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ABSTRACT
        The purpose of this 1967 study is to analyze
patterns of political learning before and after adolescence. The
hypothesis grew out of recent political science research. 297 fifth,
eighth, and eleventh grade children and 205 of their parents were
interviewed. (See Appendix A for questionnaires.) Some of the results
are: 1) There is substantial political growth during adolescence in a
number of respects, even though it is perhaps not as great as that
which occurs before eighth grade. 2) Parents and children do show
many resemblances in political orientations; but the magnitude of the
correlations is in general relatively low, and in a few cases such
correlations are negative. 3) Black and white children do exhibit
somewhat different patterns of political learning when grade level is
controlled; but both are relatively supportive, and only in a general
sense are the white children earlier in their development and more
system-supportive. 4) A number of explanatory variables show specific
effects upon the child's developing political orientations; but these
vary both by content and by grade level. More detailed future
analysis of the variables analyzed in this research can be guided by
this study. (Author/DJB)

POLITICAL LEARNING IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE: A STUDY OF FIFTH, EIGHTH, AND ELEVENTH GRADERS IN MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

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CENTER FOR COGNITIVE LEARNING

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COGNITIVE LEARNING

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POLITICAL LEARNING IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE:

A STUDY OF FIFTH, EIGHTH, AND ELEVENTH GRADERS

IN MILWUAKEE, WISCONSIN

By Jack Dennis

Report from the Concepts in Political Science Project
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Wisconsin Research and Development
Center for Cognitive Learning
The University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin

October 1969

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The Wisconsin Research and Development Center for Cognitive Learning focuses on contributing to a better understanding of cognitive learning by children and youth and to the improvement of related educational practices. The strategy for research and development is comprehensive. It includes basic research to generate new knowledge about the conditions and processes of learning and about the processes of instruction, and the subsequent development of research-based instructional materials, many of which are designed for use by teachers and others for use by students. These materials are tested and refined in school settings. Throughout these operations behavioral scientists, curriculum experts, academic scholars, and school people interact, insuring that the results of Center activities are based soundly on knowledge of subject matter and cognitive learning and that they are applied to the improvement of educational practice.

This Technical Report is from the Concepts in Political Science Project from Program 2. General objectives of the program are to establish rationale and strategies for developing instructional systems, to identify sequences of concepts and cognitive skills, to develop assessment procedures for these concepts and skills, to identify or develop instructional materials associated with the concepts and cognitive skills, and to generate new knowledge about instructional procedures. Contributing to the program objectives, the Concepts in the Political Science Project focused on the identification of appropriate grade levels and instructional methods for the instruction of citizenship concepts. This Technical Report summarizes the activities of the project during the time it was in the Center from September 1964 to August 1967.

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PREFACE

The advancement of any scientific field of knowledge depends not only upon the grand synthetic insights of seminal thinkers. It also depends upon the small increments to knowledge furnished by a community of scholars who test, develop, replicate, and refine each other's hypotheses. The present inquiry proceeds very much in the latter spirit. It builds upon the recent surge of hypothesization in the field of political socialization research as this research undertakes to describe the patterns of development in political learning of school children. In the long term, developmental study seems to offer great promise in this area; and the investigation reported below aims to advance another increment: the knowledge of maturational patterns in political learning that have recently been established in contemporary research.

A number of people have been generous in furnishing assistance in this enterprise. The members of University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory, directed by Professor Harry P. Sharp, have offered their assistance in designing the sample and questionnaire, pretesting, and in collecting the child and parent interviews. Processing of the data has been greatly facilitated by Keith Billingsley, Margaret Tropp, Michael Kagay, and Marvin Druker. My colleagues, Professors Leon Lindberg and Donald McCrone of the Political Science Department at Wisconsin, offered useful suggestions regarding item content and data analysis.

J. D.

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ABSTRACT

The present study utilizes the interview responses of 297 fifth, eighth, and eleventh grade children and 205 of their parents to analyze patterns of political learning before and after adolescence. The sample was drawn on an area-cluster probability basis, with screening for children in the appropriate grade level categories in the City of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1967.

Four major problems growing out of recent political socialization research in America were addressed: (1) Does the period after Grade 8 show as large or smaller rates of aggregate political learning, in comparison with the period before Grade 8 ? (2) Are there substantial positive correspondences between parents and their children on political orientations at each of the points in the life cycle or not ? (3) Do black and white children exhibit the same or different patterns of individual political development and parent-child correspondence in these years ? and (4) What set of explanatory variables best accounts for the kinds of political orientations children attain ?

The answers to these questions, very broadly, are: (1) There is substantial political growth during adolescence in a number of respects, even though it is perhaps not as great as that which occurs before eighth grade. (2) Parents and children do show many resemblances in political orientations; but the magnitude of the correlations is in general relatively low, and in a few cases such correlations are negative. (3) Black and white children do exhibit somewhat different patterns of political learning when grade level is controlled; but both are relatively supportive, and only in a general sense are the white children earlier in their development and more system-supportive. (4) A number of explanatory variables show specific effects upon the child's developing political orientations; but these vary both by content and by grade level.

I
INTRODUCTION

As they pass from infancy to maturity, members of each new wave of inductees into society must somehow make their adjustment to what are, for them at first, very unfamiliar political surroundings. This process of adjustment could come about in a number of ways. In some systems, abrupt change might characterize individual adaptation. Just as raw recruits are sometimes cast into combat before they have had prior training, so may new members reaching political majority find themselves to have responsibilities for which they are ill-prepared. A rather different situation—which is in some respects equally as rude, but less traumatic—is the system in which preparation is slight, but little adult participation in political life is called for. No substantial growth of political awareness is required if a system depends for its support upon general apathy, ignorance, and minimal compliance from its populace. In this case, the adult retains the blissful political ignorance he enjoyed as a child without fear of subsequent disorientation.

By contrast to both of these types, there is what is probably the more usual circumstance. Metamorphosis from politically larval childhood to post-pupal adult behavior is, on this alternative, more gradual and accretional. In American society, recent research has shown that the young newcomer typically awakens from his political innocence in a continuing series of progressive acquisitions, on both the level of cognition and of affect.[1] By age seven, the American primary school child has already begun to construct a rough map of the political realm. As he matures, after some erasures and considerable detailing in of the more subtle topological features, he uses this map to guide his way with ever increasing confidence and appropriateness in political matters.

In the first years of elementary school, for example, he begins to pay special attention to such personal embodiments of political authority as the President of the United States and the local policeman.[2] He comes to understand the meaning of external authority as he increasingly recognizes the special roles that these authorities have in society, particularly in their connections to law, protection of persons such as himself, and their locations in some wider system of authority—very early identified as "the government." In the latter identification, the young child begins to make sense even of the broadest aspects of the political system.[3]

That he understands the content and application of so broad a political concept as government should serve to dispel the common assumption that children are devoid of political thought. Indeed, research shows that some of the most basic orientations of the citizen in a democracy are characteristically developed before adolescence in America.[4] One result of the research that has come about in the last few years therefore is to eradicate the image of the child as one who lacks any sense of direction among the shifting, abstract objects of politics and government.

More important, however, is another implication of these findings. New vistas of potential knowledge have been opened with the creation of these contemporary data. Once the periods of most rapid change of political concepts and values have been located, scholarship can then focus more germanely upon the proximate forces that serve to bring about these transformations.

A difficulty of both ancient speculation and more recent probes of curricular practices in civic education has been the failure to examine assumptions about when, precisely, these changes were supposed to come about. Connection of efficient causes to particular effects of political education is not the matter of casual scholarship that it seemed. By asking in a more precise way when these changes occur, one can then locate them in a temporal sequence—something that is usually thought to be necessary for causal explication. And, therefore, one can begin to ascertain what multiplicity of causal variables is most appropriate for explaining the particular changes that come about at specific points in the life-cycle

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of the typical new member of the system.

To take this simple lesson to heart is not, however, to solve the problem. Rather, the problem becomes more complicated because variation by content and by period of learning is now assumed. No longer is one undifferentiated output the focus of study. Nor is one gross input presupposed. Furthermore, by making the dependent variable more complex (if also more precise), one also introduces the possibility of a more variable set of causal factors into the analysis. The multivariate mix of independent variables may vary from point to point in the life cycle and in terms of the variety of content that one chooses to investigate.[5]

Perhaps a way through this newly discovered complexity is first to give a more precise description of phenomena than had formerly been the case. To repeat, only when one has specified what it is which changes, can one most usefully ascribe causes. In this case, the prior task is to say what kinds of content—specific cognitive and affective political orientations—come about typically at given points of the individual's life cycle, and to begin to describe a series of aggregate learning curves thereby. When this is accomplished investigation is then able to move fruitfully to the identification of the most relevant independent variables.

To accomplish the first task, we are aided by the recent surge of developmental studies that have focused upon the preadolescent years of political development. Whereas prior to 1960 there were almost no studies in this area of children's political orientations, because of the probable assumption by researchers that late adolescence or early adulthood were the most strategic points at which to look for increasing political awareness, now the situation has changed greatly. A whole series of investigations of children's political orientations, beginning with Greenstein's work in New Haven and the Easton and Hess Chicago pilot study, have put their major stress on pre-adolescence.[6] And other studies, like Jennings' study of American high school seniors, have partially reflected the concerns of the pre-adolescent inquiries, but have gathered their comparable data over some later portion of the life cycle.[7]

One of the major gaps in this literature as it has developed—and one of the things that prevents one from proceeding directly to causal explication—is that very little has been done to connect in the same study early childhood learning to later periods, even to middle and late adolescence. As a result, those investigators who have used their research resources in looking at the early period are apt to empha-size how fundamental are changes that occur then, possibly even doubting that much political socialization of major consequence occurs after the onset of adolescence.

Hess and Torney argue, for example, that:

The most striking feature of political socialization in the elementary school is the extent to which basic orientations have been acquired by children by the end of eighth grade. Many attitudes, concepts, and types of involvement approximate toward the end of the eighth grade the attitudes and orientations of the teachers. Although there are exceptions (noted below), political socialization is well advanced by the end of elementary school.[8]

Jennings and Niemi, whose respondents are twelfth graders, argue, by contrast, that much political learning of a basic type goes on during high school. As they say,

Our analysis shows that the hypothesized pattern (rapid socialization in the elementary school years and then a levelling off with relatively little change over the rest of the life-cycle) is by no means an accurate description of the development of a variety of political orientations. In the first place, some changes do occur in the high school years. These may be largely in areas associated with cognitive capacities, as the data on the perceived differences between the political parties suggest. Additional research by Adelson and others supports the idea that considerable development of conceptualization takes place during high school. There is also strong presumptive evidence that the frequency of politically related activities rises during the secondary-school years.[9]

Clearly a difference in strategy of some consequence for the future is at issue. If adolescence is a period of as great, if not greater, change than childhood, then we cannot confine the major part of our subsequent causal investigation to the earlier period—if we expect to give an accurate account of the forces that have made the adult the sort of political actor he becomes. Thus, we need some way to resolve this question.

One relatively straightforward way to proceed, although a strangely uncommon one in the research to this point, is to design studies which intentionally bridge the age gap. Ultimately, we will want studies that connect all of the smaller segments of the average life span of the individual together into a single chain of connected stages, phases, or cycles. Short of

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that ideal or maximal strategy, however, are a large number of possible combinations of life span segments, including those that connect childhood with any of the stages beyond it.

THE PRESENT STUDY

In order to make it possible to relate what the child learns before adolescence to the developmental patterns that pertain at later ages, a survey was conducted with fifth, eighth, and eleventh graders in 1967 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. In addition, one parent of each child was also separately interviewed where possible. All respondents were selected on the basis of an area-cluster probability sample of the city of Milwaukee by the University of Wisconsin Survey Research Laboratory. The latter organization carried out the interviews using the schedule shown in Appendix A. Households were first sampled (within block clusters) and were then screened for child respondents in the three grade levels. Thus four distinct age groupings were obtained (counting parents as a single age group).[10]

Developmental Trends

By obtaining respondents of different age strata, beginning with the Grade 5 children and using questions of a type found in other such studies to be meaningful to this age group—while at the same time being meaningful to those considerably older than 10 or 11 years—it was hoped that aggregate age trends could be described. The study included a number of political content areas, which will be detailed below. An important part of what will be presented therefore is the extent of development across the age span for the preadult respondents, and a comparison of these trends with the aggregate position of their parents. This analysis will occupy Chapter II.

Child-Parent Correspondence

A second part of the study design goes beyond description of the age-connected changes in political orientation as they occur between the later part of primary school and the next-to-last year of high school. Because the children and their parents have been interviewed separately, the opportunity for calculating the degree of correspondence between parent and child in various contexts is clearly present. This permits an approach to the question of the influence of the family as an agency of political socialization.

The most incisive recent discussion of this issue, in terms comensurate with those used here, is by Jennings and Niemi.[11] They propose that the oft-attributed influence of parental political values on the child is not, except in the area of party preference, especially high. Although in every case the correlations are positive, party identification alone reaches the .5 level (tau-b).[12] Most correlations between parent's and child's political orientations are somewhat less.[13] Thus, for high school seniors, the forces creating political values in the child lie mainly outside the family.

The question one can raise, however, is whether this lack of strong correspondence between parent and child is due to the specific circumstances of high school seniors. They are, after all, in a somewhat special position. They are just at the end of the period wherein formal schooling might be expected to operate weightily upon their values. They are especially attuned to the values of their peers and of their own generation. And they are usually looking ahead to the future when they will leave the parental, home environment for university, military service, marriage, or career. And they are also at a point of intense, culturally approved differentiation from parental beliefs, norms, and mode of life. From a variety of perspectives, therefore, the senior is a "marginal man" vis-á-vis his family. The relative lack of correspondence could therefore be a function of the peculiar circumstances which do not obtain to anything like the same degree before adolescence and probably are considerably mitigated in early and middle adulthood, when a new "child-family interdependence" quite often comes about.

The present study will look at child-parent correspondences at three age levels before the period of Jennings' and Niemi's study. For the period before the end of high school, therefore, the present data will allow a test of the proposition that the family has little influence on the political development of the child. This analysis will constitute Chapter III.

Black and White Comparisons

A third major objective of the present study is to observe the extent to which children in one specific sub-cultural grouping depart substantially from the patterns of political learning of the modal child. Recent research has emphasized the white, urban, public school child, but has paid little attention to non-modal children. The most politically salient sub-group at present in American society is that of Negroes. Other groups could serve from a theoretical standpoint nearly as well, however, given the lack of systematic analysis of the political socialization patterns

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among any of them. Puerto Ricans in the United States, Mexican Americans, American Indians, or even those who live in the high poverty areas of Appalachia would seem a priori to be culturally distinct enough to warrant such analysis.[14] Indeed, any of the religious groupings which attempt to maintain distinctive sub-cultural values such as Mormons, Mennonites, or perhaps even Roman Catholics, could serve significantly as the focus of such politically relevant investigation. One would expect differences from the rest of society to be maintained in these groups, even though relevant and reliable research is only just beginning to appear.

The Negro is, of course, a particularly strategic choice for such analysis given the extent to which black people have become politically aroused in the last decade and the degree to which they represent a classic example of what is generally perceived to be an underprivileged stratum of society, economically, socially, and politically. One would expect the orientation of the black child to differ considerably from those of his more socially advantaged white counterpart therefore; and this expectation would include political as well as other orientations toward society, and the self-perception of his own role within society.

In Milwaukee, the summer riots of 1967—during the peak of this investigation—brought the question of the orientations of black youth especially to the fore. Whatever these orientations might be, they became translated into action that included violent protest against "the system" and its tangible embodiments in their own community. From the standpoint of social science inquiry, it therefore is of both theoretical and practical significance to attempt to look at the dispositions that these youth have been developing in the political realm. This analysis will constitute Chapter IV.

Explanation

Finally, the analysis presented below will concern a more general range of explanatory variables, beyond, but including parental influence and sub-cultural membership. Four general categories of independent variables are included: those relating to social structure, family communication and decision-making, school communication and decision-making, and some basic psychological orientations of the respondents. In a multivariate context, a number of key political attitudes will be correlated with the variables in each of these sets and with the whole set of independent variables, at each appropriate developmental stage. This

will allow comparative assessment of the contribution that such variables as sex, social status, race, the child's perceived influence in the family and in school, and some general psychological orientations may each make when taken singly and together. This analysis will be presented in Chapter V.

THE AREAS OF CONTENT OF DEVELOPING POLITICAL ORIENTATIONS

Having specified in a preliminary way the independent variables, we can turn next to consideration of the range of dependent variables included in the study. These cover a relatively broad range, even though they do not by any means exhaust the unlimited number of possibilities of tests that could be utilized.

At a broad level, the questions pertaining to political orientations fall under two major psychological headings: conceptual and attitudinal. In addition, a few items are phrased directly as statements of norms or general values; but evaluative orientations are not treated as a separate category. They are included rather in the attitudinal set.[15]

So far as a taxonomy of political objects and relationships is concerned, the major thrust of the questions pertain to what has been referred to above as "basic political orientations" which means, for present purposes, those involving "system-level" politics rather than simply "allocative" politics. The fundamental interest of the research is upon how the child becomes oriented to his political community and his regime. There is much less interest in what side the child comes to take in partisan or left-right ideological terms even though some questions of this type are included.[16] The main focus is upon areas that involve basic support or non-support of the system.

The more specific areas included under this heading are:

1. Orientations to government as such and trust or distrust of politics.
2. Orientations toward the nation, or other levels of political community.
3. Orientations toward the regime of democracy, including in particular:
   a. Participant orientations, e.g., sense of political efficacy, interest in politics.
   b. Libertarian or politically tolerant orientations, such as tolerance of deviant political minorities.
   c. Orientations in support or non-support of pluralism and a representational system, especially support for the party and electoral systems.

4. Miscellaneous, including definition of the good citizen, partisan orientation, left-right ideological stance, etc.

This is an abbreviated list, but it does serve to show the major aspects of content that will be used in charting whatever development occurs across Grades 5, 8 and 11, and also for the parent-child correlations, black-white comparisons, and multivariate analysis of explanatory variables that follow.

SUMMARY

As the analysis proceeds therefore, the general objective will be to shed further light upon pre-adult patterns of political socialization in America. The implications both for political theory and for learning theory should become apparent as the data are presented. On the learning theory side, one might expect that the kinds of learning curves described together with the kinds of influences found to be of greatest consequence upon what is learned at various points in the life cycle would have greatest significance. On the political theory side, the levels and differences in support for various aspects of the system that is found to be generated or undermined in these years would be of greatest consequence.

More specifically, the inquiry attempts to fill the gap in knowledge that results from a present inability to connect directly early political learning to any of the phases coming afterwards. Second, a goal is to carry forward hypothesization of the recent studies of the effects of agencies of political socialization in terms of a developmental design. A limited, but relevant, effort is made to assess one of these agencies' influence by correlating parental and child attitudes of the same kinds. Third, there will be an attempt to push analysis of sub-cultural differentiation into a particularly significant area, from the standpoint of present-day American political practice: the comparison of black children's and white children's developing political orientations. Finally, an account will be given of the relative contributions of a number of theoretically relevant independent variables pertaining to social structural location of the child, how he is perceived to interact with family and school, and some of his more general psychological dispositions.

In these several ways, it is hoped that the present work will carry forward another step the already impressive progress made in the last decade in understanding how young new members of the American system progressively make their adjustments in the realm of politics and government.

II
DEVELOPMENTAL TRENDS

As was suggested in the first chapter, one of the issues current in the field of political socialization research concerns whether or not the very substantial growth of political orientations that occurs prior to adolescence is unique in its relative importance in the life cycle. Jennings and Niemi have recently suggested that the school years after eighth grade are apt to be very significant for the elaboration of the attitudes and values developed earlier.[17] In taking issue with what they regard as a "widely accepted developmental model which suggests that almost all of political socialization occurs in the elementary school years,"[18] they raise a question of crucial theoretical and practical import.

Deciding the issue of which period exhibits most rapid change bears upon the general premise that the earlier the learning, the greater will be its consequences for later behavior. These consequences could arise on Freudian or imprinting theory premises or simply on the basis that the earlier the learning the longer the period of reinforcement possible, other things being equal. If political learning tends to cluster in the beginning portion of the child's school years, ther. it is thought that this will mean that his supportive or nonsupportive feelings and his capacity to understand the complexities of the political realm will take much firmer root than if he is introduced to them later in the life cycle. From this perspective, the shape of the overall learning curve may be of substantial interest theoretically.

From a practical standpoint, this difference in hypothesization about the timing of learning will also determine how the high costs of time, money, and effort are allocated in searching for the causes of political learning. If, for example, the period just before the new member begins to vote is the period of most rapid learning, then one best look at the social forces apt to be present at that time. For example, peers, especially work or student associates, may be the more funda-

mental foci of inquiry if late adolescence is when socialization effectively occurs, whereas family or school would be more strategic choices ten years earlier in the life span. How one spends resources in gathering the most appropriate data on causal factors depends upon answering the question about the timing of most effective transformation of new political actors' ways of political thinking.

To carry forward the elaboration of hypotheses about the shape of development is the first task of this study. Because the data fall neatly into pre-adolescent (Grade 5), early adolescent (Grade 8), and late adolescent (Grade 11), it is possible to test the extent to which change is greater at the earlier or the later end of this span. An account can be given also of the degree to which change occurs in orientation over the whole span. We can also see the extent to which the adults in the sample fall at a point on the developmental curve described by the earlier three periods, or whether the adults represent some other point, perhaps one determined by generational differences. Let us turn to this analysis.

COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT

As was indicated earlier, the survey questions comprised items with both cognitive and affective content. The items with purely cognitive components will be dealt with first. Most of these involve the changing content of general political concepts. These concepts were thought appropriate given the findings of prior political socialization research. The latter research had shown that the child even before Grade 5 would come to know many specific referents and exemplars of broad concepts like government.[19] In addition, developmental psychologists such as Piaget suggest that the older child moves increasingly from the concrete to the abstract in his intellective development.[20] Thus the main interest in the present study is to see the direction of elaboration of these concepts, if any change in mode of

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conceptualization occurs. After this area has been covered, the discussion will then move to the question of aggregate development of political attitudes.

Broad political concepts like government, politics, political parties and democracy are in one sense at the far end of a continuum of classificatory concepts, with the near end being comprised of classes containing very specific, tangible, physical objects, e.g., red books. The broad concepts lack the specificity and homogeneity of simpler classes of the physical world. This has some important consequences.

To understand these consequences one should first understand that in arriving at a comprehension of what a given classificatory concept contains, the child would, on Piaget's theory, be led through several distinctive operations. The first would be to understand what the class is, the second to master some of the basic relationships existing between this class and other classes, and the third to fathom more complex relationships among classes as described in formal logic and what Piaget calls formal operations.[21]

For very abstract classifications such as for many of the concepts pertaining to the political world, the first stage is possibly the most difficult to get through. The reasons are: (1) There are few tangible objects that the child from his daily experience can readily associate with the class, so that his discovery of exemplars goes on in a context of remoteness and unobservability. (2) Adults themselves have only rough consensus about what such categories contain. (3) As the child matures he is apt first to attain and then to discard more primitive versions of the contents of such classifications. Thus, for the concept of government, he first envisions its content to be a single person or small set of persons; then he moves to a widening of its membership to larger and larger groups of people; and finally he incorporates in its meaning less personal objects, especially institutions, norms, events, and processes.[22]

Obviously, the second and third stage operations, as postulated by Piaget, depend for their enactment upon the establishment of some relatively well-defined content of the class at some point(s) in the learning cycle—if only transitorily. The learner's capacity to relate these classes to other classes either subordinate, superordinate, or coordinate in level depends upon some content being defined for the class in question. But the difficulty in taking the first step, for many of the broader political abstractions, is the social diffuseness in definition which has resulted from the overrich legacy of political experience and philosophical meanings now associated with these concepts.

What the present analysis attempts therefore is to describe the varying contents of several of these relatively broad concepts, as such content varies over the age range. This is admittedly only a first step in the direction that scholarship needs to go in developing a complete description of the processes of cognitive development in the political sphere. It is, on the other hand, an important prior step if more precise tests are eventually to be devised.

The Concept of Government

From the prior work referred to above,[23] one could hypothesize that the government, as a broad category of political phenomena, will be relatively diffuse in content among almost any population of American school children that one could select. This is not to say that there will be a perfectly random pattern of associations. Rather, one would expect some dominant ideas about how to define the category, including those mentioned above: a single person or small set of persons, a much broader group of persons, or institutions, norms, events and processes. Let us consider the data in Table 1. These show the patterns of response to the questions, "When you think about the government, what comes to your mind," and "Anything else?"

On first inspection, we see a considerable diffusion of associations; and this diffusion obtains at each of the four stages of the life cycle. Yet there are some dominant associations and patterns of change connected with each of them. For example, if we sum the first three types of responses (00., 01., 03.) we find that 30% of the fifth graders, 31% of the eighth graders, 21% of the eleventh graders, and 15% of the parents couch their first answer in terms of a single person or the President. The maturational loss of singular personalization hypothesized in earlier work does apparently continue in the years beyond early adolescence (Grade 8)—a drop of around 10% by Grade 11 and 15% by adulthood.[24]

On the other side of the developmental pattern, there is some increase in associating government with its institutional aspects. For example, the summary category of "National government and its chief institutions" (10-19) contains 8%, 16%, 13%, and 15% at Grades 5, 8, and 11, and for parents, respectively. The increase comes between Grades 5 and 8. When we consider also the regime (or form of government) answers (40-49), we see an increase over the grades as well: 4% at Grade 5, 15% at

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TABLE 1

The Concept of Government

"When you think about the government, what comes to your mind?

	% First Response				% Second Response			
	5th	8th	11th	Parents	5th	8th	11th	Parents
Single Person, Leader, Individual Person, Group								
00. A person, someone, a man who leads (runs) the country	1%	--%	--%	1%	--%	--%	--%	--%
01. The President (no name)	24	25	15	13	1	7	4	3
03. Chief executive (name)—Johnson, LBJ	5	6	6	1	1	1	1	1
04. A group of people, NFS*	1	--	1	5	--	--	1	1
05. A group of people with some general function, people who help us, leaders	4	2	1	2	3	2	1	--
06. Legislators	--	--	1	--	3	--	3	1
07. Judges	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
08. Policemen, members of the military	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
09. Other persons, politicians	2	1	--	2	1	--	--	2
The National (Federal) Government and its Chief Institutions								
10. The national or federal government, NFS	1	--	3	3	--	--	--	1
11. The branches (in U.S.) of government-executive, legislature, judicial	1	2	1	2	--	2	--	--
12. The national legislature, U.S. Congress	3	8	4	4	--	6	10	4
13. The Cabinet, The Executive Branch	--	--	--	--	1	--	--	--
14. Democrats or Republicans, The national political parties, the two-party system	--	2	1	2	--	--	--	1
15. The Capitol, the Flag, or other symbols of national government, White House	3	2	3	1	2	5	3	2
16. The police, military, defense establishments	-	-	-	1	-	-	3	-
17. The Judiciary	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	2
19. Other national government	-	2	1	1	2	-	-	1
State, Provincial, Local Government								
20. The state government, the government of Wisconsin, Madison	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
22. Local government, City of Milwaukee, etc.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
23. Local officials	2	1	-	1	3	-	-	-
24. State officials	3	1	-	-	1	4	-	1
25. State programs, policies	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
26. Local programs, policies	--	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
29. Other state, local, regional government	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

*Not further specified.

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	% First Response				% Second Response			
	5th	8th	11th	Parents	5th	8th	11th	Parents
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
The land, the nation, the political community, the whole system								
30. The nation, U.S., America	2	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
31. Our country, our land	1	–	–	–	2	–	–	–
39. Other political community	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	–
The form or type of government, the Regime								
40. The type of government we have, NFS	–	2	3	2	–	2	–	1
41. Democracy, a democracy	2	5	10	3	–	–	1	1
42. The republic, Republican form of government	–	–	3	–	–	–	–	1
43. Popular government, the people rule	–	4	–	2	–	–	–	2
44. Free government, our freedom, liberty	1	4	–	2	1	2	1	2
49. Other regime-related answers	1	–	1	1	–	4	–	1
Politics, the Political Process, Laws								
50. Politics, persuading others, power, influence	6	2	10	4	–	–	1	2
51. The making of decisions, policies, making laws	5	4	–	2	1	–	1	2
52. Political issues of various kinds, problems that face the country	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
53. People making speeches, campaigning, elections	–	–	1	2	1	2	–	1
54. Activities of the political parties	1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
55. Activities of political interest groups, lobbies	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
56. Laws, legislation, policies in general, NFS	4	4	15	3	3	1	1	1
57. National programs and policies	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
59. Other political process answers, holding meetings of various kinds	1	1	4	2	2	2	–	2
International politics, foreign policy								
60. International problems, foreign affairs	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
61. Military involvement overseas	2	–	–	–	1	–	–	–
62. War in Vietnam	–	2	1	1	3	2	4	1
63. Our foreign policy	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
64. Our role in the international system	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
65. Middle East Crisis	–	1	–	–	–	2	–	–
69. Other foreign, international	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–
Answers that are primarily positive and negative attitudes								
70. The whole thing is bad, rotten, crooked, dishonest, etc.	–	–	–	2	–	–	1	1

	% First Response				% Second Response			
	5th	8th	11th	Parents	5th	8th	11th	Parents
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
71. The people who run the show (The Government) are too powerful	2	–	3	–	2	–	–	1
72. Politicians who are greedy, corrupt	–	–	–	3	–	–	–	–
73. Chaos, confusion, disorganization	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
74. Other negative attitudes—taxing us too much	3	7	6	9	–	–	1	2
75. People doing things for the good of the country, somethings that help us, protects people, etc.	2	–	–	1	1	–	6	–
76. Good people, smart people, people with good qualities, many virtues	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	–
77. Important, influential people	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
78. Other positive attitudinal responses—they are doing a good job	1	1	1	3	–	–	–	–
79. Other attitudinal answers	4	2	–	2	1	–	–	1
Other, miscellaneous								
80. Economy, business	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
81. What I read about in the newspapers, see on television, etc.	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1
82. Orderly, rule, organizations of society	–	2	–	–	–	–	1	1
89. Other	4	–	–	2	2	–	–	1
No Information								
90. No response, no second response	5	2	1	3	62	51	48	55
91. Not ascertained	3	–	–	–	3	–	–	–
99. Don't know	–	–	–	5	–	1	–	5
TOTAL PERCENT*	102%	96%	96%	101%	104%	97%	94%	110%
N =	117	84	69	205	118	84	69	205

*Rounding errors accumulate over a large number of response categories, thus the failure of the total percent to add to 100%.

Grade 8, and 17% at Grade 11, with the main change again being between Grades 5 and 8. The parents in this case drop back to 10%, distributing their answers more to other categories such as 70-79—the attitudinal response. In general, we find both a drop in personalization and a rise in institutionalization as major modes of defining the concept's content. And, for the former, if not for the latter, the change continues in adolescence.

When we turn to a question on the concept of government for which a set of fixed alternatives is provided; namely, one which says, "Here is a group of pictures I'd like you to look at. Which one of these pictures best represents what our government is ?", we find the response patterns shown in Table 2.

Table 2 shows that there is still some aggregate realignment after Grade 8 in choosing various of these symbolic representations of government. "Uncle Sam" declines, for example, whereas "the Flag" increases. From the standpoint of a movement from personalization to institutionalization as the dominant mode of constructing an image, there is not much movement after Grade 8. There is substantial decline on George Washington and President Johnson between Grades 5 and 8, but less change after that. On the institutional side, voting and Congress both increase slightly; but the main shifts have come earlier than Grade 5.

TABLE 2

Symbolic Representation of the Concept of Government, by Age Group (first choice)

"Here is a group of pictures I would like you to look at.
Which one of these pictures best represents what our
government is ?"

	Grade			
	5th	8th	11th	Parents
1. Policeman	2%	2%	1%	2%
2. (George) Washington	11	-	4	3
3. Uncle Sam	9	17	7	11
4. Voting	8	9	11	26
5. Supreme Court	4	4	3	5
6. Capitol	8	5	4	5
7. Congress	25	23	27	18
8. Flag	6	5	14	5
9. Statue of Liberty	16	31	27	16
11. President (Johnson)	9	3	3	7
12. Don't Know	2	-	-	-
0. No Response	-	-	-	1
Total %	100%	99%	101%	99%
	N = 131	92	74	205

TABLE 3

Concept of The Chief Law-Maker

"In your opinion, which one listed on this card has the
most to do with making the laws in this country ?"

	Grade			
	5th	8th	11th	Parents
1. Congress	34%	64%	85%	69%
2. The President	36	10	3	10
3. The President's Cabinet	8	17	10	5
4. The Judges	16	1	1	5
5. The Political Parties	6	5	1	8
6. Don't Know	-	-	-	2
7. Not Ascertained	-	2	-	-
Total %	100%	99%	100%	99%
	N = 131	92	74	205

Only the more abstract, regime-connected symbol of the Statue of Liberty shows great change, but this is primarily at pre-eighth grade. These children do associate the concept of government as much with what one could term a "liberal democracy" connotation (symbolized by the Statue of Liberty) as they do with representative government (Congress), and more than with participant government (voting). The pattern of development thus shows some movement after Grade 8, but perhaps not as much as before that time.

A third perspective on the government concept is provided by an item which asks, "In your opinion, which one listed on this card has the most to do with making the laws in this country?" Answers at each age level are shown in Table 3.

What we find corroborates the trends on the other items so far as personalization versus

institutionalization is concerned. The President at Grade 5 is still being chosen by a larger proportion as the chief law-maker (38%) than is Congress (34%). The President declines over the grades until by Grade 11 he receives only 3% endorsement, whereas Congress by eleventh grade draws 85%. Thus development in these terms continues right through adolescence. The parents, for reasons that no doubt have to do with the "adult" realization that the President is probably the individual lawmaker of greatest weight in the system, returns to roughly the eighth grade proportions.

A final item on the government concept—one that bears on the functions of government—reads: "In your opinion, what is the main purpose of government?" Table 4 presents the patterns of response.

The main movement across the school age levels is from answering "Don't know" (29%, 12% and 0% at Grades 5, 8, and 11, respectively) to choosing a definition in terms of the maintenance of unity, order, peace, law, security, and organization of society—with the latter rising from 31% at Grade 5 to 55% by Grade 11. There is also a similar advance in naming the democratic functions of insuring

rights and freedoms, and carrying out the popular will: from 7% at Grade 5 to 15% at Grade 11. Thus, we find again some late adolescent development at least in these terms.[25]

In summary of the findings on the concept of government, the overall observation is that development does not stop in early adolescence but continues to eleventh grade. Nevertheless, the fact that the parents resemble more closely the eighth graders in several cases suggests that the development in high school may be impermanent, or less permanent than the earlier formed conceptions—barring a generational effect. But before the issue is closed, one should consider some further examples.

The Concept of Politics

In Table 5, an equally broad concept has been used to elicit patterns of development across these age levels: the concept of politics. The respondent was asked, "When you think about politics, what comes to your mind?" Again we find a substantial diffusion of associations, as was the case for the concept of government. The general class of political objects is a complex one.

TABLE 4

The Main Purpose of Government, by Age Group

"In your opinion, what is the main purpose of Government?"

		Grade			
		5th	8th	11th	Parents
1.	The Organization of Society				
	a. Insure unity	4%	12%	11%	5%
	b. Keep peace and security	9	8	15	8
	c. Control people, enforce the laws	18	30	29	37
	Subtotal %	31	50	55	50
2.	Democratic Functions				
	a. Insure freedom, rights	5	8	7	6
	b. Carry out the will of the people	2	3	8	3
	Subtotal %	7	11	15	9
3.	General Welfare Functions (e.g., benefit, help serve the country)	14	17	19	15
4.	International Relations (e.g., national defense, keep harmony with other countries)	7	3	3	5
5.	Other (Domestic) Functions (e.g., handle racial, economic and other problems)	13	7	8	14
6.	Don't Know, Nothing	29	12	-	8
	Total %	101%	100%	100%	101%
	N =	128	92	74	205

TABLE 5

The Concept of Politics

"When you think about politics, what comes to your mind?"

	5th	8th	11th	Parents
		Grade		
1. Government structure and leadership				
a. Government	11%	15%	4%	12%
b. President	3	2	4	1
c. Specific elective offices	5	10	3	4
d. Specific non-elective offices	2	-	-	-
e. Other government officials	1	1	1	1
f. Leaders, politicians, leadership	2	4	1	3
g. The people	-	-	1	1
h. Other government structure	-	1	-	2
Subtotal %	24	33	14	24
2. Government functions and processes				
a. Laws	4	-	-	3
b. Specific government functions	6	2	3	1
c. Policy-making	2	-	1	1
d. Other (governing, doing things, etc.)	5	9	4	4
Subtotal %	17	11	8	9
3. Popular, democratic institutions and values				
a. Voting	10	20	24	15
b. Popular, representative government	-	-	7	2
c. Rights, freedoms	1	1	-	1
d. Other	-	-	-	1
Subtotal %	11	21	31	19
4. Parties, party system	-	3	11	7
5. Campaigns, debate, speeches				
a. Running for office	-	11	16	3
b. Debates	-	1	-	1
c. Speeches	1	3	1	2
d. Other	2	1	3	1
Subtotal %	3	16	20	7
6. Sub-groups, special interests				
a. Economic	2	-	-	1
b. Particular interests	-	-	-	1
c. Other	2	-	-	-
Subtotal %	4	-	-	2
7. Positive value, benefits				
a. Choosing best men for office	-	-	1	1
b. Benefits to people and country	2	-	-	2
c. Honesty, fairness	2	-	-	2
d. Other, general	1	-	-	1
Subtotal %	5	-	1	6
8. Negative value, "politics" in bad sense				
a. Conflict	-	-	-	1
b. Corruption	-	1	3	4
c. Manipulation	-	-	1	1
d. Slander	-	-	-	1
e. Other	2	1	-	1
Subtotal %	2	2	4	8

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Table 5 (continued)

	Grade			
	5th	8th	11th	Parents
9. Don't know, N.A., nothing	37	12	7	15
Total %	103%	97%	97%	100%
N =	129	91	70	205

What we find are a number of age trends in various categories of content. The decline of those unable to define the concept ("Don't know") goes from 37% at Grade 5 to 7% at Grade 11. Thus, the aggregate capacity to define the category increases markedly in these years. A second area of decline is in the association of politics with government (1. and 2.). There is an increase between 5th and 8th grades for governmental structure (24% to 33%), but a net decline to 14% at Grade 11.

On the other hand, increases are substantial over the grades for Categories 3—5, democratic institutions, the party system, and the "process" aspects of campaigning, competing for office and the like. "Democratic institutions" rises from 11% at Grade 5 to 21% at Grade 8 and then to 31% at Grade 11. The party system moves as a mentioned category from 0% at Grade 5 to 11% at Grade 11; and the process definitions rise from 3% at Grade 5 to 20% by Grade 11.

Thus the main shift is from government structure or function to democratic regime definitions and to the more specific democratic processes, particularly the representative ones like elections, campaigns, and parties. Again we see considerable age-level change in the saliency of different categories of elements included in the definition.

A second item pertinent to the politics concept is shown in Table 6. This concerns the respondents' definition of the main purpose of politics. Here we find considerable uncertainty among the fifth graders (68% give no answer), but this drops to 48% for eighth graders and 20% for eleventh graders. For the first three categories, which we might term "policy debate and demands," "electoral process and leadership selection," and "insuring popular government," there is marked increase over the grades. Thus as the older respondents develop conceptions of the purposes of politics, they tend to move, about equally, into these three areas of connotation.

Although the main factor here is coming to have some idea of what the class of objects consists of at all—as shown in the declining "Don't know's"—one can nevertheless say that there is age development in defining the con-

tent. This is a definition which pertains broadly to popular political processes that involve competition among and representation of competing alternatives of policy and leadership. In the context of American political experience, such a pattern of association probably arises from the strong connection of politics and pluralism.

The Concept of Political Parties

To follow up the process, representational aspects of the conception of politics, let us turn next to the concept of political parties. The question was, "When you think about political parties, what comes to your mind?" In Table 7 are shown the age level response patterns to this item.

The incapacity to answer this question (Don't know, etc.) drops from a majority at Grade 5 (51%) to 20% at Grade 8 and 10% at Grade 11. Thus 90% of the eleventh graders feel capable of defining this institution of representative democracy. One major substantive change is a movement away from a very broad notion, government or nation (Category 1), to a definition that emphasizes the existing parties (Category 2). Although the substantive progression is rather weaker than in most of the other concepts considered above, there is a slight movement. But it is difficult to detect given the rich profusion of minor associations.

When we consider a second item pertaining to the concept of political parties, we find somewhat clearer substantive, age-related changes, even though again, the incapacity to respond is very high for the youngest group. These data are presented in Table 8.

The question was, "What do you think is the main purpose of political parties?" The categories numbered 1, 2, 3, and 5 all suggest the function of providing competing choices or policy alternatives while Category 4 suggests providing competing leadership alternatives. For all of these, the general trend is up. The greater change is perhaps between Grades 5 and 8 rather than 8 and 11, but socialization in these terms does not stop in early adolescence. Over the period of grades as a whole

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TABLE 6

The Main Purpose of Politics

"What do you think is the main purpose of politics ?"

		Grade 5th	Grade 8th	Grade 11th	Parents
1. Expression, discussion of ideas, viewpoints					
a. Debate, argument, dialogue		2%	3%	5%	2%
b. Advocacy, voicing opinions		2	2	7	4
c. Information, education		-	-	11	3
	Subtotal %	4	5	23	9
2. Electoral, leadership selection functions					
a. Candidate selection, recruitment		1	13	21	9
b. Electoral process		5	3	4	5
	Subtotal %	6	16	25	14
3. Insure Popular Government					
a. Make government responsive to the people		1	4	7	6
b. Provide competition		-	1	3	1
c. Benefit the people, serve the country		7	9	9	8
	Subtotal %	8	14	19	15
4. Insure rights, freedom		6	3	6	2
5. Organization, order, unity		2	3	4	3
6. Compromise, cooperation		1	1	-	1
7. Specific functions (e.g., lawmaking)		5	7	-	4
8. Other		1	1	1	4
9. Don't know, not ascertained		68	48	20	48
Total %		101%	98%	98%	100%
	N =	127	87	70	142

TABLE 7

The Concept of Political Parties

"When you think about political parties, what comes to your mind ?"

		Grade 5th	Grade 8th	Grade 11th	Parents
1. Government, Nation					
a. Government of U.S., nation, people		3%	-%	-%	2%
b. President		2	3	-	1
c. Specified offices		4	3	-	1
d. Other		3	2	-	2
	Subtotal %	12	8	-	6
2. Particular Parties					
a. Democrats		3	-	7	7
b. Republicans		-	-	-	1
c. Democrats and Republicans		15	46	29	25
d. Two major parties		1	2	8	2

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Table 7 (continued)

	5th	8th	11th	Parents
		Grade		
e. Several, different parties	-%	2%	3%	3%
f. Other	1	-	-	3
Subtotal %	20	50	47	41
3. Elections, Competition				
a. Elections, voting, candidates	1	-	6	3
b. Competition between parties for office	2	7	6	2
Subtotal %	3	7	12	5
4. Politicians	1	-	4	1
5. Issues, Ideas, Interests	-	1	4	1
6. Party Activities				
a. Campaigns	1	2	-	1
b. Speeches	2	1	3	-
c. Advertising (points of view)	-	1	-	-
d. Fund raising	-	-	-	1
e. Conventions	1	-	4	1
f. Choosing candidates	1	2	-	1
g. Primaries	-	-	-	-
h. Platforms	-	1	-	4
i. Combinations of these and other specified party activities	-	2	1	1
j. Other—unspecified activities, do things	3	2	-	-
Subtotal %	8	11	8	9
7. Broad System Functions				
a. Freedom	-	1	4	2
b. Organized government	-	-	-	-
c. Coherent policy	-	-	-	-
d. Other, e.g., democracy	-	-	-	1
Subtotal %	-	1	4	3
8. Positive Value				
a. Picking best people	3	-	4	2
b. To help, improve, benefit	1	-	1	-
c. Honesty, fairness	-	-	-	1
d. Particular party has good men	-	-	-	1
e. Some good, preferred end	1	-	-	1
f. Other, general—e.g. "good system," "parties O.K."	1	-	3	-
Subtotal %	6	-	8	5
9. Negative Value				
a. Conflict, dissension	-	-	-	1
b. Corruption	1	-	-	2
c. Manipulation	-	-	-	-
d. Slander	-	-	-	1
e. Cheating	1	-	-	-
f. Negative personal qualities, e.g., "bums"	1	-	-	1
g. Distortion of popular choice	-	-	-	1
h. Other, general negative	-	-	-	2
Subtotal %	3	-	-	8
10. Other	-	-	-	2

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Table 7 (continued)

	Grade			
	5th	8th	11th	Parents
11. Don't know, nothing, not ascertained	51	20	10	18
Total %	104%	98%	97%	99%
N =	118	90	72	205

TABLE 8

The Main Purpose of Political Parties

"What do you think is the main purpose of political parties?"

	Grade			
	5th	8th	11th	Parents
1. To provide competition, choice among alternatives	9%	21%	32%	18%
2. Expression of different ideas	10	21	21	24
3. To organize elections, campaigns	1	3	-	1
4. To provide leaders, leadership	5	18	22	21
5. To represent the people, provide responsiveness	3	2	7	6
6. To provide organization and continuity of choice	1	1	3	1
7. Negative evaluations: e.g., conflict, distortion of choice	2	-	1	4
8. Nothing, none, don't need parties	-	2	-	-
9. Other	-	-	-	3
10. Don't know, not ascertained	69	29	15	23
Total %	100%	98%	101%	101%
N =	131	92	74	205

there is a considerable increase in capacity to cope with this idea, so that in this sense, the developmental trends are strong.

When we consider a third question pertaining to parties, "Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and the Democrats stand for?" (If so) "What are they?", we find additional evidence of conceptual growth across this span of preadult years. These data are shown in Table 9.

What we see is a majority of the respondents perceiving no important differences, although this drops from 67% for fifth graders to 57% for eleventh graders. For those who do perceive a difference—and there is an increasing number of these respondents at each higher age level— there is a mild increase in associations pertaining both to group representation differences (Category 2) and to issue and ideological content (Categories 3 and 4).

Thus, age development in seeing substantive differences between the parties goes across the grades; but even at the end only a minority are able to do so. This latter effect is consistent with earlier data on voters, who only to a low degree perceive marked policy or ideological distinctions between the two major parties.[26] In this case the stimuli are themselves ambiguous (i.e., the political parties), so that all have difficulty in saying what differences there are. The impetus for cognitive differentiation is low; but nevertheless some age trends are apparent.

The Concept of Democracy

Returning to a higher level of abstract political conceptualization, we can consider the further example of the concept of democracy. Table 10 presents the answers to the question,

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TABLE 9

The Important Differences between the Republicans and Democrats

"Do you think there are any important differences in
what the Republicans and Democrats stand for ?"

| | Grade | | | |
	5th	8th	11th	Parents
1. No important difference	67%	69%	57%	50%
2. Group differences in support, benefits	2	2	8	16
3. Issue differences	2	4	10	12
4. Ideological differences	2	4	8	7
5. Combinations of 2-4 above	-	-	10	2
6. Other	-	1	-	2
7. Don't know, not ascertained	27	19	8	12
Total %	100%	99%	101%	101%
N =	130	91	74	205

"When you think about democracy, what comes
to your mind ?"

Again the youngest children are for the most
part unable to articulate a definition. Fifty-
four percent at Grade 5 do not know, whereas
only seven percent at Grade 11 are in this cate-
gory. The two major substantive ideas are par-
ticipant or "popular" democracy and liberal or
"tolerant" democracy. Each shows an upward
trend over the grades as more and more youth
are able to furnish connotations. Participation
per se (Category 2a) rises from 6% at Grade 5,
19% at Grade 8, to 32% at Grade 11. The liber-
tarian associations (Category 3) rise from 7% at
Grade 5 to 40% at Grade 8, and 36% at Grade 11.
Other ideas, such as pluralism or representation,
do not appear in these data as forcefully as one
might have expected. Combining, for example,
Categories 2b, 2c, and 5 (which are those most
suggestive of these pluralist, representative
terms of reference), we find 3% at Grade 5, 5%
at Grade 8, and 4% at Grade 11.

One perhaps generational difference should
be noted in this connection. The parents seem
to be somewhat more oriented to liberal than
participant democracy (48% as against 16%),
whereas children spread their thoughts evenly
in these terms (36% for each). In the past,
research has shown the libertarian association
to be the more dominant so far as the concept
of democracy is concerned; but this might be
changing if the responses of these children
are any indication of generational shift.[27]
Perhaps the increasingly evident desire of the
younger generation to participate more broadly
in the political realm as well as in other insti-

tutions of society such as universities is con-
nected to this growing participant orientation—
now more often expressed in the very definition
of democracy.[28]

The Concept of the Good Citizen

One final, broad-gauge political concept
will be considered in this series, that of the
good citizen. In some respects, this idea
dovetails with that of democracy in that the
citizen in the American system is seen to be
performing roles that put into force democratic
goals and values. Tables 11 and 12 show re-
sponses to items asking the child to define the
role of the good citizen, i.e., the best adult
citizen and the best child citizen, respectively.

One way to classify the roles that might be
used to define citizenship is by four increas-
ingly "political" types. The lowest in "politi-
cal" content would be a role-definition putting
emphasis upon good personal traits and private
performance. More "political" would be the
socially concerned individual who is positively
oriented to the welfare of his fellow man. The
socially good citizen is in a sense a more ad-
vanced definition of the good citizen in the
direction of political roles. Thirdly, there is
overt political definition of these roles, but in
a more passive sense, such as obeying the law.
The fourth and most politicized definition would
involve active political participation.

With these four categories in mind, let us
look at the data. The first category corresponds
most closely to the fourth type of definition. On
this, in both tables, we see an increase over

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TABLE 10

The Concept of Democracy, by Age Group

"When you think about <u>democracy</u>, what comes to your mind?"

		Grade			
		5th	8th	11th	Parents
1. Government					
a. Government and politics, NFS		5%	5%	3%	2%
b. Our government		1	2	4	2
c. Best government		1	-	1	-
	Subtotal %	7	7	8	4
2. Popular Democracy					
a. Participation, voting, elections		6	19	32	15
b. Representation		-	1	3	1
c. Pluralism, more than one party		2	2	1	-
	Subtotal %	8	22	36	16
3. Liberal Democracy					
a. Freedom of speech		2	9	8	13
b. Freedom of speech plus other substantive civil liberties		-	1	8	8
c. Other substantive civil liberties: press, assembly, petition, religion		-	-	1	1
d. Civil liberties in general, other freedoms		5	30	19	26
	Subtotal %	7	40	36	48
4. Equality, Justice, Due Process		5	1	4	4
5. Compromise, Cooperation		1	2	-	2
6. Economic Opportunities, Free Enterprise		1	-	-	2
7. President, Pres. Johnson, Pres. Kennedy		6	1	-	1
8. Other		12	4	8	5
9. Don't know, Nothing		54	21	7	18
	Total %	101%	98%	99%	101%
	N =	129	89	73	205

the grades. The increase is much sharper, however, for the adult citizen role-definitions than for the child citizen. The child citizen is more apt to be defined in the more passive political categories by both the child and the adult respondents (although this is most true for the fifth graders and parents).

On the less political definitions there is not much net change, if one combines Categories 3, 4, and 8 for the socially oriented definition and Categories 5, 6, and 7 for the privately oriented definitions. On the adult citizen item, the combined socially oriented categories yield 26%, 20%, and 27% at Grades 5, 8, and 11, respectively. For the child citizen, the same categories show 26%, 22%, and 24%, respec-

tively—thus very little change or difference between child and adult citizenship definitions. For the lowest category in political relevance— the privately oriented definitions (5, 6, and 7), the child citizen results are 19%, 17% and 29% at Grades 5, 8, and 11, respectively; and for the adult citizen, the similar categories show 30%, 17%, and 21%—which is a net decline.

The main changes revolve around the increasing tendency to define the citizen in more participant, active, or politically expressive terms—especially for the adult citizen—and a lesser emphasis upon more passive political roles. There is some adjustment taking place therefore which stretches over the whole grade range, so that the Jennings-Niemi hypothesis seems to be borne out by these data.

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TABLE 11

Concept of the Best Adult Citizen

"Now imagine that you have to give a prize to the adult who is
the best citizen. What should an adult do to deserve such an award?"

	Grade 5th	8th	11th	Parent
1. Politically Active, Expressive				
a. Holds office	-%	-%	1%	-%
b. Is active in party	-	1	1	1
c. Works actively for issues	6	9	4	4
d. Speaks out politically	2	4	6	1
e. Other participation beyond voting	-	-	3	1
f. Votes	2	14	14	3
g. Keeps informed	1	2	6	1
h. Other	-	-	3	-
Subtotal %	11	30	38	11
2. Obeys, Respects, Enforces, Serves the Laws or Authority				
a. Active enforcement of laws	10	2	1	6
b. Obeys laws	8	15	3	9
c. Serves in armed forces	-	-	-	1
d. Respects authority, laws, flag	4	1	-	3
Subtotal %	22	18	4	19
3. Engages in Helpful, Charitable Activity				
a. Supports community organizations	2	1	-	3
b. Supports charities, worthwhile causes	5	4	6	5
c. Other, unspecified, "helps others"	9	2	3	4
Subtotal %	16	7	9	12
4. Good Neighbor, Community Member				
a. Gets along with others	2	2	1	1
b. Keeps up his home	-	1	-	1
c. Good driver	2	2	-	1
d. Keeps city clean	4	1	-	-
e. Improve city, neighborhood	2	7	16	15
f. Other	-	-	-	1
Subtotal %	10	13	17	19
5. Teacher, Leader, Model				
a. Teaches about government	1	2	4	-
b. Teaches, is example of other virtues	6	2	-	-
c. Sets a good example	1	1	3	2
d. Specific model cited (e.g., "be like mayor")	-	-	1	1
e. Other	-	1	-	-
Subtotal %	7	6	8	3
6. Good Performance in Private Life				
a. Good at job	5	2	3	1
b. Good family man	6	1	4	2
c. Religious	-	-	-	1
d. Sticks to private life	1	1	-	2
e. Other	-	-	-	1
Subtotal %	12	4	7	7

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Table 11 (continued)

		Grade			Parents
		5th	8th	11th	
7. Has good Personal Traits		11%	7%	6%	8%
8. Respect for Fellow Man, Brotherhood					
a. Non-racist, anti-racist		-	-	1	1
b. Respect, help fellow man		-	-	-	10
c. Other		-	-	-	-
	Subtotal %	-	-	1	11
9. Don't Know, Not Ascertained		14	12	11	11
Total %		103%	97%	101%	100%
	N =	126	91	73	205

TABLE 12

Concept of the Best Child Citizen

"Now for something a little different. I'm going to ask you to imagine that you
are the mayor of Milwaukee and that you have to give a prize to the child who is
the best citizen. What should a child do to deserve such an award?"

		Grade			Parents
		5th	8th	11th	
1. Politically Active, Expressive					
a. Be politically active		5	2	4	1
b. Express political views		1	-	-	-
c. Offer suggestions, solutions, about					
race and other problems		2	10	7	7
d. Be informed about current events		-	5	4	6
e. Plan to work for government, join military		1	-	1	-
f. Stop marching, other specified political					
activities		2	-	-	..
	Subtotal %	11	17	16	14
2. Obeys, Respects, Enforces, Serves the Laws					
or Authority					
a. Active enforcement of laws, e.g., "save					
someone's life," "report theft"		22	9	4	6
b. "Obey all the laws"		4	16	11	12
c. Obey parents, teachers, adults		-	1	-	6
d. Respect flag, government, political					
authority		2	-	-	1
e. Behave (oneself)		3	2	7	5
	Subtotal %	31	28	22	30
3. Engages in Helpful, Charitable Activity					
a. Belong to community organization		-	1	4	3
b. Support charities, worthwhile causes		1	4	1	2
c. Other, e.g., "help others," "do good deeds"		3	3	7	2
	Subtotal %	4	8	12	7

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Table 12 (continued)

		5th	8th	11th	Parents
			Grade		
4. Be Good Neighbor, Community Member					
a. Gets along with other people		5	4	-	1
b. Be a good driver		-	-	1	-
c. Keeps city clean		13	5	-	-
d. Improve, help city (Milwaukee)		2	5	10	4
	Subtotal %	20	14	11	5
5. Perform Well in School					
a. Do well scholastically		4	7	16	9
b. Help his teacher		2	-	1	2
c. Appreciates school, education		2	-	-	3
	Subtotal %	8	7	17	14
6. Performs Well in Private Life Outside School					
a. Helps at home		1	-	-	1
b. Is religious		-	-	-	1
c. Is competent		1	-	1	1
d. Takes initiative, responsibility		-	2	4	3
	Subtotal %	2	2	5	6
7. Has Good Personal Traits		9	8	7	9
8. Exhibits Sense of Brotherhood, Concern for Fellow Man					
a. Non-racist, anti-racist		2	-	1	-
b. Sense of brotherhood		-	-	-	7
	Subtotal %	2	-	1	7
9. Other		-	-	-	1
10. Don't Know, Not Ascertained		15	14	7	7
	Total %	102%	98%	98%	100%
	N =	131	92	73	205

Summary

What one observes therefore about the patterns of establishing definitions of some broad but basic political concepts are two things: (1) There is substantial growth in ability to articulate some appropriate definition in the period under investigation. On some of these items the capacity to formulate a meaning rises dramatically from Grade 5 to Grade 11, as is the case of the concept of political parties. (2) There is also a marked pattern of sorting out various connotations over the grades. The substance of these concepts changes as the child matures politically. We must conclude on this as yet limited evidence therefore that with a few exceptions to this point, the Jennings-Niemi observation about the continuation of conceptual political development through adolescence is borne out by these new data.[29]

DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Before we reach the conclusion that development of political orientations continues quite generally in adolescence, attention should also be given to areas of non-cognitive content. Attitudes and cognitions may exhibit different patterns of growth, with one preceding the other in terms of periods of greatest change.[30]

Past work on the specification of attitudinal variables appropriate for study in a developmental context has been considerably more extensive than is the case for political cognitions. That the attitudinal aspects of political maturation should have figured so prominently in recent investigation is understandable given the political scientist's interest in the problem of how political systems create and maintain support for leaders, policies, institutions, and

for the system itself.[31] Such support is usually regarded as primarily attitudinal in character.

Because these theoretical connections have been spelled out in detail elsewhere, they will not be explicated here.[32] Suffice it to say that many of the basic orientations pertaining to support have been identified in a number of recent political and social science works. The present survey draws upon and expands the operationalizations of these works. It includes therefore a variety of attitudinal variables of the system-level, support-related types.[33]

Ten of the more general of these variables will be described below in connection with a summary of factor analysis of many of the attitudinal items of the survey. This factor analysis of the matrix of intercorrelations among the whole set of attitudinal items was used as the basis for scoring these ten attitudinal variables for each respondent.[34]

With respondents thus scored, a summary of change in attitude can be given by presenting the mean scores at each age level for each of the ten political attitude variables. This summary will be given after the construction of the indices has been described.

The Major Types of Political Attitudes

As adumbrated above, the focus of interest is upon types of content concerned with system-political orientation. This refers, for the present survey, to attitudes to the political order as a whole and to the main institutions of political life. One of the most fundamental of these concerns the political community—the shared division of political labor, whatever its character, that members of the system have in common. The attitudinal counterpart of the political community is a "we feeling" or "sense of political community."[35] Indicators that investigators have used to measure this sense vary widely. They include questions dealing with objects of pride in one's nation,[36] "aesthetic" preference for the design of one's own country's flag,[37] or cathexis with other national symbols and rituals.[38]

The approach taken here in this connection is a relatively straightforward one of posing agree-disagree items of a type shown in earlier research to be meaningful for modal children in the United States after Grade 4. For example, the statement, "America is the best country in the world," is a test item pertaining to the sense of national political community identification. The options were presented on a separate card to the respondent and included the following:

1. Strongly agree
2. Agree

3. Agree-disagree
4. Disagree
5. Strongly disagree
0. Don't know

Those who answered "strongly agree" were judged to be highly identified with the national system, whereas those choosing the other options in order were judged to be decreasingly so identified (excepting "don't know," which suggests uncertainty).

A fairly wide set of such items were intercorrelated and factor analyzed in relation to the dimensionality hypothesis that a certain set of specified attitudinal components would be distinguishable in this sample. The hypothesized dimensions included the following:

1. Political community identification
2. Political trust
3. Support for a liberal democratic regime
4. Sense of political efficacy
5. Support for the representative institutions of parties and elections.

In the results obtained, these dimensions were shown to present and distract; yet they were more complex than had been originally envisioned. In several cases the dimensions postulated split into two or three parts. In addition, a set of "distractor" items that were related, but not central, to the above areas clustered together to form an unexpected, yet quite meaningful dimension, which has been called in what follows a sentiment of "general approval of government." Let us look at the results shown in Table 13 and discuss each component briefly.

The data are organized by factors or principal components, listing the items for each component in order of magnitude of "loading" (or factor weight) down to and including items weighted $\pm$ .30. The circled item numbers denote those used in cluster-scoring for subsequent analysis.

The first factor listed pertains to political community identification but contains a strong element of what some would call "ethnocentric" identification or preference for America. This is closely related to the preference for democracy. One could surmise that the child or adult in this sample is apt to connect very intimately the preference he has for the country and its form of regime therefore. Thus a kind of syllogism of preferences appears, which runs perhaps as follows:

1. "Democracy is the best form of government."
2. "The United States is the most democratic country in the world."

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TABLE 13

Political Attitude Dimensions*

Factors and Items**	Rotated Factor Weights
I. Political Community Identification/Ethnocentrism	
*** 88/80. "The United States is the most democratic country in the world."	.73
*** 87/79. "Democracy is the best form of government."	.68
*** 8. "The United States is the best country in the world."	.65
II. General Approval of Government	
*** 61. "The present Democratic administration in Washington is doing a good job."	.79
*** 153. "President Johnson is doing a good job."	.76
*** 59. "I like it that the government in Washington plays such a big role in solving our country's problems."	.61
*** 73. "The present Republican administration in Wisconsin is doing a good job."	.52
*** 12. "The government in Washington can usually be trusted to do what is right."	.51
45. "Most of the people who try to get elected to public office can be trusted to do what is right."	.34
28. "Most political candidates really seem to mean what they say."	.31
III. Political Trust	
*** 24. "Quite a few of the people running the government are dishonest."	-.78
*** 26. "Quite a few politicians are dishonest."	-.76
*** 45. "Most of the people who try to get elected to public office can be trusted to do what is right."	.42
12. "The government in Washington can usually be trusted to do what is right."	.41
IV. Support for Liberal Democracy: Specific	
*** 83/89. "If a person wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee against churches and religion, he should not be allowed to speak."	.79
*** 84/90. "If a person who spoke against churches and religion were legally elected to Congress from Milwaukee, he should not be allowed to take office."	.77
*** 85/91. "If a Negro wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee against white people, he should not be allowed to speak."	.75
*** 82/88. "If a member of the Ku Klux Klan who spoke against Negroes in his campaign speeches were legally elected to Congress from Milwaukee, he should not be allowed to take office."	.74
*** 86/92. "If a Negro who spoke against white people in his campaign speeches were legally elected to Congress from Milwaukee, he should not be allowed to take office."	.74
*** 81/87. "If a member of the Ku Klux Klan wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee against Negroes, he should not be allowed to speak."	.71
*** 79/85. "If a communist wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee favoring communism, he should not be allowed to speak."	.61
*** 80/86. "If a communist were legally elected to congress from Milwaukee, he should not be allowed to take office."	.61
V. Support for Liberal Democracy: Abstract	
A. Freedom of Speech	
*** 89/91. "Freedom of speech is a basic right of every American."	.74
*** 90/82. "I believe in freedom of speech."	.71
B. Right to Hold Office	
*** 91/83. "Another basic right of Americans is that everyone has an equal right to hold office."	.80

Table 13 (continued)

Factors and Items**	Rotated Factor Weights
*** 92/84. "I believe everyone should have an equal right to hold public office."	.80

VI. Political Efficacy: Government Responsiveness

*** 155. "I don't think that people in the government care much what people like me think."	.79
*** 156. "I don't think that people in the state government in Madison care much what people like my family think."	.75
*** 65. "I don't think that people in the city government care uch what people like my family think."	.66
*** 15. "I don't think that people in the government care much about what people like my family think."	.58
38. "Many primary elections aren't important enough to vote in."	.34

VII. Political Efficacy: Access to Officials

*** 99. "If the Governor of Wisconsin did something I didn't like, I would feel free to complain to him about it."	.87
*** 101. "If the mayor of Milwaukee did something I didn't like, I would feel free to complain to him about it."	.85
*** 72. "If a policeman did something I didn't like, I would feel free to complain to him about it."	.59
*** 107. "If I wanted to, I could get someone in the Milwaukee city government to listen to what I want."	.56

VIII. Support for the Party System

*** 118. "Our system of government would work a lot better if we could get rid of conflicts between the political parties altogether."	-.75
*** 117. "More often than not, the political parties create conflicts where none really exist."	-.69
*** 51. "The conflicts among the political parties hurt our country more than they help it."	-.58
*** 116. "It would be better if, in all elections, no party labels were put on the ballot."	-.46

IX. Sense of Voting Duty

*** 48. "It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win."	-.62
*** 38. "Many primary elections aren't important enough to vote in."	-.61
*** 50. "So many other people vote in the national elections that it wouldn't much matter to me whether I could vote or not."	-.61
116. "It would be better if in all elections no party labels were put on the ballot."	-.45

X. Efficacy of the Electoral System

*** 56. "The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country."	.79
*** 28. "Most political candidates really seem to mean what they say."	.50
*** 21. "Having elections makes the government pay close attention to what the people think."	.47
45. "Most of the people who try to get elected to public office can be trusted to do what is right."	.32

*The type of factor analysis used was principal component analysis with varimax rotation for 45 items and all respondents ($\underline{N}$ = 502). A series of prior factor analyses over various subsets of items was carried out before this in order to find the best subset for final factor analysis and cluster scoring. "Program Image," University of Wisconsin Computing Center, and the CDC 1604 Computer were utilized.

**Items with double numbers were those that appeared at two different points in the interview schedule, divided equally among the respondents chosen as "experimental" and "control" to test

the effect of putting the abstract democracy items either before or after the specific democracy items. The effect of this question ordering was found to be nonsignificant. The first number denotes "control."

***These numbers refer to those items used in cluster scoring.

Therefore:
> 3. "The United States is the best country in the world. "[39]

Of course, in matters of personal identification with social objects, these premises or preferred perceptions could appear temporally in any order. But it is theoretically interesting and possibly of great practical consequence that the American links these sentiments favoring both country and democratic regime so closely together. Each gives the other strength if positive support is generated; and each adds to the other's weakness if negative support comes into being. They are bound, on these data, to a common attitudinal fate.

"General approval of government" is an equally broad sentiment even though the particular items used refer mainly to actual incumbents of politically authoritative roles. The interpretation given is that of a general positive regard for the achievements of government, rather than the approval of particular leaders or policies, because both Republicans and Democrats are approved. In addition, there is some overlap with the sense of trust as exhibited in the two lowest loading (and unscored) items. Perhaps this general approval is a species of diffuse support for the whole system relative to its performance, and is therefore equivalent in one sense to the strongly benevolent image of government and figures of political authority that children have been shown to have in earlier research. [40]

Political trust per se is the main meaning of Factor III. Here the attitude focuses upon the motivations of political actors rather than upon their performance. The literature of political science has dealt so often with this general disposition to politics that no very detailed analysis of its contents and implications is needed here. [41] It is a disposition generally. recognized to affect political behavior in a variety of contexts.

Less general than political trust or approval of government is support for the institutions of a democratic regime. As we have seen above (Factor I) some of the support of this kind is very closely tied up with identification of oneself with the nation. But the more particular elements of such a democratic regime also bear analysis. Three main elements have been identified previously by the present author and his colleagues. [42] These are participant, libertarian (or tolerant), and pluralistic aspects. The remaining factors all refer to these three basic aspects of the regime of democracy as it is commonly thought to be practiced in the United States.

The "rights and liberties, " or libertarian element is contained in Factors IV and V. The former is the more specific application of these principles of allowing other individuals and minorities freedom of speech and the right to hold public office. Factor V on the other hand is the more abstract approval of these principles, divided into two sections, approval of free speech and approval of the right to hold public office. That specific application should be separated attitudinally from approval of the abstract principles comes as no surprise in that earlier studies such as by Prothro and Grigg had shown this effect. [43] There is further separation between the two types of abstract principles, but the latter, for the limited further analysis that they are used for, have been collapsed to a single score. [44]

Democracy in the American sense also means participation of "popular democracy. " The operational measure of participant orientation used here is "sense of political efficacy. " As was noted in an earlier work by the present author and his coauthor, political efficacy—as a feeling that one can participate effectively in public decisions—has at least two conceptually separable parts. [45] One is a sense that alter (government officialdom) is responsive to ego. The other is that ego can autonomously affect alter's behavior, or at least has access to alter. Empirically we find some such separation. For both aspects of political efficacy, moreover, these feelings span the several levels of the system: national, state, and local.

The third element of support for a democratic regime of the American type concerns pluralism or representative institutions. The measure of this sentiment developed in earlier work by the present author focused upon the party system as a primary mechanism of pluralistic representation. [46] Factor VIII represents a measure of party system support. To broaden this area of inquiry somewhat, items relating to support for the electoral system were also included in the present survey. Two aspects of electoral system support appeared in

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TABLE 14

Development of Political Attitudes: Mean Index Scores by Age

	Mean Scores			
	Grade			
Index	5th	8th	11th	Parents
1. Political Community Identification/ Ethnocentrism	10.5	11.8	11.7	12.2
2. General Approval of Government	19.0	18.4	16.7	17.0
3. Political Trust	10.7	10.9	10.5	9.6
4. Support for Liberal Democracy: Specific	22.4	24.0	26.9	24.0
5. Support for Liberal Democracy: Abstract	14.7	16.9	17.1	16.4
6. Political Efficacy: Government Responsiveness	13.4	14.1	14.0	13.4
7. Political Efficacy: Access to Officials	13.5	14.5	15.2	14.9
8. Support for the Party System	11.5	12.7	12.1	12.4
9. Sense of Voting Duty	9.9	12.4	12.6	12.2
10. Efficacy of the Electoral System	11.0	11.5	11.1	11.1

scorable form in these data: (1) Sense of voting duty (Factor IX), and (2) The feeling that voting and elections have efficacy in the political system (Factor X). Together these three attitudinal dimensions (Factors VIII-X) constitute the measures of the respondents' relative degree of support for the pluralist, representative aspect of the regime of democracy in America.

Thus, in all, ten political-attitudinal variables have been identified for the present analysis. These are judged to be adequate for testing the extent to which there are age trends in development of basic orientations toward the political system as such development may go beyond the elementary school years.

Trends in Aggregate Political Attitude Development

When we divide our respondents by age level and calculate the mean scores on each attitude cluster, we find the trends shown in Table 14.

What appears is that between Grades 5 and 11, there are four of these ten scores that show an increase (Indexes 4, 5, 7 and 9), whereas one (Index 2) declines, three increase (Indexes 1, 6, and 8) from Grades 5 to 8 (with slight reversals between Grades 8 and 11), and two show little if any change (Indexes 3 and 10). Development of political attitudes in the aggregate is therefore clearly present, but occurs for only half of the attitude dimensions in question.

The trends that continue across all three grade levels are a lessening of general approval of government and an increase in sense of duty to vote, support for liberal democracy at both the specific and abstract levels, and in the type of political efficacy that involves the belief that government officials are accessible. Political efficacy regarding government responsiveness, support for the party system, and political community identification show increases between Grades 5 and 8, but a tailing off between 8 and 11. Political trust and belief that the electoral system is efficacious show a similar pattern to the latter, but return at Grade 11 to the Grade 5 level or below.

The parents in only two cases stand higher than the Grade 11 youth—on political community identification and support for the party system. Thus, little development apparently goes on in these terms between Grade 11 and adulthood. In most cases, the parents look in the aggregate more like Grades 5 or 8 than Grade 11. Thus, there is either reversion to an earlier level of average feeling or else a generational difference contained in these data.

That only half of these scores show progressive change at Grades 8 and 11 gives somewhat ambiguous support for the Jennings and Niemi hypothesis in the area of political attitudes. If the hypothesis is that some basic orientations develop in these years, then their hypothesis is confirmed. But, for the other five basic attitudes, one detects little adolescent increase or decrease.

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CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a presentation of two contrasting hypotheses: one placing great stress upon preadolescence as the period of formation of basic political orientations, the other stressing adolescence. The evidence that has entered the literature in recent years makes early political learning an empirical fact. Thus, the real question is whether there is also further development after childhood. Within the confines of a limited set of political orientations, both cognitive and affective, the evidence presented here would suggest that the hypothesized post-adolescent development does in fact occur.

Growth between Grades 8 and 11 in the capacity to define a number of general political concepts takes place, as do shifts in the contents of these definitions. Increases and decreases also appear, for the aggregate, in ten political attitudes; but in this case, half do not continue to change in the same direction from Grades 8 to 11 that was true between Grades 5 and 8.

The modified hypothesis that results is that basic political socialization does continue in adolescence but this may be more pervasive in the cognitive than in the attitudinal realm. A corollary hypothesis might be that for attitudinal political development there is probably not as much change of basic orientations as is the case for the primary school years. Thus, in one sense, both sides to the issue, as it has been recently posed, are correct.

III
PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCE

We have seen that development of political orientations continues to take place across the grade span. This finding confirms the necessity for looking at the effects of socializing influences at each of these points. If there is development at all of these points, then our next task is to discover the nature of the forces operating to cause these changes. In this chapter and the next two, such an inquiry will be attempted. In this chapter, the influence of parent political attitudes will be considered. In the following chapter the influence of race will be investigated. And in the chapter after that (Chapter V), these two independent variables will be evaluated relative to nine other theoretically salient independent variables. In all these analyses, the political attitude indexes developed in Chapter II will be used as the dependent variables.

In a classic statement of the common hypothesis about the role of the family in the development of political orientations, Herbert Hyman has proposed that "Foremost among agencies of socialization into politics is the family."[47] But Hyman did not consider this to be a universal proposition incapable of modification under varying social circumstances. Rather he approached it cautiously and with whatever empirical evidence he was able to garner by the time of his inventory of findings. He notes:

> When children and their parents are measured independently and agreements in political view are established, it supports the inference that the family transmits politics to the children. While this might appear obvious, it nevertheless needs careful documentation. Furthermore, the degree of such influence can be established, and by proper comparison of these correlations under varied conditions, for example, for children of different ages, one can establish subtle features of the socialization process. A central difficulty in such studies using heterogeneous populations has to do with the expected value of correlations between

pairs of unrelated individuals, who might be in the same social stratum, place of residence, etc., for this may well be a component of the total agreement found which has nothing to do with intrinsic family influences. In the instance of most of these studies, this factor is impossible to estimate and the absolute magnitudes must be somewhat discounted.[48]

Now in this statement, Hyman has raised several of the key issues for the present analysis. Our first task will be to attempt to replicate the finding of parent-child correspondence. And we shall do so in the way he suggests it ought to be done; namely, by using independently measured attitudes of parent and child. Furthermore, we shall focus upon the problem of influence "under varied conditions"—to use his phrase—and upon the very conditions that he suggests by way of illustration, i.e., for children of different ages. Finally, to overcome the problem he raises at the end of the above quotation, the problem of the expected value of correlations between pairs of unrelated individuals who are similar in social location—we will control for a number of social structural variables, for other influences of family and school communication and decision making, and for general psychological dispositions. Let us take these matters in the order Hyman raises them.

On the first question, the extent of correlation between parent and child, Hyman proposes an average correlation of .5.[49] He thus presents a norm against which to evaluate the extent of correspondence in the present study. In making such an evaluation, one should take into account, however, the findings of Jennings and Niemi that only recently have appeared, suggesting that the overall level of correspondence is not as high—at least for high school seniors—as Hyman had hypothesized from Fisher's summary of studies of child-parent political correspondence.[50]

What Jennings and Niemi found was that only in the area of political party identifica-

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tion did the value of the correlations rise to the average level noted by Hyman. They found a .59 Pearson product-moment correlation (or a .47 tau-b correlation) for party identification, but only .12 (tau-b) for political cynicism, correlations ranging from .05 to .34 (tau-b) for four political issue preferences, and Pearson product-moment correlations ranging from .12 to .36 on eight evaluations of groups (Catholics, Southerners, Labor Unions, Negroes, etc.).[51]

The most directly comparable of these for present purposes are political cynicism and two of the items dealing with political issues in the Jennings-Niemi study. Political cynicism is the opposite of political trust (a measure of which is used here). The two issue items of relevance concern "Speakers against churches and religion should be allowed" and "Legally elected Communists should be allowed to take office"; and these show parent-child correspondences of .05 and .13 (tau-b), respectively. Both of these items are contained in the "Support for Liberal Democracy: Specific" Index, so that they should provide some terms of comparison for the present data.

THE PRESENT FINDINGS

What is found in the Milwaukee data for these two attitude areas, as well as on seven others (excluding the index concerning abstract support for liberal democracy, for the reasons given in Chapter II), is shown in Tables 15 and 16.

These tables present respectively the zero-order Pearson product-moment correlations and the partial correlations between child and parent index scores of the same type, holding constant ten other independent variables.

Looking first at Table 15 and Indexes 3 and 4, the ones most directly comparable to the Jennings-Niemi data, we note that the magnitude of the correlation varies by grade level. On political trust, the correlation is almost the same at Grades 5 and 11, but is less at Grade 8 (.09, simple r). These magnitudes compare roughly to the Jennings and Niemi finding.

Furthermore, on the specific liberal democratic index, the correlations are again in the same general range as the Jennings-Niemi item correlations. Indeed, when item correlations are computed for the two items used by Jennings and Niemi, a more exact comparison can be made by using the present data. For the "elected Communist" item, the Tau-b's are -.06, -.03, and .19 at Grades 5, 8, and 11, respectively. The Jennings-Niemi value was

.13 at Grade 12, which compares quite well with the present Grade 11 value. For the "speaker against churches and religion" item, the present tau-b's are -.17, .05, and .11 at Grades 5, 8, and 11. In this case, the Grade 8 level looks to be more like the Jennings-Niemi finding, but Grade 11 is relatively close to what they found for seniors.

Together these several findings would appear to confirm the hypothesis that parents only to a low extent reproduce their basic political attitudes in their children; but on these data, there is more positive transmission present at the end of the school years (in this case, in Grade 11) than earlier is the case.

Considering the indexes as a whole in Table 15, we see that the patterns of correspondence over the grades are by no means simple, however. In five cases there are clear age trends in association—for political community identification, general approval of government, support for (specific) liberal democracy, sense of voting duty, and efficacy of the electoral system. But some of these are toward increasing correspondence while others are toward less likeness of parent and child.

In two cases at Grade 11, moreover, the association is rather negative; and even when other things are controlled (see Table 16), this negative association remains—indeed, it increases. Thus we find two possible instances of political rebellion, or the influence of other factors which upset positive family influence. As we shall see below, part of this effect has to do with the special situation of the black youth in the sample.

It is nevertheless interesting that any such negative correlations would appear at all, given the usual hypothesis about the direction of family influence. Hyman says, for example, that "The almost complete absence of negative correlations [in the evidence available at that point] provides considerable evidence against the theory that political attitudes are formed generally in terms of rebellion and opposition to parents."[52] Subsequent research has, of course, turned up some special situations in which political attitudes are formed by children in a context of differentiation or "rebellion" from parent values—especially for rebellious children for whose parents politics is very salient. But these instances are sufficiently particular not to vitiate fully Hyman's general hypothesis.[53]

Even in the present data one would be obliged to conclude that the general tenor of family influence is positive in that an overwhelming majority of instances are positive correlations (22 of 27 simple r's and 19 of 27

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TABLE 15

Child-Parent Correspondence on Nine Political Attitude Indexes: Simple Correlations

| | (Pearson r) | | |
| | Grade | | |
Index	5th	8th	11th
1. Political Community Identification/Ethnocentrism	.34	.22	.10
2. General Approval of Government	.17	.33	.38
3. Political Trust	.33	.09	.32
4. Support for Liberal Democracy: Specific	-.10	.06	.34
5. Political Efficacy: Government Responsiveness	.25	.05	.17
6. Political Efficacy: Access to Officials	.10	.30	-.31
7. Support for the Party System	.13	.09	.19
8. Sense of Voting Duty	.26	.11	-.21
9. Efficacy of the Electoral System	-.05	-.01	.05
Number of child-parent pairs =	118	77	65

TABLE 16

Child-Parent Correspondence on Nine Political Attitude Indexes: Partial Correlations

| | (Partial r *) | | |
| | Grade | | |
Index	5th	8th	11th
1. Political Community Identification/Ethnocentrism	.23	.17	.09
2. General Approval of Government	.17	.29	.36
3. Political Trust	.10	.07	.30
4. Support for Liberal Democracy: Specific	-.14	-.03	.26
5. Political Efficacy: Government Responsiveness	.10	-.18	.08
6. Political Efficacy: Access to Officials	.03	.25	-.38
7. Support for the Party System	.08	.02	.17
8. Sense of Voting Duty	.01	-.12	-.26
9. Efficacy of the Electoral System	-.01	-.07	.11
Number of child-parent pairs =	118	77	65

*Controlling in each case for ten other independent variables that include: level of parent's education, prestige ranking of occupation of head of household, child's sex, child's race, child's report of family political communication, child's sense of efficacy in family decision-making, child's report of school political communication, child's sense of efficacy in school decision-making, child's ego strength (or assertiveness), and child's sense of confidence in his ability to control his external environment. These variables will be explicated in detail in Chapter V.

partial r's). Nevertheless, that any correlation at all (of any magnitude) is negative brings into question Hyman's hypothesis, and leads one to look for new explanatory hypotheses. It is especially striking that the highest correlation of all in Table 16 is negative. (Access to officials' efficacy at Grade 11: -.38). In addition, a -.26 correlation on voting duty at Grade 11 confirms the possibility of generational differentiation—at least in special areas of developing political content (Table 16).

One of the things that emerged in the earlier analysis of child's developing conception of the meaning of democracy (Chapter II) was a relatively sharp difference between parents and Grade 11 children in the extent to which they defined democracy in terms of participation rather than freedom (or popular rather than liberal democracy). At that point it was noted that a generational shift could be in the offing with youth favoring greater participation (even perhaps at the expense of protecting individual rights). The data in the present context of parent-child opposition rather than correspondence—in these two instances—fit rather well with such an inference. The sense that one should vote and that one has access to public officials are as strongly definitive of a participant orientation as are any indexes of the whole set. Thus, if children are to "rebel" generationally, these are terms which would seem appropriate for doing so, whereas other attitudes might not be as salient for the present mood of youth.

That youth are taking an independent and participation-demanding turn in America is, of course, a widely remarked phenomenon of our time. The demands for greater voice in the national political life as in anti-Vietnam war demonstrations or the "children's crusade" supporting Senator Eugene McCarthy, the demands for a greater student share in decision-making in the University, and in the movement supporting greater rights for black people in American society, all bespeak this new activism and emphasis upon participant democracy by the young.

The group of young people who in many ways have been most politicized during recent years because of taking part in a longer series of confrontations, demonstrations, and other acts of protest, are Negro youth. Thus, from the standpoint of generational differences, they are the ones most unlike their parents of any sector of the new generation. A hypothesis

that one could raise therefore is that a greater portion of the anomolous negative correlations will be due to their reaction to the political values of their parents. Those whose parents are least high on political efficacy are the very ones who themselves may feel the greatest need to take part in political life.

When we focus upon the correlation that is most strongly negative, the -.38 for "access to officials" at Grade 11, this hypothesis is indeed borne out by the data. The negative simple correlation is -.68 for blacks, but only -.12 for white eleventh graders. While there is thus some generational change for the white, oldest youth, this rejection of parent outlook is much sharper for black youth. The blacks in this case are strongly apt to reject the political efficacy values of their parents.[54] We will explore this and other black/white differences below.

CONCLUSION

The general finding on parent-child similarity of potential orientations over the set of terms provided is very much in line with the Jennings-Niemi data. The correlations are in the main positive, but fairly low. And the magnitude of such correlations varies somewhat by grade, with the highest average correlation at Grade 11. In general, the oldest child is more affected by his parents' outlook in political matters of these kinds, both positively and negatively. But this is not completely the case—witness political community identification. Parental influence may wane in some cases as the child grows older. But the more general trend seems to be upward with the grade level of the child. In almost no case in these data does it reach the level proposed by Hyman.

In a few moderately large negative influence situations, a generational shift is suggested. This is probably connected in these data to an especially participant cast of mind of the present younger generation. And, at least for the case of strongest "negative" transmission, the blacks are much more unlike their parents than are the whites. For the political system this augurs continued active forces of change, especially from the side of black youth. It also suggests a shifting pattern of political socialization giving rise to these differences in outlook.

IV
BLACK/WHITE COMPARISON

Given the high salience of the race relations issue in American domestic politics and the considerable upsurge of demands for equality by Negroes in the last decade, it is strange that almost no work on political socialization has focused specifically upon black/white similarities and differences. One might on many grounds hypothesize black/white disparities in what is learned about the political world and the processes by which this knowledge and sentiment come into being.[55] That our capacity to penetrate to the processes underlying many of the shifts in orientation that have led to the "Negro Revolution" is presently so slight bespeaks great opportunities for application of the techniques and hypotheses developed already in other contexts to this new area. From several standpoints, both the practical political one and from the perspective of theory, the subject is certainly ripe for analysis.

From a theoretical perspective, especially in relation to the problems of learning in subcultural minorities, there is much opportunity here. There is now fairly wide documentation of the fact that Negro children are apt to lack many of the resources available to white children in making their adjustment to the social world. They are likely not to be stimulated to learn, they often lack the communication and information resources to do so, even if they do become motivated; and an unstable or impoverished family environment often militates against attainment of the motivation to learn.[56]

In addition, contemporary studies of Negro adult political behavior provide a background of inquiry into the patterns of stability and change of such patterns of behavior among black youth.[57] Renewed interest in these questions has appeared again recently, with the realization that Negroes are reacting to the inequities they face in American society to at least as high a degree as they are becoming integrated into "the main stream of American life"—as politicians are fond of calling it. Certainly the events of recent years in which widespread disorders and violence have erupted has sharpened the awareness of the need to apply to this problem the tools of social science.[58] There is high practical interest in the subject therefore.

One of the difficulties which results from the low state of present knowledge of what political attitudes Negro youth are developing is that the direction, content, and degree of difference from white youth are all presently unknown. The present analysis will of necessity be more concerned therefore with raising new hypotheses than replicating or disconfirming the findings of others, which was the case in the previous two chapters.

A way to begin is to consider first whether support for the system is apt to be high or low for adult Negroes, either absolutely or in relation to whites. Here again the problem of finding relevant data is not easily overcome. One set of recent data that bear upon this question, however, have appeared in G. T. Marx's Protest and Prejudice.[59] Let us consider briefly some of his findings as the basis for posing hypotheses about the possible political orientation of black youth.

Marx undertook to look at a whole range of Negro attitudes and thought, at first revolving mainly around the problem of group prejudice—especially Negro anti-Semitism. But as the study progressed, it became expanded to include attitudes toward riots, whites in general, militancy in civil rights' agitation and the like. One by-product of this broadened effort was fresh attention to questions that bear directly upon the extent of support for the political system. A brief review of the latter will set the stage for the findings of the present survey.

At the political community level, Marx's questions indicate a high identification by Negroes with the American nation rather than the disaffection so often alleged in the more sensational sectors of American journalism and partisan political rhetoric. Seventy-nine percent of the Negro (adult) metropolitan sample rejected the suggestion that "It would be a good idea to give American Negroes their

own country and let them set up their own na-
tion." Only 17% agreed with this statement.[60]
Furthermore, on the statement, "If the United
States got into a war today, would you person-
ally feel this country was worth fighting for,
or not?", 87% indicated that they felt the
United States was worth fighting for, and only
11% said, "No."[61] Marx concludes that the
question of refusing to fight, if called upon,
had never entered their minds. He notes that
"They were Americans with the attitude that,
if the government calls upon you to do some-
thing, why of course you do it, it's the law,
whether it be obtaining a driver's license or
fighting in a war."[62]

In addition, Marx finds high optimism about
the conditions of Negroes in America. There
is high positive consensus on the statement
that things are getting better for Negroes in
this country: 81% say things are getting better,
whereas only 11% say they are getting worse.[63]
Negroes are also optimistic about the chances
of future integration with whites and the chance
to become leaders: 70% agree that "The day
will come when Negroes will be fully accepted
by whites"[64] and 59% agree that Negroes some
day are going to rise to the leadership of the
world."[65]

Third, Negroes react favorably to perceived
government output in race relations, as in their
response to a question on the government's
promotion of integration. The question asked
of the respondents read: "In your opinion, is
the government in Washington pushing integra-
tion too slow, too fast, or about right?"
Thirty-four percent answered "too slow," 2%
said "too fast," and 59% chose "about right."[66]

One may conclude, therefore, from these
and Marx's other data that the picture of the
disaffected, alienated Negro in America is
perhaps grossly overdrawn. Marx himself ob-
serves the following:

> Our data suggest that many people hold an
> overly sensational image of the Negro mood.
> To be sure there is deep anger and frustra-
> tion, as well as varying degrees of suspi-
> cion and resentment of whites. Yet, there
> is still optimism about the possibility of
> change within the system. Most Negroes
> favor integration in principle, are loyal to
> the United States, are opposed to indiscrim-
> inate violence, and are not consistently
> anti-white or anti-Semitic."[67]

When we turn to the data comparing Negro
and white youth below, one general hypothesis
that could be raised therefore is that both
groups will be relatively supportive;[68] and in-
deed, there should be few differences of high

magnitude between them. Let us test these
propositions.

THE FINDINGS

To begin, two of the cognitive items dis-
cussed earlier will be presented, concerning
the concepts of democracy and the good citi-
zen. The first of these is shown in Table 17,
where the patterns of response are presented
for black and white respondents controlled by
grade.

One observes from these data that the blacks
emphasize more the participant aspects of the
concept by the end of the grade span, whereas
the whites more frequently offer the libertarian
definitions. Forty-three percent of the eleventh
grade blacks volunteer "participation" answers,
but only 26% of the blacks choose the liber-
tarian responses. The situation is reversed
for the whites, wherein 32% venture populistic
definitions but 48% give libertarian responses.

Although there is overlap in these two major
emphases, the difference is striking enough
to suggest a difference in preadult conceptual-
ization of possible consequence for the system.
This is particularly true if the participant
emphasis disposes one to place greater stress
upon the value of participation as against the
norms of tolerance, something that appears
not infrequently in the activist mood of the
younger generation.

Another perspective on the possible differ-
ence in conceptual political development be-
tween the two races is given by the data in
Table 18.

For the concept of the best adult citizen,
we find that the black children acquire the
participant definition somewhat less rapidly
than do the whites, but rise to roughly an
equal level by Grade 11. On the more passive,
obedient side of political definition of the citi-
zen role, the blacks start higher, but none of
them give this definition by the end. Thus
the differences are more subtle, but neverthe-
less present for this kind of concept as well.

In being able to provide any definition at
all of one of these concepts, viz., democracy,
the black children tend to lag at first, but
catch up by the end. (See the "don't know"
percentages in Table 17.) Such difference is
not as marked on the citizen concept, however.
Were the results more uniformly in the direc-
tion of later learning by blacks, as for the
democracy concept, then one would be led to
conclude as do Langton and Jennings that
adolescence is apt to be a period of more in-
tense political development by blacks than for
whites.[69] But these findings would suggest

TABLE 17

The Concept of Democracy: Participant and Liberal Response Categories, by Age and Race

"When you think of democracy, what comes to your mind?"		(Percent) Grade				
	5th		8th		11th	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
1. Popular, participant government	5%	10%	16%	26%	43%	32%
2. Freedom, civil rights, liberties, and constitutional protection	12	16	29	48	26	48
3. Other	22	27	19	12	26	10
4. Don't know, nothing, not ascertained	61	48	36	14	4	8
Total %	100%	101%	100%	100%	99%	98%
N =	66	63	31	58	23	50

TABLE 18

The Concept of the Best Adult Citizen, by Age and Race

"Now imagine that you have to give a prize to the adult who is the best citizen. What should an adult do to deserve such an award?"		(Percent) Grade				
	5th		8th		11th	
	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
1. Political participation	10%	9%	16%	38%	35%	38%
2. Obedience, respect of the law, or of authority	24	20	23	17	–	6
3. Social concern	18	13	7	8	4	12
4. Private virtues	35	42	32	29	48	34
5. Don't know, not ascertained	13	16	23	7	13	10
Total %	100%	100%	101%	99%	100%	100%
N =	62	64	31	60	23	50

a less uniform phenomenon. Thus, at a cognitive level, one detects some black/white differences, but these seem to pertain mainly to the rate of development—which itself is mixed, as illustrated by the differences in these two items.

ATTITUDINAL DIFFERENCES

To test whether differences are more marked in political attitude development between black and white children, we can employ again the 10 political attitude indexes used above. In Tables 19 and 20, findings for these political attitudes are shown.

Table 19 presents the mean scores to show the extent of development for each race over the three grades. With the exception of "approval of government" the age trends are for the most part toward higher scores by the end of the grade span. With only a few counterinstances, moreover, the white children tend to have higher scores and therefore move more rapidly in the direction of aggregate development.

TABLE 19

Mean Scores on Ten Political Attitude Indexes by Age and Race

| | (Means) Grade | | | | | |
| | 5th | | 8th | | 11th | |
Index	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White
1. Political community identification/ Ethnocentrism	9.9	11.3	11.4	12.0	11.4	11.8
2. General approval of government	18.6	19.6	17.6	18.9	16.8	16.5
3. Political trust	9.9	11.7	10.0	11.3	10.2	10.5
4. Support for liberal democracy: specific	23.9	20.8	22.3	24.6	27.0	27.0
5. Support for liberal democracy: abstract	14.3	15.3	16.4	17.2	16.4	17.2
6. Political efficacy: government responsiveness	12.5	14.4	13.0	14.6	13.5	14.3
7. Political efficacy: access to officials	14.0	12.9	14.2	14.8	14.9	15.1
8. Support for the party system	11.5	11.5	11.7	13.1	11.0	12.9
9. Sense of voting duty	8.9	11.0	12.0	12.5	11.8	13.0
10. Efficacy of the electoral system	10.8	11.3	12.1	11.2	11.7	10.7
N =	61	55	27	50	25	42

TABLE 20

Correlation of Race and Ten Political Attitude Indexes, by Age Group

| | (Product-moment correlation)* Grade | | | |
Index	5th	8th	11th	Parents
1. Political community identification/ Ethnocentrism	.37	.17	.04	.25
2. General approval of government	.24	.28	-.10	.05
3. Political Trust	.45	.22	.05	.37
4. Support for liberal democracy: specific	-.24	.14	.03	.04
5. Support for liberal democracy: abstract	.24	.21	.00	.14
6. Political efficacy: government responsiveness	.36	.22	.14	.46
7. Political efficacy: access to officials	-.15	.17	.01	.20
8. Support for the party system	-.01	.21	.30	.22
9. Sense of voting duty	.45	.10	.26	.32
10. Efficacy of the electoral system	.17	-.21	.31	.04

*Race is scored: 1 = Black, 2 = White

Table 20 shows these few exceptions in sharper outline, in terms of the product-moment correlation of race (scored as a dichotomous variable) with each of the 10 attitude indexes by age group. In only five instances are there negative correlations with race, where whites are scored high and blacks low; and one of these correlations (Grade 5 on party system support) is essentially zero. Generally speaking, therefore, the white children and parents are more supportive of the system in these terms at every grade. The highest average correlation of race with these variables is found at Grade 5. Thus, some of the association washes out by Grade 11; but it reappears for the parents. Only on the last three indexes—the support for representative institutions—is the difference still substantial by Grade 11.

In general, therefore, the differences are not great, but the pattern is relatively uniform, with the racial difference in political attitude being one in which black children move less quickly in the direction of aggregate development. Before we leave this subject, however, it might be well to look at a few specific items, both with a view of seeing these differences that appear among blacks and whites on the indexes in more detail, but also with the possibility of looking at one or two further effects that pertain in specific item contexts, including some that are not part of the indexes. Let us examine a few of these illustrative items for racial differences in political attitude development.

Political Community and Regime

First consider two items that bear upon political community identification. The first, in Table 21, shows the pattern of response on the item, "The U.S. is the most democratic country in the world." (The response categories "strongly agree," "agree," "agree-disagree," "disagree," "strongly disagree," "don't know," and "not ascertained" are abbreviated as SA, A, A-D, D, SD, DK, and NA, respectively.) The second Table, 22, presents responses to "Democracy is the best form of government."

For each table, there is also a summary table of agree and disagree responses, so that age trends may be more readily identified. For the first, Table 21, we find that the development is linear for the blacks but peaked for the whites, over the grades. Thus, Grade 11 whites go down in agreement that the U.S. is the most democratic whereas blacks are still rising. On the other hand, the white parents exhibit a level of support that is higher

than that of black parents, suggesting in both cases a return toward the Grade 8 level. One cannot say on this item alone that white children are becoming more supportive than blacks, however, in that blacks go higher by the last grade included.

On the second item in Table 22, we see again a higher level for Grade 11 blacks than for similarly placed whites. But again the white parent level is higher than for the black parents (see summary table). Thus, whereas black youth seem to be even more supportive of democracy in general by the end of the grades, their parents are less so.

We cannot conclude in the light of these data that the white children are more supportive of the system in every way than are the blacks. Rather, the reverse seems to be the case. We can ask whether this effect can be found in other specific contexts as well.

Support for the Government

Let us look at some further items, in this case pertaining to approval of government and a broad scope for its powers. Tables 23 and 24 present these data.

Tables 23 and 24 show again some differences in the pattern of development between black and white preadults. On the statement, "We have too much government control in this country," disagreement is high for whites in the early grades but low for the blacks. This situation is precisely reversed by Grade 11 so that 69% of blacks disagree at that point, whereas only 47% of whites do so. The older black children, perhaps because of a growing feeling that the national government at least is inclined to help in their struggle for equality, increasingly favor government intervention in society. The oldest white children by contrast, are more conservative about the government's role.

In Table 24, we find another type of black/white developmental difference. In this case, both races are moving away from blanket endorsement of the Wisconsin Republican performance, but the drop between 8th and 11th grades for blacks is particularly sharp—from 72% agreement at grade 8 to only 21% agreement at eleventh grade. The oldest blacks appear to interpret this statement in a more partisan manner.

Political Trust

In a related area, political trust, we again detect differences between the races in the nature of their respective patterns of political attitude development.

In Table 25 we note a common decline of

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TABLE 21

Political Community Identification (by Age and Race)

"The U.S. is the most democratic country in the world."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	20%	8%	35%	16%	22%	30%	26%	11%
A	37	39	43	44	35	35	55	53
AD	12	8	17	16	24	26	7	16
D	7	35	2	6	8	9	5	10
SD	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DK	22	9	3	13	12	-	5	11
NA	2	2	-	6	-	-	1	-
Total	100%	101%	100%	101%	101%	100%	99%	101%
Summary: Agree	57%	47%	78%	60%	57%	65%	81%	65%
Disagree	7	35	2	6	8	9	5	10

TABLE 22

Approval of Democracy (by Age and Race)

"Democracy is the best form of government."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	12%	8%	47%	25%	29%	26%	39%	10%
A	32	41	17	31	37	48	48	60
AD	25	6	30	9	22	26	6	3
D	12	26	5	16	6	-	3	11
SD	2	5	2	3	4	-	-	-
DK	15	14	-	9	2	-	2	16
NA	2	2	-	6	-	-	2	1
Total	100%	102%	101%	99%	100%	100%	100%	101%
Summary: Agree	44%	49%	64%	56%	66%	74%	87%	70%
Disagree	14	31	7	19	10	-	3	11

TABLE 23

Assessment of the Present Degree of Government Control (by Age and Race)

"We have too much government control in this country."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	-%	12%	2%	-%	4%	9%	9%	1%
A	11	29	7	16	8	-	16	10
AD	15	9	10	3	39	22	20	12
D	43	36	45	53	35	52	52	60
SD	22	5	32	13	12	17	2	12
DK	9	8	5	9	2	-	1	5
NA	-	2	-	6	-	-	1	-
Total	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%	101%	100%
Summary: Agree	11%	41 %	9%	16%	12%	9 %	25%	11%
Disagree	65	41	77	66	47	69	54	72

TABLE 24

Approval of Government Performance: Republicans in Wisconsin (by Age and Race)

"The present Republican Administration in Wisconsin is doing a good job."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	15%	9%	17%	9%	12%	4%	5%	14%
A	63	61	48	63	31	17	52	28
AD	14	5	18	6	35	52	29	26
D	2.	11	3	9	12	17	9	14
SD	-	5	-	-	4	-	2	7
DK	6	9	13	6	6	9	3	12
NA	-	2	-	6	-	6	1	-
Total	100%	102%	99%	99%	100%	99%	101%	101%
Summary: Agree	78%	70%	65%	72%	43%	21%	57%	42%
Disagree	2	16	3	9	16	17	11	21

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TABLE 25

Trust of Candidates (by Age and Race)

"Most of the people who try to get elected to public office can be trusted to do what is right."

	5th		8th		11th		Parents	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
SA	14%	5%	20%	13%	1C%	4%	2%	7%
A	68	70	53	50	50	35	67	55
AD	14	5	20	19	22	57	19	15
D	2	20	3	6	8	4	12	16
SD	–	–	2	3	2	–	0	1
DK	3	–	2	3	–	–	1	5
NA	–	2	–	6	–	–	–	–
Total	101%	102%	100%	100%	101%	100%	101%	99%
Summary: Agree	82%	75%	73%	63%	60%	39%	69%	62%
Disagree	2	20	5	9	10	4	12	17

TABLE 26

Trust of People Running the Government (by Age and Race)

"Quite a few of the people running the government are dishonest."

	5th		8th		11th		Parents	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
SA	–%	3%	2%	–%	4%	–%	3%	1%
A	5	29	8	16	10	–	19	39
AD	12	12	22	19	14	48	17	10
D	45	46	45	28	43	38	49	30
SD	31	5	23	19	18	17	9	1
DK	8	6	–	19	12	4	4	19
NA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Total	101%	101%	100%	101%	101%	99%	101%	100%
Summary: Agree	5%	32%	10%	16%	14%	–	22%	40%
Disagree	76	51	68	47	61	55	58	31

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political trust vis-a-vis candidates for public office. Both races show a decline, but the eleventh grade blacks are very different from their white counterparts. This is shown again in Table 26, where rather fewer of the eleventh grade blacks (47%) disagree that "Quite a few of the people running the government are dishonest"—in contrast to the white eleventh graders, 61% of whom disagree with the statement. The trend is toward less political trust at successively higher grade levels in both cases. Again, we see differences which come about mainly at the end of the grade span.

Abstract Democracy

In contrast to the above, when we turn to items pertaining to support for general norms of liberal democracy, we find no differences between the races. This constitutes an area of exception to the pattern illustrated to this point. These two items are shown in Tables 27 and 28.

Here a high consensus is reached among members of both races relatively early, and continues thereafter.

Political Efficacy

More like the general pattern that is beginning to emerge, however, are items on political efficacy. Tables 29 and 30 present two items from this series.

The racial difference takes the form in these cases of a greater growth of positive efficacy by blacks rather than whites over the grades: 79% of the black eleventh graders agree with the statement in Table 29, but only 55% of the white eleventh grade students do so. Indeed, the developmental trends are quite opposite in this case! In Table 30, the trends are similar for the two races; but the Negroes are higher by Grade 11—again bespeaking greater sense of political efficacy, in this case vis-á-vis the police.[70]

TABLE 27

Freedom of Speech (by Age and Race)

"I believe in freedom cf speech."

	5th		8th		11th		Parents	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
SA	39%	8%	63%	44%	67%	57%	36%	30%
A	52	73	28	47	26	39	62	70
AD	5	8	7	-	8	4	2	-
D	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-
SD	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
DK	3	-	2	3	-	-	-	-
NA	2	3	-	6	-	-	1	-
Total	101%	102%	100%	100%	101%	100%	101%	100%
Summary: Agree	91%	81%	91%	91%	93%	96%	98%	100%
Disagree	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 28

The Right to Hold Office (by Age and Race)

"I believe everyone should have an equal right to hold public office."

	5th		8th		11th		Parents	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
SA	15%	6%	42%	25%	35%	44%	25%	30%
A	40	55	32	47	41	30	56	54
AD	19	5	15	3	12	13	5	5
D	12	24	7	16	8	13	10	10
SD	3	-	3	-	4	-	2	1
DK	9	8	2	3	-	-	-	-
NA	2	3	-	6	-	-	1	-
Total	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%	99%	100%
Summary: Agree	55%	61%	74%	72%	76%	74%	81%	84%
Disagree	15	24	10	16	12	13	12	11

TABLE 29

Political Efficacy: Government Pays Attention to the People (by Age and Race)

"Over the years, the government pays a great deal of attention to what the people think when it decides what to do."

	5th		8th		11th		Parents	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
SA	19%	17%	17%	9%	10%	22%	7%	7%
A	49%	39%	43%	56%	45%	57%	59%	66%
AD	19%	9	32	22	37	9	23	14
D	3	17	2	9	8	13	9	7
SD	2	6	2	3	-	-	1	1
DK	9	12	5	-	-	-	2	5
NA	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	101%	100%	101%	99%	100%	101%	101%	100%
Summary: Agree	68%	56%	60%	65%	55%	79%	66%	73%
Disagree	5	23	4	12	8	13	10	8

TABLE 30

Political Efficacy: Could Complain to a Policeman (by Age and Race)

"If a policeman did something I didn't like, I would feel free to
complain to him about it."

	5th		8th		11th		Parents	
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
SA	9%	9%	22%	9%	22%	44%	15%	15%
A	40	52	42	56	45	35	67	64
AD	25	8	18	9	20	9	9	3
D	19	24	13	16	8	9	7	11
SD	3	6	2	3	4	4	1	5
DK	5	-	3	-	2	-	-	3
NA	-	2	-	6	-	-	2	-
Total	101%	101%	100%	99%	101%	101%	101%	101%
Summary: Agree	49%	61%	64%	65%	67%	79%	82%	79
Disagree	22	30	15	19	12	13	8	16

Support for Representative Institutions

Turning to the area of support for representative institutions, we find a number of further instances of racial differences in political development.   These data are shown in Tables 31 – 35. (See Pages 44-46.)

Table 31 pertains to the area of voting duty. In this case, whites are increasingly higher in voting duty than blacks at the higher grade levels, as is also the case for parents.   This is not surprising given the lower turnout rate of Negroes, which has generally been associated not only with legal and social obstacles to Negro voting but also to a different outlook concerning the worth of voting and elections as effective instruments of making oneself heard in the political system.[71]

Table 32 shows, however, an opposite difference with respect to the efficacy of voting or elections—wherein blacks more strongly agree with this statement at every level than do whites.   And this effect is supported by Table 33 which shows rapid growth among black youth of a propensity to reject the statement that "Our political system would work a lot better if our leaders were chosen on the basis of merit in competitive examinations rather than by elections."   At Grade 11, 88% of the blacks, but only 61% of the whites, disagree with the statement.   Thus, the black youth more often come to support elections as a representative device, even if they still lack the higher level of sense of voting duty pertaining to the white youth.

Table 34 presents an item pertaining to support for the party system.   In it one sees an improvement in the willingness to approve party conflict—and thus the party competitive system—among whites, but a decline among blacks. The whites move from 14% disagreement at Grade 5 to 41% at Grade 11; whereas the figures for blacks are 25% at Grade 5 and 17% at Grade 11.   In this sense the blacks come to think less of the parties as a device of democratic representation than do the whites.   The older generation (parents) is close in this case to the values for the oldest youth.

In Table 35, another specific difference in patterns of racially related growth of political orientation is presented.   This item pertains to an area not mentioned above that has to do with the rather more subtle question of defining the proper role of the representative.[72]   Here we find a quite opposite racial pattern of development with respect to the statement, "A member of the United States Congress should always vote the way the people in his district want him to vote."   The blacks start high at Grade 5 but end low on agreement with this statement; the whites go in the opposite way: 27% of white fifth graders agree with the statement, whereas 66% of the blacks do so, at Grade 5.   By contrast, 55% of white eleventh graders, but only 21% of black eleventh graders, agree.   Thus again we see substantial variation in the pattern of political growth.

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TABLE 31

Voting Duty: Primary Elections (by Age and Race)

"Many primary elections aren't important enough to vote in."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	-%	2%	-%	-%	-%	9%	2%	1%
A	20	27	7	19	4	4	6	12
AD	15	5	12	13	12	13	4	0
D	34	44	50	31	51	48	58	68
SD	12	2	23	22	31	17	27	8
DK	15	8	7	6	-	0	0	5
NA	3	14	2	9	2	9	4	5
Total	99%	102%	101%	100%	100%	100%	101%	99%
Summary: Agree	20%	29%	7%	19%	4%	13%	8%	13%
Disagree	46	46	73	53	82	65	85	76

TABLE 32

Efficacy of Elections (by Age and Race)

"The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	15%	8%	10%	34%	18%	44%	15%	12%
A	45	53	50	56	41	48	46	65
AD	17	11	28	-	28	9	22	11
D	19	15	8	-	10	-	15	5
SD	-	-	2	-	4	-	2	1
DK	5	14	2	3	-	-	-	5
NA	-	11	-	6	-	-	1	-
Total	101%	101%	100%	99%	101%	101%	101%	99%
Summary: Agree	60%	61%	60%	90%	59%	92%	61%	77%
Disagree	19	15	10	-	14	-	17	6

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TABLE 33

Support for Elections (by Age and Race)

"Our political system would work a lot better if our leaders were chosen on the basis of merit in competitive examination rather than by elections."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	6%	3%	5%	6%	4%	0%	6%	8%
A	17	46	10	13	14	13	19	28
AD	18	6	22	19	20	35	19	16
D	39	25	38	38	41	39	45	41
SD	14	2	18	16	20	9	9	3
DK	16	18	7	3	2	4	2	4
NA	-	-	0	6	-	-	-	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	101%	101%	100%	100%	100%
Summary: Agree	23%	49%	15%	19%	18%	13%	25%	36%
Disagree	53	27	56	54	61	48	54	44

TABLE 34

Support for the Party System (by Age and Race)

"Our system of government would work a lot better if we could get rid of conflicts between political parties."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	17%	5%	8%	4%	6%	17%	7%	5%
A	37	50	17	34	22	48	20	50
AD	17	8	30	34	29	17	15	8
D	12	23	35	16	29	13	50	16
SD	2	2	7	0	12	4	6	3
DK	14	12	2	3	2	0	1	18
NA	2	2	2	9	-	0	1	-
Total	101%	102%	101%	100%	100%	99%	100%	100%
Summary: Agree	54%	55%	25%	38%	28%	65%	27%	55%
Disagree	14	25	42	16	41	17	56	19

TABLE 35

The Representative's Role (by Age and Race)

"A member of the United States Congress should always vote the way the people in his district want him to vote."

	5th White	5th Black	8th White	8th Black	11th White	11th Black	Parents White	Parents Black
SA	5%	11%	15%	6%	22%	4%	6%	1%
A	22	55	25	38	33	17	39	20
AD	26	8	17	16	20	52	21	15
D	28	24	32	25	18	13	30	54
SD	8	-	12	9	8	9	4	3
DK	11	-	-	-	-	4	-	5
NA	2	3	-	6	-	0	-	1
Total	102%	101%	101%	100%	101%	99%	101%	99%
Summary: Agree	27%	66%	40%	44%	55%	21%	45%	21%
Disagree	36	24	44	34	26	22	34	57

Summary

By looking at specific items, we see that the picture presented by the correlations and mean scores in Tables 19 and 20 pertains only at the broadest level. When we view race-related patterns of political growth in more detail, we find several instances in which Negroes are higher in a democratic or general system-supportive direction. This is especially the case on political efficacy and in evaluating the worth or efficacy of elections. On some matters, both races are the same—as on the abstract norms of liberal democracy; and on a number of questions the whites are more supportive; e.g., for the party system, on voting duty and on political trust.

Thus, at the more detailed level we see rather more striking differences, and these are differences which run in both directions—sometimes with whites being higher on support, and at other times, with blacks moving ahead. While the political growth profiles vary, neither racial grouping is clearly more supportive of the system in every respect. A problem for the future, therefore, will be to explicate these profiles in sharper outline and to begin to trace their origins and effects with subsequent research.

The greater cynicism but higher political efficacy of black children might well provide the starting point for such an analysis, for it is suggestive of an orientation toward reforming the system.[73] That is, if one feels that the present character of the system is somehow suspect—at least at the level of the people occupying authoritative roles—but also thinks that one can participate effectively in decisions, there is then a disposition to make things right. It is when suspicion is mixed with hopelessness that little change becomes possible.[74]

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN BLACKS AND WHITES IN PARENT-CHILD CORRESPONDENCES

One final task remains in the present discussion of the differential political socialization of the two races. That is the inquiry into whether parents of white or black children seem to transmit their political values more fully to their respective offspring. As shown above, the strongest instance of negative correlation of parents and children is at Grade 11 for blacks on one form of political efficacy, "access to officials." To put this finding in greater perspective, however, let us observe the data presented in Tables 36 and 37.

Here we find some differences between the races in the level of association of parent and child on the nine political attitude indexes. Due in part to the relatively small number of black children at Grades 8 and 11, very few of these correlations reach significance levels

TABLE 36

Parent-Child Correspondence (by Age and Race)

| | (Simple r) | | | | | |
| | 5th | | 8th | | 11th | |
Index	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1. Political community identification/ Ethnocentrism	.39	.17	.20	.18	.12	-.01
2. General approval of government	.19	.18	.19	.51	.32	.47
3. Political trust	.11	.26	-.03	.11	.27	.42
4. Support for liberal democracy: specific	-.14	.03	-.01	.25	.35	.33
5. Political efficacy: government responsiveness	.11	.18	-.18	-.06	.25	-.24
6. Political efficacy: access to officials	.18	.12	.24	.37	-.12	-.63
7. Party system support	.17	.15	-.13	.14	.14	.23
8. Sense of voting duty	.15	.11	.22	-.19	-.16	-.38
9. Efficacy of elections	-.11	.00	-.06	.02	.02	.04
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

TABLE 37

Parent-Child Correspondence (by Age and Race)

| | (Partial r)* | | | | | |
| | 5th | | 8th | | 11th | |
Index	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
1. Political community identification/ Ethnocentrism.	.39[c]	.10	.20	.19	.14	.01
2. General approval of government	.23	.10	.14	.54[a]	.25	.42
3. Political trust	.10	.11	.04	.14	.33	.17
4. Support for liberal democracy: specific	-.24	.01	-.01	.19	.21	.48[a]
5. Political efficacy: government responsiveness	-.04	-.09	-.13	-.32	.23	-.23
6. Political efficacy: access to officials	.09	.08	.20	.30	-.41[b]	-.45
7. Party system support	.05	.04	-.04	.34	.07	.71[d]
8. Sense of voting duty	.09	-.05	-.11	-.25	-.16	-.53[a]
9. Efficacy of elections	-.11	.08	-.11	-.09	.08	-.02
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

Significance— t (two-tailed): a. p = .05
b. p = .02
c. p = .01
d. p = .002

*The partial r in each case is controlled for nine other independent variables pertaining to social structure, family, school, and psychological characteristics of the child. See Chapter V below for description of these variables.

better than .05, either for the simple or partial correlations.

For Table 36, the most striking difference is the one noted above on "access to officials" at Grade 11. Here both races seem to rebel against the political orientation of their parents; but the difference between -.63 for blacks and -.12 for whites is relatively great. The oldest black youths are rejecting their parents' values of this particular kind very strongly. And this is matched to a lower degree by the negative association on sense of voting duty.

When we view the partial correlations at Grade 11 on these two indexes, we see, however, a lowering of the differences on access to officials' efficacy but a sharpening of this difference for voting duty. In the former case, part of the generational effect overlaps the other kinds of independent variables pertaining to social structure, family and school political communication and decision making and psychological variables. On the other hand, when these other effects are removed, the family's negative impact upon sense of voting duty is enhanced for black eleventh graders.

The partialling operation also brings forth a consistent pattern of black opposition to parent values across the grades on the other type of political efficacy, government responsiveness. Thus, the three indexes which show sharpest generational breaks with parents are the participant-oriented attitudes of political efficacy and voting duty; and these rejections are highest for the black youth.

The opposite case—and the more expected one given past research—is best exemplified by general approval of government. Here all of the associations between parent and child are positive and for the blacks, they are reasonably high at Grades 8 and 11 using the Hyman criterion. This is a case where the blacks' agreement with parents is high enough to upset any hypotheses that generational change is quite general among older black youth. Indeed, 17 of 27 of the correlations among blacks are positive and 10 are negative. Thus the balance is on the side of positive transmission, even though few of these positive correlations approximate .5 (see Table 37).

Among the white children the correlations are not as high on the average as for the blacks—at Grades 8 and 11—but they are to the same extent positive in correspondence

(17 of 27). Except for specific liberal democracy, moreover, the whites show no dramatic rise in parent-child correspondence of the kind blacks present in their major cases: specific liberal democracy, party system support, and sense of voting duty.

Thus, in the area of parent-child correspondence of attitudes we find reasonably substantial differences among blacks and whites. The black youth appear to be influenced more by parent values than are whites, but such influence is both negative and positive. By the end of the grade span, the five highest parent-child correlations (Table 37) are for blacks: .71 on party system support, -.53 on sense of voting duty, .48 on support for specific liberal democracy, -.45 on input efficacy, and .42 on general approval of government. Only on input efficacy is there a white Grade 11 value (-.41) that approximates these relatively strong correlations of black children and their parents.

CONCLUSION

We have investigated therefore three major areas of black/white differences in political socialization. We found that on supportive attitudes at a broad level, whites tended to score higher than blacks across the grades. Yet, when we look in detail at more specific items that touch upon these areas we find a number of instances where this general conclusion must be modified.

On the matter of parent-child similarity or difference moreover, we find again a somewhat disparate pattern between the races. Negroes appear to be socialized to politics (in the terms provided) more fully in the context of parental orientation. But, as we have observed this influence is almost as often negative as it is positive. Both subsamples exhibit tendencies towards a generational shift, as exhibited by the relatively frequent negative correlations.

In these limited data, one cannot fully explore all of the underlying causes of these differences. More extensive future research will be needed to carry out that task. Nevertheless, as we proceed to the next chapter, we will have at least limited opportunity to compare race or parental influence as causal variables to other salient independent factors. Let us turn then to that task.

V
EXPLANATION

As the final task of data analysis of this report, we shall consider next the effects of a number of theoretically relevant independent variables. The two most important of these from the perspective of the design of this study have been dealt with in detail in Chapters III and IV. But we should also look at the association of race and parent political orientation within a more multivariate context, to see how the level of their associations with each of the dependent variables compares in relative magnitude with other possible important influences. As there is an expectation that the level of association will vary by grade level, these data will be presented for each age group separately.

The independent variables chosen for this analysis are as follows:

A. Social Structure
   1. Child's Sex
   2. Child's Race
   3. Parent's Education
   4. Parent's Occupation

B. Family
   1. Parent's Political Attitude
   2. Child's Perception of the Pattern of Family Political Communication
   3. Child's Perception of his Efficacy in Family Decision-Making

C. School
   1. Child's Perception of the Pattern of School Political Communication
   2. Child's Perception of his Efficacy in School Decision-Making

D. Psychological
   1. Child's Ego Strength (or Assertiveness)
   2. Child's Sense of Confidence in his own Capacity to Control his External Environment

The measurement and coding of these various independent variables were as follows: Interviewer codes were used for child's sex and

race quite straightforwardly (boys = 1, girls = 2; whites = 1, blacks = 2). The same applied to the parent's report of his or her level of formal educational attainment. Parent's occupation was analyzed using the parent's report as recoded according to the Otis Dudley Duncan occupational prestige scale ("Socioeconomic index").[75]

Parent's political attitude was scored in each case in the same way as was the child's political attitude of the same type. These are outlined in Chapter II above. The other two family variables, political communication and efficacy in family decision-making, are based on a factor analysis of items drawn originally (with elaboration) from a study of the effects of family communication patterns on political socialization[76] and to some extent from the Almond-Verba five-nation study of participant orientations.[77] The specific items that were cluster-scored for these two indexes are as follows:

Factor Weight	A. Child's Perception of Family Political Communication
.75	142. "My family encourages me to think about political and social issues."
.68	144. "My parents encourage me to make up my own mind about most political problems."
.63	167. "We often have lively discussions in my family about politics, where different members of the family take different sides."

Factor Weight	B. Perceived Efficacy of Child in Family Decision-Making
.75	113. "I help make family decisions that affect what I want to do."
.70	112. "When a decision is made at home that I don't like, I feel free to complain to my parents."
.70	127. "I can depend on my parents to listen to my point of view whenever we disagree about something."

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The school variables were scored in a similar way using items somewhat like those employed for family political communication and efficacy. The school perception items that were cluster-scored are shown below with their loadings on the factors here called "school political communication" and "school efficacy."

Factor Weight	A. Child's Perception of School Political Communication
.43	139. "In my school, students are not encouraged to discuss political and social issues."
-.32	143. "Students in my school are encouraged to make up their own minds on political and social issues."

Factor Weight	B. Perceived Efficacy of Child in School Decision-Making
-.74	126. "If I do complain about something I don't like at school, it doesn't really help."
.68	125. "When a decision is made at school that I don't like, I feel free to complain to my teachers."
.58	132. "I can depend on my teachers to listen to my point of view whenever we disagree about something."

The psychological variables were cluster-scored, also after factor analysis, from items taken and elaborated from the Survey Research Center National Election Surveys[78] (on ego strength), and from the work of Rotter[79] (on external control). They are composed as follows:

Factor Weight	A. Child's Ego Strength (Assertiveness)
.67	166. "A person should stand up for what he believes, even if other people don't like it."
.62	67. "I have strong opinions about most things."
.51	69. "Once I have made up my mind about something, it is pretty hard to argue me out of it."

Factor Weight	B. Child's Confidence is his Capacity to Control his External Environment
-.72	100. "Most people would cheat you if they got the chance."
-.65	105. "I get more than my share of bad luck."
-.63	98. "Most people are just looking out for themselves."

-.58	106. "A person can't be too careful in dealing with other people."
-.57	140. "Most of us are the victims of forces we cannot understand."
-.40	68. "When I get into an argument, I almost never get my own way."
.38	102. "Most people can be trusted."

As we can see, there is a strong overlap in the second of these dimensions with what is generally termed "faith in people," the opposite of "misanthropy."[80] Thus, control of the external environment refers not only to the physical world and one's "fate" in it, but also to the extent to which one can rely on other people.

FINDINGS

The hypotheses that are connected to these various independent variables are diverse. For example, one would expect low ego-strength or low confidence in ability to control the environment to carry over to political inefficacy and mistrust and perhaps to other general political attitudes as well. But to see such effects, it is necessary to control for other overlapping social structural variables, and for family and school variables that refer to the processes by which these relationships come into focus.

Let us look at the data to see what the effects of these various variables might be. For this purpose, it is perhaps useful to control all of the other independent variables when one is considering the putative effect of any one of them upon a given dependent variable. Tables 38-46 present these data at each grade level.

As one looks at these tables, one impression arises immediately namely, that the effects of these independent variables are quite various, and depend both upon the dependent variable in question and upon the grade level. Another way of saying this is that whatever effects these variables have are very specific, although some, like sex, have few significant correlations, whereas others, such as the child's confidence in his ability to control the external environment, have many. Let us take each independent variable in turn.

Sex

Sex is one with fewest significant partial correlations (using the value of t to measure significance). The three significant associations sex shows are at Grade 11 on support for liberal democracy at the specific level, at Grade 5 on input political efficacy (access to

TABLE 38

Partial Correlations between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's Political
Community Identification/Ethnocentrism Score, by Grade

	(Partial $\underline{r}$)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	-.04	-.14	-.09
Parent's Education	.07	-.20*	.14
Parent's Occupation	-.20**	.17	.01
Child's Race	-.32****	.02	.06
Family			
Parent's Political Community Identification/Ethnocentrism	.23***	.17	.09
Family Political Communication	.17*	.03	-.11
Family Efficacy	-.09	.01	.37****
School			
School Political Communication	-.09	.22*	.10
School Efficacy	.04	-.01	-.04
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	.30*****	.01	-.06
Child's Ego Strength	.23***	-.01	-.04
Multiple R	.58	.42	.44
$\underline{N}$ =	118	77	65

TABLE 39

Partial Correlations between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's General
Approval of Government Score, by Grade

	(Partial r)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	-.11	.06	-.03
Parent's Education	.13	-.10	-.16
Parent's Occupation	-.17*	.08	.09
Child's Race	-.23***	-.11	.07
Family			
Parent's General Approval of Government	.17*	.29***	.36****
Family Political Communication	.22**	.18	-.04
Family Efficacy	.07	-.05	-.01
School			
School Political Communication	-.20**	.37****	.13
School Efficacy	.01	.08	.09
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	.15	.07	.28**
Child's Ego Strength	.10	-.01	.10
Multiple R	.48	.61	.53
N =	118	77	65

[+]The partial $\underline{r}$ in each case controls for all other independent variables.

Significance: $\underline{t}$ (one-tailed): *p = .05
 **$\overline{p}$ = .025
 ***p = .01
 ****$\underline{p}$ = .005

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TABLE 40

Partial Correlation between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's
Political Trust Score, by Grade

	(Partial r)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	-.01	.04	.01
Parent's Education	.09	-.19	-.00
Parent's Occupation	.17*	.10	.09
Child's Race	-.13	-.09	.01
Family			
Parent's Political Trust	.10	.07	.30**
Family Political Communication	-.07	-.02	.11
Family Efficacy	.22**	-.05	-.16
School			
School Political Communication	-.08	.20	-.08
School Efficacy	-.09	.10	.25*
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	.26****	.23*	.11
Child's Ego Strength	.01	.01	.09
Multiple R	.57	.48	.46
N =	118	77	65

TABLE 41

Partial Correlations between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's Support
for Liberal Democracy: Specific Score, by Grade

	(Partial r)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	.08	-.04	-.27**
Parent's Education	-.04	.30***	.29**
Parent's Occupation	-.01	.01	-.09
Child's Race	.19*	-.01	.13
Family			
Parent's Support for Liberal Democracy: Specific	-.14	-.03	.26**
Family Political Communication	.03	.15	.22
Family Efficacy	.09	.07	-.12
School			
School Political Communication	-.06	.12	.06
School Efficacy	.15	-.02	-.07
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	.29****	.05	.26**
Child's Ego Strength	-.03	-.20	.08
Multiple R	.46	.46	.60
N =	118	77	65

[+]The Partial r in each case controls for all other independent variables.

Significance: t (one-tailed):   *p = .05
                          **p = .025
                        ***p = .01
                     ****p = .005

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TABLE 42

Partial Correlations between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's Political Efficacy:
Government Responsiveness Score, by Grade

	(Partial r)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	.12	.04	-.18
Parent's Education	-.10	.11	-.18
Parent's Occupation	-.03	.09	.13
Child's Race	-.24***	-.14	-.08
Family			
Parent's Political Efficacy: Government Responsiveness	.10	-.18	.08
Family Political Communication	-.03	.03	.28**
Family Efficacy	.01	.11	-.23*
School			
School Political Communication	.15	.12	-.01
School Efficacy	.15	.08	.13
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	.32****	.13	.40****
Child's Ego Strength	-.13	.16	.28**
Multiple R	.55	.53	.58
N =	118	77	65

TABLE 43

Partial Correlations between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's
Political Efficacy: Access to Officials' Score, by Grade

	(Partial r)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	-.27****	-.15	.08
Parent's Education	.09	-.15	.02
Parent's Occupation	.04	.35****	.08
Child's Race	.20**	.18	-.04
Family			
Parent's Access to Officials	.03	.25**	-.38****
Family Political Communication	.17*	.07	-.01
Family Efficacy	.24***	.03	-.25*
School			
School Political Communication	-.00	.37****	.19
School Efficacy	.16*	.21*	.26**
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	-.09	.04	.25*
Child's Ego Strength	.19*	-.03	.32***
Multiple R	.54	.65	.62
N =	118	77	65

[+]The partial r in each case controls for all other independent variables.

Significance: t (one-tailed): *p = .05
**$\overline{p}$ = .025
***$\overline{p}$ = .01
****$\overline{p}$ = .005

TABLE 44

Partial Correlations between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's Party System Support Score, by Grade

	(Partial r)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	.09	.05	-.29**
Parent's Education	-.12	-.16	-.18
Parent's Occupation	.05	-.00	.10
Child's Race	-.01	-.15	-.21
Family			
Parent's Party System Support	.08	.02	.17
Family Political Communication	-.07	.00	-.03
Family Efficacy	-.10	-.31****	-.09
School			
School Political Communication	-.22**	.18	-.01
School Efficacy	.20**	-.04	.07
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	.27****	.36*****	.38*****
Child's Ego Strength	-.17*	.10	.06
Multiple R	.45	.59	.55
N = 118	77	65	

TABLE 45

Partial Correlations between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's Sense of Voting Duty Score, by Grade

	(Partial r)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	-.12	-.11	.18
Parent's Education	.00	.03	-.11
Parent's Occupation	.12	.23*	.09
Child's Race	-.30*****	.06	-.26*
Family			
Parent's Voting Duty	.01	-.12	-.26
Family Political Communication	.04	-.01	.01
Family Efficacy	-.21**	.20	.25*
School			
School Political Communication	.04	-.07	.06
School Efficacy	.16	.07	-.09
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	.33****	.08	.13
Child's Ego Strength	.11	.36****	.10
Multiple R	.61	.57	.57
N = 118	77	65	

[+]The partial r in each case controls for all other independent variables.

Significance: t (one-tailed):   *p = .05
                                 **p = .025
                                 ***p = .01
                                 ****p = .005

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TABLE 46

Partial Correlations between Each of Eleven Independent Variables and Child's Election
Efficacy Score, by Grade

	(Partial r)[+]		
Social Structure	5th	8th	11th
Child's Sex	.04	-.07	-.06
Parent's Education	.15	-.07	.02
Parent's Occupation	-.17*	.15	.23*
Child's Race	-.16	.27**	.29**
Family			
Parent's Election Efficacy	-.01	-.07	.11
Family Political Communication	.00	-.03	-.03
Family Efficacy	-.03	-.14	-.10
School			
School Political Communication	-.07	.16	.10
School Efficacy	.05	.19	.24*
Psychological Characteristics			
Child's Confidence in the External Environment	.14	-.08	.08
Child's Ego Strength	.05	-.08	.10
Multiple R	.31	.41	.49
N = 118		77	65

[+]The partial r in each case is controlled for all other independent variables.

Significance: t (one-tailed): *p = .05
**p = .025
***p = .01
****p = .005

officials), and at Grade 11 on party system support. In all three cases, boys are higher in their support than are girls—thus, the negative correlations. And when the instances of negative sex correlations are counted across all nine tables, we find that boys are higher in 16 cases out of the 27 possible. Thus, there is some slight bias in favor of boys being more supportive in these various terms, but it is relatively low in importance.

Parent's Education

Parent's education does equally little to explain the child's orientations in that in only three cases does it show significant correlation with the dependent variables when all else is controlled. These three are at Grade 8 on political community identification/ethnocentrism, and at Grades 8 and 11 on support for specific liberal democracy. For the most part, therefore, the education of the parent makes little difference to supportive or nonsupportive attitudes of these types for the children.

Parent's Occupation

Parent's occupation is slightly better as a predictor, having seven instances of significant partial correlation. These tend to be bunched at Grade 5 where there are associations of significance on political community identification, general approval of government, political trust, and election efficacy. Parent occupation is correlated significantly with access to officials' efficacy and voting duty at Grade 8, and with election efficacy at Grade 11. In only two cases is parent's occupation significant at better than the 0.025 level.

Race

The fourth social structural variable, race, improves a little more, having nine significant correlations, of which the majority are at Grade 5 (6 of 9). Thus, when other things are controlled, race has effects upon political attitudes mainly for the younger children when

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it has any effect at all. All but political trust
and party system support indexes show sig-
nificant correlation with race. And, in the
case of election efficacy and voting duty,
there are two significant correlations for each.

Parent Political Attitude

As we have seen in Chapter III, parent at-
titudes are correlated positively, in a majority
of cases, with child political attitude of the
same type; but in only a few cases are they
correlated with child attitudes at a high level.
Here we may simply note that 9 of 27 possible
instances show significant correlations; but
a few of these show suggestive patterns. For
example, input efficiency (access to officials)
shows a strongly increasing but divergent cor-
respondence, rising from .03 at Grade 5 to
.25 at Grade 8, but -.38 at Grade 11. More
of the larger significant correlations appear
at the last grade (5 of 9), so that whatever
direct influence the parent has on the political
dispositions of his child is more likely to be
effected near the end of adolescence rather
than at the beginning or when the child is still
in primary school.

Family Political Communication

The effect of family political communica-
tion patterns as reported by the child appears
to be almost as negligible as for sex or parent
education. Only four instances of significant
correlation appear: at Grade 5 on political
community identification, input efficacy and
general approval of government, and at Grade
11 for government responsiveness (output ef-
ficacy).

Family Efficacy

The child's self-perceived efficacy in
family decision-making is somewhat better as
a predictor variable showing eight instances of
significant partial correlations; and these are
spread across indexes and grades as follows:

(1) Grade 5: political trust, input political
efficacy, and voting duty.
(2) Grade 8: party system support.
(3) Grade 11: political community identifica-
tion, output and input political
efficacy, and voting duty.

Thus, the child's felt capacity to influence
decisions in the family does apparently carry
over more to his political feelings than do the
patterns of political communication in the
home—as reflected, that is, in his perception

of it. We also need, of course, to compare
both of these with their school analogues,
and we turn to these next.

School Political Communication

The first of the school variables, percep-
tion of political communication, is related to
the nine dependent variables significantly in
5 cases (out of 27 possible), and these are
as follows:

(1) Grade 5: approval of government and
party system support.
(2) Grade 8: political community identifica-
tion, approval of government,
and input efficacy.
(3) Grade 11: none.

Thus, whatever influence such school po-
litical communication has comes at the early
grades—as one might have suspected from
the Langton-Jennings report—which indicated
low effects of high school civics courses on
political attitudes of high school seniors.[81]

School Efficacy

School efficacy has six significant corre-
lations at .05 or better; and three of these are
on access to officials efficacy. On the latter,
there is in fact a slight upward trend in this
association so that while it is not a strong
relationship, it is a durable one. And this
relationship is suggested by some of the find-
ings of Almond and Verba, who showed that
remembered participation in school decision-
making is related to adult sense of subjective
political competence.[82] Thus, in a more
proximate context than their retrospective
data would allow, the present data do confirm
that the school's contribution to an adult's
disposition to participate may come in allow-
ing him, while still a child, a sense that he
can take part in decisions at school that af-
fect him.
School efficacy is also related at Grade 11
to political trust and election efficacy—both
of which are apt to be a part of a larger syn-
drome of dispositions to regard participation
favorably—and at Grade 5, to party system
support.

Child's Confidence in His Capacity
To Control His External Environment

When we move to the next "causal" vari-
able, we find 13 significant correlations (of
27 possible), which is the highest number of
any in the whole set of independent variables.

This is very striking in one sense, because of the common argument that psychological variables of this type merely reflect other forces such as the social structural, school, or family variables discussed above. But, in that a number of these other relevant variables are controlled in these partial r's, a variety of such competing hypotheses can be discounted. Six of the significant 13 correlations are found at Grade 5, and 5 are at Grade 11, leaving only 2 at Grade 8. Thus such feelings concerning the outer world are more apt to be connected to these political attitudes at the beginning and end of the period than in the middle. The more confident child at Grade 5 is likely to be higher in political community identification, higher on political trust, more supportive of specific liberal democracy, regard the government to be more responsive to the requests of citizens, support the party system more, and have a higher sense of voting duty. At Grade 8, confidence is correlated with political trust and party system support. At Grade 11, greater confidence is correlated significantly with approval of government, specific liberal democracy support, both input and output political efficacy, and party system support.

The partial correlation of highest magnitude (.40) in any of these nine tables comes on confidence: at Grade 11 for government responsiveness (or output political efficacy). The older child with a sense of trust and mastery of his environment is also more likely to think that the government responds to the desires of the citizenry. Extrapolating from the adult literature on anomie and alienation, this is of course not a wholly unexpected finding.[83] But the new implication is that such a relationship takes shape in childhood, both in the primary grades and at the end of adolescence.

Ego Strength

The final independent variable of those available shows up less strongly than the other psychological variable above, but it does have six significant correlations. These are, by grade:

(1) Grade 5: political community identification, input efficacy, and party system support (negative).
(2) Grade 8: voting duty.
(3) Grade 11: output efficacy, input efficacy.

For the political efficacy relationships, there are analogous findings for adults in The American Voter.[84] In the present data, we find these relationships to be strongest at Grade 11, which suggests that part of the connection between ego strength and political efficacy found later in the life cycle (in studies of adult voting behavior) begin to take place by the end of high school, if not before.

SUMMARY

We find a varied pattern of causal connections of the eleven independent variables to the nine dependent variables, when each independent variable is related to each dependent variable at the three grades while controlling for all of the other independent variables. Child's confidence in the external environment turns out to be the causal variable with the highest number of significant correlations; but all show at least 3 associations of significance out of 27 possible instances in each case. That few of these independent variables are related to any dependent variable significantly at all three grade levels suggests a relatively complicated pattern of causality. They come into a position of influence at specific points in the life-cycle but at other junctures seem to drop out almost entirely. In part, this may reflect the changing psychological and social circumstances of the child as he moves through the span of years.

Such complexity clearly upsets the kinds of broad generalizations about the effects of these factors upon adults that have been propagated from data garnered in retrospective reports. Such reports have come from these adults at a point when many of these forces have become deeply buried and overlain by more recently effective influences. There is thus much scope for future analysis in sorting out the etiology of fundamental political attitudes of the kind investigated here. This initial excursion suggests at the least that the task of future explication will not be a simple one.[85]

V
CONCLUSION

The present study has focused upon four major problems of political socialization research. The first is the question of the span of most intense political socialization in the life cycle of the new member of the political system. The second concerns child-parent correspondence in political orientation. The third involves the comparison of black and white racial groups in patterns of political learning. The fourth is the problem of explaining the kinds of political sentiments developed in youth in relation to four categories of predictor variables. In each problem area, the attempt has been to advance the present state of knowledge by testing, replicating, or elaborating some of the most important current hypothesizations.

In the area of developmental trends, the general conclusion is that both cognitive and affective political learning proceed through adolescence even though in the attitudinal realm, the progression in adolescence is far from uniform. The debate between those who might argue that basic political socialization is completed by Grade 8 and those who suggest that there is substantial change in adolescence is not therefore clearly resolved. That the content of broad political concepts shifts is clear. But that there is equally sharp attitudinal change in the later period is not as clear, in that it pertains only over part of the range of basic political attitudinal variables.

Each side of the issue is therefore in some sense correct, for those who have argued that childhood is a period of especially rapid and therefore fundamental change, including the present author, are not shown by these data to be wrong. Neither are those wrong who contend that some basic reorientation occurs after the primary years. What appears is that the two positions are neither logically nor empirically mutually exclusive.

On the issue of parent-child correspondence of political orientations, the present findings support in part the Jennings-Niemi evidence. But in the present case, the findings occur in a developmental context. Thus, while these findings, like those for high school seniors, show values lower than those proposed earlier by Hyman, the general tendency is some positive correlation, even when a number of other factors are controlled.

The new finding which occurs here, however, is the existence of a few negative correlations. The points at which these occur are suggestive moreover, in that they appear on items strongly reflective of a new participant orientation of youth, and they are especially strong for Negro youth. Thus some child rebellion from the political values of the parent is possible if these data are reliable indicators of generational change. And the sharpest instances of such negative transmission are among the black youth.

In one sense, this is not surprising given the state of activism promoted among the black youth of Milwaukee by The Rev. Eugene Groppi and others. But it is an impressive finding from the standpoint both of generational and subcultural differentiation, given the evidence that has been available to this point suggesting much more uniformly positive transmission of political outlook from parent to child.

The data afford further evidence of subcultural differentiation of developing political orientation, in the comparison of black and white youth in patterns of change over this grade span. At a broad level, white youth tend to lead their Negro counterparts in the level of supportive feeling on a number of dimensional indexes when mean scores are presented by grade. The level of support is higher among whites, and the period of advancement to these levels is earlier. Yet when more specific items are considered, this overall pattern is not perfectly descriptive; for in several cases blacks become more supportive over the grade span while whites are becoming less so. Thus the pattern is not a simple one.

Nor is the explanation of the relative degree of support or nonsupport of the system on the basic indexes a simple question. Few of

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the independent variables suggested by earlier work to be especially salient in this area show consistent effects at all three grade levels in the present data.   Only in a few cases any of them show significant correlation, (when all else available is held constant) with any one of the dependent variables; and none is related strongly to all of the dependent variables even at a single grade level.

Thus, these factors are somewhat specific in how they impinge upon these basic political attitudes, although some like confidence in ability to control the external environment show rather frequent covariance with the dependent variables, while others such as sex or parents'

education show relatively few.   Future research will have some guidelines therefore for selecting among these variables for more detailed analysis.

The present inquiry has attempted therefore to carry forward significant recent work in the area of political learning in four connected areas of empirical inquiry.   In each the purpose has been to present new data giving additional perspective to the still fragmentary picture that we have of how the young of our society make their adjustment to a political world which they did not create, but which it will be their task to maintain or adapt as they attain political majority.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A
Civic Concepts Survey Interview Schedule

First we would like to list all persons—adults and children—who live in this household.   To keep things straight, I'll list them by relationship to the head of the household, including anyone who usually lives here but may be away for some reason.
(LIST EACH PERSON BY RELATIONSHIP; RECORD SEX; THEN ASK QUESTIONS BELOW, AS APPROPRIATE, FOR EACH PERSON LISTED)

H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	H6	H7	H8
RELATIONSHIP	SEX	AGE	NO. YRS. EDUC.	ATTENDS SCHOOL ?	NAME OF SCHOOL	MARITAL STATUS	EMPLOYMENT STATUS
1. Head							
2.							
3.							
4.							
5.							
6.							
7.							
8.							
9.							
10.							

H3. What is_____age ? (RECORD ABOVE)

H4. What is the highest grade of school or year of college (he, she) finished ? (RECORD ABOVE)

(ASK H5 FOR EACH PERSON WHO IS 8 TO 18 YEARS OLD; RECORD ABOVE.)
H5. Is_____attending school now ?

(IF YES)
H6. What is the name of the school ? (RECORD ABOVE)

(ASK H7 and H8 FOR EACH PERSON WHO IS 16 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER; RECORD ABOVE.)
H7. Is_____now married, separated, divorced, widowed or single ?

H8. Is_____now employed full-time, part-time only, or not employed ?

---

*Refers to numbered items that were used for both parents and children.

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CIVIC CONCEPTS 1WP
(Parent Interview)

First I am going to ask you to complete a couple of questions for me. Here is the first one:

*1. Our country is called _____

*2. The next one is: As a people we are called_____

*3. What are the things about the United States that you are most proud of ?_____

_____

_____

    *3a. Anything else ?_____

_____

*4. What do you dislike most about this country ?_____

_____

_____

*5. When you think about the government, what comes to your mind ?_____

_____

_____

    *5a. Anything else ?_____

_____

*6. Here is a group of pictures I'd like you to look at. (SHOW PICTURES) Which one of these pictures best represents what our government is ?   _____(#)

*7. Which one of the pictures tells second best what our government is ? _____(#)

Here is a different kind of question. I am going to read several statements which we sometimes hear people make. For each one, I'd like to know if you strongly agree with it, agree, both agree and disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree. (SHOW CARD 1) Just give me the number on the card which comes closest to the way you feel about each statement.

CARD 1

1. Strongly agree	3. Agree-Disagree	5. Strongly disagree
2. Agree	4. Disagree	6. Don't know

*8. The United States is the best country in the world. _____(#)

Interviewer's Name_____ Interview No._____ _____

Date_____Time Started_____

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GPO 810-254-0

*9. My family has a voice in what the government does. _____(#)

*10. There are some big, powerful men in the government who are running the whole thing and they do not really care about the rest of us. _____(#)

*11. What the government does is like the weather: there is nothing people can do about it. _____(#).

*12. The government in Washington can usually be trusted to do what is right. _____(#)

*13. The American system of government is one that all countries should have. _____(#)

*14. Americans have a chance to say what they think about running the government. _____(#)

*15. I don't think that people in the government care much about what people like my family think. _____(#)

*16. The people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes. _____(#)

Next, I am going to ask you several questions about our government, using some different cards for you to pick your answers.

*17. First, how often do you think our government makes mistakes—almost never, rarely, sometimes, often, usually, or almost always? (SHOW CARD 2)

| Almost never | | Rarely | | Sometimes | | Often | | Usually | | Almost always |

*17a. Why do you feel this way?_____

_____

_____

*18. How much can you depend on the government to help you if you need it—always, almost always, usually, sometimes, seldom, or almost never? (SHOW CARD 3)

| Always | | Almost always | | Usually | | Sometimes | | Seldom | | Almost never |

*18a. Why do you say so?_____

_____

_____

*19. Do you think our government can punish anyone for doing something it thinks is wrong or that there are some people it cannot punish? Can the government punish anyone, almost anyone, many people, some people, a few people, or no one? (SHOW CARD 4)

| Anyone | | Almost anyone | | Many people | | Some people | | A few people | | No one |

*19a. What people do you think our government cannot punish?_____

_____

_____

*20. I'd like you to think now about the wisdom of our government as it compares to the wisdom of individual citizens. On most subjects, do you think the government knows more than anyone, more than most people, more than many people, less than many people, less than most people, or less than anyone? (SHOW CARD 5)

65

| More than anyone | More than most | More than many | Less than many |

| Less than most | Less than anyone |

Now I am going to read some more statements. I'd like you to answer by using the first card, the same way you did before. Just tell me the number on the card that comes closest to the way you feel about each statement. (CARD 1)

*21. Having elections makes the government pay close attention to what the people think.
_____(#)

*22. When it comes to deciding what they will do in Congress, most Congressmen pay very little attention to the wishes of the voters who elected them. _____(#)

*23. Almost all of the people running the government are smart people who usually know what they are doing. _____(#)

*24. Quite a few of the people running the government are dishonest. _____(#)

*25. Over the years, the government pays a great deal of attention to what the people think when it decides what to do. _____(#)

*26. Quite a few politicians are dishonest. _____(#)

*27. We should make a lot more of our government officials go before the voters as candidates in democratic elections than we do now. _____(#)

*28. Most political candidates really seem to mean what they say. _____(#)

Here are some questions for which you won't need to use the card.

*29. When you think about politics, what comes to your mind? _____

_____

*30. When you think about political parties, what comes to your mind? _____

_____

Now I'd like to read some more statements and have you give your opinion again by using the numbers on the card:

*31. A person should only vote in an election if he cares about how it is going to come out.
_____(#)

*32. Our political system would work a lot better if our leaders were chosen on the basis of merit in competitive examinations rather than by elections. _____(#)

*33. Legislators and other elected officials should be held responsible for the promises they make while they are campaigning for office. _____(#)

*34. Democracy works best where political parties compete strongly with each other. _____(#)

*35. We would be better off if we had only one political party in this country. _____(#)

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*36. Our city government is really run by people working behind the scenes who are not even known to the voters. _____(#) (IF AGREE, 1 or 2):

36a. Who might these be ?_____

*37. Our national government is really run by people working behind the scenes who are not even known to the voters. _____(#)

(IF AGREE, 1 OR 2)

37a. Who do you think these people might be ?_____

*38. Many primary elections aren't important enough to vote in. _____(#)

Here is a different kind of question.

*39. Which political party do you support ?

| Republican | | Some other party | Specify:_____
| Democratic | | Independent | | None | | Don't know |

I'd also like to ask you about some other people.

*40. Which political party do you think your father supported while you were growing up ?

| Republican | | Some other party | Specify:_____
| Democratic | | Independent | | None | | Don't know |

*41. What about your mother...Which political party do you think she supported ?

| Republican | | Some other party | Specify:_____
| Democratic | | Independent | | None | | Don't know |

*42. Which political party do you think most of your teachers would have supported ?

| Republican | | Some other party | Specify:_____
| Democratic | | Independent | | None | | Don't know |

*43. What about your present friends... Which political party do you think most of them support ?

| Republican | | Some other party | Specify:_____
| Democratic | | Independent | | None | | Don't know |

*44. Finally, which political party do you think most people in the United States support ?

| Republican | | Some other party | Specify:_____
| Democratic | | Independent | | None | | Don't know |

Now if you would look at the card again, I'd like to read some more statements and have you give me your opinion by number.

67

*45. Most of the people who try to get elected to public office can be trusted to do what is right. _____(#)

*46. Most politicians are looking out for themselves above all else. _____(#)

*47. The political parties are very important in making our government pay attention to what the people think. _____(#)

*48. It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have a chance to win. _____(#)

*49. We could get along just as well without most of the things that go on in politics. _____(#)

*50. So many other people vote in the national elections that it wouldn't much matter to me whether I could vote or not. _____(#)

*51. The conflicts among the political parties hurt our country more than they help it. _____(#)

*52. Usually, government does people more harm than good. _____(#)

For this question, I'd like you to look at a different card.   (SHOW CARD 6; CHECK BELOW)

*53. In your opinion, which one listed on this card has the most to do with making the laws in this country?

_____Congress   _____ The President's Cabinet   _____The Political Parties
_____ The President   _____ The Judges   _____Don't know

Now let's go back to our first card.   The next statement is:

*54. American citizens have the chance to express their opinions about the way our country is governed. _____(#)

*55. People can't get along without government. _____(#)

*56. The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country. _____(#)

*57. We have far too many elections for public office in this country. _____(#)

*58. Most of the effort, time and money spent in political campaigns could be better used some other way. _____(#)

*59. I like it that the government in Washington plays such a big role in solving our country's problems. _____(#)

*60. It is impossible for most voters to make intelligent and informed decisions when they go to the polls. _____(#)

*61. The present Democratic administration in Washington is doing a good job. _____(#)

*62. I am very glad that I can vote. _____(#)

*63. We have too much government control in this country. _____(#)

Now we'll get away from the card for a moment.

68

*64. What is the job or profession of the head of your household?_____
_____

Using the card again, how do you feel about this statement:

*65. I don't think that people in the city government of Milwaukee care much what people like me think. _____(#)

*66. Parents are the ones who should teach their children about politics. _____(#)

*67. I have strong opinions about most things. _____(#)

*68. When I get into an argument, I almost never get my own way. _____(#)

*69. Once I have made up my mind about something, it is pretty hard to argue me out of it.
_____(#)

*70. Children ought to be taught from the time they start to school about what really goes on in politics. _____(#)

*71. Luck is more important than hard work in getting ahead in a career. _____(#)

*72. If a policeman did something I didn't like, I would feel free to complain to him about it.
_____(#)

*73. The present Republican administration in Wisconsin is doing a good job. _____(#)

*74. The U.S. Representative in Congress from this district would be willing to listen to what I have to say about changing the laws. _____(#)

*75. The schools and teachers ought to teach children what they need to know about politics and government. _____(#)

*76. It doesn't matter whether parents teach their children about politics or not; the children will learn anyway. _____(#)

*77. Now for something a little different. I'm going to ask you to imagine that you are the mayor of Milwaukee and that you have to give a prize to the child who is the best citizen. What should a child do to deserve such an award?_____
_____

*78. Now imagine that you have to give a prize to the adult who is the best citizen. What should an adult do to deserve such an award?_____
_____

Here are some more statements I would like to get your opinion on. You can answer as before just by giving me a number from the card. In addition, if you want to make any comments about your answer to any of these, please feel free to do so.

(ODD-NUMBERED INTERVIEWS: CONTROL GROUP)

*79. If a Communist wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee favoring Communism, he should not be allowed to speak. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*80. If a Communist were legally elected to Congress from Milwaukee, he should not be allowed to take office. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*81. If a member of the Ku Klux Klan wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee against Negroes, he should not be allowed to speak. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*82. If a member of the Ku Klux Klan who spoke against Negroes in his campaign speeches were legally elected to Congress from Milwaukee, he should not be allowed to take office. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*83. If a person wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee against churches and religion, he should not be allowed to speak. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*84. If a person who spoke against churches and religion were legally elected to Congress from Milwaukee, he should not be allowed to take office. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*85. If a Negro wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee against white people, he should not be allowed to speak. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*86. If a Negro who spoke against white people in his campaign speeches were legally elected to Congress from Milwaukee, he should not be allowed to take office. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*87. Democracy is the best form of government. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*88. The United States is the most democratic country in the world. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*89. Freedom of speech is a basic right of every American. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*90. I believe in freedom of speech. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*91. Another basic right of Americans is that everyone has an equal right to hold public office. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

*92. I believe everyone should have an equal right to hold public office. _____(#)

Spontaneous comments (if any)_____

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Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about yourself.

93. What is your religious preference now, if any?

    | Protestant | | Roman Catholic | | Jewish | | Other | : _____ | None |

    9a. What denomination is that? _____

94. Do you now belong to a church (synagogue)? | Yes | | No |

95. About how often do you attend religious services... Would it be at least once a week, a few times a month, once a month, a few times a year, once a year, less often, or never?

    | At least once a week | | Few times a month | | Once a month | | Few times a year | | Once a year | | Less often | | Never |

Now I have another set of statements to read you. Please answer these just by giving me a number from the card.

*96. Most of the time people try to be fair and honest with other people. _____(#)

*97. If the President of the United States did something I didn't like, I would feel free to complain to him about it. _____(#)

*98. Most people are just looking out for themselves. _____(#)

*99. If the Governor of Wisconsin did something I didn't like, I would feel free to complain to him about it. _____(#)

*100. Most people would cheat you if they got the chance. _____(#)

*101. If the Mayor of Milwaukee did something I didn't like, I would feel free to complain to him about it. _____(#)

*102. Most people can be trusted. _____(#)

For this next question, I'd like you to give me your own answer.

*103. Who is the greatest American who ever lived? _____

Now, if you'll use the card again, here are some more statements:

*104. When I plan ahead, I usually get to carry out things the way I expected. _____(#)

*105. I get more than my share of bad luck. _____(#)

*106. A person can't be too careful in dealing with other people. _____(#)

*107. If I wanted to, I could get someone in the Milwaukee city government to listen to what I want. _____(#)

108. Quite a few of the people I know are a little dishonest. _____(#)

*109. A basic rule of American politics is that every adult should be able to have some control over what the government does. _____(#)

Now, I'd like to know a little more about yourself.

*110. Where were you born?_____

*111. And where was your father born?_____

Here are some more statements for which I'd like you to use the card to answer.

≠*112. While I was growing up, I felt free to complain when a decision was made at home that I didn't like. _____(#)

≠*113. When I was growing up, I helped make family decisions that affected what I wanted to do. _____(#)

≠*114. Even though I can vote, I doubt that I am ever able to change what the government does. _____(#)

*115. Men are usually more successful than women in getting the government to do what they want. _____(#)

*116. It would be better if, in all elections, no party labels were put on the ballot. _____(#)

*117. More often than not, the political parties create conflicts where none really exist. _____(#)

*118. Our system of government would work a lot better if we could get rid of conflicts between the political parties altogether. _____(#)

Here is a direct question, for which you won't need the card:

*119. Do you think there are any important differences in what the Republicans and Democrats stand for?

| Yes | | No | | Don't know |
↓
*120. What are they?_____

_____

Now, if you'll look at the card again, I'll read some more statements.

*121. No one—leader or follower—is able to control what goes on in politics. _____(#)

≠*122. When I was growing up, it didn't really help to complain about something I didn't like at home. _____(#)

*123. I can depend on my friends to listen to my point of view whenever we disagree about something. _____(#)

≠*124. My parents were often unwilling to let me express my opinions when I was young._____(#)

≠For the child version, these items are worded in such a way that they refer to the child's present situation, e.g., for #112: "When a decision is made at home that I don't like, I feel free to complain to my parents."

≠*125. When a decision was made at school that I didn't like, I felt free to complain to my teachers. _____(#)

≠*126. If I did complain about something I didn't like at school, it seldom really helped. _____(#)

≠*127. Even when I was young, I could depend on my parents to listen to my point of view whenever we disagreed about something. _____(#)

*128. In a democracy, it is the duty of government officials to listen to complaints from average citizens. _____(#)

Now for a different kind of question again.

*129. Which level of government do you have the most faith and confidence in—the national government, the state government, or local government?

| National | | State | | Local |

*130. Which level do you have the least faith and confidence in?

| National | | State | | Local |

Here are some more statements, for which you'll need to use the card.

*131. I seldom discuss political issues and events with anyone. _____(#)

*132. When I was in school, I could depend on my teachers to listen to my point of view whenever we disagreed about something. _____(#)

*133. I am quite interested in politics. _____(#)

*134. By taking an active part in political and social affairs, people can control world events. _____(#)

*135. One ought to be able to say anything he wants to against any person in government or politics. _____(#)

*136. We would be better off if no one went against what the people in the government are trying to do. _____(#)

*137. Democracy works best where not everyone is of the same opinion about what the government ought to do. _____(#)

Now I have a question for you to answer in your own words.

*138. When you think about democracy, what comes to your mind?_____

_____

For the next series, please use the card once again.

≠*139. When I went to school, students were not encouraged to discuss political and social issues. _____(#)

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*140. Most of us are the victims of forces we cannot understand. _____(#)

≠*141. The teachers I have known were often unwilling to give students a chance to express their opinions. _____(#)

≠*142. My family encouraged me to think about political and social issues when I was young. _____(#)

≠*143. Students in my school were encouraged to make up their own minds on political and social issues. _____(#)

≠*144. My parents encouraged me to make up my own mind about most political problems. _____(#)

The next questions I'd like you to answer in your own words.

*145. In your opinion, what is the main purpose of <u>government</u>?_____

_____

*146. What do you think is the main purpose of <u>politics</u>?_____

_____

*147. What do you think is the main purpose of <u>political parties</u>? _____

_____

Now, if you will use the card again:

*148. The government should help people who are poor to get ahead. _____(#)

*149. The government should make sure that Negroes are able to live wherever they want to. _____(#)

*150. It is up to each person how well he does; the government shouldn't interfere. _____(#)

*151. When most of the people in the country want to do something, the rest of the people shouldn't criticize. _____(#)

*152. We should not allow people to make speeches against our kind of government. _____(#)

*153. President Johnson is doing a good job. _____(#)

*154. Men should take a more active part than women in politics and government. _____(#)

≠≠*155. I don't think that people in the national government in Washington care much what people like me think. _____(#)

≠≠*156. I don't think that people in the state government in Madison care much what people like me think. _____(#)

_____

≠≠For the children in these cases, the item wording "like me think" was changed to "like my family thinks."

For this next question you won't need to use the card.

*157. Are there any political parties which should not be allowed to participate in elections in this country?

| Yes | | No | | Don't know |

157a. Which parties? _____

I'd like you to use the card again to answer this next series of statements.

*158. Members of the United States Congress should help the President by voting the way he wants them to vote. _____(#)

*159. A member of the United States Congress should always vote the way the people in his district want him to vote. _____(#)

*160. A member of the United States Congress should follow his party leaders even if he doesn't want to. _____(#)

*161. A member of the United States Congress should vote the way he thinks is right despite what anyone else thinks. _____(#)

*162. All Americans should support our government's foreign policy, even if they don't agree with it. _____(#)

*163. If a person wanted to make a speech in Milwaukee against the war in Vietnam, he should not be allowed to speak. _____(#)

*164. It is unpatriotic and dangerous for people to protest against the war in Vietnam. _____(#)

*165. Everyone in my family is encouraged to express his ideas, even when they go against the ideas of other members of the family. _____(#)

*166. A person should stand up for what he believes, even if other people don't like it._____(#)

*167. We often have lively discussions in my family about politics, where different members of the family take different sides. _____(#)

*168. It is better if children avoid arguments about politics rather than risk antagonizing other people. _____(#)

*169. A child should be allowed to take a point of view in politics that is quite different from that of his or her parents. _____(#)

The next questions you can answer without the card.

170. Are you a member of any organizations now (trade or labor unions, business organizations, social groups, professional or farm organizations, cooperatives, fraternal or veterans' groups, athletic clubs, political, charitable, civic, or religious organizations) or any other organized group?

| Yes | | No |

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171. Have you ever belonged to an American political party in the sense of paying dues or having a membership card? ☐ Yes ☐ No

172. Have you every contributed any money to a political candidate or party? ☐ Yes ☐ No

173. Have you ever done any campaign work—such as telephoning, mailing, typing, door-to-door contacts, circulating nominating papers, and so forth for any political party or candidate?

☐ Yes ☐ No

174. Did you vote in the last national election? ☐ Yes ☐ No

 174a. In the presidential race, did you vote for Goldwater or for Johnson?

 ☐ Goldwater ☐ Johnson ☐ Neither or other

175. Did you vote in last November's state elections? ☐ Yes ☐ No

 175a. Whom did you vote for for Governor?

 ☐ Knowles ☐ Lucey ☐ Republican ☐ Democrat ☐ Don't know

Now, if you would use the card one last time:

176. My child helps make family decisions that affect what he (she) wants to do. _____(#)

177. If my child complains about something at home, it's not likely to get him (her) very far. _____(#)

178. I am always careful to listen to ʲy child's point of view whenever we disagree about something. _____(#)

179. I encourage my child to make up his (her) own mind about most political problems._____(#)

Finally, there are just a few more questions I'd like to ask you.

180. There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social classes. Most people say they belong to either the middle class, upper class, working class, or lower class. Do you ever think of yourself as being in one of these classes?

☐ Yes   ☐ No
            (SKIP TO Q180b)
 180a. Which one?

☐ Upper ☐ Middle ☐ Working ☐ Lower

 180b. Well, if you had to make a choice, would you call yourself middle class, upper class, working class, or lower class?

☐ Upper ☐ Middle ☐ Working ☐ Lower ☐ Still refuses to choose
                                        (SKIP TO Q183)

181. Would you say you feel pretty close to other (upper, middle, working, lower AS CHOSEN) class people, or that you don't feel much closer to them than you do to people in other classes?

☐ Closer ☐ Not closer

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182. How much interest would you say you have in how (upper, middle, working, lower AS CHOSEN) class people as a whole are getting along in this country? Do you have a good deal of interest in it, some interest, or not much interest at all?

| Good deal | | Some | | Not much |

183. These days we hear a lot about liberals and conservatives in politics. Generally speaking, would you say you are a liberal in politics or a conservative?

| Liberal | | Conservative | | Neither | | Don't know |
   ↓   ↓   (SKIP TO Q183b)(SKIP TO Q183b)

183a. Would you say you are a strong (liberal, conservative AS CHOSEN) or not so strong?

| Strong | | Not so strong | | Don't know |

183b. Well, if you had to choose, would you call yourself a liberal or a conservative?

| Liberal | | Conservative | | Still refuses to choose |
                                          (SKIP TO END)

184. Would you say you feel pretty close to other (liberals, conservatives AS CHOSEN) as a group, or that you don't feel much closer to them than you do to people with other political views?

| Closer | | Not closer |

185. How much interest would you say you have in how well the views of (liberals, conservatives AS CHOSEN) are represented in government policy? Do you have a good deal of interest in it, some interest, or not much interest at all?

| Good deal | | Some | | Not much |

---

186. Sex of parent (by observation): | Male | | Female |

187. Race of parent (by observation): | White | | Negro | | Other non-white |

APPENDIX B

Partial Correlations for Each of Eleven Independent
Variables with Nine Political Attitude Indexes,
Controlling for All Ten Other Independent Variables
in Ea '; Case, by Grade and Race

28/79

TABLE 1

Partial Correlation between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Child's Political Community Identification/Ethnocentrism Score, by Grade and Race

	(Partial r)					
	5th		8th		11th	
Social Structure	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Child's Sex	-.00	-.12	-.12	-.27	.12	-.33
Parent's Education	.09	.08	-.06	-.35	-.05	.43*
Parent's Occupation	-.16	-.26*	.06	.31	-.02	-.03
Family						
Parent's Political Community Identification/Ethnocentrism	.39***	.10	.20	.19	.14	.01
Family Political Communication	.09	.18	-.03	-.05	-.13	-.19
Family Efficacy	-.12	-.02	.24	-.28	.49****	.37
School						
School Political Communication	-.12	-.07	.13	.37	.08	-.09
School Efficacy	.18	-.02	.09	-.16	.07	-.09
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	.30**	.33***	.15	-.21	-.16	-.01
Child's Ego Strength	.20	.27**	-.14	.07	-.05	.10
Multiple R	.55	.54	.43	.72	.56	.60
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

TABLE 2

Partial Correlation between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Child's General Approval of Government Score, by Grade and Race

	(Partial r)					
	5th		8th		11th	
Social Structure	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Child's Sex	-.04	-.20	-.12	.31	.12	-.26
Parent's Education	.12	.18	-.14	.08	-.13	-.06
Parent's Occupation	-.22	-.18	.03	.31	-.11	.30
Family						
Parent's General Approval of Government	.23	.10	.14	.54**	.25	.42
Family Political Communication	.04	.25*	.23	-.02	-.02	-.17
Family Efficacy	.16	.09	.05	.04	-.15	.21
School						
School Political Communication	.00	-.36***	.36**	.22	.09	.17
School Efficacy	.14	-.02	.09	-.29	.18	-.02
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	.09	.16	.25	-.40*	.36**	.15
Child's Ego Strength	-.08	.21	-.13	.09	.07	.19
Multiple R	.42	.60	.63	.73	.58	.68
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

Significance: t (one-tailed):
$*p = .05$
$**p = .025$
$***p = .01$
$****p = .005$

TABLE 3

Partial Correlation between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Child's Political Trust Score, by Grade and Race

	(Partial r)					
	5th		8th		11th	
Social Structure	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Child's Sex	-.05	-.02	.05	-.13	-.01	.38
Parents' Education	-.06	.21	-.10	-.24	-.00	.31
Parents' Occupation	.26*	.07	.27*	-.07	-.01	.26
Family						
Parents' Political Trust	.10	.11	.04	.14	.33*	.17
Family Political Communication	-.26*	-.03	-.03	-.24	.11	.44*
Family Efficacy	.35***	.16	-.03	.03	-.20	.29
School						
School Political Communication	.09	-.16	.34**	-.07	-.10	-.60***
School Efficacy	-.17	.01	.16	.08	.39**	-.59***
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	.18	.29**	.27*	.13	-.03	-.14
Childs' Ego Strength	-.13	.08	-.04	.11	.05	.17
Multiple R	.51	.50	.58	.42	.53	.88
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

TABLE 4

Partial Correlations between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Chi_d's Support for Liberal Democracy: Specific Score, by Grade and Race

	(Partial r)					
	5th		8th		11th	
Social Structure	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Child's Sex	-.07	.22	-.11	.10	-.17	-.42
Parent's Education	-.05	-.06	.12	.55***	.15	.69****
Parent's Occupation	.05	.02	.03	.11	-.08	-.56**
Family						
Parent's Support for Liberal Democracy: Specific	-.24	.01	-.01	.19	.21	.48*
Family Political Communication	-.15	.28**	.24	-.02	.18*	.14
Family Efficacy	.07	.20	-.01	.26	-.24	.51**
School						
School Political Communication	-.13	.20	.02	.16	-.07	.14
School Efficacy	.14	.10	-.16	-.03	.06	-.48*
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	.28*	.35***	.21	-.40	.31	.05
Child's Ego Strength	.05	-.24*	-.12	-.50**	.06	.06
Multiple R	.36	.65	.40	.77	.52	.87
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

Significance: t (one-tailed):   *p = .05
                                    **p = .025
                                    ***p = .01
                                    ****p = .005

TABLE 5

Partial Correlation between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Child's Political Efficacy: Government Responsiveness Score, by Grade and Race

	(Partial r)					
	5th		8th		11th	
Social Structure	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Child's Sex	.33**	-.22	-.02	.25	-.22	-.17
Parent's Education	.13	-.38****	.05	.17	-.19	-.24
Parent's Occupation	-.05	-.15	.07	.20	.20	-.16
Family						
Parent's Political Efficacy:						
Government Responsiveness	-.04	-.09	-.13	-.32	.23	-.23
Family Political Communication	.01	.13	.03	.20	.34*	.20
Family Efficacy	.08	-.12	.08	.11	.03	-.57**
School						
School Political Communication	-.07	.45****	.10	.16	.02	-.13
School Efficacy	.12	.35***	-.02	.28	.10	.15
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	.32**	.38****	.29*	-.20	.29	.54**
Child's Ego Strength	.05	-.13	.09	.22	.20	.56**
Multiple R	.48	.72**	.47	.66	.62	.80
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

TABLE 6

Partial Correlation between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Child's Political Efficacy: Access to Officials Score, by Grade and Race

	(Partial r)					
	5th		8th		11th	
Social Structure	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Child's Sex	-.23	-.25*	-.07	-.41	.12	-.09
Parent's Education	-.11	.32***	-.02	-.64****	-.02	.33
Parent's Occupation	.08	.07	.28*	.46*	.18	-.01
Family						
Parent's Political Efficacy:						
Access to Officials	.09	.08	.20	.30	-.41***	-.45*
Family Political Communications	.21	.09	.20	-.17	.14	-.49*
Family Efficacy	.08	.38****	-.08	.40	.05	-.55**
School						
School Political Communication	.07	-.14	.26*	.69****	.32	-.28
School Efficacy	.27*	-.01	.17	.36	.43***	.42
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	-.04	-.08	-.00	.30	-.02	.72****
Child's Ego Strength	.37***	.01	.12	-.19	.19	.78****
Multiple R	.62	.55	.61	.88	.74	.92
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

Significance: t (one-tailed):
*p = .05
**p = .025
***p = .01
****p = .005

TABLE 7

Partial Correlation between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Child's Party System Support Score, by Grade and Race

	(Partial r)					
	5th		8th		11th	
Social Structure	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Child's Sex	.01	.19	.01	-.23	-.21	-.61***
Parent's Education	.06	-.20	-.14	-.10	-.12	-.20
Parent's Occupation	-.01	.05	.06	.00	.19	-.56**
Family						
Parent's Party System Support	.05	.04	-.04	.34	.07	.71****
Family Political Communication	-.20	-.05	.08	-.54**	.17	-.35
Family Efficacy	.01	-.14	-.29*	-.27	-.20	.16
School						
School Political Communication	-.11	-.23	.31*	-.51**	-.07	-.34
School Efficacy	.28*	.13	-.04	.15	.19	.39
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	.09	.32***	.39***	.13	.31*	.83****
Child's Ego Strength	-.20	-.19	-.00	.13	.21	.29
Multiple R	.45	.54	.60	.74	.49	.91
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

TABLE 8

Partial Correlation between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Child's Sense of Voting Duty Score, by Grade and Race

	(Partial r)					
	5th		8th		11th	
Social Structure	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Child's Sex	-.01	-.20	-.09	.02	.23	-.18
Parent's Education	.11	-.06	.16	.15	-.02	.22
Parent's Occupation	.07	.10	.29*	.30	.22	-.08
Family						
Parent's Sense of Voting Duty	.09	-.05	-.11	-.25	-.16	-.53**
Family Political Communication	.13	-.04	-.01	-.11	.27	-.59***
Family Efficacy	-.10	-.35****	.09	.22	.23	.38
School						
School Political Communication	-.00	.03	-.08	-.17	-.05	.44*
School Efficacy	.14	.24*	.17	-.19	.09	.15
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	.26*	.37****	.08	-.23	.04	.64****
Child's Ego Strength	.04	.23*	.46****	.01	.15	.51**
Multiple R	.44	.59	.67	.55	.54	.80
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

Significance: t (one-tailed):   *p = .05
***p = .025
***p = .01
****p = .005

TABLE 9

Partial Correlations between Each of Ten Independent Variables and Child's Efficacy of
Elections Score, by Grade and Race

| | (Partial r) | | | | | |
| | 5th | | 8th | | 11th | |
	White	Black	White	Black	White	Black
Social Structure						
Child's Sex	.16	-.10	-.09	.19	-.00	-.18
Parent's Education	.09	.28**	-.19	.05	-.04	.27
Parent's Occupation	-.31	-.20	.23	-.10	.20	.26
Family						
Parent's Efficacy of Elections	-.11	.08	-.11	-.09	.08	-.02
Family Political Communication	-.27*	-.03****	.04	.20	.01	-.21
Family Efficacy	.14	-.04	-.22	-.01	-.02	-.06
School						
School Political Communication	.40****	-.45	.24	.22	.08	-.12
School Efficacy	.1:	.08	.29*	.02	.31*	.09
Psychological Characteristics						
Child's Confidence in External Environment	-.04	.23	-.12	.10	.02	.16
Child's Ego Strength	-.23	.25*	-.27*	.32	-.04	.41
Multiple R	.55	.58	.48	.48	.50	.64
N =	54	60	49	26	41	24

Significance: t (one-tailed):
       *p = .05
       **p = .025
       ***p = .01
       ****p = .005

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, David Easton and Jack Dennis, <u>The Child's Political World</u>, Report to the U.S. Office of Education, 1968, which has appeared in published form as David Easton and Jack Dennis, <u>Child n in the Political System: Origins of Political Legitimacy</u> (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969). Also see Fred I. Greenstein, <u>Children and Politics</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); and Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, <u>The Development of Political Attitudes in Children</u> (Chicago: Aldine, 1967).

2. Easton and Dennis, <u>Children in the Political System</u>, Chapters 7-11.

3. See David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government," in Roberta Sigel (ed.), <u>Political Socialization: Its Role in the Political Process. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science</u>, Vol. 361 (September, 1965), pp. 40-57.

4. See David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," <u>The American Political Science Review</u>, Vol. 61 (1967), pp. 25-38.

5. For explication of these problems, both on the dependent and independent variable sides, see Jack Dennis, "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research," <u>Midwest Journal of Political Science</u>, Vol. 12 (February, 1968), pp. 85-114.

6. See, for references to these works, Jack Dennis, "A Survey and Bibliography of Contemporary Research on Political Learning and Socialization," Occasional Paper No. 8, Wisconsin Research and Development Center for Cognitive Learning, Madison, Wisconsin, April, 1967; John J. Patrick, <u>Political Socialization of American Youth</u> (Washington: National Council for the Social Studies, 1967); and Richard Dawson, "Political Socialization," in

James H. Robinson (ed.), <u>Political Science Annual: An International Review</u>, Vol. 1 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966), pp. 1-84.

7. Findings from the Jennings' Survey Research Center study can be found in: M. Kent Jennings, "Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government," <u>Midwest Journal of Political Science</u>, Vol. 11 (1967), pp. 291-317; M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, Vol. 62 (1968), pp. 169-184; and Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum," <u>American Political Science Review</u>, Vol. 62 (1968), pp. 852-867. Also see the work cited in note 9 below.

8. Hess and Torney, <u>op. cit.</u>, page 220.

9. M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "Patterns of Political Learning," <u>Harvard Educational Review</u>, Vol. 38 (Summer, 1968), pp. 443-467, at page 466.

10. The areal sampling procedure of the present study is somewhat unique in political socialization research. Most such studies use school populations, mostly for reasons of convenience and economy. With the growing sensitivity of school administrators, especially in the larger cities of the nation, to research that can be made the focus of a political issue by community interest groups, especially those concerned with race relations, it was thought better to avoid the school system entirely. Although more expensive, the area survey may be more economical in the long run if full cooperation (and thus a proper sample) is unlikely to be obtained from the schools for reasons that usually have little to do with the study and over which the schools themselves have little control.

11. Jennings and Niemi, "The Transmission of

Political Values from Parent to Child,"
op. cit.

12. Ibid., page 173.

13. Ibid., pp. 175, 176, 178.

14. For a pioneering effort to look at how
Appalachian children differ from more
modal American children, see Dean Jaros,
Herbert Hirsch, and Frederick J. Fleron,
Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political
Socialization in an American Sub-culture,"
The American Political Science Review,
Vol. 62 (June, 1968), pp. 564-575.

15. For discussion of these ways of classify-
ing the content of political socialization
see Dennis, "Major Problems of Political
Socialization Research,"loc. cit., at
pp. 91-98.

16. For discussion of "system politics" as a
focus of political socialization research,
see Easton and Dennis, Children in the
Political System, Chapters 1-3.

17. Jennings and Niemi, "Patterns of Political
Learning," op. cit.

18. Ibid., page 443.

19. See, for example, Easton and Dennis,
"The Child's Image of Government," op.
cit.

20. Jean Piaget, Judgment and Reasoning in
the Child and Language and Thought of
the Child (Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield,
Adams, 1959).

21. See the discussion of Piaget's theory in
these terms in Alfred A. Baldwin, Theories
of Child Development (New York: Wiley,
1967), pp. 171-300.

22. See Easton and Dennis, "The Child's
Image of Government,":loc. cit.; and
Joseph Adelson and Robert P. O'Neil,
"The Growth of Political Ideas in Adoles-
cence: the Sense of Community," Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology,
Vol. 4 (1966), pp. 295-306.

23. Ibid.

24. See Easton and Dennis, "The Child's
Image of Government," loc. cit.

25. A somewhat similar effect was found for
teachers in the eight-city study reported
in the two Easton and Dennis articles, in
Children and the Political System, and in
the Hess and Torney volume, all cited
above. Teachers in the aggregate were
typically matched best to the response
levels of eighth graders, although in a
considerable number of cases they looked
to be more at what would be projected as
the grade 9 level.

26. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse,
Donald E. Stokes, and Warren E. Miller,
The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960);
and Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of
Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David
E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent
(New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261.

27. For references to these data on the concept
of democracy see Jack Dennis, Leon Lind-
berg, Donald McCrone, and Rodney Stiefbold,
"Political Socialization to Democratic Orien-
tations in Four Western Systems," Compara-
tive Political Studies, Vol. 1 (1968), pp.
71-101.

28. It should also be noted that the President
manages to draw some support in this con-
text, even though there is no special rea-
son from an adult point of view why he
should do so. One should remember the
very pervasive role that the President is
seen to have by primary school children
in anything political, which includes there-
fore this regime-level category. See
Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political
System, Chapters 7-9.

29. See Jennings and Niemi, "Patterns of Po-
litical Learning," op. cit., page 466; and
Adelson and O'Neil, op. cit.

30. See Greenstein, Children and Politics,
Chapters 3 and 4, for a relevant compari-
son of attitudinal and cognitive develop-
ment.

31. See David Easton, A Systems Analysis of
Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965),
and A Framework for Political Analysis
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1965). For empirical work following upon
Easton's and other theoretical suggestions
in the area of the concept of support, see
Jack Dennis, "Support for the Party System
by the Mass Public," American Political
Science Review, Vol. 60 (1966), pp. 600-
615; Walter F. Murphy and Joseph Tanen-
haus, "Public Opinion and the United States
Supreme Court," Law and Society Review,
Vol. 2 (1968), pp. 357-384; Kenneth M.
Dolbeare, "The Public Views the Supreme
Court" in Herbert Jacob (ed.), Law, Poli-
tics and the Federal Courts (Boston: Little
Brown, 1967), pp. 194-212; John C. Wahlke,
"Public Policy and Representative Govern-
ment: The Role of the Represented," Report
No. 9, The Laboratory for Political Research,
Department of Political Science, University

of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa (September, 1967) (mimeo); and G. R. Boynton, Samuel C. Patterson and Ronald D. Hedlund, "The Structure of Public Support for Legislative Institutions," <u>Midwest Journal of Political Science</u>, Vol. 12 (1968), pp. 163-80.

32. See Easton and Dennis, <u>Children in the Political System</u>, Chapters 1-3.

33. See the reference in Note 4 of Easton and Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," <u>loc. cit.</u>; and the references in Dennis, <u>et al.</u>, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems," <u>loc. cit.</u>, for discussion of the operational measures of a number of these attitudes.

34. Thirty-seven children whose parents failed to complete the interview were not thus scored.

35. See the discussion of this distinction in Easton, <u>A Systems Analysis of Political Life</u> (Chapters 10 and 11).

36. See Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, <u>The Civic Culture</u> (Princeton, 1963), p. 102 ff.

31. See especially, L. Horowitz, "Some Aspects of the Development of Patriotism in Children," <u>Sociometry</u>, Vol. 3 (1940), pp. 329-341.

38. See Jean Piaget and Anne-Marie Weil, "The Development in Children of the Idea of the Homeland and Relations with other Countries," <u>International Social Science Bulletin</u>, Vol. 3 (1951), pp. 561-578; Gustav Jahoda, "The Development of Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality," <u>The British Journal of Educational Psychology</u>, Vol. 33 (1963), pp. 47-60 and 143-153; Leonard W. Doob, <u>Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations</u> (New Haven: Yale 1964); and Wallace E. Lambert and Otto Klineberg, <u>Children's Views of Foreign Peoples</u> (New York: Meredith, 1967).

39. The hidden premise here is that a country attains its greatness on the basis of its political order. That Americans are apt to be most proud of their political system (in relation to their economic system, cultural achievements, physical beauty of the country, etc.) is shown in the Almond-Verba five-nation study cited above. (Note 36)

40. See Easton and Dennis, <u>Children in the Political System</u>; Greenstein, <u>Children</u>

and Politics; and Hess and Torney, <u>The Development of Political Attitudes in Children.</u>

41. See, for example, Robert E. Agger, Marshall N. Goldstein, and Stanley A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," <u>Journal of Politics</u>, Vol. 23 (1961), pp. 477-506; and Edgar Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," <u>Journal of Politics</u>, Vol. 25 (1963), pp. 312-323.

42. Dennis, <u>et al.</u>, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems," <u>op. cit.</u>

43. James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," <u>Journal of Politics</u>, Vol. 22 (1960), pp. 276-294.

44. This was done mainly for reasons of simplicity and conceptual clarity. The distributions on these items show a pattern of such high consensus and therefore such low variance, that the score is only used in reporting mean cluster scores (Table 15). It is not used for the further, multivariate analysis of Chapter V.

45. Easton and Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," <u>op. cit</u>.

46. See Dennis, "Support for the Party System by the Mass Public," <u>op. cit.</u>, and Dennis, <u>et al.</u>, "Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations," <u>op. cit</u>.

47. Herbert Hyman, <u>Political Socialization</u> (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), page 69.

48. <u>Ibid.</u>, pp. 69, 71-72.

49. <u>Ibid.</u>, page 72.

50. For Fisher's summary, see <u>ibid.</u>, pp. 70-71. The Jennings-Niemi findings are in: M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child," <u>The American Political Science Review</u>, Vol. 62 (1968), pp. 169-184.

51. Jennings and Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values...," pages 173, 178, 175, and 176, respectively.

52. Hyman, <u>op. cit.</u>, page 72.

53. See, for example, Russell Middleton and and Snell Putney, "Political Expression of Adolescent Rebellion," <u>American Journal of Sociology</u>, Vol. 68 (1963), pp. 527-535;

and Eugene Uyeki and Richard W. Dodge, "Generational Relations in Political Attitudes and Involvement," Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 48 (1964), pp. 155-165.

54. The other black/white comparisons on parent-child correspondence will be presented in the next chapter.

55. One exception to this is an article by Dean Jaros, "Children's Orientation toward the President: Some Additional Theoretical Considerations and Data," The Journal of Politics, Vol. 29 (1967), pp. 368-387. Also see D. Jaros, Children's Orientations toward Political Authority: A Detroit Study (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, Department of Political Science, 1966); Robert Sigel, "Image of a President: Some Insights into the Political Views of School Children," American Political Science Review, Vol. 62 (1968), pp. 216-226, at pages 220-221; James W. Clarke and John W. Soule, "How Southern Children Felt About King's Death," Transaction, Vol. 5 (1968), pp. 35-40; and A. W. Singham, "Political Socialization of Marginal Groups," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, Vol. 8 (1967), pp. 182-198. More recently dissertation research directly on this question has been undertaken by Edward Greenberg at Wisconsin and Sandra Kenyon at M.I.T. The latter were reported at a panel on this subject at the 1969 American Political Science Association meetings in . New York, September 1969.

56. The social and learning situations of Negroes are described in James S. Coleman, et al., Equality of Education (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966); and Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Employment, Income, and the Ordeal of the Negro Family," in Talcott Parsons and Kenneth B. Clark (eds.), The Negro American (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 134-159. Also see Robert Coles, Children of Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); E. Franklin Frazier, Negro Youth at the Crossways (New York: Schocken Books, 1940); Charles S. Johnson, Growing up in the Black Belt; Negro Youth in the Rural South (New York: Schocken Books, 1941), and Nona Y. Glazer and Carol F. Freedon (eds.), Children and Poverty (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968).

57. See, for example, Donald R. Matthews

and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966). John M. Orbell, "Protest Participation among Southern Negro College Students," American Political Science Review, Vol. 61 (1967), pp. 446-456; Gary T. Marx, Protest and Prejudice: A Study of Belief in the Black Community (New York: Harper, 1967); James Q. Wilson, Negro Politics (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960); H. D. Price, The Negro and Southern Politics: A Chapter of Florida History (New York: New York University Press, 1957); V. O. Key, Jr. Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949); Alexander Heard, A Two-Party South? (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1952); A. Sindler (ed.), Change in the Contemporary South (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1963); and A. Leiserson (ed.), The American South in the 1960's (New York: Praeger, 1965).

58. See The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Dutton, 1968) for a detailing of this unrest and an attempt to locate its causes. Also see Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, Racial Crisis in America (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 1964).

59. Marx, op. cit.

60. Ibid., page 28.

61. Ibid., page 30.

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid., page 6.

64. Ibid., page 13.

65. Ibid., page 14.

66. Ibid., page 11.

67. Ibid., page xx.

68. For the extent of supportive sentiment among the whole population of American adults—and thus among whites, who constitute the overwhelming proportion of the sample—see Almond and Verba, op. cit.

69. Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States," Langton and Jennings, op. cit.

70. A majority of Negroes in Marx's metropolitan sample (59%) answered that in their own city, the police treat Negroes very well or fairly well, which suggests a favorable view of the police on balance. That

so high a proportion both of oldest children and of parents feel that they can complain to the police would seem to fit with Marx's data. See Marx, op. cit., page 36. That Americans in general regard the police highly is shown by evidence cited in Easton and Dennis, Children in the Political System, Chapter 14.

71. See Robert E. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), page 49.

72. See Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, Vol. 57 (1963), pp. 45-56.

73. For a similar difference in another context see Litt, op. cit.

74. For a relevant analysis in terms of Negro college student protest, see Orbell, op. cit.

75. See Appendix B of Albert J. Reiss, Occupations and Social Status (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 263-275. The Decile coding scale was used in the present analysis.

76. See Steven H. Chaffee, Jack M. McLeod, and Daniel B. Wackman, "Family Communication Patterns and Adolescent Political Participation," in Jack Dennis and Frederick W. Frey (eds.), Exploration of of Political Socialization: A Reader in Contemporary Research (New York: Wiley, forthcoming).

77. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), especially Chapter 12.

78. See Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960).

79. Julian B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Internal Versus External Control of Reinforcement," Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, Vol. 80 (1966), whole No. 609.

80. See, for example, Morris Rosenberg, "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," American Sociological Review, Vol. 21 (1956), pp. 690-695; "The Meaning of Politics in Mass Society," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 15 (1951); and H. McClosky and J. H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," American Sociological Review, Vol. 30 (1965), pp. 14-40.

81. Langton and Jennings, op. cit.

82. Almond and Verba, op. cit.

83. Relevant data for adults are found in McClosky and Schaar, op. cit.

84. A. Campbell, et al., op. cit.

85. Appendix B. contains data similar to those presented in this chapter, except that there is a further subdivision of black and white.