

Second, the potential decision must have a differential effect on members of the organization. The differential effect may arise solely from a difference in value systems. That is, a given decision might have the same objective effect on all members of an organization, but different value systems might give rise to considerable conflict over the issue. The decision regarding the disposition of SRI certainly had differential effects for the various parties involved. At one point, the president of SRI stated that the majority of the SRI employees would walk out if research restrictions were imposed. Certainly this statement would pro- duce far greater concern for a trustee of the university than it would

for a student activist. Furthermore, the cash value of SRI to the university would have an effect on the trustees vastly different from its effect on the radical students. Finally, the ongoing problem of implementing controls over the type of research done at SRI would be a concern of the trustees long after the present crop of students had left campus.

Third, the potential decision must be of <u>importance</u> to at least two groups within the organization that have different goals or desires regarding the issue. Both might be partisan groups seeking to influence the authorities in favor of their respective positions, or one might be a group of partisans and the other the organization's authorities. The issue of war-related research at Stanford and SRI was a matter of importance to many in the university community. After weeks of conflict over the issue, some 1,300 students and faculty members signed a complicity statement, and over 3,000 voted to commend the A3M for its action. (The total student enrollment at Stanford in the spring of 1969 was 10,600.) An all-campus "day of concern" received widespread participation from both students and faculty.

Finally, for there to be group action, a partisan group must perceive that the decision about to be made will be contrary to its wishes. In this case, the students had a long history of distrust regarding the trustees, and they were fairly certain that their demands would not be met.

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STAGE TWO: BACKGROUND FACTORS AFFECTING
THE CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT

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Certain specific background factors in the organization help determine the type of conflict that will develop in any given situation. The clarification and definition of these factors is critical.

<u>The Normative Variable: Trust</u>

William Gamson[4] suggest that one major determinant of conflict is trust (or lack of it), that is, the basic attitude of partisan groups toward decision-making authorities. The trust dimension is based on a

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[4]William A. Gamson, <u>Power and Discontent</u> (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 39ff.

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group's perception of the efficiency of the authorities in achieving
collective goals and their bias in handling conflicts of interest--in
short, whether a group feels it can get preferred outcomes from the
authorities.

Three levels of trust are specified by Gamson: confidence, neu-
trality, and alienation. Confidence means that the group identifies
with the authorities, perceives them as the group's agents, and believes
that the political institutions will produce favorable deicions--in
short, the group believes that the basic authority structure is valid
and worthy of confidence. Neutrality means that the group feels the
authorities are biased neither toward them nor against them. Alienation
means that the partisan group regards the authorities as incompetent to
achieve collective goals and biased against the group, serving instead
some rival set of interests. In short, trust is the belief by partisans
that the authorities not only can but will give them their preferred
outcomes on a given policy decision.

The April Third Movement was clearly an alienated partisan group.
Months of participant observation and many hours spent listening to
speeches and discussions gave some feeling for the depth of the aliena-
tion. Documentary evidence is certainly inadequate to convey this feel-
ing, but the following quotations from movement publications give
examples:

> The men who govern the University have a vested interest in continu-
> ing counter insurgency. Some are directors of defense oriented
> firms which depend upon large military expenditures and which
> benefit from the performance of defense related research at Stanford
> and SRI. Since we are asking the Trustees to make a decision which
> will be detrimental to their own concerns, they will not make that
> decision willingly; they will make that decision only in response to
> very strong pressure from the Stanford community . . . . The Trus-
> tees are men of death and oppression. We reject this and call for
> life and love. Join us in creating a new community and a new world . .
> . .

> We should understand then that the Trustees and President Pitzer
> (himself a member of the Board of Directors of the Rand Corporation,
> a larger version of SRI that does much counter-insurgency research,
> war games, and mega-death planning also) have their positions, their
> military and economic power at stake. Given a choice these men
> would rather close down Stanford than lose SRI to the community.

> They will never willingly allow the research programs at SRI to come under the control of people who wish to stop American Military and economic penetration of the third world.[5]

These brief quotations give some indication of the high degree of the A3M's alienation, an alienation that helped create the proper atmosphere for severe conflict.

The Internal Group Variables: Involvement and Cohesion

Political involvement is the degree to which partisan groups are actually interested in influencing the policies of an organization. For most people, politics is a remote and unrewarding activity, and usually the "law of apathy" prevails: most of the people, most of the time, on most issues, don't give a damn. Political involvement is the exception rather than the rule. On the other hand, a high level of involvement means that the group can sustain high interest for influencing a given policy decision. Cohesion means that once involved the members of a partisan group are able to agree on basic goals and tactics; they are not torn by internal strife to the extent that their attempts to be influential fail.

The A3M's involvement, of course, varied a great deal with the fortunes of war and with the pressures of such things as exams. Nevertheless, the A3M did manage to capture the attention of virtually the entire university community and the participation of a substantial number of its members. As mentioned above, during one sit-in some 1,300 people signed a complicity statement admitting their participation in the sit-in. Over 1,500 indicated that they would participate in another sit-in if need be, and more than 3,000 voted to commend the A3M for "helping to focus the attention of the campus upon the nature of the research being conducted at the University and SRI."

Student involvement varied substantially, but there was always a dedicated core of student radicals at the center of the movement. They gave countless hours of labor to the cause and were able consistently to involve about 400 people in militant actions. Some of the later rallies and planning meetings ran well over a thousand in attendance. Clearly,

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[5]Declassified, April 11, 1969, p. 5.

the A3M was able to maintain a relatively high level of involvement from April 3 until the end of the spring quarter in June.

Turning to the cohesion variable, the A3M represented a fairly wide spectrum of values and interests. Nevertheless, the movement could always rally around one common goal--the end of war-related research at Stanford and SRI. In addition, cohesion was fostered by the group's decision style, organization, and propaganda. "Participatory democracy" was the general style of decision making employed. Major decisions were always made by the group as a whole, and the coordinating committee generally offered voting privileges to anyone interested in coming to the meetings. This feeling of freedom and openness did much to contribute to cohesiveness. In general there was little overt pressure for conformity to any single line of thought, and thus partisans whose viewpoints were not identical could work together. As an organizing tactic, the development of "affinity groups" contributed a great deal to group cohesiveness. The groups were small and intimate, the atmosphere was always friendly, and the group meetings were generally conducive to the building of personal friendships. Propaganda was a third factor that contributed to group solidarity. The A3M was itself a prolific publisher, and it also obtained extensive coverage from the Stanford Daily and Stanford radio station, KZSU. Rallies, carnivals, speeches, theatrics, posters, and a political evangelism called "rapping" were important propaganda techniques that helped hold the group together and politicize the uncommitted. The degree of cohesion remained high enough even to sustain the intense conflict that resulted in a total of about 100 arrests made at various times.

The Access Variable

Access refers to the openness in the lines of communication and influence between partisan groups and key authorities. The degree of access can range from a very low level, at which partisans have absolutely no control or influence over the decision, to the other extreme, at which the partisans are actually given the authority to make the decision. The degree of access tends to affect the degree of trust, with low access generally leading to low trust, and vice versa. High

access, meaning that partisans have open channels of communication and a voice in decision making, may not prevent high levels of conflict--it may even have the opposite effect, by exposing the full array of disagreements that exist--but the conflict will be formalized and directed through the legitimate legislative channels. Extremely low access will often act as a damper on interest articulation because the authorities seem so isolated that partisans' see little value in attempting to influence them. When it does occur, however, conflict generated by partisans with extremely low access is likely to be unrestrained.

In the case of the A3M, the issue centered around one question: Was Stanford University to retain SRI and control the type of research that went on there, or not? On this issue there was only one final authority, the Board of Trustees, and the students had low access to this decision-making body.

The Resource Variable

Resources are the weapons that a group may use to pressure authorities on an issue and that largely determine the group's effectiveness. Three basic types of resources are suggested: constraints, inducements, and persuasion. Constraint resources serve to add disadvantage or difficulty to the opposed authorities. The ability to withdraw support is a constraint resource, as are propaganda, demonstrations, sit-ins, disruption, violence, or threats. Inducement resources are used to offer some new advantage or benefit to the authorities, that is, some specific good or service to be exchanged for desired actions by authorities. The use of inducement resources need not require any immediate return. Often inducements are offered in order to accumulate political obligations that may be drawn upon in the future. Persuasion resources do not add anything new in the way of advantages or disadvantages to the authorities, but instead convince the authorities that the partisan's argument is correct.

The relationship between conflict and resources is simple: for high conflict of any type, both partisans and authorities must have high resources; otherwise one group will dominate, and high conflict will not occur. It is important to note, however, that high resources alone do

not necessarily result in high conflict. Resources are a necessary but
not sufficient cause of conflict.

Turning to the A3M at Stanford, it is obvious that the group was
very restricted in the kinds of resources it might use to influence the
trustees' decisions. The arguments presented by the student radicals
were not regarded as persuasive by the trustees, who were charged with
the financial welfare of the university and could not help but be
impressed by the size of the sum the sale of SRI would add to the uni-
versity coffers. Inducements were also in short supply, for the students
really had very little that the trustees needed. If an alienated parti-
san group has no persuasion or inducement resources, it must start with
coercive tactics, that is with constraints. This was largely the case
with the A3M.

The movement had enough student support to close parts of the uni-
versity effectively for nine days and to gain national attention, includ-
ing the attention of a United States Senate investigating committee.
Student disruptions had caused widespread concern in high places, and
there were rumblings that Congress was pondering some federal sanctions
on the universities. In addition to the fears of federal sanctions,
there was also the question of what a serious disruption might do to
the image of the university and what effect it might have on private
giving by alumni and others. University officials and trustees were
aware of the hidden costs and disadvantages that can result from serious
disruptions on a campus, and hence militant tactics became an extremely
powerful constraint resource when the students finally acted.

STAGE 3: MOBILIZATION OF PARTISANS AND
MODES OF INTEREST ARTICULATION

Now the stage is set. The student group is ripe for action, and
a significant policy decision on SRI is about to be made--a policy deci-
sion that is important, that will have differential effects, that has
action alternatives, and that the students expect will go against them
because of the bias of the decision-makers. Under these circumstances,
the mobilization of partisans occurs; the question now is how the parti-

sans will organize and what they will do to influence policy. This activity aimed at influencing decisions is called <u>interest articulation</u>. We have defined four types of interest articulation. We shall discuss each of them briefly, then return to the A3M and show how its peculiar background variables combined to produce a certain type of interest articulation.

Apathy

One possible response is to ignore the whole issue and make no attempt to influence the decision. This is by far the most common response. On most issues, most people, even those who hold strong opinions, do not become actively involved, and authorities are allowed to act without interference. It is the exception rather than the rule for partisans in an organization to become involved in the process of policy formation.

Formalized Conflict

In formalized conflict the attempt to influence the decision is made through the formal channels of the system. The partisan group appeals to the existing formalized adjudication bodies, observes the established rules for decision making, and abides by the eventual decisions of the legitimate decision-making body. There may be intense disagreement over an issue, but its expression is constrained by the methods of decision making established by the organization.

Strategic Conflict

In the strategic mode of interest articulation, the partisans do not resort to serious extralegal tactics, but neither do they follow formal political procedures for conflict resolution. As a rule, they are excluded from the formal channels of decision making, and hence they organize to use pressure tactics that may not be sanctioned by the organization, but are nevertheless sanctioned by the larger society. Partisans in the strategic mode might use intense lobbying, the circulation of petitions, and the formation of unions.

Anomic Conflict

This mode of interest articulation is used by those who are excluded
from the formal decision-making channels and who lack the resources for
or confidence in strategic actions. In this case, the normal legislative
channels are rejected, and pressure is applied through means that are
entirely extralegal, both from the organization's point of view and from
that of the larger society. Tactics are often highly coercive and may
include propaganda, threats, demonstrations, and violence in the form of
arson, bombings, and the like. Student protest movements give us a prime
example of this type of interest articulation.

Earlier, we discussed three basic types of resources that groups may
use: constraint resources, inducement resources, and persuasion resources.
These three types of resources parallel the three types of tactics that
partisan interest groups will use. Once again, the conflict mode under
which the group is operating affects the type of tactic employed. Groups
acting in the formalized mode will use persuasion as their primary tac-
tic. Groups using the strategic mode will use persuasion and escalate
quickly to inducements. Finally, groups operating in the anomic mode
will escalate their tactics as high as constraints and these will consti-
tute their primary tactic.

A sort of "principle of economy" seems to operate in the use of
tactics. The tactic of persuasion is the least costly, hence this tac-
tic is usually attempted first. The tactic of offering inducements is
more costly than persuasion and is seldom resorted to until partisans
are convinced that persuasion will not work. The use of constraints or
coercion, particularly as seen in anomic interest group activity, can
often lead to physical violence, injury, legal action, and incarceration.
These tactics are often outside the sanction of the larger society and
thus can carry with them severe costs in terms of social disapproval
and punitive action. There are times, of course, when a particular
interest group may be totally lacking in one type of resource and may
be forced, therefore, to omit that type of tactic.

With these four types of action available, what determines which
one a given partisan interest group will use? This is a critical ques-
tion, for here we want to link the background variables (trust, involve-

ment, group cohesion, access, and resources) with the interest articula-
tion variables (apathy, formalized conflict, strategic conflict, anomic
conflict). The following five propositions suggest the connection:

Proposition 1: High trust promotes restrained, formalized conflict;
neutrality promotes strategic conflict; and low trust, or alienation,
promotes anomic conflict.

Proposition 2: All types of high conflict situations require high
involvement on the part of at least some partisans. Low involvement
promotes apathy.

Proposition 3: High group cohesion promotes high levels of conflict
and allows for effective influence. Low cohesion tends to render the
group ineffectual and promotes apathy.

Proposition 4: High access promotes high trust and formalized con-
flict; medium access promotes neutral trust and strategic conflict; and
low access promotes low trust and anomic conflict.

Proposition 5: Resources are necessary for conflict of any type,
and low resources lead to inaction. High resources may or may not lead
to high conflict.

These five propositions suggest how each background variable by
itself affects the mode of conflict, but we are really much more interested
in the combination of factors. It is only when they are all out together
that we can predict with some assurance what a group will do. Let us
assume that available resources and high involvement are "threshold"
factors, that is, no group is going to engage in the conflict if it does
not have high involvement and some resources. Then let us ask about the
various combinations of access, trust, and cohesion. Figure 2 suggests
what groups may do if they have different scores on each of these vari-
ables.

Now, where does the Stanford A3M fit in this picture? With low
trust and access, and high cohesion, involvement, and resource potential,
the A3M is clearly a case of a group ripe for anomic types of action, an
exact model of the Number 18 combination in Figure 2. A highly unhappy
group, distrustful of the decision-makers, sure that the decisions would
be biased against their wishes, and organized into a cohesive group--it
is no wonder that the A3M used coercive tactics.

Possible combinations
(read down)

Background variables[a] / Mode of interest articulation[b]		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	24	26	27
Background variables[a]	Trust	+	+	0	-	+	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	0	-	-	-	-	0	+	+	+	+	+	+
	Cohesion	+	0	-	+	+	0	+	0	0	0	+	0	-	0	+	0	+	+	0	-	-	+	0	-	+	0	-
	Access	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	0	0	0	0	0	-	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-
Mode of interest articulation[b]	Primary possibility	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	S	S	S	S	An	An	An	An	An	An	An	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A
	Secondary possibility	S	A			S	S	S	An	A	An	S	An	An	A	A	S	S	An	A	A	A	A / F	A / F	A	A	A	A

[a]Key: Values of background variables

+   High
0   Medium
-   Low

[b]Modes of interest articulation

F   Formalized
S   Strategic
An   Anomic
A   Apathy

Fig. 2. The impact of combinations of the background variables on the modes of interest articulation.

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When the approximately 800 people met on April 3, 1969, to formulate
a series of demands regarding research activities at Stanford and at SRI,
the group was still relatively unstructured and unstable. During the
next few days, however, it developed into an effective interest group
with articulated goals, symbolic expressions, a common life-style, a high
rate of interaction, and a name. Although a great deal of informality
prevailed, there was nevertheless a degree of organization and an array
of standing committees to handle everything from legal defense to the pub-
lication of a periodical. The partisans were now mobilized and the cycle
of conflict was under way.

STAGE FOUR: THE CYCLE OF CONFLICT

Our analysis suggests that once conflict has begun it moves through
succeeding rounds or cycles. The rounds of the battle include the follow-
ing elements: (a) a partisan attempt to influence a potential decision;
(b) a response by authorities; (c) an evaluation of that response by
partisans; and (d) a decision by partisans to stop the conflict or go on
to a new round. Thus, the action of the authorities is the critical
point in the development of a conflict cycle.

In this case, conflict over research at Stanford had already been
going on for some time when the April Third Movement emerged. As early
as May 1966 some students picketed administrative offices at Stanford
over the question of university acceptance of classified research con-
tracts. In October 1968, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) had
posted demands for the control of research at Stanford and SRI on the
door of the Board of Trustees' office. In January 1969, the SDS disrupted
a meeting of the trustees and called for the resignation of certain mem-
bers either from that board or from the positions they held in defense-
related industry.

Round One

For the A3M itself, the first round consisted of a show of force at
the public meeting on April 3 and a series of demands presented to the
trustees. The trustees decided to give a token response and stall for
time. They requested the Board of Directors of SRI not to take any new

contracts in chemical and biological warfare, pending completion of a committee study on the relationship between Stanford and SRI. (The committee was called the Scott Committee.) They also voted to hold a hearing on Stanford-SRI relations following the publication of the committee report.

Round Two

Further demands by the A3M were drawn up on the evening of April 9, when about 900 students gathered in an auditorium for nearly three and one-half hours of discussion, debate, and evaluation of the trustees' actions. The group voted overwhelmingly to reject the trustees' response to their demands and to stage a sit-in at the Applied Electronics Laboratory (AEL), a two-story building near the center of campus. The students moved immediately to the building, and about 400 students occupied it shortly before midnight.

The next day (April 10) the demonstrators received a written notice from President Pitzer informing them that they were violating university policies and asking them to leave. About 500 of them attended a meeting that evening and voted to continue the sit-in. The vote included a demand that the trustees act decisively to meet their demands by April 15.

On the following day, President Pitzer again asked the demonstrators to leave the building and formally notified the Stanford Judicial Council that the students occupying AEL were violating university policy on campus disruptions. But the sit-in continued, sometimes in an atmosphere that was almost carnival-like. Many students spent each night in the building sleeping in the corridors, in offices, or even on the roof. During the day, large crowds joined the group, particularly for the noontime and evening rallies, which consisted of lengthy discussions of issues and tactics. Over 1,300 people signed a "complicity statement" that read, "I am sitting at AEL, wish you were here."

On Monday, April 14, the Scott Committee on relations between the university and SRI released its report. Nine of the twelve members recommended that SRI be sold. Seven of these favored sale with a restrictive covenant that would prohibit certain types of war-related research for a period of 20 to 25 years. The three other members (one professor and two

students) supported closer ties between SRI and the university with con-
trol over the type of research that could be accepted.

On April 16, the Stanford Judicial Council held hearings on the AEL
sit-in to determine whether the campus disruption policy was being violated.
After eight hours of testimony and two hours of deliberation, the council
concluded that the sit-in was indeed a disruption of an approved activity
of the university. The council recommended that President Pitzer take ac-
tion in accordance with the section of the charter dealing with "extraor-
dinary circumstances" and declare the Applied Electronics Laboratory
closed to all persons from Friday, April 18, 1969, to Friday, April 25,
1969. Meanwhile the demonstrators occupying AEL voted to end the sit-in
voluntarily.

Following the close of the sit-in, student body president Denis Hayes
called a mass meeting of the Stanford community. About 5,000 students and
faculty gathered in Frost Amphitheater to discuss the issues. At this
meeting some 3,000 ballots were distributed to students and faculty. More
than 1,500 Stanford students indicated that they would participate in
"another sit-in or similar action of protest" unless the Board of Trustees
responded positively to their concerns about research at the university
and SRI by mid-May. In addition, students at the meeting voted 3,073 to
203 to commend the A3M for "helping to focus the attention of the campus
upon the nature of the research being conducted at the University and SRI."
The A3M was at a turning point: it could either stop its action or go on to
more radical tactics. The next section sets forth the theoretical con-
siderations that determine a group's further tactics at such a turning
point.

Reevaluation by the Partisans

In the case presented here we have noted that the cycle of conflict
involved (a) an attempt by the partisans to influence a decision, and
(b) a reaction by the authorities. Earlier, however, we also noted that
after each response by the authorities there was (c) an evaluation of
strategy by the partisans, to see whether they would accept the authori-
ties' decisions or whether they must continue to press for a different
decision. In such a situation, what determines whether the partisans
will quit or will escalate their tactics?

Four sets of variables discussed above are involved: goals, cohesion, resources, and trust. First, the group evaluates its goals to see whether the authorities' decisions are congruent with them. Second, the group examines its internal processes to see if it has the commitment and cohesion to undertake a new round of action. Third, the group analyzes its resources and tactics to see if they are adequate, or if the authorities have effectively cut off some tactics (for example, a new court order may short-circuit a planned sit-in). Finally, the group unconsciously evaluates its trust of the authorities. If their goals have not been met, it is unlikely that their trust has changed, but it is at least possible that the authorities have somehow convinced the partisans that the best possible decisions are being made, even if they are not what the partisans want. The role of persuasion and propaganda is critical as the authorities try to raise the trust level of the partisans.

Figure 3 shows how various moves could be made by the partisans, depending on the outcome of their reevaluation. (1) With negative goals outcomes, high internal cohesion, continued resource availability, and low trust, the partisans are likely to escalate their tactics, hoping to make it too expensive for the authorities to ignore them. (2) If they have won their point, but still have low trust and high cohesion and resources, they are likely simply to escalate their goals. (3) With unfulfilled goals, low trust, and available resources, a group that has found its commitment and cohesion falling apart will try to regroup, build new cohesion, and seek new recruits. (4) If the group is still eager to act, but has lost its resource capacity, it is likely to build coalitions with other groups. (5) If all the factors are negative, then stopping is really the only option that a group has. Finally, (6) with an increase in trust, the group is likely to moderate its efforts in the hope that authorities will eventually favor them. Figure 3 summarizes these various options.

The Encina Hall Sit-in

Turning back to the A3M, the first round had proven inconclusive. The trustees had made token gestures. At that point the A3M's cohesion was strong (a combination like that in Col. 1, Fig. 3). The logical move was to escalate tactics.

Possible changes

Areas reevaluated	1	2	3	4	5	6
Goals Preferred outcomes received?	-	+	-	-	-	+ or -
Internal resources Cohesion maintained?	+	+	-	+	-	+ or -
Transactional resources Tactical weapons still available?	+	+	+	-	-	+ or -
Trust Increased?	-	-	-	-	-	+
Type of action for future rounds	Escalate tactics	Escalate goals	Regroup	Coalition action	Stop	Stop or de-escalate tactics & goals
Explanation	Have resources Hope tactics may win next round	If tactics worked, try for more goals though trust may still be low	Consolidate internal resources, hope for new round	Unite to gain more resources	Disintegration of group	Trust increased Conflict becomes more formalized

Key: + High
     - Low

Fig. 3. Partisan reevaluation of tactics after each round of conflict.

On April 30 a five-man committee of the trustees held a public hearing
on the SRI issue. After the hearing about 800 students gathered in the
Student Union. Following lengthy discussion and debate the group voted to
stage a sit-in at Encina Hall, the "nerve center" of the university admin-
istration. The students moved immediately to the building, and at 1:05 a.m.,
after a brief scuffle with a group of right-wing students who were blocking
the front door, the activists broke the glass doors and about 300 students
entered the building. The students were repeatedly warned by the Dean of
Students, by faculty members, and finally by a deputy sheriff that if they
did not leave the building they would be arrested. At 7:00 a.m. the demon-
strators in the building called a meeting to decide what action they would
take.

At 7:15 a.m. three buses arrived and discharged about 125 officers.
One group of police quickly entered the building. Moments earlier the
student meeting had ended in a vote to leave the building. A faculty mem-
ber was immediately informed of the vote, and he shouted at the police to
stop. The police did so and waited for 10 minutes while the demonstrators
gathered their belongings and left the building. No arrests were made.
At 9:30 a.m. the university obtained from the Superior Court an injunction
and temporary restraining order to prohibit further action.

That evening (Thursday, May 1) about 900 people gathered in a univer-
sity auditorium for a meeting of the April Third Movement. Moments after
the meeting began, a university policeman stood up and read the court in-
junction against the A3M leaders. Shortly thereafter it was disclosed that
four process servers were serving papers just outside the doors of the audi-
torium. The reading of the injunction naturally became the focus of the
meeting, and angry discussion continued until 2:30 in the morning. Finally
the assembly ended by demanding that the Academic Senate recommend to the
administration the withdrawal of the injunction order. However, the senate
did not act on that demand at its Friday meeting.

A Struggle for Survival

On Monday evening, May 5, a general meeting of the A3M was held in
the Old Union courtyard. A thousand people were expected; about 150 atten-
ded. It was generally conceded that the Encina sit-in had been a mistake

and had cost the movement its broad base of support. Several speakers
stressed the need to return to the original goals and to rebuild support
for the movement. In essence, a tactical error had been made, and the
badly splintered group decided to regroup and build new coalitions. (See
Fig. 3, Cols. 3 and 4.)

On Thursday evening, May 8, at a general meeting of the A3M, the
group voted to stage a boycott of classes on the following Monday and Tues-
day in order to emphasize "the extraordinary importance of the issues."
The affinity groups spent the weekend in planning and organizing. Red arm
bands, rallies, discussion groups, guerilla theater, and a colorful politi-
cal carnival marked the first day of the boycott on Monday, May 12. Forty-
seven faculty members announced plans to postpone their classes, and Stan-
ford's Council of Presidents endorsed the boycott.

Over 1,100 students participated in the carnival, which included a
wide variety of political games sponsored by the various affinity groups.
At the end of the second day of the boycott, students gathered to hear the
trustees' expected decision on SRI. The decision was announced about 6:00
p.m. from the ninth floor of the Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Building in
San Francisco, where the trustees had been meeting. The unanimous decision
was to sever formal ties between Stanford University and SRI.

Since that is what it had seemed the students wanted, the obvious
thought was that now the conflict would be over. It did not happen that
way. As we mentioned above, a win, accompanied by strong group cohesion
and continued basic distrust, is likely to result in new demands rather
than in cessation of activity. (See Fig. 3, Col. 2.) That is exactly what
happened. Although the students had won most of their demands, they simply
upped the ante, demanding that the decision to sever relations with SRI be
reversed so that the university would retain tight control and root out
unpopular research.

In short, by this time the conflict had generated a life of its own
and was sucking everyone into more radical confrontations. The partisan
students were expanding their sources of support by building coalitions
with other partisans; their goals were escalating and more severe demands
were being made; their tactics were becoming more radical all the time.
The authorities were moving up the power hierarchy, drawing in more power-
ful officials to deal with the crisis; and they were mounting ever more
severe counterattacks against the partisans.

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The Next Round: Attack on SRI at Hanover Street

On May 13, the day after the trustees' severance decision, about 1,000 persons gathered for a meeting of the A3M. Several proposals for action were considered. Discussions continued throughout the afternoon and into the evening. Finally, the group decided to disrupt a nearby facility of SRI located on Hanover Street. The following morning, students marched to Hanover Street and set up picket lines under the watchful eyes of about 50 police. The students began blocking traffic at a nearby intersection, and a massive traffic jam was created. Demonstrators distributed leaflets to the stalled motorists and attempted to engage them in conversation about the demonstration. The traffic jam lasted until about 11:00 a.m. and was finally cleared as cars maneuvered around the barricades or drove over open fields to other streets.

About 11:00 a.m., also, the police began their long-awaited move. About 150 police officers using tear gas swept down the street clearing the area of demonstrators and forcing them into open fields. Sixteen arrests were made as students and police engaged in brief scuffles. Most of the demonstrators left as a group shortly before noon. Damage to the building and grounds was estimated at $10,000.

Round Two at SRI-Hanover

On Monday, May 19, demonstrators again gathered into affinity groups in front of the Student Union and moved off toward Hanover Street. This time, however, the police were on hand in force. About 225 policemen had been stationed at Hanover Street, and a helicopter was circling overhead. The demonstrators were dispersed quickly and roadblocks were removed almost as soon as they were placed. After about an hour of "cat and mouse" with the police, the demonstrators retreated to campus. About 450 demonstrators gathered there shortly before noon, forming picket lines on the sidewalk and distributing leaflets to nearby homes while some 175 policemen looked on.

The Momentum Slows

That evening, at a general meeting of the A3M, it was decided to "move on SRI when the police are not there in force." The following day featured

a "phone-in" at SRI calculated to tie-up the switchboards and disrupt nor-
mal activity. On May 22, about 130 A3M demonstrators picketed peacefully
for an hour and a half in front of the Hanover Street facility of SRI.
There were no arrests and no serious confrontations with the 17 police of-
ficers present.

The following Sunday, May 25, a planning meeting was called for 7:30
p.m. in a university auditorium. This was also the evening of Spring Sing,
and only about 20 people were on hand for the meeting. The assembled group
laid plans for the movement's next action, which included a noon rally on
Tuesday, May 27, followed by a march to the building housing the Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace to talk to its Director, W. Glenn
Campbell (also a regent of the University of California). This really was
the movement's last gasp, and burning of Campbell's effigy concluded the
dwindling meeting. Toward the end of the quarter the pressure of examina-
tions did much to curtail the activities of the A3M.

A Quiet Death for the A3M

During the summer the A3M announced two meetings. The first was held
at 7:30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 23. About 40 members were present. The
meeting began with a discussion of the current legal entanglements stemming
from the various SRI demonstrations. The number of arrests was steadily
rising, and the bail fund was nearly depleted. Movement members were
urged to sign up for the fund-raising committee.

The second meeting took place on July 30. Fifteen members were present.
At this meeting, plans were made for six members to make sandwiches to sell
at a rock concert; the proceeds were to bolster the bail fund. The meeting
adjourned after about 45 minutes of discussion. This was the last official
meeting of the April Third Movement, although the legal defense committee
did continue to function into the next academic year during a period of
arrests and trials stemming from the SRI demonstrations.

Altogether, warrants were issued for a total of 99 persons, most of
them Stanford students, and arrests continued into the fall quarter on a
variety of charges. The trials began on August 18, 1969, in the North Santa
Clara County Superior Court. Several defendants pleaded no contest to the
charges against them, and jail sentences were meted out in some instances.

STAGE FIVE: MEDIATION, CONCILIATION, AND
THE FORMULATION OF POLICY

The conflict had run its course, at least for the time being. There remained only the dynamics of mediation and conciliation. Negotiations were undertaken, compromises were forged, and a politically feasible policy was hammered out. This policy represented the official climax of the conflict.

In the Stanford events, the decision that emerged was a jerry-built compromise that really made no one happy, but neither did it violently offend everybody. The final decision was to sell SRI outright. This outcome gave some solace to those who wanted the university to be free of the burden of SRI's war-related research, but it certainly did not meet the demand for closer relations with Stanford and restriction of war research.

All in all, the decision was a delicate compromise. Many students were still upset, but the faculty, through the Academic Senate, backed the trustees' decision. With the summer, student opposition died and the crisis was over.

SUMMARY

The essential task of this article has been to analyze policy formulation under conditions of high conflict. Taking the April Third Movement at Stanford as an example, we have tried not only to describe what happened, but to explain regularities in behavior--that is, to construct a primitive theory of conflict in organizational policy-making situations.

Following William Gamson's lead, we have suggested that conflict can largely be understood as the attempt of partisans to influence the decisions of authorities, i.e., the decision makers. In this case the partisans were the A3M students, and the authorities were the trustees and the administrators of the university. There were five stages in our analysis.

In stage one, we suggested that certain decisions have more potential for producing conflict than others. Decisions that are seen as important, have action possibilities, affect large numbers of people, and have differential consequences for different interest groups are the ones most likely to cause intense conflict.

In stage two, we examined the <u>background factors</u> that make a group
ripe for conflict. A group is likely to try to influence policy if it
is directly affected by the outcome of the decision, of course, but only
if it simultaneously mistrusts the authorities (feeling that the authori-
ties are biased against them), is cohesive (able to form and organize a
group of partisans), and has resources available that cannot easily be
countered by the authorities. With these factors making the situation
ready for conflict, it is likely that the group will mobilize to fight
for a favorable policy decision.

Stage three dealt with <u>mobilization of partisans</u>. Figure 2 shows
how the unique combination of low trust, high cohesion, and high re-
source potential led the April Third Movement to select anomic behavior
as appropriate interest articulation behavior, thus rejecting apathetic,
formalized, and strategic modes. Anomic interest articulation is the
most radical, from the tactical perspective, for partisans who feel that
they are excluded from the formal channels of decision making and who
have few legitimate tactics naturally turn to forceful, "non-legitimate"
tactics--sit-ins, rock throwing, and violence.

In stage four we analyzed the <u>cycle of conflict</u>, which begins once
the partisans have mobilized. The cycle consists of (a) an attempt by
the partisans to influence a decision, (b) a reaction by the authorities,
(c) a reevaluation by the partisans, and (d) either a cessation or an
escalation of tactics, depending on the new situation. If there is an
escalation of tactics, it is likely to be accompanied by both an escala-
tion of goals, with more severe demands being made, and an escalation in
authority, with increasingly higher levels of the administrative hierar-
chy being brought into the struggle and increasingly severe countertac-
tics being used. Figure 3 shows how the various reevaluations by the par-
tisans may lead either to a cessation of the conflict or to an escalation.
Any number of rounds may be fought at this stage, and the level of con-
flict may vary in a number of ways.

Finally, stage five dealt with <u>mediation</u> and <u>negotiation.</u> It is rare
indeed that a group attains all of its goals. The more usual case is a

negotiated compromise that partially meets the needs of many groups. The
end of one round and one decision is likely to bring up a new topic, a
new battle, and a new cycle of conflict. This is true in most dynamic
organizations, and particularly in that newly politicized institution,
the university.