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ABSTRACT

This address starts by explaining the educational philosphy of John Dewey. In this context, the central aims of education are cognitive and moral development. In a pluralistic society, the teaching of morals poses a grave problem and gives rise to a belief in moral and ethical relativity. This address proceeds to show what is wrong with ethical relativity conceptions and to show that the developmental-philosophic strategy is the only clear non-relativistic strategy for educational aims. The school's major conscious aim is seen as academic achievement as defined by tests and grades. According to Dewey, an educational experience which stimulates development is one which arouses interest, enjoyment and challenge in the immediate experience of the student. From the progressive or cognitive-developmental perspective, insofar as behavior changes are of reversible character, they cannot define genuine educational objectives. Central to the progressive approach is the longitudinal perspective, the perspective that the worth of an educational effect is to be determined by its effects upon later behavior and development. (CK)

THE CONTRIBUTION OF DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY TO EDUCATION -- EXAMPLES FROM MORAL EDUCATION

Invited Address--Division of Educational Psychology--
American Psychological Association, Washington,
September 7, 1971

Lawrence Kohlberg

Speeches have to start with a joke or a reading from the Bible. Since I don't know any good moral jokes I'll start with a reading from the Bible, the Bible of education. Sometimes my moral education sermons start with a reading from the Old Testament of Education, Plato's Republic, but today I'll start with a reading from the New Testament of Education, delivered to John Dewey in 1895.

It starts: "The educative process can be identified with growth or development not only physically but intellectually and morally." It goes on:

> . . .we may say that every teacher requires a sound knowledge of ethical and psycholcgical principles. Only psychology and ethics can take education out of the rule-of-thumb stage and elevate the school to a vitel, effective institution in the greatest of all constructions -- the building of a free and powerful character. Only knowledge of the order and connection of the stages in the development of the psychical functions can insure the full maturing of the psychical powers. Education is the work of supplying the conditions which will enable the psychical functions, as they successively arise, to mature and pass into higher functions in the freest and fullest manner.

Let me paraphrase this text -- First, true education is not teaching; it is supplying the conditions for development. Second,

development is not just the catch-all phrase of child psychology textbooks, development is defined by a psychology of invariant ordered sequential stages. Third, development is defined not solely by psychology, but by philosophic ethics and epistemology. Fourth, as a result, the central aims of education are cognitive and moral development, with moral development a free and powerful character being the ultimate touchstone of education. Fifth, moral character is not conformity to, or internalization of cultural norms; moral development is freedom, not bondage.

Today I want to suggest how we are trying to put Dewey's abstruse preachment into very concrete practice. In doing this I shall present a view of what developmental psychology potentially can contribute to education. In my view, this potential contribution is revolutionary -- it goes far beyond the presentation of a bundle of facts about child behavior useful for teachers to know. Once understood, the basic findings of recent developmental psychology are revolutionary because they redefine the school's aims and its methods for meeting these aims.

While I am claiming that recent work in developmental psychology can revolutionize the schools, the revolution is really Dewey's old revolution which never really took place in the thirties.

While I may be presumptuous to speak as an elder about educational history, I like to think I got a head start in educational history by being a student in the late forties at the University of Chicago, the place where all the educational revolutions started or almost started.

I became intensely interested in educational ideology as an undergraduate at the University of Chicago in the late forties, partly because I needed to be educated and partly because of Hutchins. At that time, in Chicago, the issue was the Hutchins worship of the eternal Platonic ideas of Western man versus Dewey's pragmatism. While all Chicago undergraduates learned that the truth lay with Plato and Aristotle, we were all forced to read Dewey carefully. And while we all believed that education should really be the transmission of the great ideas of Western man, not pragmatic, we all could see that Dewey's ideas about education were great. If your measure of ideas about education is the standard set by Plato and Aristotle, then you know that there was only one modern thinker about education worth taking seriously and that was John Dewey.

As I became a graduate student, I shifted my interest from education to clinical and child psychology, in those days dominated by Freudian thought. Somehow, however, I stumbled across Piaget, who in those days was not part of the psychology curriculum. When I started reading Piaget, I said, "Of course," because I had already learned to understand Dewey. I later found out that there were two great American developmental psychologists, both primarily philosophers, John Dewey and James Mark Baldwin. While American psychology had ignored both men, a man named Claparede in Switzerland was heavily influenced by both of them. Claparede at Geneva founded an institute of developmental psychology and pedagogy, based upon what Dewey and Baldwin called the functional-genetic approach. Claparede had a brilliant student,

Piaget, to whom he turned over this institute. And Piaget developed the general promises of Dewey and Baldwin into a science of great richness and of logical and empirical rigor.

One of the areas in which Piaget had developed the basic insights of Dewey and Baldwin was the area of moral development. This area of Piaget's work attracted me greatly. As a clinical psychologist, I could see the importance of the area, but the way in which clinical psychologists handled it seemed grossly inadequate. To label moral development "the superego formation" seemed intellectually and philosophically naive. Those same clinical psychologists who discussed with great earnestness the ethical limits of directive therapy, would turn around and label similar ethical concerns in their patients a "rigid superego." In any case, starting with Piaget's exploratory work, I began a fifteen-year study of moral development, and of some of its roots in Piagetian cognitive development. Starting with an interest in moral stage psychology and philosophic ethics, over 20 years I have moved down the primrose path to what I think is the end of the line in taking Dewey seriously. We are now planning what we hope will be "a vital and effective institution in the greatness of all constructions, the building of a free and powerful character." It happens not to be a school but a reformatory which we see as an institution for moral education. Partly we've gone to prison because all the school systems we have approached are afraid to take Dewey's ideas seriously. Prisons are more willing to listen to ideas because they know they are failures; they know they are not serving their function of reducing crime while

schools still think they are educating. Prisons know they are failures because they have more realistic notions of success and failure than do schools. They consider their Reformatory dropouts successes. Their failures go on to higher learning at what the inmates call the college, the state prison. In contrast, high schools and colleges count their dropouts as failures; their successes get Ph.D.s.

I'll talk a little later about how realistic the school's criteria of success is. But I want to spend only as much time in negative criticism of the schools as is necessary to convince you that we need radically different definitions of educational aims, of concepts of what schools are for, than those now used, and that research educational psychology must create these definitions. The strategy educational psychology must use to do this, I will claim, must be Dewey's developmental-philosophic strategy for defining the aims of education. This label, developmental-philosophic, is meant to connote the union of the study of universal stages of development with philosophic definition of development in terms of universal ethical and epistemological principles. To justify this strategy, I will have to save you today from the common sin or error of most psychologists, the error of believing in value-relativity. As an example of this error let me cite Berkowitz's textbook definition of morality. "Moral values are evaluations of action believed by members of a given society to be right." In the early 1900's, psychoanalysis and other popular psychologies challenged Victorian moralism by claiming that conscience was the internalization of arbitrary standards, the superego, and that men had no wills, only

needs and counter-needs. As I shall document today, these popular psychology beliefs are now taken for granted by sophisticated high school students who then complain of a malaise called identity-diffusion, lack of will, or lack of commitment to values. Luckily, psychology is the disease of which it is the cure. Today I shall report the psychological cure of the psychological disease, the psychological finding of moral universals, and conclude that the disease was never based on science; it was only one more piece of bad philosophizing by psychologists. In showing what is wrong with ethical relativity conceptions, I shall also try to show that the developmental-philosophic strategy is the only clear non-relativistic strategy for educational aims. Finally, I shall try to show that relativity is the fatal logical flaw in what I call the human engineering or industrial psychology approach to defining educational criteria which has dominated most educational psychology practice.

In talking about human engineering or industrial psychology approaches to educational psychology, I mean fundamentally a focus upon the research study of means and methods of educational teaching and testing under the assumption that the aims of education are given by one's client, the school system. In the early 1900's, educational psychology had two choices, the path of Dewey's developmental-philosophic approach or the path of Thorndike's industrial psychology or human engineering approach. Partly because educational psychology chose Thorndike's industrial psychology path, Dewey's proposed transformation of the schools into just institutions stimulating development never

really took place. Educational psychology's contribution to the justice of the school at that time was the standardized achievement test marked on a curve. The particular relativistic fallacy involved in this is indicated by Ed Zigler's comment that the vision of justice of Head Start and other compensatory projects is the vision of getting the entire country above the 50th percentile on achievement tests. Incidentally, with all credit to Ed Zigler, Dewey made the same comment in a 1922 article in The Nation.

As we all know, the schools' major conscious aim is academic achievement as defined by tests and grades. Educational psychology's improvement of the aim was the creation of the achievement test, based on an industrial psychology rationale of marking on an arbitrary curve to predict to an arbitrary criterion. Luckily industrial psychology eventually provides the data to cure itself. After reviewing the major predictive or longitudinal studies, Mayer and myself concluded: "School achievement seems to relate to later success because it is associated with, or rides on the back of, intelligence and social class without independently contributing to life adjustment, as measured by occupational or economic success or by absence of crime, mental illness, unemployment or ratings of life adjustment." "Advocates of academic readiness have confused success in school with success in life." "In terms of future job success, high school dropouts do as well as graduates who do not attend college; high school graduates with poor achievement scores and grades do as well as those with good scores; and college graduates with poor grades do as well as those with good grades."

So thoroughly ingrained is the human engineering or industrial psychology approach in educational psychology that the failure of the schools is perceived as a failure in its methods, not its aims. The most cited document on the failure of the schools is the Coleman report. Its basic conclusion is that the schools have failed to develop methods to raise achievement test scores for the disadvantaged; it never questioned the worth of achievement scores as criteria of education's aims in the first place.

If one's educational aims are correct, the methods will follow. I probably do not need to stress to this audience the primary finding of American educational psychology, the finding that educational methods don't vary much in across-the-board efficiency. Study after study of method A versus method B indicates no difference or little difference. The reaction of educational psychology to these findings has been to look for more complex interaction between methods and teacher or pupil characteristics, so far a hunt that has not led us far. My reaction would be that educational psychology would contribute more to society by investing more effort in defining sensible aims than in honing methods for questionable aims.

Besides the industrial psychology approach, another basic strategy used by educational psychology to define educational aims, especially non-cognitive ones, is the mental health trait strategy. Based on the pose of ethical relativity, it replaces moral terms with personality traits with supposed mental-health value. Its empirical effectiveness is summarized in the Kohlberg and Mayer paper as follows:

> The current emphasis on mental health traits -- exemplified by Head Start objectives for instance -- can't be substantiated on the basis of existing longitudinal research. Admirable as these traits may appear to be, they have failed to show any predictive value for adult 'life adjustment.' At the moment there is no evidence that a psychiatrist or psychologist can pick out preschool or elementary children who will have adult mental health or adjustment problems (aside from the few severely retarded, brain damaged or autistic children). Most studies show that three-quarters of the children diagnosed as needing treatment and receiving it get better, but so do three-quarters of the control children diagnosed as needing treatment but not receiving it. . .

The Kohlberg and Mayer paper primarily stresses the empirical fact that the only good long-range predictors of adaptive features of personality and cognition are measures defined in terms of trends and sequences of age development. Since neither achievement measures nor mental health measures are developmental, neither are predictive over time or to really new settings. Today I wish to stress the philosophic failure of the value-relativity assumptions behind achievement and mental health trait conceptions of educational aims. To clarify the issues of relativity in the non-cognitive area, let us start by recognizing that the basic non-cognitive aims of the school are in one sense or another moral education aims.

While moral education has a forbidding sound, all teachers constantly do it. They tell kids what to do, make evaluations of children's behavior, and direct children's relations in the classrooms. Sometimes teachers do these things without being aware that they are engaging in moral education; but the kids are aware of it. As an example, my

second grade son told me that he did not want to be one of the bad boys. Asked "which bad boys?" he replied, "the ones who don't put books back where they belong and get yelled at." His teacher would have been surprised to know that her concerns with classroom management defined for her children what she and her school thought were basic moral values, or that she was engaged in value-indoctrination.

Most teachers are more aware that they are teaching values, like it or not, and are more concerned as to whether this teaching is unjustified indoctrination. In particular, they are uncertain as to whether their own moral opinions should be presented as "moral truths," whether they should be expressed merely as personal opinion, or should be omitted from classroom discussion entirely. As an example, an experienced junior high school teacher told us, "My class deals with morality and right and wrong quite a bit. I don't expect all of them to agree with me, each has to satisfy himself according to his own convictions, as long as he is sincere and thinks he is pursuing what is right. I often discuss cheating this way but I always get defeated, because they still argue cheating is all right. After you accept the idea that a kid has the right to build a position with logical arguments, you have to accept what they come out with, even though you drive at it ten times a year and they still come out with the same conclusion." This teacher's confusion is apparent. She believes everyone should "have their own ideas" and yet she is most unhappy if this leads to a point where some of these ideas include the notion, "It's all right to cheat." In other words, she is smack up against the problem of relativity of values in moral education.

Now this morning I'm going to solve this teacher's problem for you. We will attempt to demonstrate that moral education can be free from the charge of cultural relativity and arbitrary indoctrination which inhibits this teacher when she talks about cheating.

Before I solve it for you, I want to reject a few copouts or false solutions sometimes suggested as solving the relativity problem. One is to call moral education socialization. Writers like Phil Jackson and Bob Dreeben have claimed that moralization in the interests of classroom management and maintenance of the school as a social system is a hidden curriculum, that it performs hidden services in helping children adapt to society (Jackson, 1970). They have argued that since praise and blame on the part of teachers is a necessary aspect of the "socialization" process, then the teacher does not have to consider the psychological and philosophical issues of moral education. In learning to conform to the teacher's expectations and the school rules, the child is becoming "socialized"; he is internalizing the norms and standards of society. I have argued at length (Kohlberg, 1970) that this approach is a copout to relativity as clarifying educational aims. In practice it means that we call the teacher's yelling at kids for not putting their books away "socialization."

You will recognize that the problem raised is one which goes beyond moral education. It is the problem of the perspective of social relativity implied in the whole industrial psychology approach to the school. It says, "Since values are relative and arbitrary, we might as well take the given values of the society and school as our starting

point and adapt the child to them." Thus Bereiter and Engelmann (1966) say:

> In order to use the term cultural deprivation, it is necessary to assume some point of reference. . . The standards of the American public schools represents one such point of reference. . .There are standards of knowledge and ability which are consistently held to be valuable in the schools, and any child in the schools who falls short of these standards by reason of his particular cultural background may be said to be culturally deprived. (p. 24)

The Bereiter and Engelmann preschool model, then, takes as its standard of value "the standard of the American public schools." It recognizes that the kinds of learning prized by the American public schools may not be the most worthwhile kinds. But it accepts the arbitrariness because it assumes that "all values are relative," that there is no ultimate standard of worthwhile learning and development, so we should settle for getting the child to conform to and make it in the system.

The second major copout from the relativity problem is defining moral values in terms of what I called the bag of virtues. By a bag of virtues I mean a set of personality traits generally considered to be positive. For Hartshorne and May (1928) the traits included honesty, service and self-control. For Havighurst and Taba (1949), they included honesty, loyalty, responsibility, moral courage and friendliness. Aristotle's early bag of virtues included temperance, liberality, pride, good temper, truthfulness and justice. The Boy Scout list is well-known -- a scout should be honest, loyal, reverent, clean and brave.

The attraction of such an approach is evident. Although it is true that people often cannot agree on details of right and wrong or even on fundamental moral principles, we all think such "traits" as honesty and responsibility are good things. By adding enough traits to the virtue bag, we eventually get a list which contains something to suit everyone.

As can be seen from the different lists of virtues mentioned, one difficulty with this approach to moral character is that everyone has his own bag. However, the problem runs deeper than the composition of a given list of virtues and vices. Vague consensus on the goodness of these terms conceals a great deal of actual disagreement over their definitions. What is one man's "integrity" is another man's "stubbornness," what is one man's honesty in "expressing your true feelings" is another man's insensitivity to the feelings of others. This is evident in controversial fields of adult behavior. Student protesters, view their behavior as reflecting the virtues of altruism, idealism, awareness, courage. Those in opposition regard the same behavior as reflecting the vices of irresponsibility and disrespect for "law and order."

As I have documented elsewhere, all the king's horses and all the king's men of test methodology and factor analysis have done little to make the virtue words objective. You can't make up good tests of relativistic value concepts. Let me cite an example from the Stanford Research Institute study of the non-cognitive effects of Follow-Through. Falling into the bag of virtues strategy for avoiding facing hard issues of value-conflict and value-relativity, minority group educators listed

increasing ethnic pride as a salient objective of Follow-Through. To measure ethnic pride, SRI made up an ethnic pictures test. The Follow-Through child was asked to pick a black, chicano, or white pictured child as the one who was smartest, best liked, best looking or generally best. In other words, a black child scored high in ethnic pride if he thought blacks were always smartest, most likeable, etc.

The results SRI found were that the Follow-Through group who increased the most in ethnic pride were the white children. That finding suggests that the ethnic pride measure was just another measure of race prejudice. One man's integrity is another man's stubbornness; a black man's race pride is a white man's race prejudice. Undoubtedly, a test could have been made up which at least tried to distinguish between pride and prejudice, but if Jane Austen couldn't do it, why think SRI could?

As the Follow-Through example suggests, the use of the bag of virtues, and its failures, go far beyond what is usually considered moral education. A mental health rather than a moral bag of virtues is the approach to non-cognitive aims that comes most naturally to American educators. For instance, it is embodied in the Head Start list of objectives derived from "a panel of authorities on child development." The first is:

Helping the emotional and social development of the child by encouraging self confidence, spontaneity, curiosity and self discipline.

From the developmental perspective, to operationalize the aim of "helping the emotional and social development of the child" would

require that the general lines of the child's ego development be logically and empirically charted, and that the preschool changes which facilitate it be discovered. However, the authorities already know what it means to stimulate social or ego development: it means increasing a set of traits called self confidence, spontaneity, curiosity and self discipline. Now all these words sound nice, but one wonders whether promoting self discipline and promoting spontaneity are consistent with one another, or whether either has any favorable consequences for later development. As I said earlier, the longitudinal research suggests they don't.

We have summarized three copouts from the relativity problem and rejected them. We found that socialization, teaching positive values and developing a bag of virtues all left the teacher where she was, stuck with her own personal value standards and biases to be imposed on kids. There is one last copout to the relativity problem. That is to lie back and enjoy or encourage it. In the new social studies this is called value-clarification.

As summarized by Engel (1970) this position holds that:

> In the consideration of values, there is no single correct answer but value clarification is supremely important. This is not to suggest, however, that nothing is ever inculcated. As a matter of fact, in order to clarify values, at least one principle is: in the consideration of values there is no single correct answer.

An elaboration of this approach in one curriculum is entitled "Why don't we all make the same decisions?" A set of classroom materials and activities are then presented to demonstrate to children the following propositions:

A. We don't all make the same decisions because our values are different.

B. Our values tend to originate outside ourselves.
C. Our values are different because each of us has been influenced by different important others; each of us has been influenced by a different cultural environment.

The teacher is told to have the children discuss moral dilemmas in such a way as to reveal these different values. As an example, one child might make a moral decision in terms of avoiding punishment, another in terms of the welfare of other people. The children are then to be encouraged to discuss their values with each other and to recognize that everyone has different values. Whether or not "the welfare of others" is a more adequate value than "avoiding punishment" is not an issue to be raised by the teacher. Rather, the teacher is instructed to teach only that "our values are different."

Acceptance of the idea that all values are relative does, logically, lead to the conclusion that the teacher should not attempt to teach any particular moral values. This leaves the teacher in the quandary of our teacher who couldn't successfully argue against cheating. If one of his students has learned his relativity lesson, when he is caught cheating, he will argue that he did nothing wrong. His own hierarchy of values made it right to cheat.

In criticizing the approach I again need to point out that it goes beyond moral or value education as such. Much psychological and affective education, many sensitivity and encounter groups, are designed to clarify the self's true value and feelings and to create an atmosphere which says, "What's right is to do your own thing whatever it is, as long as it is really yourself."

Now I am not criticizing the value-clarification approaches as a procedure. My point is rather that value-clarification is not a sufficient solution to the relativity problem. Furthermore, the actual teaching of relativism is itself an indoctrination or teaching of a fixed belief, a belief which we are going to show is not true scientifically or philosophically (Kohlberg, 1971).

In other words, I'm happy to report that I can save you today from the relativity problem that has plagued philosophers for 3,000 years. I can say this with due modesty because it didn't depend on being smart. It only happened that my colleagues and I were the first people to do detailed cross-cultural studies of the development of moral thinking.

To clarify just what the issue is I will read you a dilemma we have used and would like you to decide whether it is objectively right or wrong to steal the drug:

> In Europe, a woman was near death from a very bad disease, a special kind of cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the money, but he could only get together about $1,000 which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that his wife is dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the drug and I'm going to make money from it." Heinz got desperate and broke into the man's store to steal the drug for his wife.

Should the husband have done that? Was it right or wrong? Is your decision that it is right (or wrong) objectively right, is it morally universal, or is it your personal opinion? If you think it is morally right to steal the drug, you must face the fact that it is legally wrong. What is the basis of your view that it is morally right, then, more than your personal opinion? Is it anything which can be agreed upon? If you think so, let me report the results of a National Opinion Research Survey on the question asked to a representative sample of adult Americans. Seventy-five percent said it was wrong to steal, though most said they might do it.

Can one take anything but a relativist position on the question? By a relativist position I mean a position like that of Bob, a high school senior. He says:

"There's a million ways to look at it. Heinz had a moral decision to make. Was it worse to steal or let his wife die? In my mind I can either condemn him or condone him. In this case I think it was fine. But possibly the druggist was working on a capitalist morality of supply and demand." (I went on to ask Bob, "Would it be wrong if he didn't steal it?")

Bob replies, "It depends on how he is oriented morally. If he thinks it's worse to steal than to let his wife die, then it would be wrong what he did. It's all relative, what I would do is steal the drug. I can't say that's right or wrong or that it's what everyone should do."

But if you agree with Bob's relativism, you may not want to go as far as he does. He started the interview by wondering if he could

answer because "he questioned the whole terminology, the whole moral bag." He goes on, "But then I'm also an incredible moralist, a real puritan in some sense and moods. My moral judgment and the way I perceive things morally changes very much when my mood changes. When I'm in a cynical mood, I take a cynical view of morals, but still whether I like it or not, I'm terribly moral in the way I look at things. But I'm not too comfortable with it." Bob's moral perspective was well expressed in the late Joe Gould's poem called "My Religion." Brief and to the point, the poem said, "In winter I'm a Buddhist, in the summer I'm a nudist." Bob was in psychoanalysis.

Now Bob's relativism rests on a confusion. The confusion is the confusion between relativity as the social science fact that different people do have different moral values and relativity as the philosophic claim that people ought to have different moral values, that no moral values are justified for all men.

To illustrate, I will quote a not untypical response of one of my graduate students to the same moral dilemmas. She says, "I think he should steal it because if there is any such thing as a universal human value, it is the value of life and that would justify it."

I then asked her, "Is there any such thing as a universal human value?" and she answered, "No, all values are relative to your culture."

She starts out by claiming that one ought to act in terms of the universal value of human life, implying that human life is a universal value in the sense it is logical and desirable for all men to respect all human life, that one can demonstrate to other men that it is

logical and desirable to act in this way. If she were clear in her thinking she would see that the fact that all men do not always act in terms of this value, does not contradict the claim that all men ought to always act in accordance with it. Because she makes this confusion, she ends in total confusion.

What I am going to claim is that if we distinguish the issues of universality as fact, and the possibility of universal moral ideals, we get a positive answer to both questions. In the first place, basic moral values don't come from the outside, from the culture. From the age of four my son joined the pacifist and vegetarian movement and refused to eat meat because, he said, it's bad to kill animals. In spite of his parent's attempts to dissuade him by arguing about the difference between justified and unjustified killing, he remained a vegetarian for six months. However, he did recognize that some forms of killing were "legitimate." One night I read to him from a book about Eskimo life which included a description of a seal-killing expedition. While listening to the story he became very angry and said, "You know, there is one kind of meat I would eat, Eskimo meat. It's bad to kill animals so it's all right to eat them."

This episode illustrates (1) that children often generate their own moral values and maintain them in the face of cultural training, and (2) that these values have universal roots. Every child believes it is bad to kill because regard for the lives of others or pain at death is a natural empathic response, though it is not necessarily universally and consistently maintained. In this example the value of

life led both to vegetarianism and to the desire to kill Eskimos. This latter desire comes also from a universal value tendency: a belief in justice or reciprocity here expressed in terms of revenge or punishment (at higher levels, the belief that those who infringe upon the rights of others cannot expect their own rights to be respected).

I quoted my son's responses because it is both shockingly different from the way you think expressed in the idea that it is a low stage, and yet it has universal elements you will recognize. Recognizing both the universal and the different, you will see that moral development is largely a process of stage restructuring of universal human tendencies of empathy (concern for the welfare of others) and justice (concern for equality and reciprocity) in more adequate forms. This restructuring occurs in the form of six culturally universal stages presented in Table 1. The universality of these stages is documented by findings in villages and cities in the United States, Great Britain, Taiwan, Yucatan, and Turkey. In all these cultures, the same basic moral concepts used in making moral judgments were found -- value of life, reciprocity.

Place Table 1 about here

My studies show not that the same basic moral concepts are used in every culture, but that the stages of their development are the same. Furthermore, the experimental work has demonstrated that children move through these stages one at a time and always in the same order. Developmental change means forward movement in the sequence without

skipping steps. Moral reasoning of the conventional (Stages 3-4) type never occurs before the preconventional (Stages 1-2) thought has taken place. No adult in Stage 4 has gone through Stage 6, but all Stage 6 adults have gone at least through Stage 4.

The cross-culturally moral trends and these stages are presented in Figure 1. They are universal human modes or principles of moral thinking that progress through an invariant order. In addition, there are differences in more specific moral beliefs that are culturally or individually determined and are, therefore, relative in content. Differences that can be seen in the basic structure of moral thinking are differences in maturity or development. Accordingly, the teacher may take the stimulation of moral development as the aim of moral education. Such stimulation of development is not indoctrination; rather, it is the facilitation of the child's development through a sequence that is a natural progression for him. We can then operationalize Dewey's statement that the aim of educative process can be equated with development, intellectual and moral.

Can we operationalize Dewey's statement that educational process is not instruction, it is supplying the conditions for development? What I have said implies that we should move from developmental research to moral education practice. Practical work started with a Chicago thesis by Moshe Blatt who ran classroom discussions of moral dilemmas in junior high and high school classes, black and white, lower class and middle class. The discussions were Socratic, no right answers were preached. Instead, developmental principles were employed. The

first major principle was that exposure to the stage above the child's own would stimulate development while exposure to the step below would not induce regression. The classes were composed of children at three adjacent stages, a naturally occurring mixture in most classrooms. At first Blatt would pit the bottom two stages against each other. Then when he felt children at the lowest stage had moved up, he would pit the middle stage against the next higher. The second basic principle was the induction of cognitive conflict. The trouble with conventional moral education is it preaches the obvious cultural cliches. Our procedure was to throw these cliches in conflict, to pose situations where there was no ready answer, when there was violent disagreement. Only by sensing the inadequacy and conflict of his own current stage of thought is the student impelled to reorganize at the next level. Blatt's results were quite clear-cut. About one-quarter of the students moved up one stage, another quarter showed some but less upward change. These results occurred in all age, race, sex and class groups. One year later, the experimental subjects retained the average one-third stage advance over their controls. Perhaps of most significance is that classroom-induced change was developmental, it was almost always to the next stage up. These results have encouraged us to begin more formal preparation and evaluation of moral discussion materials and methods. These range from a film strip series for first and second graders, to a manual on use of the new social studies materials in high school from the developmental perspective, to an undergraduate course on moral and political choice. These efforts

focus on moral judgment. We are aware, of course, that moral judgment is not moral action. It is however a necessary if not sufficient condition for moral action. A person cannot engage in principled moral action if he is not aware of principles.

As Joe Hickey reports on Tuesday, a delinquent raised from instrumental egoism to the light of conventional or even post-conventional morality judgment has a certain sense of salvation, he likes thinking of himself as a moral being. But there are still severe problems in changing his behavior and life style. Not the least of these problems is the unjust institution in which he lives, the prison. After all, whether in prison or in schools, the fundamental condition for moral development, for development of the sense of justice, is not moral discussion but a just society. So Dewey's demand that education supply the conditions for development means making the schools and prisons just. Since the prisons seem aware of their limitations in this regard, we are currently developing a just community approach to two institutions, one in Connecticut, one in Georgia. Peter Scharff will give a progress report on this Quixotic venture Tuesday.

I have tried to document a beginning effort to take Dewey seriously in educational intervention.

Now if we can briefly conclude with some general implications about value-relativity and educational psychology research. Most research on learning and development defines its key terms in value-neutral and relativistic fashion, in terms which do not imply that learning implies greater cognitive adequacy or worthwhileness. Learning

is measured as frequency of response of "learning to criterion." Acquisition of a cognitively arbitrary or errnoeous concept (e.g., that it is best to put a marble in the hole) is considered to be learning in the same general sense as is acquisition of a capacity for logical inference. There is, in other words, no clear or philosophically justified concept of cognitive adequacy directing the definition and study of learning in most American theory and research.

We quoted the value-free and relativistic approach to moral research in Berkowitz's definition of morality as the internalization of the standards of the group; a definition which denotes nothing worthwhile. While in a democratic or just society moral internalization may culminate in just action, in a Nazi society it will culminate in genocide.

Given a "value-free" educational psychology research, there is no way to move from psychological research to the prescription of practice without importing a set of value-assumptions having no relation to psychology itself. When the psychologist moves from value-free research results to the prescription of practice, he is in the bind of importing values from somewhere. If he is a relativist, his imported values are likely to be biased and arbitrary, i.e., they are likely to be merely his particular values or the values of his particular community. Interventions based on "social relativity," like the Bereiter and Engelmann intervention quoted, are no more ethically rational than are the standards of the American public school with which they start.

To rationally intervene the educational psychologist must join in the construction of a rational educational ideology, a set of prescriptions which are grounded on both the methods of science and the methods of rational ethical judgment. The value component of a rational educational ideology does not spring directly from the personal values of the psychologist or from the values of his reference group, but from a consideration of educational psychology facts in light of philosophically rational ethical principles.

If I have saved you from ethical relativity, you will have no trouble accepting the idea that rational ethical principles and research fact must be integrated in educational prescription. I wish now to argue however that such integration is almost impossible unless it is done at the start of inquiry into educational fact. Given that we need ethical and epistemological principles to make educational prescriptions, these principles must also guide inquiry. There is very little ethically principled advice about education which can be given to teachers on the basis of research facts derived from studies which define morality or cognition in value-free relativistic fashion.

In contrast to value-free research approaches, the approach suggested by Dewey and Piaget is the <u>developmental-philosophic</u> strategy for relating the study of human development to educational aims. This solution imports philosophic considerations of value or adequacy at the very start of the study of development and learning. Piaget starts with epistemological and logical criteria of the adequacy of thought. Because

these philosophic criteria are involved in Piaget's initial conceptualization of what cognitive development is, his research has direct implications for educational conceptions of what cognitive development ought to be.

My own work in morality has been based on the same developmental-philosophic assumptions. My work, using the developmental-philosophic strategy attempts to avoid the naturalistic fallacy of directly deriving judgments of fact and judgments about the facts of development from notions of evaluative adequacy, it however also assumes that the two may be systematically related. It takes as a hypothesis for empirical confirmation or refutation that development is a movement toward greater moral adequacy (hypothesis about fact derived from reflective value-analysis) and it takes as a hypothesis that an empirical sequence of development may reflect a philosophically justified order of adequacy (hypothesis about reflective or philosophic statements of adequacy derived from factual findings). As an example, John Rawls (1971) has developed a quite definitive argument for why what we term Stage 6 is a more adequate conception of justice than is Stage 5, 4, etc.).

What we term the developmental-philosophic strategy for relating the psychology of development to philosophy is Dewey's strategy for relating the child to the curriculum. The relation of the child to the curriculum is the relation of developmental psychology to logic or philosophy. Of it Dewey says:

> It may be of use to distinguish and to relate to each other the logical and the psychological aspects of experience --

> the former standing for subject-matter in itself, the latter for it in relation to the child. A psychological statement of experience follows its actual growth; it is historic; it notes steps actually taken. The logical point of view, on the other hand, assumes that the development has reached a certain positive stage of fulfillment. It neglects the process and considers the outcome. It summarizes and arranges, and thus separates the achieved results from the actual steps by which they were forthcoming in the first instance. We may compare the difference between the logical and the psychological to the difference between the notes which an explorer makes in a new country, blazing a trail and finding his way along as best he may, and the finished map that is constructed after the country has been thoroughly explored. The two are mutually dependent.

Our review suggests the logical and empirical bankruptcy of the aims of traditional education, and of the behavior technology, compensatory education, tests and measurements and mental-health approaches which educational psychology has developed to support these aims. The current efforts to define a new kind of education go largely under the name of open education, heralded as "How the schools should be changed" by Silberman (1970). As Silberman notes, much of the ideology of open education rests upon the thought of Piaget, and is in that sense the same developmental ideology that lay behind Dewey's progressive education. Indeed Dewey's 1900 Chicago Laboratory School looked much like British infant schools today. The weakness of open education, whether in the United States or Britain, is that it has no clear positive

definition of its aims. As the terms "open education" or "informal education" indicate, it is an ideology defining the means of education, not its ends. Its successes are registered in the fact that children are more happy, involved, or interested in a good open classroom than in a traditional classroom. The child's enjoyment and interest is a basic and legitimate criterion of education if stripped of its mental health pretensions but it is a humanitarian criterion, not an educational criterion. Education or worthwhile learning and development meet humanitarian criteria, i.e., they argue that a concern for the enjoyment and/or the liberty of the child is equivalent to a concern for his development. In contrast the progressive ideology distinguishes the two, holding that the humanitarian criteria are a necessary but not sufficient condition for meeting developmental criteria. On the psychological side the distinction between humanitarian and developmental criteria is the distinction between the value of the child's immediate experience and the value of that experience as it enters into development. Some forms of romantic or "humanistic" psychology often claim not only that emotional aspects of education are important components of the educational process, but that spontaneous emotional experience and expression are educational goods or aims in themselves. In contrast, while Dewey believes in education as experience, the test of the worth of present experience is "that they live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences," i.e., that the experiences lead to later development.

> Some experiences are miseducative. Any experience is miseducative that is the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of further experience. An experience may be immediately enjoyable and yet promote the formation of a slack and careless attitude which operates to modify the quality of subsequent experiences so as to prevent a person from getting out of them what they have to give. Just as no man lives or dies to himself, so no experience lives or dies to itself. Wholly independent of desire or intent, every experience lives on in further experiences. Hence the central problem of an education based on experience is to select the kind of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experience."
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> (Dewey, 1938, p.)

According to Dewey, an educational experience which stimulates development is one which arouses interest, enjoyment and challenge in the immediate experience of the student. The reverse is not necessarily exactly the case, however, immediate interest and enjoyment does not always indicate that the educational experience is stimulating long-range development. Interest and involvement is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for education as development. For humanistic psychology having a novel, intense and complex experience is <u>self-development</u> or self-actualization. For the progressive, a more objective test of the effects of the experience upon later experience and behavior is required before deciding that the experience is developmental.

Paradoxically, both the romantic and the cultural transmission ideologies have focused upon observing educational objectives in terms of changes which are immediate in time. A characteristic behaviorist strategy is to demonstrate the reversibility of learning, an experiment in which a preschooler is reinforced for socializing rather than withdrawing in a corner is followed by a reversal of the experiment demonstrating that when the reinforcement is removed, the child again becomes withdrawn. From the progressive or cognitive-devel pmental perspective, insofar as behavior changes are of this reversible character, they cannot define genuine educational objectives. Central to the progressive approach then is the longitudinal perspective, the perspective that the worth of an educational effect is to be determined by its effects upon later behavior and development. In the passage quoted earlier, Dewey says, "the central problem of an education based on experience is to select the kind of present experiences that lie fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experience." This central problem, then, is a problem to be settled by empirical longitudinal research.

The basic problems of educational ends and evaluation, then, can only be solved by longitudinal studies of the effects of educational experience as these relate first to the natural lines of human development and second to a reflective or philosophic appraisal of the meaning and worth of the various lines of development. Such an undertaking is a new, large, lengthy and difficult task for educational psychology. Can it settle for less?

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