DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 055 470   FL 002 308

AUTHOR   Fishman, Joshua A.
TITLE   Nationality-Nationalism and Nation-Nationism.
PUB DATE   68
NOTE   13p.; Offprint from Language Problems of Developing
              Nations, p39-51

ABSTRACT
              The process of national integration does not
necessarily require monolingualism. The western, post-Versailles,
intellectual heritage prompts contemporary sociologists to assume
that cultural and linguistic differences automatically tend toward
demands for nation formation and language recognition. Countries like
India prove otherwise. Not all language differences that exist are
noted, let alone ideologized. Conscious and even ideologized language
differences need not be divisive. In the new nations of Africa and
Asia, diglossia is extremely widespread and each language has its own
functionally exlusive domain. Most new nations of Africa and Asia are
not yet ethnic nations, which tends to reinforce diglossia
conditions. African languages have rarely become symbolic of the
quest for nationhood. Diglossia could easily remain a way of life for
new nations. (VM)

Joshua A. Fishman

NATIONALITY-NATIONALISM AND NATION-NATIONISM

The relationship between language and nationalism is a central topic for all those concerned with the language problems of the developing nations. The term nationalism proves to be a particularly troublesome one, however, because it pertains simultaneously to nation and to nationality, two concepts that require rather more careful differentiation than they have usually received.

I suggest that the word nation be reconsidered as a politico-geographic entity (otherwise referred to as country, polity, state) such as might qualify for membership in the United Nations. A nation may present *no* high degree of sociocultural unity, and, indeed, nations vary greatly in the extent to which they possess such unity within their borders. Those who choose to ignore this often confuse the separate questions of political community and sociological community—each having very definite language needs that frequently go unrecognized by the others.

"Nationality," on the other hand, might best be reconsidered as a sociocultural entity that may have no corresponding politico-geographic realization. Its discriminanda are essentially at the level of authenticity and solidarity of group behaviors and group values, rather than at the level of governmental, politico-geographical realizations and implementations. The advantage of separating these two kinds of national integration (both terminologically and conceptually) is that such separation provides greater insight into *why* social solidarity is not a precondition for the existence of a national political community and into *how* a national political community can attain such solidarity in successive steps.

"Nation" signifies something different for Americans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Eastern Europeans, not to mention Africans and Asians. I have selected a meaning of the term for elaboration here that is closer to the everyday American than to other meanings. The traditional distinction drawn between nation and state in political science is not unrelated to the distinction I seek to make, but it fails to reflect in the labels selected the developmental relationship between the two entities.[1] The

39

further fact that much of modern political science proceeds comfortably *without* the notion of nationalism, merely means that it is not deeply concerned with the ideological-emotional components of attachment to nationality and to nations. This lack of concern may indicate an unconscious American intellectual bias, which is all the more unfortunate because of the aura of objectivity in which it is cloaked.

The reason for the widespread confusion concerning the meaning of nationalism in many Western tongues is quite simply that the past several centuries (and particularly the past five decades) have witnessed the successful acquisition on the part of many *nationalities* of their own politico-geographic entities, or *nations*.[2] The driving or organizing dynamic in this nationality-into-nation process has been referred to as *nationalism*. The trio (nationality, nationalism, and nation) would not be so troublesome to us today if the process of nationality-into-nation had stopped at the boundaries of the nationalities purportedly involved, that is, if all nations had initially been or remained *single-nationality nations*. However, history is no great respecter of terminology and nations have constantly gone on to absorb and consolidate territories peopled by quite different nationalities, and this process (which is essentially past the nationality-into-nation stage) has also been referred to as "nationalism."

Finally, to make matters even more troublesome, the processes by which nationalities *themselves* were formed, out of prior (indeed primordial) tradition-bound ethnic groups, has also been referred to as *nationalism*.[3] Thus the term utilized to designate the nationality-into-nation process has also been *extended backward* to refer to a formative, dynamic period coming *before* the nationality-into-nation transition at the same time that it has been *extended forward* to refer to a formative, dynamic period coming *after* the nationality-into-nation transition.

Obviously, the term nationalism has been given too great a burden to carry, without sufficient clarity as to what the *underlying* phenomenon is that ties all of these uses together. If *this* could be clarified, then the role of language in each of these stages or kinds of nationalism might also become clearer.

It seems to me that we have here two separate but relatable continua (nationality and nation), each capable of successive transmutations and cumulative symbolic elaborations of their pre-existing stages.

THE SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF SOCIOCULTURAL
INTEGRATION: NATIONALISMS

At the sociocultural level it is the *transition between ethnic group and nationality* that is initially crucial to our immediate purpose (although prior transitions occurred along the band-to-clan stages). As a result of symbolic elaboration the daily rounds of life that constitute traditional

ethnicity (including ways of speaking, dressing, harvesting, cooking, cele-
brating, worshipping, etc.) come to be viewed not as minimally ideolo-
gized (which is not to say unrationalized), localized, and particularized
"innocent" acts but, rather, as expressions of common history, common
values, common missions, longings, goals, etc.[4]

This awareness of basic or *underlying unity* in the presence of and in
preference to seemingly *disparate appearances* may come in the face of
common superordinate threat, or after conquest of one group by another
or, at times, by intermarriage and peaceful diffusion and assimilation.
What is crucial, however, is the *ideologized transformation*, the more
inclusive (or exclusive) and conscious point of view, that has been erected
over behaviors that had hitherto existed on a more localized, traditional-
ized, and routinized scale. This process of transformation from frag-
mentary and tradition-bound ethnicity to unifying and ideologized na-
tionality may well be called nationalism.[5] If it is so called, however, it
should be referred to as nationalism$_a$ ("sub *a*") in recognition of the fact
that it is only the first of many transformations of sociocultural integra-
tion yet to come.[6] Certainly many developing countries are witnessing
exactly *this* kind of transformation from ethnicity to nationality among
certain population segments at this very time. Language, too, comes to be
viewed differently in this process, as the actual range of varieties in the
nationality-conscious-speech community expands and as distinctions be-
tween locals, nationals, and marginals obtain. By way of contrast much of
Western Europe has gone through several successive transmutations: first
from ethnicity to nationality, then from nationality to larger nationality,
and, in some cases, from larger nationality to even more inclusive nation-
ality—each transmutation bringing with it characteristic changes in
repertoire-range and attitudes.[7] This consideration, however, brings us to
another dimension—the politico-geographic base on which these socio-
cultural transmutations of ethnicity and nationality are realized.

THE SUCCESSIVE STAGES OF POLITICO-GEOGRAPHICAL
INTEGRATION: NATIONISMS

The unifying and ideologizing dynamism of nationalism bombards and
transmutes not only human populations viewed as territorially abstracted
sociocultural aggregates but also the very territories that these popula-
tions inhabit. Hills and rivers and woods cease to be merely familiar; they
become ideologically significant (shrines, birthplaces, battlefields, com-
memorative sites, ancestral grounds, etc.). However, the unification and
transmutation of these two systems—the sociocultural and the politico-
territorial—do not always or even usually proceed apace. On occasion,
populations that are already socioculturally integrated on the basis of
common nationality seek coextensive, self-determined, political bound-

Joshua A. Fishman

aries. On other occasions the fortunes of war or diplomacy or economic ascendency result in common political boundaries for populations whose common nationality develops later. If we go back far enough in the history of *Western Europe* we find *nationality* sentiments *pressuring* for appropriate political boundaries (i.e., nationalism forming the state), rather than merely nationalism *catching up with* political boundaries and then creating greater nationalities to match these boundaries (i.e., the nation forming nationalism).[8] Thus the sociocultural nationality and the politico-geographic nation are rarely in phase with each other. Rather, one is (or is seen to be) frequently out of phase with the other and there is often considerable pressure "to catch up," with concomitant impact *on* language (repertoires) and exploitation *of* language symbols.

I would hope we might agree to no longer call *both* of these "catching up" processes by the *same* name. Where the political boundaries are most salient and most efforts are directed toward maintaining or strengthening them, regardless of the immediate sociocultural character of the populations they embrace—indeed, wherever politico-geographic momentum and consolidation are in advance of sociocultural momentum and consolidation—we might prefer a term such as *nationism*[9] (or "political integration") to that old standby, nationalism. Whenever the boundary of the nation, however, is more ideologized than that of the nationality


Figure 1. Nationalism and nationism.

we may also begin to find pressure building up for "authentic" cultural unification or intensification. These are the nationalistic consequences of nationism.

THE DIFFERING LANGUAGE PROBLEMS
OF NATIONALISM AND NATIONISM

It seems only reasonable to conclude that language problems (or at least those language problems that are emphasized) will *differ*, depending on which of these pressures, nationalism or nationism, is stochastically paramount. Among those for whom *nationalism* is clearly paramount, that is, where populations are actively pursuing the sociocultural unification that befits those whose common nationality is manifest, the choice of a national language is not in question since it is usually already a prominently ideologized symbol. The major language problems of nationalism are language maintenance, reinforcement, and enrichment (including both codification and elaboration) in order to foster the nationalistic (the vertical or ethnically single) unity, priority, or superiority of the sociocultural aggregate. Note, however, that some of these (nationalistic) language actions have indirect implications for *nationism* as well, since such matters as the use of intricate writing systems, or the rejection of westernisms, or the rejection of the legitimacy of specialized registers per se have necessary consequences for the conduct of the politico-geographic nation and the institutions under its control (government, schools, technological, industrial, and agricultural planning, etc.).[10]

Conversely, among those for whom *nationism* is stochastically paramount *other* kinds of language problems come to the fore. The geographic boundaries are far in advance of sociocultural unity. Thus problems of horizontal integration, such as quick language choice and widespread literary language use, become crucial to the nation's functional existence per se. Language policy based on nationism, however, has direct implications for nationalism (i.e., for sociocultural unity) in the new nation. The language(s) selected may foster or long delay isomorphism (or catching up) between nationism and nationalism; it may strengthen or weaken the potential for sociocultural unity of the several populations within common politico-geographic boundaries,[11] and so on.

As a result, there are both *direct* and *indirect* ties between language and nationism as well as between language and nationalism. However, language and nationalism represents a more ideologized historical interaction (in terms of mass ideology) since nationalism so commonly elaborates upon language as one of its markers of symbolic unity and identity. This is partially a byproduct of the much *longer* and more intimate relationship between language and sociocultural pattern that enters into nationalism and *its* view that *a* particular language is a uniquely appro-

priate link between speakers and their sociocultural pattern. It is
nationalism that views self-identity, group-identity, and self-identity
through group-identity as impossible (unthinkable) without a *particular*
language rather than merely without a common language. For nationism,
language questions are initially not questions of authenticity (identity)
but of efficiency (cohesion). Only after efficiency seems likely can attention
be divided between it and the search for as unified a version of national
authenticity as is feasible. Nevertheless, such feelings of authenticity can
come in the future, as they have in the past, on a purely or largely
exoglossic base.

All nations apportion attention and resources between the claims of
authenticity (sociocultural integration) on the one hand and the claims
of efficiency (political integration) on the other.[12] The new nations are
merely at an earlier, more formative stage in connection with both and,
as a result, must orient themselves toward local multilingualisms and
official exoglossia at a time when older nations are withdrawing increas-
ingly from that once commonplace pattern.[13]

NATIONAL INTEGRATION AND MULTILINGUISTISM

The distinctions made here between sociocultural integration (nation-
alism) and political integration (nationism) and the successive transitions
of both should enable us to examine the internal, intranational conse-
quences of multilinguistism in the developing nation as well as some of
its external, international consequences.

Our Western, post-Versailles intellectual heritage has caused many
contemporary sociologists to be all too ready to assume that cultural and
linguistic *differences* automatically tend toward demands for nation-
formation and language *recognition* [12]. The postwar African experi-
ence is therefore a puzzle to many sociologists and political scientists, and
even the Indian experience, though seemingly more "natural," puzzles
those who know that India has many, many times as many languages as
those that have either received or demanded political recognition. This
puzzlement brings to light three points.

1. *Not all language differences that exist are noted, let alone ideolo-
gized.* By this I mean that linguists recognize language differences
(whether in phonology, morphology, or syntax) that millions of native-
speakers consciously or unconsciously ignore. Thus Wolff has reported
several instances in which West African groups speaking distinct, and at
times unrelated languages ignore the differences between them, at times
reciprocally and at times unilaterally [12]. Wolff claims that mutual intel-
ligibility is largely a function of intergroup attitudes. Polomé [10] has re-
ported similar data for the Swahili region of Central and East Africa;
Wurm has much the same to say for New Guinea [13]; Haugen comments

on such developments at various times in different Scandinavian contexts [7]; and similar phenomena have long been known to students of Southeast Asia.[14] The general point here is that differences do *not* need to be divisive. *Divisiveness is an ideologized position* and it can magnify minor differences; indeed, it can manufacture differences in languages as in other matters almost as easily as it can capitalize on more obvious differences. Similarly, *unification is also an ideologized position* and it can minimize seemingly major differences or ignore them entirely, whether these be in the realm of language, religion, culture, race, or any other basis of differentiation.

2. *Conscious and even ideologized language differences need not be divisive,* whether at the national or at the international level. Thus the pat' rn of national diglossia has its international counterparts as well.

In the diglossia situation a single society recognizes two or more languages as its own, with each having its own *functionally exclusive* domains [3].[15] Most of Europe is still marked by such diglossia if we recognize differences between dialectal varieties (utilized when one is among family and friends) and the national standard (the language of school, government and "high" culture). In former days, European elites were marked by a diglossia pattern in which (Parisian) French functioned as an international status symbol that alternated with one's own national standard and local dialect in accord with the demands of particular role-relationships, interactional patterns, and domains of discourse [5]. Today English is often the diglossia key to "elitemanship" as were Latin, Provençal, Danish, Salish, and other regional languages for certain parts of Europe in the past [4].

In non-European settings, particularly in the new nations of Africa and Asia, diglossia is extremely widespread and therefore language statistics or nation-and-language typologies that slight this fact are somewhat to very misleading. On occasion, it is a traditional diglossia in which two or more languages have long-established, functionally separate roots in the same society (e.g., classical and vernacular Arabic in Egypt and Syria, Sanskrit and Hindi in parts of India, Spanish and Guarani in Paraguay, tribal languages and Hausa and Arabic in Northern Nigeria).[16] Diglossia of a more modern sort exists throughout most of sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Latin America and involves English, French, or Spanish together with one or more indigenous languages. Such diglossia, combined with other factors to be mentioned, basically accounts for the lack of language divisiveness in the political integration of most of modern Africa. Instead of trying to cope with hundreds of local languages as instruments of government, education, industrialization, etc., most African states have decided to assign all of them equally to their respective home, family, and neighborhood domains and to utilize a single, major European language (usually English or French) for all more formal, statusful,

and specialized domains.[17] This approach tends to minimize internal linguistic divisiveness since it does not place any indigenous language at an undue advantage as *the* language of nationhood.

3. *Most "new nations" of Africa (and Asia) are not yet ethnic nations,* which tends to reinforce the diglossic approach. They are not yet socio-cultural units as a result of the long and painful common struggle of a population to unite across local differences, to create heroes and histories, songs and dramas, in order to attain certain common goals. African lan-guages have rarely become symbolic of the quest for nationhood because from the very first nationhood normally implied a supra-ethnic, supra-local entity, whereas almost all indigenous languages remained entirely local and therefore prenational or non-national or even antinational in implication.[18] As a result the indigenous African and the imported Euro-pean languages are more easily retained in functionally noncompetitive spheres, thus avoiding a confrontation between them.

Can such separation last? Is it not inevitable that urbanization and industrialization[19] will bring to the fore large indigenous populations who seek roles in the spheres of government and economy without know-ing the "proper" language for such roles. Will language conflict not ensue as Woloff and Sango and countless other languages of urbanizing Africans become connected with nationalistic (ethnically cohesive, unify-ing, and expansive) movements that oppose domination by the narrow population segment that controls French or English?

THE SPECIAL NEED FOR DIGLOSSIA
IN THE CURRENT QUEST FOR NATIONISM

This *may* come to pass but it is not inevitable.[20] The experience of the Arab world is exactly that of entering planned mobilization with diglossia far from abandoned. Indeed, in continents so long accustomed to superposed languages, both foreign and indigenous, there are several factors that should minimize the displacement of diglossia.

1. As distinct from conditions that existed in pre-Versailles days, new languages now become politically consolidated and recognized primarily on the basis of their utility and actual use in the domains of science and technology [9]. Belletristic and even governmental use are no longer signs that languages have "arrived" as fitting vehicles for elitist use. This state of affairs is merely a reflection of the changed position of technology vis-à-vis literature as a source of status mobility for nations and interest groups.

2. Technology is basically nonethnic and uniformizing throughout the world. It leads linguistically to but one, two, or three world "technology" languages and to essentially similar life-styles regardless of language. This is in sharp contrast to the basically heterogeneous and diversifying role

of the languages of belletristics prior to World War I. The purpose and the function of those languages was to render their speakers maximally different in terms of cultural values and world views.

3. The uniformizing requirements and consequences of technology are such that for many years to come many monolingual nations in control of "old languages" will need to resort to diglossian compromises in various technological and educational domains. This trend should be much stronger than the countertrend, namely, the abandonment of diglossia on behalf of *new* national standard languages with undisputed hegemony in all domains of national expression. Such diglossian compromises may mean the end of *forced* language assimilation in the domain of family and friends, but they may also mean the end of the exclusivistic sway of a single language in all domains of national life. Both of these factors when viewed in long-term perspective should lead to a diminution of *internal* linguistic strife and thus to a dimunition of purely or basically linguistic strife in international affairs as well.

Having appeared on the world scene as nonethnic nations at a time when the struggle for existence is particularly fierce, I predict that many of the "new nations" will long need to emphasize *nationism* (rather than *nationalism*) and diglossia involving a LWC (language of wider communication) rather than monoglossia. In the successful nations a wider diglossic nationalism will ultimately develop, so that feelings of national identity *will* correspond approximately to their wider geographical borders.[21] In the unsuccessful nations a narrower diglossic-nationalism will develop corresponding to smaller regions that are already defined in terms of sociocultural unity. Neither Pan-Africanism nor Negritude nor communism nor Islam nor democracy nor Christianity is likely soon to replace the nation as the unit of efficient, rational management of administrative affairs, or the nationality as the unit of authenticity toward which nations and subnations will be attracted. The language problems of each stage and kind of national integration (i.e., of nationalism) will be a reflection of the unfinished business of each.

NOTES

1. For many good examples of modern and fruitful discussions of political integration and the political system see David Easton's *A System Analysis of Political Life* (New York, Wiley, 1965, esp. Ch. 11) and his earlier essay "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, 9, 383–400 (1956–1957).
2. van den Berghe (this volume) defines nationalism as either "a political movement" or "a process of growing self-consciousness based on a feeling of common ethnicity," thus confusing a byproduct with the core of the phenomenon in question.
3. See my "Varieties of Ethnicity and Varieties of Language Consciousness" [4] for an elaboration of nationalism so defined.

4. Deutsch's conviction that such elaborations usually occur during periods of intense modernization ignores the elaborative role of traditionalization. Reorientation rather than its stimulus is the crucial factor.
5. Both van den Berghe and Mazrui (in this volume) have commented on religion as a factor in nationalism. In addition, van den Berghe considers racism as foreign to nationalism per se. Actually, both religion and racism are very common unifying threads, particularly in the fabric of early nationalism. *Ultimately,* the successive transmutations of religious, racial and class ideologies are antinationalistic, although many do not pass beyond their nationalistic phase.
6. This early (but not earliest) variety of sociocultural integration has received fairly extensive attention from Deutsch [2] to C. Geertz [6], although generally subsumed under the label "national integration," which masks the distinction between political and sociocultural integration that I wish to stress.
7. The sociocultural consolidation of the English (both as a result of opposing the Normans and as a result of fusion with them) is one unification and transformation that stands in a reciprocal relationship with the politico-geographical nation "England." Great Britain, the United Kingdom, and the British Commonwealth of Nations are successive transformations toward life at an ever-larger scale. Each is another step away from the original ethnic base, each is ideologized at a more abstract level, but each ultimately is associated with certain recurring traditionalized affiliative behaviors. Similar transmutations from nationalism$_a$ to nationalism$_b$ to nationalism$_o$ may be encountered in the history of France, Spain, Germany, etc. After a certain point, of course, internationalism or cosmopolitanism appears to be more appropriate than nationalism for the process under consideration.
8. Rustow (in this volume) considers the latter typical of post-dynastic states of Western Europe, the countries of overseas immigration, and the post-colonial states. He considers the former process (nationalism creating the state) typical of the "linguistic states of Central and East Europe and the Middle East." Van den Berghe describes Afrikaner nationalism as being of this type (nationality into nation) as well (this volume). Although I do not quarrel with these characterizations, I wish to point out that they may be no more than accurate but static characterizations of stages in an inherently cyclical and unstable process.
   I am quite convinced that Tabouret-Keller's reference (this volume) to the "coincidence between national and linguistic" frontiers in Western Europe is, at best, accurate only for a very restricted period in history, since there have been in Western Europe, as elsewhere, not only ample cases of "forward developing" out-of-phase instances between nationalities and their nations but also instances of regressive development in which nationalities crumbled and returned to more primitive stages of ethnic consciousness or lack of consciousness.
9. Van den Berghe speaks of "territorialism" (this volume), but in most concrete instances I believe "nationism" to be the more fruitful designation because of its cognate relationship to nationalism and because of its ideologized implication.
10. Alexandre (this volume) is absolutely right in pointing out that language characteristics transform political programs as are Gumperz and Das Gupta (this volume) in their reiteration that without proper language specialization (technical enrichment) *and* its widespread popularization the availability of a common language does not improve national functioning.
11. It must be realized that all nations—particularly new ones—are concerned with nationism and nationalism simultaneously. As a result, Alexandre's claim (in this volume) that "an independent African government must develop precisely horizontal channels to promote any kind of nationwide feeling of common purposes and interests" is probably an exaggeration since no national apparatus can function

without vertical specialization in language as in roles. Rustow's perceptive statement (this volume) that "the closer interaction and interdependence of the modern age tend to pose sharply latent questions of identity and unity" applies to both nationalistic and nationistic entities. If the reformulations presented in this essay are of value it will be because they attempt to define identity and unity (both types of solidarity) in more incremental fashion, closer to the level of social process and social interaction, to the end that *their measurement in human behavior* per se (rather than their use as categories or descriptive labels alone) becomes a more feasible task.

12. Tabouret-Keller (this volume) is certainly correct in her diachronic comparison between Africa today and Europe of a century or more ago.

13. Since much of my critique has been by way of "exaggeration for the purposes of clarity" let me briefly sketch an actual case to indicate how the interplay between nationism and nationalism has unfolded in the past eighty years of Jewish history. Political Zionism was initially only one sector of the total nationalistic fervor that gripped Eastern European Jewry in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In its early stages it was perhaps more concerned with "people building" than with "nation building," both of these terms being coined almost immediately. Its nemesis, the "Jewish Labor Bund of Russia, Lithuania, and Poland," was frequently more popular (until World War II) and concentrated entirely on "people building" (*arbet af di erter, döizm*) within a socialist-autonomist framework. Both organizations derived some of their appeal from more traditional nationalist sentiments carried by Jewish beliefs and practices through the centuries. Between them at both extremes there arose a veritable host of splinter parties that sought to combine nationism, nationalism, socialism, and traditionalism in differing degrees.

Thus certain early Zionist thinkers disclaimed interest in a political entity, believing that only a cultural center (*mercaz rukhni*—Akhad Ha'am) was needed. Whereas the Bund was primarily Yiddishist, the Zionist movement was primarily Hebraist. Between the two there were several programs favoring Yiddish *and* Hebrew, albeit in differing degrees, and with differing priorities and long-term commitments. Competing versions of national history, national school systems, national literatures, and national destiny were devised and cultivated in Eastern Europe, up to 1939. None of these were *actually* nation building (since the nation was both elsewhere and iffy) and therefore positions with respect to language choice and language acceptance were far less pressing than were the constant efforts on behalf of language codification and language elaborations.

Not so in Palestine proper where "nation building" was a more urgent pursuit although "people building" was rarely lost sight of entirely. (Of course, even Palestine itself had a rival as the national homeland since some Zionists favored accepting the Crown's offer of Uganda and, when defeated, established a Territorialist movement which is still in existence today—although the forthcoming "Sociolinguistic Survey of East Africa" need not now expect to run into many of its adherents in Uganda.) Language choice was long a very hot issue in Palestine with both German and Yiddish attracting very considerable support, German before World War I and the Yiddish between the two wars. The conflict between the adherents of Yiddish and the adherents of Hebrew is referred to as "the language conflict" (*riv halashonot—riv haloshoynes*). There were also serious but less fiery discussions of diglossic solutions: Hebrew *and* Yiddish, Hebrew *and* English, Hebrew *and* Arabic, etc.

With the creation of the State enormous attention was given to the rapid acceptance of Hebrew by both new settlers and older inhabitants who had not yet learned it. (However, while immigrants were learning Hebrew in Ulpanim many native-born Israelis were learning Yiddish and other Jewish communalects via

service in the armed forces and in the temporary settlement camps.) With the relaxation of nation building efforts per se in more recent years, renewed attention has been given to people building, particularly in the hope that the young will become more appreciative of and knowledgeable about a wider definition of Jewish nationality than that which is evident within the minuscule boundaries of Israeli time and space. Those with a far different concept of Jewish nationality than the one recognized by the State are still pressing for alternative linguistic realizations.

14. Of course, the opposite also obtains under certain circumstances. There are many instances where linguistic differences are exceedingly marginal, indeed, where they are no greater than the minor dialectal differences existing *within* certain well-recognized national standards, but where these differences are emphasized and cultivated. Several such "cultivated" differences exist in the Western World today (see Kloss [9] for the best discussion of such *"ausbau"* languages in the Germanic area) and are treated as seemingly autonomous languages (Czech and Slovak, Serbian and Croatian, Macedonian and Bulgarian, Russian and Byelorussian), whereas their parallels in the new nations are still rather few (Hindi-Urdu being the prime example). If the cultivation of minor differences is pursued in the new nations, a major possibility is the fractionization of English (East African, West African, Indian, etc.) that might be fostered thereby.

15. Tabouret-Keller (this volume) mentions that the absence of socioeconomic and sociocultural competition between two language groups leads to a remarkable stability of the "(bi) language pattern," but she fails to note that this is a *necessary* precondition of the stable intragroup bilingualism that diglossia typifies.

16. It is important to distinguish between (a) diglossia, which normally implies a *societally based* and *culturally valued functional differentiation* between languages and (b) bilingualism, which carries no such implication. Thus Switzerland, Belgium, and Canada may well be bilingual *countries* in which the proportions of bilinguals are rather small and unilateral, precisely because they are *not* diglossia settings (except for German, Swiss-German diglossia) in which a single, unified population views two or more languages as its own for particular purposes. For further details see my "Bilingualism with and without diglossia; Diglossia with and without Bilingualism," *Journal of Social Issues,* 23 (2), 29–38 (1967).

17. In several instances the result has been that a native speech-community finds itself divided into two segments due to differences in the national diglossia (or triglossia) pattern to which different parts of the community have been attached. Thus Hausa speakers in Nigeria are developing English-Hausa-Arabic triglossia and those in Niger, French-Hausa-Arabic triglossia. If this split is ideologized it may lead to demands for a Pan-Hausa State, with or without a superposed European language. A similar situation exists with respect to Swahili speakers in the Congo and in Tanzania. It is not apparent to me why Alexandre claims that such divisions of a language group between two nations is injurious to the development of each (this volume). No such injury seems to have visited upon the English or French speaking nations of the world.

18. It should be recognized that where the boundaries of ethnicity and nationhood correspond fairly closely indigenous languages have been symbolically elaborated into national languages. Alexandre, Mazrui and Paden all make this point, although in quite different ways. Alexandre and Mazrui show how colonial languages were the instruments of Westernization, education, national liberation, and even such postnationalistic ideologies as Pan-Africanism and Negritude. Paden demonstrates how a regionally consolidated superposed language can be a base for national power and yet never transcend its local roles.

19. Although we must be grateful to Tabouret-Keller (in this volume) for raising the

question of language maintenance and language shift and for pointing to industrial-
ization and urbanization as facilitators of shift, some may find her presentation
lacking with respect to social process analyses. Categories such as urban-rural, older-
younger, male-female, etc., do not explain the dynamics of culture change which
carry language shift along with them.
20. The slow spread of national standards in Europe is well illustrated by Tabouret-
    Keller. This volume.
21. Alexandre's view that "for an African the valuation of English or French is cultural
    not national" (this volume) and a similar position by Tabouret-Keller (this volume)
    are contradicted by Mazrui and by the historical experience of most other (even if
    only transitionally) exoglossic nations in world history.

REFERENCES

1. Deutsch, Karl W. 1942. The Trend of European Nationalism: The Language As-
   pect. *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, 36, 533–541.
2. Deutsch, Karl W. 1953. *Nationalism and Social Communication; An Inquiry into
   the Foundations of Nationality.* Cambridge and New York: Technology Press of
   MIT and Wiley.
3. Ferguson, Charles A. 1959. Diglossia. *Word*, 15, 325–340.
4. Fishman, Joshua A. 1966. Varieties of Ethnicity and Varieties of Language Con-
   sciousness. *Georgetown Univ. Monog. No. 18, Languages and Linguistics*, pp. 69–79.
   Also see my application of these concepts to Ukrainian language maintenance and
   shift in my *Language Loyalty in the United States*, The Hague: Mouton, 1966.
5. Fishman, Joshua A. 1965. Who Speaks What Language to Whom about What? *La
   Linguistique*, 2, 67–88.
6. Geertz, Clifford. 1963. *Old Societies and New States.* New York: Free Press.
7. Haugen, E. 1966. Semicommunication: The Language Gap in Scandinavia. *Socio-
   logical Inquiry*, 36, 280–297.
8. Hymes, Dell. 1962. The Ethnography of Speaking. In *Anthropology and Human
   Behavior*, Washington, Anthrop. Soc. of Wash., pp. 13–53. Also see his Functions
   of Speech: An Evolutionary Approach, in F. C. Gruber (ed.), *Anthropology and
   Education.* Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1959, pp. 50–66. BMRS:
   A-124.
9. Kloss, Heinz. 1952. Der linguistische und der sociologische Sprachbegriff: Abstand-
   sprachen und ausbausprachen, in his *Die Entwicklung neuer germanischer Kultur-
   sprachen*, Munich: Pohl, pp. 15–37.
10. Polomé, Edgar. 1963. Cultural Languages and Contact Vernaculars in The Republic
    of the Congo. *Texas Studies in Literature and Language*, 4, 499–511.
11. Stewart, Wm. A. 1962. An Outline of Linguistic Typology for Describing Multi-
    lingualism. In F. A. Rice (ed.), *Study of the Role of Second Languages*, Washington,
    D.C.: CALMLA, pp. 15–25.
12. Wolff, Hans. 1959. Intelligibility and Inter-Ethnic Attitudes. *Anthrop. Ling.*, 1(3),
    34–41.
13. Wurm, S. A., and D. C. Laycock. 1961/62. The Question of Language and Dialect
    in New Guinea. *Oceania*, 32, 128–143.