DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 056 580   PL 002 653

AUTHOP   Fraser, Bruce
TITLE   Sentences and Illocutionary Forces.
INSTITUTION   Language Research Foundation, Cambridge, Mass.
PUB DATE   Jul 71
NOTE   67p.; In Language Research Report No. 4

EDRS PRICE   MF-$0.65 HC-$3.29
DESCRIPTORS   *Deep Structure; Descriptive Linguistics; English;
                Generative Grammar; Grammar; *Linguistic Competence;
                Linguistic Theory; *Semantics; *Sentences; Sentence
                Structure; Structural Analysis; Surface Structure;
                Syntax; Transformation Generative Grammar;
                *Transformation Theory (Language); Verbs

ABSTRACT
        This paper considers the way in which a grammar must
account for the speaker's knowledge of sentence force as opposed to
sentence form or meaning and the way in which this force is related
to a sentence. According to the performative analysis approach, the
force of each sentence should be stated explicitly as a part of the
underlying representation of that sentence. After consideration and
rejection of performative analysis, the author suggests an approach
which states that sentence force is a function of sentence meaning,
analogous to the work in semantics showing that sentence meaning is a
function of constituent meaning and sentence form. Three types of
relationships between sentence meaning and sentence form (explicit,
underdetermined, and idiomatic) are described along with examples of
each. A list of references is included. (VM)

Sentences and Illocutionary Forces*

Bruce Fraser

1. Introduction

The native speaker of English knows that a sentence like (1-1)

(1-1)   John may leave now.

standardly counts as a simple prediction of the future, a report
of John's freedom of movement, or the giving of permission -- to
name three of the most likely ways in which the sentence can be
used.[1] He also knows that this sentence is not standardly taken
to have the force of a plea, a request for information, or an
oath, although the circumstances in which the sentence is uttered
might permit these latter interpretations. I take this knowledge
to be a part of the linguistic competence of the native speaker
and, thus properly included within the domain of a grammar. In
this paper I will be concerned first with how the pairing of a
sentence with its illocutionary force(s) fits into a grammar and
second with the principles which relate a sentence and its
force(s).[2]

In the following discussion we will be talking about sen-
tences, not utterances. A sentence, a construct with linguistic

theory, has standard ways in which it can be used, e.g., to make a promise, make a plea, etc. We will not be talking about utter-ances: using sentences to communicate. Thus, we are not con-cerned with how a sentence HAS been used, was INTENDED to be used, was TAKEN by the hearer, and so forth. In addition, although the term conventional use (standard use) is a technical term, I have no adequate definition for it and will rely on the reader's intuitions. To pick an extreme case, sentence (1-2)

(1-2)   Harry is ill.

is standardly used to make a statement, give a report, or make a warning, but is certainly not conventionally used as an example of a three-word sentence. On the other hand, the sentence

(1-3)   I promise I'll find you.

has the superficial appearance of a promise; one might want to argue that it is conventionally used as a threat as well. Per-haps so. What is important is not if this or other instances appear to violate linguistic conventions, such as a verb used performatively denoting the illocutionary act the sentence can count as, but rather, what we take to be the conventional use(s) of the sentence and how this is to be accounted for.

I will be addressing two main questions in the course of the paper. The first is the way in which the pairing between a sentence and its force(s) fits into a grammar. In section 2, we examine and reject the Performative Analysis (PA), a position which holds that the conventional use of a sentence is stated explicitly as part of the underlying representation of the sen-tence, where the pairing is accounted for by the generative rules

of the grammar. In this analysis the illocutionary force indicator is always a highest performative verb.

In section 3 we propose an alternate approach in which conventional force is taken to be a function of sentence meaning and linguistic conditions on illocutionary acts. In discussing this approach we show that the relationship between meaning and force is often not explicit and requires a variety of interpretive principles. In section 4 we summarize the discussion.

2.   The Performative Analysis

2.1   Statement of the Performative Analysis

The most widely known and detailed attempt to pair a sentence with its force is the effort which I will refer to as the Performative Analysis (PA). Based primarily on some ideas presented in Austin (1962) and elaborated in greatest detail and most carefully by Ross (1970), the major thrust of the PA is that the force of each sentence should be stated explicitly as a part of the underlying representation of that sentence. The PA asserts that sentence force should be carried by a single performative verb present in the highest clause of the sentence, and that this highest clause can, under certain syntactically-statable conditions, be deleted. It is argued, for example, that (2-1) has (2-2) underlying it and that a Performative Deletion Rule deletes all but the embedded S.

(2-1)   Prices slumped.

(2-2)

$$_S[\ \underline{I}\text{-}\ \begin{bmatrix} +V \\ +\text{Performative} \\ +\text{Communication} \\ +\text{Linguistic} \\ +\text{Declarative} \end{bmatrix}\ -\ \underline{you}\ -\ [_S\underline{\text{prices slumped}}]_S]_S$$

Aside from the problems of the PA statement and its justification, points to be taken up in §2.2, there are a couple of important implications which follow from the adoption of the PA.

First, sentences like

(2-3)   i) I promise you that I will be home at 5 o'clock.
         ii) I will be home at 5 o'clock.

both have the force of a promise: the first only that force, standardly, and the second, that force among others. I maintain that the sentences differ in meaning: (2-3i) means that the speaker undertakes an obligation to be home, at 5 o'clock; (2-3ii), on the other hand, lacks the sense of obligation as a part of its meaning. In using the sentence (2-3ii) to make a promise (a possible use), the speaker assumes the obligation; but this obligation is not part of the 'meaning' of the sentence (2-3ii). The PA precludes this position. Since the PA claims that (roughly) (2-3i) underlies (2-3ii), and accepts that transformations are meaning preserving, deriving the abbreviated sentence from the fuller form requires meaning preservation. To support the PA, one must maintain that the examples in (2-3) and similar cases have identical meaning. Moreover, one is forced to maintain that transformations delete meaning-carrying lexical items, for there is certainly nothing in $\underline{I}$ or $\underline{will}$, etc., that carries the sense of speaker obligation to carry out the action specified by the

following verb phrase.

Second, since the underlying representation is defined as the level at which the force of the sentence is determined, it follows that force ambiguity of a particular sentence is disambiguated at the underlying level. For example, in terms of the PA, (2-311) has three underlying representations:

(2-4)　　i)　I predict
　　　　　ii)　I warn you　} that I will be there on time.
　　　　　iii)　I promise you

2.2　Critique of the Performative Analysis

In this section I want to examine the PA as presented by Ross (1970) in some detail, to see just how well it stands up when pushed. At issue is both the accuracy of the overall statement of the PA and the syntactic evidence which has been adduced to support it.

2.2.1　Problems of the General Approach

The PA maintains that

(2-5)　　every deep structure contains one and only one per-
　　　　formative sentence as its highest clause (Ross, Ibid.,
　　　　p. 261)

There are two different claims: first, that every sentence has only a single performative verb associated with it which (verb) specifies the force of the sentence. And second, that this verb is in the topmost clause of the sentence's underlying representation. I will examine the second of these claims first.

Note that the sentences

(2-6)   i)   I regret that I must inform you of your dismissal.
        ii)   I am pleased to be able to offer you the job.
       iii)   Let me point out that I admit you're right.
        iv)   I would like to congratulate you.

can be taken as a statement of a regret, an offer, an admission

and a congratulation, respectively, even though the performative

verb is embedded and is not the highest verb as required by Ross

(2-7)   "All declarative sentences occurring in contexts
         where first person pronouns can appear derive from
         deep structures containing one and only one super-
         ordinate performative clause whose main verb is a
         verb of saying." (p. 259)

Regret and point out may be verbs of saying; please and like

are not. In fact, examples such as those in (2-6) run counter

to the claim that "there is an independently necessary constraint

that prohibits any verb from having a performative interpretation

when it is embedded as the complement of another verb." (p. 251)

I doubt that evidence can be found to argue that in (2-6) the

sentence-initial material is not at the highest level.

Sentences with -ly adverbs form one class of counterexamples

to the highest verb claim.

(2-8)   i)   Obviously I concede that I've lost the election.
        ii)   It is obvious that I concede that I've lost the
              election.
       iii)   It ⌐ that S - is obvious.

The argument usually runs that (2-8i) has been derived by an

optional rule from an earlier sentence like (2-8ii) which, in

turn, has been derived from (2-8iii). But now compare (2-8i)

and (2-9).

(2-9)   I concede that it is obvious that I've lost the election.

In (2-9) the speaker concedes that the fact that he lost the

election is obvious -- he is conceding the obviousness of his defeat, whereas in (2-8i), the speaker concedes that he has been defeated, and then makes a clarifying comment about the appropriateness to make this concession. The <u>obviously</u> in the (2-8i) case is not within the scope of the concession and thus any argument that it began embedded under <u>concede</u> in the underlying representation is highly suspect. Yet <u>concede</u> determines the force in (2-8i).

There are two additional points with respect to these examples. First, it is not clear to me that (2-8i) and (2-8ii) have the same meaning. In fact, I question whether examples like (2-8ii) are acceptable at all. But if they are, I strongly doubt if their utterance constitutes a concession, but more likely a report of what the speaker habitually does. And second, when the <u>obvious</u> is inside the scope of the performative verb as in (2-9), the rule relating <u>it is obvious</u> and <u>obviously</u> cannot apply, for it will produce cases like

(2-10) *I concede that obviously I've lost the election.

Although I don't know the conditions under which a performative verb may be embedded and still retain its force, it is clear that the performative verb is not always on top. Thus, the simplicity of the PA whereby the highest verb always carries the force of the sentence must be abandoned.

We now turn to the contention that a sentence has one and only one performative verb which specifies its force. We noted above that sentence (1-1) had more than one illocutionary force: it was force-ambiguous. At issue here is force-multiplicity:

where the sentence force is a composite of two or more distinct forces. The speaker in uttering such a sentence under the appropriate conditions would be performing more than one illocutionary act. Force-multiplicity is direct counterevidence to the PA claim of one sentence-one force. We now consider a number of cases.

The first involves sentences in which there are two verbs, both of which are being used performatively.

(2-11)   i) I admit that I concede the election.
         ii) I announce that I hereby promise to be timely.
        iii) I insist that I dare you to leave now.

Sentence (2-11i) is simultaneously an admission and a concession, (2-11ii) an act of announcing and promising, and (2-11iii) an act of insisting and daring. What should be posited is the highest performative verb, for example, in (2-11): _admit_ or _concede_? Certainly not _concede_, so then _admit_? But then, how is the concession force of the sentence to be determined? One alternative would be to define a procedure for searching around in a sentence to determine if there is more than one operational performative verb. But if this is chosen, then the entire highest single performative verb claim must be abandoned. A second alternative would be to posit abstract verbs, for example a verb of _admission/concession_ for (2-11i), which would function as the highest performative verb. But I seriously doubt that even the staunchest defenders of the PA would fall back on such a device.

A second sentence type with force-multiplicity is illustrated by the following examples.

(2-12) i) I promise that I will be there
       ii) I admit that I did it.

Promising entails predicting; admitting entails asserting.
That is, by virtue of the meaning of promise and admit and
their performative use, the sentence commits the speaker to
performing the act of predicting and asserting as well. A
taxonomy of the linguistic conditions on illocutionary acts
(Cf. section 4) will indicate the range and complexity of such
force entailment. If the PA is embedded into a linguistic
theory (e.g., Generative Semantics) in which all semantic re-
lations, save the most primitive ones, are all spelled out in
the underlying representation, then such force entailment will
also be spelled out as well. The result: there will be more
than one verb functioning performatively in such sentences. The
PA embedded into an Aspects type theory will not be troubled
by such examples.

A third type concern verbs discussed by Austin (1962) because
they appeared to fail as pure performatives. Austin argued that
verbs like agree, approve, blame, am sorry and others could be
used performatively and descriptively as well.

(2-13) i) I agree that John should go home.
       ii) I blame you for his injury.

Austin questioned if the speaker is performing the illocutionary
act of agreeing in uttering (2-13i) or describing his attitude.
Similarly, is the speaker blaming the hearer by virtue of uttering
(2-13ii) or only describing his state? I suggest that the issue
is not either/or but that these constitute another type of force-
multiplicity. Austin never discussed this possibility, and I

don't know how he would view this conclusion.

The fourth type involves sentences like

(2-14) i) Why are we stopping here?
        ii) Must you do that now?

which, I contend, have both the force of a reque t for infor-
mation and an expression of negative opinion. C ntrary to what
others have argued (Lakoff, 1971) I don't view t ese two forces
as two legs of a force-ambiguity but as force-mu tiplicity. I
don't know of any good test to distinguish ambig ity from mul-
tiplicity. A rough heuristic is to determine wl ether the
hearer can respond in such a way to reflect his areness of
both forces. Thus, to (2-14i) the hearer might nswer "Because
I'm hungry and I make the decisions." It may be that most if
not all sentences carry some indication of the p ychological
state of the speaker as an expression of belief, attitude, and
so forth. If so, then the examples like (2-14) re rather
trivial cases of force-multiplicity, albeit stil counterevidence
to the PA claim of a single highest performative erb.

A fifth type (suggested by Ross, personal c mmunication)
concerns sentences with appositive relative clau es.

(2-14)' i) Did Mary, who is friendly, ever ar ive?
         ii) Have you seen Max, who is quietly hewing away?

Each example clearly has the force of a request or information
but also seems to have the force of an assertion   If by uttering
(2-14i)', for example, the speaker is both askin about Mary's
arrival and asserting that Mary is friendly, we ave another in-
stance of force-multiplicity.

Conjoined cases such as those in (2-15) exh it counter-
examples to both parts of (2-5).

(2-15)   i) I admit that I'm late, and I promise that I will
be on time from now on.
ii) I wish he were here, but I authorize you to do it
anyway.
iii) Be careful of the road, and call me when you arrive.
iv) Why wash your car, since it's going to rain tomorrow.

The speaker of these sentences can be taken to be performing

more than one type of speech act. In (2-15i) he is both admit-

ting and promising; in (2-15ii), he is wishing and authorizing;

in (2-15iii) he is issuing a warning and giving an order; and in

(2-15iv) he is making a suggestion and making a prediction. What

is to be the highest single performative verb? Perhaps there
is none. Certainly neither of the verbs denoting the force
of each half of the conjoined sentence can seriously be considered
as the highest performative verb. Perhaps some super-high verb,
e.g., of saying in (2-151) and (2-151i) and of requesting in
(2-151ii)? I don't know what it would be in (2-151v). The PA
is intended to apply to all sentences, particularly declaratives
for which the analysis was worked out in detail. We must conclude
that either the single highest verb analysis must be rejected, or
that conjoined sentences are not dominated by a single S. The
latter conclusion runs counter to all evidence I know of concern-
ing conjoined sentences.[3]

Finally, there are difficulties with the actual statement
of the Performative Deletion. Ross (ibid) wrote that

> at present, it is not clear to me how this rule
> is to be generalized sufficiently to handle
> this class of cases [the declaratives] but
> still kept specific enough so that performative
> verbs like authorize and grant will not be de-
> leted. Perhaps no general condition is
> statable, and verbs must be lexically marked as
> to whether or not they undergo this rule.
> (p. 249)

Having examined this rule in some detail, I can only agree with
his premonition that its generality is limited. We now look at
a number of difficulties the rule faces, both in simply account-
ing for the declarative examples, the subject of Ross' paper,
and the other types of speech acts in general. In all cases,
we will consider examples in which there is an embedded S
which can stand as a well-formed

utterance alone, and will ignore cases such as "I hereby veto thi⌐ bill" and "I now appoint you the Chairman" for which the rule was never intended.

Ross briefly considers whether the rule should be optional or obligatory and, on the basis of sentences like (2-16) due to McCawley, suggests that the rule should be sensitive to <u>hereby</u> and should be obligatory when <u>hereby</u> occurs with verbs like <u>tell</u>.

(2-16) i) I tell you that prices slumped.
       ii) *I hereby tell you that prices slumped.

But consider the examples in (2-17).

(2-17) i)   I even claim that John will win tomorrow.
       ii) I strongly agree that Suzan is the best.
      iii) I only admit that I am not with the FBI.

These sentences can be taken as a claim, an agreement, and an admission, respectively, but the higher performative clause cannot be deleted. The sentences in (2-17) do not have the same force as the corresponding ones in (2-18).

(2-18) i)   Even John will win tomorrow.
       ii) *Strongly Suzan is the best.
      iii) Only I am not with the FBI.

The speaker of (2-17i) claims many things, and surprisingly, claims that John will win tomorrow; the speaker of (2-18i) claims that many people will win tomorrow, surprisingly John. (2-18ii) is simply not grammatical. And in (2-17iii), the speaker admits only one thing: that he is not with the FBI; in (2-18iii), he admits that he is the only one that is not with the FBI. The performative deletion rule is intended to preserve meaning and force. The examples in (2-17) and (2-18) are not synonymous and it follows that the rule must be blocked for such cases.

A second instance of non-applicability of the rule is illustrated by examples in (2-19).

(2-19) i) I approve that you took the dog to the Vet.
    ii) I apologize that we are late.
   iii) I beg that we leave now.
    iv) I move that he should be allowed to decide.

The embedded S "You took the dog to the Vet" does not have the force of approving, nor "We are late" that of apologizing. "We leave now" is not standardly begging, and "He should be allowed to decide" is hardly a move at a meeting. Conclusion: with some verbs, (e.g., approve, apologize, beg, move) the rule of perfomative deletion may not apply.

On the other hand, there are numerous cases in which the rule must apply if the sentence is to be well-formed. The first sort of case is illustrated in (2-20).

(2-20) i) I offer do you want to go home.
    ii) I request can you pass me the salt.
   iii) I recommend that you should stay here.
    iv) I authorize you that you may buy some butter.
    v) I urge you that you ought to take this piece of pie.
   vi) I thank you that I am grateful for this attention.

Each of the examples use the force denoted by the initial performative verb (offer, request, etc.), but in each case, the Performative Deletion Rule must obligatorily apply.

A second class of cases are those illustrated in (2-21)

(2-21) i) *I threaten that I will kill you.
    ii) *I plead that you will spare his life.
   iii) *I boast that I have done that.

where the highest verb (threaten, plea, boast) can never be used performatively, even though the embedded clause can be taken, respectively, as a threat, a plea, and a boast.

To summarize, I think it is clear that 1) even when a verb is used performatively, it need not be the highest verb in the underlying representation or the surface structure; ii) that there are a variety of cases of force-multiplicity of the sentence and there is no single verb, performative or other-wise, which can account for the total force; and iii) that the rule of Performative Deletion Rule, when pushed to handle a wide range of declarative sentences and other types of speech acts as well, appears to require a highly complicated state of con-ditions. It is not the simple generalization initially proposed. Ross (p. 249) foresaw such complications; this complication of the rule should not be taken as a criticism of his work, but confirmation of his fears.

2.3.2 Problems of Syntactic Justification

We turn now to the syntactic justification presented in support of the PA. In his paper Ross (ibid) presents fourteen arguments to support his main thesis that a sentence such as (2-22i) is derived from (2-22ii).

(2-22) i) Prices slumped

ii) $_S[I \begin{bmatrix} +V \\ +Performative \\ +communication \\ +linguistic \\ +declarative \end{bmatrix}$ $\underline{you}$ $_S[Prices\ slumped]_S]_S$

Seven of the arguments are in support of the postulating a highest subject $\underline{I}$, three in support of a highest declarative performative verb denoting linguistic communication (e.g., $\underline{say}$, $\underline{tell}$, $\underline{claim}$, $\underline{argue}$, $\underline{agree}$), and three arguments in support of a highest indirect

object <u>you</u>. One final argument is separate from the others.

The arguments to support the PA all take the following

general form:

(2-23) i)   Syntactic facts involving embedded sentences are
              presented.
        ii)   It is asserted that these facts can be accounted for
              by relating them to constituents in the dominating
              sentence.
        iii) Corresponding facts are shown to occur in simple
              declarative sentences.
        iv)   It is concluded that the facts in the simple declara-
              tive sentences can be accounted for only by adopting
              the constituent of the performative clause being
              argued.

I will not examine in detail all 14 of the arguments. This

has been done elsewhere (Fraser, 1970a). However, I do want to

examine several of them to show:

(2-24) i)   That the generalization claimed for the embedded
              sentence can be shown to be either too restrictive
              or just simply false.
        ii)   That, when relevant, performative sentences them-
              selves exhibit the very same syntactic phenomena
              claimed for declaratives.

Showing the evidence to be inaccurate or incomplete may or may

not constitute serious counter-evidence for the syntactic justi-

fication of a particular argument. In each case, one will have

to decide if the complete evidence, when stated, is in consonance

with the PA. However, the second point is crucial since the PA

is now on the horns of a dilemma: either one must argue that per-

formative sentences themselves are embedded into a performative

sentence, where the highest verb will have no illocutionary force,

or argue that the syntactic facts in performative sentences are

different from those in simple declarative sentences.[4]

The first four arguments, all tokens of the same type, involve the distribution of the emphatic reflexive pronoun in English.[5] In particular, Ross claims that the following generalization is the major one governing the rule that produces emphatic reflexives.

(2-25)   If an anaphoric pronoun precedes an emphatic reflexive, (e.g., <u>him himself</u>), the former may be deleted if it is commanded by the NP with which it stands in an anaphoric relationship. (p.227)

He concludes that the acceptability of sentences like

(2-26)   This paper was written by Ann and myself. (R 21a)

but the unacceptability of the same sentence with a third person reflexive pronoun (e.g. <u>himself</u>) can be accounted for by positing a higher subject, <u>I</u>, later deleted by the Performative Deletion Rule. If (2-26) has an underlying representation "I say to you that Ann and I wrote this paper" then the acceptable <u>myself</u> but unacceptable <u>himself</u> follows by the convention stated in (2-25). Nothing turns on whether the reflexive refers to a higher subject or object, but only that the subject or object command the ERP. I take no issue with Ross' claim that if there is a higher sentence, these ERPs are normally predictable. It is worthwhile asking, however, whether these are the only conditions for their occurrence.

Notice first that there are cases where ERPs have no referent from which the <u>morphological</u> shape is derivable in any obvious way.

(2-27) i)   I agree (with you) that the letter should have been written by Harry and ourselves.
       ii) We question if the job should be finished by Jones and myself.

iii) The Chair acknowledges that the question was
      directed at the Secretary and myself.
iv)   Counsel moves that the jury be selected by the defense
      lawyer and yourself.

In (2-271) the _ourselves_ can refer to either and _I_ and _you_,
taken as a group, or to the _I_ and some other group of people whose
identity is understood from the context. (2-2711) shows the
speaker representing a group but later referring to only himself.
The Chair is clearly co-referential with the speaker in (2-27111)
but the acceptability of the example turns on the speaker's aware-
ness that chairmen as well as mayors, senators, etc. use their
titles in speaking in the first person. Finally, the performative
verb _move_ never occurs with the indirect object _you_ though it
does permit the vocative indirect object as in "I move, Mr. Chair-
man, that..." where the _Mr. Chairman_ takes _yourself_ as the ERP
form. The point is this: far more is going on in terms of the
ERPs of the embedded sentence than can be predicted from a simple
PA. The _I-say-to you_ paradigm appears to account for only part
of the facts.

A second difficulty with the PA follows from the fact that
an ERP need not have a _commanding_ antecedent NP nor must the
antecedent even occur in the same sentence.

(2-28) i)   Was the paper which John mentioned finally written
              by just Mary and himself?
        ii)   Since the people who he expected yesterday haven't
              arrived yet, the work can't be completed by only
              Sue and himself.
        iii) After arguing with him for two hours, I've finally
              gotten Jones to give in. The job will be pulled
              by Smith and himself tomorrow afternoon.
        iv)   Mary was furious about the bill she got. So, since
              the whole house had been painted just by John and
              herself, the contractor decided that he would lower
              the price.

> v) Mary rued the day she ever took the job. There was never any help available and everything had to be done all by herself.

In (2-28i-ii) the antecedent occurs before the ERP but in neither case does it command it. For (2-28iii-iv) the ERP clearly refers to an NP in an earlier sentence. Of course, the question remains as to whether one would posit for (2-28iii) a structure of the sort "I say to you that Jones says to me that the job..." Perhaps, but this goes well beyond the PA. The point is that ERPs don't come from just higher sentences although under some conditions they may.

Finally, and crucially, we find performative sentences which exhibit ERPs as in (2-29).

(2-29) i) You are hereby authorized by John and myself to buy that ship.
       ii) You are hereby advised by Mary and myself that we are married.
      iii) The court rejects any such remarks directed at the other jurors and myself.

But if these are performatives -- and they most certainly are -- then they cannot, by definition, be embedded in another performative. The PA requires that the performative verb be always at the top level. Where, then, does the ERP come from here? Clearly not from a higher sentence. Perhaps a lower (deleted) sentence; but this also contradicts Ross' claim. These facts strike me as the strongest type of syntactic counterevidence to Ross' main thesis of higher performatives underlying declarative sentences, since the facts he adduces are found in performatives and cannot be accounted for. The same sorts of counterevidence can be brought

for the other four cases of ERPs presented by Ross in 2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.1.4, and 2.3.3.

As a second type of argument in support of a higher I, Ross suggests as a first approximation to exclude sentences like

(2-30) i)   ??It was given by me to your sister. (R37a)
       ii) ??Tom thinks that it was given by him to your sister.(R38)
       iii) ??Sue was expected by Max to wash him. (R40b)

that the following condition holds:

(2-31)   If a deep structure NP and some other NP in the deep
         structure are co-referential, then the former NP may
         not become a passive agent. (R41)

It is argued that the examples in (2-30) are excluded because there was a higher S which includes I as its subject NP.

I suggest that the sentences, if unacceptable, are out because of stress considerations, not because of two co-referential NP's. Sentence final position is normally the intonation center and pronouns, unless emphatically stressed, do not take primary stress. Notice the unacceptability of a sentence like

(2-32)   *A large shock was given by it to my sister.

where the it refers to a live wire, etc. But this deep structure doesn't violate condition (2-31).

Moreover, a different order of constituents often results in an acceptable sentence.

(2-33)   What happened to your sister? Oh, she was given a black
         eye by me although it was totally unintentional.

In addition, stressing the pronoun produces an acceptable sentence.

(2-34)   It won't be given by ME to your sister.

And finally, why not rule out the sentence

(2-35)   It was given by you to your sister

since the PA requires a higher you? I don't think the examples here really bear on the issue at all.

A third type of evidence presented to support a higher sentence subject I turns on the infelicity of sentences like those in (2-36) where the verb lurk co-occurs with I as the subject in simple declarative sentences.

(2-36) i)   ?*I am lurking in a culvert. (R43a)
        ii) Max believes that I am lurking in a culvert. (R44a)

Ross claims that a verb like lurk must be constrained so that it does not appear in a deep structure in which its (lurk's) subject is co-referential with the subject of the next sentence higher.

But as Ross acknowledges (footnote 27) the constraints on lurk are not well understood. A higher sentence object does not preclude acceptable lurk sentences, e.g.,

(2-37) i)   Tom told me that I was lurking in the alley.
        ii) I've been informed that I lurked in the bushes last night.

Moreover, it is clear that the constraint on lurk is not a subject restriction.

(2-38) i)   I deny that I lurked near your house last night.
        ii) I admit that I'm lurking near your wife.
        iii) The fact that I am lurking in the bushes should'nt bother you.
        iv) I declare that I am not lurking in the alley.

Notice also that (2-38) are performative sentences.

Harnish has suggested (personal communication) that the correct use of the verb lurk implies that the person performing the action of lurking is doing so unobserved. Sentences such as (2-39i) are perfectly acceptable, while (2-39ii) is at least questionable because it is announcing to someone his intention to carry out an act which, to perform, the speaker must assume he is doing unobserved.

(2-39) i)   I was lurking near City Hall last night and saw the
              Mayor smoking grass.
        ii) I will lurk near your yard tomorrow.

A final argument for a higher I involves the phrse <u>according</u>

<u>to NP</u>. The claim is made that first person NP's may ot appear

in the phrase following <u>according to</u> in simple declartive sen-

tences. Thus, according to Ross, sentences such as

(2-40) i)   *According to me, food prices will skyrocet.
        ii) *According to us, I should be punished.

are excluded by the following condition:

(2-41) No well-formed deep structure may contain an mbedded
        <u>according to</u>-phrase if the NP in that phrase s identical
        to any NP belonging to the first sentence aboe the one
        containing that phrase. (R49)

But the following sentences violate the conditin stated

in (2-41).

(2-42) i)   According to you, we all should be domed.
        ii)   I concede (declare) that according o me, the U.S.
              has no foreign policy.
        iii) I admit that according to you, MCarthy would make
              a great President.
        iv)   Jones didn't hear it fro Mary that according to her
              .
        v)   Don't deny that according to you, all imperatives
              have an underlying <u>you</u>.

And notice again that (2-42) are performatives.

The next section contains three arguments to support the

claim that declarative sentences have a higher deep structure verb

like <u>say</u> (the bundle of syntactic features in (2-22ii). The first

argument depends on the claim that the verb <u>believe</u> can have a

human object NP in case a higher sentence has a co-referential

subject for a verb of linguistic communication. This claim is

reflected by the following example.

(2-43) Tom told her that Ann could swim but nobody
       believed   i) *them
                ii) *her
             iii) him

The final <u>him</u> in (2-43iii) appears to be a reduction of something

like <u>what he told</u>. One doesn't believe John in the sense of one

hits John; rather, John communicates some information which is

either believed or not. If the information is believed, then

we can say that John is believed. It is not surprising that

verbs of linguistic communication are involved here. Ross then

claims that the acceptability of a sentence like

(2-44) Ann <u>can</u> swim, but if you don't believe me, just watch
       her.

is accounted for by the PA. However, as Ross acknowledges, there

are higher verbs whose object is the antecedent for the <u>believe</u>

object and there are non-linguistic communication verbs which

permit a human object to follow <u>believe</u>:

(2-45) i) They listened to the story from John but nobody
           believed him.
     ii) The people received the truth from Harry but only
           Mary believed him.
   iii) The expert ridiculed our testimony and consequently
           the jury wouldn't believe us.
    iv) Jones made it plain that Harry would come home but
           I didn't believe him.
     v) Johnson is so stupid that I simply cannot believe him.
    vi) We are in such a mess because of Rusk that I will not
           believe him this time.

The point: the conditions for the position of the anaphoric

reference is much wider than suggested in Ross' discussion.

    It appears that the human objects for <u>believe</u> can be accounted

for without recourse to the PA. Suppose that we derive (2-43iii) from

(2-46) Tom_i told her_j that Ann could swim but nobody believed

      what he_i told her_j. (R60)

such that the string what $\underline{he}_i$ $\underline{told}$ $\underline{her}_j$ is reduced to $\underline{him}_i$

in case there are co-referential antecedent NP's. This reduction

is in line with the notion of recoverability usually required

under the operation of a deletion transformation. This approach

will also apply to sentences like "I $_i$ told you$_j$ that... nobody

believed me$_i$" ($\underline{me}$ = what $\underline{I}_i$ $\underline{told}$ $\underline{you}_j$).

Now notice that we find perfectly good sentences like

(2-47) i)   Everybody believes him today. (what he says)
      ii)   No one ever believes her, damnit. (what she says)
     iii) Someone must have believed them. (what they say)
     iv) Harry believes her through thick and thin.
      v)   I hereby admit to you that I believe him.
     vi) I hereby acknowledge that I believe them.

in which the object of $\underline{believe}$ is a personal pronoun, certainly

anaphoric, but with no antecedent in the underlying representation

ála the PA. Moreover, (2-46v-vi) are themselves performative and

thus not (presumably) embedded sentences.

The main force of the second argument for a higher verb of

saying is summarized as

(2-48)   No deep structure containing VP-be damned if S is well-
formed unless the subject of this VP is identica. to
the subject of the first VP up the tree whose head verb
has the features [+Communication, +Linguistic, +Declara-
tive].

The claim is made that the relative acceptability for sentences like

(2-49) i)   I'll } be damned if { I'll go.
     ii) *He'll }   { he'll

follows from the PA. (I find (2-49ii) acceptable.)

Although there is wide variation on acceptability, the fol-

lowing sentences, all violating the higher subject identity and/or

communication verb restriction, are acceptable.

(2-50) i) I knew that you'd be damned if you'd pay up.
    ii) Jones'll be damned 'f he'll go.
    iii) The President'll be damned if he'll forego the vote.
    iv) Harry probably figures I'll be damned if I'll support Nixon.
    v) You'll be damned if you'll go - isn't that right?

To be sure, the subject of the VP-be damned if S is interpreted as holding the view expressed by the following embedded sentence. For example, in (2-50ii) we understand Jones to be unwilling to go. What seems to be at issue in accounting for the acceptability of non first person sentences is that the speaker have some knowledge of the subject's opinions. The following sequence lays the ground work for the final, non-I-subject-be damned if sentence.

(2-51) Jones is ready to do almost anything for me. But I admit that he'll be damned if he will wash my socks.

Thus, it appears that these be damned if cases required special knowledge of the subject's views, but do not support the claim for a higher performative verb.

The final argument in ⟩ 2.2 turns on some facts of Arabic which I cannot evaluate. Moreover, I don't believe they can be considered relevant for an argument about English syntax, the direct subject of the paper.

The final section of arguments is presented to support a higher indirect object you. The first claim is that

(2-52) The deep structure subject of an idiom like hold one's breath, lose ones cool, etc. must be identical to the indirect object of the second sentence up.

Aside from the fact that practically no idioms of the form V one's N permit a passive form like hold one's breath (keep one's word is one similar case), I find most of Ross' unacceptable examples

acceptable. For example, the sentences

(2-53) i)   I want Tom's breath to be held until I say "stop."
       ii)   Can your breath be held very long under water?
      iii)   I expect your word to be kept at all times.
       iv)   I told Max that I wanted $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{his} \\ \text{your} \\ \text{their} \end{Bmatrix}$ word to be kept no

       matter what.

are all acceptable for me but violate his restrictions. In ad-

dition, I simply don't find the restriction on the second sentence

up to be accurate:

(2-54) I indicated to Harry that Mary was not fully informed that
        they wanted his breath to be held longer than usual.

and find that no support is provided for the PA higher _you_.

     The second argument is that the subject of subjective predi-

cates such as _be tired_, _be bored_, _feel angry_ cannot be identical

to the indirect object of the first verb up. Thus, sentences like

(2-55) i)   *You feel tired.
       ii)   *You are bored.

can be automatically excluded by the PA which contains a higher

indirect object _you_.

     But it is clear that this restriction cannot be correct in

light of sentences like

(2-56) i)   I demonstrated to him that he felt tired.
       ii)   You told Jones that he probably feels bored.
      iii)   It is now possible to prove to Harry that he is tired.
       iv)   I heard from you that you feel happy.
        v)   You are depressed, aren't you?

The reason why sentences like (2-55) are not normally uttered as

a simple declarative is not clear to me; it does not seem to turn

on a higher indirect object _you_. Also, the sentence (2-56v) pre-

sumably has such a _you_ indirect object but is perfectly acceptable.

     The final argument in section 2.3 deals with ERPs, is similar

to those cases discussed above, and will not be reviewed here.

In section 2.4, Ross speculates that the interpretation of

the sentence (2-57i)

(2-57)   i)   Jenny isn't here, for I don't see her.
        ii)   I say that Jenny isn't here, for I don't see her.

is derived from (2-57ii), since she might very well be here.   I

take no issue with his interpretation of the sentence (2-57i)

but don't see how it bears on the PA.

In summary, after careful examination of the syntactic

evidence presented in support of the PA, I must conclude that it

fails to make the case.   There are just too many cases where the

restrictions are either too loose or too tight or simply false.

And this, coupled with the "you are hereby authorized..." cases

suggests that a syntactic motivation for the PA is not going to

succeed--at least not with the evidence thus far presented.

2.3   Other Arguments for the PA

In addition to the excellent paper by Ross, there are various

other attempts to support the basic PA program.   I will review

some of them here.[6]

2.3.1

Robin Lakoff (1969) discusses a variety of sentence types

in which the distribution of the indefinite quantifiers <u>some</u> and

<u>any</u> cannot be predicted on the basis of syntactic environment alone.

She presents examples such as

(2-58)   i)   If you eat {some} candy, I'll whip you.   (R.L. 4a)
        ii)   {any}

(2-59)   i)   If you eat {some spinach,} I'll give you ten dollars (R.L. 4b)
        ii)   {any   }

and argues as follows.   Sentence (2-58i) is conventionally taken

to be a promise, albeit a strange one since the sentence implies
that the hearer wants to be whipped; in addition, the sentence
implies that the speaker wants the hearer to eat some candy.
Sentence (2-58ii), on the other hand, has the opposite inter-
pretation: the sentence is conventionally taken to be a threat
or warning and implies that the hearer would not want to be
whipped, and that the speaker does not want the hearer to eat
any candy.

(2-59i) is usually taken as a promise with the implication
that the hearer would want ten dollars and the speaker wants the
hearer to eat some spinach. And the opposite with (2-59ii). The
thrust of her discussion is that in sentences like (2-60), where
the "Ø" is some neutral action with respect to the hearer,

(2-60) i)   If you draw $\left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{some}\\\text{any}\end{array}\right\}$ pictures on the wall, I'll Ø
        ii)

sentence (2-60i) is conventionally taken as a promise, while
(2-60ii) is taken as a threat, by virtue of the presence of <u>some</u>
in the first, <u>any</u> in the second.

R. Lakoff then goes one to remark that the sentences in
(2-58) and (2-59) are related to those in (2-61) and (2-62)

(2-61) I warn you that, if you eat $\left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{any}\\\text{*some}\end{array}\right\}$ candy, I'll whip you (R.L. 5a)

(2-62) I promise you that, if you eat $\left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{some}\\\text{*any}\end{array}\right\}$ spinach, I'll give you
        ten dollars (R.L. 5b)

and correctly observes that, assuming normal conventions of the
use of <u>warn</u> and <u>promise</u> and the normal attitudes of people towards
whipping and receiving money, the *'d sentences are infelicitious.
The choice of <u>some</u>/<u>any</u> corresponds to (2-58) and (2-61)/(2-59) and
(2-62), and the force of these sentences are the same, although

there is no verb <u>warn</u> or <u>promise</u> appearing in the surface

structure of the first two. She concludes that "it is difficult

to see how this could be predicted -- how both the meaning and

the syntactic properties could be accounted for together, and

the generalization achieved -- without performative abstract

verbs, operating in 4a (2-58) and 4b (2-59), parallel to real per-

formative verbs in 5a (2-61) and 5b(2-62)." (p.612)

Whereas I agree completely with the observations that, in

the examples presented, a <u>some</u> correlates with a positive dis-

position on the part of the speaker, an <u>any</u> with a negative dis-

position, I do not (predictably) agree with the conclusion that

the performative analysis is the answer. To support this opposition,

I want to consider some additional examples: first, other condi-

tional sentences which can be taken as threats or promises; second,

other examples of threats and promises.

Consider the examples in (2-63).

(2-63) i) I'll $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{help} \\ \text{whip} \end{Bmatrix}$ you if $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{any} \\ \text{some} \end{Bmatrix}$ students try that a second time.

   ii) I'll $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{help} \\ \text{whip} \end{Bmatrix}$ you if they try that at $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{some} \\ \text{any} \end{Bmatrix}$ other place.

(2-64) i) If you refuse $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{some} \\ \text{any} \end{Bmatrix}$ cheese, I'll help you.

   ii) If you refuse $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{some} \\ \text{*any} \end{Bmatrix}$ cheese, I'll whip you.

(2-65) If you have $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{any} \\ \text{?some} \end{Bmatrix}$ trouble, I'll $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{help} \\ \text{whip} \end{Bmatrix}$ you.

The examples in (2-63) show that conditional threats and promises

with the indefinite noun phrase in the non-object position permit

both the <u>some</u> and <u>any</u> form. While there is a subtle distinction

in interpretation carried by the <u>some/any</u> (a distinction I cannot

adequately state), interchanging <u>some</u> for <u>any</u> or vice-versa does

not change the force of these examples. Examples (2-64) show that

if the verb of the _if_-clause is _refuse_ (_leave_, _reject_), then the _some_ occurs with the sentence taken as a threat, and the _any_ with the sentence taken as a promise. Finally, when the verb of the _if_-clause is non-volitional such as _have_ (_need_, _want_) as in (2-65), the _any_ appears preferable for both threats and promises. The examples in (2-64) are perhaps the most interesting in that the positive or negative disposition of the speaker is not being carried by the _some_ and _any_. In (2-641), for example, the implication is that the speaker does _not want_ the hearer to reject some cheese, whereas the _some_, according to R. Lakoff's argumentation, should imply that the speaker _wants_ the rejection.

It may be that these three sorts of counterexamples will be accounted for through some existing analysis of quantifiers and/or verbs, or some analysis under development. For example, one could (and probably will) argue that the _any_ in (2-63) is not the same as that in (2-58) and (2-59). One could also argue that _refuse_ verbs as in (2-64) and non-volitional verbs as in (2-65) create special environments, either syntactic or semantic, and the _some_/_any_ distribution is thereby accounted for. When such analyses do appear and do account for the above facts, then we can re-examine the jump from (2-58 and (2-59) to the performative analysis conclusion. At present, all we have are some interesting cases where _some_ and _any_ distribute with promises and threats in the object position, of _if_-clauses of conditional sentences, with certain verbs.

Let us now briefly examine the distribution of _some_ and _any_ with promises and threats.

(2-66) i) I'll follow you $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{anywhere} \\ \text{?somewhere} \end{Bmatrix}$.

ii) I $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{promise} \\ \text{warn} \end{Bmatrix}$ you that I'll eat $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{any} \\ \text{*some} \end{Bmatrix}$ food before me.

iii) I'll leave $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{any} \\ \text{some} \end{Bmatrix}$ leftovers.

iv) I'll $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{help} \\ \text{whip} \end{Bmatrix}$ you before I talk to $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{someone} \\ \text{anyone} \end{Bmatrix}$.

v) I'm going to $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{help} \\ \text{whip} \end{Bmatrix}$ someone before the night is out.

(2-66i) with the <u>anywhere</u> can be taken as either a threat or promise; with <u>somewhere</u> it is strange as either. In (2-66ii) the <u>any</u> goes with either the threat or promise interpretation; the <u>some</u> with neither. Both <u>some</u> and <u>any</u> may occur in (2-66iii) as a threat ("You're not paying me enough so I'll leave some/any leftovers which you will have to clean up") or a promise ("Since you've been so helpful, I'll leave some/any leftovers"). Similarly with (2-66iv). Finally, in (2-66v), only <u>someone</u> is acceptable (still the indefinite <u>some</u>-stress is on the verb <u>whip</u> or <u>help</u>).

The distribution of <u>some</u> and <u>any</u> does not appear to correlate in any systematic way with promises and threats, either in general or even in conditional sentences. Perhaps subsequent analysis will show that the systematicity is really there, just obfuscated by the effect of other phenomena in the examples I've presented. If so, fine. But at present, there is no real case for arguing that <u>some</u> and <u>any</u> have a syntactic reflex which correlates with a speech act type.

As an aside, it's worth noting that the <u>some/any</u> association with the positive/negative speaker disposition appears in a variety of other cases, and appears to distinguish between force ambiguity.

For example, (2-67i)

(2-67) i) Should you eat $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{the}\\\text{some}\\\text{any}\end{array}\right\}$ cheese
      ii)
      iii)

can be taken either as a straightforward request for information
(with perhaps a positive position by the speaker), answerable by
yes or no, or a (polite) suggestion to stop eating the cheese.
But (2-67ii) is usually taken to be only a request for informa-
tion though the second interpretation is not excluded and (2-67iii)
is usually taken only as a suggestion to cease eating. Analogously,
in the sentence (2-68i)

(2-68) i) Can you pass $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{the}\\\text{some}\\\text{?any}\end{array}\right\}$ salt
      ii)
      iii)

may be taken as a request for information or a polite request
for action -- "Please pass me the salt." (2-68iii), however, seems
strange although the sentence "Can you see some/any people?" is
acceptable as a request for information. We will discuss such
cases in §4.

2.3.2

Additional syntactic arguments drawn from different sources
are presented by G. Lakoff (1970) in section IV, Performative Verbs,
in support of the PA. Although his statement of the PA differs
in detail from that given by Ross, the sense is the same and I
will not restate it.

The first argument concerns sentences like

(2-69) i)   Egg creams, I like (L.1)
      ii)   John says that egg creams, he likes (L.2)
      iii) *The fact that egg creams, he likes bothers John (L.3)
      iv)   *John dreamed that egg creams he liked (L.4)

Lakoff argues that (2-691) is formed by a rule of topicalization and though the rule can apply to clauses which are objects of verbs of saying ("actually a somewhat larger class including verbs of saying" (page 20)), it doesn't usually apply inside subject or other sorts of object complements. He concludes that if (2-691) has a higher <u>I say to you</u> at the point at which the topicalization rule applies, there can be a single environment for applicability: when the clause is the object of a verb of asking. Otherwise, "one would have to say that the rule applies either in the object of verbs of saying or in simple declarative sentences," (page 20).

The force of this argument is not that there is a syntactic phenomenon (e.g., the ERPs discussed earlier) which will be accounted for in a systematic way if the PA is adopted. Rather, a much weaker argument is being made: the statement of a transformational rule will be simplified from two to one environments of applicability. Thus, even if the argument goes through, its significance is less than those presented by Ross.

But examination of the facts suggests that the generalization Lakoff offers isn't correct. Topicalization may not occur when the clause is the object of a verb of saying, as the following sentences illustrate.

(2-70) i) *John reported that egg rolls, I gave to Mary.
        ii) *I deny that ice cream, I eat for dinner.
        iii) *He agreed that wheat germ, he has enough of.

(Note that the embedded object complement clause is an acceptable sentence with the topicalized NP when it stands as an independent clause.)

In addition, topicalization applies to a wide class of verbs, going well beyond verbs of saying.

(2-71) i)   I expect that ice cream she likes.
       ii) We know that rhubarb they can't eat.
       iii) I request that all electric wires you leave alone.
       iv) We guessed that even modern music he would dig.

The ground rules for this topicalization is the subject for further research. It seems clear that verbs of saying don't play a significant role.

The second argument involves sentences like

(2-72) i)   Never have I seen such impudence.
       ii) John said that never had he seen such impudence.
       iii) *The fact that never had he seen such impudence
            bothered John.
       iv) *John dreamed that never had he seen such impudence.

The form of the argument is the same. Lakoff claims that the rule of negative preposing [my term-he doesn't give it a name] applies in simple declaratives (2-72i), when the clause is the complement of a verb of saying (2-72ii), but not generally in other complements.

My approach here is similar to that above: to test whether verbs of saying are the significant element in the syntactic phenomenon under discussion. For these examples, I cannot find a significant number of cases where a sentence is unacceptable when an object of a verb of saying has undergone negative pre-posing. (Deny is one possible counterexample, as in"*I deny that never have I seen such a mess.") It appears that the clause be the object of a verb of saying, is a sufficient condition. However, the ranges of possible environments is far wider than object complements of verbs of saying.

(2-73) i) I realized that never had I seen that man before.
     ii) I asked that never should he be permitted to hear
        it again.
    iii) Harry thought that never had anyone ever evidenced
        such chuzhpah before.
    iv) Recall that never has that been tried before.
    v) Don't worry that never before did anyone succeed.

The necessary condition, that the clause be the object of a verb

of saying fails.

A third argument rests on the privilege of occurrence of

so with heavy stress, as in

(2-74) He did so eat the hot dog.

Examples are presented which, similarly, suggest that the so

occurs only in simple declarative sentences and in the object

complements of verbs of saying. But then, what about sentences

like

(2-75) i) I do so claim that John is silly.
     ii) I do so agree with you.
    iii) I do so admit to having peeked under the Christmas tree.

in which the speaker is claiming, agreeing, or admitting by virtue

of uttering the sentence. These would suggest a highest verb of

saying over the performative verb. But this runs directly counter

to a main claim of the PA.

Yet another argument involves sentences like

(2-76) i) Keep it to yourself (*himself, *myself, *herself).
     ii) Watch your (*his, *her, *my) step.
    iii) John told Mary to keep it to herself (*yourself, *himself)
    iv) We told John to watch his (*her, *my) step.

in which the acceptable pronoun in (2-76i-ii) is yourself and in

(2-76iii-iv) is co-referential with the indirect object of tell.

But I don't see how this supports the PA. The acceptable pronominal

form in the third and fourth examples follows from the fact that

the underlying subject of the embedded clause, deleted during the

derivation by the rule of Equi-NP Deletion is co-referential

with the indirect object of the higher verb, <u>tell</u>...   This

need not have been the case:

(2-77) John told Mary that they should watch their steps.

The first two examples follow from that part of the analysis

of imperative sentences to which presumably Lakoff agrees:

that <u>you</u> is the underlying subject. After all, there are sen-

tences like

(2-78) i)   You will keep it to yourself (*himself).
        ii) You will watch your (*my, *his) step.

to be accounted for, irrespective of the merits of the PA.

    Another argument asserts that sentences like

(2-79) It would be wise to wash yourself/myself (*herself, *himself).

are best explained by a higher <u>I</u> and <u>you</u>. But surely the under-

lying representation of (2-79) is something like

(2-80) It -- <u>for</u> NP to <u>wash</u> NP -- <u>would be wise</u>.

where the usual rule of reflexivization will apply to the embedded

clause, followed by Extraposition.

(2-81) i)   It would be wise for $\begin{Bmatrix} me \\ him \end{Bmatrix}$ to wash $\begin{Bmatrix} myself. \\ himself. \end{Bmatrix}$
        ii)

The issue, then, is not the acceptability of a particular reflex-

ive pronoun, but the conditions under which the underlying subject

can be deleted. When an "It is wise..." sentence is explicitly

embedded in another, higher, clause, as in (2-82)

(2-82) i)   John thought that it would be wise for him) to Ø
        ii) I admit that Harry will argue that it would be wise
             for me) to Ø [note that the <u>I</u> is not the subject of
             the next highest verb claimed necessary by Lakoff
             (p. 26)].

we can use the rule of Equi-Deletion, where the for NP must

be co-referential with some earlier NP. But, analogous to the

as for myself cases, the acceptability of the It would be wise

cases depends on the context in which the sentence is uttered.

(2-83) i) Kissinger told Agnew that it would be wise [for
the President] to order in the troops.
ii) John said to Mary that it would be stupid [for that
group of students] to try that.

The NP enclosed in []'s is the subject of the embedded clause

but is not present earlier in the sentence.

The remaining issue is how to account for the possibility

of deleting the I or you functioning as the clause subject. The

PA straightforwardly permits this deletion under conditions of

identity. I have no adequate counter proposal but point out

that NP's can be deleted in a variety of environments, in case

they refer to either the speaker or the sentence or the intended

audience. For example

(2-84) i) [You] go home.
ii) If the paper is completed [by me] by noon, the job's done.
iii) The job was well done [by you].
iv) That hurts [me].

An additional argument involves sentences containing paren-

thetical adverbial expressions (underlined) in (2-85).

(2-85) i) Why is John leaning, since you know so much.
ii) Since I'm tired, go home.
iii) John has left, in case you haven't heard.

I agree with Lakoff that in each case the adverbial clause does

not modify the main clause. He suggests that they modify a highest

verb ask, order and tell, respectively, above the main clause.

But note that these parentheticals can go with many types of speech

acts: they supply the reason for the performance of the act of

uttering the sentences (sometimes implying irony and sarcasm)

as the following examples illustrate.

(2-86) i)   Since you are sick, go home [ORDER]
        ii) Since I was asked to, I hereby christen this ship
             the S.S. Mistake [CHRISTENING]
       iii) Since it is raining, let's leave now [SUGGESTION]
        iv) Since it is getting late, I warn you to hurry [WARNING]
         v) Since I like ice cream, I will come to your party
                                                     [PROMISE]

In short, the speaker may offer a variety of explanations for

why he is performing a particular type of speech act, or he may

simply perform the act. Whether the proferred reason fits in

with the hearer's conception of an acceptable rationale is

usually independent from the sentence counting as the performance

of that act. (2-87i) counts as a promise and

(2-87) i)   Since I'm sick, I promise I'll be there on time.
        ii) Since you know so much, I christen this ship the
             S.S. Mistake

(2-87ii) as an act of christening, though the reasons given are

difficult to appreciate without additional information. But this

suggests that parenthetical statements or reason for performing

a speech act are without linguistic constraint (except for some

tense restrictions). They have no logical connection to the

speech act, nor to any performative verb present, and do not

support the PA.

A final case has been discussed in Bach (1971) and Baker

(1970) as well as the Lakoff article under discussion. It con-

cerns the interpretation of questions like

(2-88) Who remembers where John bought what books

which can have two sorts of answers:

(2-89) i)   Peter (and Harry and...) remember where John bought
             what books.
        ii) Peter remembers where John bought the green books,
             and Harry remembers where John bought the red books,
             and ...

The argument runs thus. Only one WH-word can be moved forward

in a clause and if one is moved, it is preposed to follow the

verb and controls it (however control should be taken to mean

here). The WH preposing of examples

(2-90) i)   I wonder where he went.
      ii) Let's ask where he went.
      iii) Where did he go?

will be accounted for by the same rule if (2-90iii) has a higher

controlling verb of asking. In addition, they argue that if each

WH-word is bound by a verb, the higher ask can account for the

individuation sense of (2-88) to which the answer (2-89ii) is

appropriate.

I don't see any way at the moment to argue that the higher

verb of asking doesn't or shouldn't exist. Both direct and

indirect questions are formed (roughly) in the same way, namely,

by bringing forward a WH-word. By definition, indirect questions

are embedded clauses; thus, there is a higher verb. The next step

is, naturally, to posit a higher abstract (performative) verb to

make as neat a generalization as possible.

However, it is not clear that the phenomenon of individuation

in questions and the higher verb of asking are related. Consider

the examples in (2-91).

(2-91) i)   Who bought which books?
       ii)   Which books were bought by whom?
       iii) Where John bought which books is known by whom?
       iv)   He wondered who bought which books.
       v)   Who wondered who bought which books?
       vi)   Who remembers which place John bought which books?
       vii) Who knows who remembers where John bought which books?
       viii) Which books does he know that Harry remembers John
             bought where?

In (2-91i), the individuation sense is the only acceptable inter-

pretation. Similarly for (2-91ii). But in (2-91iii), the
passive of (2-88), this sense is precluded. The only answer to
(2-91iii) is "...is known by John (and Mary and...)." In (2-91iv),
the sense is again that of individuation but in (2-91v), the
sense is otherwise. What is it that permits a verb like wonder
to have the individuation sense when in the independent clause
but precludes this sense in the dependent clause? A similar case
is (2-91vi), where the embedded clause has the individuation sense
but the entire sentence does not. Finally, example (2-91vii)
shows that when (2-88), which could have individuation sense
between the top who and the embedded which books is itself embed-
ded, the individuation sense is lost between any of the possible
WH-words.

An additional bit of potential counter-evidence concerns
echo questions. It is crucial to the PA that the presence or
absence of the highest performative verb be irrelevant to the
interpretation of the sentence. But in the following examples
when the performative verb remains the sentence is unacceptable.
(Heavy stress on the WH-word is indicated by caps.)

(2-92) i) WHO did you say came here?
           *I ask you to tell me WHO you said came here.
       ii) John saw WHAT over there?
           *I ask... John saw WHAT over there?

The performative PA clearly doesn't work correctly for echo
questions. Whether this is because echo questions are not
questions at all or are different in many other ways as well or
if the PA should treat these as special cases and obligatorily
delete the performative clause, I can't say.

2.4 Conclusion of PA Discussion

What, then, can we conclude from the material presented and discussed in this section? First, to my knowledge no one has suggested that there is in principle evidence which will bear on the question of whether or not the PA or something like it is a viable alternative for the task of pairing sentences with their force(s). It does appear, however, that the program detailed by Ross and supported by others is not syntactically motivated, as claimed, nor is its statement straightforward, though perhaps possible. I think it is fair to conclude that the evidence is far too weak and scattered to justify a significant theoretical innovation as the Performative Analysis.

Various linguists would argue today, however, that the Aspects framework or anything remotely resembling it is unacceptable. They maintain that there is a more acceptable alternative, namely Generative Semantics. This is not a forum for discussing the merits or demerits of either approach (or some third or fourth). I point out, however, that the PA falls easily within the Generative Semantics framework, as now conceived, and without the onus of syntactic justification. Within this framework, the issue is simply this: how are the generalizations between sentence sense and sentence force best captured?

3.0 A Meaning Approach to Conventional Use

The performative approach attempts to pair a sentence with its illocutionary force(s) by generating highest performative clauses in the underlying representation. In this section I

will present the outline of a very different approach, one in
which illocutionary force is taken to be a function of sentence
meaning.

General Statement

In its most general form, the approach is this. For each
sentence we have a syntactic, semantic, and phonological char-
acterization -- its grammatical description. (Whether the
semantic interpretation is a function of the underlying repre-
sentation alone or the entire derivation is irrelevant for our
purposes.) For each type of illocutionary act we have a set of
linguistic and contextual conditions which, when taken together,
constitute a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for an
utterance to count as the performance of that illocutionary act.
This division of conditions claims that there are requirements
on the performance of an illocutionary act which are characteris-
tically carried by the sentence as such, and independent of the
context in which the sentence is uttered. These conditions deter-
mine the eligibility of the utterance of the sentence to count
as the performance of a particular act. The aim of this approach
is to develop the principles which pair each sentence with the
illocutionary force(s) conventionally associated with it,
stressing particularly the role played by the linguistic con-
ditions.

Looking first at sentences, we maintain that the illocution-
ary force of a sentence is a function of sentence meaning but it
is not a function of the sentence form: syntactic structure or

phonological shape. Of course insofar as meaning is a function

of syntactic or phonetic considerations, these aspects of a

sentence are relevant. What this restriction amounts to is

the claim that (i) transformations do not affect sentence force

(since transformations are meaning-preserving), and (ii) optional

variation of stress and intonation as well as substitution of
synonymous lexical items do not affect sentence force. This
claim would be contradicted : ', for example, the force(s) asso-
ciated with an active sentence and its passive form is not the
same or, if by replacing optometrist with eye doctor or bállet
with ballét, a change of sentence force resulted.

Following Katz (1971) in spirit though not in detail, we
distinguish between the propositional content of a sentence
(what proposition is expressed when the sentence is uttered) and
the propositional type of a sentence. For our purposes, a pro-
position can be thought of as a statement of sentence referents
and what is predicated of them. The propositional type provides
information on how the proposition is to be taken.[7] For example,
in the following example,

(3-1)   i)   You will be here on time.
        ii) Will you be here on time?
        iii) Be here on time.
        iv) I suggest that you be here on time.

the propositional content is the same: you will be here on time.
However, in (3-1i) the propositional type is Predictive: the
speaker is claiming that being on time will be true of the hearer.
In (3-1ii) the propositional type is Questive: the speaker is
asking if being on time will be true of the hearer. In (3-1iii)
the type is Requestive; the speaker is asking that the hearer
take action to be on time. And (3-1iv) has a Suggestive proposi-
tional type; the speaker is recommending to the hearer that he
be here on time. The propositional type of the first three
examples is carried by the syntactic form of the sentence; in
the fourth, the performative verb determines the propositional

type. We will see below that the propositional type will play an important role in determination of sentence force. For the present we will assume that each performative verb is paired with one and only one propositional type. Further, we speculate that propositional types are, in general, analyzable into a combination of less complex propositional types. We will not discuss this possibility here.

Turning now to the anlaysis of illocutionary acts, we note that Searle (1969) identifies four types of conditions: Propositional Content, Preparatory, Sincerity, and Essential. However, for this discussion I find it more useful to make the distinction between linguistic and contextual conditions: the linguistic conditions are satisfied by the sentence, the contextual conditions by the context of the utterance of that sentence.

To view the range of conditions on the performance of an illocutionary act, we consider the illocutionary act of promising which, according to Searle, (ibid), requires satisfaction of at least the following conditions:

(3-2)   i)   The speaker expresses the proposition P in the
              utterance of the sentence.

       ii)   In expressing P, the speaker predicates a future act
              A of himself.

      iii)   The speaker intends that the utterance of the sentences
              will place him under the obligation to do A.

       iv)   The speaker intends to do A.

        v)   The hearer prefers the speaker's doing A to his not
              doing it and the speaker believes this to be the case.

       vi)   It is not obvious to either the speaker or hearer
              that the speaker will perform A in the normal course of
              events.

Whether or not these conditions accurately reflect the require-
ments on promising, they do show that some are clearly linguistic
(for example (3-21-ii)) and others are clearly contextual (for
example (3-2vi)).

We will stipulate the linguistic conditions on an illocu-
tionary act in the following way. We assume that each performa-
tive verb corresponds to one and only one illocutionary act.
Abstracting away from the specific details, each sentence contain-
ing a performative verb places syntactic conditions on the embed-
ded clause both in terms of propositional content and propositional
type, and semantically entails certain propositions. We hold
the linguistic conditions for an illocutionary act A to be just
those syntactic conditions and semantically entailed propositions
of sentences containing the performative verb corresponding to A.
Sentences containing the performative verb _promise_, for example,
have the following linguistic conditions.

(3-3)   i)   The speaker expresses a proposition with a future
             tense and an assertive propositional type.

       ii)   The speaker intends to act to insure the truth of
             the future proposition.

      iii)   The speaker undertakes the obligation to act to
             insure the truth of the future proposition.

       iv)   The speaker believes that his action is in the hearer's
             best interests.

These semantic entailments correspond roughly to conditions
(3-21-v). That each of the conditions is indeed linguistic can
be shown by violating the condition and noting that the sentence
ceases to be counted as a promise.

(3-4)   i)   *I promise that you have left

       ii)   I promise to help you but I don't intend to

iii) I promise to help you but I don't have to.

iv) ⊥ promise to help you though I know you don't want me to.

It is important that the semantic linguistic conditions on an illocutionary act are defined in general as semantic entailments on sentences containing the performative verb which corresponds to the act. This means that any disagreement about X being a non-syntactic linguistic condition on performing illocutionary act A is settled by determining whether X is semantically entailed by the sentence containing the performative verb A. We will see below that some linguistic conditions are more important than others.

For the purposes of examining the ways in which sentence-meaning is related to sentence force, we establish the following correspondences: Explicit; Underdetermined; and Idiomatic. We now briefly characterize each of these relationships. Of course, when a sentence has more than one force, the relationship between the sentence and each of its forces may be different.

Explicit

This type of relationship obtains when the sentence contains a performative verb. Example (3-5) illustrates such sentences.

(3-5)   i)   I promise to be home on time.
        ii) I request you stay in bed.
        iii) I confess that I broke the vase.

The pairing of the appropriate sentence force with the examples in (3-5) is trivial. The linguistic conditions on each illocutionary act are defined as the syntactic conditions on the embedded proposition and the semantic entailments of the sentence containing the performative verb associated with that act (e.g., promise-Promising; admit-Admission). Since these sentences each contain

a performative verb, they necessarily have the force of the

act named by the verb. Or simply, for these cases, the force

is the name of the propositional type.

In (3-51) the future proposition which the speaker obliges

himself to affect is spelled out as the embedded clause and his

role is clear: the speaker must get home on time for the proposi-

tion to be true. Similarly for (3-5iii). In a sentence like

(3-6i), the future proposition is certainly clear but the action

to which the speaker obliges himself is not obvious.

(3-6)   i)   I promise that John will be home on time.
        ii) I request that Mary be allowed to leave.

Similarly for (3-6ii). In such cases when the nature of the action

predicated of the speaker or the hearer is not explicit, the in-

terpretation is

(3-7)   i)   I promise to do what is necessary such that...
        ii) I request that you do whatever is necessary such
             that...

For such case we tentatively posit a rule of semantic interpre-

tation

(3-8)   Whenever the meaning of a performative verb entails
        the predication of some act A of referent R, and when
        this predication is not explicitly part of the pro-
        position P, interpret P as "R do whatever is necessary
        that P."

There are three related cases. First, in sentences like

(3-9)   i)   I promise that I undertake the obligation to go.
        ii) I confess that the foul deed was done by me.

part of the meaning of _promise_ and _confess_ has been made explicit

in the embedded clause: the undertaking of the obligation and

the admission that the deed was a foul one. We might characterize

these as cases where meaning overdetermines force or where there is meaning redundancy which is relevant to force determination. I see no difficulty in handling such cases.

The second case concerns ambiguous sentences in which one leg of the ambiguity fol'ws from the performative use of the verb, the other from the habitual use. (3-51), for example, can be both a promise and a report about the speaker's habitual actions; e.g. a child's answer to the question "How come you are allowed to leave just before dinner to go out and play?" There is a clear force-ambiguity in these cases which is directly reflected in the meaning-ambiguity. Most performative verbs can be used in the habitual sense.

The third related case involves sentences like

(3-10) i)   I promise that I wanted to go.
      ii) I confess that I will try.

where the embedded clause fails to meet the syntactic restrictions on the highest verb when used performatively. (3-10i) fails in two ways: the embedded clause is in the past thereby failing to specify some future proposition, and its verb denotes a state (wanting) rather than an action. (3-10ii) fails to have the force of a confession because the embedded clause specifies a future rather than a past proposition. The verbs promise and confess are not being used performatively, and appear to be a coding for some other performative verb. The sentence-force of (3-10i) is that of swearing; in (3-10ii) that of admitting. Whether this coding is conventional or not is open.

Underdetermined

These are cases in which sentence-meaning underdetermines sentence-force and are by far the most challenging. Sentences like

(3-11)   i)   I will try.
           ii) Try to see.

are conventionally used to perform a range of illocutionary acts. For example, performing the act of promising, threatering, warning and predicting all require that the speaker express a proposition with a future time and an Assertive propositional type. (3-11i) does contain such a proposition and thus meets the syntactic condition of these four types of illocutionary acts. Similarly, (3-11ii) meets the syntactic linguistic condition of a Requestive propositional type and thus might count as an order, request, plea, etc. There are many similar equivalence classes which bind sets of illocutionary acts. Since there is no additional information carried by these sentences which indicates if the semartic linguistic conditions of the different acts are met, e.g., if the speaker is undertaking an obligation, that the future proposition, if true, constitutes a danger to the hearer, and so forth, we will say that, in cases such as (3-11i), the sentence has the incomplete force of a promise or a threat, etc., and for (3-11ii), the incomplete force of an order, a command, etc. Of course, (3-11i) can be USED as a promise or threat, etc.; the point here is that its force is not determined explicitly by sentence-meaning.

A second sort of underdetermined pairing involves sentences like (3-12).

(3-12)   I hereby undertake the obligation to go.

50

which contains the performative verb <u>undertake the obligation</u>
and has the corresponding force. But (3-12) also meets lin-
guistic conditions (3-3) on promising except for (3-31v).
Promising and undertaking an obligation differ in that the
former but not the latter requires the favorable disposition
of the hearer towards the future speaker-action. (3-12)
explicitly has the force of undertaking an obligation and incom-
pletely the force of a promise.

Idiomatic

Semantic-idiomaticity arises when the meaning of a consti-
tuent is not a compositional function of the meaning of its parts
(cf. Fraser, 1970). The limiting case is a single lexical item
(e.g., <u>bottle</u>) and runs through phrases (e.g., <u>kick the bucket</u>)
up to and including entire clauses (e.g., "The cat has got his
tongue"). The possibility of a corresponding force-idiomaticity
arises in case the force of a sentence is not a function of its
meaning.

One potential set of examples involves expressions like

(3-13)   i)   Buzz off.
         ii)   Scram.
        'ii)   Vamoose.
         iv)   I order you to leave my present location.

which have the force of a strong request (an order) to leave the
location of the speaker. The examples (3-13i-iii) certainly
have the same force, and, if they have any meaning, they have
identical meaning to (3-13iv). Alternatively, one might argue
that the examples in (3-13i-iii) have no meaning and their only
interpretation is their force. However, it is possible to refer
to such expressions as in

(3-14)   He told me to buzz off, but I wouldn't leave.

where buzz off appears to have the meaning of to leave. These

cases do not strongly support the position that there is force-

idiomaticity.

A more convincing case involves why-questions. A sentence

like

(3-15)   Why don't you come over here?

has the force of a request for information ("Because I don't like

you.") and, when the verb is volitional, the force of an invita-

tion ("O.K., I will in a minute."). The request for information

force follows directly from the sentence meaning and the linguistic

conditions on requesting. But it is not obvious that invitation

force follows from sentence meaning either directly or in terms

of some general principles of interpretation. Lacking such

principles, we treat this pairing as force-idiomatic and define

a special convention:

(3-16)   A sentence of the form Why don't you Ø has
           the proposition type Polite Request.

In short, a why don't you sentence is a request with a mitigated

effect, thus an invitation. But this identification of force was

only partly a function of sentence meaning; the other part was by

fiat. As we learn more about the way in which sentence meaning

and sentence force interact, I would anticipate many of these

force-idioms to be non-idioms and to follow directly from the

sentence meaning and some general principles of force interpre-

tation.[8]

In summary, I have proposed that there are three basic ways in which a sentence can be related to its force(s). The first, the explicit, involves a performative verb which carries the sentence force. The second, the underdetermined, involves pairing an equivalence class of forces with a sentence which satisfies some but not all of the linguistic conditions. The third, the idiomatic, involves pairing a sentence with a force at least in part by fiat. We will now examine several complex cases to see how their forces might be accounted for.

3.2 Some Examples

May-questions

I will assume but not justify the assumption that there are at least three senses of may. The sentence

(3-17)   John may leave now.

is ambiguous: the speaker is either expressing his opinion about a possibility of John leaving (opinion sense), giving permission for John to leave (permission sense), or reporting on the availability of John's leaving (availability sense). That the first sense of may can never occur in a may-question follows from the strangeness of requesting information on one's own opinions.

Consider sentences of the for may-NP-∅.

(3-18)   i)   May I leave now?
         ii) May anyone come in now?
         iii) May I have the salt?
         iv) May I get you a cup of tea?

(3-18i) has the force of a request for permission; (3-18ii) the force of a request for information; (3-18iii) the force of a request for hearer's physical action; and (3-18iv) the force of making an offer. (Each of these sentences may have more than one force but we will ignore this force-ambiguity for the moment.) That the first three examples are requests of some sort is predictable from the syntactic form of the sentence; the offer force of the fourth is not immediately obvious. We first examine the conditions on a may-question which permit it to have one or more of these request forces and then observes how the fourth offer case fits in with the others.

I can find only one restriction on a may-question which prevents it from having the force of a request for permission: the surface structure subject may not be you. The following examples illustrate this.

(3-19)   May i)   I go?
              ii)   I be exempted from the exam?
            iii)   John leave?
             iv)   *you go?

This exception may or may not follow from the syntactic analysis given to the modal may with the permissive sense. The explanation would appear to lie, however, in the strangeness of someone giving himself permission to do something. I suppose that if one finds "Do you permit yourself to go" acceptable, then (3-19iv) will also be acceptable. I find them both strange.

Sentences like

(3-20)   i)   May anyone come in?
            ii)   May I leave now?
          iii)   May you do that at this point?

have the force of a request for information <u>about</u> permission.
The hearer is being asked if he has any information which indicates
that the action being questioned is not permissible. An appro-
priate answer to the examples in (3-20) is "As far as I know."
I can find no restrictions on a <u>may</u>-question which will block it
from having the force of a request for information about permission.
Note that even the <u>may you</u> sequences are acceptable here. If we
are correct in assuming that <u>may</u> has both a permissive and an
availability sense, the pairing of each of these forces with a
<u>may</u>-question is directly a function of the meaning; a question
like (3-20ii) is semantically ambiguous.

In contrast to these first two types, the possibility of a
<u>may</u>-question having the force of a request for action is quite
limited. As a first approximation, I offer the following condi-
tions:

(3-21)   A <u>may</u>-question has the force of a request for action if

          i) the surface structure subject is first person (<u>I</u>, <u>we</u>)
   and ii) the verb is "receptive" or the sentence is in the
            passive form.

The term "receptive" denotes a verb which describes an action or
state in which the subject receives the effect of the action: for
example, <u>have</u>, <u>receive</u>, <u>obtain</u>, <u>hold</u>, <u>smell</u>, <u>feel</u>, <u>try</u>, and so
forth. I don't know if this group forms any natural syntactic
or semantic class. The following examples are sentences with a
request for action force.

(3-22)   i) May I hold the baby?
     ii) May I have the salt?
    iii) May we hear the radio now?
     iv) May I be escorted into the room?

I take the _may_ in these examples to have the permissive sense and do not take the sentences as semantically ambiguous. Yet each is standardly used to perform both the illocutionary act of requesting permission and requesting action. (3-221), for example, can count as a request for the hearer to give the baby to the speaker. But there is nothing in the meaning of this sentence which involves "giving" or any other related action.

One approach is to treat this pairing as an idiom and define the following special convention:

(3-23)   A _may_-question with a first person subject and a
            [+Receptive] main verb or passive form has the
            force of a request for hearer action.

The hearer action is unspecified in the receptive verb case:
it is (cf. 3-8) whatever is necessary to bring about the state requested by the speaker. The action in the passive case is whatever is specified by the verb. But I find this approach unsatisfactory since it assumes that there is nothing systematic about the pairing.

Alternatively, we can argue in the following way.

(3-24)   i)   Linguistic conditions on a request for permis-
                 sion include the speaker predicating a future act
                 of someone other than the hearer and the speaker
                 indicating a desire for this act to be carried out.

            ii) Linguistic conditions on a request for hearer
                 action include the speaker predicating a future
                 act of the hearer and the speaker indicating a
                 desire for the act to be carried out.

            iii) In questions with permissive-_may_ in which the verb
                 is receptive or the sentence has the passive form,
                 the speaker makes a request for permission for
                 something to happen to himself, e.g., hold the
                 baby, obtain the salt, etc.

iv) The hearer of the utterance of such a sentence can reasonably infer that since the speaker has requested something happen to him and indicated a desire for this to happen to him, that the speaker would approve of the hearer doing whatever is necessary to carry out the act.

Statements (3-24 i-iii) lie within the domain of the meaning of the sentence. Statement (3-24iv) specifies a way in which this meaning and some theory of conversation interact. Perhaps such a theory of conversation (c.f. Grice, 1968) should be included as a part of linguistic competence and thus a part of the grammar. We will not explore this issue here.

That may-questions have the force of an offer might be accounted for by a special convention:

(3-25)   A may-question which has a first person subject, second person object and which is in the active form with a volitional verb has the force of an offer.

But again, this assumes no systematicity of the pairing. Alternatively we can argue

(3-26)   i) Same as (3-24i)

ii) Linguistic conditions on an offer include the speaker predicating a future act of himself which (act) affects the hearer, and the speaker indicating a willingness to carry out the act.

iii) In questions with permissive-may in which the speaker is the subject and the object of the volitional verb is either the hearer (you) or someone associated with the hearer (your wife), the speaker makes a request for permission to carry out some act that affects the hearer.

iv) Sentences as characterized in (iii) above appear to satisfy the linguistic conditions on an offer as stated in (ii) above.

Thus, it appears that the force of an offer which is paired with certain may-questions (cf. 3-25) follows directly from the meaning

of these sentences and the linguistic conditions on the illocution-
ary act of offering. The following sentences all have the force
of an offer.

(3-27)   i)   May I find you a better basket.
          ii) May we take your coat.
          iii) May I bring your wife home tonight.
          iv) May I belt you in the mouth.

Note that (3-27iv) counts as an offer, albeit one that is not
likely to be taken up.

To summarize the discussion of may-questions, we ave noted that
when the may has the availability sense, the question has the force of
a request for information about permission. When the may has
the permissive sense, the sentence always has the force of a re-
quest for permission (except where the surface structure subject
is you), and may have the force of a request for hearer action or
an offer. The request for hearer action force does not appear to
follow completely from the meaning of the sentence and linguistic
conditions on the illocutionary act of requesting, while the offer
force does appear to follow.

Pseudo Conditionals

Consider the sentences in (3-28).

(3-28)   i)   If you take the box -- then ⎫
          ii) Take the box -- and   ⎬ I'll ẅ you.
          iii) Don't take the box -- or ⎭

These three examples appear semantically synonymous and a good
case can be made for deriving the second and third from the first.
The forces of the three, however, are not the same. (3-28i) has
the force of a threat, a warning, a promise, and a prediction.

Similarly for (3-28ii). But (3-28iii) can not have the force of

a promise. No matter what ∅ is taken as, sentences like (3-29)

do not conventionally count as promises.

(3-29)   i) Don't take the box or I give you $1000.
         ii) Don't talk or I'll help you.
       iii) Don't deny it or I'll get you loose.

That (3-28) has at least the four forces of a threat, warning,

promise and prediction follows from the meaning of the main

clause of the sentences. That (3-28iii) cannot be a promise

may follow from the meaning of not plus or, but I have no adequate

analysis. Even if this is the case, it does not necessarily mean

that the sentences in (3-28) are not synonymous -- the not...or

may be taken as equivalent to ...and..., and if...then...[9]

Can-questions

Can-questions, like may-questions, exhibit a variety of

forces, which derive only partly from the multiple sense of can.

Let us assume that can has both a sense of permission and a sense

of ability, and consider the sentences in (3-30)

(3-30)   i) Can I talk to John?
        ii) Can you see the boat?
      iii) Can John go home?
       iv) Can you pass me the salt?

(3-30i) has the force of a request for permission (the permissive

sense of can) but not of a request for information, since in

general one cannot question his own ability. (3-30ii) has the

force of a request for information (the ability sense) but not

permission since in general one does not give himself permission.

(3-30iii) has both forces. These facts follow from the co-oc-

currence restrictions of subject noun phrases with the two senses

of <u>can</u>. The determination of sentence force in (3-30i-iii)
follows directly from sentence meaning and the linguistic
conditions on the two illocutionary acts of requesting per-
mission and requesting information. (3-30iv), however, has
both the force of a request for information   d a request for
action, analogous to "May I have the salt?" This particular
duality of sentence force has been noticed and commented on
informally by nearly everyone interested in the area of illo-
cutionary acts with the predictable lack of agreement. One
reasonable line of argument runs along the following lines:

(3-31)   i)   A linguistic condition on the act of requesting
               includes the speaker indicating that he believes
               that the hearer be able to carry out the act
               specified (The sentence "I request you come here
               but I know you can't" is semantically contradictory.)

         ii)   A <u>can</u>-question in the active form in which the
               subject is <u>you</u>, and the verb volitional, requests
               information about whether or not the hearer has
               the ability to perform some act.

        iii)   If a sentence like (   ) is uttered in a con-
               text in which the speaker and hearer both know that
               the hearer has the ability to carry out the act,
               then the request for information force is obviously
               not what was intended by the speaker. If not a
               request for information, then what?... A request
               for action.

Statements (3-31i-ii) deal with sentence meaning and the lin-
guistic conditions on the act of requesting. Statement (3-31iii)
is well outside this area and in some theory of conversation.
One might argue that this determination of force is not so indirect
by claiming that, in general, when one of the linguistic condi-
tions of an illocutionary act is questioned, the force is that of
the act itself. But the relationship is surely not so straight-
forward. First, the speakers of sentences like

(3-32) i)   Is it possible for you to pass the salt
       ii) Are you able to pass the salt
      iii) Is it within your ability to pass the salt

are all asking about the hearer's ability to pass the salt. But
whereas (3-30iv) is a simple request for action, however it is
to be determined, the sentences in (3-32) all carry with them
some sense of impatience or sarcasm. Second, sentences like

(3-33) i)   Can you bring me the paint
       ii) Can you move your car
      iii) Can you find your own seat

do not have the force of a request for action, standardly, unless
the context in which they are uttered erases the request for in-
formation force from consideration. For example, these sentences
would normally have only the request for information force in a
telephone conversation. It appears that to account for the re-
quest for action force of such sentences indeed requires assump-
tions about the context in which they are uttered. This, of
course, is not the case for sentences in which the meaning more
fully determines force.

Illocutionary Force Anaphora

        As a final example, consider the sentences in (3-34).

(3-34)   John said that he would go but I didn't believe his

        i)   promise
       ii) *admission

What we have here is the name of the illocutionary act (promise
and admission) referring back to what John is reported to have
said. The grammar must account for the fact that what the speaker
reports John to have said does not satisfy the linguistic require-
ments for conventionally making an admission but does, at least

minimally, satisfy those for making a promise. If the under-
lying representation for (3-34) contains the proposition "I will
go" with the "I" referring to John and the propositional type
is Assertive, then, in line with the previous discussion, the
acceptability of (3-341) but not (3-3411) might well be straight-
forward. But this remains to be seen.

4.   Conclusion

The main point of the paper has been to bring into sharper
focus the issue of the way in which a grammar must account for
the speaker's knowledge of sentence force as opposed to sentence
form or meaning and the way in which this force is related to a
sentence. The Performative Analysis, if correct, would provide
a neat account of sentence force. All sentences would have the
general form: Illocutionary Force Indicator-Propositional Con-
tent, where the illocutionary force indicator would be the highest
performative clause. Unfortunately, this theoretical suggestion
runs afoul of a variety of counterevidence and must be rejected,
at least on the basis of available support. Alternatively I
suggested an approach by which sentence force is a function of
sentence meaning, analogous to the work in semantics to show sen-
tence meaning to be a function of constituent meaning and sen-
tence form. I suggested that there were at least three types of
relationships between sentence meaning and sentence force (ex-
plicit; underdetermined; and idiomatic) and discussed some
examples of each.

I think the best conclusion to draw from all of this is that

we have barely begun to understand the correspondence between
sentences and illocutionary acts. We don't know what aspects of
sentence meaning are most relevant, just how gener.l is the
function which maps sentences onto forces, to what extent illo-
cutionary acts can be said to have disjunct sets of linguistic
conditions, or to what extent a theory of conversation interacts
with a determination of conventional force and if such a theory
should be included as part of the grammar. These, and other
questions, await investigation.

Notes

2. I will use terms such as <u>illocutionary force</u>, <u>illocutionary act</u>, <u>speech act</u> and <u>performative verb</u> in the sense of Searle, 1969. As an aid to exposition, I will frequently use <u>force</u> for <u>illocutionary force</u> and speak of sentences having a <u>force</u> rather than a <u>potential force</u>. Finally, I will use the phrase "performative verb" as a shorthand for "a verb which is being used performatively in the sentence."

3. While it is possible to have a single sentence force with disjunct parts

      i) I order you to sit down or go home.

it is not possible to have a conjoined sentence with <u>or</u> in which each conjunct has a distinct force

      ii) I order you to stop or I promise to go home.
      iii) I admit I did it or I christen this ship the
                S.S. Flub.

4. Steve Anderson independently noticed many of the following syntactic counterexamples and presented them in an unpublished

5. Ross doesn't refer to the pronouns under consideration as
ERP's but only as reflexives or reflexive pronouns. However,
there are clearly a number of ways in which these pronouns are
of a different sort from the pronouns in sentences like "John
shot himself" or "I pride myself in being punctual." For example

a) They always carry some stress, though not always
emphatic.

b) They occur in embedded clauses -- the point of Ross'
arguments.

c) They do not abide by the Crossover Principle.

i) It wasn't only John and himself that he awarded
a prize to.

ii) My feet have been washed by only Mary and myself.

6. There are various unpublished arguments intended to support
the PA. I will not review them here.

7. Searle (1969) distinguishes between a propositional indicator
and an illocutionary force indicator and uses as an example the
sentence "I promise that I will come" in which the difference
between the indicator of illocutionary force ("I promise") and
the indicator of propositional content ("that I will come") lies
right on the surface. However, for many sentences the term
"illocutionary force indicator" is misleading whereas the term
"propositional type" is less so.

8. There is always the danger that sentence-force pairings will

principles. On the other hand, this category can be thought of as the reservoir of unsolved pairings -- the task is to reduce cases of force-idiomaticity to a minimum.

9. These examples may constitute counterevidence to the claim that transformations do not change force. Note also that passive sentences with I subject can be requests for actions ("May I be included on this list") while the corresponding active form does not have this force ("May you include me on this list"). However, the two cases with may don't mean the same thing and perhaps the passive transformation is obligatory here. Or perhaps will and may have some relationship as in the pair: "Will you include me" -- "May I be included."

References

Austin, J., 1962, How To Do Things With Words, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Bach, E., 1971, "Questions", Linguistic Inquiry, Vol. II, No. 2, pp. 153-166.

Baker, L. 1970, "Notes on the Description of English Questions," Foundations of Language, pp. 197-219.

Fraser, B., 1970a, "Idioms Within a Transformational Grammar," Foundations of Language No. 6, pp. 22-42.

Fraser, B., 1970b, "Reply to 'On Declarative Sentences'," in Harvard Computational Laboratory Report No. 25, Harvard University.

Grice, P., 1968, "Utterer's Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning," Foundations of Language No. 4, pp. 1-18.

Katz, J., in press, Semantic Theory, Harper & Row, New York.

Lakoff, G., 1970, Linguistics and Natural Logic, Studies in Generative Semantics No. 1, The University of Michigan.

Lakoff, R., 1969, "Some Reasons Why There Can't be Any some-any Rule," Language Vol. 45, No.3, pp. 608-615.

Ross, J.R., 1970, "On Declarative Sentences," in R. Jacobs and P. Rosenbaum (eds.), Readings in Transformational Grammar, Ginn and Co.

Searle, J., 1969, Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press.