DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 046 347	HE 001 935
фімГВ УПІНОВ	Sklar, Pernard Faculty Culture and Community Conflict: A Historical, Political, and Sociological Analysis of
	the October 18, 1967, Dow Demonstration at the University of Visconsin.
PUB DAME	70
NOTE	<b>47</b> ۵.
EDRS PRICE	FDPS Price MF-20.65 PC-\$3.20
DESCRIPTORS	*Activism, *Conflict, *Conflict Pesclution,
	*Faculty, *Higher Pducation, Organization, Power
	Structure
<b>UDENTIFIERS</b>	*Wisconsin University

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the response of faculty members to the October 18, 1957, Dow demonstration at the University of Wisconsin, and the way in which faculty members dealt with the incident provoked from within their own ranks. Discussed are: (1) the rationale and method of the study; (2) the University and its setting; (3) the incident; (4) the anatomy of faculty conflict and the various forces, group structures, and interconnecting networks of communication and influence that were operating in the situation; and (5) the determinants of faculty conflict and conflict resolution. The paper concludes with a discussion of the changes that have taken place since that confrontation. (A<sup>r</sup>)



## FACULTY CULTURE AND COMMUNITY CONFLICT: A HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF THE OCTOBER 18, 1967, DOW DEMONSTRATION AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

Bernard Sklar University of Southern California

UE OEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION WEILTAN OFFICE OF EDUCATION THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEVED FROM THE PERSO'I OF OFGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECES SARLY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDU CATION POSITION OR OLICIEY

#### INTRODUCTION

Ever since the Berkeley student revolt of 1964, student activism on the American campus has become a subject of major concern. Aside from the problem that it has raised for the administration of such institutions, there are a number of issues that it has posed for faculties as well; issues that have serious ramifications not only for the morale and general stability of such groups, but ultimately, for the strength and vitality of institutions of higher learning in general. It is the purpose of this study to examine one particular aspect of that question; namely the response of faculty members to a particular incident of student activism and the way in which faculty members dealt with the conflict that this incident provoked within their own ranks.

3 3

~

Essentially, this is a study in political sociology. It is a case study, reflecting the fact that very little is known about the meaning of these events to university faculties.<sup>1</sup> It is also apparent that the theoretical implications of faculty political behavior, particularly in a collective sense, are largely undeveloped.<sup>2</sup> More important, the signs are that this kind of political tension is not likely to abate, making universities, and faculties along with them, increasingly subject to the pressure of outside events ano forced to deal with them in legislative and administrative ways.

<sup>2</sup>Theoretical statements concerning the political life of faculty bodies are singularly absent in the work of Talcott Parsons, perhaps the leading theoretician on this subject. See his series of statements in <u>The American Sociologist</u>; in particular Volume 1, number 3 (May, 1966) and Volume 2, numoers 2 (May, 1967) and 3 (August, 1967). The same is true of another leading student of the American university, David Riesman (see his and Christopher Jencks' book <u>The Academic Revolution</u> (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1966) or a number of other sociologists and historians who have written on the subject in recent days. In this connection see "The Embattled University," <u>Daedalus</u> (Winter, 1970).



ħ

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>There is a vast literature on the meaning of these events in an individual sense; that is to faculty members writing as individuals either in regard to how these events have affected them or their institutions. Only rarely have faculty members talked about the behavior of their colleagues as a body. For an example of this "personal" literature see Sidney Hook "Freedom to Learn, but Not to Riot," <u>New York Times Magazine</u> (January 3, 1965), pp. 8-9, Seymour M. Lipset and Sheldon Wolin, <u>The Berkeley Student Revolt</u> (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1965) contains several statements of this kind, as does the Fall, 1968 issue of <u>The Public</u> <u>Interest</u>.

With these concerns in mind, it was determined to explore a particular incident of student activism; to learn about the conditions under which such events may occur, about the ways that faculty members tend to act when these events do take place and about the factors that account for these patterns of faculty behavior. A number of circumstances permitted such a study at the University of Wisconsin; first, a serious confrontation had taken place there; second, Wisconsin is quite representative of an important type of higher educational institution; and third, there was an invitation from a faculty member to undertake this project.

American academic communities, and as a consequence, American academic men, represent a curious mixture of freedom and restraint. Professors enjoy a fair degree of autonomy and despite the encroachments of legislative bodies and governing boards have a great deal of freedom in guiding not only their own professional lives but also the destinies of their institutions. As a result, when confrontation occurs, the academic man, because of the variety of his dispositions, interests and commitments is likely to be torn by conflicting interests, sentiments and loyalties. On the one hand are his loyalties to the institution; on the other his devotion to students, their radicalism perhaps



reflecting his own concerns about the ills of contemporary society. In practical terms there are the threats to his own time and work and the fact that police may be called on the campus and violence precipitated as a result.

In all this the typical faculty member is ill equipped to do very much either individually or through collective processes; for the authority of the faculty is severly limited and its ability to act restricted by the cumbersome machinery of consultative government. Ultimately faculty members must confront the dilemma of their institutional-professional life by withdrawing to their own arena to do battle with the issues and the contradictions of their differing interests, ideologies and commitments.

As a first step in this study, it was determined to undertake a preliminary field investigation to determine the exact nature of the incident and then the faculty's involvement in its development, mediation and resolution. As a result of this effort it became apparent that the only faculty who acted in an organized fashion in regard to the students were those who supported them and that a crucial variable in understanding this particular conflict was the powerful mediating influence of the faculty's own executive committee. A preliminary attempt to interview faculty members involved also demonstrated that there were not just a handful of actors engaged in this process but a much



larger interactive system at work.

Based on the preliminary findings, it was determined to take the initial investigation and broaden it into a fullscale study of the incident. It was determined, first, to undertake a study of documentary materials in order to have a thorough understanding of the incident. Then an examination of the institution itself was made. This was done by making use of written histories, minutes of various kinds, newspaper accounts of higher education in the state, and a variety of published and unpublished university documents. Such material was supplemented by interviews with selected informants.

In terms of the central problem of the study, the October 18 incident and the faculty's response to it, the methods employed for collecting data are those that fall under the general rubric of qualitative research. Unlike quantitative research, the methodological problems involved in field work are difficult to find systematically treated in any one work.<sup>3</sup> Coupled with this is the fact that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>In this connection, several works proved to be helpful in this study; particularly Barney G. Glaser and Anselm Strauss, <u>The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies</u> for Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1957) for theoretical assumptions concerning the nature of such research, Buford J. Junker, <u>Field Work</u>, <u>An Introduction</u> to the Social Sciences (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950) for specific consideration of certain techniques and Arthur J. Vidich, Joseph Densman and Maurice J. Stein, editors, <u>Reflections on Community Studies</u> (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1904) for general insight into the social, emotional and political processes involved.



qualitative research depends to a great extent on what the researcher as an individual brings to the problem. As Vidich and Bensman point out:

The perspective of independent investigation is based on whatever concaternation of theoretical background and experience the researcher brings to the field, and on his discovery of problems while he is in the midst of the field experience. He devises means to follow those insights that appear to him to be appropriate to the insight and data, and he tends to push his explorations to their logical conclusion (whether they result in failure or success) to the point where he is satisfied he has made all efforts possible in examining the problems that stimulate inquiry.<sup>4</sup>

This statement helps to establish the approach to field work used in this study. Implied is not only the fact that one must have a willingness to follow where the problem may lead, but also an ability to deal with the ever-present flux and pressure of events in the field. Another aspect of the problem of doing this kind of research is establishing a basis for operating in the field. Academic men are busy. The pressure of committee work, teaching responsibilities and research, not to mention personal demands on their time are enough to lead to a universal despair concerning the ability to meet one's



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, "The Springdale Case: Academic Bureaucrats and Sensitive Townspeople," in <u>Reflections on Communities Studies</u>, ed., Arthur J. Vidich et al, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964), p. 320.

commitments. As a result it was necessary to maintain a particular sensitivity to these conditions in order to gain and continue to maintain the cooperation of academic men during the course of this study.

As in most field work situations the role that one takes is to some degree determined by the situation. In this case it seemed best to take an "observer as participant" role; that is to maintain a position of one who is a member of the community at the same time that one observes and records ones impressions. For operational purposes and as a means of organizing day-to-day activities, the researcher used a traditional inforview approach. In doing so, an effort was made to obtain data from both senior and junior men, from those in the professional schools and those in the arts and sciences, and from those who were active participants in the incident and those who were not. Interviews were arranged by telephone and based on prior introductions; lists of such names were a by-product of the interview process.

It was the general function of these interviews to gather specific information about what faculty members had done, observed, or simply felt during the incident and then probe for further insights. This kind of interviewing tends to be unstructured and depends for its focus to a great



extent on what happens in the interview itself.<sup>5</sup> In each case, however, an effort was made to learn something about the structure of the social system that provided the context for these events. In addition to single as well as repeat interviews (depending on the circumstances), it was possible to develop a number of informants who provided information on the institution, various personalities, and in particular, the networks of influence and communication within the University.

All data, whether produced as the result of a conversation with an informant or in an interview, were recorded on specially developed protocol forms. This material must be distinguished from a field diary in which entries were made on the basis of general observation or reflections over a six-month period, beginning in late February of 1968 and extending until October of that year. During that time 70 individuals were interviewed, 47 of whom were full-time faculty members, for a total of 114 interviews. Protocols were read, coded and filed according to categories that had relevance either to the incident or reflected the emerging patterns of analysis.

<sup>5</sup>Burleigh B. Gardner and William F. Whyte, "Methods for the Study of Human Relations in Industry," <u>American</u> <u>Sociological Review</u>, XI (October, 1946) as quoted in Junker, <u>Field Work</u>, p. 86.



The analysis of data was not something that occurred after the data had all been collected but was engaged in throughout the time in the field. A final period of analysis and synthesis reflected an effort to bring together three levels of understanding. One of these was the purely historical and involved an account of contemporary student activism beginning with the first major confrontation on this campus and moving up to include the October 18 incident itself. The second level of understanding was an historical, structural and statistical description of the University. The final analysis concerned faculty behavior in response to the October 18, 1967 incident, first in terms of the dynamics of the conflict within the faculty and then with regard to those variables that seem to account for that conflict and the way it was resolved.

#### THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The University of Wisconsin ranks among, the major universities of America. Holding third place in the nation in terms of the number of doctorates awarded annually,<sup>6</sup> Wisconsin is also among the top six institutions in the



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Doctorate Production in United States Universities, 1920-1962 (Washington: National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1962), p. 19.

country in terms of the baccalaureate origin of those going on for the doctor's degree. Within a total enrollment of 54,977 students on 13 campuses, the center of the system and the essential source of its prestige is the Madison campus where the incident we are studying took place.<sup>8</sup>

The campus is well known for its attractive physical setting. Among the salient characteristics of the institution is its long history of political liberalism and its well known tradition of service to the state. Both of these qualities are combined with a strong commitment to research and graduate instruction. In 1965 when the American Council on Education issued its evaluation of graduate education in America, Wisconsin ranked third after Berkeley and Harvard in the number of departments rated as either "distinguished" or "strong."<sup>9</sup>

Of a total enrollment of 33,000 students on the Madison campus, 23,000 are undergraduates.<sup>10</sup> Forty percent of these students are from out of the state, making for a

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>8</sup><u>Milwaukee Sen</u>tinel, October 14, 1967.

<sup>9</sup>Raymond H. Ewell, "A Quantified Summary of the American Council on Education Report <u>An Assessment of</u> <u>Quality in Graduate Education</u>," Buffalo, State University of New York-Buffalo, December, 1967. (Mimeographed).

10 The University of Wisconsin Madison Campus, Enrollment Report for First Semester, 1967-68 (Madison: Office of the Registrar, 1965), p. 1.



rather cosmopolitan student body.<sup>11</sup> Since the end of World War II Wisconsin has experienced a rapid growth in student population, doubling alone in the period 1957-1967. The faculty has grown at an even more accelerated rate during that time, rusing from 1,286 full and parttime members in 1947 to 3,133 in 1967.<sup>12</sup>

Although salaries tend to be low compared to institutions of similar rank,<sup>13</sup> the University nevertheless has enjoyed a low rate of turnover; roughly 4 percent for the years 1965-68 for example.<sup>14</sup> One can only speculate, of course, about why this would be true, but one of the contributing factors no doubt is tha fact that the faculty members enjoy an extraordinary degree of autonomy. A long standing tradition of faculty government seems to insure a maximum degree of faculty participation in policy decisions, something the Board of Regents has characteristically -up until the time of the incident at least -- supported.

The University is governed by a ten-member Board of Regents, nine of whom are appointed by the Governor. Since

# ll<sub>Ibid</sub>.

<sup>12</sup>University of Wisconsin Budget Analysis (Madison: The University of Wisconsin, 1947-68).

<sup>13</sup>"Report to the Regents on Faculty Salaries," Madison, The University of Wisconsin, June 1968.

14"Basic Institutional Data for the Complex University, University of Wisconsin - Madison, "Madison, The University of Wisconsin, March, 1969, p. 52.



the University is a creature of the Legislature rather than of the Constitution of the state, the Regents tend to reflect the coloration of the administration that has appointed them. At the time of the incident the liberals held a majority. Although the Central Administration of this large university system is located in Madison, the Chancellor of the Madison campus enjoys a great deal of autonomy. The style of administration on both the Madison campus and throughout the University is a rather informal one. A tendency for administrators to be selected from within the Wisconsin "family" contributes to a high level of commitment to the institution, while at the same time creating a degree of provincialism in its personnel and mode of operation.

#### THE INCIDENT

Wisconsin did not experience its first serious confrontation with students until the spring of 1966 when a group of 500 students staged a sit-in over the University's position on the draft. Coming towards the end of the semester, this demonstration created a period of crisis within the institution that lasted for eight days. During that time the demonstrators were able to mobilize a significant segment of the student population in regard to the



issues while the administration, with a united faculty behind it, demonstrated its ability to respond to student sentiments, at least symbolically, without giving into the students in a substantive way.

In the fall of that year the campus was once again provoked by a heckling incident involving Senator Edward Kennedy. The Senator was prevented from speaking in behalf of the democratic candidate for Governor by students who wanted him to talk about the war in Vietnam. A direct result of the Senator Kennedy incident was the passing of a resolution by the faculty late in the year that specifically condemned obstruction of the rights of others "to listen and participate."<sup>15</sup> This resolution ultimately became Chapter 11.02 of the University's "Laws and Regulations" and played an important part in the subsequent events leading up to the October 1967 Dow demonstrations.

In February of 1967 the University actually experienced a confrontation over the presence of the Dow recruiters on the campus. This occurred in the Engineering building and led to the arrest of 17 students who either rofused to leave the placement office where they had staged their protest or tried to obstruct the movement of the police van carrying those who first had been arrested. Later that day students

<sup>15</sup>Wisconsin State Journal, December 13, 1966.



held the Chancellor and Dean of Students virtual prisoners in the Dean's office while demanding action on these issues. The Chancellor agreed to discuss the problems at a rally that evening and received wide publicity for posting over \$1,000 of his own personal funds as bail money for those who had been jailed. This action and the reaction of the campus to holding the Chancellor captive took most of the steam out of the demonstration and brought it to a close the next day.

In the spring of that year an entirely different kind of incident was precipitated by student and faculty dissatisfaction over a bus lane that ran on one of the main arteries near the campus. The bus lane, a single lane moving against traffic, was an alleged hazard (a co-ed had been struck oy a bus and had her leg amputated) and a committee was organized to agitate for its removal and for the improvement of pedestrian safety in general. A planned obstruction of the bus lane late one afternoon developed into a series of related events, including the blocking of all traffic on this busy thoroughfare and led to the arrest of 25 students for disorderly conduct before the episode was brought to a close.

Thus in the fall of that year (1967) when students began discussing the possibility of a demonstration against the Dow Chemical Company, the University was aware of and to



a degree prepared for such outbursts, although actual violence had never been a part of these demonstrations. Under the leadership of the Dean of Students a number of efforts were made to warn students about the consequences of disruptive behavior, citing the newly codified Chapter 11.02. Students brought counter suit in Federal Courts, and it was to a degree uncertain what would happen when the demonstration began on Tuesday, October 17, 1967.

The first day turned out to be a peaceful one with picketing and rallies the only form of protest behavior. Early Wednesday, however, a group of students entered the Commerce Building and jamming themselves into the eastwest corridor of that building, effectively blocked the entrance into the interview rooms. University police, augmented by off-duty Madison police officers, made an attempt to arrest one of those obstructing but were unable, physically, to remove the prisoner.

Beginning as light hearted and orderly demonstrators, the participants became increasingly noisy as the morning wore on and as efforts were made to clear a path to the obstructed area. Acting on the advice of the University police chief, the Chancellor (recently appointed, although a faculty member for 21 years) approved the summoning of regular city police. Such arrangements had been discussed with the Madison police chief and an effort was now



made to warn students that they were in violation of the law before physically removing them from the building. The assumption was that students would go limp and allow themselves to be carried out.

The appearance of riot-equipped police, however, only seemed to heighten the tension, particularly among the several thousand students now outside the building. Nevertheless, after a series of warnings to those inside, 30 helmeted city police led by the campus police chief entered the building to remove them. As they did so they encountered a mass of students and spectators who reacted to the column of policemen by recoiling and then, with the pressure of those behind them, pushing forward in such a fashion that several policemen were ejected from the building.

Within seconds and without orders, the police began clubbing everyone out of the building. Students stumbled or ran out bleeding and hysterical and as they did so, the crowd outside became enraged. The crowd moved in and when a few officers tried to establish a perimeter around the entrance, rocks were thrown and in several cases physical assaults took place. Sensing a deterioration in the situation, the Madison police chief, who had arrived earlier to direct his men, called for tear gas. Conditions, however, were unfavorable for its use and after three attempts to



disperse the crowd this way, the Sheriff's office was called for reinforcements. Arriving around four in the afternoon, they were able to secure the area and by five o'clock the crowd had drifted away. In all, 50 students had been injured, none of them seriously. The police sustained 21 injuries, and two of these men proved to be seriously hurt.

The campus was in a state of shock and dismay over these events. The Chancellor announced the cancellation of further interviews pending a faculty meeting at 3:30 P.M. Thursday, the following day. All over the city and throughout the state as well as the nation, the news of these events precipitated angry reactions about police brutality or student anarchism. That evening over 5,000 students attended a rally and voted to strike. At the same time a group of 200 younger members of the faculty, calling themselves the Liberal Caucus, met to denounce the administration's action and to organize for the next day's faculty meeting.

On Thursday the campus experienced a series of rallies and demonstrations. In spite of the strike, a number of classes met; many of them turning into a discussion of the previous day's events. Late in the afternoon over 1,300 faculty members (80 percent of the voting faculty) met in the Union Building. Notwithstanding the efforts of



the Liberal Caucus to condemn the police action, the faculty voted two to one to support the administration's action. Still dissatisfied, the faculty after seven hours of heated discussion adjourned its meeting until the following Monday.

Over the long weekend students continued their strike. On Saturday they gathered as a group and moved silently up the main street leading from the campus to the Capitol to stage a protest on the steps of the State House. Some 2,000 well dressed men and women participated in the march. On Sunday, however, only 300 gathered for a prayer vigil and by a vote of the student coordinating committee that night the strike was called off pending the outcome of the faculty meeting the next day.

At the same time a number of caucuses and meetings were held within the faculty. The University Committee, the faculty's executive committee, became the focal point for the efforts of these mostly conservative groups to bring pressure on the University to resolve these difficulties as quickly as possible. The Liberal Caucus, the only dissident group among the faculty, met on several occasions and with the help of some of the older, better established faculty members who acted as mediators, was able to effect a compromise with the University Committee which condemned the use of police on campus without condemning the administration. The compromise that was worked



out also called for a study of these events and the entire question of on-campus recruiting, as well as the matter of obstruction, in the event of future demonstrations of this kind.

When the faculty met on Monday the issue had for the most part been resolved. The more radical elements of the faculty had to a degree been silenced by their liberal colleagues and the bulk of the faculty, concerned about the resumption of orderly processes on the campus, was ready to support the compromise resolution that was presented. Although the student leaders felt that they had been sold out by the faculty, the balance of sentiment had shifted sufficiently so that further action of a more radical kind seemed impossible. It remained for the committee appointed to study these events to carry on the debate while public opinion and the State Legislature probed for the causes and cures of campus violence.

#### THE ANATOMY OF FACULTY CONFLICT

In order to understand what actually occurred within the faculty as a result of this incident, it was necessary to undertake a behind-the-scenes analysis of the various forces, group structures and interconnecting networks of communication and influence that were operating in this situation. Of particular importance were the Liberal Caucus



and the University Committee, the former the focal point for dissident opinion and the latter the center for concerted effort by the faculty to establish order and provide leadership during the crisis.

Before attempting to analyze the nature of either of these groups or their efforts during this period, it is imperative that we understand the ideological structure of the faculty as a whole. On the left was a small group of radical faculty members, no more than a dozen, who were closely linked with a group of perhaps 200 younger faculty members -- almost entirely from the humanities and social sciences, and to some extent law -- who made up the Liberal Caucus. These faculty members I refer to as the young liberals. In the center were the vast majority of faculty members, the bulk of whom could be described as liberal, non-left and middle class. To their right, largely from the professional schools, and in particular engineering and agriculture, were those whom I

labeled conservative and a handful of those who had ultra-conservative positions on political (non-academic) questions in general.

The Liberal Caucus itself grew out of the sentiments of a group of younger faculty members, several of whom witnessed the incident and were incensed at the behavior of the administration in calling the police to clear the



building. Using the membership list of the "Faculty for Peace" group, a series of calls were made just after the police action, resulting in the turnout of roughly 200 persons in the Law School that evening. The group met three times in all during the crisis. The principal work was actually carried out by eight or nine of the members, several of whom were ultimately designated as a leadership council. This kind of limited participation reflected the general membership of the larger group -- faculty members without tenure, or tenure recently acquired, who were generally heavily committed to their professional duties, family obligations or both.

During the first stage of the crisis -- that is prior to the first faculty meeting -- their posture was essentially militant. Realizing that they were at war with the established faculty and established institutional norms, they nevertheless tried to develop a series of resolutions and supporting documents that would condemn the action of the administration. But their general lack of organization and parliamentary skill, together with the fact that such faculty meetings were controlled by established faculty members, resulted in the defeat of all of their motions. Instead the faculty voted by a margin of two to one to support the administration and its action in these circumstances. Yet the Caucus had succeeded in generating

A. N. Nickey



a great deal of emotion during the meeting and creating what in effect was a major split in the faculty. It was on this basis that the faculty decided to adjourn its meeting until the following Monday morning, leaving the long weekend for a series of meetings and political maneuvers that led to the final resolution of the conflict.

For a number of reasons, the University Committee was in the oest position to focus the interests and concerns of the vast majority of the faculty. Elected by the faculty as a whole, members of the Committee were readily identified as established members of that body. The average length of service at the University among the six members was 19.5 years and there was only one member under 50 years of age. Being in this position not only required that they study the numerous university-wide issues that come before the faculty as a whole but also gave them a kind of authority that the vast majority of the faculty recognized and supported. The fact of their long service to the institution and deep roots in the community also gave them access to the major seats of faculty power, although at the same time it cut them off from the younger more liberal elements in the Liberal Caucus.

Although they were in no better position to handle the confusion and anxiety that followed in the wake of the demonstration then were the members of the Liberal Caucus, it was their responsibility to reflect general faculty



sentiments and frame some kind of resolution to present to the faculty meeting the next day. Given their seniority and commitment to the institution, and their communication with those of similar dispositions, it is not surprising that the resolution they presented to the faculty was fairly conservative, supporting the administration and condemning the lawlessness of the students. It was with some shock that they confronted the serious divisions in the faculty that Liberal Caucus sentiments had developed. Moreover, this issue seemed to override all other questions and set this group to work healing the apparent breach in the faculty community.

In the wake of the first faculty meeting a number of caucuses were formed across the campus. Virtually all of them tried to communicate their position or concerns to the University Committee, for the Committee was forced to fill a vacuum left by the collapse of the administration (the Chancellor had teen thrown into a state of shock by these events). It was not a job that any of the members were prepared to do or particularly relished for it involved an intense round of discussions, confrontations and negotiation. To deal with the flood of communication aimed at them, they asked each individual or group to formulate its ideas in a resolution that could be presented to the Monday meeting.



At the same time they tried to keep in contact with these various centers of influence with the exception of the Liberal Caucus, a group about which they were quite confused, both in terms of its purpose and its membership -- a membership that they regarded as quite radical.

For their part, the members of the Liberal Caucus came away from the Thursday meeting with a sense of great disappointment. This was reflected in the low attendance at their second meeting on Friday. At that time they formally selected a five-man steering committee, talked about a general watchdog function for the future and agreed to meet on Sunday evening to discuss any resolutions that might be offered at the second faculty meeting on Monday afternoon.

What was needed at this point, of course, was some way of mediating the differences between these two positions -that of the Liberal Caucus and the larger segment of the faculty, as reflected in the actions of the University Committee. In an effort to perform this task three members of the faculty, colleagues of the Chancellor, began to act rather spontaneously and somewhat informally as intermediaries between those groups and the Chancellor. All three were well established and because of their personal acquaintance with the Chancellor and individual members of the University Committee, were able to allay the fears of that body concerning the "radical" qualities of the Liberal



Caucus and the anger of the Caucus towards the administration. In the process they provided a communications link between the groups that was crucial to the negotiation of an agreed upon formula for the resolution of the conflict.

At the same time the campus remained in a state of continued, if somewhat diminished turmoil, with a strike, mass meetings and the like. As the weekend wore on it became clear to the members of the University Committee that the discussions and meetings within the faculty had converged upon three essential issues. One concerned the whole question of violence; the second seemed to revolve around the issue of employment interviewing on campus; and the last concerned how the University should respond to confrontation as such. Added to this was the notion that a special committee be appointed to study the two policy issues in question: placement interviews and the "mode of response" question. While to a degree the Liberal Caucus would have agreed with this "agenda," it was essentially the question of violence that represented the most important issue to them. In order to get a strong "no violence" position on the floor, and hopefully passed, they spent their time making contacts and lining up what they felt was their constituency for the Monday faculty meeting.

By Sunday morning the University Committee had a



draft resolution that they felt reflected the sentiments of all the major parties. It was conveyed to the Liberal Caucus and offered to a well-attended meeting of young liberals (roughly 200 were present) by one of the mediators that night. Making a plea for support, the Caucus leaders pointed out the realities of the situation; the fact that the resolution which called for a committee of students and faculty to discuss the major issues and condemned "force and violence" (although it did not say on whose part) was the best that could be obtained, given the mocd of the faculty as a whole. Efforts by a few faculty members to radicalize the group were futile and with only minor dissent the group voted to support the compromise resolution. The faculty meeting the next day seemed to bring the entire episode to an end by recognizing the need to consider the issues that had been raised, while at the same time stating, in effect, that the University had to resume its regular way of life. Dissent was minimal and . as a result the whole campus experienced a relaxation of tension in the face of this, albeit preliminary, yet general consensus on the part of the faculty.

#### DETERMINANTS OF FACULTY CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

From a sociological point of view the important



question arises as to the determinants of this particular conflict and its resolution. Four sets of explanatory variables have been developed in this connection; three of these, <u>generational</u> factors, <u>professional</u> factors and <u>ideological</u> factors, having to do with the genesis and development of the conflict itself and the last, <u>political</u> factors, regarding its resolution.

Perhaps the most significant variable in this entire struggle grows out of the differences that exist between the generation of younger academic men, largely in the humanities, social sciences and law, who made up the constituency of the Liberal Caucus and the members of the established faculty who dominated the University Committee. The younger men were not only the product of a system that offered them rather high status early in their careers and what appeared to be an unusual degree of professional mobility, but were themselves recruited from segments of society that until recently had been less well represented within the academic world. These men tended to be more urban, to have a higher representation from the Non-WASP community and to be much more mobile than their academic counterparts in the older generation. As result of these and other factors, such as the youth of the group, they tended to have much less institutional loyalty, to take a more agressive view towards the kind of social problems



facing the University and the world and to take a more critical position vis-a-vis the University.

On their part the older generation, nutured in an environment that was more restricted and entering the academic world in a less advantageous position has over the years developed a sense of regard and affection for the institution. Such loyalties and sentiments put them in a position where they felt they had to defend the institution in this situation. But it was not just a difference of positions in regard to institutional loyalty that distinguished these two groups. There was also a radical difference in style. The older men were more conscious of a need for civility and restraint in the affairs of academic men and generally felt that political issues, at least some of those that the younger men were trying to inject into this struggle, were a matter for private and not collective concern. When all of this is added to the fact that, under normal conditions, very little communication takes place between these groups, not only across campus but within departments, one can see that the stage was set for a major clash between these segments of the faculty. It is the conclusion of this study that the struggle which the events of October 18 precipitated within the faculty was, if not initiated, to a great extent sustained by differences in outlook and mood concerning the



University and the problems it confronts. Furthermore, these differences were a reflection of academic generations that not only have different social origins and a different opportunity structure, but different conceptions of what the University is and what the role of academic men should be.

Equally important to an understanding of this conflict is the difference that arose between those who support the conception of the university as a place to train the individual for a job, and thus support some kind of placement service on campus, and those who feel the university has no such obligation. Engineers, because of their commitment to the placement function as an integral part of the academic task, became the standard bearers for this position. Members of the Liberal Caucus, on the other hand, expressed the belief that the presence of such a service, extraneous as they believed it to be, only served to heighten the tension of those opposed to the war and created the conditions that resulted in violence.

Yet it was not just this difference of opinion that created the division between these two groups as it was their respective approaches to the crisis itself. The engineers, methodical and dispassionate by training as well as disposition, were appalled by the lack of restraint as well as the emotionalism injected into debate over the issues by members of the Liberal Caucus. They felt that the attitudes of these



men, the methods they employed in the study of social problems and the example they offered to students, not only served to encourage anti-social behavior of this kind, but also made it impossible to settle difficulties that resulted in a direct, uncomplicated and just manner. Their background, as well as their training, forced them both to reject the ends the young liberals proposed and to condemn the manner in which they pursued those ends. This was a manner that the engineers felt abandoned the principles upon which the university was built -- rationality, objectivity and disinterestedness. Thus it is our conclusion that the crisis precipitated by the events of October 18, and in particular the difference marking the debate between the engineering faculty and the young liberals, was largely the product of vastly different ideas concerning the function of the University and the faculty's role within it, ideas that themselves were the product of different intellectual styles, professional training and personal temperament.

Finally, of importance in the analysis of this conflict, is the difference in ideology which separated the mass of the faculty from those in the Liberal Caucus in regard to what they felt were the essential questions. In a sense it was the Liberal Caucus that insisted that the



issues were political, pointing to the police action and the implications that the placement service had raised in the context of the student protest. Feeling that the faculty was inert politically, and accusing them of selfish motives because of their desire to end the struggle and return to work, the young liberals in a sense failed to understand the meaning of this resolve on the part of their colleagues. For instead of representing an apolitical point of view it reflected the definition that these men had placed upon the situation itself -- a situation they regarded much more in institutional terms than ideological ones. Their attendance at both major faculty meetings (roughly 80 percent of the faculty was present at each) seems to attest to their concern. What is more important, however, is their implicit view on the part of the majority of the faculty that it was the life of the institution that was in question. This view not only made debate between these groups largely impossible but elso exascerbated the differences between them. It is thus the conclusion of this study that the conflict that the events of October 18 precipitated in the faculty, although largely sustained by the generational and professional differences that had been aroused, was ultimately a result of the fact that a vast majority of the faculty regarded these questions in terms of their immediate implications for the institution and their professional



roles in it and not the ideological questions that the young liberals had defined.

There remains the question, of course, of how such a struggle was resolved, given these major forms of cleavage and the sentiments related to them. The faculty as a whole had only a limited capacity for such debate. Not only did they have other duties and obligations that pressed upon them but the nature of the faculty forum is such that it provided only an irregular and clumsy apparatus for the formal as well as informal discussion of differences. The bulk of those involved in the Liberal Caucus also felt these pressures for a return to normality. At the same time their commitment to this debate was much more intense, both from a professional and ideological point of view. As a result they felt a need to arrive at a settlement that gave them some kind of satisfaction in terms of the issues they had raised. This came in part from the success they had in overturning the initial stand of the University Committee. Even more substantially, however, they obtained this result from the degree to which they were given access to, and the expectation of continued influence on, the centers of power within the institution.

At the same time the question arises not only as to how such an institutional crisis could resolve itself



32 .

but also how it was able to do so with a minimum of bitterness and randor. To an extent the three intermediaries played an important part in bringing the major . contending parties in the conflict into direct negotiations with each other. In a similar fashion we must credit the long standing traditions of faculty government for giving everyone an opportunity to air his grievances and make his position clear. But of even greater importance is the fact that this tradition itself has bred within the institution a group of faculty members who are skilled in the practice and the art of faculty government. It was these older, established members of the faculty who, informally, took up the task of helping the University Committee arrive at an agreeable compromise to this conflict and then seeing to it that the essence as well as the importance of that compromise was conveyed to the various sectors of the faculty they represented. It is thus the conclusion of this study that the resolution Wisconsin achieved could not have been accomplished had there not been, in addition to a long history of faculty participation in institutional government, a small group of seasoned faculty members, dedicated above all else to the University's survival, and experienced in the practical means of gaining faculty cooperation and bringing its various factions into some kind of agreement on immediate ends.



### AN EPILOGUE TO THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER 18

In a discussion of this kind, the question arises as to why things happened exactly as they did and what it is that we may predict about future situations of a similar kind. Since the October 18 demonstration a great deal has happened to change the character as well as the significance of such confrontations, not only at Wisconsin, but across the nation. At the same time there is some evidence that the events of 1967 are something that the Madison campus cannot forget and they represent thus far, the ultimate challenge Wisconsin has had to face as an institution.

Several factors were crucial in determining the kind of resolution we have just examined. One was the tradition of faculty government. This involvement not only accounts for the kind of milieu that permitted faculty members to confront each other directly and openly on the issues, but also provided the training ground for the kind of faculty politician who could negotiate those questions within his own department or area and with colleagues in other disciplines. Of even more importance, however, was the functioning of the apparatus that brought the salient elements of that conflict into confact and ultimately effected a compromise between them. In that respect the leadership



of the three mediators was quite important, and uniquely so, for they were functioning for an administration that was partially disabled by these events.

At the same time one cannot say that the mediators "saved the day." The events themselves were too complex and the elements in the conflict too intricately interwoven to say that any one act or any one group of individuals made all the difference. If one has to isolate a single, overriding factor, it was probably the ability of the institution to adapt; to move with the events and make an adjustment to them without compromising either its essential purpose or alienating its more liberal or its more conservative elements. Because of its relative isolation, the University has also had more freedom to heal itself; to deal more directly and exclusively with its own problems and thereby achieve some kind of internal balance.

At the same time one must understand that conditions have vastly changed since October 1967. Today the issue of student activism is no longer the largely local one that it was then. The beginning of an awareness of this fact also marks the character of events at Madison. Although there was a failure in terms of a dialogue between left and right, in another way the violence produced the most intensive discussion this community has experienced in recent times,



a discussion that was both educational and provided a kind of catharsis. One is left with the conclusion that the most important factor operating in these circumstances was a quality of the community as a whole; its flexibility, its openness and its responsiveness to change. To say that this makes "all the difference" is not to imply that other conditions need not have been present, but to indicate the crucial importance of this particular variable; a variable to which, perhaps, less attention has been paid than deserved in the study of social conflict.

To make predictions about future confrontations or disruption is rather misleading for in a sense, several have already occurred, including a series of events in February, 1969 over the admission of black students and the creation of a black studies department. In that case the National Guard with called in, and although there was a great deal of tension there was no violence and relatively little disruption. During this episode the faculty was relatively united. The behavior of the administration (strengthened since October 1967) was generally approved of, and though the faculty voted to create a black studies department they did not approve the control of that department by the students (an important demand).

If one must make a prognosis as to the future, two different sets of questions have to be asked; first, what



is the probable response of the administration, the controlling element in these events, and second, given such a response, what are the likely prospects for faculty behavior?

One is inclined to believe that if the qualities of flexibility, openness to change and willingness to learn were so important in the past, they will be of even greater usefulness in the future. This is particularly true of the administration. Follow-up interviews found administrators, well up to a year after the crisis, doing everything they could to work within the framework of what one of them has called, "a new world." If nothing else, they have not been guilty of the insularity and insensitivity that the Cox Report says was so disastrous in the case of Columbia in 1968.<sup>16</sup>

If attitudes such as these are important in a "preventive" sense, a posture of readiness and plans for action are equally important. Given a strengthened administration, and a state government that is ready to back up the administration with the National Guard, the University is not likely to be caught without the necessary force to contain student violence, a force they seem inclined to use only with the greatest restraint.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Crisis at Columbia: The Cox Commission Report (New York: Vintage Books, 1968).



Now what of the faculty? Recent observations as well as a number of other events leads one to believe that the faculty is differently disposed toward confrontation on the part of students. For one thing, the informal apparatus for dealing with dissent within the faculty community, something that was totally absent on October 18, has been reasonably well established. The young liberals, if not directly a part of the inner councils of the University, are able to contact such centers directly and such centers seem much more willing to entertain such cooperation as well. Interview data also reveal that both faculty groups, liberals and conservatives, are aware of what is happening on campuses across the country and anxious to avoid the worst forms of violence and dislocation.

There are other important "outside" factors as well. For one thing the "nature of the situation" has changed. No longer can the faculty count on the Regents to automatically ratify its recommendations on internal matters.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, the Legislature has become increasingly vocal in its



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>This became apparent early in the fall of 1968 when the Regents demonstrated their pique at the presentation of a "nude" play (a university theater production of Peter Pan in which six coeds danced in the ride) and discontinued its performance without consulting the faculty. It would have been customary for the faculty to handle this as a disciplinary matter. The Milwaukee Journal, October 5, 1968.

criticism of the University, its students and the faculty. All of this has created a feeling of vulnerability and loss of power within the faculty. In addition there is among the young liberals a sense of the realities that are present in these situations -- meaning student confrontations. There has been, as one young liberal put it, "a change in our understanding of the facts:"

One of them is that at the time of the October '67 thing there were a lot of innocent students involved and while it was true that there are a lot of hangerson, later on any student should know what he's getting in for these days. Students now know that if they go out in a mob there's gonna be some guys there hiding behind that mob and throwing rocks and worse; so that just by creating the crowd they're really creating a serious danger of destruction of property, injury, and so forth.

In that respect they are no longer willing to endorse, in a blanket fashion, the freedom of protest. Perhaps this is one reason for accepting the presence of the National Guard without protest in February of 1969 -- something they violently objected to at an earlier time. Finally, a number of young liberals convey a sense of "fatigue," not only in the face of the number of hours of debate, meeting in caucus, and the like that go into things like the Dow demonstration end other political battles, but also in terms of its "futility."

This does not mean a sense of failure or even retreat, but rather what is a much more pragmatic view of what the



issues are and when to take a stand. Thus when the Regents recently singled out the salary increase of a particular faculty member (a faculty radical) for reduction, the young liberals moved quickly against them. Here was a clear violation of academic freedom, politically motivated, and patently unjust since the faculty member was a productive scholar and good teacher. In this case one of the leaders of the Liberal Caucus was able to work directly with members of both the University Committee and the administration in putting pressure on the Regents to relent; which they did. In addition, the whole process was carried on "discreetly." All of this suggests a further incorporation of the more liberal faculty into the established structure of faculty politics and their ability to influence faculty action.

Thus it seems that should there be another occasion when the life of the institution is threatened, that it is unlikely the faculty will face the kind of crisis that it did on October 18. What it seems will happen is what happened in the black student incident just cited -- the faculty will remain fairly well united while its conservative and liberal elements negotiate the conditions for such unity behind the scenes. For those few faculty members who feel they must take a principled stand against the institution on such matters there is little support. The major segments



of the liberal left have sufficient leadership, as recently demonstrated, and a communications network that is well enough integrated that the need for information or sharing of sentiments can be rapidly carried out. What is more important, their leadership structure is no longer as isolated or as inexperienced as it was. Not only are they in a position to act or not to act, but they are in a better position to convey where they stand to the administration and the conservatively controlled University Committee. Ιf' factions remain, as no doubt they do, their antagonism is blunted by the overwhelming sense of danger posed by an increasingly hostile public, a Legislature that is equally incensed and placing increasing pressure on the Regents, and a violent subsection of the "student" community that is clearly disaffected and ready to destroy the institution to make its point.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The problem dominating this investigation, and the one to which we may be able to provide the greatest insight, concerns the organization of the faculty of a large complex institution such as Wisconsin. In looking at this question not so long ago, Burton R. Clark made the following observation:



The tightly-knit academic community with a relatively unified faculty culture is thus changed in our day into an entirely different kind of system by the joint impact of increasing scale and professionalism. The concept of academic community is a myth of considerable value in most colleges and universities, but it is not to be taken seriously as a description of the actual state of affairs in most places now and in the forseeable future.18

In many respects this research bears out Clark's interpretation of the breakdown of a "relatively unified faculty culture," although it has been our conclusion that this was not only due to increasing scale and professionalism but to the social origins of the newer entrants and the opportunity structure they have enjoyed. Clark goes on to point out that as a result of this condition it is perhaps more useful to regard the university as a federation:

. . . the concept of federation seems more appropriate to many universities, composed as they are of a large number of quasi-autonomous professional schools, colleges and departments. Within the federation, held together by a loose bureaucratic structure, many nations and tribes live their own ways. . . In a community, interests are held much in common and the consensus is extensive. But a federation of divergent disciplines is not coordinated by the easy interaction of men of common interest. Rather, the disciplines exist as separate estates, with distinctive subcultures, and are coordinated by the impersonal means of a larger organization.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>18</sup>Burton R. Clark, "Faculty Culture," <u>The Study of</u> <u>Campus Cultures</u> (Boulder: Western Interstate Commission for Higher Education, 1963), p. 53.

19<sub>Ibid</sub>.



Although this interpretation of what the university represents is a very useful one, and offers a clear cut idea of how such an organization may function on a day-to-day basis, it does not tell us much about the larger fabric of relations that bind men together in such an enterprise; an extremely important question insofar as this study is concerned. "For no association," as MacIver once pointed out, "can in the long run survive unless its constituents are in some degree bound together by indivisible social bonds."<sup>20</sup> How are those bonds created at Wisconsin, and what does this portend for the future of the university?

At one time the faculty at Wisconsin found an immediate and direct form of integration through such mechanisms as the University Club, to which a majority of the faculty belonged and where they gathered almost daily. Although this focal point for faculty interaction no longer exists, one of the most important mechanisms involved -- informal contacts across a broad range of academic life -- has not completely disappeared. Rather what has taken place is that the context for the development of such bonds, as well as their reinforcement, has shifted.

Nowadays these contacts may begin in the earliest days when as a new faculty member an individual may live in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>R. M. MacIver and Charles H. Page, <u>Society, An</u> <u>Introductory Analysis</u> (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1949), p. 443.



in the University Houses. These low cost rental units, available only to new faculty, with a limited tenancy of five years, throw young faculty from different disciplines together in a communal atmosphere that creates enduring lines of friendship and communication. Cross-disciplinary ties are also made by membership on the numerous committees that a highly participatory institution such as Wisconsin demands. Roughly 1,100 such appointments are made each year and even after allowing for the fact that some men inevitably serve on several committees, the fact remains that such appointments not only contribute to friendships and alliances across wide areas of the campus but also serve a general integrating function. Finally, crossdisciplinary ties are strengthened through the various research institutes where men are drawn together from a number of disciplines. Where at some institutions crossing disciplinary lines seems difficult, Wisconsin encourages them both structurally and informally.

What seems to be important in all this is that such people can, when necessary, contact and inform each other about matters happening on campus. There is no doubt, for example, that a number of contacts were thus initiated during the crisis and that these contacts together with the efforts of the active faculty politicians (and often it is



hard to tell the one from the other), not only helped bring about a resolution of this conflict but also provide an important basis for maintaining the wholeness this institution enjoys.

In this respect academic communities resemble the urban communities that surround them. Today, much as in the community at large, academic men seek their goals through a broad spectrum of groups and contending organizations. Many of these -- the Senate, the department, various committees -- are familiar ones, but apparently new groups have become necessary as the scope and the intensity of faculty concerns have changed. From such groups -- the ad hoc groups we have seen at Wisconsin and elsewhere -- it must be assumed that not only are new vehicles for the expression of faculty attitudes emerging, but that there is also an ever-present culture to which faculty members relate as a body.

Several lines of research suggest themselves in this connection. It would be useful to study ad hoc groups of this kind on a number of campuses to find out the extent to which they follow the Wisconsin pattern; that is as groups of young, partially alienated faculty members from the social sciences and humanities, or where there are other patterns of participation as well. In particular, it seems



important to determine the degree to which social origins of new faculty have helped to determine the scope and direction of faculty factionalism, political activity and the like. It might also be useful to determine the conflicts these new political roles generate with traditional roles and commitments, and the relationship such political activity has with academic productivity, satisfaction and success.

At the same time it is important that we look into the question of how the existing structure of the university has adapted to new movements or strains within it. As this study clearly indicates, it is the mass of the faculty that makes the difference between success or failure on the part of these new influences or demands. What is needed is empirical data that tells us more specifically, and more systematically, how the faculty responds to these issues, because it is abundantly clear that no change takes place in the university unless it takes into account the needs and interests of this vast group and the nature of its response to these pressures. Then, and perhaps only then, will we have the basis for the beginning of a theory in regard to the political life of the university.

For if there is a final conclusion to draw from this study, it is contrary to the impression that one gets from the literature on universities in America that there is no such



46

 $\mathbf{\hat{z}}$ 

thing as a political life within the faculty, at least not in any collective sense.<sup>21</sup> This dissertation, we hope, has made this much clear: that universities, like communities in general, are made up of people who in addition to their daily tasks must also continue to live with each other and settle their differences. Regardless of what one may call this process, it seems at its very heart to be profoundly political.

Perhaps the quiescence of faculties over the past has deceived us, for there certainly was a long period in the history of American institutions of higher learning when the echoes of political strife seemed remote indeed. But such action has never been entirely absent -- it has simply worn a genteel disguise; something that the issues, the tencr of the times and the make-up of the faculty made possible. All that has changed, and as a result a latent factor in the life of such institutions has made itself apparent. To ignore this would be to prejudice our understanding of the university as a social system. То study it, however, requires that the academic man, the student par excellence, study himself. And by this I mean study the very processes that have made it possible for him to have the kind of academic world he has today.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>This is particularly evident in the work of Talcott Parsons, perhaps the leading theoretician in this area. See his latest statement: "The Academic System: A Sociologist's View," <u>The Public Interest</u>, Fall, 1963; in particular p. 182.

