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### ABSTRACT

The school lunch program has not responded to national needs: the greater the need of the child from a poor neighborhood, the less the community is able to meet it. Of about eight million children whose families cannot afford the cost of a school meal, three million receive a lunch free or at reduced cost; of the five million denied reasonable access, three million could be served immediately because they attend schools where the program now is operated. The remaining two million attend schools where local service is not available now. Although Congress, both in the National School Lunch Act of 1946 and the Child Nutrition Act of 1966, recognized the moral need for action, its prime concern has been how the money has been spent, rather than whether funds are meeting the need. Under Section 25 of the Agricultural Appropriations Act of 1968, sponsored by Representative Carl Perkins, an additional \$45,000,000 was allocated. But most states use these funds to hold down the prices of regular school lunches, thus benefiting the middle-class youngsters at the expense of the poor. (JM)

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## WHY CHILD NUTRITION PROGRAMS FAIL

by

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UD009918E

Wednesday, December 3, 1969

## FOREWORD

This pamphlet was produced by Rodney E. Leonard under a grant from The Children's Foundation.

From 1967 to 1969, Mr. Leonard was Administrator of Consumer and Marketing Services in the United States Department of Agriculture. Prior to that, he held other posts in the Department, served as assistant to the Governor of Minnesota, and worked as a newspaper reporter.

While the views expressed in this paper are Mr. Leonard's, all of us share responsibility for the appalling situation outlined here.

Charles U. Daly  
President  
The Children's Foundation

Washington, D.C.  
December 3, 1969

The United States is faced with an embarrassing situation: an over-abundance of food and a large segment of the population that goes hungry or is malnourished.

Two major efforts exist to cope with this problem. One consists of the family food assistance programs, such as food stamps and commodity distribution, designed to help low income families obtain more food. As others have shown, family food assistance programs are an inadequate response to the conditions of poverty in which 25 million or more Americans live today.<sup>1</sup>

The other major effort consists of child nutrition programs, principally school lunch. This paper examines the failure of that effort.

From the beginning, the legislation establishing these programs took note of those children whose parents are poor. When Congress wrote the National School Lunch Act of 1946 specific provision was made for these children in language which says lunches will be provided free or at reduced prices, without discrimination, to all children "who are determined by local school authorities to be unable to pay the full price."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Report of the President's Commission on Income Maintenance, November 1969. See also, Hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Hunger and Malnutrition, 90th Congress, 2d session; Hunger, U.S.A., and Still Hungry in America, et. al.

<sup>2</sup>See Appendix I for a brief description of the legislation of all child nutrition programs.

Taking "note" apparently was not enough. For all the pious words, the inability of the school lunch program to respond to national needs recognized 24 years ago is graphically illustrated by an analysis of state efforts to provide free and reduced price lunches.<sup>3</sup> (See Table A.)

In 1967, several womens' organizations made a study of the school lunch program. Their Daily Bread<sup>4</sup> was the first comprehensive analysis of the inadequacies in this national program. It helped to galvanize congressional action, but the response still has been far short of the need.

Their Daily Bread showed that two out of three children did not participate in the National School Lunch program. Now the ratio is three out of five. The first survey found the greater the need of the child from a poor neighborhood, the less the community was able to meet it. This doleful judgment still prevails.

Today, there are 52 million children under 18 years of age in public and private schools of whom 20 million are served a school lunch on an average day.<sup>5</sup> About ten million attend schools with no facilities to feed children, and almost nine out of ten of these are children in elementary schools.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>Data taken from reports filed by states with the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition & Human Needs.

<sup>4</sup>Their Daily Bread, A Study of the National School Lunch Program. Committee on School Lunch Participation, New York, 1967.

<sup>5</sup>Food & Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, based on unpublished study by Agriculture Research Service.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

Guideline Policy

Breakfast

School Lunch

TABLE A School Year 1968 - 69	School Lunch											Breakfast			Guideline Policy		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	No. School Districts	No. Plans Approved 6/30/69	No. Plans Rejected		
ADA	ADP	% 2:1	F/RP	% 4:1 Children	No. AFDC Children	% 4:6	No. ESEA Children FY67	% 4:8	ADP	% 10:1	% Free Breakfast						
Alabama	787,714	510,628	64	101,536	327,500	31	244,311	41.6	39,415	5.0	46	119	117	0			
Alaska	46,437	24,668	53	8,120	8,187	99	6,974	11.6	633	1.4	100	29	19	0			
Arizona	311,477	165,602	53	30,855	62,264	50	46,633	66.2	33,987	11.0	76	296	117	0			
Arkansas	414,173	280,506	68	80,482	202,135	40	149,658	53.8	5,047	1.3	83	395	385	0			
California	2,186,433	827,000	38	75,743	472,876	16	396,632	19.1	6,000	0.3	21	1,109	660	75			
Colorado	498,129	222,647	44	13,973	60,026	23	45,989	30.3	5,172	1.0	6.0	181	181	0			
Connecticut	460,041	191,344	42	7,548	45,085	17	39,361	19.1	18,705	4.1	96	177	188	0			
Delaware	108,261	58,464	54	2,548	12,628	20	10,982	23.2	132	0.1	30	48	48	0			
D. C.	130,605	36,469	28	20,542	30,320	68	22,896	89.7	8,665	6.7	100	-	-	-			
Florida	1,270,412	774,369	60	81,227	243,894	33	145,719	55.8	5,052	0.5	43	67	72	0			
Georgia	1,014,144	790,003	76	158,563	357,359	44	245,261	65.3	7,572	0.5	58	193	181	17			
Hawaii	159,819	128,004	80	7,324	18,423	40	12,460	58.6	284	0.2	76	1	1	0			
Idaho	252,369	78,735	31	2,652	24,031	11	14,902	17.7	-	-	-	117	all	0			
Illinois	2,392,786	600,000	25	33,933	290,423	11	254,140	13.4	3,982	0.2	7.0	1,279	1,175	few			
Indiana	1,124,711	622,014	55.3	20,665	127,923	16	88,233	23.5	31,212	2.0	81	339	all	0			
Iowa	625,474	344,020	55	11,785	118,709	99	85,169	13.8	3,339	0.5	15.3	461	470	0			
Kansas	391,266	253,215	65	17,305	75,287	23	49,671	34.8	405	0.1	36	335	380	5			
Kentucky	638,818	477,161	74	94,000	263,414	35	196,465	47.8	194,930	30	21	195	190	0			

3. In the case of columns 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11, percentages were figured by the simple division indicated.

4. F/RP: Free and Reduced Price Lunches Daily

	School Lunch							Breakfast			Guideline Policy				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	No. School Districts	No. Plans Approved 6/30/69	No. Plans Rejected
ADA	ADP	% 2:1	F/RP	% 4:1	No. AFDC Children	% 4:6	No. ESEA Children FY67	% 4:8	ADP	% 10:1	% Free Breakfast				
Louisiana	913,598	696,748	76	90,933	9.9	294,483	31	205,962	44.2	13,037	1.4	81	70	70	0
Maine	175,000	96,311	55	15,023	8	35,931	41	22,456	66.9	1,120	0.7	-	297	297	0
Maryland	729,995	293,158	40	15,532	2.1	93,802	16	81,246	19.1	3,454	0.5	88	24	23	0
Massachusetts	685,175	445,364	65	48,881	7	105,057	46	77,492	63.1	1,927	0.2	86	351	558	0
Michigan	1,339,829	554,528	41	27,589	2	231,004	11	167,661	16.4	3,989	0.3	62	650	532	0
Minnesota	773,871	457,550	59	18,500	2.4	135,658	13.6	102,145	18.1	2,016	0.3	25	1,244	1,244	0
Mississippi	540,000	380,573	70	79,311	14.7	320,750	25	256,196	31.0	6,435	1.2	100	149	130	50%
Missouri	1,017,412	523,787	51	41,396	4	196,430	21	144,612	28.6	1,314	0.1	78	729	all	0
Montana	161,559	57,310	35	5,497	3.4	24,602	22	16,978	32.4	815	0.5	100	730	220	0
Nebraska	266,313	142,783	54	10,037	3.8	60,088	16.7	37,346	26.9	517	0.2	37	1,571	395	0
Nevada	113,468	19,424	17	1,725	1.5	5,718	30	4,688	36.8	485	0.6	22	17	13	0
New Hampshire	139,135	71,165	51	N.A.	N.A.	12,434	N.A.	8,385	N.A.	900	1.0	16	173	all	0
New Jersey	1,266,524	248,002	19.5	25,327	2	126,334	21	108,767	23.3	4,782	0.4	97	573	321	13
New Mexico	no data	supplied													
New York	1,160,000	1,413,000	45	417,500	13	489,281	85	405,584	103	4,800	0.2	98	747	974	0
North Carolina	984,946	776,198	78	155,893	15	456,019	34	334,527	46.6	10,640	1.0	79	157	157	0
North Dakota	130,046	89,097	68	N.A.	-	39,332	-	26,325	-	290	0.2	8.3	474	354	0
Ohio	1,511,727	779,635	52	56,601	3.7	257,320	22	194,251	29.1	36,549	2.4	100	640	all	0



	School Lunch										Breakfast			Guideline Policy		
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	No. School Districts	No. Plans Approved 6/30/69	No. Plans Rejected	
	ADA	ADP	% 2:1	F/RP	% 4:1	No. Children	% 4:6	No. ESEA Children FY67	% 4:8	ADP	% 10:1	% Free Breakfast				
Oklahoma	391,471	257,000	65.5	39,227	10	135,770	29	101,346	38.7	4,970	1.3	65	694	740	0	
Oregon	430,401	191,486	44	8,033	1.5	44,075	18	33,832	23.7	646	0.1	71	356	all but	2	
Pennsylvania	2,125,071	830,961	39	58,558	2.0	334,387	17	255,396	22.9	3,640	0.2	80	699	547	0	
Rhode Island	107,840	41,577	38	6,484	6	24,291	26	18,883	34.3	41,577	38	72	39	32	0	
South Carolina	603,387	458,865	76	142,248	23	278,491	51	208,329	68.3	5,250	0.9	81	93	92	0	
South Dakota	no data supplied															
Tennessee	678,509	529,546	78	72,299	13	314,191	29	222,959	32.4	11,654	1.7	82	150	145	3	
Texas	2,395,000	967,112	40	122,000	5	617,085	19	403,275	30.3	92,558	3.8	80	1,244	1,106	0	
Utah	251,361	162,220	65	15,866	6.3	21,478	74	15,395	103	325	0.1	3.2	40	40	0	
Vermont	85,461	40,598	47	4,200	10.3	14,723	28.6	8,945	47.2	753	0.8	24	235	248	0	
Virginia	1,018,000	N.A.	41*	64,630	6.3	256,421	25	179,409	35.5	47,111	4.6	47	134	132	0	
Washington	753,460	777,076	37	15,350	2	67,200	23	49,358	31.1	1,822	0.2	13.6	326	224	16	
West Virginia	320,628	181,724	56	35,600	11	141,566	25	109,083	32.6	51,905	16	95	55	55	0	
Wisconsin	721,329	351,095	49	10,739	15	112,011	9.6	78,593	13.6	1,859	2.6	47	459	431	0	
Wyoming	80,362	35,922	44	2,065	2.0	9,273	22	6,585	31.4	744	0.9	100	161	110	0	

\*Estimated



There are about eight million children<sup>7</sup> whose families cannot afford the cost of a school meal. Three million receive a lunch free or at reduced cost. Of the remaining five million who are denied reasonable access to the lunch program, three million could be served immediately because they attend schools where the program now is operated. The remaining two million attend schools where food service is not now available.

While the Congress, both in the National School Lunch Act of 1946 and the Child Nutrition Act of 1966, paid lip service to a moral responsibility for child nutrition, the legislation and the form of its administration are predicated on economic interests. Congress passed on the legal responsibility for child nutrition to the states and local school districts. The Executive Branch recognizes that the power center in food rests closer to the economic interests of those who can afford to produce, market, process or consume rather than with those who cannot.

As a result, the administrative structure of the child nutrition programs is a means primarily of distributing inadequate resources in such a manner as to minimize the possibility of fraud in the programs and, therefore, public censure, rather than to respond to human need. As will be shown in later sections, the needs of the food industry often dictate how the dollars are spent.

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<sup>7</sup> Estimates vary. The Council on Hunger and Malnutrition places the figure at 8.4 million, while other analysts estimate the number at 8.6 million. The USDA puts the figure at 6.7 million. The President's Commission on Income Maintenance estimates that two out of five persons in poverty are 18 years or under. This figure includes about 8 million school age children.

At the state and local levels, where legal authority presumably rests, the child nutrition programs are in incoherent shambles. One example of the gross mis-administration of the program by the states is the apparent diversion of millions of dollars appropriated to supply free and reduced price lunches for needy children. Under Section 25 of the Agricultural Appropriations Act of 1968, engineered by Representative Carl Perkins, an additional \$45 million was authorized for this purpose. But most states apparently are using these funds to hold down the prices of regular school lunches--in effect, benefiting the middle-class youngsters and diluting a special effort to provide an adequate diet for the poor.

According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), \$32.6 million of the Perkins monies were used to provide free lunches over and above the existing program for free lunches and helped to raise the number of children receiving them to just over three million. This represents an increase of only about 400,000 above the figure for the 1967-68 fiscal year. Perkins funds were intended to boost the number of free and reduced price lunches closer to four million on the average day, or at least a million more children than in the previous school year.

Questionnaires<sup>8</sup> sent to the state school lunch directors in the summer of 1969 by the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs (the McGovern Committee) show that almost \$27.7 million were spent for free lunches through state administered programs during the period 1968-69. These funds were utilized at a rate which for

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<sup>8</sup> All except two states, New Mexico and South Dakota, filed reports with the McGovern Committee, which were unpublished at the time this paper was written.

at least the last three months of the school year could have provided over a million additional free lunches a day.

An analysis of the data indicates that an estimated 54 per cent of this money was diverted to other school lunch purposes, and did not find its way to children who need a free or reduced price lunch.

A third of the states were able to translate fully the Perkins money into additional free or reduced price lunches for needy children. Eight states spent the additional funds with no measurable results. (See Table B.)

Clearly, states and local school districts substituted Perkins money to pay for lunches which before had been provided free or at reduced prices from other federal sources or from state and local funds. In some southern states, where funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) had been cut off to encourage faster school desegregation, the Perkins money was used to make up the difference where ESEA funds had been earmarked for school feeding. [In the 1966-67 school year, more than \$30 million of ESEA funds were used for school lunches.]<sup>9</sup>

Local school districts, in the absence of strong state and federal supervision, will rationalize the use of the Perkins funds to meet rising program costs, contrary to congressional intent and executive instruction. It is revealing that the spokesmen for state school lunch directors advocated this position before the Appropriation Committees two years ago.

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<sup>9</sup>Statistical Report, Fiscal Year 1967, Title I/Year II, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. U.S. Department of Health, Education & Welfare.

PERKINS FUND USED FOR FREE/REDUCED PRICE LUNCHES

TABLE B

	Amount Spent	Possible No. of Lunches Served Daily*	Actual No. Additional Served Daily	No. of Lunches Converted Daily	Percent Funds Diverted
Alabama	\$2,551,917	73,000	12,000	61,000	83.6
Alaska	16,527				100
District of Columbia	26,022				100
Arizona	361,221	9,000	10,000+	-0-	-0-
Arkansas	538,469	26,900	30,000+	-0-	-0-
California	1,672,721	83,700	6,800	76,900	91.8
Colorado	238,106	7,900	3,700	4,200	53
Connecticut	147,822	7,400	7,100	300+	Not Significant
Delaware	12,462				100
Florida	2,014,441	57,600	600	57,000	98
Georgia	2,132,141	71,000	34,000	37,000	52
Hawaii	73,975	2,100	5,000	-0-	-0-
Illinois	942,657	37,700	14,900	22,800	60.5
Indiana	372,972	18,600	10,700	7,900	42.5
Iowa	250,259	12,500	8,100	4,400	35

\*Assumes 25 cents per day per lunch State Reimbursement

	Amount Spent	Possible No. of Lunches Served Daily	Actual No Additional Served Daily	No. of Lunches Converted Daily	Percent Funds Diverted
Kansas	\$150,760	5,025	8,000	-0-	-0-
Kentucky	900,000	31,000	-0-	31,000	100
Louisiana	461,191	18,400	20,000	-0-	-0-
Maine	175,000	7,000	7,200	-0-	-0-
Maryland	329,761	16,500	12,300	4,200	25
Massachusetts	665,279	33,260	33,800±	-0-	-0-
Michigan	714,261	23,800	-700	23,800	100
Minnesota	529,851	21,200	17,600	3,600	17
Mississippi	822,032	27,400	33,000	-0-	-0-
Missouri	693,276	23,100	16,350	6,750	29
Montana	-0-	-0-	-0-	-0-	
Nebraska	202,071	6,700	6,400	300	Not Significant
Nevada					Not Significant
New Hampshire	Data Inadequate				
New Jersey	489,475	16,300	21,300	-0-	-0-
New Mexico	No Data				

	Amount Spent	Possible No. of Lunches Served Daily	Actual No. Additional Served Daily	No. of Lunches Converted Daily	Percent Funds Diverted
North Carolina	\$2,203,907				100
New York	1,516,451	75,800	0-40,000	0-35,000	45-100
North Dakota	125,389	8,360	4,980	3,380	40
Ohio	641,575	18,350	18,350±	-0-	-0-
Oklahoma	792,912	26,400	21,600	4,800	18
Oregon	158,300	6,300	5,100	1,200	19
Pennsylvania	371,237	14,800	-0-	14,800	100
Rhode Island	101,004	3,360	1,860	1,500	45
South Carolina	1,112,379	31,800	18,300	13,500	42
Tennessee	1,615,000	46,000	11,200	34,800	75.6
Texas	2,312,902	92,500	13,500	79,000	86
Utah	264,997	8,300	-0-	8,300	100
Vermont	53,825	2,700	2,700	-0-	-0-
Virginia	No Data Available				
Washington	212,845	8,500	8,600	-0-	-0-
West Virginia	401,606	11,400	11,400	-0-	-0-

	Amount Spent <u>1/</u>	Possible No. of Lunches Served Daily <u>2/</u>	Actual No. Additional Served Daily	No. of Lunches Converted Daily	Percent Funds Diverted
Wisconsin	\$258,387	8,500	4,000	4,500	53
Wyoming	41,924	1,400	1,400	-0-	-0-
South Dakota	No Data				
	27,691,035	1,006,155	460,225	545,930	54.3

1/ Data taken from reports submitted to U.S. Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs (McGovern committee).

2/ See Appendix II for formula used to develop analysis.

While the Perkins funds provided some increase in the number of free and reduced price lunches during the 1968-69 school year, most of the more densely populated states provided free and reduced price lunches to fewer than four per cent of the children attending school. More than 15 per cent should be eligible nationally. Only New York comes close with 13 per cent.

The less urban states, other than those in the southeastern region, show no better performance. Most do not exceed five per cent.

The southeastern states, excluding Virginia, provide at least nine per cent of school children with free or reduced price lunches. Many exceed 15 per cent, with South Carolina topping the list with 23 per cent.<sup>10</sup>

The present gap in reaching children most in need of good nutrition can be seen clearly by comparing the number of free or reduced price lunches to the number of children in families on welfare. This comparison in no way implies that all free or reduced price lunches go to these children, or that they are the only ones who need such assistance.

Only five states and the District of Columbia provided free or reduced price lunches at a rate equal to more than half the number of children in families on welfare. Alaska tops the list at 99 per cent. Two states, Wisconsin and Iowa, did not exceed ten per cent,

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<sup>10</sup>The need is greater in this region than elsewhere. The response of South Carolina, when viewed in relation to the number of children in families on welfare, is only slightly better than Massachusetts, although the latter state provides only seven per cent of its lunches free or at reduced prices.



and Illinois, Michigan and Idaho had 11 per cent rates. The rest, for the most part, huddled together at rates of between 20 and 40 per cent.<sup>11</sup>

Another measure of the overall performance by states is the comparison of the number of free lunches served on a daily basis with the number of children cited by states under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act as needing special assistance.

Only three states--New York, Alaska and Utah--claimed to serve more free lunches than the number of Title I children. Of the others, only the District of Columbia exceeded 70 per cent, and the rest of the States ranged from 13 per cent in Illinois to 68 per cent in South Carolina.

Urban states, as a rule, did much worse than their less urban neighbors. The urban states, for example, generally provided free lunches to an equivalent of no more than 30 per cent of the Title I children. The less urban states, however, are generally above 30 per cent.

The extent of the child nutrition gap is best illustrated by another comparative statistic. More than seven out of ten states did not provide free lunches to the equivalent of half of the children used to justify the amount of Title I money the states receive.<sup>12</sup>

The situation regarding free and reduced price lunches--and the Perkins monies in particular--is only the most glaring example of how the needy child is short-changed. The school breakfast program, which began its fourth season in 1969, is another.

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<sup>11</sup>Table A, page 3.

<sup>12</sup>Table A, page 3. Of the 48 states responding to the questionnaire, 46 provided sufficient data to make this analysis, and 35 were below the 50 per cent mark.

Authorized by the Child Nutrition Act of 1966, the school breakfast program served an average of 300,000 children each day.

In 36 states, participation in the breakfast program was less than 1.5 per cent of the children attending school.<sup>13</sup> In 24 states, participation was less than half of one per cent. In only four states did participation exceed 10 per cent of students in daily attendance.

Two of the four states are in Appalachia--Kentucky, where 30 per cent of the school children were served breakfast, and West Virginia, where 16 per cent of the students ate breakfast at school. The third is Arizona, where 11 per cent of students used the program. The fourth is Rhode Island, where 38 per cent of the school children were served breakfast, even though only eight per cent of the schools equipped to serve meals are in the program. If states representing three geographical regions with such diverse social and economic characteristics can achieve a level of performance in the breakfast program distinctly superior to other states, obviously the program can work on a national rather than a state or regional basis.

It is worth noting that in all four states which appear to be moving the program along, the percentage of schools which serve breakfasts is less than the percentage of students who eat them. A reasonable conclusion is that the program is being offered in schools where the need is great and where the response more than justifies the program.

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<sup>13</sup>Table A, page 3.

One argument in defense of the state performance with the breakfast program is a claim that Congress is stingy. Last year \$3.5 million was appropriated for breakfasts, hardly a magnificent sum. Yet, with freedom to direct the \$45 million Perkins fund, the states choose to put only \$2 million more into breakfasts. Since each state receives a proportionate share of breakfast funds, and each state had the same degree of choice with the Perkins money, the variable factor appears to be the degree of state and local concern.

The other major new child nutrition program is the Vanik Program, or Section 13 of the National School Lunch Act, enacted in May 1968. It authorized for the first time federal support for meal service--breakfast and/or lunch--in children's activities outside the school. But the tardiness of the Congress in allowing child feeding to follow the child appears to be carrying over into the administration of this program.

While the Congress appropriated \$10 million for the Vanik Program in fiscal year 1969, the USDA's records show that only \$3.4 million was spent. In hearings in March 1969 before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture, the Department requested \$20 million for fiscal year 1970. The \$10 million increase was needed because "From reports we have of the interest expressed in the program, (we) feel there is a great need."<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Hearings, Department of Agriculture Appropriations for 1970, Part 5, House of Representatives, Ninety-First Congress, First session.

Shortly after this statement, the USDA revised its budget, and, in April, proposed cutting \$10 million from this program. However, the Department recommended increasing funds to "insure the availability of milk to summer camps, child care centers and schools that do not have food service programs."<sup>15</sup>

This shifting of fiscal gears has all the hallmarks of paring a budget to fit both the dictates of the Bureau of the Budget and the dairy interests. It helps to understand priorities when a program to provide a complete meal for children is slashed in favor of one which provides only milk.

Even a brief review of actual experience in the states indicates the Vanik program did not start late, as some claim.<sup>16</sup> It just did not start. Nearly two out of five states did not reply to the McGovern Committee's request for data on this aspect of the child nutrition program. Many of these states are prohibited from administering programs outside the school system. Of those states which did report on the Vanik program, the records show that of more than \$2.9 million allocated by the Department, over \$750,000 was returned unspent. While there are no data available, the fact the USDA spent less than \$1 million to establish non-school feeding projects in states where it administers the program directly suggest the states may simply reflect the Department's own lack of enthusiasm.

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid.

<sup>16</sup>See Table A, page 3.

There are now only 15 projects under the Vanik Program in California, 50 in New York, 5 in New Jersey and 53 in Illinois. However, rather than make the effort to strengthen the program, the decision apparently was made to use its state of anemia as an excuse to reduce the proposed budget by the \$10 million.

When one turns from the special programs to the school lunch program as a whole, the situation is equally abysmal. Among states considered urban--those with a population density significantly above average--the majority do not provide any lunch service in even half of their elementary schools. New Jersey and Pennsylvania, for example, maintain lunch programs in only one-third of their elementary schools.

Where lunch service is available, participation by elementary school students in urban states rarely is greater than 50 per cent. Of 13 urban states and the District of Columbia, only three report participation higher than 50 per cent, and only two as high as 65 per cent.

Among the less densely populated states, by contrast, the number of elementary schools serving lunch rarely drops below 50 per cent. Most range between 60 and 80 per cent, with the higher percentages more common. Participation in these programs also is the reverse of the experience in urban states. Most less densely populated states report participation rates exceeding 60 per cent, and several serve lunches to 80 to 90 per cent of elementary students.

In secondary schools, availability of food service is uniformly better in all states. Few drop below the 80 per cent level.

However, the programs in the more densely populated states rarely serve more than 40 per cent of students in attendance on a given day, while the less urban states report half or more of the secondary students are participating.

When the data for all school children are analyzed, program deficiencies are even more depressing. Urban states are distinguished for their poor performance--New Jersey, for example, serves less than 20 per cent of its school children. The less urban states appear to be better; most reach 50 per cent or more and several attain a rate above 70 per cent.<sup>17</sup>

In the 57 cities with more than 250,000 population the school lunch program is even more pointedly not doing an adequate job. The situation underscores the absence of a national program, and emphasizes the lack of state programs. (See Table C.)

With an average daily attendance reported in fiscal 1969 at nearly seven million children in schools of the 57 largest cities, only 2.2 million eat lunch in school, or slightly over a third of those attending on an average school day. About one in six children attend schools where food service is not available.

While the 57 largest cities account for about 13 per cent of all school children, they account for only eight per cent of average daily participation. While 10 per cent of the nation's school children are without food service, nearly 16 per cent of the children in the 57 largest cities suffer this indignity. Proportionally more children from low income homes attend these schools.

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<sup>17</sup>See Table A, page 3.

TABLE C

## SCHOOL CHILDREN IN URBAN CITIES (1968-69) \*

CITY	With Food Service				Without Food Service				
	1 ADA	2 No. of Schools	3 ADA	4 Percent ADP(3)/ ADP(2)	5 No. of Schools	6 ADA	7 Percent (6) City ADA	8 ADA of low-income Schools	9 Percent ADA(8)/ ADA(6) low-income
Akron, Ohio <sup>1</sup>	58,024	44	40,620	56.8	26	17,404	30	8,811	50.6
Chicago	572,461	307	405,749	20	239	166,712	29	5,720	30.4
Cincinnati, Ohio <sup>2</sup>	78,558	96	77,378	47.8	4	1,180		604	
Cleveland <sup>2</sup>	141,682	77	81,557	49.2	102	60,125	43	35,791	58.7
Columbus, Ohio <sup>2</sup>	91,619	67	46,693	68	101	44,926	49	14,654	33
Dayton, Ohio <sup>2</sup>	58,380	23	23,361	59.8	66	35,019	60	14,729	43
Detroit	292,097	164	200,896	29.8	149	91,201	31	53,414	58.6
Indianapolis <sup>1</sup>	93,764	77	66,680	53	54	27,084	29	19,587	72
Milwaukee	120,154	132	104,143	36.6	24	16,011	13	2,111	13
Minneapolis	69,361	40	39,316	50	55	30,045	43	4,638	15
Omaha	53,258	74	47,389	56.8	22	5,869	11	390	
St. Louis <sup>4</sup>	82,578	134	50,670	24.7	21	7,566	9	115	

\*Urban Lunch Study, School Lunch Division, Consumer and Marketing Service, April 1969.

CITY	With Food Service				Without Food Service				
	1 No. of Schools	2 ADA	3 ADP	4 Percent ADP(3)/ ADP(2)	5 No. of Schools	6 ADA	7 Percent (6) City ADA	8 ADA of low-income Schools	9 Percent ADA(8)/ ADA(6) low-income
St. Paul, Minn.	49	30,578	17,937	58.6	32	9,247	22		
Toledo <sup>2</sup>	25	21,546	8,465	39.8	49	39,929	65	12,609	32
Dallas	172	147,650	56,187	39.7					
Houston	228	232,959	23,124	9.9					
V. ichta <sup>2</sup>	39	35,720	27,759	79.8	74	29,097	44.8	7,297	25
Los Angeles <sup>3</sup>	489	510,978	182,714	35.8	72	42,885	7.8	17,751	41.8
Salt Lake City <sup>2</sup>	19	21,388	13,651	63.8	26	12,623	37	2,177	17
Baltimore	111	117,643	26,440	22.4	99	59,057	33.5	17,555	29.6
Boston <sup>2</sup>	74	41,579	20,053	48.3	172	38,912	48.4	4,802	12
Buffalo	39	36,000	13,500	38	58	32,203	47.2	20,200	62.7
Dist. of Columbia	167	126,914	33,652	25	17	5,554	4		
Jersey City	8	11,781	2,510	21	27	24,682	68	15,472	62.6
Newark	58	47,425	18,846	40	20	13,040	23	3,745	20



CITY	With Food Service				Without Food Service				
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	No. of Schools	ADA	ADP	Percent ADP(3)/ADP(2)	No. of Schools	ADA	Percent (6) City ADA	ADA of low-income Schools	Percent ADA(8)/ADA(6) low-income
New York	921	935,000	373,000	38.5	37	33,000	0.3		
Philadelphia <sup>2</sup>	143	138,577	12,586	9.1	127	148,702	52	(116)NA	(91% of Schools
Pittsburgh	29	74,882	9,520	27	85	39,396	53	17,346	23
Rochester		41,000	4,600	25.3	41	22,800	56	11,870	52
All Urban	6,741	6,912,185	2,265,084	38.8	1,883	1,083,263	15.7	325,592	30

1. All Non-NSLP Lunch Program
2. Both NSLP and Non-NSLP
3. Mostly Non-NSLP
4. Lists only NSLP School

Individual cities vary, but cities in the Northeast and Midwest-- which account for 90 per cent of all urban schools and 94 per cent of all ghetto schools without food service--are the most inadequate.

**Baltimore:** Food service is denied to nearly 60,000 children, or nearly 34 per cent of the school population. Where lunches are served, only one in five children participate.

**Boston:** Over 40,000 children, or one out of two, attend school where food service is not available. Of those who can get lunch, only half do.

**Buffalo:** Almost half--32,000--of the children attend schools without lunch service and two out of three are students from lower income areas of the city. Only one of three of those who have lunch service make use of it.

**Jersey City:** Of the city's 35 schools, 27 do not provide food service. Nearly 25,000 children, or 68 per cent of the children attending school, are denied lunch. Two out of three of those children live in low income neighborhoods.

**Chicago:** Some 400,000 of the 572,000 children in school have access to food service, but only 82,000 receive meals on the average day. Over 50,000 children attend 42 ghetto schools where food service is not available.

Detroit: Over 292,000 are enrolled in the school system, but 91,000 attend schools--including 58,000 from 70 ghetto schools--where they are denied food services. Of the 200,000 in schools with food service, only 60,000 are served lunch on the average day.

Of the large cities in the Northeast, six operate school systems where nearly half or more of the children are denied food service. The most unenviable record among states is undoubtedly the large city performance in Ohio. Of the state's six large cities, two deny food service to 60 per cent or more of the children in school, two exclude between 40 to 50 per cent and one withholds food service from 30 per cent of the children in attendance.

As the state-by-state and city-by-city discrepancies must indicate, one key to this chaotic situation is in the administration of the program by the states and the individuals at the state level who bear that responsibility.

Child feeding programs are assigned to state educational agencies, and are run by individuals who, by and large, tend to be concerned with their status in an educational hierarchy.<sup>18</sup> Many sense the lack of a

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<sup>18</sup>In 1957, E. Allen Bateman, former Commission of Public Instruction for the State of Utah, said, "As an uninvited guest at the educational banquet, school food service has successfully run the gamut of neglect, of scorn, of fear, of anger, and has now entered the approved portals which entitle it to a chair at the education board." The message apparently hasn't filtered through to most state school lunch personnel.

In the fall of 1969, a director from a large state said, referring to the USDA role in child nutrition, "I think the (school lunch) program would do much better if it were in education rather than agriculture."

A director of a midwestern state's program said in a recent interview, referring to his lack of professional educational credentials, "You know, around here we are looked upon as sort of a second class citizen."

background in education puts them at a disadvantage. If their attitude is a reflection of the professional educator's view of child nutrition, then the right "union card" is more important than program goals, whether it is to provide nutrition or educational nourishment.

This sensitivity among school food service directors cannot be ignored, particularly when they occupy the key position in the child nutrition program complex. By legislative design, administrative practice, bureaucratic intent and program structure, they can make the decision which determines which children are fed. The state director, particularly with more federal funds arriving in the form of block grants, can spend or withhold program money as he or she determines.

There is no national model which all the states follow. At least eight states operate the school lunch program without legislative authority, and rely on general authority of the state to accept or reject cash or other forms of federal largess. Of the states which consider the nutritional health of children important enough to specify their concern in legislation, many simply authorize school boards to establish lunch programs. Others spell out in more detail how the program shall be operated. Less than a dozen appropriate state funds to finance lunches. Most appropriate only the minimal amount necessary to administer the programs. In current practice, this is just enough to maintain the records to file claims to obtain federal assistance. Few states operate with more than an accounting staff. Even the best, those with regional program supervisors, do little more than maintain watch over the technical aspects of food preparation. In other words, no one is evaluating need or monitoring inequities--in. "lonal or

otherwise--in the programs.

The federal government, if it recognizes the problem, has done little about it. The USDA, until 1968, held only regional meetings with state directors during the summer months. These dealt primarily with procedure: how to fill out the forms which good program accounting required. In the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, school lunch has about the same status as school maintenance. When the amount of ESEA funds going to school food service became too large to ignore, the Office of Education sent out a memorandum in 1968 telling the states to cut back on food service use of the monies.

Thus, there is every reason, except one, to concede that the state school lunch director is trapped, unable to apply the potential power of his position to improving child nutrition programs in his state. That one exception is the very significant difference which vigorous leadership has made in certain states. Again, the difference shows up in the Southeast. Under every standard of program accomplishment, these states--excluding Virginia--are grouped at the head of the list. They do significantly better in percentage of schools offering food service; of students in school who participate in the program, whether elementary or secondary schools; of students attending school who receive free or reduced price lunches; of free or reduced price lunches served in comparison to the number of children from welfare families.

The performance of the Southeastern states has been questioned. For example, "These are states with a more rural population and fewer urban areas." Yet, among the eight cities in the Southeast with more

than 250,000 population, practically all children have access to food service, and more than 55 per cent of those attending school on a given day are served lunch.<sup>19</sup> The average for the other urban areas is about one-third. For example, "The number of children from families on welfare is not a fair comparison particularly since the Southeast operates to keep welfare services from the people while Northern urban states try to make the welfare program reach those who need it."

The real question, however, is if New York can serve free lunches to the equivalent of 85 per cent of the children from welfare families, why does Michigan serve only 11 per cent, or California only 16 per cent?

If Mississippi can serve 25 per cent, why does Iowa reach less than 10 per cent? If Kentucky serves better than 35 per cent, why does Minnesota do less than 14 per cent? If Tennessee reaches 29 per cent, why does Texas do no better than 19 per cent?

Part of the answer is money. The Southeastern states have been willing to finance lunch programs with a considerable amount of ESEA funds, as pointed out earlier. In fiscal 1969, an estimated \$30 million in ESEA money went for school food service, with two-thirds of it spent in the Southeast. In addition, because the Perkins money is allocated under a formula which gives proportionately more to states with greater low income population, the Southeast has benefited more.

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<sup>19</sup>Urban Lunch Study, School Lunch Division, Consumer and Marketing Service, USDA, April 1969.

But money is only part of the answer. Attitude is another. An educational system willing to use ESEA funds for child feeding is implicitly giving more status to nutrition than a state which does not. In addition, state directors in the Southeast, by creating a regional approach to child nutrition, have developed a system to provide alternative solutions to problems and to give status to themselves on an area basis. These directors have created a peer group, not limited by state boundaries, and they meet at least once, and usually several times a year. The meetings are workshops where states share common problems and benefit from a broad range of experiences in the attempts made to solve them. More importantly, over a period of time, the regional conferences have helped state directors to focus on their basic function: planning the delivery of services to the child.

In many other states, the director and staff, when they are not updating reports, tend to perform as nutritional specialists. But the nutritional function should be placed elsewhere, preferably closer to the actual delivery of food service in the community.<sup>20</sup> State directors should be concerned primarily with the delivery system since no one else performs that task.

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<sup>20</sup>In Atlanta, for example, six specialists, described as food service coordinators, were brought into the city school system in 1964. All children now have access to food service. Daily participation has increased from 46 per cent to over 70 per cent in the 1968-69 school year--a figure exceeded among the large cities only by Honolulu. The number of free lunches served daily has grown from 5,500 to more than 15,000. If each city had achieved the same rate of growth, let alone the same ratio of participation, the child feeding problem in the United States would be significantly different today than it is.

As a result of the lack of direction most directors give the program, few states have the capability to assist large urban areas even where the effort is wanted. Where the state director recognizes the problem, there is not enough staff, nor is there an adequate body of research on which to develop an urban child nutrition project.

But many state directors appear to be unable to recognize the problem faced by the cities. Cities which wrestle with a host of urban problems, thus, will not find help at a state agency which dogmatically insists that the school food service program, as it presently is being operated, will provide them with the best solution. It has failed to solve their problem for the past 24 years.

The majority of state directors will say they like to "think of the school food service program as being used and thought of as another classroom. . ." <sup>21</sup> and few see any place "in our educational food service program" for other means of delivering food. In a much more direct fashion, the director of food service programs in an Eastern urban state maintains, "Schools under efficient management can give the best service at lowest cost." He believes, "The cafeteria is a laboratory where the student puts into practice the nutritional facts he has learned in the classroom."<sup>22</sup>

Other than the fact that nutrition education is noticeable to most children and their parents only by its total absence from school, the tragedy of this position is that it makes the form of food

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<sup>21</sup>Select Committee, op. cit.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid.



delivery more important than the act of delivery. It implies that hungry children will be morally stronger knowing that food is being denied until the means of delivery can serve an "educational purpose."

Nutrition education cannot begin in the absence of food. Obviously, no person given the choice between feeding a hungry child or denying him food will choose the latter. The issue, however, is seldom presented in these terms.

If the state director seems to perform with a lack of purpose, it may only be a reflection of the machinations of the federal civil service, the bureaucratic structure which operates public programs.

The federal bureaucracy is an engine of continuity. Because of this fact, it is more responsive to its own internal dynamics and to institutions with occupants of a more continuing nature--such as the congressional committees--than it is to the Presidency. The Food and Nutrition Service, the latest structure within USDA for administering the child nutrition programs at the federal level, demonstrates these two characteristics and the negative impact they have on performance, just as its predecessors, did. This negative impact includes:

- 1) The program forms and procedures which the agency uses are more important to providing the Appropriation Committees with a mechanical accounting than to informing the Congress whether the health and well-being of children are being protected.

This situation is not altogether surprising. The Congress has restrained its official interest in social programs generally to

authorizing machinery to deal with them and directs its continuing interest to a review of how the money is spent. Rarely does the Congress balance the social books.

The report of the hearings before the House Appropriations Subcommittee<sup>23</sup> on the agency's funding requests for fiscal 1970 is a realistic example. The report contains repeated references to how much money was spent for food assistance, the way it was spent, the measures taken to insure it was spent without fraud and the willingness of the committee to appropriate it. No question was raised to determine if the funds were adequate, or whether the programs were reaching all the individuals who needed help, or how many individuals were in need of assistance.

The Congress is expected to protect the citizen from misuse or waste of his tax dollar, but that is the procedure of governing and not the end purpose of government. Yet, so long as the Congress asks questions of the administrative agencies related only to this limited purpose, then the administrative agencies will respond only to those questions.

Thus, the information gathering channels of the child feeding programs are designed primarily for bookkeeping purposes and less for program development, more for managing dollars than services. Reports show only how many lunches are served each day. A school district, a state or the federal government can only estimate the number of

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<sup>23</sup>Hearings, Department of Agriculture Appropriations for 1970, Part 5. House of Representatives, Ninety-first Congress, First Session.

children who participate. Similarly, all the administrative levels only can estimate the number of children who need free or reduced price lunches. The data available only record how many lunches were submitted by states on claims to the federal government for reimbursement, and does not tell how many need a free lunch.

2) Program resources are not fully subject to agency control. Political decisions which always enter into consideration of how federal funds are going to be used do not reflect the program's mission in all cases.

For example, more than ten per cent of the federal resources devoted to child nutrition are in the form of commodities purchased with Section 32 funds.<sup>24</sup> Section 32 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to spend up to 30 per cent of U.S. customs receipts on farm commodities and authorizes their use by, among others, needy individuals and schools. The decision to purchase these commodities is made initially by specialists in the commodity divisions of Consumer and Marketing Service (C&MS) of USDA. These specialists prepare official allocation proposals, called "dockets," recommending that Section 32 funds available under the budget be spent to purchase various categories of commodities. The dockets reflect a bureaucratic decision. The actual policy decision on each docket proposal is made by the Commodity Credit Corporation which rejects the recommendation of the specialists only on occasion.

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<sup>24</sup>See Table D, page 42.

The needs of the child nutrition program rarely enter into the docket considerations. Where they do, it usually is to reassure those making the purchase decision that the child feeding outlets can use the food products which may be purchased.

Significantly, when the food assistance programs were transferred in 1969 from C&MS to the new Food and Nutrition Service, authority over Section 32 was kept in the commodity division of C&MS. Obviously, in the struggle to establish priorities, the human nutrition advocates failed to convince the Secretary that the person in need of food should be given equal recognition to producing groups and processing industries.

3) Program management is weak and program direction is unaggressive at the agency level.

a) In describing how the program operates, the agency told its House Appropriations Subcommittee in 1969 that "We provide national criteria which are then applied by the state school people. . . . We lay down the general rules and . . . . Under those general criteria each individual situation is reviewed by the state agency and we in turn consult with them and review their operation."<sup>25</sup>

As one Congressman observed, it is really a situation where the states themselves set up the criteria. The consequences of this concept of program direction can be seen in the spectacular failure of the agency to insure the translation of the Perkins fund into

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<sup>25</sup>Hearings, Department of Agriculture Appropriations for 1970, Part 5. House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 1st Session.

additional free and reduced price lunches.<sup>26</sup>

b) Program management suffers from a lack of clear administrative policy. For example, there is no official definition of a reduced price lunch. For accounting purposes, any lunch served at a price ten cents below the prevailing level in the school district can be considered a reduced price lunch. However, every school in the district must follow the same pricing policy.

This is an administrative convenience and not a policy. It permits a 25 cent lunch in one district to be considered as reduced in price even though an adjacent district charges no more than 25 cents for any lunch served. In the latter situation, a reduced price meal has to be 15 cents.

An example of the problems caused by such vague administrative policy arose in 1969 in Baltimore. A citizen action group offered to underwrite the cost of lunches in several low-income schools. Mothers of the children, however, wanted to pay something for the meals, if only a nickel. But a nickel is far below the administrative definition of a reduced price lunch in Baltimore. The school administration refused to allow reduced price lunch programs because it could not afford to extend the program to all schools and, thus, could not allow it to be used in a limited number of schools.

Obviously, if the standard for a reduced price lunch were set at a low level and applied throughout the school food service program, anything at or below that level would qualify for federal assistance,

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<sup>26</sup>See Table B, page 9.

the program would operate more efficiently.

Another example of vague program policy is the definition of nutritional standards for meals served under the program. The Type A lunch--a meal which provides a third to a half of the daily nutritional needs of the child--is defined by regulation in terms of food groups rather than nutritional minimums.<sup>27</sup> This technique is effective for schools or school districts without staff nutritionists. However, it is inflexible and discourages schools with nutritionists or food companies from experimenting with menu patterns which do not meet present Type A standards, but may be more acceptable to children and just as nutritious.

c) The agency has inadequate procedures for maintaining budgetary control.

Other than the block grant concepts under the Perkins fund program, the money for child nutrition programs is apportioned among the states through a multiple budget allocation procedure. Each program--breakfast, lunch, Section 11, Vanik, etc.--has its own budget account and each state receives its proportionate share.

This "multiple allocation" procedure has certain advantages, the principal one being that it assures the funds intended for specific purposes will not be diverted to other programs. The technique also inevitably reduces the capacity of the agency to obtain maximum service from available dollars. And, it provides no means whatever to detect when programs operating under a block grant begin to drift from their

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<sup>27</sup>See Appendix I.

intended purpose. It also is inadequate because it will not stretch to meet the different needs of the different states. While an urban state may need a greater proportion of its funds for equipment and facilities, another may need more in free lunches. Another may put greater emphasis on breakfast or on food service outside the school. Under these circumstances, a mad rush begins to develop toward the end of each fiscal year as each state, unable to use certain categories of funds, informs the USDA of its intent to return funds from some of the individual program accounts. At the same time, the states either volunteer or are asked how much more they need or could use in other program categories, and the funds which are returned are then re-allocated to the states by the USDA. This frantic juggling means either the loss of services where money is not spent, or poorly performed services because money is spent with inadequate planning and foresight.

The block grant approach, originating in the child nutrition programs with the Perkins fund monies, is an invitation to public disenchantment in the absence of more sophisticated administrative procedures than those now existing for multiple allocations.

The diversions reported earlier in the Perkins funds are not the only example of the problem of sending out federal resources accompanied by nothing more than good intentions. The experience with federal guidelines for free and reduced price lunches parallels the fate of funds to finance them.

The guidelines resulted from pleas from state school lunch directors who said, in effect, "we want you to tell us to feed the needy children because then we can tell local school boards we must

because the federal government requires us to."

The guidelines were published in October 1968 and required each school district to file a plan with the state by the start of the 1969-70 school year. The plan must describe the standards the district will use to certify a child as eligible for a free lunch. It also must describe who is to do the certifying, and how parents will be informed that free lunches are available.

Judging from the results of the McGovern Committee questionnaire,<sup>28</sup> fewer than a dozen states have made a serious effort to review the district plans. Others have been willing to accept district plans which provide no specific information that local community groups could use to encourage greater participation in the school feeding program. Even more discouraging, no state is capable at this time of providing specific assurances that the guidelines are being followed in local school districts. No state has adequate staffing to conduct field audits. The federal agency's monitoring effort is even more haphazard. It sends regional staff to review district plans on file in the state offices.

Hence, no one can describe the current status of the effort to establish guidelines for free and reduced price lunches in every school district because no one at the federal or state level knows. Yet, the guideline enforcement policy calls for the withdrawal of all federal funds for child feeding where the guidelines are not being carried out. Under the circumstances, the only conclusion is that

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<sup>28</sup>See Table A, page 3.



this effort to apply innovative program direction through the imposition of the guidelines is meaningless.

4) The agency is unable to plan major programs of social dimension, or to sustain an environment for creative and innovative program management.

Structurally, the agency is geared to reporting data which are relevant to an economic budget and to provide the kind of program supervision which insures each dollar is being spent properly from an accounting sense. There is no policy and planning section where program strengths and weaknesses can be analyzed in relation to public needs for program services. Where many other federal agencies have recognized the need to separate the administrative line function from the planning staff operation, the food assistance programs largely have been devoid of this essential dicotomy.

The administrative structure in the food and nutrition programs is the same today as it was when the decade began, a time when all food assistance programs were operated by fewer than 300 persons. Today, the agency has experienced a nearly seven-fold increase in personnel, and the child nutrition programs alone employ more people than all programs did in 1961. The agency, however, operates on a highly personal basis, much as it did when decisions on all aspects of program activities down to the regional level were made by fewer than a dozen persons.

Consumer and Marketing Services has always geared its administrative data gathering to produce information on finances, a logical response to a program which is expected by the Congress or

the Executive to dispose of a minimum of cash and a maximum of commodities. Criticism and the inevitable crisis within the agency which follows is expected to result from fraud or other instances of the misuse of the federal dollar.

The expansion of the program from 1961 on signaled a basic change. It was the beginning of new priorities, or the shift, however slow and muted, from a program to distribute the excesses of a very productive agriculture to the distribution of public services--in this case, food or nutrition. The crisis to be anticipated thereafter would come from failure to deliver services, more than the failure to dispose of federal resources honestly. It was a crisis arising from public clamour. But, without the separation of planning and administrative functions, with the same highly personal structure, and without a strong impetus from the Congress or the Executive, the agency still is unable to respond to the change.

After the Administration's efforts to bring the Department of Defense under civilian control in the late 1960's, program planning and budgeting (PPB)--the technique used for this purpose--was imposed on civilian agencies. As originally conceived, PPB was to provide the top policy officials in each Department and, through them, the Bureau of the Budget and the President with a clear set of alternatives in the allocation of federal resources among competing national goals.

No one apparently questioned whether national priorities can be created merely by churning together a sufficiently large volume of data, or whether the value judgments used in selecting that data should reflect priorities which respond to national problems. PPB

is a mechanical device for measuring performance, and is only as good as the information going into it. The information fed into the federal system is barely sufficient to give the appearance of producing a rational annual budget. It is incredibly bad information for monitoring the delivery of services today, or for anticipating and planning services the public will need five years hence.

To make PPB, or some other planning system, a functional instrument to use in managing the delivery of child nutrition programs, the government must be willing to spend the money to obtain the information the system needs. Further, the data which are gathered for planning and monitoring should be determined by human values rather than accounting procedures and surplus disposal problems.

Short of forcing the program to be measured by larger standards, the federal response in child nutrition will continue in the pattern reflected by the appropriations and expenditures under school lunch and child nutrition activities, summarized as follows:

1. Child feeding and nutrition goals are given secondary roles to the demands of the food industry;
2. The Executive and the Congress are in general agreement on funding levels; arguments occur over how far and how fast to go with new programs;
3. Growth in program resources is a measure of public pressure and not any recognizable plan.

Federal resources are provided as cash grants or as commodities.

Since the inclusion of commodities indicates a value judgment already has been made in the use of funds to purchase them, the best indicator of federal priorities for child feeding is Section 4, the authority

in the school lunch act which provides the largest single source of cash to states and school districts. (See Table D.)

The Section 4 appropriation in 1946 was \$51.3 million, which represented about half of the cost of food purchased for the lunch program, or 4.5 cents per lunch. The appropriations in 1947 rose to \$54.8 million, and the next year fell by a million dollars--a situation which might reflect a budgetary reaction to the first post-war recession. The appropriations jumped to \$58.8 million in 1949 and for the next three years were pegged at \$64.6 million. Thus, for the Truman years, no apparent pattern is discernable other than a budget officer's finesse properly labeled as the "pegging concept."

The pegging concept became the hallmark of the Eisenhower budgets, with a \$67 million figure used for three years, an \$83.6 million figure for two, and a \$93.6 million for three.

Under the Kennedy and Johnson budgets, Section 4 funds increased each year by small increments, reflecting a policy to peg cash grants at a level of 4.5 cents per meal served in the program, and to raise cash funds as participation increased. It is a more sophisticated approach, but it is largely meaningless when the food cost of a lunch averages 36 cents today as compared to 9 cents in 1946.

Other than for minor adjustments, the Congress has accepted the figures for child feeding proposed by the Administration. Any comparison of the budget proposal and the final Congressional action on appropriations will demonstrate that on those items where Congress has the last word the difference is minimal.

TABLE D

FEDERAL RESOURCES FOR CHILD NUTRITION\*  
(Millions)

	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959
Section 4	51.3	54.8	53.8	58.8	64.6	64.6	64.6	65.9	67.0	67.0	67.0	83.6	83.6	93.6
Section 6		14.0	14.5	14.5	17.3	17.3	17.3	16.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	49.7
Section 32	5.8	2.3	19.3	21.6	36.2	15.2	13.0	51.7	94.2	26.9	65.3	112.5	61.8	44.4
Section 416					2.0	19.6	3.6			43.4	34.6	19.5	14.2	22.4
Section 11														
Breakfast														
Equipment														
Vanik														
Perkins														
Total	57.1	81.1	87.6	94.9	120.4	116.7	98.5	133.6	176.2	152.3	181.9	230.6	174.6	210.1

\*U. S. Department of Agriculture

	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970*
Section 4	93.6	93.6	98.6	108.6	120.6	130.0	138.6	147.4	154.9	162.0	168.0
Section 6	58.4	59.7	69.4	59.4	59.3	59.3	59.3	59.3	59.3	64.3	64.3
Section 32	28.6	58.6	29.1	29.3	43.7	173.2	49.4	50.9	100.1	79.3	90.4**
Section 416	42.3	13.0	83.9	91.7	92.0	39.7	67.4	79.5	120.3	144.8	146.8**
Section 11			Enact- ed				2.0	2.0	5.0	10.0	44.8
Breakfast								2.0	3.5	3.5	10.0
Equipment								0.8	0.8	0.8	10.0
Vanik										10.0	10.0
Perkins										44.0	89.0
Total	222.5	224.9	281.0	289.0	315.6	402.2	316.7	341.9	443.9	518.7	633.3

\*House Appropriation

\*\*USDA Estimates

The uncontrollable budget items primarily are Section 32 and Section 416, both dealing with commodities. These are determined by crop or animal production conditions, or by the miscalculation of some food processor's general manager. Even this is somewhat misleading since the budget proposals will contain target expenditure figures for these items, and the target figure usually is very close to the actual expenditure figure.

Sharp differences between the Executive budget and the congressional appropriation will be found on new programs, an experience in child nutrition which did not occur until the 1960's. In 1962, the Congress enacted Section 11 at the request of the Administration to provide more cash grants for free lunches to schools with enrollments of children from poverty-level families. But the Appropriation Committees could not be convinced to fund this section until 1966.

Funding of the Child Nutrition Act, which even the Administration proposed at nominal levels, was cut by the Appropriation Committees in 1967 and 1968. The difference in relation to the total amount of federal resources allocated to child feeding is measureable only in fractions.

The significance of the differences, however, is in the "go slow" attitude of the Appropriations Committees, a position they defend with the argument that the agency needed more experience before more funds should be authorized.

While the Appropriation Committees tell the Administration to go slow on Section 11 or on the school breakfast and other child nutrition programs, there is no similar record of caution on funds to purchase

meat when cattle prices fall or to buy frozen orange concentrate when a surplus in the citrus crop exists.

The budget pattern for expenditures of Section 32 and Section 416 under the child feeding programs is incoherent unless it is viewed in relation to production conditions, at least until 1968.

For example, Section 32 expenditures in 1953 were \$51.7 million compared to \$13 million in 1952. Spending jumped again in 1954 to \$94 million and then dropped back to \$27 million in 1955. The variations are understandable only because beef prices dropped significantly in 1954-55. The same situation was repeated in 1965 when Section 32 expenditures rose to \$173 million from the previous year's level of \$43.6 million and then fell again in 1966 to \$49.4 million. School children in 1965 were again called to eat their way through excessive supplies of hamburgers and beef roasts.

The conventional approach to budgeting for child feeding began to change in 1968 and 1969, when the public and its champions were bringing home to Washington the message that there were millions of hungry and malnourished Americans. For example, Section 32 and Section 416 expenditures were at near record levels for both years, with no particular commodity surplus to explain why. In 1969, \$44 million was provided from Section 32 by the Congress to strengthen the school lunch program. Neither the Administration nor the Appropriation Committees, however, originally had proposed the increase. The funds to provide more free meals, breakfasts, and food service equipment were added through adroit legislative



engineering of Representative Carl Perkins, Chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee.

In addition, underscoring the casual attitude to these very real problems, appropriations to fund child feeding programs for the 1969-70 school year were not approved by the Congress until mid-November and had not been signed by the President and thus released to the states even as Thanksgiving week began. This has not been an uncommon experience for the school lunch program in the past decade. If the states appear indifferent to the existence of hunger among children, the attitude may be a reflection of that at the highest levels of government.

It is difficult to predict what future changes will occur. On the basis of the record, it is obvious that states and local school officials have a valid complaint that federal assistance is inadequate and unpredictable, and any kind of planning is difficult and unnecessarily complicated. And it is obvious that millions of American children still are hungry every day.

APPENDIX I

FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR CHILD NUTRITION

1. School Lunch Prog. :

The National School Lunch Act of 1946 (amended in 1962 and 1968) provides grants to states through the Department of Agriculture for "... the establishment, maintenance, operation, and expansion of non-profit school-lunch programs." Schools are required to serve lunches free or at a reduced price to students whom local school authorities consider unable to pay full cost. The USDA has set the general criteria for need to include family income (including welfare grants), family size, and the number of school children in the family, among others. More specifically, free or reduced price lunches should be given to children from public assistance families, such as Aid for Dependent Children; those who receive food stamps or commodities; or do not get welfare assistance but have a comparable income. USDA regulations encourage simplified application forms and flexibility in granting free or reduced price lunches to those in temporary financial distress.

School districts must prepare and publish a statement of the criteria to be used for free and reduced price lunches. It must specify the officials who determine the child's eligibility and the procedural steps in their decision. The school must have a system which allows appeals in individual cases.

Names of children who receive free or reduced price lunches "will

not be published, posted, or announced in any manner to other children" nor can students be required to use a separate lunchroom, lunchtime, serving line, entrance, or medium of exchange. They cannot be required to work for their meal, according to regulation.

The Act specifies that cash payments will be made to schools which serve Type A lunches or those designed to furnish between one-third and one-half of the children's daily nutritional needs. Regulations specify this as: one-half pint of fluid whole milk served as a beverage; two ounces of lean meat, poultry, fish or cheese, or one-half cup of cooked dry beans or peas, or four tablespoons of peanut butter; a three-fourth cup serving of two or more fruits and/or vegetables; one slice of whole grain or enriched bread, or a serving of cornbread, biscuits, rolls, muffins, etc., made of whole grain or enriched meal or flour; two teaspoons of butter or fortified margarine. The Type A lunch may also be served without milk. A Type C lunch is one-half pint of fluid whole milk.

Section 4 of the National School Lunch Act authorizes funds for reimbursement of the cost of food to the schools. The maximum allowed administratively is 9 cents, but the maximum which the USDA budgets and the Congress appropriates is 4.5 cents. Where a school agrees to serve free or reduced price lunches to all needy children, the state agency administering the funds may reimburse the schools for all lunches served at a maximum rate of twenty cents; or a school may elect to continue the regular nine cent maximum and, in addition, be reimbursed at a maximum rate of twenty-five cents for all free or reduced price lunches served, or a total allowable maximum of 34 cents

for free or reduced price lunches.

Section 11, added to the Act in 1962, authorizes more cash grants to schools "... drawing attendance from areas in which poor economic conditions exist." Schools receiving these funds are reimbursed at either a maximum rate of twenty cents from Section 11 funds if all needy children in the school receive free or reduced price lunches, or 25 cents for each free or reduced price lunch served.

The average cost of a school lunch in the 1969-70 school year is estimated at about 60 cents, with food costs taking 36 to 38 cents. The present Act puts the burden for labor, equipment and other costs, including the portion of food costs not paid by federal grants, on states and local school districts.

## 2. The Breakfast Program

The Child Nutrition Act of 1966 authorizes a pilot school breakfast administered by the USDA. Participating schools are reimbursed at a maximum rate of fifteen cents for each meal served. Free or at a reduced price meals are provided to children whom local school authorities consider unable to pay the full price. The administrative criteria includes family income (including welfare grants), size, and the number of school children in the family. Where a school serves all or nearly all the students free breakfasts but cannot adequately finance the program, the Department of Agriculture will assume up to 80 percent of all meal costs, including purchase, preparation and serving the food.

Each breakfast by regulation must contain at least: one-half pint of fluid whole milk; one-half cup of fruit or full strength fruit or vegetable juice; a slice of bread or its equivalent in cornbread, biscuits, flour, or three-fourths cup serving of whole grain, enriched, or fortified cereal; and, as often as possible, protein-rich foods such as eggs, meat, fish, poultry, cheese, or peanut butter.

### 3. Surplus Commodities

In addition to cash grants, the USDA also provides food commodities to schools--an average of about 12 cents worth per meal currently--under these major authorities:

\*Section 416 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, which allows price supported commodities--wheat (flour), rice, butter, beans, cheese, dry milk, corn (meal)--to be distributed to schools;

\*Section 32 of Public Law 74-320, which authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to spend up to 30 percent of U. S. customs receipts. Funds can be used for several purposes, primarily the purchase of farm commodities which are not price supported, including meat, poultry, eggs, fruits and vegetables, among others, and distribute them to needy individuals and to schools.

\*Section 6 of the National School Lunch Act authorizes the Secretary to spend an amount as determined by the Congress to purchase food commodities specifically for school lunch purposes.

At present, the Section 6 appropriation is \$69 million;

\*Section 210 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 allows commodities

for state correctional institutions for minors, Public Law 75-165 for non-profit summer camps for children, and Public Law 86-756 for use in home economics courses in elementary and secondary schools.

4. Nonfood Assistance

Section 5 of the National School Lunch Act authorizes grants for nonfood assistance, i.e., equipment used in "...storing, preparing, or serving food for school children." Additional funds can be given to schools "...drawing attendance from areas in which poor economic conditions exist" for equipment to store, prepare, transport and serve food. At least 25 percent of equipment costs must be paid by state or local authorities.

5. Section 13, The Vanik Program

Public Law 90-302, passed on May 8, 1968, technically as Section 13 of the National School Lunch Act, authorizes funds for food service grants to public and private non-profit child case institutions serving areas where "poor economic conditions exist" or "where there are high concentrations of working mothers." These include day care centers, settlement houses, recreational centers and day care centers for handicapped children. The program applies to public and private institutions and to special summer programs with food services similar to those available under the national school lunch or school breakfast programs during the school year. In cases of severe need, the federal grant may cover a maximum of 80 percent of the operating costs. Funds for nonfood are also authorized. The federal government will pay up

to 75 percent of the cost to rent or purchase equipment, not including land or buildings.

One or more of the following meals can be served: breakfast, lunch, supper and between meal snacks. Breakfast and lunch requirements are the same as school meals. The supplemental--snack--food must include a serving of milk or full strength fruit or vegetable juice and a serving of whole grain or enriched bread, rolls or cereal. Protein-rich foods--peanut butter, cheese--should be served as often as possible. Maximum rates of reimbursement are thirty cents for lunches. Meals are served free or at a reduced price to those whom local program directors say are unable to pay the full cost.

6. Section 25, The Perkins Bill

The Perkins Bill, or Section 25 of the Agricultural Appropriations Act of 1967, authorized \$45 million from Section 32 for food service for needy children. The amount was in addition to the regular appropriation items requested by the administration and initially provided by the Appropriation Committees. The fund is called the Perkins fund because the Kentucky congressman introduced and brought through the House a bill to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to use \$100 million of Section 32 money. The Appropriation Committees agreed to add \$45 million as a compromise which the Congress accepted.

7. ESEA Title I Funds

Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 provides financial assistance to schools serving areas with concentrations of low-income families. The program is designed for

educationally deprived children. The maximum grant to a local educational agency is determined by multiplying 50 percent of the average state or national per pupil expenditure, whichever is greater, by the total number of students ages five to seventeen:

- a. whose families earn less than \$2,000 per year;
- b. whose families earn more than \$2,000 per year but who receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children;
- c. who live in institutions for neglected or delinquent children, other than those in which a state agency is directly responsible for providing free public education; and
- d. who live in foster homes supported by public funds. If there is any money remaining after maximum grants have been allocated to eligible schools, the maximum family income for eligible children becomes \$3,000 per year. For the school to receive any money, the total number of students eligible for Title I funds must exceed ten.

In its application for funds the school must describe specific projects for educationally deprived children residing in areas with high concentrations of low-income families. Projects should help educationally deprived children who require the greatest assistance, but no children should be excluded from the project if they are not from low-income families. "Educationally deprived children" are those needing special educational assistance to attain a scholastic level appropriate for their age. The term includes those handicapped (mentally retarded, impaired in hearing, vision, speech, or other health problems, and seriously disturbed emotionally) or whose special



needs arise from "poverty, neglect, delinquency, or cultural or linguistic isolation from the community at large." The money may be used to construct facilities necessary to the success of the project. Title I money may be used for feeding programs, and over \$30 million was used in school feeding in fiscal 1969.

8. The Migrant Program

Public Law 89-750, enacted in 1966--an amendment to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act--allocates separate funds for the education of children from migrant families. Children who move at least once during the school year are eligible if their parents work in agriculture or a related occupation (e.g., canning). About 200,000 children in forty-five states participate. Special spring and summer programs are conducted in northern states during the peak of migrant labor activity there, with extended day instruction in the southern states in the regular school year. Of the \$45 million spent on the program in fiscal year 1969, about \$3.1 million was used for lunches and snacks.

9. Project Head Start

Project Head Start, delegated to HEW's Office of Child Development, has two programs for pre-school children from low-income families. One is a year-round program for children between three and five years of age. The other is a smaller program during the summer for children entering elementary school in the fall. Feeding programs in projects differ, but most have at least a hot lunch and a morning or afternoon snack. Commodities from the USDA are to be utilized

extensively. Breakfasts are to be provided for those who don't get them at home, although Head Start, which involves the parents as much as possible, encourages family breakfasts.

OEO pays up to 80 percent of the total costs, or an even greater percentage in very poor communities. The eligibility requirement is a family income below the poverty level (e.g., the Social Security Administration's \$3,400 for a family of four.)

APPENDIX II

BASIS FOR CALCULATIONS ON PERKINS FUND - TABLE B

20 School days/month  
180 School days/year  
9 Months in school year

September - 180(9)	January - 100(5)	May - 20(1)
October - 160(8)	February - 80(4)	
November - 140(7)	March - 60(3)	
December - 120(6)	April - 40(2)	

- A. To determine number of F/RP lunches possible on average daily basis.
1. Multiply amount spent by 4 (25¢ payment/lunch).
  2. Divide by number of days listed opposite month given as starting time for Perkins program.
- B. To determine number of lunches (average daily basis) converted by state.
1. Multiply November average daily F/RP lunch figure by 9. (November is the last month unaffected in all states by Perkins program, and is generally a typical month).
  2. Multiply A<sub>2</sub> above by the number in parenthesis after the month listed as starting time for Perkins program.
  3. Add B<sub>1</sub> and B<sub>2</sub> above, and divide by 9.
  4. If B<sub>3</sub> is larger than the average daily number of free or reduced price lunches served by the state, the difference is assumed to be the number of lunches converted on the average daily basis for the year.
  5. Multiply B<sub>4</sub> by the number of months the Perkins program was not in operation in the state, and divide the total by the number of months the program was in operation.
  6. Add the figures for B<sub>5</sub> and B<sub>4</sub> to obtain a number which approximates the average daily number of lunches converted during the period of operation of the Perkins program.
- C. To determine percent of Perkins funds diverted by state.
1. Divide B<sub>6</sub> by A<sub>2</sub>.

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