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ABSTRACT

A new approach to the development of strategies and procedures for rational resolution of value conflicts is described and illustrated. Strategies are based on 6 tasks for meeting the standards for a rational value judgment discussed by Jerrold Coombs (1971). The 6 tasks involve reducing differences in each of the following: the interpretation of the value issue, the purported facts assembled, the assessed truth of purported facts, the relevance of facts, tentative value judgments, and testing the acceptability of value principles. Procedures are formulated on the basis of 3 sets of principles: logical, such as analyzing value conflict into its logical components; procedural, such as organizing sources of conflict according to the kind of logical component and how they contribute to the complexity of the conflict; and psychological, such as breaking larger conflicts into smaller conflicts and resolving smaller conflicts first. In tests of both the approach to strategies and the procedure, results were as follows: (1) behavior on the 6 tasks followed a complex pattern, rather than occurring in a simple logical order; (2) participants discussed a variety of alternative plans, rather than just the initial plans on which there was conflict; and (3) the emphasis on moral and economic concerns was changed somewhat. (Author)

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# Strategies and Procedures for the Resolution of Value Conflicts<sup>1</sup>

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The purpose of this paper is to present a new approach to the resolution of value conflicts, with some preliminary results illustrating this approach. We shall not attempt any precise definition of the phrase 'resolution of value conflicts'. Rather we shall clarify only what a value conflict is. We restrict value conflict for the purposes of this paper to a difference in value judgments. For examples of value conflict in this sense, see Handout #1.

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Handout #1 goes about here  
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Our approach to the resolution of value conflicts is part of a more general research program on rational value analysis. It might be helpful to take a quick look at the background of this research program. Several distinct points are relevant. (1) We started several years ago with the analysis of the logical aspects of teaching behavior, and followed this with an analysis of the strategic aspects of teaching behavior (Smith et. al., 1962, 1970; Smith et. al., 1967). This work in the analysis of the logical and strategic aspects of teaching behavior gave our work a strong educational emphasis. (2) Within the work just cited, we then focused on the evaluative aspects of discourse, and

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<sup>1</sup>Address given to the Rocky Mountain Psychological Association, Denver, May, 1971. Basically, the address was a "talking to" and explaining the set of handouts.

Person A

- (1) The use of pesticides is inadvisable.
- (2) The supersonic transport is worthless.
- (3) The Mona Lisa is beautiful.
- (4) The internal combustion engine is outmoded.
- (5) The author's argument is not fair.
- (6) The Crime Control Bill is reactionary.
- (7) The U.S. involvement in Vietnam is immoral.

Person B

- The use of pesticides is necessary.
- The supersonic transport is undesirable.
- The Mona Lisa is not beautiful.
- The internal combustion engine is effective.
- The author's argument is effective.
- The Crime Control Bill is necessary.
- The U.S. involvement in Vietnam is good.

Handout #1. Example of Value Conflict:  
Conflicts in Value Judgments.

developed logical models of evaluation. First we developed a simple value model (Meux, 1963, 1967) and then a general value model (Meux, 1970; Chadwick and Meux, 1971). (3) At this point we were fortunate in meeting James Chadwick, who at the time was a Social Studies teacher in one of the local high schools in Salt Lake County. We worked together in developing a practical approach for formulating one's own value judgment on a controversial issue. This approach is described in detail in Chadwick and Meux (1971). (4) Next we became more interested in the psychological aspects of values, especially value analysis. This was particularly important in attempting to answer questions about how the capabilities for rational value judgments can be developed. (5) At this point we were asked to collaborate in the writing of one of the yearbooks for the National Council for the Social Studies, focusing on value problems in the Social Studies. In this yearbook, which will be published this September, we have four chapters, each focusing on a different aspect of our overall conceptual framework. Chapter 1 focuses on the objectives and rationale of value analysis, Chapter 2 on teaching strategies for rational value judgments and the development of capabilities for rational value judgments, Chapter 3 on practical procedures for value analysis (including that indicated above developed with Chadwick), and Chapter 4 on the resolution of value conflicts. (6) We now view our conceptual framework as having three general facets which are investigated simultaneously. Handout #2 depicts this conceptual framework. Let us now turn to a discussion of Handout #2.

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Handout #2 goes about here  
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I. Conceptual-Logical Facet (Handout #3)

Standards of a Rational VJ\*

Variety of well-confirmed, relevant facts. Acceptable value principle.

Objectives of Value Analysis

Particular VJ

Developing capabilities for VJ

Particular resolution of VC\*

Developing capabilities for resolution of VC

Tasks Required in Value Analysis (VC)

Reducing differences in: interpretation of the value question, purported facts assembled, assessed truth of purported facts, relevance of facts, tentative value judgments, testing the acceptability of value principles.

Examples of Logical Principles

Analyze VC into logical components

Differentiate logical components

Reinterpret logical components

Appeal to epistemic rules

II. Empirical-Psychological Facet (Handout #4)

The Course of Destructive Conflict

Principle: Minimize commitment before attempting to resolve conflict.

Productive Conflict

Principle: The moderator should perform an integrative function in order to facilitate group decisions characterized by generosity to members, resolution of fairness, and exploration of areas of integrative rather than compromise solutions.

Principle: Solutions founded either upon (a) any of the unchallenged facts or (b) unchallenged interpretations of facts, taken from the problem situation, should be selected for consideration and evaluation.

Conditions Influencing the Course of Resolution

Principle: Define conflict as a small conflict rather than a large conflict. (Issue control)

III. Procedural-Rule Facet (Handout #5)

Ways of Handling Complexity

Organize facts by basic concerns, positive or negative, general or specific; rank facts by importance; make subsidiary VJ for each concern.

Integration of Ways of Handling

Complexity: The Fact-Assembly Chart

Examples of Procedural Principles

Identify sources of VC

Rank sources of VC by importance

Organize sources of VC using Fact-Assembly Chart

Behavior During Session	Outcomes of Session Tapes Charts (Handouts #7-11)		Analyses of Outcomes			
			Tape Passages	Observation Systems	Interviews	Other

Along the left-hand side of the handout are the three facets of the conceptual framework: conceptual-logical, empirical-psychological, and procedural-rule. Across the top of the handout is the time dimension with three factors: before a conflict resolution session, during a conflict resolution session, and after a conflict resolution session. (Actually, of course, there may be more than one conflict resolution session). The following four handouts (#3 - #6) elaborate the various parts of this conceptual framework.

#### Conceptual-Logical Facet of the Conceptual Framework

Handout #3 elaborates upon the conceptual-logical facet of the conceptual framework.

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Handout #3 goes about here  
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Standards. First are the standards of a rational value judgment, which are the core of our whole conceptual framework at present. Three things are important about these standards. (1) The standards are a minimal and reasonable set. These may be illustrated as follows.

1. The purported facts supporting the judgment must be true or well confirmed.
2. The facts must be genuinely relevant, i.e., they must actually have valence for the person making the judgment.
3. Other things being equal, the greater the range of relevant facts taken into account in making the judgment, the more adequate the judgment is likely to be.
4. The value principle implied by the judgment together with the facts must be acceptable to the person making the judgment.



The first standard follows from the fact that value judgments are to a degree based on factual considerations. If someone is wrong about the facts, his judgment based on the facts may also be wrong. Suppose someone judges that capital punishment is a good thing on the grounds that it deters serious crime. If as a matter of fact capital punishment does not act as a deterrent, the evaluator has made a poor judgment. If the factual mistake were pointed out to the evaluator he would have to reconsider and perhaps change his judgment.

The second standard follows from the fact that a value judgment is based in part on certain of the evaluator's attitudes toward facts about the value object. If an evaluator misrepresents his attitudes towards the facts, especially to himself, he is liable to make a judgment he could not accept or defend were he to become aware of the misrepresentation. Thus his judgment is not as rational as it could be. Suppose someone were to judge that his local newspaper was an excellent newspaper, and when questioned as to the basis for his judgment replies that it gives complete coverage of local new events. When faced explicitly with this criterion--namely, that newspapers which give complete coverage of local news events are excellent--he realizes that this criterion is not one to which he attaches much importance. He may then change his value judgment about the local newspaper, especially if he finds no other relevant facts to support his original value judgment.

The third standard is implied by the dependence of value judgments on facts. Suppose someone were to judge that building freeways into cities is a good thing because freeways move persons and goods into and out of the city faster and with fewer chances of accidents occurring.



### Standards of a Rational Value Judgment

1. The purported facts supporting the value judgment must be well confirmed.
2. The facts must be genuinely relevant, i.e., they must actually have valence for the person making the value judgment.
3. Other things being equal, the greater the range of relevant facts taken into account in making the value judgment, the more adequate the value judgment is likely to be.
4. The value principle implied by the value judgment together with the facts must be acceptable to the person making the value judgment.

### Objectives of Value Analysis

1. Particular Value Judgment: Helping students make the most rational value judgment they can make about the value object under consideration.
2. Capabilities for Value Judgments: Helping students develop the capabilities and dispositions required for making rational value judgments.
3. Particular Resolution of Value Conflict: Helping students to achieve a rational resolution of a particular value conflict between themselves and other members of a group.
4. Capabilities for Resolution of Value Conflicts: Helping students develop the capabilities and dispositions required for the rational resolution of value conflict between themselves and other members of a group.

### Tasks Required in Value Analysis

- | For Value Judgments<br>(Objectives 1 and 2)                             | For Resolution of Value Conflicts<br>(Objectives 3 and 4)                |
|---|--|
| 1. Identifying and clarifying the value question                        | 1. Reducing differences in the interpretation of the value question      |
| 2. Assembling purported facts   | 2. Reducing differences in the purported facts assembled                 |
| 3. Assessing the truth of purported facts                               | 3. Reducing differences in the assessed truth of purported facts         |
| 4. Clarifying the relevance of facts                                    | 4. Reducing differences in the relevance of facts                        |
| 5. Arriving at a tentative value judgment                               | 5. Reducing differences in the tentative value judgments                 |
| 6. Testing the value principles implied by the value judgment and facts | 6. Reducing differences in testing the acceptability of value principles |

### Examples of "Logical" Principles for Resolution of Value Conflicts

1. Analyze value conflict into its logical components.  
(The six tasks for objectives 3 and 4 above are one way of doing this.)
2. Differentiate logical components of the value analysis to reduce differences.
3. Reinterpret value objects, criteria, principles, and situations to reduce differences.
4. Appeal to epistemic rules wherever relevant.  
(This includes rules of evidence and scientific method, definitional rules, rules of testimony, etc.)

He does not take into account the facts that building freeways increases congestion and air pollution in the cities. If these additional facts were pointed out to the evaluator he very well might change his original judgment. Again, this indicates that his original judgment was not as rational as it might have been.

The fourth standard of rationality derives from the fact that one cannot accept a value judgment and reject the value principle implied by it together with the facts without involving himself in a logical contradiction. Suppose a person's value judgment is 'The New York Times is excellent.' He bases this value judgment on five facts. Three facts have positive valence for him: the N.Y. Times has more coverage of events than any other paper, has experienced reporters, and receives great diversity of opinion from which to select stories. Two facts have negative valence for him: the N.Y. Times does not present the most radical views, and it takes a long time to read. The person's value principle, then, may be stated as follows: 'Any newspaper which has more coverage of events than any other paper, has experienced reporters, and receives great diversity of opinion from which to select stories is excellent even though it does not present the most radical views and takes a long time to read.'

(2) There is sometimes a misunderstanding of the concept of rational so as to equate it with the concept of logical, factual, or nonpersonal. Although Standards 1 and 3 do refer to factual or nonpersonal matters, Standards 2 and 4 emphasize the role of the person himself in the value analysis, since they emphasize relevance of the facts to the person (Standard 2) and the acceptability of the value principle to the person (Standard 4).

(3) A value judgment is judged as rational on the basis of the process or procedure by which it was obtained, and not just on the basis of characteristics of the product, i.e. the value judgment.

Objectives. We have emphasized mostly Objectives 1 and 3, i.e. those objectives concerned with particular value objects. We feel that this is especially important, since we have to get clear on the kinds of things that go on in a value analysis before we can proceed in a sound way on the development of capabilities for value analysis. (We are now, however, about to start on a project for the development of capabilities for value analysis, i.e. Objectives 2 and 4.)

Tasks in value analysis. These tasks, whether for Objectives 1 and 3 or for 2 and 4, are logically required to achieve the standards of a rational value judgment. It is especially important to note that the first three tasks are mainly "non-personal" in that they require behavior relevant to epistemic or logical rules, on which there can be a very high level of intersubjective agreement. The importance of this point is that many people feel that values are a completely personal matter and there is no connection with facts (Objectives 1 and 2). A parallel point with respect to conflict resolution is that many people feel that value conflicts are completely subjective and personal, with no chance of reducing conflict by non-personal means.

Empirical-Psychological Facets of the Conceptual Framework

(Handout #4)

The column to the left in Handout #4 parallels the kinds of

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Handout #4 goes about here  
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## Kinds of Psychological Factors\*

### The Course of Destructive Conflict

Principle: Minimize commitment before attempting to resolve conflict.  
(Deutsch, Maier)

### Productive Conflict

Principle: The moderator should perform an integrative function (receive and communicate information, summarize information to facilitate integration, minimize appraisal, detect when the group is ready to resolve differences and agree to a unified solution) in order to facilitate group decisions characterized by generosity to group members, resolution of problems of fairness, and exploration of areas of integrative rather than compromise solutions. (Maier)

Principle: Solutions founded either upon (a) any of the unchallenged facts or (b) unchallenged interpretations of facts, taken from the problem situation, should be selected for consideration and evaluation. (Maier)

### Conditions Influencing the Course of Conflict Resolution

Principle: Define conflict as a small conflict rather than a large conflict. (Issue control) (Deutsch)

\*Organization by Deutsch, M. Conflict: productive and destructive. J. of Social Issues, 1969, XXV(1), 7-41.

Implications of Principle for: Strategies	Procedures
	Have at least two sessions, with first session devoted to exploring sources of conflict. Moderator plays most active role in initial and final phases of each step in the procedure.

Fill in Value-Action Grid (Handout #6), emphasizing actions (solutions) with unchallenged facts.

Task 1: Reducing differences in interpretation of value object.

psychological factors in Handout #2. This organization of psychological factors is that used by Deutsch (1969). Under each kind of psychological factor is at least one principle. The principle is stated in terms of a recommendation for action, or a general guide to behavior. Each factor is the source of some implication, and is one fruitful way to examine the generation of implications from psychological findings, generalizations, theoretical principles, etc. Each psychological principle can be examined with respect to its implications for the tasks in resolving value conflicts, the implications for strategies of conflict resolution, or the implications for the procedures of conflict resolution.

In this paper we examine only one implication of each psychological principle.

(Discussion of principles in Handout #4.)

Procedural-Rule Facet of the Conceptual Framework

(Handout #5)

Although in one sense the procedures and rules are derived from or are implications from the first two facets of the conceptual framework, we felt it was important to distinguish a procedural-rule facet from the other two facets, for three reasons: (1) A separate facet helps emphasize the teaching aspects of our general research program, emphasizing that teaching is not just a matter of combining logic and psychology. (This involves viewing teaching as rule-guided behavior. See Smith, Meux, et. al.; 1967). (2) A separate facet emphasizes that we have had experience with some of these procedures (we have had the most experience with procedures for achieving Objective 1, namely the Extended Procedure in Chapter 3 of the yearbook mentioned above). (3) A separate facet emphasizes that these

yearbook mentioned above). (3) A separate facet emphasizes that these procedures can function independently of the other two facets in generating strategies and procedures for resolving value conflicts.

The ways of handling complexity in Handout #5 are mainly for reducing

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Handout #5 goes about here  
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the confusion and difficulties encountered by the person when he is attempting to formulate his own value judgment on a controversial issue or in resolving conflict with another person. The Fact-Assembly Chart is an integration of the five suggested ways of handling complexity, and is an intermediate step between procedural rules and strategies or procedures for resolving value conflicts.

#### Strategies and Ten-Step Procedure in the Conceptual Framework

(Handout #6)

These strategies and procedures are the results of generating and integrating implications. A strategy or procedure is what is actually used to guide the behavior in conflict resolution sessions. This handout finishes the elaboration of the "Before" part of the conceptual framework in Handout #2.

#### Illustration of a Conflict Resolution Session

We now turn to that part of the conceptual framework concerned with what happens during the conflict resolution session. We assume that the session is guided by some strategy or procedure generated. Once it has been chosen and the topic and participants selected, the conflict resolution session can begin.



### Ways of Handling Complexity

1. Organize facts as they are collected by basic concerns (social, economic, moral, etc.)
2. Separate facts according to whether they support a positive or a negative value judgment.
3. Subsume specific facts under more general facts for which they provide evidence.
4. Rank assembled facts with respect to their importance to the value judgment.
5. Make subsidiary value judgments, i.e. arrive at a value judgment of the value object for each separate basic concern (social, economic, moral, etc.)

### Integration of Ways of Handling Complexity: The Fact-Assembly Chart

The above ways of handling complexity can be integrated into what we call the Fact-Assembly Chart:

		Negative		Positive		Subsidiary Value Judgments
		General	Specific	General	Specific	
Basic Concerns	A					
	B					
	C					
	.					
	.					

### Examples of Procedural Principles for Resolution of Value Conflicts

1. Identify the sources of value conflict.  
(These may be identified in logical, psychological, historical, etc. terms)
2. Rank the sources of value conflict with respect to their importance.
3. Organize the sources of conflict using the Fact-Assembly Chart.  
(In each of these three principles, the persons may work separately or jointly.)

Handout #5. Procedural-Rule Facet of Conceptual Framework



Strategy: General rule to guide behavior at choice points.  
 Procedure: Set of specific steps to follow in sequence.

### I. Strategies Specified in Terms of Facets of Conceptual Framework

- Conceptual-Logical: Proceed through tasks in order 1-6 (either on original value object (#1) or on alternative value object).  
 Empirical-Psychological: Reduce threats and pressure while focusing on the important ideas by the use of some problem-solving procedure.  
 Procedural-Rule: Attempt resolution on original value object, using all ways of handling complexity. (#2)

### II. Strategies Specified in Terms of Procedural Dimensions

#### A. Procedural Dimensions

Structure: (1) Use of organizational devices which involve no specification of temporal sequence such as the Fact-Assembly Chart, and the Value-Action Grid. (2) Extent to which behavior is guided by rules specifying temporal sequence.

Production of alternative value object: Extent to which alternative value objects are sought to resolve the value conflict.

Rigor: Extent to which logical standards are achieved for each task.

Extensiveness: Extent to which experience is extended past that with which the resolution is entered.

#### B. Examples of Strategies

Structure: (1) Compare Fact-Assembly Charts on original value object and reduce differences.

(2) Fill in Value-Action Grid (Dissertation)

		Actions (VOs)			
		1	2	...	...
Values (Concerns)	A				
	B				
	...				
	...				

	Lo	Hi
Str		X
Pr	X	
Rig	X	
Ext		X
Str		X
Pr		X
Rig	X	
Ext		X

Production: (1) Attempt maximum resolution on original value object before moving to an alternative value object. (#1, #2)

Str		X
Pr	X	
Rig		X
Ext		X
Str	X	
Pr		X
Rig	X	
Ext	X	

(2) Attempt only enough resolution on original value object to identify differences crucial to resolution on alternative value object. (#3)

Rigor: Perform every task rigorously.

Extensiveness: Perform every task rigorously.

### III. Ten-Step Procedure

	Handout
1. Record initial value judgments	8
2. Comparing and modifying positive and negative statements	8
3. Ranking the modified positive and negative statements	8
4. Identifying important sources of conflict	9
5. Comparing and modifying evidence cards for most important sources of conflict	10
6. Ranking modified list of positive and negative statements	
7. Comparing and modifying value principles	11
8. Comparing tests for modified value principles	
9. Revising value principles	11
10. Comparing final value judgments	

Value Object: Use of DDT				
Basic Concerns	POSITIVE		NEGATIVE	
	General	Specific	General	Specific
Ecology			DDT gets concentrated in the food chain so that animals & people at the end of the food chain get concent. DDT	Lake Michigan study 0.0085 ppm in sediment 0.41 ppm in tiny invertebrates 3-8 ppm in flesh of fish eatg inverte 3, 177 ppm in fatty tissue of gulls feeding on fish Trillionths in rain and surface water 5-20 ppm in fatty tissues of people
Economic	DDT has a large market DDT costs less than alternative methods of control		DDT destroys natural controls and balances in pests DDT costs more than formerly	
Practical	DDT is persistent  DDT kills a broad range of insects DDT's alternatives cost more and require more ingenuity to find	Resists breakdown by water, microbes, and sunlight  Flies, mosquitoes, bollworm Harder marketing methods More specialized controls New research needed	DDT is decreasing in power to kill insects  DDT has available alternatives  DDT may affect sex-hormone metabolism	Use on cotton tripled from 1965 to 1967 In Texas, dose needed to kill bollworm increased many 1000fold 1960-65 Plants resistant to insects Introducing natural enemies Birds & mammals have similar sex hormones and regulators High DDT levels in autopsies of humans
Health	DDT combats malaria	Experience in Panama and other parts of world		Much less useful and effective  Risky Self-defeating

Subsidiary Value Judgments

Highly detrimental

Handout 7. Example of Fact-Assembly Chart, with the Value Object 'Use of DDT'.

At this point we have conducted several sessions. Each of these conflict resolution sessions started with a genuine conflict in value judgment between two persons--the conflict was assessed informally, but did turn out to be genuine. There was no attempt to determine ahead of time whether or to what extent there were value conflicts in criteria or value principles.

In resolutions #1 and #2, we had the participants gather facts and write criteria for them. In resolution #3, facts were gathered but no criteria written. In resolution #4 no facts or criteria were brought to the session. A blackboard was used to record important points, such as facts, criteria, and value principles. The sessions ranged from two to four hours. The longest, when transcribed, was about 80 double-spaced pages.

The 10-step procedure we discuss here illustrates only one out of a great variety of procedures that can be generated. This procedure was used in resolution #2. The 10 steps are listed at the bottom of Handout #6. Handouts #8 - 11 are actual results from some of the steps in one use of the procedure on the topic of liberalization of abortion laws.

(At this point, we just went through the Handouts #8 - 11.)

#### Outcomes of Conflict

#### Resolution Sessions

We have already seen some of the results of a conflict resolution in Handouts #8 - 11. We now present some other preliminary results, mostly at a rather informal but suggestive level.

#### I. Strategies

We can describe the strategies for the first three conflict resolutions as follows:

## KEITH

Initial VJ: Liberalization of abortion is highly desirable.

R <sub>1</sub>	R <sub>2</sub>	NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	R <sub>1</sub>	R <sub>2</sub>
1	1	Religious objections due to controversy over when we begin to call something a human being.	Would reduce births beyond former numbers what would otherwise be expected.	1	1
2	2	Cultural objections for other reasons than statement 1.	Abortion, properly performed, is not as dangerous as a normal childbirth.	2	2
3	3	Cost of a comprehensive plan, especially in underdeveloped countries.	Abortion per se causes no psychological damage.	3	3
			Would reduce proportion of children raised by resentful mothers.	4	5
			No discrimination against poor because of illegal abortions.	5	6

## JANET

Initial VJ: Liberalization of abortion is undesirable.

R <sub>2</sub>	R <sub>1</sub>	NEGATIVE	POSITIVE	R <sub>1</sub>	R <sub>2</sub>
1	1	We do not know when what society has called <u>life</u> a human being begins.	Abortion is the only post-conception control acceptable to large numbers of people.	1	1
2	2	Abortion is morally unacceptable to many people.	Abortion is becoming an increasingly uncomplicated and safe operation.	2	2
3	3	The problem of control is more motivational than technological.	Abortion would reduce the proportion of children being raised by resentful mothers.	3	3
4	4	Abortion is culturally and traditionally objectionable to some people.	Abortion per se causes no psychological damage.	4	4

Key: Underlining - statements or phrases added in Step 2.

Word crossed out indicates deletion during Step 2.

R<sub>1</sub> - Initial ranking before discussion.R<sub>2</sub> - Reranking in Step 3.

Handout #8. Steps 1, 2, and 3: Initial Value Judgments, Initial and Modified Positive and Negative Statements and Rankings.

Initial Statement (at start of Step 4)		Modified Statement (at end of Step 4)	
Keith	Janet		
+	-	None	Would reduce expected birth rate significantly beyond what it would have been
-	+	None	None
+	0	Deleted	Deleted
0	+		Abortion is the only post-conception control acceptable to large numbers of people
-	0		Liberalized abortion would reduce births beyond former number
			Abortion is the only post-conception control acceptable to large numbers of people
			Religious objections due to controversy over when we begin to call something a human being
0	-		We do not know when what society has called a human being begins
			Liberalized abortion involves destroying life which is in the range about which there is controversy about the meaning of the term 'human being'

Key: + : Top ranked positive statement  
 - : Top ranked negative statement  
 0 : Statement is not included in this person's list

Handout #9. Step 4: Identification of Statements Most Likely to Produce Conflict.

Person	Fact Identified in Step 4	Initial Criterion (at start of Step 5)	Modified Criterion (at end of Step 5)
Keith	Liberalized abortion reduces birth rate beyond what it would be	Any birth control procedure which is voluntary, ethical and rational, and effective is desirable	Any birth control procedure that reduces birth rate is effective
Janet	Liberalized abortion is acceptable to large numbers of people	Any post-conception control acceptable to large numbers of people is feasible	Same
Keith and Janet	Liberalized abortion has religious and cultural objections	Any birth control procedure which has religious and cul- tural objections is less feasible	Same
Janet	Liberalized abortion has religious and cultural objections	Any birth control procedure which has religious and cul- tural objections is unethi- cal	Same
Janet	Liberalized abortion does not take into account the fact that we don't know when hu- man life begins	Any birth control procedure which does not take into account the fact that we don't know when human life begins is unethical	Any birth control procedure which destroys life in the range about which there is controversy about the mean- ing of 'human being' is un- ethical

Handout #10. Step 5: Facts, Initial Criteria,  
and Modified Criteria for State-  
ments Most Likely to Produce Con-  
flict



Initial Value Principle (Before Discussion)	Modified Value Principle (from Step 7)	Final Value Principle (from Step 9)
Any birth control program which has no Hitler-type connotations, is voluntary, would reduce births beyond what they otherwise would be, is safer than normal childbirth, and would cause no psychological damage is highly desirable even though there are religious and cultural objections due to controversy over when to begin calling something a human being and even though it may be very costly especially in underdeveloped countries.	No change.	Any birth control program which has no Hitler-type connotation, is voluntary, would reduce births beyond what they would otherwise be, is safer than normal child birth, and might prevent other more drastic, involuntary measures from being taken later, is highly desirable even though there are religious and cultural objections over when to begin to call something a human being, it may be very costly, but not to the extent of depriving the family of other necessities, and it may cause some psychological damage.
Any birth control procedure that is unethical and has not been shown to be significantly more effective for population control than educational programs alone is undesirable even though it is technologically feasible and may be acceptable to large numbers of people.	Any birth control procedure that involves the HB controversy, and has not been shown to be significantly more effective for population control than educational programs is undesirable even though it is technologically feasible and may be acceptable to large numbers of people.	Any birth control procedure that involves disobeying L.D.S. descriptions of law, and has not been shown to be significantly more effective for population control than educational programs is extremely undesirable even though it is technologically feasible and may be acceptable to large numbers of people.

Keith

Janet

Handout #11. Steps 7 and 9: Comparing Initial and Modified Value Principles of Keith and Janet.



C.R. #1: "Proceed through tasks in order 1-6."

C.R. #2: "Attempt maximum resolution on original value object before moving to alternative value objects."

C.R. #3: "Attempt only enough resolution on original value object to identify differences crucial to resolution on alternative value objects."

The main outcomes of using strategies--rather than specific procedures--seemed to be a constant feeling of meandering around a great deal, difficulty in sticking to the point, that it was too unstructured. This feeling did not arise with very short segments of the session. Another outcome was that it was very difficult for the moderator to guide the discussion with only the general strategy for explicit guidance.

## II. Procedures

Conflict resolution #2 was the only session in which a specific, step-by-step procedure was used. There were two main outcomes here: one was that the participants felt that it was too long, and were frustrated after seeing all the material not covered; the other was that it was quite valuable to have a structured session.

## III. Conceptual-Logical Facet of the Conceptual Framework

In addition to examining outcomes in terms of strategies and procedures, outcomes can be examined in terms of the facet of the conceptual framework.

In the conceptual-logical facet, the outcomes during the execution of tasks 4 and 6 were especially interesting.

Task 4. Reducing Differences in the Relevance of Facts. This task involves examining important facts in order to reduce differences in their relevance. We had several examples of reducing differences in relevance, each in a somewhat different way.

The first fact examined was that more people would receive public assistance under the plan. Keith's criterion was 'Any plan in which more people receive public assistance under the plan is desirable.' Terry's criterion was 'Any GMYI plan in which more people receive public assistance is burdensome to the taxpayer.' These criteria clearly show that the fact initially had positive valence for Keith and negative valence for Terry. However, after some discussion of the two criteria, it turned out that Keith's criterion did not have much weight since it really doesn't say much, e.g. about how much public assistance the additional people are getting under the plan. Terry pointed out after examining his criterion that it didn't make explicit that there may be more people but they could each be getting less money. Both agreed, then that their criteria did not take enough circumstances into account. Thus, with essentially the same fact, Keith and Terry had conflicting criteria, but reduced this difference by agreeing that the criteria were not specific enough and so had little relevance for them.

We next examined the relevance of Keith's most important positive fact, that the Schwartz plan would bring 34 million people up to a non-poverty standard, with the criterion 'Any program which would raise 34 million people to nonpoverty levels as set forth by the Council of Economic Advisors is desirable.' During the discussion of this criterion, Terry

inadvertently introduced another fact which touched on his basic economic concern. The moderator comments illustrate how this might be handled:

K: Anytime all of a formerly poor people can be brought to a nonpoverty level by a program, the program is desirable.

M: OK, so that makes that relevant, very relevant. For you (Terry), that's not relevant.

T: Well, I know what that does. That causes inflation.

M: Wait a minute. Let's look at the criterion, not the results. In the first step you just look at the criterion, and not the result of instituting the plan. Because that's a different fact. What you're doing is bringing in another fact, that the Schwartz plan would result in inflation. That's a separate fact.

T: OK, the way that's set up there is...it's significant for me.

Thus, Terry, after seeing that this was a separate fact about a program and that this criterion was to be judged by itself, agreed with the criterion since it expressed his moral concern about the poor. Thus, the initial disagreement about the criterion was reduced by eliminating an oversight, namely bringing in another fact which touched on the economic concern.

The examination of Keith's criterion, described in the previous paragraph, revealed the complexity of the concerns and how the overall decision involved balancing the concerns:

M: A person could hold strictly to the economic picture and say, "Well, I'm sorry, that's not desirable." It's just irrelevant for him, because it doesn't talk about economics. But, this is relevant for you.

T: In the whole decision making process, it most certainly is.

M: But see, that would make a difference in where you take it from here.

T: It would be easier if it weren't.

M: Well, it's a matter of balancing concerns, rather than just looking at one concern.

T: Yeah.

M: So if you could find a program which would achieve both this kind of thing, raising the standard and satisfying your economic concern, you would look at that. Whereas, and you might give way a little bit on the economic picture because you are concerned with this. But a person who is just concerned with economic, would not give way. He would continue to look only at the economic.

Finally, the moderator pointed out that the testing of criteria shows the differences in concerns:

M: This writing of criteria is a good way to test the differences in concern between the two persons. Because when you start asking why do you have the difference in the relevance, the reason is your different concerns. It starts coming out pretty clearly.

Task 6. Reducing Differences in the Acceptability of Value Principles.

To reduce differences in acceptability of value principles, Keith and Terry first stated their value principles. These were written on the board to focus discussion better:

K: Any GMYI which brings 34.1 million people to nonpoverty status without nullifying the gain is desirable even though it may result in work disincentive and a rise in prices for nonpoverty levels of income, and even though it probably will have much opposition in Congress.

T: Any GMYI that increases the federal budget from four to seven billion dollars over present proposed budget and adds more people to tax supported programs and duplicates benefits is undesirable even though it sets national standards for welfare payments and brings a significant number of lower-level income families to nonpoverty level.

Role Exchange Test. After recording the two value principles on the board, Keith tested his principle as follows:

"The new person would be a person, who say, like in New Jersey, who might get less money with this plan. They've been given a minimum of \$3,000, but with this plan they might get cut out of other public assistance and therefore bring level down..."

Keith's reaction to being in the role of this kind of person was as follows:

K: My immediate feeling was one of outrage, and as I began to visualize more completely a paradigm of the affected person other feeling followed in short order. I felt hostility toward the government and then frustration as I realized I couldn't "fight city hall". Finally, this frustration turned to depression as I contemplated the advantages I would lose under the new plan and how this would affect my family's life.

Keith also noted that this was the first thing that occurred to him. He had listed this as one of his negative facts, i.e. that some people now getting public assistance would be dropped if the Schwartz plan were instituted, but did not have this fact represented in the "even though" part of his value principle, the part that has the negative aspects. Although this role exchange was somewhat disturbing, it was not clear how to reformulate the value principle to take care of the difficulty.

Terry's first role exchange was with people in the middle-income level:

T: Let's talk about the people who are in the middle incomes because there are more of those and the more of those are adversely affected.

Terry's reaction to being in the role of this kind of person was as follows:

T: I actually identified with the person under role exchange since, in real life, that is my role. This was when the most adversely affected person was the one in the middle income bracket who would foot the bill. My feelings were of righteous indignation and reluctance to spend the money.

After some discussion of who was most adversely affected and what the basis of adversity is, Keith noted that the person most adversely affected is the person who would have received benefits if some GMYI were passed. This is because in Terry's principle the GMYI is undesirable, and so would not be instituted. Thus those people who would receive benefits under a GMYI would not receive benefits under his principle, and so are the

most adversely affected under his principle. Terry's reaction to being in the role of this person was as follows:

T: When the role exchange was with the person who would have received benefits had the plan been instituted, I didn't change my value principle but did empathize with those people. The realization that I might not have enough money to sustain me heightened my moral concern and played down the economic concern. My feelings that prompted this change in concerns included: despair, hostility toward everybody that have more, and anxiety about family well-being.

The impact of this role exchange on Terry's principle illustrates the kind of conflict resolution that can go on without being reflected explicitly in the value judgment or value principle:

M: Well, how do you feel about your principle?

T: I feel like it still stands, pretty much the way it is. However, the more I talk about it, the more the moral concern has, than the economic because it'll come out every time we talk about the economy because Keith will bring it up. There's going to be a push-pull type of thing to get funds from somewhere else. I don't really believe that, but there is a possibility. And as long as that possibility exists, then the probability of inflation going down a little bit exists, and also the probability of getting all the money from the "almost poor" group is lessened.

K: So now your concern has come closer and now my statement is something to the effect that even if it did add inflation to the certain upper levels, I would still accept it.

#### IV. Empirical-Psychological Facet of Conceptual Facet

Here we will examine just one psychological principle, that concerning "issue control." (Define conflict as a small conflict rather than a large conflict.)

In resolution #4, for example, we found that it was especially helpful to break down the Organized Crime Control Bill of 1970 into the separate titles. We found that two of the titles contained most of the conflict, the titles on recalcitrant witnesses and dangerous special offenders.



Terry's comments also express how a participant feels as a result of issue control:

T: Do you know what I think this conflict resolution comes from? You take a main issue (it's pretty hard to resolve a main issue), but you get down into the smaller things and you start agreeing about those, and you build a little rapport there--getting to know how the other person feels... And that's a whole lot of it.

#### V. General Observations During Sessions

Following are a few general observations of salient phenomena during sessions.

**Problem Solving.** We found a continual effort to find alternative value objects or at least criteria for alternative value objects. This happened to a significant extent in resolution #1--where there was no explicit focus on this kind of activity. It happened to a lesser extent in resolutions #2 and #4.

**Intraperson Conflict.** We found that the intraperson conflict increased as the discussion proceeded. This was indicated by such expressions as "This is more complex than I thought." This was probably due to an increase in the number of facts brought into the discussion, an increase in the awareness of one's own values, and an increase in the awareness of other's values. It also seemed that the person at this point was more susceptible to influence and change, that he was more willing to settle for a compromise solution, that is, an alternative value object. It would be at points like this that we might expect undue influence to have its greatest impact.

**Undue Influence of Other Persons.** During the resolution, however, we did all feel that the participants do not do anything they really don't want to, that is with respect to being biased or unduly influenced either



by the moderator of other participant. In fact, when I was in the role of participant, it was clear that a certain feeling of reluctance would arise whenever I felt a tendency to deviate from my true or genuine viewpoint.

**Influences of Strong Values.** We found that within our strategies and procedures, value judgments based directly on strongly held values such as religious viewpoints or positions are not "negotiable." This showed up especially in resolution #2. Thus, if they directly imply a value judgment, there will be no resolution of conflict from value change on the original value object (unless, of course, the other person changes). This does produce a rather frustrating feeling on the part of the other person without the viewpoint, but possible outcomes still include a clarification of each person's position, a resolution of intraperson conflict, or even achieving resolution on some alternative value object.

**Awareness of Concerns.** We found that a concern may turn out to be more important than was thought at the start of the resolution. For example, in resolution #2, Janet at first underemphasized the importance to her of relevant Mormon doctrine, and in resolution #1, Terry at first underemphasized the importance to him of his moral concern.

**Immediate Outcomes.** At the close of the session, there was a strong feeling in all four resolutions that much resolution had been accomplished--either that there was a considerable amount of resolution of intraperson conflict and satisfaction with his own final value judgment, or that there was increased agreement on criteria for a resolution, or that there was actual conflict resolution on the original value object. Thus, outcomes in which there is little or no resolution of the original value conflict

may still involve some valuable outcome relevant to value conflict, whether resolution of intraperson conflict or the agreement on a set of criteria for an alternative value object acceptable to both participants.

#### VI. General Observations After Sessions

Following are a few general observations of salient phenomena after sessions.

**Increased Awareness.** For a considerable period after the completion of the resolution, for example one, two, or three weeks, there was increased awareness of the issue and of concerns important in the resolution.

**Reduction in Disposition for Conflict.** Another finding is that after a resolution between two people, conflict seemed less likely to develop. For example, after resolution #1, I noticed that Keith and Terry, when entering a situation of potential conflict, would immediately take steps to reduce this conflict with such statements as "Well, we don't have all the facts" or "Oh, I guess our criteria need more examining."

**Interviews.** Six months after the first two resolutions, we conducted brief informal interviews with the participants, asking them three questions: "What seem now to be the salient points about the conflict resolutions?", "Did I, as moderator, talk too much?", and "Are there any ways you can think of to improve the whole situation?"

**Main Salient Points from Interviews.** No clear points of agreement were obtained here. Some possibilities are the lack of sound documentation and source material, the interest in seeing another person's valuing and line of reasoning, and feeling more clear about one's own values, partly through the formulation of criteria and value principles.

Moderator Participation. There was considerable agreement that the moderator participation was not really excessive, and that it was helpful in clarifying what was involved and in reducing the meandering and getting off on a tangent.

Improving the Situation. The main suggestions were to have shorter sessions, having the moderator organize or structure the sessions more (e.g. by getting more agreement on the interpretation of the value object), and having the participants analyze transcripts of the session before arriving at a final value judgment.

#### Problems of Criteria for a Successful Resolution of Value Conflicts Arising from a Focus on Rationality

We will not attempt to treat the problems of adequate criteria for a successful conflict resolution here, since we have discussed them in detail elsewhere (Meux, 1971), but will only mention several points.

(1) Criteria are very difficult, perhaps even impossible, to specify without getting into ethical-value questions. (2) Conflict resolution is basically problem-solving in some area of concern. Thus the problem may be best solved by an alternative value object. (3) There may be reduction of important differences in the various tasks when discussing the original value object that are helpful when discussing some alternative value object (proposed solution to the area of concern). (4) As already indicated, there is some intraperson reduction of conflict.

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