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ABSTRACT

The Meiji Restoration of 1868 ended six centuries of feudal military rule by establishing a divine Emperor and clam oligarchy. Compulsory schooling and military service soon followed. Until WWII both institutions engaged in moral training that was both Confucian and nationalistic in its emphasis on absolute loyalty to the state and Emperor. The ethical instruction in the school was taught in required "shuushin" courses. By the 1930's a new dimension was added to these courses: the suitability of Japan's national character for less well-endowed races. Military personnel received spiritual training in every facet of their preparation for Japan's defense and cosmopolitan destiny; their social role included modeling of the Japanese character. Post WWII schooling and military organization and training are markedly different. External intervention and national re-evaluation have resulted in democratic educational objectives and practices. Although constitutionally demilitarized in 1947, the military was re-established between 1950 and 1954. It is relatively small in size and budget, civilian controlled, staffed by volunteers, and is limited by statute and public opinion to a self-defense role. In conclusion, the dominant values of Japanese society, the mission and capabilities of the military forces, and the relationships between the armed forces and society today bear little surface resemblance to prewar Japan.
(Author/DJB)

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EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION IN THE
JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

by

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In many important ways WW II seems to mark a discontinuity in Japanese tradition - it was the event which made possible a series of fundamental changes in Japan's political, social and economic structures - and in attitudes toward military force and international relations. But the continuity of these reforms and attitudes which support them is by no means certain.

For this reason I summarize some of the important aspects of socialization in the Imperial Japanese Forces prior to WW II, note some major changes from tradition as seen in Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) - changes which are not only discontinuous with Japan's past, but which merit the term "unique", and lastly suggest some of the methods of socialization today and some of the problems involved and trends perceived.

Socialization in pre-WW II Japan

Six centuries of more or less regional feudal military rule were

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replaced in 1868 by a central government controlled by a clan oligarchy - a series of events usually called the Meiji Restoration. The new government needed military forces to enforce its decrees and an educated populace to understand its function. Almost simultaneously compulsory education and universal military conscription were enacted in the early 1870s. Initial conscription was designed to provide "National" forces under control of the central government (not a congeries of samurai units from different feudal lords) - and used mainly for internal security. The new "national" army of conscripts successfully defeated four minor military revolts and one major military insurrection by 1877. Thereafter, the character of the conscript forces changed.

After 1877, the Japanese assumed complete control of their military education system and eliminated foreign instructors. The Military Academy (Shikan gakkoo) was established in 1882 and the Army University (Rikugun Daigaku) in 1883. Fifteen specialized military schools were established in the next several years. Japan's Army and Navy became forces prepared for emergencies on the continent.¹

This new military force reflected and was a support of the new Japanese society. Professor Hall saw two fundamental problems in the development of this new society.

The first task was the "relative equalization" of the several distinct social classifications of pre-Meiji Japan. The second was the subordination of all members of these classes to the Imperial institution. Encompassing these two points was the absolute need to develop a true national consciousness by the transfer of feudal and

local loyalties to a central unique Imperial institution. He viewed the process as consisting of four stages:

- "1. The development of the theocratic concept of subordination of the individual to the State;
2. The discovery, invocation, and emphasis of a basic loyalty or allegiance which has traditionally existed in the culture;
3. The shift of this traditional loyalty to the person of the Emperor and the concept of the Japanese State;
4. The utilization of the educational apparatus of the schools, especially of the new shuushin courses, to strengthen and make permanent the new feeling of subordination and loyalty to the Emperor Institution."²

Shuushin - or "ethics courses" were the educational instrumentality to propagate and inculcate these principles. Such courses first appeared in elementary school instruction in 1872. Shuushin was defined by Hall as "not a body of canonized ethics, but rather a body of instructional material with content not dissimilar to that of occidental etiquette, civics, national history, mythology and current events."³ The texts carried many prosaic lessons on common courtesy, stories of international characters such as Benjamin Franklin, and many tales of Japanese heroes. Interspersed with such content were exhortations to "obey the law no matter what it is" and to prepare oneself from birth to perform the "honorable duty of defending the country". The student is reminded that the "Emperor's august virtue" was the source of every statute, law and regulation promulgated in the Empire. Complete submission to the "Imperial Will" and atomization of the individual were shuushin's objectives.⁴

In the 1880s many influential Japanese came to believe that the extravagant mimetic response to Occidental contacts was about to overwhelm traditional concepts of moral values in Japan. When Mori

Arinori became Minister of Education in 1885 he set out to make the national education system an instrument to nourish nationalism.⁵ In a speech in 1889, Mori stated: "In the administration of all schools, it must be kept in mind, what is to be done is done not for the sake of the pupils, but for the sake of the country".⁶

The next year the Imperial Rescript on Education was promulgated. This document, memorized in its entirety by generations of Japanese school children, officially proclaimed loyalty and filial piety as the moral cornerstones of the State and explicitly proclaimed that these two virtues are the "source of our education". (See Enclosure 1). In a passage most directly related to the military, the Rescript also enjoins all - "should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State:".

Japanese education and socialization in the post-Restoration decades was essentially moral in basis. This morality was Confucian in overtone, but singular in its emphasis on the Emperor. In the 1930s there was a reaction - a turning away - from the relative liberalism of the 1920s. The morality proclaimed in the Rescript on Education and propagated by the shuushin courses in the public schools acquired a new aspect - international in character. The shift from self-consciousness of the unique quality of one's national character to conscious belief in its suitability for less well-endowed races easily culminates in a sense of mission - a not unfamiliar phenomenon. Japan was no exception.

This new aspect was defined in the mid-1930s in Kokutai no Hongi. The writers of this book noted the extremist political trends in the

West which arose from the conflict of individualistic and the totalitarian tendencies and stated the purpose of Kokutai no Hongi thusly:

"This means that the present conflict seen in our people's ideas, the unrest in their modes of life, the confused state of their civilization can be put right only by a thorough investigation by use of the intrinsic nature of Occidental ideologies and by grasping the true meaning of our national entity. Then too, this should be done not only for the sake of our nation, but for the sake of the entire human race which is struggling to find a way out of the deadlock with which individualism is faced. Herein lies our grave cosmopolitan mission. For this reason we have compiled the Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan.⁷

Although Kokutai no Hongi can hardly be termed a best-seller in a class with the Bible or Mao's Red Book, nearly two million copies were published. It was the authoritative interpretation and teacher's guide for material used in the shuushin courses. The educational apparatus used to carry out the disindividualization of the Japanese school child and complete his identification with the Emperor in Japan's "cosmopolitan mission" was comprehensive. In 1940, compulsory shuushin courses were taught to more than twelve million students in the elementary grades. This subject comprised 7% of the total curriculum.⁸

Instruction was focussed on the unique characteristics of the Japanese state - divine origin, divine leadership, divine characteristics

of Yamato-damashi and a divine mission - the political goal of extending the benefits of Japanese imperial rule.⁹

This type of self-image was supported by a "nationalism" which was unlike the democratic nationalism of 19th Century Europe and the revolutionary nationalism of 20th Century Asia; rather, Professor Maruyama has positively defined it as the strengthening of certain aspects of "deeply-rooted feudalistic or patriarchal ideology to serve as moral support for seemingly Westernized political institutions and more characteristically for the national ideology and psychology."¹⁰

This nationalism described by Maruyama found expression in shuushin instructional material which exhorted male students to "cultivate mind and body from childhood so that (they) will be able to perform the honorable duty of defending the country".¹¹ The Ministry of Education informed students they were to be made "conscious of the Empire's mission in the Far East and the world, and of the vital importance of national defense....".¹²

What I have said so far should suggest the general orientation of the educational system in Japan prior to WW II. Now I wish to turn to the social status of the soldier and sailor during the same period. I mentioned earlier that the special status and privileges of the centuries-old military - or samurai-class in Japan were purposefully done away with in the 1870s. The clan armies were replaced by a conscript army of commoners, although most of the officers were of samurai lineage. The soldiers of the new army and navy were accorded special relationship to the Emperor - that of soldier to Commander-in-Chief.

The Imperial Precepts to the Soldiers and Sailors was delivered in the Gunjin Chokuyu of January 4, 1882 (Enclosure 2). Addressing the military men of Japan, the Emperor stated the supreme command of all armed forces lay in his hands and that he would forever retain supreme civil and military command, thus avoiding the disgrace of past ages when military men usurped actual power. The Emperor enjoined soldiers and sailors to practice loyalty, propriety, valor, fidelity and simplicity.¹³

The special relationship was made even more explicit in the Constitution of 1890 wherein the "sacred and inviolable" Emperor was stated to have "supreme command of the Army and Navy" (Gunreiken) (Art XI), to "determine the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy" (Gunseiken) (Art XII), and the power to "declare war, make peace and conclude treaties" (Gunji Taiken) (Art XIII).

There were no civilian organizations nor government bureaucracy to mediate between the military and the Emperor, neither in practice nor in theory. The principle of independence of the military command was established, as the recent Japanese White Paper on Defense¹⁴ has duly noted. Neither the Cabinet nor the Diet could control military operations, the employment of military forces nor even certain matters of general military administration. Politics and military affairs were separated by two devices: The Ministers of War and Navy had to be active duty officers, and no Cabinet could be formed unless acceptable to these Ministers. Furthermore, the right of direct access to the Emperor (iaku joo soo) by military officers was maintained.

Within the Imperial Military Forces the values taught in compulsory civilian school courses in shuushin were reinforced by inculcation of

concepts termed seishin kanyoo - or in approximate English - "spiritual training", or perhaps more accurately "cultivation of the psyche" - "psyche" in the sense that it denotes the "spiritual being as distinct from the body, both in nature and destiny; the mental life of an individual comprising intellectual, emotional, impulse activities and predispositions."

Seishin Kanyoo - spiritual training - was emphatically not something tacked on to the usual military training as some type of education and information program - or even roughly comparable to the "Why We Fight" indoctrination in World War II.

It was based on the moral concepts of the Imperial Rescript of 1882. Its grand purpose was stated in the Kyooiku-rei (Military Instruction Manual) this way:

"The object of military training is to train officers and men, and forge thereby an invincible Army which shall support the Imperial Will efficiently. However, to accomplish this aim, the indispensable element is a solemn military spirit and firm military esprit. Therefore, the primary purpose of military training lies in this element."¹⁵

Conforming to this guidance, military instruction concentrated in its vital aspects on the intangible qualities of a fighting force, not technical training. This was due, in part, of course, to the relatively low development then of technological aspects of war, but also it was indebted to the samurai tradition of the simple life style and moral superiority. The "do without" philosophy translated Japan's material disadvantage into a moral advantage. A later paragraph of the Military Instruction Manual reads:

"....The state of training permits us to overcome the enemy's material and quantitative superiority by exploiting our efficiency under the single command of the Emperor,

despite our inferiority. If one wishes to be victorious in war, he must be conspicuously superior in the matter of training (in time of peace). Therefore, those charged with training must always maintain this spirit, exhaust all knowledge and ability, be assiduous in the thoroughness of training, and hereby make possible complete victory through belief therein."¹⁶

Although the Military Instruction Manual devotes several paragraphs to spiritual training, it was not a military subject, per se, to be mastered; rather it was "life blood of training",¹⁷ not even to be neglected while sleeping. Spiritual training was the single unifying element which transcended and was superior to all other aspects of military training -- it was the key to victory in combat. Absolute obedience - complete military discipline - was also the "life blood of the army" and the means to develop the acquired characteristics of sacrificing (the soldier's) life for the country.¹⁸

Both the civilian shuushin courses and the military spiritual training emphasized common ideas - uniqueness of the Imperial Institution, the divinity of the Emperor and the obligation of absolute obedience to him, the importance of service to the state, the cosmopolitan nature of Japan's mission, the vital importance of national defense, and the "offering of one's life to the state should emergency arise", wrapped in the ancient Confucian values of loyalty, propriety, faithfulness, righteousness and simplicity.

The specific relationship between these two educational devices - shuushin courses and spiritual training in military service - was made explicit in an Army publication:

"Military instruction directly controls the tendencies of civilian morality and exerts a very great influence on the civilian spirit. The spiritual nature acquired in the Army becomes a model for the civilian spirit. This is

because it achieves elevation of the national prosperity and paves the way for firmness of character. We believe that any person in charge of training cultivates good soldiers, also he makes good citizens and must realize that he is making model, representative citizens."¹⁹

The Imperial Forces claimed to set the style - and to serve as the model for - the Japanese value system. At least in war-time, the Nippon Times supported this view in language which might epitomize the role of the Imperial Forces in pre-1945 Japan:

"The Japanese Army and Navy represent the whole of the nation in a way that other armies and navies cannot...the Army of Japan comprises the essence of the manhood of the nation...In Japan universal (military) service is in fact the modern extension of the privileges and honors of the ancient highborn samurai. The Army is the nation in arms and the nation is a nation of knightly warriors."²⁰

Post-World War II Education

With Japan's defeat in World War II the Allied occupying forces moved rapidly and effectively to restructure important segments of Japanese society. The six million-man armed forces were demobilized and nation-wide demilitarization was generally complete. Education was decentralized, school curricula changed and textbooks destroyed or rewritten. All shuushin instruction was done away with. The purge program of SCAP removed hundreds of thousands of persons from further participation in military or educational pursuits. General MacArthur commented that Japan understood fully as any nation that war does not pay and that Japan's "spiritual revolution has probably been the greatest that the world has ever known..."²¹

Prewar instruction - especially in the late 1930s - emphasized joy of having been born a Japanese, the awareness that the land of Japan and its history had "nurtured a people with a superior national character" rooted in the divine origins of their country. After the

war such curricula content was seen not only to have been a defect in the shuushin classes, but to have been a "reflection of a fatal defect in the entire Japanese social structure and its accompanying irrational ideology which in turn determined the psychological and intellectual behavior of the Japanese people".²²

The Basic Education Law of 1948 set the official tone for postwar education. Article I reads:

"Art. I. (The Objectives of Education). Education aims at the perfection of character; as a builder of a peaceful state and society, it loves truth and justice, respects the value of each individual, it values highly labor and responsibility, it anticipates the nurturing of a healthy people full of the spirit of individuality. In such a manner it must be carried out."²³

Art. X prohibits any school from engaging in religious instruction and other provisions direct that "education shall not be subject to improper control". The latter is considered to include not only interference from state and local governments, but also from individuals and social organization, political parties and labor unions, which have a capability to influence the educational system.²⁴

The postwar Education Law negated the views expressed in the Imperial Rescript on Education - the previous basis for "state control of the people's thought, conscience and ethics as well as their value system." The Basic Education Law has been described as the complete replacement of the old system by a new system which will insure that education remains democratic.²⁵

The emphasis legally placed on individual development and autonomy in education has not satisfied all Japanese. The search for a sound and practical value system is hardly at an end. At least a partial

return to traditional values was to be expected, and has occurred. As long as twenty years ago, even before Japan regained its sovereignty after WW II, the Yomiuri newspaper carried a story about "The Essentials of Practical Ethics for the People" (Kokumin Jissen Yooryoo) the preface of which spoke of "awakening the Japanese people to the spirit of a free independent people". Criticized as the second appearance of the Imperial Rescript on Education, the Minister of Education denied this - saying it "could never happen, it was just right." The document spoke of the Emperor as the "moral center" of Japan and referred to loving relations between husband and wife, enjoining people to be filial to their parents and good to brothers and sisters. The individual was to have respect for others and to develop the qualities of freedom, justice, responsibility, thoughtfulness, love, purity, patience and wisdom. Strongly reminiscent of Confucian teachings (for the most part) and apparently unobjectional, the document was still attacked by some.²⁶

Something akin to ethics teaching was put back in the public school curricula in 1958 to assist in character-building and to counter the felt "spiritual vacuum". Feeling that Japan's youth lack moral purpose, civic responsibility and national pride, a modest amount of such training (one-hour weekly) has been reintroduced, albeit hesitantly, at all levels of the elementary and junior high school system. Patriotism is dealt with carefully: children are taught to "love the nation with pride as Japanese and to contribute to the development of the nation as a link in international society."²⁷

The Japan Ministry of Education is now studying a Ten Year Plan (four years in the drafting) which will undertake the first significant

reform in the education system since the Occupation. In addition to changing from the American 6-3-3 pattern for secondary education to a "more Japanese" 4-4-6 pattern, the plan calls for such things as better teacher training, higher salaries, and three year programs for many baccalaureate degrees. Major opposition stems mainly, however, from proposed increased state aid to private institutions. This aspect is seen as possibly leading to rigid centralized state control and a revival of "intense pressure for national unity which marked the prewar militarist government."²⁸

Post-World War II Military

Demilitarization of Japan was even more thoroughgoing than the reform in education. Six million servicemen were demobilized. International Military Tribunals laid the blame for aggression on dozens of top-rank military and civilian leaders, thousands of others were purged, and millions of weapons were dumped in the waters around Japan. The 1947 Constitution provided not only that "war as a policy of government, the threat of armed force, or the use of armed force as a means of settling international disputes is forever renounced," but also prohibited the "maintenance of ground, sea or air forces or any other war potential."

Nevertheless, two weeks after North Korea's invasion of the Republic of Korea in 1950, SCAP directed the establishment of a 75,000 man National Rural Police force to provide for Japan's internal security - to fill the gap left by dispatch of US troops in Japan to Korea. A sea arm was added in 1952 and Japan now had a National Safety Force and a Coastal Safety Force. In 1954 an air arm was provided for and legislation established the Japan Defense Agency. The three services

became known as the Self-Defense Forces (SDF).

The apparently ambiguous Constitutional status of the SDF is dealt with by referral to Art. 51 of the UN Charter which authorizes collective or individual self-defense and reads "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." This reference is reinforced by the so-called Sunakawa Judgment of Japan's Supreme Court (December 16, 1959) which states the following concerning the intent of the Japanese Constitution:

"It does not in any way deny the inherent right of self-defense which our country possesses as a sovereign state; the pacificism of Japan's Constitution by no means implies no defense and no resistance..... That our country can take measures for self-defense necessary to maintain its peace and security and to insure its survival must be said to be a matter of course, as the exercise of the functions inherent to a state."²⁹

Fundamental Guidelines for National Defense were adopted by the Japanese Government in 1957. They limit military operations to those for prevention or repelling of indirect or direct aggression, an example of national self-denial practiced by few other states. This policy is supported by cooperation with the UN, the promotion of national welfare, and reliance on security arrangements with the United States. To guarantee the accomplishment of these objectives, "the greatest importance must be attached to civilian control or the precedence of politics over military affairs."³⁰

In both theory and fact, the SDF are subordinate to civilian authority. The "Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, has supreme command authority over the Self-Defense Forces"; the Director-General

of the Defense Agency is a civilian minister, and the National Defense Council is composed only of civilians. Even within the Defense Agency, the vital posts are held by civilians. In both administrative and operational matters, the Prime Minister and his subordinates in the SDF are responsible to the Diet.³¹ In vital aspects the current organization differs at national level from that of the prewar military services.

The SDF differs in significant ways from the military forces of other states. Its Constitutional status is not entirely clear. Its mission is limited because it has no mission for out-of-country offensive operations. It does not participate in UN military missions. Its personnel are civil servants and have no separate military status; and of course, are not subject to any military law, for such does not exist. Unlike many other major - and minor powers, too - it has no conscription system, depending on volunteers to staff its ranks.

Although Japan ranks as the third largest national economic unit in the world, its allocation of personnel and financial resources to self-defense contrasts strikingly with US and USSR allocations. The latter allocate about 10 times as much of their GNP and about 8 times as many persons proportionately as does Japan. (See Table 1 for other comparisons). Where Japan allocates 5 times as much to public education as it does to military expenses, the US and USSR devote less than one-half as much (See Table 2 for other comparisons). Such comparisons on the face of it seem unfair, or perhaps meaningless because the international responsibilities and treaty involvements of the US and the USSR are so complex and wide-ranging. It does suggest, however, that Japan has held for nearly two decades to its stated policy of

Table 1. Military Expenditures (1968)
(Current dollars)

Country	Mil. Exp. (\$1,000,000)	GNP (\$1,000,000)	Population (Millions)	Armed Forces (1,000)	Forces (per 1,000 population)	Mil.Exp. Per Man
Japan	\$1,146	\$141,920	101.1	250	2	\$4,584
CPR	7,500	90,000	806.0	3,100	4	2,419
India	1,603	43,000	527.1	1,333	2	1,415
N. Korea	629	3,500	13.4	410	31	1,534
Korea, Rep. of	235	5,730	30.5	620	20	379
China, Rep. of	425	4,200	14.1	528	38	805
US	80,596	865,700	201.2	3,500	17	23,027
USSR	55,000	413,000	238.0	3,470	15	15,850

Country	1964	Mil. Exp. as % of GNP 1968	% Change Mil.Exp. 1964-68	% Change in GNP 1964-68
Japan	1.2%	.8%	+37.1	+108.7
CPR	7.9	8.3	+36.4	+ 28.6
India	4.4	3.7	-11.0	- 4.7
N. Korea	12.0	18.0	+109.7	+ 40.0
Korea, Rep. of	4.5	4.1	+ 91.1	+108.7
China, Rep. of	9.5	10.1	+ 95.0	+ 83.4
US	8.1	9.3	+ 57.0	+ 36.0
USSR	(8-10)	(8-10)	+ 22.0	+ 40.5

Source: Extracted from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures 1970, Washington, D.C. 1971.

Table 2. Per Capita Military Expenditures
and Related Data: 1968

<u>Country</u>	<u>Mil.Exp.</u>	<u>GNP</u>	<u>Pub.Educ.</u>	<u>Pub.Health</u>	<u>For.Econ. aid given</u>	<u>% of GNP for mil.Exp.</u>
Japan	\$11	\$1,404	\$59	\$3	\$8	
CPR	9	112	5	-	-	
India	3	82	2	1	-	
N. Korea	47	261	7	1	-	
Korea, Rep. of	8	188	4	-	-	
China, Rep. of	30	298	7	1	-	
US	401	4,304	231	106	20	
USSR	231	1,735	139	58	1	

Source: Extracted from US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures, 1970, Washington, D.C. 1971.

basing its defenses, in part, on promotion of the national welfare. It accords with the Defense White Paper assertion that "Japan will become a big power in terms of economy, but never will it be so in terms of military strength." This policy is seen as an attempt "to break all precedents in history and to give history an unheard-of challenge by aiming at a new utopia where top priority will be given to social welfare and world peace."³²

Self-Defense Force Education and Training

The three arms of the SDF maintain training institutions not unlike those in the United States - an Air Training Command for the Air SDF, a Fleet Training Command for the Maritime SDF and the ground forces have a number of schools for specialist officer and enlisted training - Ordnance, Infantry, Quartermaster, and so forth.

Two important installations - the National Defense College and the Defense Academy - are under the direct control of the Japan Defense Agency.

The National Defense College has the mission of education and training for senior SDF officers and other government officials. It strives for a comprehensive understanding of military problems from the viewpoints of domestic and world politics, foreign affairs, science, economics and ideology.

The Japan Defense Academy graduated its first class in 1957 and has produced about 15% of the SDF officers on active duty. The four year course is attended by candidates for commissioning in all of the services. The commission is conferred, as in the Imperial Forces, after one year of probationary service following graduation.

The Defense Academy curriculum was revised in 1965. The total

course consists of 176 semester hours of academic study and 72 semester hours of military studies. The academic division of time compared to the US Military Academy is:

	<u>Japan Defense Academy</u>	<u>US Military Academy</u>
Math, Science and Engr.	67%	45%
Soc. Sci. and Humanities	25%	39%
Electives	8%	16%
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

One-half of the elective study is oriented to studies preparatory to commissioning in a given service. Thus only 4% of the curriculum is "free electives".

The 25% of their academic work devoted to social sciences and humanities covers the following subjects:

<u>Subject</u>	<u>No. of Semester Hours</u>
Psychology	2
Political Science	2
Descriptive Geography	2
Philosophy	4
History	4
Japanese Lang/Lit.	4
Economics	4
Law	6
Foreign Language	16 (Chinese, English, French, German or Russian)

Undergraduate training for the SDF officer is directed mainly toward the development of competent engineers in a variety of fields.

The major problem faced by the SDF leadership is how effectively to develop forces capable of deterring external aggression and successfully defeating such aggression if it occurs. Technological superiority and abundance of material is not necessarily decisive in combat. Esprit in itself is no guarantee of success. To an outsider - and to many SDF officers - esprit is what seems to be lacking. It is most difficult to develop, at least in any traditional sense, for here the SDF leaders are faced with restraints - perhaps welcome restraints - in comparison to other armed forces.

The serviceman's outlook in the SDF is first of all conditioned by his oath of office:

"Realizing the mission of the SDF to maintain the peace and independence of our country, I swear that I shall respect the laws, maintain the solemn regulations with one mind, always cultivate virtue, respect individual dignity, train my mind and body, improve my abilities, not participate in political activity, fulfill my duties with a strong sense of responsibility, think not of danger when faced with difficulty, endeavor to do my duty and thereby respond to the trust of the people."33

The meaning of the Oath of Service was soon expanded by the leadership which felt that the "problem of basic spirit for guidance of the SDF has become a delicate matter." The general tone differed significantly from pre-war instructions. For instance, "realization of the mission" was explained by noting that preservation of the fatherland and aspirations for peace are feelings common in all countries. Therefore, what was needed was for SDF personnel to realize first of all that they are Japanese - and should "burn with a mature patriotism, to bear any difficulty". This patriotism must be rooted in the feelings of the Japanese people. Another instance - "cultivation of virtue and respect for the individual" - requires the

SDF member "as a member of society to first cultivate good sense". He must regard his military unit as a place to build character for the self-defense force of the people and thereby be of value to the people.³⁴

In 1961 a particular effort was made to provide "moral" or "spiritual guidance" for the SDF in the publication of the "Ethical Principles for S.D.F. Personnel" (See Enclosure 3).

In the fuller discussion of the "Ethical Principles" the awareness of mission is said to lie in the "individual conscience" - how different from thirty years ago. Yet, the anonymous authors of this document seem to have striven vainly for inspiring words and thoughts.

Here and there in the explanation, one can catch the old vocabulary. The "cultivation of dependability" is seen as respecting one's words and action, of honoring promises, "of having good manners, of being frugal, or being sincere and loyal". At least token reference to 3 of 5 points in Emperor Meiji's Rescript. I would not judge the success of attempts to develop a concept of "nationalism" acceptable to the Japanese people as a whole, but the "Ethical Principles" does try. "To protect Japan is our natural duty; unless we hand over this land to the next generation with the addition of the fruits of our labor, it cannot be said that we have fulfilled our duties".

...."Our people have succeeded in maintaining the unity of the race and the State, despite countless numbers of calamities that befell them"... "Such a unity of the race and the State has not been enjoyed always by every people."...."History shows that invasion and destruction will visit suddenly at an unexpected time and in a form little thought of, turning in an instant the peace of today into a

pandemonium of confusion tomorrow"...therefore, anyone who loves his country and has the future of his race at heart, knows how important it is to make careful preparations in time of peace against emergencies which may befall the nation at any time."

How one judges the significance of the things I have mentioned so far is a matter of individual experience, and perhaps derives from one's expectations from the Japanese. It is no secret that the Peking Review, among others, sees Japan in league with the US military-industrial complex, plotting vainly to recover Taiwan, to introduce Self-Defense Force troops into the Republic of Korea and initiate a new war of aggression. As the Peking Review sums up Japan's future - "An 'economic power' is bound to become a 'military power' and economic expansion definitely leads to military expansion. This is an inexorable law of the development of Japanese militarism."³⁵ Less jaundiced and ideologically-blinded sources are also concerned about what course Japan will take in military affairs.

Certainly institutional limitations are in effect. In addition to the "no-war" article of the Constitution, that document also limits ministerial office to civilians (Art 66), insures the Diet as the highest organ of State (Art 41), makes the Cabinet responsible to the Diet in the exercise of executive authority (Art 66) and places ultimate control of the budget in the House of Representatives (Art 85).

To date the SDF seems to have stayed well out of politics (as the Oath requires) and not to have ambitions in that direction. The SDF seems occupied with training and development. Their budget requests remain small by nearly any standard. Factionalism in the SDF is not public, if, in fact, it exists at all. It remains a small all-volunteer

force probably incapable of exerting any general effect on Japanese thinking through internal socialization processes which might be considered objectionable given the stated military policies of the Government.

The Future

The Defense of Japan, or the "Defense White Paper" published a year ago is the most comprehensive public statement on that subject. In his introduction, then Defense Agency Director-General Nakasone states that the "Defense of Japan" is no longer merely the defense of Japan, but is connected with the "Defense of Mankind" whereby Japan shares responsibility for the "fate of the world". Several promises were made by Mr. Nakasone - Japan will have no offensive weapons to threaten other countries; the SDF will not be sent overseas; no conscription system will be adopted; Japan will not manufacture, possess, or permit nuclear weapons on Japanese soil; and Japan will never become a great power in a military sense. He affirmed that the key to Japan's "defense policy for peace" lies in the success or failure of civilian control.³⁶

The ability to continue these present policies into the future is seen by the White Paper to depend on development of a spirit to defend the nation, patriotism, and a national consensus. The independence of Japan is too precious to be compromised for anything else. Aggression must be resisted regardless of the sacrifice. One must realize that Japan is "where our ancestors lived" and where "our descendants will also live"; that the people of Japan are of one race; and that "there are no other countries in the world which have such characteristics as one race, one state, one language and a

population of one hundred million."³⁷

Patriotism - the love of country - is, 't states, the most natural sentiment of a human being who desires prosperity for his country. True patriotism doesn't mean simply words - "It must be the willingness to give one's life for the defense of the nation in a time of crisis."³⁸ Without such a "spiritual foundation in the people a nation's defense cannot be provided for."³⁹

Taking note of Japan's dependence on joint defense with the United States, the White Paper suggests too much reliance on others involves the danger of implanting a sense of irresponsibility toward national defense on the part of the people - the possibility of "degenerating the national spirit". The aim must be to develop the capacity to defend Japan by an autonomous system of defense - one which will enable mutual cooperation, but which still rests on a national consensus.⁴⁰

The matter of "SDF personnel as citizens" is given two pages in the White Paper. Referring to the "Ethical Principles for SDF Personnel", emphasis is given to the formation of a sound national spirit based on love of country, but the major requirement is that SDF personnel be first and foremost good citizens of a democratic society. SDF personnel must be conscious of their role as component members of a democratic society and realize that "they and the society are one inseparable entity."⁴¹

Conclusions.

The dominant values of Japanese society, the mission and capabilities of the military forces and the relationships between the armed forces and society today bear little surface resemblance to prewar Japan.

The goals of the SDF are abundantly clear insofar as they require first and foremost the development of SDF servicemen and women as good citizens of Japanese society. It is hardly conceivable that the SDF would do otherwise. The Japanese government foresees a period of unprecedented international influence for Japan in the future - influence derived from economic power and specifically not from military power. Whether this can be accomplished remains to be seen. In any event, the capacity of the SDF to influence any alternative choice seems minimal. Public opinion, relative security and the absence of perceived threats to Japan have influenced greatly the socialization role of the SDF to date - and will do so in the future. On balance it seems to me that the SDF will continue its past policies seeking the public approval which it so badly needs and trying its best to live up to the dominant values of Japanese society today.

Enclosure 1.

The Imperial Rescript on Education

Know ye, Our subjects: Our Imperial ancestors have founded Our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting and have deeply implanted virtue. Our subjects ever united in loyalty and filial piety have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire; and herein also lies the source of our education. Ye, Our subjects, be filial to your parents; affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives be harmonious; as friends true; bear yourself in modesty and moderation; pursue learning and cultivate the arts and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral power; furthermore advance public good and promote the common interest; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourself courageously to the State; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of Our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth, so that Ye not only be Our good and faithful subjects, but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers.

The Way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by Our Imperial Ancestors to be observed alike by Their Descendants and subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is Our wish to lay it to heart in all reverence in common with you, Our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue.

20th day of the 10th month of the 23d year of Meiji.

Enclosure 2.

Imperial Precepts to the Soldiers and Sailors
(Gunjin Chokuyu - Jan. 4, 1882)

The forces of Our Empire are in all ages under the command of the Emperor.
* * * * *

The supreme command of Our forces is in Our hands, and although we may entrust subordinates commands to Our subjects, yet the ultimate authority We Ourselves shall hold and never delegate to any subject. It is Our will that this principle be carefully handed down to posterity and that the Emperor always retain the supreme civil and military power, so that the disgrace of the middle and succeeding ages may never be repeated.

Precepts

1. The soldier and sailor should consider loyalty their essential duty.

Neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics, but with a single heart fulfill your essential duty of loyalty and bear in mind that duty is weightier than a mountain while death is lighter than a feather.

2. The soldier and sailor should be strict in observing propriety.

Except when official duty requires them to be strict and severe, superiors should treat their inferiors with consideration, making kindness their chief aim, so that all grades may unite in their service to the Emperor.

3. The soldier and sailor should esteem valour.

There is true valour and false. Never to despise an inferior enemy or to fear a superior, but to do one's duty as soldier or sailor -- this is true valour.

4. The soldier and sailor should highly value faithfulness and righteousness.

Faithfulness implies the keeping of one's word, and righteousness the fulfilment of one's duty.

5. The soldier and sailor should make simplicity their aim.

If you do not make simplicity your aim, you will become effeminate and frivolous and acquire fondness for luxurious and extravagant ways; you will finally grow selfish and sordid and sink to the last degree of baseness, so that neither loyalty nor valour will avail to save you from the contempt of the world.

These 5 articles should not be disregarded even for a moment by soldiers and sailors. Now for putting them into practice, the all-important thing is sincerity. These 5 articles are the soul of Our soldiers and sailors and sincerity is the soul of these articles. If the heart be not sincere, words and deeds, however good, are all mere outward show and can avail nothing. If only the heart be sincere, anything can be accomplished. Moreover, these 5 articles are the "Grand Way" of Heaven and Earth and the universal law of humanity, easy to observe and to practice.

Encl 3

Ethical Principles for SDF Personnel - June 1961

I. Awareness of Mission

(1) We will protect from external aggression the soil and people of the country of Japan, which we have inherited from our forefathers and which we will bequeath to the next generation after enriching it in substance and bringing about its further development.

(2) We will protect the peace and order of our national life, which is established on the basis of freedom and responsibility.

II. Self-Improvement

(1) We will endeavor to mold ourselves into a positive and unprejudiced personality, the mark of a respectable member of society, and to cultivate the capacity for correct judgment.

(2) We will develop ourselves into well balanced individuals with respect to such essential elements as intelligence, initiative, trustworthiness and physical strength.

III. Fulfillment of Responsibility

(1) We will courageously and perseveringly perform our duties even at the risk of our lives, as dictated by our sense of responsibility.

(2) We will be bound by love with our comrades, and making public service our basic spirit, we will stand steadfastly at our posts.

IV. Strict Observance of Discipline

(1) We will consider discipline as the life of the unit, and we will be faithful and strict in abiding by the law and in obeying orders.

(2) We will ensure that the orders we give are appropriate, while at the same time cultivating the habit of conscious and positive obedience.

V. Strengthening of Solidarity

(1) Under superior leadership and warm solidarity, we will develop confidence in our ability as a group to endure trials and tribulations.

(2) In unison with one another, we, the land, sea and air forces, will perform our duties efficiently and will successfully fulfill the mission entrusted us by doing our utmost to ensure the existence of our fatherland and people.

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