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ABSTRACT

Centering around case studies of American military intervention (1898 to 1933) in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua, this unit invites the student to compare the results of such intervention with the foreign policy goals and ideals the interventions were intended to implement. It confronts him with the dilemma of power in international affairs, with the difficulties inherent in executing foreign policy, with the problem of misunderstanding and misinterpretation caused by differences in culture, and with the question o f the morality and the efficacy of the use of force in international problem-solving. The unit has been designed primarily for college-bound students. (See SO 000 161 for a listing of related documents.) (Author/SBE)

TEACHER'S MANUAL

IDEALS AND REALITY IN FOREIGN POLICY:

AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE CARIBBEAN

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NOTE TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN EDITION

This unit was prepared by the Committee on the Study of History, Amherst College, under contract with the United States Office of Education. It is one of a number of units prepared by the Amherst Project, and was designed to be used either in series with other units from the Project or independently, in conjunction with other materials. While the units were geared initially for college-preparatory students at the high school level, experiments with them by the Amherst Project suggest the adaptability of many of them, either wholly or in part, for a considerable range of age and ability levels, as well as in a number of different kinds of courses.

The units have been used experimentally in selected schools throughout the country, in a wide range of teaching/learning situations. The results of those experiments will be incorporated in the Final Report of the Project on Cooperative Research grant H-168, which will be distributed through ERIC.

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This unit was initially prepared in the summer of 1967.

This is a unit about the foreign policy of the United States as applied in the Caribbean area from 1898 to 1933. It does not concentrate on foreign policy formulation but upon its actual application, specifically application in an extreme form--military intervention. It is a study in contrasts, the contrast between the officially announced ideals of Washington and the reality of Caribbean intervention. It offers the student of foreign policy a unique experience, a view of our Caribbean policy from the receiving end.

Section I provides an overview, the "big picture," with maps, charts, and introductory essay. Section II presents the officially announced policy of the United States. With its well-turned phrases and its highly quotable references to peace, justice, freedom, and the rights of nations, it reads like most foreign policy pronouncements of the recent past and present. Sections III, IV, and V, the central focus of the unit, are three case studies which explore the application of our policy. Here, thought, the student reads the terse messages of the State and Navy Departments in action. He sees both through the eyes of our officials and of the citizens of the occupied republics, the reality of our foreign policy. In the final section, the student reads the harsh analyses and criticisms of articulate Latin-American nationalists. Are they perhaps similar to other criticisms the student may have heard and dismissed?

On its simplest level this unit may have the sobering effect of seeing our actions through the eyes of others, which may lead the student to view with a new sophistication and perspective the foreign policy announcements in the press and on television. On a higher level, the unit should provoke continuing thought and inquiry into more universal questions: the uses of history, the nature of power, the bases of national policy, the inevitability of misunderstanding and minsinterpretation produced by the clash of differing cultures, the morality and even the efficacy of the use of force in international problem-solving. The student may come to grasp the sense of irony and paradox, even tragedy, in the gap that arises between the lofty ideals of the distant policy maker and the sometimes sordid and counter productive application of policy in the field--the gap between what a society likes to think it is doing and what is actually being done in its name.

A word of warning and an invitation: This unit does not provide anything approaching a complete study of our Caribbean policy during this period. Limitations of length have resulted in a careful selecting and editing of documents with the intent of focusing attention on the central issues raised. If suspicion arises as to oversimplification, the teacher and student are invited to consult the sources. Although the writer feels the materials presented are representative, the subject itself and this unit especially, are likely to produce dispute and controversy, a result which is expected and welcomed. True historical inquiry does not lie in passive acceptance of a single interpretation or single collection of documents, but rather in the clash and conflict of many views, many sources. The unit is offered with the intent of raising more questions than it answers.

INTRODUCTION

The student may be shocked, surprised and confused by the opening statements. They should be read in class and should raise immediate questions. The teacher might pose the following series of questions, designed to focus on the central issue of the unit and carry the student through to the end.

1. What questions occur to you as you read and compare these statements? There will be many questions suggested but among them the teacher is certain to find: why this hostility? what were we doing? who is right, our defenders or our critics?

2. What kinds of information do you need to answer your questions?

3. Where would you look for such information?

4. What kinds of problems might arise in your search?

Here is set out in simplified form the historian's approach. In discussing and using these questions, the student will be introduced to the techniques of historical inquiry.

SECTION I

OVERVIEW

This section is composed primarily of reference materials, but also contains a brief overview of the topic. The student should familiarize himself with the information presented here as it will provide him with a frame of reference for the case studies, and he will want to refer to the maps in this section as he moves through the unit. A quick scanning of the charts and maps will impress upon the student the tremendous scope and depth of our Caribbean involvement during this period.

The teacher might find it possible to use these materials in a discussion which focuses on the problem of definition, especially of such terms as "control" and "intervention." Out of such a discussion should come not only greater precision in the use of terms throughout the rest of the unit, but perhpas a more sophisticated perception that in the last analysis, such terms are at best functional rather than abstract, and necessarily relate to the total structure described. From this perception might come greater care in the use of terminology generally.

SECTION II

THE CARIBBEAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

In tracing the main outlines of our Caribbean policy as it developed during this period, this section illustrates the ideals of our policy--what our administrations said it wanted to do and what it claimed it was doing. The first documents stress the strategic necessities. Taft's "dollar diplomacy" adds a new dimension, the encouragement of private investments in the area to further national policy. The Wilsonian approach adds a third element, the promotion of constitutional government. The address of President Coolidge synthesizes all of these elements and adds new ones, representing a high water mark before the turning of the tide of intervention. The final selection, Stimson's speech, stands both as a summary and justification of the policy, but it has a strangely defensive, almost apologetic tone. The stage was set for a new apprehension of reality, and a new policy. Through all of these documents, except perhaps Roosevelt's letter to his son (#1), runs an unmistakable thread of idealism and moral righteousness. It has been said that Americans believe in the immaculate conception of their foreign policy. This idealism stands in stark contrast with the case studies which follow.

The student should not look ahead to the case studies while reading and discussing this section, though he will want to refer back to it when he moves on to later sections. Here his main concern should be to understand the official Caribbean policy of the United States as it was presented to the nation and the world.

An assignment here might consist of asking each student to commit to paper a very brief summary of what our policy was in terms of what we were doing and why we were doing it. The emphasis should be on motivation and goals. The papers should be set aside and not examined again until the completion of the final section.

SECTION III

CASE STUDY IN INTERVENTION:

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Sections III, IV, and V are case studies of United States intervention in the Caribbean. They are the realities which point to the gap between ideals and application. These three interventions were selected for study because they most clearly focus on the central questions of the unit. In addition, they span the time period of the unit, providing a discernable and logical evolution, from the initially simple Dominican customs receivership of 1905 to the frustratingly complex and bitterly contested Nicaraguan intervention of the late 1920's.

The background to intervention in the Dominican Republic is traced from the customs receivership, which gave the U. S. only partial control over Dominican Finances, and its failure to achieve the desired results through efforts to increase United States control by diplomatic means (A5), which led to the military intervention. Bryan's letter (A3) raises questions on the selection of foreign service personnel. Russell's internationally infamous note (A5) and the Dominican Foreign Minister's reply (A6) provide a study in contrasts.

The intervention and occupation developed from the attempts to bolster a "useful" President, who resigned rather than permit himself to be used as an excuse for intervention (B1). The new President, while willing to cooperate, would not give in completely by issuing an unconstitutional decree and thus faced non-recognition and the total cutting off of all funds to his government, as the United States now had control of customs (B4). The American position was summarized by the State Department (B5) and a decision was reached at the highest level, as evidenced by the note signed "WW" (B6), to end Dominican sovereignty with a proclamation of martial law, leaving us free to impose our reforms.

The Dominican challenge to the morality of the occupation as expressed by Peynada (C1) and to its legality as expressed by Perez (C2) may be compared with the United States justifications contained in Russell's note (A5), the State Department memo (B5) and Captain Knapp's proclamation (B7). The occupation's unfortunate relations with civilians, an almost certain result of military occupation and "pacification" tend to nullify all the good works described in the last section. Questions suggested for this case study could be applied with modification to the others.

1. What were we trying to achieve and why?

2. How do the official policy statements in Section II relate or fail to relate to the actual events? Contrast Wilson's

idealism (II, 4 and 5) with the actions of his appointees, Bryan (III, A3 and 4) and Russell (III, A5, B1,2,8) and with his own note approving the declaration of martial law (B6).

3. How do misunderstandings arising from cultural differences affect policy? The decision to intervene was based mainly on our interpretation of the treaty of 1907, especially regarding the increase of national debt (C2). Is it possible that words may mean different things to different societies? How did cultural differences affect the relations with civilians? How did they affect interpretation of events?

4. How did the unfortunate relations between the military and civilians affect the success of the intervention? Could the incidents that occurred have been avoided? Why do you suppose the author included only atrocities? Americans aren't beasts, these must have been exceptions. Why didn't he describe all the good things done by the marines? Here the teacher might suggest an answer, how do we judge the armed forces and generally the "goodness or badness" of our adversaries such as the Japanese in World War II or the Viet Cong in Vietnam.

5. How about the morality of the methods involved in carrying out our reforms? Is it important or even possible to be always "morally just" in carrying out foreign policy, or can "good" results or the "rightness" of our cause justify the means? What about necessity? Perhaps our opponents force us to use ruthless means: they just wouldn't cooperate so we <u>had</u> to do it. Maybe they started it. Maybe they would do the same to us.

6. Was the United States justified in intervening? Compare our reasoning with the protests of the Dominicans.

7. Was the United States wise in intervening--that is, did the accomplishments and results of the intervention mark this as a successful policy?

8. If you were a citizen of the Dominican Republic, what would have been your reaction to the events described?

SECTION IV

CASE STUDY IN INTERVENTION: HAITI

The Haitian intervention offers a parallel, though it is in some ways unique, to the Dominican intervention. A similar set of circumstances furnished both the long term and immediate causes. The diplomatic efforts at solution telescoped into a year. The expected intervention occurred in 1915 amid scenes of disorder and bloodshed, or was the disorder exaggerated by American reports? From the dispatches of the originally secret Navy Department records emerges the fact that the Haitians were "permitted" to elect a "cooperative" President (A2). Varieties of pressure, diplomatic and military, brought about the acceptance of the desired treaty (III, B). Finally, since the treaty appeared to be unconstitutional, a new constitution was written for Haiti and approved in an interestingly arranged plebicite (III, C). The relations between the occupation and civilians were much more troublesome by racial antipathies, for Haiti is a Negro Republic. Charges of atrocities resulted in interesting and illuminating defenses of American conduct (III, D). Again the accomplishments of the intervention seem more apparent to the Americans than to the Haitian critics (III, E).

The same series of questions suggested for the Dominican Republic may be posed in relation to Haiti.

SECTION V

CASE STUDY IN INTERVENTION: NICARAGUA

This is a study of the second intervention in Nicaragua, not the first which lasted from 1912 to 1925, but some of the key figures are the same such as the "cooperative" President, Adolf Diaz. The decision to intervene was complicated by new issues. Outside influences threatened the strategic security of the United States, Mexico and International Communism, or were they the same, as our government implied? Here also appeared a new intervention, not to secure United States control but to secure free elections which would insure stability, a lesson in democracy. Here also, the reaction was different: Marines and the marine-trained National Guard were unable to suppress guerilla forces under the bandit or patriot Augusto Cesar Sandino. Parenthically, the students may have noted by now that a marine trained "guard" was a prominent feature of all three interventions. The "free" elections proved to be not so free; the country could not be pacified; and our government was embarassed by domestic and foreign criticism. By this time, opposition to the United States had been generated in the Caribbean which would prove increasingly troublesome to our interests there. The intervention was terminated, but the troubles remained, submerged for a time by the "Good Neighbor" policy and a crop of marine-trained dictators, only to reappear today more threatening than ever. The final document in this section indicates a definite abandonment of the policy of direct intervention which was not employed again until 1965.

The same questions suggested earlier may be applied with new ones added:

1. In what ways is this intervention similar to the others? In what ways different?

2. How convincing is the Coolidge administration's justification for intervention (V, A5)? Are there weaknesses?

3. How accurate are the analyses of the foreign press (A6)? Can anything be gained by listening to the opinions of outside observers?

4. What value can an historian's approach have in policy problem solving (A8)?

5. Was Sandino a bandit as our government officially termed him? Was he a Communist? Are we always accurate in judging the

motives and sincerity of our opponents?

At this point, the class might summarize the salient features of the three case studies. It would be useful to arrive at generalized answers to the eight questions suggested. The students will find that questions 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 on pages 5 and 6 will be most useful in this task.

SECTION VI

OURSELVES AS OTHERS SEE US

The final section presents the student with a sampling of anti-American criticism, both historical and current. The criticism does not represent a cross section of Latin American opinion as there were and are some notable supporters of our policy, especially among groups who benefited from it. Unfortunately, they tend to be in a minority and while significant, are not typical. Through the eyes of these writers, the student is invited to view our foreign policy as many Latin American nationalists have done and still do. There is an ominous similarity between the statements of communist and non-communist writers. May we assume that Latin American communists and nationalists agree on many points, that the nationalists tend to be so "left" and the communists so nationalistic that the differences between them lose much of their importance? Contents are more important than labels. The student is not expected to agree with these writers, only to understand them and the events that contributed to the development of such attitudes.

The students may now reexamine their summaries of our policy written after studying from Section II and compare them with the statements in Section VI. In what ways are they different? Why are they different? The students may see that viewing foreign policy from the receiving end has given them a different perspective and that this combined with a different cultural frame of reference could produce the widely varying interpretations before them.

The students should now be able to conduct a fruitful discussion of the specific questions posed at the beginning of this unit. Did they find tentative answers to some of their questions? Did they have to revise these answers as they moved through the unit? Are they satisfied that they have the "right" answers now? From what sources did they gather evidence? Were all the sources American? What problem did they encounter in their search? Were they able to recognize bias in themselves and the sources? How did they handle this problem?

Finally, and most important, are there questions remaining unanswered or new questions arising out of the unit? The teacher may suggest some: Why, since direct intervention was apparently abandoned in the early 1930's, do some of the critical statements date from a later period--Arevalo's in 1961 and Guevara's in 1967? What is our policy today in the Caribbean? Is there the same gap between what we say we are doing and what is actually being done? How are we regarded by Latin Americans today? How can we find out?

Inquiry is a habit. Once acquired it may be hard to stop.

STUDENT'S MANUAL

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INTRODUCTION

[A Cuban newspaper prophesizes that the day will arrive when it will be considered a "sacred duty" to kill Americans.][1]

[Juan Jose Arvela, President of Guatemala, speaks bitterly of United States economic exploitation of Latin Amerca. He declares that the expropriation of millions of dollars by U.S. businessmen and bankers has led to progress in the United States and stagnation in Lation America.][2]

[An American historian states that American imperialism was a temporary and rather benign phenomenon. He notes that it was basically designed to protect the entire new world against the imperialism of Europe.][3]

This is a unit about foreign policy. It is about a particular foreign policy, that followed by our country from 1898 to 1933 in an area we used to call the American Lake, the Caribbean. Since we have interests there today, perhaps it is still an American Lake.

This study does not concentrate on the formulating of policy but upon its application in one of its most extreme forms--direct military intervention. Our policy produced the statements you just read. Do they raise questions in your mind? As you move through this unit, you will read what many people involved in each situation had to say of our policy: our Presidents and officials of the State Department, Naval and Marine officers, newspapermen, the inhabitants of the Caribbean countries, and even a guerilla general. They may help you arrive at tentative answers to some of your questions, but they will ask you more questions than they answer.

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[1] LaNacion, June 21, 1922, quoted in Maurice Zeitlin and Rober Scheer, Cuba: Tragedy in Our Hemisphere (Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1963), 46.

[2] Juan Jose Arevalo, The Shark and the Sardines (Lyle Stuart, New York, 1961), 10-11.

[3] Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1943), 385-386.

SECTION I

OVERVIEW

1. Map of the Caribbean area:[1]



(Map on following page, footnote below)

[1] Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964), inside cover.

U.S.A.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

GULF OF MEXICO

Bahama Is.

Florida Straits

Matanzas
Bahía Honda
Habana
Santa Clara
Piner del Río
Cuba
Yucatan Channel
Camagüey
Isle of Pines
Manzanillo
Guantánamo
Santiago
Windward Passage
Pte. St. Nicholas
Gonaives
Cap-Haitien
Monte Cristi
Puerto Plata
Samaná Bay
Hinche
Haiti
Santiago
Saibe
Port-au-Prince
Santo Domingo
Azua
Dominican Republic
Mona Passage
San Juan
Puerto Rico
Virgin Is.
San Pedro de Macoris

Yucatán
Gulf of Campeche
Veracruz
Mexico City
Kingston
Jamaica

Br. Belize
Honduras
México
Gulf of Honduras
Puerto Barrios
Puerto Tela
La Ceiba
Cortés
Guatemala
CARIBBEAN SEA
Gulf of Tehuantepec
Honduras
Tegucigalpa
Guatemala
San Salvador
La Unión
Nicaragua
Namasigue
Matagalpa
El Salvador
Corinto
Tipitapa
Bluefields
Corn Is.
León
Managua
Granada
Gulf of Fonseca
San Juan R.
Greytown
Gulf of Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Limón
San José
Santa Marta
Gulf of Venezuela
Pto. Cabello
La Guaira
Caracas
Venezuela
Colón
Panama
Panama
Gulf of Darién
Santo Domingo
Gulf of Panama
Colombia
PACIFIC OCEAN
Bogotá

2. American activities in the Caribbean, 1898-1927:[2]

[The chart outlines (1) the political relationships of the United States with Latin American countries, (2) dates of military interventions by the U.S. in Latin America, and (3) estimates of the amount of U.S. government investments and loans in the area.]

3. "Our Stake in Latin America:"[3]

[The table shows that American investment in various countries of Latin America increased astronomically from 1912 to 1928. It shows that the U.S. (1) has more money invested in Latin America than any other area of the world and (2) has made a larger investment in Latin America than any other nation has.]

4. In January, 1927, an article entitled "Uncle Sam, Imperialist: A Survey of Our Encroachments in the Caribbean, 1898-1927" by William R. Shepherd, Professor of History at Columbia University, appeared in The New Republic:[4]

[The author states that the underlying motive for American intervention in the Caribbean has been the desire for political and economic gain. While the author notes that American intervention has sometimes involved fair policies (as in Cuba) and sometimes cruel and ruthless treatment (as in Haiti), he argues that American foreign involvement has always contributed to the material welfare of the Caribbean countries. Finally, the author claims that opposition within Caribbean nations to American policies has been politically motivated "rather than the result of actual wrong inflicted."]

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[2]William R. Shepherd, "Uncle Sam, Imperialist: A Survey of Our Encroachments in the Caribbean, 1898-1927", The New Republic, Jan. 26, 1927, 268.

[3]"Our Stake in Latin America," Literary Digest, Jan. 28, 1928, 60.

[4]William R. Shepherd, "Uncle Sam, Imperialist," 266-267.

SECTION II

THE CARIBBEAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES: EVOLUTION TO 1933

The broad outlines of our Caribbean policy are traced in the papers of the Presidents and State Department. Although many of these documents are general statements of foreign policy, all are particularly applicable to the Caribbean area.

1. Letter of Theodore Roosevelt to his son, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., February 10, 1904:[1]

> San Domingo is drifting into chaos, for after a hundred years of freedom it shows itself utterly incompetent for governmental work. Most reluctantly I have been obliged to take the initial step of interference there. I hope it will be a good while before I will have to go further. But sooner or later it seems to me inevitable that the United States should assume an attitude of protection and regulation in regard to all these little states in the neighborhood of the Caribbean. I hope it will be deferred as long as possible but I think it is inevitable.

2. Annual message from President Theodore Roosevelt to the United States Congress, Decomeber 6, 1904:[2]

> It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or entertains any projects as regards the other nations of the western hemisphere save such as are for their welfare. All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, orderly and prosperous. Any country whose people conduct themselves well can count upon our heartly friendship. If a nation shows that it knows how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political matters, if it keeps order and pays it obligations, it need fear no interference from the United States. Chronic wrongdoing,

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[1] Theodore Roosevelt Papers, President's personal letterbooks, XV, Library of Congress, as quoted in Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States, 155.

[2] Theodore Roosevelt, The Words of Theodore Roosevelt, State Papers as Governor and President 1899-1909 (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1925), XVII, 299-300.

or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean sea would show the progress in stable and just civilization which with the aid of the Platt amendment Cuba has shown since our troops left the island, and which so many of the republics in both Americas are constantly and brilliantly showing, all question of interference by this nation with their affairs would be at an end. Our interests and those of our southern neighbors are in reality identical. They have great natural riches, and if within their borders the reign of law and justice obtains, prosperity is sure to come to them. While they thus obey the primary laws of civilized society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of cordial and helpful sympathy. We would interfere with them only in the last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the entire body of American nations. It is a mere truism to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere else, which desires to maintain its freedom, its independence, must ultimately realize that the right of such independence cannot be separated from the responsibility of making good use of it.

In asserting the Monroe Doctrine, in taking such steps as we have taken in regard to Cuba, Venezuela and Panama, . . . we have acted in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large. . . .

3. Annual message from President William Howard Taft to the United States Congress, December 3, 1912:[3]

The diplomacy of the present administration has sought to respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse. This policy has been characterized as substituting dollars for bullets. It is one that appeals alike to idealisitc humanitarian sentiments, to the dictates of sound policy and strategy, and to legitimate commercial aims. . . .

In Central America the aim has been to help such countries as Nicaragua and Honduras to help themselves. They are the immediate beneficiaries. The national benefit to the United States is twofold. First, it is obvious that the Monroe Doctrine is more

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[3] Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1919, 1912, X, XII. (Hereinafter referred to as Foreign Relationsof the United States.)

vital in the neighborhood of the Panama Canal and the zone of the Caribbean than anywhere else. There, too, the maintenance of that doctrine falls most heavily upon the United States. It is therefore essential that the countries within that sphere shall be removed from the jeopardy involved by heavy foreign debt and chaotic national finances and from the ever-present danger of international complications due to disorder at home. Hence the United States has been glad to encourage and support American bankers who were willing to lend a helping hand to the financial rehabilitation of such countries because this financial rehabilitation and the protection of their customhouses from being the prey of would-be dictators would remove at one stroke the menace of foreign creditors and the menace of revolutionary disorder.

4. Statement of Latin American policy by President Woodrow Willson, March 11, 1913:[4]

Cooperation is possible only when supported at every turn by the orderly processes of just government based upon law, not upon arbitrary or irregular force. We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican government everywhere hold, that just government rests always upon the consent of the governed, and that there can be no freedom without order based upon law and upon the public conscience and approval. We shall look to make these principles the basis of mutual intercourse, respect, and helpfulness between our sister republics and ourselves. We shall lend our influence of every kind to the realization of these principles in fact and practice, knowing that disorder, personal intrigues, and defiance of constitutional rights weaken and discredit government and injure none so much as the people who are unfortunate enough to have their common life and their common affairs so tainted and disturbed. We can have no sympathy with those who seek to seize the power of government to advance their own personal interests or ambition. We are the friends of peace, but we know that there can be no lasting or stable peace in such circumstances. As friends, therefore, we shall prefer those who act in the interest of peace and honor, who protect private rights, and respect the restraints or constitutional provision. Mutual respect seems to us the indispensable foundation of friendship between states, as between individuals.

5. Additional views were expressed by President Wilson in an address delivered at Mobile, Alabama, October 27, 1913:[5]

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[4] Ibid., 1913, 7.

[5] The Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson (George H. Doran Company, New York, 1924), I, 34-36. (Reprinted by permission of Estate of Woodrow Wilson, c/o Dale D. Drain, Washington, D.C.)

[President Wilson notes that in the past foreign capitalists have dealt harshly with Latin America. He declares that the U.S. must now prove that she is willing to befriend her southern neighbors. He suggests that the U.S. demonstrate that her interest lies in promoting liberty and human rights, and not in seeking her own material gain.]

6. Statement to the United Press by President Calvin Coolidge, April 25, 1927:[6]

[President Coolidge states that the U.S. has always been interested in promoting freedom abroad and that she has always acted within the limits of international law. He notes that there are instances when the U.S. has a moral responsibility to intervene in foreign countries. He stresses, however, that America will use her power in "support of the universal rights of humanity."]

7. Address by Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson before the Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 1931:[7]

Furthermore, the difficulties which have beset the foreign policy of the United States in carrying out these principles cannot be understood without the comprehension of a geographical fact. The very locality where the progress of these republics has been most slow; where the difficulties of race and climate have been greatest; where the recurrence of domestic violence has most frequently resulted in the failure of duty on the part of the republics themselves and the violation of the rights of life and property accorded by international law to foreigners within their territory, has been in Central America, the narrow isthmus which joins the two Americas, and among the islands which intersperse the Caribbean Sea adjacent to that isthmus. That locality has been the one spot external to our shores which nature has decreed to be most vital to our national safety, not to mention our prosperity. It commands the line of the great trade route which joins our eastern and western coasts. Even before human hands had pierced the isthmus with a seagoing canal, that route was vital to our national interest. Since the Panama Canal has become an accomplished fact, it has been not only the vital artery of our coastwise commerce but, as well, the link in our national defensive power of our fleet. One cannot fairly appraise American policy toward Latin America or fully appreciate the standard which it has maintained without taking into consideration all of the elements of which it is the resultant.

Like the rocks which mark the surface of a steady river current, all of the facts and circumstances which I have outlined have produced

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[6]The New York Times, April 26, 1927, 10. (c 1927, by The New York Times Co. Reprinted by permission.)

[7]Henry L. Stimson, The United States and the Other American Republics, An Address before the Council on Foreign Relations, February 6, 1931, Department, Latin-American Series, No. 4 (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1931), 4-5.

ripples in the current of our steady policy towards the Latin American republics. Some of them have resulted in temporary intrusions into the domestic affairs of some of those countries, which our hostile critics have not hesitated to characterize as the manifestation of a selfish American imperialism. I am clear that a calm historical perspective will refute that criticism and will demonstrate that the international practice of this Government in the Western Hemisphere has been asserted with a much readier recognition of the legal rights of all the countries with which we have been in contact than has been the prevalent practice in any other part of the world. . . .

SECTION III

CASE STUDY IN INTERVENTION:

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

In implementing our Caribbean policy, the Department employed many methods, diplomatic, economic, and military. Of these, direct military intervention was the most extreme, often employed in an emergency to protect lives and property during revolutionary disturbances, less frequently to achieve results which diplomacy had failed to produce. These case studies are not comprehensive but rather concentrate on the events surrounding the actual intervention, the relations between occupation forces and civilians, and the achievements of the intervention.

The Spanish-American War of 1898 was our first real involvement in the Caribbean, and the treaty with Spain resulted in making Puerto Rico our first possession in that area. With the Platt Amendment, Cuba became our first protectorate. Panama became our second protectorate in 1903, and the building of the canal created additional strategic necessities inthe Caribbean. Although military intervention in the Dominican Republic did not occur until 1916, its causes date from the first years of the century.

A. Background to Intervention

The following documents relate to our early involvement with the Dominican Republic.

1. President Theodore Roosevelt's message to the Senate, February 15, 1905:[1]

> I submit herewith a protocol concluded between the Dominican Republic and the United States.

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[1] John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1906), VI, 518-519, 526-528.

The conditions in the Republic of Santo Domingo have been growing steadily worse for many years. There have been many disturbances and revolutions, and debts have been contracted beyond the power of the Republic to pay. Some of these debts were properly contracted and are held by those who have a legitimate right to their money. Others are without question improper or exorbitant, constituting claims which should never be paid in full and perhaps only to the extent of a very small portion of their nominal value.

Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves aggrieved because of the nonpayment of debts due their citizens. The only way by which foreign creditors could ever obtain from the Republic itself any guaranty of payment would be either by the acquisition of territory outright or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the custom-houses, which would of course in itself, in effect, be taking possession of a certain amount of territory.

It has for some time been obvious that those who profit by the Monroe doctrine must accept certain responsibilities along with the rights which it confers; and that the same statement applies to those who uphold the doctrine. It can not be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement on its part. We do not propose to take any part of Santo Domingo, or exercise any other control over the island save what is necessary to its financial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of revenue, part of which will be turned over to the Government to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part of which will be distributed pro rata among the creditors of the Republic unpon a basis of absolute equity. The justification for the United States taking this burden and incurring this responsibility is to be found in the fact that it is incompatible with international equity for the United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such steps.

An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the Monroe doctrine take what action it sees fit in the adjustment of its disputes with American states, provided that action does not take the shape of interference with their form of government or of the despoilment of their territory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or the seizure of the customhouses, and this means, as has been said above, what is in effect a possession, even though only a temporary possession, or territory. The United States then becomes a party in interest, because under the Monroe doctrine it can not see any European power seize and permanently occupy the territory of one of these Republics; and yet such seizure of territory, disguised or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which the power in question can collect any debts, unless there is interference on the part of the United States. . . .

That most wise measure of international statesmanship, the Platt amendment, has provided a method for preventing such difficulties from arising in the new Republic of Cuba. In accordance with the terms of this amendment the Republic of Cuba can not issue any bonds which can be collected from Cuba, save as a matter of grace, unless with the consent of the United States, which is at liberty at all times to take measures to prevent the violation of the letter and spirit of the Platt amendment. If a similar plan could now be entered upon by the Dominican Republic, it would undoubtedly be of great advantage to them and to all other peoples, for under such an arrangement no larger debt would be incurred than could be honestly paid. . . .

But, no such plan at present exists; and under existing circumstances, when the condition of affairs becomes such as it has become in Santo Domingo, either we must submit to the likelihood of infringement of the Monroe doctrine or we must ourselves agree to some such arrangement as that herewith submitted to the Senate. In this case, fortunately, the prudent and far-seeing statesmanship of the Dominican Government has relieved us of all trouble. At their request we have entered into the agreement herewith submitted. Under it the custom-houses will be administered peacefully, honestly, and economically, 45 percent of the proceeds being turned over to the Dominican Government and the remainder being used by the United States to pay what proportion of the debts it is possible to pay on an equitable basis. The Republic will be secured against over-seas aggression. This in reality entails no new obligation upon us, for the Monroe doctrine means precisely such a guarantee on our part. . . .

The Republic of Santo Domingo has by this protocol wisely and patriotically accepted the responsibilities as well as the privileges of liberty, and is showing, with evident good faith its purpose to pay all that its resources will permit of its obligations. More than this it can not do, and when it has done this we should not permit it to be molested. We on our part are simply performing in peaceful manner, not only with the cordial acquiescence, but in accordance with the earnest request of the Government concerned, part of that international duty which is necessarily involved in the assertion of the Monroe doctrine. We are bound to show that we perform this duty in good faith and without any intention of aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of our weaker neighbors or of conducting ourselves otherwise than so as to benefit both these weaker neighbors and those European powers which may be brought into contact with them. It is in the highest degree necessary that we should prove by our action that the world may trust in our good faith and may understand that this international duty will be performed by us within our own sphere, in the interest not merely of ourselves, but of all other nations, and with strict justice toward all.

3. The treaty formalizing the customs receivership, which had been established by executive agreement in 1905, was signed at Santo Domingo on

February 8, 1907. Its key clauses provided:[2]

> [This treaty states that the U.S. shall appoint an official to collect customs until the bonds issued by the Dominican government are paid, and that the Dominican government shall not incur further debt until these bonds are paid.]

3. Our relations with other countries, and in fact the success or failure of our entire foreign policy, depends to a great extent on the officials stationed in foreign countries. The following letter from Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan to Walter Vick, Receiver General of the Dominican Republic, dated August 20, 1913, throws some light on methods of selection:[3]

> [In a letter to the newly appointed Receiver General of the Dominican Republic, W. J. Bryan requests a list of available positions with which he may reward his loyal campaign workers.]

4. In a statement oto The New York Times Secretary Bryan issued an explanation of his letter the day following iits publication:[4]

> [In a statement in the New York Times, Bryan explains his letter to Vick. He defends the system which bestows political appointments on those who have worked in politics. He notes that Mr. Vick received his appointment through this system.]

5. The Dominican situation remained satisfactory to the United States until 1911 when a new series of financial and revolutionary disturbances began. On Novermber 19, 1915, our Minister to the Dominican Republic, William

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[2]Treaty Between the United States and the Dominican Republic 1907, American Journal of International Law (American Society of International Law, New York, 1907), Supplement to I, 233-234.

[3]The New York Times, January 15, 1915, 6. (c 1915, by the New York Times Co. Reprinted by permission.)

[4]Ibid., January 16, 1915, 6.

Russell, addressed a note to the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs:[5]

Mr. Minister:

In accordance with instructions I have the honor to say to your excellency that the Government of the United States is anxiously concerned over the present unsettled conditions, both political and financial, in the Dominican Republic. My Government, by reason of the obligations assumed and by virtue of the authority given under the provisions of the convention concluded on February 8, 1907, is particulary interested in the material progress and welfare of the Dominican Republic and to that end is most anxious to secure the early establishment of a permanent peace throughout the country.

The two or three years following the enactment of the Dominican convention in 1907 seem to have passed without a violation on the part of the Dominican Government of clause III of that convention. Since 1910, however, it appears that the exigencies of the conditions in the Republic, have gradually caused first one of its administrations and then another to disregard the provisions of clause III of the solemn coovenant entered into between the United States and the Dominican Republic. . . .

The Department of State has awaited the receipt of some plan looking to the adjudication and final liquidation of the very considerable current indebtedness which has been accumulating slowly under previous administrations and rapidly under the Jiménes administration, and it has naturally expected to be informed that the daily increase in this indebtedness had ceased.

To its surprise and deep regret, no favorable information has come to hand. From a variety of sources advices have been received that the Government of President Jiménes is increasing the indebtedness of the Dominican Government at the rate of from one to three thousand dollars per day. In addition to this it is alleged that the extreme peculations taking place in the collection of the internal revenues are being used largely to benefit politicians, while the civilian employees of the Government go unsalaried and unfed. . . .

The present current indebtedness is variously described at from five to seven million dollars. This staggering statement clearly indicated the existence of some fundamental improprieties in the present Government. If tribute has been paid to prevent those who otherwise would do so, from starting revolutions, or to quell incipient revolutions; if the officers of the Government of President Jiménes are enriching themselves and leaving in want civilian employees of the Government, it can but be manifest that such a state of discontent will soon be reached as will threaten the very existence of the Dominican Republic.

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[5] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, 333, 335-336.

It is therefore, evident that since 1910 there has been a continuous violation of the provisions of the Convention of 1907, especially in that part which reads:

> Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the United States.

In direct contravention of the foregoing solemn undertaking, the Dominican debt has been increased by some seven millions of dollars. Closely associated with this regrettable failure to comply with treaty obligations, there has been a continual internecine struggle to obtain control of the Government and Government funds, which has resulted in a state of revolution so continuous as almost entirely to interrupt all national development in the Republic.

While my Government has recognized its perfect right to insist that the Dominican Republic should observe all the obligations of the convention of 1907, especially those regarding the increase of the public debt and the obligation to give full protection to the general receiver, so that the free course of the customs should not be interrupted, it has now, for the first time, determined that further violations of the obligations of the convention, which the Dominican Republic freely assumed, shall cease.

The Department of State maintains that a strict compliance on the part of the Dominican Government, of clause III of the Convention of 1907, in which the Dominican Government is prohibited from making any increase in its public indebtedness without the sanction of the Government of the United States, will constitute a most effective deterrent to all those who might contemplate the instigation of political disorders, to which the Republic has been subject for many years. The creation of a floating indebtedness, directly or indirectly, must certainly be interpreted as contravening the provision of the Convention of 1907. Failure to meet budgetary expenses, the appropriation of sums in excess of probably revenues, the purchase of supplies and materials, no adequate provision for payment of which has been made, are considered by the Department of State as a contravention of clause III and should be discouraged.

My Government therefore has decided that the American-Dominican Convention of 1907 gives it the right;--

A. To compel the observance of article III by insisting upon the immediate appointment of a financial adviser to the Dominican Republic, who shall be appointed by the President of the Dominican Republic, upon designation of the President of the United States, and who shall be attached to the Ministry of Finance to give effect to whose proposals and labors the Minister will lend all efficient aid. The financial adviser shall render effective the clauses of the Convention of 1907. . . .

B. To provide for the free course of the customs and prevent factional strife and disturbances by the creation of a constabulary, which the Dominican Government obligates itself for the preservation of domestic peace, security of individual rights and the full observance of the provisions of the convention, to create without delay and maintain. This constabulary shall be organized and commanded by an American to be appointed, as "Director of Constabulary," by the President of the Dominican Republic, upon nomination of the President of the United States. In like manner there shall be appointed to constabulary such other American officers as the director of constabulary shall consider requisite. . . .

6. The Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs replied in a note dated December 8, 1915:[6]

Mr. Minister: I acknowledge receipt of your courteous note No. 14 of the 19th of last month.

The President of the Republic on his return and after being acquainted with the contents of said note has instructed me to state to you as follows.

The Dominican Government has done everything in its power to avoid and later suppress disorders which have given rise to expenses and a consequent unstable condition of public finance to which your excellency refers in said note. It avoided said disorders with a due regard to the laws, guaranteeing to each citizen his rights, although some were making seditious use of said rights.

Disorders were repressed by detaching armed troops to combat the rebellion and succeeded in putting it down completely. But the Dominican Government, like any other government in the world in like case, could not prevent that public disorder and the sacrifices made to re-establish order were burdensome to the public finances and even interrupted the orderly march of institutions and the collection of internal revenue. . . .

It is not the Government's fault that the enemies of public peace, in less than a year, raised the standard of revolt on three different occasions, requiring that use of resources and energies which it was always the purpose to apply to the development of the great interests of the country.

Public order disturbed, the prime duty was to restore it. Without peace there is no progress, nor welfare, nor organization. . . .

It is perfectly well understood that the convention is a treaty, is an international law which fixes with precision the duties of each one of the contracting parties.

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[6] Ibid., 337-339.

The present administration aspires to maintain itself within its provisions and calls attention to the fact that the irregularities caused by the maladministration of previous governments and of the three revolutions that occurred during this administration, have in no wise affected the service of the public debt, which is religiously paid, and the bonds maintain a value in foreign markets which emphasizes the seriousnesswith which international agreements are carried out.

For the reason that it is not likely to bring about the end desired, the Government does not acquiesce in the suggestion of your excellency to secure the reestablishment of the office of the financial expert. . . . To re-establish this office therefore, would be cause for stirring up an absolutely dangerous public sentiment. And as the purpose of the American Government is to sincerely assist the Dominican Government in the fulfillment of its duties, that aid should assume a form devoid of all danger, of everything which might wound a national sentiment jealous of its sovereignty.

In regard to the transformation of the public forces into a civil guard organized and commanded by American officials designated by your Government and appointed by the Dominican Government, there is the same objection as in the matter of the financial expert. That which is sought for is not a peace obligated by force, which is always precarious, but a moral peace, resulting from tranquility of mind and a cessation of warlike acts, and a desire for financial welfare.

And the establishment of a police as proposed, interpreted by the Dominican people as an abdication of the national sovereignty, far from being a pacificating element would be, on the contrary, an inextinguishable germ of trouble, of protest, and of violent attacks--all of which would bring about a situation much more lamentable than the present.

The question is not one of those to be settled by the increase or the abolition of the armed forces of the Republic. The most important side of the matter is the economic side, and with the re-establishment of the producing vitality of the country social and political phenomena which are at present a source of alarm both to native and foreigners will be easily and advantageously modified.

This is the constant aim of the Government, and the foreign aid which it may need and which on several occasions the American Government has offered and which will be accepted with thanks, must be of that character which does not wound the susceptibilities of the Dominican people, as everything which disturbs peace of mind must, perforce, act contrary to the whole social life of the Dominican Republic. . . .

B. Intervention

In April, 1916, a crisis developed in the Dominican Republic. Briefly, an unconstitutional act by Dominican President Jiménes aroused opposition

from a majority of the members of Congress. While Congress prepared impeachment proceedings, Minister of War Desiderio Arias occupied the fortress in Santo Domingo, the capital.

1. In a series of telegrams Minister Russell reported to the Secretary of State on the events occurring from May 2 through May 7, 1916:[7]

Santo Domingo, May 2, 1916, 6 p.m.

> Senate has approved House proceedings of impeachment and fixed Thursday as the day for the President to answer. . . .President maintains that proceedings have been illegal on account of force of Arias, and by our advice will leave towards capital tonight with his forces for a point near the city so as not to provoke conflict . . . . Arias and supporters relying on provisions of Constitution. . . . Arias in full control of city, which is patrolled by irresponsible groups of soldiers and armed civilians.

Santo Domingo, May 3, 1916, noon.

> In view of probable landing troops here tomorrow which may not be understood in other parts of Republic as being for protection of American Legation, Consulate, American citizens, and in view of the fact that there are in other parts of the country Americans who would be in danger, I request additional ships be here with force sufficient to protect American life and property. Puerto Plata, Macoris, Sanchez should be provided for.

Santo Domingo, May 5, 1916, noon

> President with all his forces advanced on the city and demanded surrender of fort. Fighting commenced and Prairie has landed force for the protection of Legation. Foreigners are massed in Haitian Legation under the protection of guard from Castine.

Santo Domingo, May 6, 1916, 6 a.m.

> American forces preparing to march on the city. President out of ammunition and can not win and has requested us to take the city.

Santo Domingo, May 7, 1916, 7 a.m.

> The President, forced by family and Cabinet, resigned rather than face the responsibility for loss of life and disastrous consequences that would result from capture of the city by our forces. The President has plenty of men but was absolutely out of ammunition and could do nothing without our assistance which he declined to accept at the last moment. This is not the end but the beginning of trouble and I strongly advise that forces be kept just where they are for present.

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[7] Ibid., 1916, 223-225.

2. At 11:50 a.m. May 13, 1916, Minister Russell and the commander of American forces in the area, Admiral Caperton, delivered a note to General Arias and his staff:[8]

> Gentlemen: In view of the fact that the armed forces in rebellion against the present constituted authority of the Government of the Dominican Republic are occupying all the military positions of the city of Santo Domingo and are forcibly preventing the constitutional executive representatives of the Dominican Republic from entering the city in safety to take charge of their respective portfolios; and in view of the fact that all efforts to bring about a Pacific agreement with those in control of the military power of the city have failed; and in view of the publicly announced policy of the United States of America to support, by force, if necessary, the present contituted authority of the Republic;
>
> Therefore, we, the undersigned hereby call upon you to disarm the military force at present in the City of Santo Domingo, to evacuate all fortified positions within the city, and to turn over to the custody of the forces of the United States of America all arms and ammunition now in the city; and we hold each and all of you responsible for the consequences that may result from a refusal to comply with the terms of this communication.
>
> The demands herein made must be complied with at or before the hour of 6 a.m., May 14, 1916, and must be indicated by the hoisting of white flags on the tower of the fortress and of the municipal building and at other fortified places within the city in such a way as to be plainly visible from the sea and from commanding positions outside the city wall; and we hereby formally demand that in case a disarmament is not made, as above specified, you notify all the civilian population, native and foreign, to leave the city within 24 hours after the day and hour above specified, that is 6 a.m. May 14, 1916, at which time, to wit 6 a.m. May 15, 1916, force will be used to disarm the rebel forces in the city of Santo Domingo and to support the constituted government.
>
> Noncombatants leaving the city by water transportation must keep out of the line of fire of the American warships. . . .

3. General Arias withdrew his forces. Admiral Caperton issued a notice to the people of Santo Domingo:[9]

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[9] Ibid., 228.

Notice to the People

1. Owing to the conditions that have existed in and around this city in consequence of the fact that rebels in arms have taken possession of the city, excluding therefrom the constitutional officials of the Government, and after all means to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the situation had been exhausted, it became necessary to have the city occupied by forces of the United States of America.

2. Notice is hereby given to the citizens of Santo Domingo that the forces of the United States of America have assumed control in this city.

3. All the inhabitants are requested to stay in the city and cooperate with me and my representatives in protecting life and property and maintaining order. . . .

4. While American forces gradually occupied the country- assumed control of Dominican finances, and cut off all revenue to the government, Congress elected a new President, Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, former Judge in the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague. On August 26, 1916 an exchange of telegrams took place between Minister Russell and the Secretary of State:[10]

Santo Domingo, August 26, 1916, 9 a.m.

. . . The President told me that I could say to you that he realized absolute necessity of reforming the country with our help, that he was obliged to accept the status quo in regard to our control of finances; that the army would be called in to be organized into some sort of police, and that he would need the assistance of our military officials for this; that the suspension of payments placed him in helpless condition; that the above measure had never been taken with any other Government and that it seemed to him as if he, so full of desires for reform, had been selected as the victim. I asked him if he could not put in the form of a decree his acceptance of the status quo to which he replied that this was absolutely outside of his faculties but that the fact that he did accept ought to be enough for us.

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[10] Ibid., 234-235

Washington, August 26, 1916, 3 p.m.

Your August 4, 11 a.m. Provisional Government will not be recognized until it shows itself to be favorable to our interpretation of convention as to control, constabulary and other reforms. . . .

5. A letter from the Chief of the Latin American Division of the State Department to Secretary Lansing, dated November 21, 1916, was forwarded to President Wilson the following day:[11]

Dear Mr. Secretary:

There is attached herewith a memorandum made by the American Minister to Santo Domingo, dated November 9, a memorandum of a conference which was held between Mr. Polk, Admiral Benson of the Navy, Captain Knapp, Mr. Russell and Mr. Stabler on October 31; and also a draft of a proclamation declaring that Santo Domingo be placed under military government.

The situation has now reached a very serious point, in view of the fact that according to telegrams from the Legation at Santo Domingo the President has issued a decree convoking the electoral college for the purpose of electing senators and deputies. It is apparent that the majority of the senators and deputies will be from the Arias faction, hence giving Arias, who has been the disturbing element in Santo Domingo for many years, complete governmental control, even in the event of the election of Henriquez as constitutional president.

This new phase of the situation, coupled with the fact that the provisional government will not meet the views of the United States in regard to the establishment of financial control and constabulary, brings the Government of the United States face to face with a serious problem.

The withholding of the funds by the United States Government, on account of the fact that recognition has not been granted to Henriquez, has brought an economic crisis in the country which is daily growing worse and for which this Government would not wish to be placed in such a position that it would be held responsible.

After careful consideration of the matter, in conference with the Navy Department, it was thought that the only solution of the difficulty would be the declaration of martial law and placing of Santo Domingo under military occupation, basing this on the interpretation which the United States has given to the Dominican Convention of 1907 and also upon the present unsettled conditions in the Republic.

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[11] Ibid., 241.

Captain Knapp, who has gone in command of the cruiser squadron of the Atlantic fleet as Commander of the Forces in Dominican waters, is understood to have arrived today in Santo Domingo and it is felt that no time should be lost in instructing him to put into effect the proclamation declaring military control and to immediately commence the disbursement of the funds under martial law.

6. Letter from President Wilson to Secretary Lansing:[12]

The White House
Washington, November 26, 1916.

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

It is with the deepest reluctance that I approve and authorize the course here proposed, but I am convinced that it is the least of the evils in sight in this very perplexing situation. I therefore authorize you to issue the necessary instructions in the promises.

I have stricken out the sentences in the proposed proclamation which authorizes the commanding officer to remove judges and others in certain circumstances. It may be necessary to resort to such extreme measures, but I do not deem it wise to put so arbitrary an announcement in the proclamation itself.

Faithfully yours,

WW

7. Proclamation of November 29, 1916, issued by Captain Knapp of the United States Navy:[13]

PROCLAMATION

Whereas, a treaty was concluded between the United States of America and the Republic of Santo Domingo on February 8, 1907, Article III of which reads:

> "Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by previous agreement between the Domincan Government and the United States. A like agreement shall be necessary to modify the import duties, it being an indispensable condition for the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate and that the President of the United States recognize that, on the basis of exportations and importations of the like

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[12] Ibid., 242. [Footnote omitted]

[13] Ibid., 246-247.

amount and the like character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired to make such modification, the total net customs receipts would at such altered rates of duties have been for each of such two years in excess of sum of $2,000,000 United States in gold"; and

Whereas, the Government of Santo Domingo has violated the Article III on more than one occasion; and

Whereas, the Government of Santo Domingo has from time to time explained such violation by the necessity of incurring expenses incident to the repression of revolution; and

Whereas, the United States Government, with great forbearance and with a friendly desire to enable Santo Domingo to maintain domestic tranquility and observe the terms of the aforesaid treaty, has urged upon the Government of Santo Domingo certain necessary measures which that Government has been unwilling or unable to adopt; and

Whereas, the Government of the United States is determined that the time has come to take measures to insure the observance of the provisions of the aforesaid treaty by the Republic of Santo Domingo and to maintain the domestic tranquility in the said Republic of Santo Domingo necessary thereto;

Now, therefore, I, H.S. Knapp, Captain, United States Navy, commanding the Cruiser Force of the United States Atlantic Fleet, and the armed forces of the United States stationed in various places within the territory of the Republic of Santo Domingo, acting under the authority and by the direction of the Government of the United States, declare and announce to all concerned that the Republic of Santo Domingo is hereby placed in a state of Military Occupation by the forces under my command, and is made subject to Military Government and to the exercise of military law applicable to such occupation.

This military occupation is undertaken with no immediate or ulterior object of destroying the sovereignty of the Republic of Santo Domingo, but, on the contrary, is designed to give aid to that country in returning to a condition of internal order that will enable it to observe the terms of the treaty aforesaid, and the obligations resting upon it as one of the family of nations. . . .

H. S. Knapp
Captain United States Navy, Commander Cruiser Force,
United States Atlantic Fleet

U.S.S. "Olympia," Flagship
Santo Domingo City, R. D.
November 29, 1916.

8. Telegram from Minister Russell to Secretary Lansing:[14]

Santo Domingo, December 14, 1916, 2 p.m.

> Since my arrival I have been impressed with manner in which the people have accepted the new order of things. Disappointed petty politicians are the only people dissatisfied. I am convinced that the present military government or a de facto government with an American governor supported by the military should go right ahead for a year at least working out complete reforms necesaary with the voluntary aid of patriotic Dominicans. At the end of this time if it has been shown that the country is in a position to have de facto government presided over by a junta of the best native element then this could be done and after a period of trial for this junta the country should be ready for elections, then proceed with elections for president. There is nothing to fear from this program above outlined, for it is what the country needs and expects. To proceed with any elections now would be disastrous as the country is not ready for this and will never be ready until some form of registration is inaugurated and an intelligent electoral law is in operation. Censorship of the press has produced excellent effect and should be continued for a whole at least. . . .

C. Protest

As might be expected, officials of the Domingo govennment regarded the events that had transpired from a different viewpoint.

1. Dr. Peynada, former Secretary of the Dominican treasury testified before a Senate Inquiry held in 1922 that Dominican revolutions had never constituted a threat to foreign life and property, only one American having ever been killed in Dominican history and that an accident. Moreover, he claimed, they did not involve much real fighting and bloodshed. He offered his version of the events preceding the proclamation of martial law:[15]

> Dr. Peynada. . . . I affirm that at the time Admiral Knapp proclaimed the military occupation of Santo Domingo by the troops of the United States, which was in November, there was no pretext, because there was no revolution at all, and nobody could say that he was in danger here. Property was in no danger, and there was an established constitutional Government, elected unanimously by the electorial college established by the constitution.

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[15] Senate, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo, Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domigg (Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1921-1922), 948-949. (Hereinafter referred to as Senate Hearings.)

The point I want you to keep in mind is that that was a government acceptable by the United States as a constitutional government because it was according to our constitution; that there was no reason for maintaining matial law, because the United States were trading with us, ready to recognize our Government if we accepted their terms. They said to us that if we did not accept them they would proclaim the military occupation of military law. So that proved that our contention was good; that there was no revolution at all and there was no reason for proclaiming martial law.

The Chairman. What office did you hold?

Dr. Peynada. Secretary of the treasure. I had the distinguished honor of being the only secretary of the treasurey in the world without a treasury. It was a honor for me, of course. . . .

The Chairman. Well, at all events it was propsed to you between the 1st of August, when President Henriquez took office, and the 26th of November. The treaty was proposed to you in that interval?

Dr. Peynada. Yes; in exchange for the recognition. The United States Government would recognize us if we were ready to accept that treaty. The Hon, W. W. Russell and Admiral Pond were representing the United States.

Senator Pomerene. Let me see if I understand you, Doctor. Do I understand that the Dominican Government was ready to accept the treaty and would have accepted it provided the United States Government would recognize--

Dr. Peynada. No; it was proposed to us that if we would accept that treaty we would be recognized. And the last meeting was held by Dr. Henriquez y Carvahal and myself with the Hon. W. W. Russell and Admiral Pond, I believe, but this I remember very well; Gen. Pendleton, who was chief of the army of occupation at that time, resided at Santiago and came here for that purpose, as I suppose. He was in the conference, and when I asked him or them, "You have no modification at all?" he said, "No"; it must be accepted as it was. . . .

Dr. Peynada. Those are the words of Gen. Pendleton. I can not say it was Admiral Russell or Admiral Pond. It was the only meeting he had with us.

The Chairman. This is the last conference?

Dr. Peynada. The last conference. He said to me, "You must accept, because otherwise, we shall proclaim military law and appoint a military governor in Santo Domingo, " and I said to him, "What does that mean, military law"? and he said, "Military law means that if you put your head or one finger in the way of the Government, the head or the finger will be cut off." I said, "Gen. Pendleton, if you have no modification to that proposition, it is useless to go on with this meeting, because I declare in the name of President Henriquez and in that of the Dominican Republic that we will not accept that proposition." That ended it. A few days afterwards Admiral Knapp came with the proclamation of military government.

Gentlemen, I believe that the Dominican people until that moment loved the people of the United States, and I hope that the Dominican people still love the American people as I love them. All the depradations, the inuries to the lives of the Dominicans, all the bad actions of the troops, are secondary questions for me. The principal question is that there was no reason at all, no right at all, to land troops on Dominican territory and to impose on peaceful people like Dominicans, who were not at war with the United States and who loved the United States, a military government for over five years. That is my principal grievance, and all the others are secondary. There were greivances, I don't deny, but the principal is that.

I have, as I told you, learned to love the people, the traditions and the history of the United States. In 36 trips that I have made to the States in 20 years and my study of their constitution, I have confirmed that sentiment, but more than this, that sentiment became a profound conviction when I learned that Secretary Root, in the Conference of Rio de Janeiro, speaking with the highest authority of the United States, said, "We, the United States, wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except over ourselves. We neither claim nor desire any rights, privileges, or powers we do not freely concede to every American Republic." And I ask everybody, was it right that after those words, the Government of the United States should jeopardize the confidence of the Latin-Americans by the actions taken in Santo Domingo. . . .

2. Note from the Dominican Minister to the United States, A. Perez Peredomo, to Secretary of State Lansing:[16]

Washington, December 4, 1916

Mr. Secretary:

In compliance with instructions received from my Government I have the honor to lay before the Government of the United States of America through your excellency the formal protest by which the legitimate Government of the Dominican Republic finally and irrevocably resists the unexampled act in contempt of the sovereignty of Dominican people which on the 29th of November, brought to a climax the illegal course of the forces of American intervention in the territory of the Domincan Republic: the act is the proclamation of Captain Knapp, commander of the said forces, by authority of your excellency's Government, in the capacity of Military Governor of the Dominican Republic.

The Dominican Government bases its protest on the following:

1st. The United States has always recognized the international entity of the Dominican Republic and it was in that capacity that the Dominca Republic concluded with the United States of America the Convention of 1907.

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[16] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1916, 244-245.

2nd. If the American Government considered as is stated in the proclamation which installs Captain Knapp as Military Governor of the Republic "that previous Governments of the Dominican Republic had violated Clause 3 of the said Convention by increasing, for causes beyond their control, the internal debt of the Dominican Republic, which interpretation differs from that put on the said Clause 3 by the Dominican Government,[17] the American Government only had the right to sue out against the Dominican State through the proceedings in force for such cases the legal consequences of the fault the latter was supposed to have fallen into, but by no means that of sitting in supreme judgment of the contract and destroying, by way of penalty, the sovereignty of the Dominican people.

3rd. Nor could the Washington Government any more derive that right from the alleged state of domestic unrest which is also invoked in the aforesaid proclamation, since no State has the right to interfere in the domestic questions of another State. . . .

4th. A state of war which alone could have justified such a proceeding on the part of the Government of the United States toward the Dominican Republic has never existed between the two nations.

And therefore by acting as it has with the Dominican Republic, your excellency's Government plainly violated in the first place the fundamental principles of public international law which lay down as an invariable rule of public order for the nations the reciprocal respect of the sovereignty of each and every one of the free states of the civilized world, and in the second place the principles which guide the doctrine of Pan Americanism which also hallow the inviolability of American nationalities; principles which may be said to have found their highest authorities in the many official declarations of the learned President of the United States; the Constitutional Government of the Dominican Republic hereby formulates, in addition, the concomitant reservation of its rights which it will vindicate at the proper time.

Saluting [etc.]

A. Perez Perdomo

D. The Occupation and Civilians

The following selections relate to the relations between the occupation forces and the icitizens of the Dominican Republic.

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[17] Interpretation of Clause 3 is a key issue. The term "public debt" in romance languages refers to a country's bonded debt, i.e., its formal loans, but does not include temporary deficits. The Dominicans insisted on the standard Spanish interpretation, while the United States insisted on its English interpretation.

1. In his book, The Americans in Santo Domingo, Melvin Knight, Professor of History at Barnard College, Columbia University, discussed a number of incidents, drawing his information from local Dominican newspapers and from the Senate Hearings:[18]

> [Melvin Knight notes that when the U.S. marines occupied the Dominican Republic many innocent people were unjustly harassed or killed. But he stresses that individual marines are not the primary cause for such atrocities. He states that because military law is "intentionally and necessarily frightful" interventions by U.S. troops in foreign lands must inevitably lead to violent atrocities.]

2. Many situations were subject to differeing interpretations. The American version of the incident described here appeared in the Annual Report of the Military Government of Santo Domingo:[19]

> At the time when Military Government was proclaimed there were not sufficient troops to garrison Macoris, and for some time after that the managers of the sugar estates themselves requested that no troops be sent for fear it would occasion an outbreak; but General Pendleton and myself, after waiting to see that conditions were generally quiet in other parts of the country, determined that this condition could not be allowed to go on, and troops were sent to Macoris. During this operation captain John R. Henley was wounded and Lieutenant James K. Bolton was killed while taking luncheon on board a small vessel at the wharf at Marcoris. This act was murder pure and simple by a half-grown boy. Except for the excitement attendant upon such an affair, there was no real opposition in Macoris City.

3. The same incident was described by Horacio Blanco Fombona, publisher of the Dominican review Letias, who was later imprisoned by the military government for views expressed in his publication. His version was summarized and translated into English by the American journalist, Rafael de Nogales y Mendez:[20]

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[18]Melvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Domingo (Vanguard Press, New York, 1928), 82-83, 79-82.

[19]Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917, 710.

[20]Rafael de Nogales y Mendez, The Looting of Nicaragua (Robert M. McBride and Company, New York, 1928), 262-263.

[The story is told of a Dominican boy who resented the American occupation of his country to such an extend that he shot an officer who had just embarked from an American warship. The marines answered by wildly shooting at everything in sight. The boy managed to slip away.[21]]

4. Statement by Rear Admiral Thomas Snowden which appeared in the Dominican newspaper, Listin Diario on January 12, 1920, under the heading "Official Section, Military Government":[22]

[Snowden states that at one time the military fought violence with violence. He adds taht "there were even secondary authorities who distinguished themselves by their cruelty."]

5. Horacio Blanco Fombona described a reconcentration decreed by the Occupation in one district of the Dominican Republic:[23]

[Fombona states that the American military decreed a "reconcentration" policy in the Dominican Republic, according to which all people living in a certain farming area were forced to abandon their homes and take up residence within the city limits. Their farm houses and animals were destroyed, and anyone found outside the city's limits was shot.]

6. The same author recounted an incident occurring in that district:[24]

[Fombone reports an incident in which a woman, in the presence of her small children, was hung and then shot by an American Captain.]

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[21]The boy involved was Gregorio Urbano Gilbert, who later served as a staff officer of General Sardino fighting American marines in Nicaragua. Neill Macuaulay, The Sandino Affair (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967), 148. (Reprinted with permission of Quadrangle Books, Inc. from The Sandino Affair by Neill Macaulay, c 1967, by Neill Macaulay.)

[22]Tulio M. Cestero, "American Rule in Santo Domingo," The Nation, July 17, 1920, 78.

[23]Rafael de Nogales y Mendez, The Looting of Nicaragua, 260-261.

[24]Ibid., 260

7. Sumner Wells has served as Chief of the Latin American Division of the Department of State and was American Commissioner to the Dominican Republic from 1922 to 1925. In his book Naboth's Vineyard, Wells commented on the atrocity charged and reported testimony taken from the Senate Hearings, along with excerpts from the proceedings of the military investigation which followed:[25]

> [Dr. Coradin states that there is reason to believe that many testimonies of atrocities committed against the Dominican people were unfounded. But he also notes that many actual incidents were never even brought to the attention of the authorities since the parties involved were often afraid of punishment. Dr. Coradin brings to the Senate's attention many letters he received from people who either witnesses or were themselves actually victims of torture. The testimony of the boards set up to investigate these specific cincidents is then presented. The board concluded that much information is contradictory and confused. It finds Dr. Coradin a person who is "unworthy of belief". The U.S. marines involved are cleared of charges against them.]

8. Letter from Monseigneur Novel, Archbishop of Santo Domingo to the American Minister:[26]

> [The Archbishop notes that people of Santa Domingo have often in the past witnessed injustices during times of political upheaval, but he stresses that the injustices of the present period are the most severe ever witnessed.]

E. Achievements of the Intervention

By 1920 the results of the American occupation were being examined. The selections below present various evaluations.

1. Excerpts from a Clark University address, delivered in 1920 by Colonel C. Thorpe, United States Marine Corps, former Chief of Staff of the Brigade of Marines in Occupation of the Dominican Republic:[27]

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[25] Sumner Wells, Naboth's Vineyard: The Dominican Republic 1844-1924 (Payson and Clarke, Ltd., New York, 1928), II, 806-809, 1025-1028.

[26] Rafael de Nogules y Mendez, The Looting of Nicaragua, 271.

[27] Colonel George C. Thorpe, "American Achievements in Santo Domingo, Haiti and Virgin Islands," Mexico and the Caribbean, Clark University Addresses. George H. Blakeslee, ed. (G.E. Strechert and Company, New York, 1920), 232-233, 242, 247. (Reprinted by permission of Hafner Publishing Co., Inc.)

[Col. Thorpe stresses the accomplishments of the American troops occupying the Dominican Republic. He declares that the mission of the military government has only been to implement social and economic progress. He stresses that the criticism of U.S. rule is expounded by people who do not know the facts.]

2. In November, 1920, Current History discusses a report by Commander Reynolds Hayden of the Staff of Admiral Snowden, the Military Governor of Santo Domingo in 1920:[28]

[Commander Hayden states that U.S. rule was established in the Dominican Republic because conditions there were "seriously disturbed." He notes that the U.S. regime has brought immense improvements in both economic and social conditions. He adds that the U.S. is training Dominicans for important jobs in order that they may be able to carry on this progress when U.S. occupation ends.]

3. Statement by Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, former President of the Dominican Republic, appearing in Current History in June, 1921:[29]

[The author feels that the public works that the Americans implemented were overshadowed by the terror that was inflicted on the Dominican people. He notes that the economic situation has greatly deteriorated, and that it has now been necessary for the Occupation Government to go abandon its public work projects. He adds that this government is now seeking a large loan which the Dominican people refuse to ratify.]

The occupation was terminated in 1924 with the supervised election of a new President, General Horacio Vasquez, and the withdrawal of Marines. The United States maintained a semi-protectorate through a new treaty in 1924 continuing the customs receivership. A revolution in 1930 resulted in the emergence of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina as President of the Republic. General Trujillo, the Marine-trained head of the Marine-trained national guard was able to maintain himself in power until his assassination

[28]"Prosperity in Santo Domingo," Current History, November, 1920, 348.

[29]Francisco Henriquez y Carvajal, "Protest of Santo Domingo's Deposed President," Current HIstory, June, 1921, 400-401.

in 1961. Critics maintain that the Trujillo regime was notable in Latin American history as one of the longest, bloodiest and most repressive. Supporters or apologists point to its stability, to its friendliness to United States interests, and to its strong stand against communism. The fiscal protectorate over the Dominican Republic was terminated by a treaty in 1940.

SECTION IV

CASE STUDY IN INTERVENTION: HAITI

During the early years of this century, Haiti's political and financial difficulties caused growing concern in the United States. Haiti's external and internal public debt, much of it in the hands of French and German investors, had risen to 32 million by 1915. In addition, from 1912 on, revolutions occurred almost annually. Beginning in 1914, our State Department urged the Haitian government to accept a customs receivership similar to that in effect with the Dominican Republic. The proposed treaty was almost identical to the Dominican treaty except in two particulars: (1) provision for a Financial Adviser who was to have complete control over all Haitian finances and (2) the right of the United States to take any steps necessary, including intervention, to carry out the purpose of the treaty. Numerous attempts at persuasion were made, including the withholding of recognition and the threatening presence of American warships in Haitian waters. None of these methods succeeding, direct intervention seemed the only solution.

A. Intervention

In 1915, an extraordinary series of events occurred bringing an immediate response from the United States.

1. A series of telegrams from the American Charge d'Affairs in Port-au-Prince to Secretary of State Lansing described the scenes in the capital

on July 27 and 28, 1915:[1]

July 27, 1915--9 a.m.

Uprising in the city this morning at 4:15; heavy firing for two hours which still continues intermittently. Government completely taken by surprise and revolutionishts now in partial control of the city. President and a few generals surrounded in the palace. . . . Presence of war vessels advisable.

July 27, 1915--12 noon

From all information available President has escaped from the palace and has taken refuge in French Legation which is next door.

July 27, 1915--2 p.m.

French Legation threatened and a forcible entry attempted for the purpose of taking out the President. French Minister and British Charge d'Affairs have telegraphed for ships. Situation very grave and the presence of war vessels as soon as possible necessary.

July 27, 1915--6 p.m.

Commandant of arrondissement of the Guillaume Government murdered about 70 political prisoners in their cells before giving up prison and was himself killed. Great excitement and intense feeling as a result. . . .

July 28, 1915--11 a.m.

At 10:30 mob invaded French Legation, took out President, killed and dismembered him before Legation gates. Hysterical crowds parading streets with portions of his body on poles.

U.S.S. Washington entering harbor.

2. A second series of telegrams, most of them between Admiral Caperton and the secretary of the Navy, continued the description of events from

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[1] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, 474-475.

July 28 to August 10, 1915.[2]

July 28. To Secretary of the Navy from Admiral Caperton:

No government or authority in city. Many rival leaders in town. Am landing force in city for purpose of preventing further rioting and for protection foreign lives and property; and to preserve order. Have directed naval station Guantanamo, Cuba, to send company marines port-au-Prince. Account large area city, will require regiment of marines from United States at once for policing and patrolling. . . .
CAPERTON

July 29. To Secretary of the Navy from Admiral Caperton:

Landing force established in city. Slight resistance during early part of night as advance was being made. This resistance easily overcome. No casualties our forces. As there is no government or authority in town, am required assume military control in city. As proceeding disarm bodies Haitian soldiers and civilians today. Can not see how this can develop into any other than absolute military control of city. Regiment of marines absolutely necessary and should be sent at once.

CAPERTON

August 2. To Secretary of the Navy from Admiral Caperton:

Large number Haitian revolutions, largely due existing professional soldiers called Cacos, organized in bands under lawless, irresponsible chiefs, who fight on side offering greatest inducement and but nominally recognize the Government. Cacos are feared by all Haitians and practically control politics. About 1,500 Cacos now in Port au Prince, ostensibly disarmed, but retain organization and believed to have arms and ammunition hidden. They have demanded election Bobo President, and Congress, terrorized by mere demand, is on point complying, but restrained by my request. Present condition no other man can be elected account fear of Cacos. Believe can control Congress. Can prevent any Cacos outbreak in Port au Prince after arrival regiment of marines U.S.S. Connecticut. Stable government not possible in Haiti until Cacos are disbanded and power broken.

Such action now imperative at Port au Prince if United States desires to negotiate treaty for financial control of Haiti. To accomplish this must have regiment of marines in addition to that on Connecticut. Majority populace well disposed and submissive, and will welcome disbanding Cacos and stopping revolutions. . . . As future relations between United States and Haiti depend largely on course of action taken at this time, earnestly request to be fully informed of policy of United States. CAPERTON

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[2] Senate Hearings, 306, 308, 312, 313, 315, 325, 326.

August 5. To Secretary of the Navy from Admiral Caperton:

Great relief expressed by all classes except Cacos at presence of American troops. Americans afford hope of relief from Government by terror. Universally believed that if Americans depart, Government will lapse into complete anarchy. My opinion is that United States must expect to remain in Haiti until native Government is self-sustaining and people educated to respect laws and abide by them. Should president be elected now there would be complete machinery for all Government functions. With American protection and influenced by United States, progress toward good government could be soon commenced. Haitian people anxious to have president elected, because at present no central Government in Haiti except as directed by me. Also people uneasy, fearing United States may not permit continuance of Haitian independence.

August 7. From the Navy Department to Admiral Caperton:

Conciliate Haitians to fullest extent consistent with maintaining order and firm control of situation, and issue following proclamation: 'Am directed to assure the Haitian people United States of America has no object in view except to insure, establish, and help to maintain Haitian independence and the establishing of a stable and firm government by the Haitian people. Every assistance will be given to the Haitian people in their attempt to secure these ends. It is the intention to retain United States forces in Haiti only so long as will be necessary for this purpose.' Acknowledge.

Benson, Acting.

August 7. To Secretary of the Navy from Admiral Caperton:

All classes Haitians clamoring for immediate election President. Legal congress with civil functionaries and all necessary organization except President and cabinet for regular Government now exists. Only two serious candidates--Bobo and Dartiguenave; latter will probably be elected. Have had daily conferences with president of senate and chamber deputies, with senators, deputies, ex-cabinet ministers, and many leading Haitians. President of Senate Dartiguenave, in presence of congressmen, states congressmen are agreed that Haiti must and will gladly accede to any terms proposed by United States. They now say will cede St. Nicholas Mole outright without restriction, grant customhouse control, right to intervene when necessary, and any other terms. They beg only as far as possible avoid humiliation. They insist no Government can stand except by United States protection. . . .

Extremely desirable reestablish Government immediately. Unless otherwise directed I will permit Congress elect President next Thursday.

CAPERTON

August 10. From the Navy Department to Admiral Caperton:

Allow election of President to take place whenever Haitians wish. The United States perfers election of Dartiguenave.

BENSON, Acting.

August 10. Secretary of State to the American Charge d'Affaires:

In view of the fact that the Navy last night informed Admiral Caperton that he might allow election for the president whenever the Haitians wish, and of the impression which exists here that election may take place Thursday next, it is desired that you confer with the Admiral to the end that in some way to be determined between you the following things be made perfectly clear:

First: Let Congress understand that the Government of the United States intends to uphold it but that it can not recognize action which does not establish in charge of Haitian affairs, those whose abilities and dispositions give assurances of putting an end to factional disorder.

Second: In order that no misunderstanding can possible occur after election it should be made perfectly clear to candidates, as soon as possible, and in advance of their election, that the United States expects to be intrusted with the practical control of the customs and such financial control over the affairs of the Republic of Haiti as the United States may deem necessary for efficient administration.

The Government of the United States considers it its duty to support a Constitutional Government. It seems to assist in the establishment of such a government and to support it as long as necessity may require. It has no design upon the political or territorial integrity of Haiti. On the contrary what has been done, as well as what will be done, is conceived in an effort to aid the people of Haiti in establishing a stable government and maintaining domestic peace throughout the Republic.

LANSING.

B. Negotiating the Treaty

Although a cooperative President had been elected, the desired treaty was not immediately accepted. Several methods were employed with the essentially helpless but still resistant Haitian government.

1. Telegram from Secretary Lansing to Charge d'Affaires Davis, August 24, 1915:[3]

Washington, August 24, 1915, 9 p.m.

The United States desires to deal justly and considerably with Haitians. It covets no Haitian territory, nor does it desire to usurp

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[3] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1915, 437-438.

Haitian sovereignty or seek treaty conditions other than for the welfare of the Haitian people. . . .

Reposing full credence in the statements which Dartiguenave and the members of the Haitian Congress had made to Admiral Caperton, the Department naturally expected a speedy ratification of the treaty. . . .

If the previous understanding, which has influenced the conduct of this Government, does not result in a prompt ratification of the treaty, then this Government will be compelled to consider the adoption of one of the following courses: First, establishing there a military government until honest elections can be held; second, permitting the control of the government to pass to some other political faction representative of the best elements of Haiti whose members will be willing to join in the prompt reestablishment of a stable government and permanent domestic peace. . . .

Use the foregoing discreetly and orally impress upon the President elect, and his supporters, serious consequences which may result if they should force this Government to adopt one of the above alternatives. . . .

LANSING.

2. Admiral Caperton proceeded with his own methods, described in these two dispatches, the first to the Secretary of the Navy, the second to an officer in his command, Captain Dorrell:[4]

August 19, 1915

Following message is secret and confidential. United States has now actually accomplished a military intervention in affairs of another nation. Hostility exists now in Haiti and has existed for a number of years against such action. Serious hostile contacts have only been avoided by prompt and rapid military action which has given the United States a control before resistance has had time to organize. We now hold capital of country and two other important seaports. . . . This will require not less than one regiment of marines of not less than eight companies, the artillery battalion of marines, and three more gunboats or light cruisers. Consider it imperative that these contemplated operations be kept for the present secret and undertaken only when force is available and custom service organized and ready. This secrecy extremely important now pending treaty negotiations. . . .

CAPERTON.

September 8, 1915

Successful negotiation of treaty is prominent part present mission. After encountering many difficulties treaty situation at

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[4] Senate Hearings, 335, 353.

present looks more favorable than usual. This has been effected by exercising military pressure at propitious moments in negotiations. Yesterday two members of Cabinet who have blocked negotiations resigned. President himself believed to be anxious to conclude treaty. At present am holding up offensive operations and allowing President time to complete Cabinet and try again. Am therefore not yet ready to begin offensive operations at Cape Haitien but will hold them in abeyance as additional pressure. . . .

33 Difficulties eliminated, the treaty was signed on September 16, 1915. An anti-occupation group, the Union Patriotique d'Haiti, in a memoir published in The Nation on May 25, 1921, presented a different view of these events:[5]

> [The Union Patriotique d'Haiti explain their version of the events surrounding the tragic death of Haiti's ex-president. They feel that the city had settled down to relative quiet when Haiti was invaded by the United States troops. The people were too shocked to fight back. The group feels that the U.S. forced a completely unfavorable treaty on the Haitian people. They believe that their government was subjected to a series of violent and oppressive acts perpetrated by the Americans.]

C. A New Constitution for Haiti

The new treaty was similar to the customs conventions with the Dominican Republic but with three significant additions: (1) an American Financial Adviser with supreme authority over all Haitian finances, (2) a national guard (gendarmerie) trained and officered by American Marines, and (3) the right of the United States to take whatever steps might be necessary to achieve the objects of the treaty. Unfortunately, as the Haitians soon pointed out and President Dartiguenave had explained all along, the treaty was unconstitutional. The solution, "suggested" by the Occupation, was a new constitution. To this end, President Dartiguenave

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[5] "Memoir by the Delegates to the United States of the Union Patriotique d'Haiti," The Nation, May 25, 1921, 752-753. [Footnote omitted.]

called an unconstitutional constituent assembly. The Legislature refused to cooperate and was dissolved. In 1917 new elections were held and a new constituent assembly convened. Again, the members refused to rubber-stamp the American proposals, especially one which would permit foreign ownership of land. Instead, the assembly prepared to draft a constitution of its own.

1. Report of the Commander of the Marine Brigade, General Cole, June 15, 1917:[6]

> Antagonism national assembly to foreign ownership land and to all American influence such that no endeavor I can make short of dissolution assembly will prevent passage constitution along lines reported my 13107. Have discussed matters fully with minister and Gen. Butler. Suggest minister notify Haitian Government that, in opinion our Government, constitution prepared assembly will make impossible to bring about results contemplated under articles 1 and 14 of treaty, and consequently our Government can not accept such constitution. If national assembly refuses heed such warning, it will be necessary to dissolve assembly to prevent passage. The number marines in Haiti should be increased by at least eight full companies to prevent disorders that may follow dissolution assembly. . . .

2. Major Smedley Butler, accompanied by armed officers and men of the new gendarmerie entered the assembly chambers, interrupted the proceedings and dissolved the assembly. After clearing the building they confiscated all papers relating to the assembly's constitution. An acceptable constitution was then prepared with the participation of President Dartiguenave and officials of the United States State and Navy Departments. The Democratic Vice-Presidential nominee Franklin D. Roosevelt, referred to this in a campaign speech at Butte, Montana, on August 18, 1920. The New York Times carried the story the following day:[7]

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[6] Senate Hearings, 698.

[7] The New York Times, August 19, 1920, 15.

[Roosevelt notes that when he was Secretary of the Navy he "wrote Haiti's constitution." Roosevelt argues that the effect of American control in the Caribbean is to guarantee the United States the votes of those countries in the League of Nations.]

3. The new constitution contained several significant features: (1) foreigners were permitted to acquire and own land; (2) all acts of the Haitian government and the American Occupation were declared valid and constitutional; (3) new elections for the Haitian legislature were to take place on January 10th of an even numbered year to be fixed by the President; and (4) in the meantime, legislative powers would be exercised by a "Council of State" members of which were to be appointed by the President. The new constitution was to be approved in an unconstitutional national plebicite. The plebicite was described during the Senate Hearings which were held in 1922 by the Rev. Tom Evans, an American missionary who had been serving in Haiti for 28 years:[8]

Senator Pomerne. Do I understand from your statement that these native citizens were intimidated so that they would not vote against the adoption of the new section of the constitution? Is that the fact?

Mr. Evans. Yes; most emphatically so. They were terror stricken. . . . of imprisonment, of being clubbed to death, or shot down by gendarmes and marines. Besides the proclamation of the American occupation. . . announcing the so-called voting, the following notices were put up at boths, or in Haiti at the courts of justice (sic) and signed by American marine officers--who have power over life and death in the Black Republic that no American in the United States can possibly realize--and read, as the specimen below:

INTIMIDATION AND THREAT.

Republic of Haiti
Port-de-Paiz, June 11, 1918.

In accordance with the decree of His Excellency, the President of the Republic, published in the Monitor of May 8 last, all the citizens of this commune of Port-de-Paiz are asked to be present to-

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[8] Senate Hearings, 191-193. [Footnote added.]

morrow at the Hotel Communal to vote on the new constitution, published in the Monitor of the same date. Any abstention from such a solemn occasion will be considered an unpatriotic--that is, anti-American occupation--act. Maintenance of order will be assured by the gendarmerie (under chief, Gen. Williams, American marine officer), and the ballots will be distributed by a member of the administration of finances (an American marine officer) opposite the voting offices, etc.

Herman H. HANNEKIN,
Lieutenant gendarmerie d'Haiti, American marine officer.

E. LESCOT,
Government Comminssaire, Northwest.

Senator Pomerene. What was the vote at St. Mare; what was the result there?

Mr. Evans. There was no means of knowing. The natives felt no interest whatever, as it was known from the announcement by the occupation (through Dartigenauve), that whatever the American marines did no one dared to oppose or even question. All slips were taken to Port Au Prince, and published there. It was looked upon as a mere farce, and lowered the prestige of the United States among Haitians, who seriously think, and even Europeans, and indeed Americans, who felt that the American occupation had gone the limit, and made itself a laughing-stock, and looked contemptible. No votes were reckoned to my knowledge at either town, but all taken in charge of American marines to Port Au Prince.

Senator Pomerene. No, no; when the votes were counted what was the result of the election in that place?

Mr. Evans. All were taken to Port Au Prince, and published there, but whether they gave numbers supposed to be case at each town, I know not, and like others cared little, as I became disgusted, and felt disgraced that such was possible in the name of the United States, and by anyone who called himself an American!

Senator King. You mean the Republic, Senator. They might have published the vote as 1,000,000 as 63,000 there is no one to contradict or to explain for the American marines managed the whole business. I do not believe that any pink slips were put in by Haitians, and that out of shame certain marines cast in a couple of hundreds. This is the belief in Haiti.

I denounced it then, and denounce it more still to-day, as the greatest mockery I ever say in my life, and never thought we had Americans and marine officers that could sink so low before these gendarmes, and poor Haitians, whose respect, implicit confidence, and highest admiration should be the aim of every military officer and true American who despises anything like hypocrisy and scorns deceit

and fraud.[9] . . .

D. The Occupation and Civilains

As in the Dominican intervention, but to an even greater extent in Haiti, charges of atrocities were raised against Marine occupation forces. In the case of Haiti, a new factor may have entered the picture.

1. Herbert Seligmann, who visited Haiti in the Spring of 1920, wrote an article which appeared in The Nation, July 10, 1920:[10]

> [Seligmann argues that the prevailing attitude of mind among the American soldiers sent to assist Haiti has been "determined contempt for men of dark skins." Seligmann describes how American anti-black racism has manifested itself in violence, murder, and other atrocities committed against the Haitians.] [11]

2. Testimony before the Senate Hearings brought out numerous cases of torture and killings. Among the more unique methods of torture was gradual electrocution by current generated from a portable field radio. One explanation of why so little news of these activities readhed the higher authorities or the outside world at the time was given in his testimony before the Senate Hearings by Frederick C. Baker, who served with the gendarmerie in Haiti for three years:[12]

> Question: Was it generally talked about, among the marine officers and gendarmerie officers, that prisoners were being "bumped off"?
>
> Answer: In close circles among the gendarmerie officers whom I knew best and with whom I most associated it was understood, I believe, to be the popular thing to "bump off" as nearly as possible all prisoners taken. It was more or less discussed by them all and it was generally understood among them. . . .

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[9] Although almost every official, American and Haitian, who served during the occupation testified during these hearings, none challenged or contradicted Rev. Evan's statements.

[10] Herbert J. Seligmann, "The Conquest of Haiti," The Nation, July 10, 1920, 35-36. [Footnote added.]

[11] James Weldon Johnson of the N.A.A.C.P. who also visited Haiti in 1920, corroborated Seligmann's charges. James Weldon Johnson, "Self-Determining Haiti," The Nation, Sept. 4, 1920, 226-267.

[12] Senate Hearings, 456.

Question: What was the attitude of Maj. Wells with reference to reports of trouble in the north?

Answer: Maj. Wells often instructed me, along with others, to use the soft pedal on all reports, and except in cases of necessity or to comply with some regular order to make no reports at all. He often explained this by saying that Port au Prince was too busy and had no time to receive or read reports on details. He stated that he would be satisfied as long as the country was in a state of good police, and he neither cared nor wanted to hear of the details of executions to accomplish this end. . . .

3. Order issued by Colonel John H. Russell, Brigade Commandant, on October 15, 1919:[13]

Confident Order:

1. The brigade commander has had brought to his attention an alleged charge against marines and gendarmes in Haiti to the effect that in the past prisoners and wounded bandits have been summarily shot without trial. Furthermore, that troops in the field have declared and carried on what is commonly know as an "open season," where careis not taken to determine whether or not the natives encountered are bandits or "good citizens" and where houses have been ruthlessly burned merely becuase they were unoccupied and native property otherwise destroyed.

2. Such action on the part of any officer or enlisted man of the Marine Corps is beyond belief; and if true, would be a terrible smirch upon the unblemished record of the corps, which we all hold so dear.

3. Any officer, noncommissioned officer, or private of the Marine Corps, or any officer or enlisted man of the United States Navy attached to this brigade, or any officer, noncommissioned officer, or private of the gendarmerie d'Haiti, guilty of the unjustifiable and illegal killing of any person whomsoever will be brought to trial before a general court-martial or military commission on a charge of murder or manslaughter, as the case may warrant.

4. The unjustifiable maltreatment of natives and the unlawful violation of their person or property will result in the trial and punishment of the offender. . . .

4. Another viewpoint on the question of atrocities was expressed by Clifford A. Tinker, in an article appearing in Review of Reviews, July, 1922:[14]

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[13] Ibid., 429-430.

[14] Clifford A. Tinker, "Occupation of Haiti and Santo Domingo," Review of Reviews, July, 1922, 49-50.

[Tinker proposes to explain "another side" in the matter of American atrocities. He argues that so-called Haitian patriots were "never more than organized bands of robbers" who maintained their control of the countryside "through an appeal to superstitious fears."]

5. In a final report, the Senate Committee of Inquiry which had conducted the hearings, took up the charges of atrocities.[15]

On the evidence before it the committee can now state--

(1) That the accusations of military abuses are limited in point of time to a few months and in location to restricted area.

(2) Very few of the many Americans who have served in Haiti are thus accused. The others have restored order and tranquillity under arduous conditions of service, and generally won the confidence of the inhabitants of the country with whom they came in touch.

(3) That certain Caco prisoners were executed without trial. Two such cases have been judically determined. The evidence to which reference has been made shows eight more cases with sufficient clearness to allow them to be regarded without much doubt as having occurred. Lack of communications and the type of operations conducted by small patrols not in direct contact with superior authority in some cases, prevented knowledge of such occurrences on the part of higher authority until it was too late for effective investigation. When reported, investigations were held with no apparent desire to shield any guilty party. Such executions were unauthorized and directly contrary to the policy of the brigade commanders.

(4) That in the course of the campaign certain inhabitants other than bandits were killed during operations against the outlaws, but that such killings were unavoidable, accidental, and not intentional.

(6) That there was a period of about six months at the beginning of the outbreak when the gendarmerie lost control of the situation and was not itself sufficiently controlled by its higher officers, with the result that subordinate officers in the field were left too much discretion as to methods of patrol and local administration, and that this state of affairs was not investigated promptly enough, but that it was remedied as soon as known to the brigade commander. That the type of operations necessarily required the exercise of much independent discretion by detachment commanders.

(7) That undue severity or reckless treatment of natives was never countenanced by the brigade or gendarmerie commanders and that

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[15]Senate, 67th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report No. 794, as quoted in James W. Gantenbein, ed., The Evolution of Our Latin American Policy, 645-656. [Footnote added.]

the investigation by naval authority of charges against members of the Marine Corps displays no desire to shield any individual, but on the contrary an intention to get at the facts.

(8) That the testimony of most native witnesses is highly unreliable and must be closely scrutinized and that many unfounded accusations have been made. . . .

In concluding this portion of the report the committee expresses its chagrin at the improper or criminal conduct of some few members of the Marine Corps and at the same time feels it to be its duty to condemn the process by which biased or interested individuals and committees and propagandists have seized on isolated instances, or have adopted as true any rumor however vile ror baseless in an effort to bring into general disrepute the whole American naval force in Haiti. The committee wishes to express its admiration for the manner in which our men accomplished their dangerous and delicate task.[16]

E. Achievements of the Intervention

The documents below offer different evaluations of the achievements of the American Occupation.

1. In 1930, President Hoover appointed a commission to study conditions in Haiti. Excerpts from the commission's report:[17]

The reasons which impelled the United States to enter Haiti in 1915 are so well known that they need not be set forth in this report.

Conditions were chaotic; means of communications were largely nonexistent; the peasant class was impoverished; disease was general; property was menaced; and the debt of the government, indeterminate in amount, had risen--at least on paper--to staggering proportions.

Having landed a force of Marines, thus restoring public order and protecting the citizens of the United States and other countries from violence, the United States by treaty obtained control of a variety of governmental agencies with a view to assisting in the reestablishment of a stable government. There was not and there never has been on the part of the United States any desire to impair Haitian sovereignty.

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[16]The exact number of Haitians killed during the occupation probably will never be known. Our official records put the number at 2250 by 1920 as compared with 13 Marines killed. Annual Report of the Secretary of Navy for 1920, quoted in Ernest Gruening, "Conquest of Haiti and Santo Domingo," Current History, March, 1922, 889.

[17]Report of the President's Commission for the Study and Review of Conditions in the Republic of Haiti (Government Printing Office, Washington, 1930), 6-8.

There is no room for doubt that Haiti, under the control of the American Occupation, has made great material progress in the past fifteen years. . . .

Since the Occupation the Haitian Government, especially under President Borno, with the guidance and assistance of the American officials in its service, has a fine record of accomplishment. Eight hundred miles of highways have been built. . . . A most involved financial situation has been liquidated and the entire fiscal system renovated and modernized. In a word, order has been breated where there was only disorder in the collection and disbursement of the Government funds. As efficient constabulary has been organized and trained and has maintained peace and order. . . . A Public Health and Sanitary Service, which is a model of devotion and efficiency, has been organized and maintained. . . .

Since the Occupation an efficient Coast Guard has been organized, lighthouses have been built and navigation rendered much safer, agriculture has been encouraged, and hospitals, public buildings, and parks have been constructed.

Figures indicative of progress have been submitted showing an increase in the registration of automobiles in seven years from 400 to 2,800. The number of linear feet of bridges built has been multiplied by three. There has been a notable increase in the number of permits issued for private building construction and a wholesome increase in the gross trade as measured by the value of exports and imports. The automatic lighthouses have been increased from 4 to 15; telephone subscribers have increased from about 400 to nearly 1,200 and the number of telephone calls a year from about 1,000,000 to over 5,000,000. . . .

The commission was disappointed at the evidence it received of the lack of appreciation on the part of the educated and cultured Haitians of the services rendered they by the Occupation and their own Government. Out of many dozen witnesses only one or two made favorable mention of the achievements of their administration. . . .

2. Dantes Bellegarde, a distinguished Haitian educator and writer, also served as his country's delegate to the League of Nations. Two of his books, L'Occupation Americain d'Haiti and Pour une Haiti Heureuse, were reviewed in The New Republic, August 7, 1929:[18]

[In his books Bellegarde declares that America had no just cause for intervening in Haiti. At the time of the intervention Haiti was not

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[18]Raymond Leslie Buell, "A Haitian Speaks for Haiti," New Republic, August 7, 1929, 318-319.

in debt to the United States, nor had Haitians committed any anti-American acts. Bellegarde argues that the "real cause for the (American) intervention was to assist certain American financial interests." Furthermore he contends that "material prosperity, the boasted aim of the American occupation, has not been realized." Finally he charges the American occupiers with race prejudice and the distruction of civil liberties.]

By the terms of an executive agreement signed on August 7, 1933, the American Occupation was terminated. As with the Dominican Republic, United States control over customs was continued for some years. Today, Haiti is among the most impoverished of countries in the world, with one of the lowest average life expectancies and annual per capita incomes. It is also under a repressive and corrupt dictatorship. For a time after World War II, the United States extended military and economic assistance to Haiti, but when relations deteriorated, economic aid was cut off. American aid was resumed after Haiti, at the Ponta del Este conference of the Organization of American States, sided with the United States and cast the deciding vote expelling Cuba from OAS. More recently relations have continued to worsen and aid has been cut off again.

Section V

CASE STUDY IN INTERVENTION: NICARAGUA

Edwin Leiuwen, Chairman of the Department of History, University of New Mexico, summarized our first intervention in Nicaragua.[1]

> [According to Leiuwen, American intervention in Nicaragua originated when a local despot, Jose Santos Zealya, "contracted unusually large loans in Europe, thereby raising the spectre of Old World intervention in case of default of payments." The U.S. government supported opponents of Zelaya who was ousted in a revolution in 1909. From that date until 1926 the United States (1) maintained military forces in Nicaragua, (2) established close economic ties with the local government, and (3) signed treaties which guaranteed United States rights to construct a canal through the country.]

The following summary of events sets the stage for the second intervention which is the topic of this case study.

In 1924 elections resulted in victory of a Liberal-Conservative coalition over traditional leaders of the Conservative Party, who had been kept in power by United States influence and support since 1909. The new government of Carlos Solorzano, President (Conservative) and Dr. Juan Sacasa, Vice-President (Liberal) was recognized by the United States. (It should be noted that differences between the two parties were mainly personal and regional, not ideological, for both represented chiefly the interests of the very small upper class.)

In August of 1925 the last Marines were withdrawn. Within a month a new revolution occurred. Former President and Conservative Leader, General Emiliano Charmorro forced the "packing"of Congress with Conservatives and

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[1] Edwin Leiuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America (Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1965), 44-45.

the resignation of President Solorzano. He then had himself declared President while Vice President Sucasa fled the country. The United States did not recognize Chamorro.

In 1926, a Liberal pro-Sacasa revolt broke out under General Moncada. Chamorro resigned in favor of a friend. Congress was then reconstructed, as the packed Conservatives were removed, and the original Liberal members were invited to return to their seats. Only a few of them did so, as the executive (which in Central American wields considerable power and is usually able to determine elections and force measures through the legislature) was still in the hands of Conservatives. On November 11, this Congress elected as President the former President, Adolfo Diaz, a Conservative. He was at once recognized by the United States as the constitutional President.

The Nicaraguan Constitution provided for the election of a provisional President only if both offices of President and Vice-President are vacant. President Solorzano had resigned so that office was vacant, the election of Chamorro being unconstitutional. But Vice-President Sacasa had not resigned, having only left the country temporarily for reasons of his own safety.

Dr. Sacasa now claimed to be the constitutional President of Nicaragua in that (1) Congress had no right to elect a new President since the office of Vice-President was not actually vacant, and (2) the Liberal Party which he represented was clearly the majority party of Nicaragua, Diaz and the Conservatives never having enjoyed genuine popular support. This latter claim was in fact true and was verified by most observers of the Nicaraguan scene including our own State Department during the first intervention. Mexico, which at this time was experiencing very strained relations with the United States over its own nationalist and revolutionary program, recognized Dr. Sacasa as constitutional President. Sacasa returned to Nicaragua

Adolfo Diaz, who had relied on United States support to stay in office in 1911, was unable to suppress the Liberal forces and appealed for United States aid.

A. Intervention

The following selections give evidence of the American response to Diaz's request.

1. The New York Times of November 18, 1926:[2]

> [The Times article points out that the U.S. government was extremely concerned over the possibility of "Mexican-fostered Bolshevist hegemony" being forced upon Nicaragua when that country is in such a crucial geographical position (ie., next to the Panama Canal). Accordingly the government was seriously considering a request by Nicaraguan President Diaz for American aid "to restore peace in his country."]

2. The New York Commercial expressed the opinion that:[3]

> [According to the Commercial, Mexico, by directions from the Soviet Union, has inspired the recent revolution in Nicaragua.]

3. On December 23, 1926, Admiral Latimer landed marines and sailors in Nicaragua, occupying the city of Puerto Cabezas on the Caribbean coast where Dr. Sacasa had set up his "Constitutionalist Government," declaring it to be a neutral zone and imposing censorship. Dr. Sacasa's representative in the United States sent the following not to Secretary of State Kellogg:[4]

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[2]The New York Times, Nov. 18, 1926, 1.

[3]The New York Commercial, as quoted in the Literary Digest, Dec. 4, 1926, 14.

[4]The New York Times, Dec. 29, 1926, 1, 3.

[The note protests the "unwarranted" American intervention in Nicaragua and subsequent imprisonment of "President" Juan B. Sacasa. The note contends that Sacasa is the constitutionally legal ruler of Nicaragua.]

4. On December 31, 1926, The New York Times carried an appeal from President Coolidge to the American press under the headline "Coolidge Asks the Press to Back the Government in Its Foreign Policies. . . Does Not Want Foreign Nations to Think We are Divided":[5]

[The President declares that criticisms in the press directed against administration foreign policies are "injuring the standing of the United States to Latin America." Some articles create what Coolidge considers the false impression that American sentiment is divided. Coolidge argues that the press should support American foreign policies.]

5. On January 10, 1927, President Coolidge sent a message to Congress on the subject of American interference in Nicaragua:[6]

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES; While conditions in Nicaragua and the action of this Government pertaining thereto have in general been made public, I think the time has arrived for me officially to inform the Congress more in detail of the events leading up to the present disturbances and conditions which seriously threaten American lives and property, endanger the stability of all Central America, and put in jeopardy the rights granted by Nicaragua to the United States for the construction of a canal. It is well known that in 1912 the United States intervened in Nicaragua with a large force and put down a revolution, and that from that time to 1925 a legation guard of American marines was, with the consent of the Nicaraguan Government, kept in Managua to protect American lives and property. . . .

In October, 1924, an election was held in Nicaragua for President, Vice-President, and members of Congress. This resulted in the election of a coalition ticket embracing Conservatives and Liberals. Carlos Solorzano, a Conservative Republic, was elected President and Juan B. Sacasa, a Liberal, was elected Vice President. This Government was recognized by the other Central American countries and by the United States. It had been the intention of the United States to withdraw the marines immediately after this election, and . . . the marines were withdrawn in August, 1925, and it appeared at that time as though

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[5] Ibid., Jan. 1, 1927, 1.

[6] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, III, 288-298. [Footnotes omitted.]

tranquility in Nicaragua was assured. Within two months, however, further disturbances broke out between the supporters of General Chamorro and the supporters of the President, culminating in the seizure of the Loma, a fortress dominating the city of Managua. . . . Vice President Sacasa thereupon left the country. In the meantime General Chamorro, who, while he had not acutally taken over the office of President, was able to dictate his will to the actual Executive, brought about the repulsion from the Congress of 18 members, on the ground that their election had been fraudulent, and caused to be put in their places candidates who had been defeated at the election of 1924. Having thus gained the control of Congress, he caused himself to be appointed by the Congress as designate on January 16, 1926. On January 16, 1926, Solorzano resigned as President and immediately General Chamorro took office. The four Central American countries and the United States refused to recognize him as President. . . .

Notwithstanding the refusal of this Government and of the other Central American Governments to recognize him, General Chamorro continued to exercise the functions of President until October 30, 1926. In the meantime, a revolution broke out in May on the east coast in the neighborhood of Bluefields and was speedily suppressed by the troops of General Chamorro. However, it again broke out with considerable more violence. The second attempt was attended with some success and practically all of the east coast of Nicaragua fell into the hands of the revolutionists. Throughout these events Sacasa was at no time in the country, having remained in Mexico and Guatemala during this period.

Repeated requests were made of the United States for protection, especially on the east coast. . . .

Accordingly, the Navy Department ordered Admiral Latimer, in command of the special service squadron, to proceed to Bluefields. Upon arriving there he found it necessary for the adequate protection of American lives and property to declare Bluefields a neutral zone. . . .

On [October 30, 1926] General Chamorro formally turned over the executive power to Sebastian Uriza, who had been appointed designate by the Congress controlled by General Chamorro. The United States Government refused to recognize Senor Uriza, on the ground that his assumption of the Presidency had no constitutional basis. Uriza thereupon convoked Congress in extraordinary session, and the entire 18 members who had been expelled during the Chamorro regime were notified to resume their seats. The Congress which met in extraordinary session on November 10 had, therefore, substantially the same membership as when first convened following the election of 1924. This Congress, whose acts may be considered as constitutional, designated Senor Adolfo Diaz as first designate. At this session of Congress 53 members were present out of a total membership of 67, of whom 44 voted for Diaz and 2 for Solorzano. The balance abstained from voting. On November 11, Senor Uriza turned over the executive power to Diaz, who was inaugurated on the 14th.

The Nicaraguan constitution provides in article 106 that in the absence of the President and Vice President the Congress shall designate one of its members to complete the unexpired term of President. As President Solorzano had resigned and was then residing in California, and as the Vice President Doctor Sacasa, was in Guatemala, having been out of the country since November, 1925, the action of Congress in designating Senor Diaz was perfectly legal and in accordance with the constitution. Therefore the United States Government on November 17 extended recognition to Senor Diaz.

Following his assumption of office, President Diaz . . . requested the assistance of the United States Government to protect American and foreign lives and property. . . .

Immediately following the inauguration of President Diaz and frequently since that date he has appealed to the United States for support, has informed this Government of the aid which Mexico is giving to the revolutionists, and has stated that he is unable solely because of the aid given by Mexico to the revolutionists to protect the lives and property of American citizens and other foreigners. . . .

As a matter of fact, I have the most conclusive evidence that arms and munitions in large quantities have been on several occasions since August, 1926, shipped to the revolutionists in Nicaragua. Boats carrying these munitions have been fitted out in Mexican ports, and some of the munitions bear evidence of having belonged to the Mexican Government. It also appears that the ships were fitted out with the full knowledge of and, in some cases, with the encouragement of Mexican officials and were in one instance, at least, commanded by a Mexican naval reserve officer. At the end of November, after spending some time in Mexico City, Doctor Sacasa went back to Nicaragua, landing at Puerto Cabezas, near Bragmans Bluff. He immediately placed himself at the head of the insurrection and declared himself President of Nicaragua. He has never been recognized by any of the Central American Republics nor by any other Government, with the exception of Mexico, which recognized him immediately. . . .

During the last two months the Government of the United States has received repeated requests from various American citizens, both directly and through our consuls and legation, for the protection of their lives and property. The Government of the United States has also received requests from the British Charge at Managua and from the Italian ambassador at Washington for the protection of their respective nationals. Pursuant to such requests, Admiral Latimer, in charge of the special service squardron, has not only maintained the neutral zone at Bluefields under the agreement of both parties but has landed forces at Puerto Cabezas and Rio Grande, and established neutral zones at these points where considerable numbers of Americans live and are engaged in carrying on various industries. He has also been authorized to to establish such other neutral zones as are necessary for the purposes above mentioned.

For many years numerous Americans have been living in Nicaragua developing its industries and carrying on business. At the present time there are large investments in lumbering, mining, coffee growing, banana culture, shipping, and also in general mercantile and other collateral business. All these people and these industries have been encouraged by the Nicaraguan Government. That Government has at all times owed them protection, but the United States has occasionally been obliged to send naval forces for their proper protection. In the present crisis such forces are requested by the Nicaraguan Government, which protests to the United States its inability to protect these interests and states that any measures which the United States deems appropriate for their protection will be satisfactory to the Nicaraguan Government.

In addition to these industries now in existence, the Government of Nicaragua, by a treaty entered into on the 5th day of August, 1914, granted in perpetuity to the United States the exclusive proprietary rights necessary and convenient for the construction, operation, and maintenance of an oceanic canal. . . .

There is no question that if the revolution continues American investments and business interests in Nicaragua will be very seriously affected, if not destroyed. The currency, which is not at par, will be inflated. American as well as foreign bondholders will undoubtedly look to the United States for protection of their interests. . . .

Manifestly the relation of this Government to the Nicaragua situation, and its policy in the existing emergency, are determined by the facts which I have described. The proprietary rights of the United States in the Nicaraguan canal route, with the necessary implications growing out of it affecting the Panama Canal, together with the obligations flowing from the investments of all classes of our citizens in Nicaragua, place us in a position of peculiar responsibility. I am sure it is not the desire of the United States to intervene in the internal affairs of Nicaragua or of any other Central American Republic. Nevertheless it must be said that we have a very definite and special interest in the maintenance of order and good government in Nicaragua at the present time, and that the stability, prosperity, and independence of all Central American countries can never be a matter of indifference to us. The United States can not, therefore, fail to view with deep concern any serious threat to stability and constitutional government in Nicaragua tending toward anarchy and jeopardizing American interests, especially if such state of affairs is contributed to or brought about by outside influences or by any foreign power. It has always been and remains the policy of the United States in such circumstances to take the steps that may be necessary for the preservation and protection of the lives, the property, and the interests of its citizens and of this Government itself. In this respect I propose to follow the path of my predecessors.

> Consequently, I have deemed it my duty to use the powers committed to me to insure the adequate protection of all American interests in Nicaragua, whether they be endangered by internal strife or by outside interference in the affairs of that Republic.
>
> CALVIN COOLIDGE

6. The foreign press, both in Latin America and Europe, expressed opinions on United States activities in Nicaragua typified by these examples quoted in two items appearing in The New York Times on January 12, 1927:[7]

> [Various articles in the Times report that the foreign press generally condemns American intervention in Nicaragua on the grounds that that intervention is only designed to protect America's commercial economic interests. The foreign press accuses America of "imperialism."]

7. American critics of our policy were not lacking. On January 7, Senator Borah of Idaho, one of the most distinguished senators of his day, called on the President. The New York Times recorded the aftermath of that visit the next day:[8]

> [According to the Times Senator Borah condemned American involvement in Nicaragua on the ground that the U.S. government was supporting an unconstitutional regime. Borah is quoted as saying, "'Diaz is President in violation of every provision of the (Nicaragua) Constitution. . . and is held there by force of American arms.'"]

8. On January 12 The New York Times carried a statement by Professor Clarence H. Haring of Harvard University:[9]

> [Haring questions whether precipitate American intervention in Nicaragua was really justified. He questions (1) the veracity of U.S. claims about Sacasa's putative involvement with the Mexican government, and (2) whether American canal rights in Nicaragua are really in jeopardy.]

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[7] The New York Times, Jan. 12, 1927, 2.

[8] Ibid., Jan. 8, 1927, 4.

[9] Ibid., Jan. 12, 1927, 2.

9. Early in February, Diaz proposed a treaty with the United States virtually making Nicaragua an American protectorate. By this time, the Coolidge administration's intentions in Nicaragua were being seriously and widely questioned. The following editorial appeared in The New York Times on February 23:[10]

> [The Times editorial sarcastically questions the United States governments' stated justifications for intervention in Nicaragua; namely, to protect life and property and to guarantee American rights to construct an interoceanic canal. "If the real aim of our government is to prevent the Diaz regime from being overthrown by the liberal revolutionists," states the editorial, "it ought to be frankly declared. . . ."]

B. The Stimson Mission

In March, 1927, as the cases worsened and criticism mounted, President Coolidge appointed Henry L. Stimson to go to Nicaragua to arrange some sort of settlement.

1. Upon his arrival in Nicaragua, Stimson analyzed the situation and suggested solutions in two telegrams to the Secretary of State:[11]

April 20, 1927

> Third. . . . Importance and bitterness of Diaz legitimacy arises directly out of fact that in Nicaragua, as in all other Central American countries, Government regularly can and does control result of election. Present Conservative or Liberal control of Government machinery will determine result of 1928 election in favor of respective party unless free election is assured by the United States.
>
> Fourth. Furthermore Washington conferences of 1907 and 1923 have made question of free elections very heart of Nicaraguan problem as well as of general Central American problem.. Owing to government-controlled elections the only way to accomplish change in party control of Government is by revolution or coup d'etat. By forbidding latter, Washington conferences have strongly tended to make exisiting party control permanent and the United States as strongest sponsor of the said conferences becomes target of hatred of opposition. In dealing with Central American situation those conferences have thus treated the symptom and not the disease.

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[10] Ibid., Feb. 23, 1927, 22.

[11] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, III, 324-327.

Fifth. While reserving final conclusions, am now strongly impressed that the greatest inducement that can now be offered to Liberal leaders to agree to early peace would be the knowledge that the United States would supervise elections of 1928, exercising sufficient police powers for that purpose. Both the Government and Liberal leaders have spontaneously and without exception indicated to me that they would gladly request such police power. Furthermore, believe that such supervision could be continued with similar consent in subsequent years and thus be made means for gradual political education of Nicaraguans in self-government through free elections. Believe that such action by the United States would appeal far more strongly to both American and Latin American public sentiment than naked military intervention in support of Diaz and against Liberals which may otherwise quite probably become necessary to bring about early pacification of the country. Such a naked military intervention in 1912, with no vigorous attempt to improve political methods of Nicaragua, proved to be wholly barren of permanent political benefit and peace lasted only 25 days after withdrawal of marines. Therefore believe we should endeavor to carry out a more conservative effort now. . . .

April 23, 1927

Organization of a Constabulary under temporary American command as well as instruction seems to be absolutely essential to make successful supervision of election possible. . . . Creation of such Constabulary would eventually greatly reduce number of marines necessary to guarantee stability. . . .

2. After negotiations, Stimson reported that Diaz had agreed to the "Stimson Plan."[12]

After repeated discussion with men of both parties Diaz placed yesterday in my hands signed outline of terms of peace to which he would agree to as follows:

1. Immediate general peace in time for new crop and delivery of arms simultaneiously by both parties to American custody.

2. General amnesty and return of exiles and return of confiscated property.

3. Participation in Diaz cabinet by representative Liberals.

4. Organization of a Nicaraguan Constabulary on a nonpartisan basis commanded by American officers.

5. Supervision of elctions in 1928 and succeeding years by Americans who will have ample police powers to make such supervision effective.

6. Continuance temporarily of sufficient force of marines to make foregoing effective. . . .

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[12] Ibid., 326.

3. Stimson then attempted to secure the agreement of General Moncada and of Dr. Sacasa's representatives to this proposal. Stimson later recounted his version of the interview with General Moncada:[13]

> [Stimson declares that, after brief discussions, Moncado accepted all terms of peace "except the unexpired term of Diaz." However, according to Stimson, Moncada "would not fight the U.S." if the United States insisted on supporting Diaz until the 1928 election because he recognized that "neither he nor any Nicaraguan could, without help of the United States, end the war or pacify the country."]

4. Years later, General Moncada reported a somewhat different version of the interview:[14]

> [Moncada reports that Stimson was intransigent in his support of Diaz. Furthermore, according to Moncada, Stimson declared that peace was "imperative" and that the U.S. intended to "attain it (peace) willingly or by force."]

5. Stimson reported to the Secretary of State on May 12, 1927:[15]

> At 4:30 this afternoon I received the following telegram from Boaco:
>
> 'The military chiefs of the Constitutionalist Army assembled in session today have agreed to accept the terms of the declaration made by General Henry L. Stimson, personal representative of President Coolidge of the United States and consequently have resolved to lay down their arms. They hope that there will be immediately sent to receive these arms sufficient forces to guarantee order, liberty and property.'
>
> Signed by Moncada and 11 generals including all his prominent chiefs except Sandino. I am informed that latter agreed to sign but broke his word and with small band of men left Moncada. I believe this marks definitely the end of the insurrection. Trucks with escort of marines left this morning to receive the arms.
>
> Colonel Robert Rhea of Marine Corps was appointed today Chief of the Constabulary and has begun work of organization. After visiting Moncada's army Saturday and arranging as far as possible with Diaz Government the immediate program of conciliation and reconstruction I hope to sail for home Monday via Key West.

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[13] Henry L. Stimson, American Policy in Nicaragua (C. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1927), 76-77.

[14] General Jose Maria Moncada, Estados Unidosen Nicaragua (Tipografia Atenas, Managua, 1942), translated in Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967), 38.

[15] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, III, 347. [Footnote omitted.]

C. The War With Sandino

The one Liberal general who refused to accept the "Stimson Plan," Augusto C. Sandino, moved into the Segovia Mountains with a small body of followers.

1. On May 18, he sent a telegram from the town of San Rafael del Norte, addressed to all the authorities in the area:[16]

> [Sandino vows to resist the invaders. He feels that he must comply with his "sacred duty" to defend his country even if the world turns against him.]

2. Telegram from the American Minister in Nicaragua, Eberhardt, to Secretary of State Kellogg:[17]

July 20, 1927, 5 p.m.

> Sandino is reported to be an erratic Nicaraguan about 30 years of age with wild Communist ideas acquired largely in Mexico where he spent several years prior to his return to Nicaragua about a year ago via the Coco River plentifully supplied with arms which he gave to followers in northern Nicaragua or concealed there, meantime working at the Butters American mine in San Albino till he finally joined Moncada this spring. Refusing to lay down arms with other Moncada generals he returned to northern Nicaragua where he has since roamed at will with a few followers committing most every known depredation and acts of outlawry. Following his confiscation of the American mine referred to in my telegram number 161, June 30, 2 p.m., the number of his admiring followers increased and he repeatedly wrote insultingly to Captian Hatfield, commander of the garrison at Ocotal, offering his men all loot and plunder they might find and also to join them drinking "Yankee blood" the day soon to be when they would take that town. Once o'clock Saturday morning July 16th, Sandino led 300 or 400 men, plentifully armed with rifles, machine guns and bombs made from powder confiscated from the American mine, in an attack on 39 marines and 48 Nicaragua constabluary garrisoned at Ocotal, the latter well supplied with small arms but with only two machine guns. The fight continued till middle of the afternoon with a loss to Sandino of more than 200 men when our airplanes arrived and with bombs and machine gunfire routed the attacker[s] who fled in disorder, Sandino with them. . . .

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[16] Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair, 63-64.

[17] Foreign Relationsoof the United States, 1927, III, 441.

3. Another American view of the situation is expressed by Major Floyd, U.S.M.C. in his field message dated July 26, 1927:[18]

> [Floyd declares that, under present conditions, further progress will only be accomplished through continued war against the rebels. He notes that the people are "unquestionably strong for Sandino."]

4. Telegram from Secretary Kellogg to Minister Eberhardt:[19]

> July 27, 1927--noon.
>
> The Department and the American public are naturally much disturbed by continued reports of engagements between the United States marines and the forces of Sandino. . . . As the Legation must know, the Department's information regarding actual conditions affecting the restoration of tranquility and order in Nicaragua has on many occasions been found to be grossly inaccurate and misleading. The Department, therefore, cannot impress upon you too strongly the urgency of keeping it promptly and accurately informed. The Department has been led to believe that armed opposition to the present program would speedily disappear, and that it need anticipate no serious complications on this account. If the Department must face the probability that Sandino or any other bandit can raise and keep in the field forces sufficient to cause trouble and give rise to repeated engagements with the United States marines and the Nicaraguan constabulary, like those which have recently taken place, the Department should like to have immediately by telegraph as full a report as possible from you and General Feland setting forth actual conditions and advising what the Department must expect.
>
> KELLOGG

5. In spite of the campaign waged against him by the Marines and the National Guard, Sandino continued his operations. He explained his purposes to the manager of an American mining firm in a letter dated April 29, 1928:[20]

> My Dear Sir:
>
> I have the honor to inform you that on this date your mine has been reduced to ashes by order of this command and to make more tangible our protest against the warlike invasion your Government has made of our territory with no other right than that of brute force.
>
> Until the Government of the United States orders the retirement of the pirates from our territory there will be no guarantee in this country for North American residents therein.
>
> In the beginning I confided in the thought that the American people would not make themselves creditors of the abuses committed in Nicaragua

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[19] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, III, 442.

[20] Ibid., 1928, III, 575-576.

by the Government of Calvin Coolidge, but I have been convinced that North Americans in general uphold the attitude of Coolidge in my country; and it is for that reason that everything North American which falls into our hands is sure to meet its end.

The losses which you have had in the mine mentioned you may collect from the Government of the united States--Calvin Coolidge, who is the only one truly responsible for the horrible and disastrous situation through which Nicaragua is now passing. . . .

The pretext that Mr. Calvin Coolidge gives for his intervention in Nicaragua is to protect the lives and interests of North Americans and other foreign residents in the country, which is a tremendous hypocrisy. We Nicaraguans are respectable men and never in our history have there ever been registered events like those now taking place which is the fruit harvested from the stupid policy of your Government in our country.

The most honorable decision that your Government ought to make in the present conflict with Nicaragua is to retire its forces from our territory, thus permitting us Nicaraguans to elect our national Government, which will be the only means of pacifying our country.

Upon your Government depends the preservation of good or bad friendship with our national Government; and you, the capitalists, will be appreciated and respected by us as long as you treat us as equals and not in the erroneous manner of today, believing yourselves lords and masters of our lives and property.

I am your affectionate servant,

Fatherland and Liberty,
A. C. SANDINO

6. Writing in 1951, Willard Beaulac, the American legation's first secretary during this period, commented on Sandino's claim:[21]

> [Beaulac admits that only after the Americans intervened in Nicaragua were foreign lives lost and foreign property destroyed.]

7. Early in 1928, the American writer Carleton Beals went to Nicaragua and managed to obtain a personal interview with General Sandino in his mountain camp. His account, published in The Nation, describes his entry into the guerilla camp and the interview:[22]

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[21] Willard Beaulac, Career Ambassador (Macmillan, New York, 1951), 123.

[22] Carleton Beals, "With Sandino in Nicaragua," The Nation, March 14, 1928, 289, and March 21, 1928, 316.

[Beals declares that Sandino's charismatic personality and his strong sense of justice have created fierce loyalty among his soldiers. In the interview, Sandino maintains that he and his army are not bandits, but have lived by stealing from the United States. He declares that his group never could have existed against the "might of the U.S." if the peasants had been against them.]

8. A month later, Carleton Beals, writing from Managua described another aspect of the campaign against Sandino:[23]

[Beals notes that the Americans are not accustomed to fighting guerrilla warfare in tropical forests. As a result, the marines have killed many civilians but few of Sandino's soldiers.]

9. The numerous charges of atrocities made against American Marines were summarized by Neill Macaulay:[24]

[Macaulay notes that American marines were enraged because while they were accused of heinous war crimes the atrocities of the guerrilas were ignored. The author believes that the Americans could not possibly be guilty of all the violent acts of which they were accused. But he does note that the military were definetly involved in savage acts.]

10. The same author discussed Sandino's international connections:[25]

[Macaulay notes that Sandino's cause was hailed in Moscow, Germany and China.]

11. The Literary Digest for January 14, 1928, summarized the opinions on the Sandino question as expressed on the editorial pages of leading American newspapers:[26]

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[23]Carleton Beals, "This is War, Gentlemen!", The Nation, April 11, 1928, 404.

[24]Macaulay, The Sandino Affair, 116-117, 228-229. [Footnote omitted.]

[25]Ibid., 113-114. [Footnotes omitted.]

[26]"Nicaragua's Bloody Peace," The Literary Digest, Jan. 14, 1928, 8.

[The predominant opinion expressed in these editorials is that the American people have been misinformed by their government concerning acts of violence committed by U.S. troops in Nicaragua. However, some editorials do give support to U.S. policies.]

D. Elections

While the pacification campaign continued, American supervised elections were held.

1. Telegram from the American Minister in Managua to Secretary of State Kellogg, November 5, 1928:[27]

American electoral information reportenumber 10. Conservatives 49,666; Liberals 67,939. Precincts reported: 362 precincts; unreported 70.

La Prensa, chief Conservative organ, headlines tonight, "The American supervision has honorably observed its promise. The elections Sunday were honest, tranquil, correct, and honorable. The Liberals obtained the victory."

El Comercio, leading Liberal organ, headlines, "The United States is vindicated before the world."

Other comments similarly.

EBERHARDT

2. Third parties, such as the anti-occupation Nationalist Party, were not permitted to enter the elections. From his post as Argentine Consul in Nice, Manual Ugarte issued a manifesto commenting on the elections:[28]

[The author feels that the Nicaraguan crisis is caused by both U.S. imperialists and corrupt Latin American politicians. He states that the American-superivsed elections were a fraud since those who opposed American occupation were not permitted to vote.]

E. Achievements of the Intervention

Difficulties and flaws developed in the application of our Nicaragua policy. The new President, General Moncada, began to use the Marine-trained

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[27] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1928, III, 515.

[28] "Ugarte on Sandino," The Nation, Sept. 29, 1928, 280.

national guard to suppress political opposition. Pacification proved impossible, and domestic and foreign criticism embarrassed the administration.

1. A fresh outbreak of guerrilla activity in Nicaragua presented Henry L. Stimson, now Secretary of State, with a new crisis. His position was expressed in a telegram to the Minister in Nicaragua:[29]

Washington, April 16, 1931, 7 p.m.

> In view of the outbreak of banditry in portions of Nicaragua hitherto free from such violence you will advise American citizens that this Government cannot undertake general protection of Americans throughout that country with American forces. To do so would lead to difficulties and commitments which this Government does not propose to undertake. Therefore, the Department recommends to all Americans who do not feel secure under the protection afforded them by the Nicaraguan Government through the Nicaraguan National Guard to withdraw from the country, or at least to the coast towns whence they can be protected or evacuated in case of necessity. Those who remain do so at their own risk and must not expect American forces to be sent inland to their aid. A similar message has been sent to the Consulate at Bluefields.
>
> STIMSON

2. Some Marines remained to supervise the elections of 1932. Dr. Juan Sacasa was elected and on January 1, 1933, took the oath of office as the last of the Marines were being withdrawn. On the same day, American-trained General Anastasio Somoza took command of the national guard. Writing years later, Henry L. Stimson summarized the achievements of ethe intervention:[30]

> [The author believes that the U.S. marines came to Nicaragua as peacemakers and did their job well.]

3. With the end of American intervention, Sandino ceased his guerrilla war and entered into negotiations with the new Sacasa government. It was during these talks that General Sandino, his brother, and two of his generals

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[29] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931, II, 808.

[30] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (Harper and Brothers, New York, 1947), 115-116.

were seized by order of General Somoza. They were taken at night to an airfield on the outskirts of Managua and riddled with machine gun bullets.

In the concluding chapter of his book, Neill Macaulay presents another view of the achievements of the intervention:[31]

> [The author states that while the U.S. was not directly involved in either the assassination of Sandino or the deposing of Sacasa, it did play an indirect role in engineering these events. The author believes that the U.S. supported Somoza because he was willing to be the pawn of the Americans.]

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[31] Neill Macaulay, The Sandino Affair, 257-258. [Footnote omitted.]

SECTION VI

OURSELVES AS OTHERS SEE US

The Caribbean policy of the United States, as it was conducted during the period covered in this study, caused a rather pronounced reaction throughout Latin America. Offered here is not a cross section of Latin American opinion, but rather a sampling of the writings of some of the more outspoken critics of our policy.

1. Ruben Dario was one of Latin America's best known poets, one of the leaders of the "modernist" movement around the turn of the century. This poem "To Roosevelt" was published in 1905.[1]

> [The poet praises the power of the U.S. but recognizes her as the foe of Latin America. The poet warns Roosevelt that he must "be God himself" before he can overtake the "free America that keeps its Indian blood."

2. Jose Ingenieros, the Argentine sociologist, was one of Latin Americas most brilliant and productive intellectuals. He was for a time the most widely read author of the Spanish language and was a favorite of Latin American youth. His writings include significant works in sociology, psychology, criminology, medicine, political science, and philosophy. The following article was written in 1922, just three years before his death:[2]

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[1] Alfred L. Coester, The Literary History of Spanish America (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1916), 464-465. [Footnote omitted.]

[2] Jose Ingenieros, "Por La Union Latino Americana," Nosotros, Buenos Aires, XVI (October, 1922), as translated by Donald M. Dozer, The Monroe Doctrine, Its Modern Significance (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1965), 67-68, 70-71.

[Ingenieros believes that the Monroe Doctrine supports not "America for the Americans" but rather "Latin America for the North Americans' He points out that the United States often uses subtler means than outright annexation, such as intervention through loans to foster dependent relationships.]

3. Manuel Ugarte, also considered by many to be one of Latin America's most brilliant writers, became an internationally known leader of the opposition to American "imperialism." An excerpt from his book, Destiny of a Continent, published in translation in the United States in 1925:[3]

[Ugarte feels that U.S. imperialism has been uniquely effective because of its historically proven ability to adapt to the "circumstances", "social conditions", and "racial composition" of its subject peoples.]

4. Ernesto "Che" Guevara requires little introduction. The professional Marxist revolutionary and expert on guerrilla war was a prominent figure in Castro revolution and government of Cuba. Although he disappeared mysteriously in 1965 and, reputedly, was subsequently engaged in fomenting rebellion in Latin America, an article signed by Guevara was published in the Cuban magazine Tricontinental in April, 1967 and was reprinted in the June-July, 1967 issue of Viet Report:[4]

[Che Guevara declares that U.S. monopoly capitalists maintain complete political and economic domination over the Latin American countries. He believes that indigenous liberation movements will arise in these oppressed countries. The U.S. will retaliate by using brute force against these movements. But Guevara believes that the Latin American countries will eventually follow the same road as Viet Nam.

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[3]Manuel Ugarte, Destiny of a Continent (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1925), 139-140. [Footnote omitted.]

[4]Che Guevara, "Why We Must Fight," Viet Report, June-July, 1967, 11.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

General works on the subject of our Latin American policy include Samuel Flagg Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1943); J. Lloyd Meecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations (Houghton Mifflin Company, New York, 1965); and a recent study in great depth of our Caribbean policy by Dana G. Munro, Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean 1900-1921 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1964). An excellent but very brief paperback is Edwin Lieuwen's U.S. Policy in Latin America (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1965).

For further investigation into the case studies, Melvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Domingo (Vanguard Press, New York, 1928) is very readable. The Haitian intervention is thoroughly covered and documented in Arthur C. Millspaugh, Haiti Under American Control 1915-1930 (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1931). The first Nicaraguan intervention is described with equal detail and documentation by Isaac J. Cox in Nicaragua and the United States 1909-1927 (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1927). The second intervention and its significance in the development of a new Latin American policy is discussed in a brief but thoroughly documented chapter in Bryce Wood, The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy (Columbia University Press, New York, 1961). The war with Sandino is presented in highly readable form by Neill Macaulay in The Sandino Affair (Quadrangle Books, Chicago, 1967).

One of the most recent American studies of our Latin American policy which presents a critical but well documented view, one with which many Latin American nationalists today agree, is by John Gerassi, The Great Fear in Latin America (Collier Books, New York, 1965), which is a paperback edition.