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ABSTRACT

Before the implications of ethnic pluralism for social behavior and attitudes can be understood, some idea of the extent of diversity among ethnic groups is necessary. This paper provides data on the ethnic groups who reside in the center of three of Connecticut's largest cities: Hartford, Bridgeport, and New Haven. The degree of similarity and dissimilarity between Connecticut's ethnic groups in social characteristics, in economic and political dimensions, and in their attitudes toward the world around them, is examined in this report. (Author/JM)

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Ethnic Pluralism in the Connecticut Central City

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PREFACE

We are pleased to present this report by Assistant Professor of Sociology Harold J. Abramson on the characteristics and attitudes of Connecticut's ethnic population regarding political, social, racial and other subjects to an interested public. Observers of American life have been awakened by the events of recent years to the importance of the ethnic factor in our politics and society, and there has been increased recognition of the need for more research in this area. The data upon which this report is based comes from a study of Connecticut's five major cities conducted by Professors Irving L. Allen, J. David Colfax, and Henry G. Stetler of the University of Connecticut's Sociology Department. (Professor Abramson used data from the three largest cities, Hartford, New Haven, and Bridgeport). The research was originally funded by the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare and supplemented by the Connecticut Research Commission and the University of Connecticut Foundation. Five previous reports have been published as the "Community Structure Series" by the Institute of Urban Research analyzing various other segments of the data and outlining the methodology of the over-all study.

For the special analysis of the Community Structure data by Professor Abramson, financial support was provided by the American Jewish Committee. His study was first presented to a state-wide consultation on Connecticut's ethnic and working class Americans held at Albertus Magnus College in New Haven on April 17, 1970. The consultation was co-sponsored by the University of Connecticut's Institute of Urban Research among other groups and organizations in the state concerned with racial, labor and moral issues confronting our society. We are then pleased to issue this report which combines many threads of our research and activist interests into a fabric of analysis that provides insights into the reactions of millions of ethnic Americans to the dilemmas and deprivations of their situation.

Morton J. Tenzer, Acting Director
Institute of Urban Research

ETHNIC PLURALISM IN THE CONNECTICUT CENTRAL CITY[1]

About a half century ago, in his book Character and Opinion in the United States, the philosopher George Santayana described the social context of being an American. "If there are immense differences between individual Americans," he wrote, "yet there is a great uniformity in their environment, customs, temper, and thoughts. They have all been uprooted from their several soils and ancestries and plunged together into one vortex, whirling irresistibly in space . . . To be an American is of itself almost a moral condition, an education, and a career." Santayana saw the American as a symbol.

This is the theme that has predominated in interpretations of the American society by historians, journalists, and sociologists. In other phrases, and with other variations, this is the theme of the Melting Pot, and of Anglo-Saxon conformity, and of the Americanization movement.

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[1]Data examined in this report come from a study of Connecticut cities, as research performed pursuant to a contract with the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education under the provisions of the Cooperative Research Program. Additional support was received from the University of Connecticut Research Foundation and the Connecticut Research Commission. For a description of the study, see Irving L. Allen and J. David Colfax, Urban Problems and Public Opinion in Four Connecticut Cities (Report No. 14, Community Structure Series No. 3; Storrs, Conn.. Institute of Urban Research, University of Connecticut, 1968).

For the preparation of this report, the author wishes to acknowledge the financial support made available by the American Jewish Committee, consultation with Irving L. Allen, and research assistance provided by Scott B. Cummings, Deena J. Steinberg, and David L. Metzger.

But one might also choose to turn this idea around, and say, if there is considerable uniformity among the masses of Americans, yet there is a history and a present of important differences. And one may choose to look at the American experience in terms of its differences as well as its uniformities, and then begin to wonder at the way in which it has all been put together. As we all know, the Melting Pot did not happen. Ethnicity, as a kind of distinctiveness defined by race, religion, national origin, and even geographical isolation, remains, even if little systematic work has been done on the subject in describing how and why ethnicity is maintained, and to what degree it is meaningful.

As with so many other aspects of the present, past, and future, the Black Movement of the 1960's and 1970's urges a re-assessment of American society. We are indebted to America's Blacks, because their social movement -- their very relevant revolution -- forces us to be more aware of who we are and of what America has been, is, and will be. There is a history of violence and ethnic strife in the American past, as well as a history of social change and social mobility and progress. And what ties the past to the present, as a thread of national continuity, is pluralism -- the diversity of different ethnic groups co-existing in some degree of accommodation under the roof of the same society. At times this ethnic pluralism can function positively, and can lead to harmonious and stable relationships. At other times this pluralism can function negatively, with conflict and tension among the groups and the values they seem not to share.

Before we can begin to understand the implications of ethnic pluralism for social behavior and attitudes, some idea of the extent of diversity among ethnic groups is necessary. Even if we cannot claim to grasp all the issues involved, a basic step would be some appreciation of just how much diversity there actually is among different ethnic groups in America. Toward this goal, we can provide a look at the ethnic groups who reside in the center of three of Connecticut's largest cities: Hartford, Bridgeport, and New Haven. The aim of this paper is to provide some hard facts by way of introducing some questions of ethnic life in Connecticut. How similar or dissimilar are Connecticut's ethnic groups in social characteristics, in economic and political terms, and in their attitudes toward the world around them? This will be a brief attempt to raise some basic questions about a very important idea -- the fact of ethnic diversity in contemporary life.

A Profile of the Ethnic Factor

Religion and national origin frequently go together, and the survey shows just how related these two components of ethnicity actually are. The three largest religious faiths are identified -- Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Jewish -- as are the largest independent nationality or ethnic backgrounds. Afro-American or Black; Eastern European; English; French-Canadian; German, Irish; Italian; Polish; and Spanish-speaking.[2]

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[2]For reasons of the number of cases per group in the survey, and for some ethnic similarities in background, certain groups were combined as follows: Eastern European includes Hungarians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Slovaks, Ukrainians, Czechs, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Russians, Serbs, and Croatians; English includes English, Scotch, Welsh, and English Canadians; German includes German, Dutch, Austrian, Swiss, and Flemish; Spanish-speaking includes Puerto Rican, Latin American, Spanish and Portuguese.

When the relation between religion and ethnicity is drawn (TABLE 1), we find what we expect, that a majority of the people who are of Black, English, and German background are Protestant, and the majority of the Eastern Europeans, French-Canadians, Irish, Italians, Poles, and the Spanish-speaking are, of course, Catholic. We can turn the question around and also ask, which are the larger and which the smaller ethnic groups in these central city areas (TABLE 2). For all three cities in Connecticut, the Blacks are the largest single group, they comprise 17 per cent of this population. The Italians are the next numerous, being 15 per cent, and the Irish are 12 per cent of this urban population. The Blacks also stand out when counted by religion; almost half of the Protestants in these three cities are Afro-American.

The remaining description will focus on the largest specific groups involved: the Blacks (of all religions) and the Whites, Protestants, Jews, and Roman Catholics, the latter as a total group and also viewed by ethnic composition. Because of the importance of social class, we can better understand the extent of diversity if we distinguish between white collar and blue collar occupations, for each ethnic group.[3] The percentage of workers in blue collar occupations varies considerably among all of these ethnic groups (TABLE 3). The membership of the blue collar working class runs from 95 per cent of all Spanish-speaking Catholics to 25 per cent of all Jews.

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[3]The occupational classification is based on U.S. Census categories, as follows: white collar jobs include all professional, managerial, clerical and sales workers, blue collar jobs include all craftsmen, factory operatives, private household workers, service workers, and unskilled labor.

Two facts stand out in this comparison. first, the fact that white collar and blue collar jobs vary a great deal in their distribution from one ethnic group to another, and second, that because of this, it is essential to look at both ideas when we talk of pluralism and diversity. Is diversity in Connecticut due to socio-economic factors, such as the kind of occupation? Or are differences more complicated than that? Does diversity exist, regardless of one's white collar or blue collar employment?

Let us consider a few important ideas, especially those which are particularly germane to life in the central city. Home ownership, for example, is often an important characteristic in describing an urban neighborhood, but we usually lack information on which groups are more likely to own their home, and which are more likely to rent them. We would probably expect that relatively few in the central cities of Connecticut do actually own their homes, or live in houses where they are paying on a mortgage instead of some fixed rental. This is true; only one-third of all central city residents own their homes (TABLE 4). But the figures for the different ethnic groups show real diversity. As many as half of all Jews, and Eastern European, Italians, and Polish Catholics own their homes, but all other groups are considerably more likely to rent theirs. And this diversity remains, even when we look at blue collar and white collar families. White collar jobholders are somewhat more likely to own than to rent, for all in the survey taken as a whole, but this is not always true for each ethnic group taken separately. German Catholics and Jews, for example, are more likely to own a home if they are blue collar, and there is no difference at all between white collar and blue collar Irish, or between Italians of different

occupations. Regardless of their occupational status, the Irish are more likely to rent, and the Italians are more likely to own. Interests in home ownership, and the alternative prospects of owning or renting, are variable by ethnicity as well as class.

The idea of home ownership in the central city is important also for the sense of the neighborhood. Despite all the research into the large metropolitan or middle-size American city, under the traditional name of urban sociology, we know little about comparative ethnic behavior in the central city. We lack information, for example, on the ethnic neighborhood. To be sure, there are studies and reports which look at particular neighborhoods, individually. But until we emphasize comparative life styles, we cannot begin to talk about ethnic pluralism.

In this connection, it is valuable to have an idea of the ethnic relationships in urban neighborhoods. A question included in this survey which comes close to this idea refers to the number of close friends in the neighborhood who are relatives or in-laws of the family being interviewed. This question then taps not only the location, i.e., the immediate neighborhood, but also the nature of friendship choice and kinship. For all people in the survey only 27 per cent replied that most of their close friends are neighbors (TABLE 5). But the difference by social class is impressive. Blue collar workers are more than twice as likely to have these stronger ties of kinship than are white collar workers. And this is true for most of the specific groups mentioned as well.

Ethnic diversity on this question is also impressive. Of all the groups interviewed in Connecticut's central cities, the Italians, the

Spanish-speaking, and the Poles stand out as reflecting this kind of ethnic kinship pattern and neighborhood. The white collar Protestants and German Catholics stand out too, at the other end, as exceptions to this pattern.

The implications of this are interesting. If one-third to one-half of a particular group in the central city claims that most of its friendship choices in the neighborhood are among relatives and kinfolk, then the idea of the urban neighborhood assumes a strength and a character which, perhaps, many have tended to ignore. The neighborhood can be an extended family, or so it can be defined if the three ideas of local vicinity, friendship choice, and family relations are more than randomly united. If this pattern varies, and is more important for some ethnic groups than for others, as it indeed is, it is crucial for urban planning and urban development. The problems of urban renewal seem all the more momentous because they so frequently tend to ignore this very kind of consideration.

Another important background factor, certainly, is the level of formal education one has reached. The findings on this question show, as might be expected, that education does correlate with occupation; people with white collar jobs tend to have more formal education (TABLE 6). But the fact of ethnic diversity is just as real, within each occupational category. The percentages of those who have at least some college experience or more cover a wide range among white collar job holders; 62 per cent of the white collar Irish have been to college, as contrasted with 18 per cent of the white collar Polish. The differences in this area may well be due to the influence of generation in the United States and Connecticut, since the

Irish immigrated to America in periods before most of the Polish did. But it is precisely this kind of diversity which needs to be accounted for in understanding the pluralism of the United States.

A relevant economic factor is, of course, family income. Again, as with education, one might expect that white collar jobs produce more income on the average, but this is actually not always true. It is true for the total population, 28 per cent of the white collars in this study had family incomes over $10,000, but only 10 per cent of the blue collars were this affluent. And, this pattern is most evident for the German Catholics and the Jews, their increase from blue collar to white collar is the greater, for all groups (TABLE 7). But, the Blacks, the Eastern Europeans, the Irish, and the Polish show less gain in income between the two occupational categories. Thus, not only is there diversity within the total population when seen ethnically, but the patterns themselves are variable by ethnic group.

Related to income is the question of poverty in America, and attitudes toward the poverty issue are a most important segment of public opinion. The central city residents interviewed in Connecticut were questioned on how they felt about the government's role on the problems of poverty. They were specifically asked if the federal government should do more to fight poverty, should do less, or if they felt that the government is doing the right amount at the present time. Fifty-five per cent of all those interviewed said that the government should do more (TABLE 8). Again, ethnic groups show some differences on this question. The Blacks and the Spanish-speaking stand out

as most supportive on more federal activity, and the Polish and Irish Catholics appear as less so.

Class differences, we would expect, might be obviously relevant here, and the data support our expectations. Blue collar workers are 61 per cent in favor of greater government activity, while white collar workers are only 44 per cent. There are some ethnic differences here too. For the most part, blue collar workers from each ethnic group are more interested in seeing federal activity increase in poverty programs, with the exception of the Jews. The Jewish blue collars, like the Polish Catholic working class, are among the least supportive of more federal activity on this issue. For the Italians, there seems to be no class difference; half of each of the white collars and the blue collars among the Italian Catholics favor more government activity, rather than less or the status quo.

The interesting finding here, it would seem, is that a plurality of almost all of the groups are behind the idea of a greater government role in solving the problems of poverty. On the surface, one might expect a plurality in support of the status quo. This is not the case, however. Religious and racial and ethnic groups in Connecticut are fairly united on generalized support for the notion that the federal government not only has a role to play in poverty issues, but that its role should be even greater than it presently is.

Support of the government's role in poverty and welfare issues is historically linked to the Democrats, as opposed to the Republicans. What are the political party preferences of Connecticut's ethnic groups, as they emerged in this study? For total figures, 68 per cent of all those

interviewed in the central cities replied that they were Democrats or leaned toward the Democratic Party. Three-fourths or more of the Blacks, the Jews, the Irish, and the Spanish-speaking are Democrats; and a majority of every other group except the white Protestants tend to support this party (TABLE 9).

Class membership is important. For the total, there are twice as many Republicans among white collar workers than among blue collar job holders, and this of course supports the general and repeated finding that political party relates very strongly to social class and economic status. But the total figures mask ethnic diversity. The reality of ethnic politics is such that there are exceptions. White collar workers among the Blacks, the Jews, those from Eastern European backgrounds, and the Polish Catholics tend to be Democrats as well, at least as strongly as they are represented among the blue collar counterparts in these groups. Other ethnic backgrounds show some change in the percentage Democratic between blue collar and white collar politics, but the changes are variable.

The last research to be reported here is a generalized subjective feeling about race relations between blacks and whites in Connecticut. Central city residents were asked for their perception of the race climate in their cities; was it getting better, staying the same, or getting worse, with reference to how they thought things used to be in the last five years or so. As the total figures emerge, there are no differences by occupational class position. Thirty-one per cent of all respondents felt racial matters were getting better, 40 per cent felt the climate was staying the same, and

28 per cent said that race relations were getting worse (TABLE 10). This is about one-third in each category. By ethnicity, however, German Catholics and Eastern Europeans were more likely to feel things were deteriorating, Blacks as a group were more likely to see things staying the same, and Jews were more likely to see the race climate as improving. All other groups were, by and large, roughly divided by these three opinions, and class position makes a difference only for some groups, and not always in the same way. Being white collar suggests that Blacks, Jews, German Catholics, and Irish Catholics were more likely to see improvements, but Italian Catholics were more likely to see race relations getting better if they were blue collar workers.

When summing up the implications of these various findings and ideas, I wish to make several points. It is difficult, if not impossible, to draw sufficiently clear and complete portraits of ethnic behavior in a short presentation. The data as presented here are merely suggestions of ethnic differences. We cannot explain, at this stage, as much as we would like to, because the complexity of the questions involves so much more than what meets the eye. We have a good deal more to do in research in this area of inquiry, and we need to account for many more factors than mentioned above. The length of time an ethnic group has been in the United States or in an urban area, the subjective identification one has with his own ethnic background, the historical experience of an ethnic group in this country and abroad, and the specific values and way of life which may characterize any particular ethnic group - - all these are important to realize before conclusions can be reached that are surer of reality.

On the other hand, if ethnicity were not important in American life today, then politics and family life and urban neighborhoods, to name a few instances, would not show the ethnic diversity that they do show, and differences in surveys of the American population would not emerge. Most interpretations of America that do emphasize differences usually, up to now, have dwelled on sectional cleavage-- the values and interests of the North, and the South, the Middle West, and the Far West, and regions within these sections, such as New England -- or on the class conflict between the haves and the have-nots, and between labor and management.

But ethnic pluralism may still be another way of interpreting the United States, and especially those areas such as Connecticut, where everybody in fairly recent memory has come from somewhere else, and where accommodation to the social and economic and political system is always being negotiated. Our American history and society has been a constant exchange of the negotiation of power, for example, and ethnic groups in America have always been involved in conflict, and even frequently in violence, because of this negotiation.

The ethnic and economic interests in Black Power, now, among Afro-Americans in the United States, or the struggles in the Grape Strike in California among Mexican Americans, are in the same tradition of the Molly Maguires among the downtrodden Irish coal workers in Eastern Pennsylvania, or the conflicts of Italian laborers in New Orleans and in the railroad towns of Colorado, or the efforts of the Chinese to ward off massacres and lynchings in the Far West. The tradition is one that combines ethnicity and economic necessity, and one that usually combines elements of powerlessness

with ethnic differences. Some trends of the present may de-emphasize ethnic diversity, but the reality of the American past and persisting cultural variations suggests that ethnic pluralism is not just romanticism but a force in American society which has long had a role in shaping inter-group relations, and which we may be just beginning to understand.

TABLE 1. -- Per cent distribution of ethnic groups by religion

Father's Ethnicity	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Total	
Black	94	6	0	100	(288)
Eastern European	13	59	28	100	(163)
English	68	31	1	100	(173)
French Canadian	11	87	2	100	(92)
German	51	36	13	100	(143)
Irish	17	83	0	100	(198)
Italian	2	98	--	100	(268)
Polish	5	82	13	100	(94)
Spanish-speaking	11	89	--	100	(91)
Other	39	22	39	100	(127)
Total	36	56	8	100	(1,637)

N = 1,637
No religion = 50
Other religion = 42
NA, religion, ethicity = 54

Total N = 1,783[a]

[a]N = 1,783 = the total number of respondents interviewed in Hartford, Bridgeport, and New Haven (central cities).

TABLE 2. -- Per cent distribution of religious groups by ethnicity

Father's Ethnicity	Protestant	Catholic	Jewish	Total
Black	45	2	1	17
Eastern European	4	11	35	10
English	19	6	2	11
French Canadian	2	9	2	6
German	12	6	14	9
Irish	6	18	1	12
Italian	1	28	--	15
Polish	1	8	9	6
Spanish-speaking	2	9	--	6
Other	8	3	36	8
Total	100 (595)	100 (909)	100 (133)	100 (1,637)

TABLE 3. -- Per cent distribution of religio-ethnic groups by occupational class

Religio-Ethnic Group	White Collar	Blue Collar	Total
Blacks, all religions	13	87	100 (283)
Protestants, white	48	52	100 (312)
Jews, white	75	25	100 (129)
Catholics, white	36	64	100 (878)
Total	37	63	100 (1,602)
Specific Catholic Groups			
. . Eastern European	30	70	100 (96)
. . English	50	50	100 (54)
. . French-Canadian	25	75	100 (79)
. . German	66	34	100 (50)
. . Irish	49	51	100 (162)
. . Italian	36	64	100 (259)
. . Polish	22	78	100 (78)
. . Spanish-speaking	5	95	100 (73)

N = 1,602
NA, occupation = 35

Total N = 1,637

TABLE 4. -- Percentage of Home Owners, by religio-ethnic group and class

Religio-Ethnic Group	White Collar	Blue Collar	Total
Blacks	22 (37)	13 (245)	14 (282)
Protestants	30 (149)	24 (163)	27 (312)
Jews	48 (97)	66 (32)	53 (129)
Catholics	40 (312)	35 (564)	37 (876)
. . Eastern European	55 (29)	45 (67)	48 (96)
. . English	26 (27)	11 (27)	19 (54)
. . French-Canadian	40 (20)	24 (59)	28 (79)
. . German	33 (33)	41 (17)	36 %50)
. . Irish	32 (80)	28 (82)	30 (162)
. . Italian	52 (92)	54 (167)	53 (259)
. . Polish	59 (17)	41 (59)	45 (76)
. . Spanish-speaking	--- (4)[a]	9 (69)	3 (73)
Total	38 (595)	29 (1,004)	32 (1,599)

N = 1,599
NA, home owners = 3
Total N 1,602

[a]Too few cases for percentaging.

TABLE 5. -- Per cent who say that most of their close friends in the neighborhood are relatives, by religio-ethnic group and class

Religio-Ethnic Group	White Collar	Blue Collar	Total
Blacks	18	34	32
Protestants	7	29	19
Jews	15	26	17
Catholics	21	36	31
. . Eastern European . . .	34	28	30
. . English	26	19	22
. . French-Canadian	15	23	21
. . German	6	18	10
. . Irish	14	27	21
. . Italian	26	47	40
. . Polish	29	37	35
. . Spanish-speaking . . .	--[a]	49	49
Total	16	34	27

[a]Too few cases for percentaging.

TABLE 6. -- Per cent with some college education or more, by religio-ethnic group and class

Religio-Ethnic Group	White Collar	Blue Collar	Total
Blacks	27	6	10
Protestants	53	10	31
Jews	49	19	41
Catholics	40	11	22
. . Eastern European	20	14	16
. . English	48	18	33
. . French-Canadian	35	5	13
. . German	48	24	40
. . Irish	62	21	41
. . Italian	31	9	17
. . Polish	18	13	14
. . Spanish-speaking	--[a]	1	2
Total	44	10	23

[a]Too few cases for percentaging.

TABLE 7. -- Per cent whose annual family income is over $10,000, by religio-ethnic group and class

Religio-Ethnic Group	White Collar	Blue Collar	Total
Blacks	13	7	8
Protestants	27	10	18
Jews	41	4	32
Catholics	26	13	17
. . Eastern European	26	22	23
. . English	33	19	26
. . French-Canadian	26	11	15
. . German	43	7	30
. . Irish	25	24	24
. . Italian	22	9	14
. . Polish	12	11	11
. . Spanish-speaking	--[a]	0	0
Total	28	10	17

[a]Too few cases for percentaging.

TABLE 8. -- Per cent who feel the federal government should do more to help the poor, by religio-ethnic group and class

Religio-Ethnic Group	White Collar	Blue Collar	Total
Blacks	63	77	76
Protestants	44	51	48
Jews	51	43	49
Catholics	40	57	51
. . Eastern European	35	66	56
. . English	38	58	48
. . French-Canadian	33	65	56
. . German	44	67	51
. . Irish	33	54	44
. . Italian	48	51	50
. . Polish	33	41	39
. . Spanish-speaking	--[a]	63	62
Total	44	61	55

[a]Too few cases for percentaging.

TABLE 9. -- Political party preference, by religio-ethnic group and class (in percentages)

Religio-ethnic Group	White Collar				Blue Collar				Total			
	Dem	Rep	Ind	Total	Dem	Rep	Ind	Total	Dem	Rep	Ind	Total
Blacks	83	9	8	100	87	7	6	100	86	7	7	100
Protestants	29	56	15	100	47	34	19	100	38	45	17	100
Jews.	81	8	11	100	83	7	10	100	81	8	11	100
Catholics	59	24	17	100	76	12	12	100	70	16	14	100
. . Eastern European .	76	19	5	100	67	14	19	100	70	16	14	100
. . English	54	31	15	100	60	24	16	100	57	27	16	100
. . French-Canadian .	65	5	30	100	74	19	7	100	71	15	14	100
. . German	42	34	24	100	79	7	14	100	53	26	21	100
. . Irish	63	19	18	100	86	5	9	100	75	12	13	100
. . Italian	60	28	12	100	80	12	8	100	73	18	9	100
. . Polish	62	19	19	100	64	14	22	100	64	15	21	100
. . Spanish-speaking .	---	--	---	---	88	8	4	100	87	10	3	100
Total	57	28	15	100	75	14	11	100	67	20	13	100

TABLE 10. -- Perception of race relations (getting better, staying the same, getting worse), by religio-ethnic group and class (in percentages)

Religio-ethnic Group	White Collar				Blue Collar				Total			
	Better	Same	Worse		Better	Same	Worse		Better	Same	Worse	
Blacks	52	45	3	100	39	53	8	100	40	52	8	100
Protestants	32	43	25	100	28	34	38	100	30	38	32	100
Jews	48	30	22	100	36	39	25	100	45	32	23	100
Catholics	27	38	35	100	27	39	34	100	27	39	34	100
. . Eastern European	22	33	45	100	20	36	44	100	21	35	44	100
. . English	38	43	19	100	33	46	21	100	36	44	20	100
. . French Canadian	28	33	39	100	31	44	25	100	30	41	29	100
. . German	25	33	42	100	6	44	50	100	18	37	45	100
. . Irish	38	41	21	100	28	35	37	100	33	38	29	100
. . Italian	18	39	43	100	32	40	28	100	27	40	33	100
. . Polish	25	33	42	100	19	42	39	100	20	41	39	100
. . Spanish-speaking .	---	---	--	---	24	41	35	100	24	41	35	100
Total	33	39	28	100	30	42	28	100	32	40	28	100

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