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Abstract
                Procedures for the operation of the
Political-Military Exercise (PME) are detailed in this
handbook as a means of involving political science students
in the actual dynamics of international policy-making
decisions through the PME game experience. Two basic
designs for operating the simulation exercise are presented
with a discussion of the format alternatives, facilities,
materials, and administrative techniques required for each
design. The first design, a 1- or 2-day concentrated game,
supplements regular classroom procedures; the second
substitutes the PME format for normal classroom activity
during a major portion of the course. The possible impact
of the game on students, a student evaluation of the two
methods, and recommendations for research into the
effectiveness of the PME as a teaching device are also
discussed. Appendices provide examples of documents
necessary for operating both designs of the PME; student
newspaper accounts and a student history of the Middle
Eastern exercises; a PME evaluation questionnaire for
students; and a bibliography on games and simulation
techniques, on international law, and on contemporary
problems in international relations and national security.
(JB)

Final Report

Project No. 6-8964
Contract No. OEC-3-7-068964-2199

THE POLITICAL-MILITARY EXERCISE AS A

TEACHING DEVICE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE:

A HANDBOOK

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1969

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SUMMARY

This report sets forth procedures for the operation of
Political-Military Exercises in the classroom situation.
The Political-Military Exercise (PME) is a type of simulation
of international relations that has been developed at the
RAND Corporation, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
and other institutions for use in research and teaching.
Two simplified procedures are developed here for use of the
PME in the teaching of international relations and foreign
policy courses.

The first of the two closely related procedures repre-
sents the use of the simulation as a supplementary operation
outside the regular classroom environment during a one or
two day period. The second reports experience attempting
to integrate the PME with course material for repeated and
evolutionary use during the course, substituting for conven-
tional classroom activities.

After a consideration of factors that may influence
choice of format by the prospective user, the facilities,
materials and procedures of the two types of exercise are
discussed in detail. Some consideration of the impact of
the simulation on student participants and evaluative
problems are discussed. The project was primarily directed
at formulation of a handbook of procedures, and so the
evaluation of the technique is recommended as further research.
Appendices provide programmatic examples of the necessary
documentation for operation of the exercise in either form.

The report and its appendices will serve as a handbook
for those interested in the use of the Political-Military
Exercise variety of simulation in political sciences courses
dealing with international relations, foreign policy, and
related areas.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Political-Military Exercise (PME) is a method of simulation, one of several varieties that have been experimentally used in the teaching of social science courses.[1] Tracing its origins to the practice of military war games,[2] the addition of political aspects to tactical games is attributed to the Total War Research Institute, established in Japan in 1940.[3] There, prior to Japan's entry into World War II, the Japanese "gamed" both international and tactical situations anticipating future events in the real world. Further development of the techniques of war games and political gaming by the RAND Corporation[4] was adapted at M.I.T. and such other institutions as the U.S. Military and Air Force Academies, Columbia University and the University of Wisconsin both for research and teaching purposes.[5] The teaching

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[1]The availability of simulations has expanded rapidly and the interested reader is referred to the bibliography for more comprehensive listing. International processes are simulated in Harold Guetzkow and Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Inter-Nation Simulation Kit (Chicago: Science Research Associates, 1966); Oliver Benson, "A Simple Diplomatic Game," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 504-10; and E.S. Munger, Bruce R. Abell, and Willard G. Manning, Jr., The CalTech Political Military Exercise (Pasadena: Division of Humanities and Social Studies, California Institute of Technology, 1967). See also Harold Guetzkow et al., Simulation in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), especially pp. 190-223.

[2]A history of gaming techniques is available in Sidney F. Giffin, The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict (New York: Doubleday, 1965), but it is heavily slanted toward the military antecedents.

[3]See Robert D. Specht, "War Games," Memorandum P-1041, March 18, 1957 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation), pp. 1-4.

[4]Specht, op. cit.; "Experimental Research on Political Gaming," Memorandum P-1540-RC, November 10, 1958 (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation); and H. Goldhamer and H. Speier, "Some Observations on Political Gaming," World Politics, Vol. XII (October 1959), pp. 71-83.

[5]The development of the M.I.T. game has been reported in several places over the years. See, for example, Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Norman J. Padelford, "Three Experiments in

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applications of the PME, for reasons implicit in its title, have been primarily in courses on international relations and foreign policy, although variations on the PME and other types of simulations have found use in courses on comparative politics, American government, and urban studies.[6] This report concerns the experience of several years experimentation with the Political-Military Exercise, both as a supplementary and as a more integral instructional method. Its objective is to make the technique more widely available to those unfamiliar with its operation, and to provide some standardized guidelines for a framework within which the PME may be evaluated.[7]

The terminology surrounding the theory and practice of simulation in political science remains unsettled, and the following background does not aim at precise usage.[8] One introductory point that should be made is that the frequent use of the term "game" in reference to simulations does not necessarily imply that they rest upon the body of thought known as "game theory." Insofar as game theory is a useful

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Political Gaming," American Political Science Review, Vol. LIII (December 1959), pp. 1105-15; Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton S. Whaley, "The Political Military Exercise: A Progress Report," Orbis, Vol. VIII (Winter 1965), pp. 854-870; and Giffin, op. cit., pp. 68-88. Bernard C. Cohen's critical observations on his experience at the University of Wisconsin are reported in "Political Gaming in the Classroom," Journal of Politics, Vol. 24 (May 1962), pp. 367-81.

[6]For example, Marvin G. Weinbaum and Louis H. Gold, Presidential Election: A Simulation with Readings (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, forthcoming): Urban Systems Simulations, City I (Washington: Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies, 1968); and H. Roberts Coward, Bradbury Seasholes, Marshall Whithed and Robert C. Wood, Woodbury: A Simulated Mayoral Election, unpublished documents, Division of Special Interdisciplinary Studies, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.

[7]Hayward R. Alker, Jr. and Ronald D. Brunner have compared certain theoretical bases and operative features of the PME with the Northwestern INS and the Raytheon TEMPER simulations (Simulating International Conflict: A Comparison of Three Approaches, mimeographed, Yale University, 1966), suggesting that the structural emphasis upon general principles of international relations in the INS model may have more appeal as a teaching instrument than the unprogrammed theoretical and historical inputs brought to the PME by its participants. The Political-Military Exercise has not been subjected to

analytical tool as applied to political science, it can appro-
priately be used to analyze a simulation such as the Political-
Military Exercise that attempts to simulate political events.
However, as Richard E. Quandt has pointed out, the resemblance
between "games" and "game theory" is largely confined to the[9]
fact that both deal with strategies and strategic responses.[9]

Simulations are efforts to represent some aspect of the
real world--with the implication of dynamic processes--under
controlled conditions for the purpose of observation or manip-
ulation. In the social sciences these efforts may involve
varying degrees of abstraction and sophistication, and vary-
ing mixes of men and computers. The Political-Military
Exercise simulates the environment of international relations
by placing participants on small teams representing the major
policy-makers of several nations with the remainder of the
world being played by a Control Team.

After preliminary assignments preparing the players for
the roles they are to take in the Exercise, the available
time is divided into alternating "Move Periods" and "Control
Periods," a technique adopted after early continuous action
games occasionally became too chaotic. The participants are
initially provided with a scenario of the world situation for
game purposes to which the national teams must respond as they
believe would be appropriate on the part of the nation they
are playing. The scenario generally, but not necessarily,
includes the elements of a crisis situation (hence the use
by some of the term "Crisis Game").[10] These reactions are
developed into team moves during the Move Period by formulating

comparison with other instructional techniques, however, as the
INS model has: James A. Robinson et al., "Teaching with Inter-
Nation Simulation and Case Studies," American Political Science
Review, Vol. 60 (March 1966), pp. 53-65.

[8]See James A. Robinson, "Simulation and Games" in Peter
H. Rossi and Bruce J. Biddle, The New Media and Education
(Chicago: Aldine, 1966).

[9]"On the Use of Game Models in Theories of International
Relations," in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (eds.), The
International System (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1961), p. 71n.

[10]Giffin, op. cit.

written messages directed either to other teams or to Control.
The Control Team receives all these messages at the end of
the Move Period and, during the succeeding Control Period,
restructures the world situation to take account of the
national team actions. At the same time, Control intervenes
in the restructuring through its function of representing
those parts of the world not played by individual teams and
in the role of Nature. The restructuring is made known through
individual messages and a general situation report outlined in
a game newspaper. These are distributed to the various teams
and "game time" is usually advanced for the following Move
Period.

Alternating Move and Control periods continue through the
available time and the "crisis" develops. At the close of
the final Move Period action is terminated without consider-
ation as to whether any crisis has been resolved. Several
evaluative activities may then be used in order to relate the
game experience to substantive course content.

The exercise thus differs from the so-called "mock" arrange-
ments frequently used for pedagogical purposes in at least
two significant ways. First, in the matter of role-playing,
it has generally been found desirable that participants con-
centrate their energies upon the generic role and its decision-
making context (Premier of the Soviet Union, U.S. Secretary of
State, etc.) rather than trying to play the role of a specific
person (Nikita Khruschev, Dean Rusk, etc.) holding the office
at the posited time of the exercise. Second, the players must
deal with a dynamic model of the decision-making environment
that includes the multiplicity of variables and constraints
associated with the "real world," particularly the relevant
power relationships. In this simulation of capabilities and
constraints the exercise is similar to the military war game
but adds other elements of power to the variables to be con-
sidered through the inclusion of the political dimension.

Student response to simulation experiences is generally
marked by great enthusiasm, results that are replicated by
activities reported here (See Chapter V: Student Response
and Evaluation). The game experience with the PME appears to
give the student a better understanding of the policy-making
process and its environment than can be engendered by other
available methods, principally by relating the abstract mater-
ials of the textbook and classroom to the "real world." No
amount of lecturing on the theory of governmental organization
and the function of intelligence can communicate adequately
the problems of a policy-maker called upon to make a crucial
foreign policy decision in the absence of what he would re-
gard as adequate information. Thus, one important affect upon
students is a new sense of the difficulties facing the decision-
maker and the complexities of the world with which he must
deal. Charles Burton Marshall notes that empathy can be use-

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ful, even for persons far more knowledgeable than the average high school or college student.[11]

> "... The simulated President of the United States, [played by "a distinguished writer on world affairs"] acquitted himself admirably. He was sobered by the experience, however: appalled by the goadings of Destiny in the guise of a control group, baffled by having to act in face of debatable data, shaken by a sense of the irrevocability of every act, and disconcerted, more-over, in finding himself--an inveterate and accomplished critic of responsible magistrates--expressing himself and acting in the manner of the objects of his criti-cism. Assuming the role had made a difference. ..."

Expectations of increased interest, attitude change and increased learning and retention cannot be presently confirmed, however. Some initial studies comparing simulation with other instructional techniques produced results mildly favor-ing simulation, primarily in the area of stimulating student interest and involvement.[12] Indicated advantages in convey-ing content have not shown up at significant levels in avail-able studies, a finding that parallels her research on various teaching methods.[13] The research thus far undertaken has dealt with more highly structured and abstract simulations than the PME.[14]

In spite of the lack of definitive evidence favoring sim-ulation over other instructional techniques, or one form of simulation over another, the original purpose of the project reported here--to set forth the basic design and administrative techniques of the PME--seems even more pertinent as student discontent over the "irrelevance" of much of their course work has increased in recent years. There is little reason to believe that the PME is less effective than alternative use of class time, and at least some to believe that it may have some advantages. The final evaluation must be left to further work.

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[11]The Exercise of Sovereignty (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 90.

[12]Robinson et al., op. cit. (A.P.S.R.). A summary of evaluative research is given in Cleo H. Cherryholmes, "Some Current Research on Effectiveness of Educational Simulations: Implications for Alternative Strategies," The American Behavioral Scientists, October 1966, pp. 4-7.

[13]Ibid., p. 6; Robinson et al., op. cit., p. 65; W.J. McKeachie, "Research and Teaching at the College and University Level," in N.L. Gage (ed.), Handbook of Research and Teaching (Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1963), 1118-72.

One of the principal objections to the Political-Military Exercise has been that it is an expensive and time-consuming method of instruction.[15] Indeed, the available descriptions of the M.I.T. political exercise have been oriented toward the elaborate circumstances of a research game using professional participants.[16] One purpose of this report is to set forth the procedural details of operating a PME so that its use need not be particularly burdensome. Although empirical questions remain to be answered concerning varying effectiveness under different circumstances, the experience reported here covers sufficient variation in the availability of facilities to indicate that, with appropriate modifications of the general format, the PME can be used und conditions ranging from informal classroom use to elaborate laboratory facilities.

Two principal formats were used during the course of th project. The first, which lays out the basic framework of the Political-Military Exercise, represents a simplified version of the M.I.T. political exercise to supplement regular classroom lectures and discussions. The design is based upc the premise that a separate and consecutive time period is set aside outside the classroom for the operation of the exe cise and that most of the content of the course is treated i a conventional classroom fashion.

In a more experimental fashion, modifications of the basic design were made in order to integrate the gaming expe ence with the course materials. There are a number of diffe ways in which this procedure might be developed: classroom experimenters may wish to attempt variations on the method reported here. Some of the parameters leading to the design are discussed in more detail in Chapter I. During the pro-ject three classes were taught with the integral format, eac having two exercises conducted over an extended period durir classroom time. The primary objective was to integrate the simulation experience with the content of a basic course in international relations.

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[14]Cherryholmes, op.cit.

[15]Cohen, op.cit., p. 379; Bloomfield and Padelford, op. cit., pp.1114-15; T.C. Schelling, "Experimental Games and Bargaining Theory," in Knorr and Verba, op.cit., p. 47.

[16]E.g., Bloomfield and Whaley, op.cit.

Which format may appeal to the prospective administrator of a Political-Military Exercise will depend upon many factors, including class size, academic calendar, departmental resources, and the personal predilections of the teacher. Pending more scientific validation, the reader must determine for himself whether the value of the experience makes the simulation a worthwhile investment of his own and students' time.

II. THE POLITICAL-MILITARY EXERCISE: TWO DESIGNS

Two methods of using the Political-Military Exercise
(PME) in the classroom are presented in this report. The
first, the supplementary game, is a concentrated and tightly
organized simulation that most closely resembles the pro-
fessional games utilized by government agencies and research
orr izations.[1] Some of the procedures have been simplified,
largely because such outputs as a detailed game history and
in depth exploration of policy issues by researchers are not
necessarily desired. The format is also based upon the
assumption that the simulation experience will be concentrated
in a period that does not exceed one day in length, while
research games generally require a longer period in order to
develop the issues being explored to a useful degree.[2]

The alternative format will be referred to as the "Inte-
gral Exercise" and is the result of an effort to make the
simulation experience a more frequent and developmental class-
room experience. The procedures described in this report
have been developed over a number of years in experimentation
with the PME at M.I.T., the Ohio State University, and Case
Western Reserve University.

At the outset, it was not entirely clear to what degree
and in what ways the PME could be integrated into the daily
conduct of a course. Possibilities ranged from nearly com-
plete substitution of gaming for usual classroom activities
to the use of simulation in the manner of the conventional
laboratory adjunct to science courses. In practice, the
extremes were necessarily compromised by the constraints
imposed by conventional social science crediting and schedul-
ing practices, and by the necessity of special room facilities.
The laboratory parallel was evident, however, particularly
in the use of elaborate facilities at the Ohio State University
Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, with the consequence that
some student participants suggested that administrative treat-
ment of simulation as a laboratory adjunct to the course
with appropriate credits would be better than the use reported
here.

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[1]See Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, "The Political-
Military Exercise: A Progress Report," Orbis, Vol. VIII
(Winter 1965), pp. 854-70, especially p. 857.

[2]Ibid., p. 859. The time period may be divided between
an evening and the following morning instead of being con-
centrated within one calendar day, however.

The integral format finally adopted resulted in two PMEs, each extending over a period of two to three weeks, substituting for regular class time during each quarter or semester. The procedures are very similar to those used in the supplementary format, with minor modifications resulting from the more leisurely pace at which the simulation operates. In an introductory course in international relations, it was found useful to use the first game to illustrate the basic concepts of the field following an intensive period of reading and class discussion of conceptual material. The second exercise, using the practiced student veterans of this first illustration, focused upon a more specific problem with a crisis setting.

This format is not radically different from class time operations tried earlier.[3] The two principal differences lay in the developmental nature of the exercise and in the way the simulations, particularly the first, were tied into the course material. In the first instance, the students did not expect to do their best simulation of reality at the outset, but to improve their skills while digesting the course material and the game experience. In the second, the material and the experience were tied together by frequent discussion, involving interruption of the game and sometimes a setting back of the clock. Such actions worked well enough for the purpose of the first game, but they can badly disrupt the feeling of realism once students get into the swing of things.

There are other ways in which one might attempt integral use of simulation in coursework. The PME is sufficiently flexible that it could be adopted to a more specifically laboratory role; or it would be possible to play several small games in parallel, testing different theories in international relations. Several factors influenced the designs presented here, and some of these may influence the prospective user in the choice of format. These factors may generally be grouped under institutional resources and administrative constraints.

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[3]Bernard C. Cohen, "Political Gaming in the Classroom," Journal of Politics, Vol. 24 (May 1962), pp. 367-81.

A. Institutional Resources

In general, the smaller the school the more likely it is that circumstances will militate against the use of the supplementary game. The concentration of resources necessary for a one day operation places heavy demands upon the Game Director and the Control function. As a consequence, it is necessary to have a team of four to six to serve as Control, while the Game Director spends much of his time dealing with the inevitable crises in the mechanics of the game. In a large university context it is seldom difficult to recruit a number of competent faculty and graduate student volunteers to participate in such an operation, but such resources may not be available in a small institution, although they can sometimes be imported.

The other major resource necessary is a suitable physical setting for the exercise. Although it is possible to operate a small game within a single large room, the requirement of security for each team's deliberations suggests an individual room to serve as headquarters for each. In some institutions this can be solved through use of a facility such as the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory at Ohio State (used for part of this project) or Purdue University. If gaming is to achieve widespread use, however, it clearly cannot be designed to be dependent upon such elaborate and seldom available facilities. The problem is usually solved by taking over a complex of offices or classrooms outside normal hours. This suggests certain restraints; for repeated intrusion into faculty office space as required by the integral format is not likely to be welcomed, and it may not be possible to schedule such a course in the evening hours when the empty classroom complex may be available.

In terms of financial resources, the integral format is the less expensive operation to mount, although even the supplementary game is unlikely to exceed $50 in cost, including secretarial assistance during the game. A supplementary game sometimes requires special janitorial service arrangements, secretarial help in running duplicating machines, and places demands upon the time of about a half dozen professional persons for Control and administration. Rapid action and concentration of activities make the supplementary game vulnerable to improvisations gone wrong--although this is not a _prima facie_ reason for not improvising.

Because the integral game is spread out over a greater period of time it is easier for one person to cope with. A single faculty member can usually manage the Control function in an hour or two of time between class sessions (depending upon his background and its relevance to the exercise). Secretarial assistance may be used within regular hours, and there is more flexibility and time in which to improvise.

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Although graduate assistance was available to this project during the two quarters of integral format experimentation, a third session was managed entirely by the Project Director. This was assisted by the use of several closely supervised students on the Control Team.

Resources are thus a matter for consideration in deciding upon the game format or, indeed, whether to attempt mounting a PME at all. Exciting and eminently successful games have been played using a wide range of available resources, however. They may be shoestring operations using mimeographed message forms and a subdivided auditorium or gymnasium; or involve pre-printed message forms, paid consultants, and laboratories with complex communications equipment.

B. Administrative Restraints

Class size is the most important of administrative constraints bearing upon use of the PME. Because of the facilities at the Ohio State Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, the supplementary games reported here were generally limited to between thirty and forty students. Very much larger games of this type have been run with great success,[4] but matters do become rather unwieldy when the number of students rises sixty. A Control Team may find it difficult to cope with the output of more than eight teams, causing the system to "overload." At the same time, when teams grow larger than six or seven students, problems arise in the division of roles and organization of the team, unless the team represents a multinational grouping. There are serious problems, then, in coping with very large numbers of students.

Different problems arise with small numbers, however. Certain specialized games involving such situations as a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union may lend themselves to a two-team game. For most scenarios, however, fewer than four teams give rise to a phenomenon of "over-control" in which the national team participants over-rationalize their problems as the actions of an omnipresent and malevolent Control. In most PMEs some participants begin to see themselves as playing "against" Control rather than other national teams with conflicting objectives;

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[4]The CalTech PME of 1967 involved one hundred participants and a game within a game. See E.S. Munger, Bruce R. Abell and Willard G. Manning, Jr., The CalTech Political Military Exercise (Pasadena: California Institute of Technology, 1967).

but an absence of other teams as sources of troubling acts focuses hostility upon the Control function more than usual in a small game. Particularly in a teaching exercise this can have the unfortunate affect of diverting students from careful consideration of the consequences of their strategies and acts in the simulated international politics to the rationalization of the problems faced in their simulation roles as a game artifact.

The best solution appears to be six to eight teams of four to seven students each.[5] This sets class size limits of from twenty-five to fifty as the most effective range for operating a PME. Within this, the supplementary format tends to operate best with larger numbers, while the integral game requires fewer numbers and less outside assistance.

The curriculum may be of some importance in the ways in which gaming is used in the classroom. Four of the five experiences reported here involved an introductory international relations course that was taught on the assumption that the larger percentage of students would not take other courses in the field. There was therefore little time in which to experiment with other forms of simulation if the "real world" orientation of the PME was to be experienced. A simulation oriented curriculum in international relations might well involve the use of the simplified and abstract Inter-Nation Simulation (INS) in order to instill basic principles of international politics,[6] then attempt a supplementary PME, finally moving the integral format for student exploration of particular problems on an almost independent basis at an advanced level.

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[5]Bloomfield and Whaley (op.cit., p. 858), suggest somewhat smaller numbers, a reflection of the different purposes involved in a professional operation.

[6]In spite of the suggestion of Alker and Brunner reported in Chapter I (Note 7), there is a danger in this. It lies in the problem of students memorizing the structural relationships provided by the simulation rather than learning about international processes through discovery. It is possible that the unprogrammed nature of these relationships in the PME makes it less vulnerable to this problem than the INS. See Cleo H. Cherryholmes, "Some Current Research on Effectiveness of Educational Simulations:...," The American Behavioral Scientist, October 1966, pp. 6-7.

Such intensive use of simulation would undoubtedly depend upon more substantive evidence of its value than is presently available. The most relevant point here is that the more sophisticated the students are with respect to political concepts, policy-making procedures, and similar materials, the sooner games under the integral format can be used to develop second order thinking. Both the supplementary and integral formats worked well for a basic international relations course, but not all instructors may find simulation illustrations a congenial method of dealing with basic concepts. The less sophisticated the students are, on the other hand, the greater the "poetic license" to be extended in the operation of the game. Infelicities in diplomatic prose are often more easily forgotten in pressures of a supplementary game!

The writer has not experimented with the use of a PME at the secondary school level, although some experiments were tried with entering freshmen in a course on the social sciences. Using the integral format, the experiment generated a fair degree of enthusiasm and some fairly silly moves. (In our experience, undergraduates tend to "blow up the world" by the end of a game about two-thirds of the time, graduate students, one-third, and professionals almost never!) An entirely impressionistic judgment would be that the supplementary format would provide the atmosphere of high politics and role-playing that are likely to be of greater interest to the secondary school student than the more theoretical aspects of international relations.

The final administrative constraint that appeared relevant during this project was the academic calendar. Scheduling procedures for social science courses ordinarily demand that simulation time under the integral format be taken from regular class hours. To ask otherwise of students would, in all fairness, require a reallocation of credits assigned to the course. To run two games under the pressure cooker pace of the ten week course on the quarter calendar leaves precious little time--less than half the course--in class hours for conventional classroom activities, including organization and discussion of the simulations. The latter are indispensable, too, if the game is to serve legitimate instructional purposes rather than being a mere diversion for the students. Simulations are like any other instructional device: they will not substitute for disciplined thinking on the part of the teacher and interaction between students and teacher.

Student evaluations (See Chapter V.) of quarter-long courses appeared generally satisfied with the balance between classroom and simulation activities. However, our feeling was very definitely that the more leisurely pace of a semester length course was better suited to the use of the integral

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format. More time could be spent on basic reading materials early in the semester, and the tension between doing basic readings and undertaking preparatory research for the initial simulation was lessened. For the faculty member, uneasiness concerning the balance between games and classwork was eased. This appraisal is again impressionistic, and cannot be taken as a determining factor in decisions on usage and format. Note also, that although the quarter system tends to work against the integral format, the semester calendar is no hazard to a supplementary game.

One other factor that may influence the choice of format concerns the teacher's expectations about his own role in the exercise and the impact this may have on student learning. Under the integral format, the teacher is Control, even though he may co-opt students into the Control function to assist him. He will dominate the exercise and determine its direction. He will bring his own understanding and assumptions into the exercise as the basic theoretical underpinnings of the simulation, whether these are explicit or not, prepro-grammed or ad hoc. He is therefore more certain that he will be able to make the points he wishes to, and that the game will focus upon those problems that he regards as most important. On the other hand, this heavy reliance upon the instructor may result in undesirable biases, tensions between students and teacher, and overlooking of options at times of significant Control decisions. In the case of the supple-mentary game, the Control function is a collective one with the concomitant advantages of a variety of perspectives. Without a well-oiled administrative staff, however, the teacher may not feel that he can participate in the activities of Control since he must attend to the mechanics of the operation. His absence from the Control team may result in the exercise taking a very different focus and different directions than those most suitable to his instructional pur-poses. In short, the supplementary game certainly can in-fringe upon the autonomy of the teacher in his classroom. In practice, this problem is largely a matter of degree, and the amount of influence the instructor desires over the course of the exercise a question of personal taste and experience.

These factors are summarized in Table 1, with the caveat that none of the variables suggested are of a definitive nature. Simulation in the classroom remains experimental, and it is surely possible for the teacher interested in using this technique to find ways of circumventing some of the problems that arise in any innovation.

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TABLE I

Factors in Choosing a Simulation Format

	Format	
	Supplementary	Integral
Resources:		
1. Faculty	Requires volunteers	Course instructor alone
2. Facilities	More complex	Simpler
3. Financial	More expensive	Less expensive
Administrative factors:		
1. Class size	Larger	Smaller
2. Curriculum	Basic	More advanced
3. Calendar	Quarter	Semester

* * *

Appendices I and II present in a programmatic form the documents that are used to administer a Political-Military Exercise. Many of the directions are either explicitly or implicitly laid out in the outlines and documents, and the following two chapters therefore concentrate more upon an overview of the operation of classroom games than specific procedural aspects.

It has seemed useful in the past to admonish the student participants in an exercise with a point that can be made here. There is a difference between "fun and games" and "games and fun." Games are fun. Therein, for the present, lies their most obvious advantage, for it is increased interest and involvement that consistently shows up in studies of classroom simulation.[7] The fun, however, is but an adjunct of a serious educational activity and cannot be permitted to detract from the instructional purpose of the game. It is fine to approach the simulation with a certain measure of good humor, but not with frivolity. The association of the term "game" with frivolous activities may mean that its usage in connection with simulation is unfortunate, but the term has stuck; and it is well to forestall any attitude problems that may thereby have been created.

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[7]Ibid.

III. RUNNING A SUPPLEMENTARY EXERCISE

Organizing and operating a one-day Political-Military Exercise can appear to be a formidable operation. In fact, once the administrative techniques are in hand, it is not difficult for the teacher to operate a game well within the normal limits of effort that can be devoted to the classroom. Although an exercise generates some paperwork--mostly in the operation of the game itself--much of the advanced planning can be accomplished within a fairly limited period of time. It is possible, in fact, to co-opt students into the planning process in many cases with incumbent advantages of heightened student anticipation. Three phases are involved in preparing a supplementary game: advanced preparation, the running of the game itself, and post-exercise activities to maximize the teaching value of the experience.

A. Advance Preparation

1. Facilities

For the teacher wishing to run a simulation preparation begins with arrangement of appropriate facilities for the game at the appointed date. Facilities should provide a separate headquarters room for each team that is to participate along with a larger space for the activities of Control and a Message Center. The latter may be combined, but to provide a reasonably serene atmosphere for Control's deliberations it is desirable that they be separate but adjacent. Imposing upon the generosity of colleagues for the use of a faculty office complex is often the solution to the facilities problem. This may have additional advantages in the availability of telephones among the offices (provided these are interconnected on a dial basis). A classroom complex of six to eight rooms will serve equally well for the setting. Teams are generally limited to about six members, and so rooms for team headquarters need not be especially large.

Certain game design features presented in this report were influenced to some extent by the availability of a Behavioral Sciences Laboratory at the Ohio State University. The Laboratory provided six small experimental cubicles linked into the complex by telephone and television communications systems. This made it difficult to exceed the number of six teams, but numbers much higher can cause problems in controlling the game. Two offices, also tied into the communications system, were used to house Control and the Message Center, and a larger Laboratory room was used for

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international organization meetings, the proceedings being broadcast by means of television to the individual team headquarters. Teams were permitted to call Control on the telephone system, and Control was able to address all teams simultaneously over a public address system. The teams were not permitted telephonic communication among themselves.

Such facilities represent the ultimate in simulation equipment and are not available at most institutions. Therefore, the office or classroom complex is the ordinary setting for a game. In early PMEs, the involvement of the United Nations or some other international forum ordinarily called for the presence of all teams and Control in the same room. Such sessions were truly plenary! The addition of concurrent meetings held simultaneously with Team Move Periods was influenced by the availability of the communications system in the Ohio State Laboratory. It has been found quite possible to include such meetings with the more prosaic facilities usually available, however. The only necessary difference is to be more certain that the World Times edition following the meeting includes an adequate summary of the events in the international conference.

2. Control

The second necessity for a one day game is a Control Team. This has consisted of four or five faculty members with some knowledge of international relations or other relevant aspects of political science. Although under certain circumstances it might be possible to use advanced undergraduates or graduate students on the Control Team, the pace of a one day exercise is such that it is well to have some degree of professional expertise available. An excess of imagination on the part of Control can lead to an atmosphere of unreality that detracts from the simulation experience, and the pace of the game does not permit detailed research activities in order to fill lacunae in Control's collective knowledge. The potential for such gaps is great, for the Control Team's functions include the play of all countries not represented by student teams, domestic forces in every country, and the source of much intelligence for the teams. In addition, Control must play the forces of nature, rule on the plausibility and consequences of moves as umpire, and oversee the restructuring of the scenario after each Move Period in the omniscient and omnipotent style of a deity.

It is therefore Control that constrains the teams to live with the implications of their actions rather than a preprogrammed set of theoretical rules for the game. Unlike more highly structured simulations such as the Inter-Nation Simulation, the theoretical bases of a PME are not rigidly

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built into the simulation, but are the premises from which
the participants, particularly the Control Team, operate
in their assumptions concerning the nature of international
politics and national policy-making.

As a consequence, the PME does not provide a uniform
experience for its participants. Each PME, involving the
huge number of variables that can be dealt with by a
sizable group of human minds, is different rather than re-
licating other runs. Each participant, too, is likely to
take home with him his own particular sets of lessons.
The principal variables in this are the Control Team inputs,
the scenario of the game, and the roles played by the individ-
ual participant.

The Control Team seldom requires much in the way of
advance preparation. A specific memorandum on game pro-
cedures is suggested in Appendix I as Document #7. This is
an elaboration of the procedures present in Document #4, for
the specific use of Control members. In attempting to
assist busy faculty volunteers to prepare for their role, it
is often helpful to include copies of useful background clip-
pings or other materials that may be readily available with
the complete set of documents sent in advance to Control
members. It is not realistic to expect a great deal of
advance preparation on the part of such people, nor is it
necessary for the purpose of the exercise since it is their
expertise that has been volunteered. One pleasant way of
dealing with the briefing of a Control team is to arrange a
luncheon meeting shortly before the exercise.

Such a briefing should discuss the objectives of the
scenario and the general purpose of the game as well as
clarifying administrative procedures. Organizing the Control
Team is often best left to its members, although it is advis-
able that the Game Director appoint a chairman. If the
instructor wishes to participate in the Control Team himself
on a continuous basis, he should have an assistant who can
handle the administrative machinery of the exercise. Other-
wise, attention to such matters will leave him time for only
sporadic and peripheral participation in Control.

At least one member of the Control Team should oversee
the flow of messages to be sure that each team input receives
appropriate action. Another member may wish to supervise
production of the World Times newspaper, although it is help-
ful to have clerical assistance for the actual typing and
duplicating. This function is often better served by a
graduate student with some knowledge of the field. Other
divisions of labor for the Control Team may be geographic--
by area or by country--or functional--military matters, the
United Nations, diplomatic, etc. This is best defined by
the team itself in consideration of the scenario.

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Within limits, Control should be instructed to give the participants the maximum feasible latitude in the play of a student game. As umpire, it is Control's privilege to accept or reject moves on the grounds of whether they are realistic or not. This prerogative should be exercised with discretion, however, for the purpose of a student game is to instruct, not to predict. It should represent an opportunity for the students to explore aspects of the world that they have read about but not experienced. Insofar as it is reasonable, they should be given the chance to test some of their ideas about international politics and to try unusual strategies. It is not important during the play of the game that the real world incumbents of the roles being played by students would be unlikely to take particular actions or respond in a particular way. Such unrealistic aspects may be pointed out in the post exercise activities. What is important is that, once embarked upon a course of action, the student participants be made to face the consequences of their acts. Thus, Control should not "play" the game, in spite of its vast powers, but literally "control" it. There is a certain amount of artistry involved in the judgments called for here. A fine line exists between a disruptively unrealistic strategy and one that is simply improbable in the real world. This is one area in which Control may wish to consult with the course instructor even though the latter is not participating with the Control Team during most of the game.

3. The Scenario

The choice of a scenario should include a number of factors. First, it should be an effort to focus upon some particular problem that the teacher wishes to deal with in his course. This might include a special geographic area of interest, different types of international conflict, or particular international processes. In a general course on international relations, it is often quite sufficient to select almost any international crisis in order to use the game to draw together materials presented during the course.

Because there are generally certain problems associated with using historical scenarios--particularly the fact that history tends to become a self-fulfilling prophesy unless thoroughly disguised--scenarios are customarily taken from the present or the future. A present day scenario is often the easiest on the instructor, since he need not bother with elaborately conceived alterations in present day international affairs. Thus it is possible, provided that a particular locale which students can focus their pre-game research is chosen, to take the daily New York Times as being the binding

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scenario from which the game will start. The further into
the future a scenario is pressed, the more difficult it
becomes to cover all possible contingencies in the Prelimi-
nary Scenario distributed to students. On the other hand,
a contemporary scenario can have its own hazards, chief
among them being the possibility of preemption of the crisis
by the real world between the time the assignment is made
and the exercise commences. On several occasions, but only
once justifiably, the writer was deterred from using a
Southern Africa scenario involving Rhodesia by the threatened
imminence of a Unilateral Declaration of Independence.

A Scenario usually requires a geographic focus as well
as a specific time, since it is impossible to operate a
completely global game within the limits of time and expertise
that can be assembled. In fact, although Control Teams are
instructed to give students a maximum latitude in the play
of the exercise, one necessary function of Control is to cut
off moves that threaten to shift the entire focus of the game
into an area for which the students are not prepared. In
one unfortunate case students had spend several months pre-
paring for a central European crisis. Early in the play of
the game several major powers made moves in the Asian perip-
hery that resulted in focusing attention on Southeast Asia.
The consequence was that a number of teams were left entirely
out of the proceedings while the great powers went their
merry way in another part of the world. It is not always a
bad thing for students playing small countries to learn what
it is like to be completely ignored by the great powers. In
this extreme case, however, their frustration is understand-
able; and the absence of student preparation in the area of
Southeast Asia manifested itself in the clumsiness and un-
reality of some of the moves by the large powers. It is
therefore necessary, even in a sketchy scenario that proposed
to commence the exercise with minor modifications of that day's
New York Times, to give the game a particular geographic
focus.

The geographic focus also gives the basic cue for assign-
ment of teams. Although, as suggested above, differences in
the amount of activity and importance of certain team roles
is inevitable and useful, a team that is completely left out
of an exercise is a potential source of disruption. Team
assignments should be made with the expectation that a reason-
able amount of participation and importance will exist for
each nation that is played by a team. Given the contemporary
structure of international politics, it is almost always
necessary to have a United States team and a Soviet Union team.
Beyond this, the choice is largely a matter of common sense
on the part of the Game Director. National political situations

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that are excessively complex are often better left to be played
by Control, however. In sum, the scenario should be chosen
to provide for a sufficient number of teams, all of which
will be adequately involved in the action of the game.

Scenarios may be distributed to the students in phases.
The Preliminary Scenario must give geographic focus to pre-
game preparations by the students and, in the case of a future
scenario, must give at least a general outline of the world
situation. An optional Interim Scenario may be distributed to
the participants giving additional focus and, perhaps hint-
ing at the nature of the crisis. A Final Scenario is dis-
tributed at the outset of the exercise and usually includes
a crisis provoking event. This is not always necessary, and
exciting games have resulted by beginning the exercise with
the morning's edition of the New York Times being considered
the final scenario. This works best in gaming such scenarios
as the situation in Vietnam where matters long ago reached
the crisis stage and require no additional prompting. It
also has the advantage of avoiding the possibility of being
preempted by real world events, and minimizes the burden of
scenario preparation for the teacher. In general, whether
the scenario is taken from the day's headlines or developed
by the teacher, a one day game is better begun with a crisis
precipitating event since it is important that the action
develop quickly. With the integral format students have a
way of generating their own crises without the instructor's
assistance, but these may require several Move Periods to
develop.

4. Team Assignments and Student Preparation

The supplementary PME operates best with about six teams
of from four to six members each, although there is some
range of variation possible. The teams usually represent the
top level policy-makers of a single national entity and should
all have a reasonable expectation of being active participants
in the game. In some cases it is useful to assign a group of
nations to a team, which may then make moves on behalf of any
one of the group or on behalf of the "bloc." Thus, it is
possible to have a team represent N.A.T.O., the Arab League,
or the membership of the Organization of African Unity and
to move both as a group, sometimes representing the centralized
international secretariat of the organization, but more gener-
ally as an international caucus, and as individual nations
from the group. Such a collective team may also be a partial
membership of some grouping as "all of N.A.T.O. except Britain
and France," if individual teams seem useful for some members
but cannot be formed to represent all of the nations in the
bloc.

In the event that a multi-national team is played, it controls all activities normally under the control of the governments involved, including multiple votes in an international organization meeting. If, for example, a team represented the members of the Organization of American States in an exercise in which the United States, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic were represented by individual teams, the O.A.S. team would control seventeen votes in a meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The way in which they cast them is, of course, subject to approval by Control. Students on this type of team appear to be as adept in shifting their role perspective from one nation to another as are members of national teams in changing their perspectives when forced to double up such roles as foreign minister and economic advisor through the division of labor.

Ready criteria do not always suggest themselves for the assignment of students to individual teams, especially in the impersonal setting of a large university. Student volunteering is one possibility, but it does not guarantee well matched groups. One way of getting around this problem is to simply allocate persons to teams by running down through the academic standing of the students in the class--provided some measure is available. It is usually necessary for the teacher to designate a chairman for each team (in the case of the Soviet Union, it may even be two--one party and one government). After that it is possible to permit students to organize their own roles, dividing the principal functions of their nation's foreign policy decision-making body among themselves. Teams are expected to perform as the highest level executive decision-making body of the country they represent. Thus, the chairman of the U.S. team usually plays the role of the President of the United States, while his teammates take on the functions of Secretary of Defense, State, and so forth. With small teams it is often necessary for some of these functions to overlap. It is the functional aspects that must be covered, and not the roles of specific persons. It is difficult enough for the average student to project himself into the role of another nation's policy-makers without requiring that he take on the idiosyncratic qualities of an individual person. Only in cases in which the personality of such men as President deGaulle become a dominant aspect of the policy-making process of a certain nation should students attempt to play such a role with a particular person in mind. Otherwise, students are instructed to play the official role only (e.g., President of the United States--not President Johnson).

In order to assure advance preparation for the simulation, each student is expected to submit a briefing paper. This should represent the background, given his particular role and function, that he would wish to bring to a meeting of his

country's Cabinet, National Security Council, etc., to consider the situation given in the Preliminary Scenario. This should be submitted one week before the simulation is run, and may be used as the primary basis for a grade if desired. We have never attempted to establish criteria on which a student may be graded on his actual performance during the game, other than the implicit threat of sanctions for irresponsible behavior. The variation in forms of activity is simply too great, and the chances of prompting unrealistically competitive behavior by the student seem large. Since the PME results reflect the non-zero-sum nature of international politics, there is no ostensibly objective criterion that can be used to measure performance.

Using their copies of this briefing paper, members of each team should meet during the week preceding the game in order to formulate a strategy for their country during the exercise. A summary team strategy paper is customarily required of each team, to be submitted one day before the commencement of the exercise. This paper is used by the instructor to determine whether teams are properly prepared for the exercise and to prevent teams from embarking upon disruptive or unrealistic strategies during the first Move Period. They also serve as guidance for the evaluation of early moves by Control and, during the Debriefing Session at the end of the exercise, the strategic perspective of each team should be evaluated in view of developments during the game.

The background research done by the students should provide them with a thorough grounding in the international politics of the crisis area and the decision-making processes, interests, and strategies of the nation which they will re-present. What often results from this work, in fact, is a more intimate knowledge of the particulars of a situation than that of the Game Director or of individual members of Control. As a consequence students have been known during the course of games to provide the supposedly omniscient Control team with pertinent corrections of Control's infor-mation. Embarrassing as such moments may be, the know-ledgability of students emerging from a game experience can be remarkable.

To assist students in this background work as well as to provide up to date information for Control purposes, we have found it useful to maintain a clipping file dealing with international political news. It is also helpful to provide students with a specialized bibliography and reserve materials to serve as a departure point for their research.

5. Documents and Supplies

A complete list of suggested documents for a supplementary PME is given in Appendix I. Some of these are optional, or may be varied according to the preferences of the Game Director. The first three deal with the scenario and have already been described. Document #4 represents the "Scheme of the Game" and is a student handbook on the basic ground rules of the exercise. Students should have an opportunity to familiarize themselves with its contents and should attend a briefing session during which the teacher discusses gaming procedures.

The fifth document, a team roster, can be of assistance to students in identifying their team assignments and classmates and serves as a checklist of participating teams.

Document #6 is the schedule for the exercise and is given in several forms in the Appendix. The principal variations are in the number of Move Periods available and whether the exercise is concentrated within one calendar day or spread across an evening and part of the following day. Four Move Periods are often quite sufficient to carry developments far enough to be of interest and the longer time available for thinking out moves can be useful. Shorter Move Periods speed up the action and impart momentum, but they often generate complaints about the lack of time to carry out strategies. A certain amount of time telescoping is inevitable and the problems of decision-making under deadline pressures may be an important part of what students can learn from a PME. It is probably best to begin with a more leisurely schedule and step up the pace once some experience in gaming has been acquired. This is also the reason that earlier Move Periods on the schedule are, in some cases, longer than later ones. Once the participants get into the exercise their skills will improve and the pace may be stepped up.

An exercise concentrated within one calendar day is quite feasible and may be necessary because of scheduling problems in some cases. We prefer to split the exercise between two days, however. A PME places heavy demands upon the energies of participants and can be a tiring experience. By the end of a long day of gaming both students and Control members may not be at their best for the purpose of the debriefing session which is a very important part of an instructional game. It is then that Control can offer helpful criticisms to the students and clarify the events of the exercise, over which only Control has anything resembling a complete view. Since it may be difficult to reassemble a volunteer Control panel for later class discussion, this must generally be conducted at the end of the exercise, preferably

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with the participants as alert as possible.

If a two day exercise can include some flexibility in the latter part of the schedule it can also counteract one specific disadvantage of the single shot supplementary game. The disadvantage lies in the necessity of calling an end to the game by a specified time. This leads to a tendency to play against the deadline: to attempt to resolve "everything" by the end of the game. In the real world, of course, matters are never so neat, for the future goes on indefinitely. In order to avoid this artifact, it is useful to maintain some uncertainty as to the time at which the game will be terminated. An open-ended schedule for the afternoon of the second day can provide this flexibility.

Of the last two documents, Document #7, directed specifically to Control, has already been mentioned. The last document in the series is a Guide to U.N. Procedures originally prepared to assist students in games at M.I.T. It is optional, but can assist in preventing delays in the operation of U.N. meetings through a lack of familiarity with procedures on the part of the students. One member of each team should be prepared to represent his country (or countries) at such meetings. He should give care in his pre-game preparation to the ways in which national interests are represented at an international forum and to the ways in which diplomatic and parliamentary procedures may be used to protect these interests.

The following equipment should be available for the operation of the game. Matters that are optional or can be improvised are indicated by an asterisk (*).

Typewriters (1 or 2) for the use of Control. (Students may wish to bring portable typewriters for their own use if these cannot be provided by the school.)

Fluid duplicator and supplies or other copying process for the World Times.

Pre-printed message forms or a mimeographed substitutes with carbon paper.

Wire baskets or comparable file containers for receiving and sorting messages.

Miscellaneous maps, reference materials, scratch pads, etc.*

Message Center*: Message Log, numbering machine.

6. Summary of Preparations

Advance preparations on the part of the Game Director include:

1. Arrangements for appropriate facilities.

2. Recruitment and briefing of Control team.

3. The selection and writing of an appropriate Preliminary Scenario. An Interim Scenario is optional, and a Final Scenario should be prepared for distribution at the commencement of the game.

4. Team assignments and guidance of preparatory research by student participants.

5. If possible, secretarial or student assistance should be arranged to aid in duplicating the World Times and in the operation of the Message Center.

Student preparations include:

1. Organization of the teams into functional decision-making roles.

2. Preparation of background briefing papers presenting the expertise necessary for the policy-making councils of the nation they are to represent.

3. The formulation of a final team strategy paper by the group, indicating their perceptions of their role country's interests in the scenario situation, their expectations about the response of other nations, and their strategies for dealing with the situation.

4. The advance study of documents giving game procedures.

B. Running the Exercise

1. The Message Center

It is possible to operate a PME without having a person specially charged with the largely clerical duties that pertain to a Message Center. Many of these duties are necessary in professional games in order to have records from which the Game History can be reconstructed and the flow of messages discerned. Such histories are not usually a desired end product of a student game, although they may be of some service in post-exercise appraisals. The smooth flow of messages is assisted, however, by having a centralized clearinghouse for this purpose, and a Message Log is often useful in tracing

down an overlooked missive.

Activity at the Message Center is not constant through-
out the exercise, and so it is possible to combine the tasks
of typing the World Times, duplicating it, and operating the
Message Center in one person. An example of a log sheet is
given in the appendix. As each message is submitted to the
Message Center it is assigned a Game Number that indicates
the order in which it was submitted. A numbering machine is
a useful device for this, and can serve the additional purpose
of validating a message by indicating that it has passed through
the official channels. A column of the log is assigned to
each team, and the team message number is entered in that
column opposite the Game Number given to it. Team message
numbers should be given by each individual group to its
actions, numbering consecutively throughout the exercise. By
checking against the log it is then possible to ascertain
whether a message has been received by Control and logged in.
By keeping a record of the team numbers each group can keep
track of responses to its actions.

The Message Form is the primary tool of communication
during the course of the exercise and these written messages
represent the transactional flow of the game. Because summit
diplomacy and face-to-face meetings between principal policy-
makers of nations are relatively infrequent occurrences in
the real world, these should be strictly limited in the PME.
Even when such meetings do occur, they are monitored by a
member of Control and their results summarized in a message
submitted by each participating team at the end of the Move
Period. A copy of this memorandum is usually passed on to
the other participating teams in order to assure that no
misunderstandings arise.

Thus all communications are either conducted or noted
in writing, and it is through the submission of messages
that actions are accomplished. The necessary information
to accomplish this is incorporated into the preprinted form
shown in Appendix I and described in Document #4. Improvised
forms may be run off in advance with a mimeograph machine,
but NCR (chemically treated) or carbon-insert forms are not
expensive, and can usually be purchased for approximately
$5/hundred. A one day exercise uses between two and three
hundred message forms--about ten forms per team per Move
Period.

We have found a four sheet message form useful. One
copy is retained by the originator of the message; one copy
is filed in a central file at the Message Center as messages
are logged in; one copy is retained by Control; and the
fourth copy is sent on to the intended recipient after it is
approved by Control. In cases in which the message is directed
to Control it is useful to return this copy to the originator

with some indication that Control has seen the message and taken whatever action is necessary. An additional advantage to the NCR form is that Control may respond to intelligence requests directly on the message form, thereby incorporating its response into the files before returning the face copy.

Some care should be taken in briefing students on the procedures for writing up messages. In particular, it is necessary that students fully understand that under "Move Description" they can only undertake such actions as would be under their control as the government concerned. They may order an intelligence or sabotage mission: only Control can determine its success. They may plant a story in the media (particularly if their government has strong control over the national press): only Control may determine that the event reported has, in fact, occurred if it involves non-governmental operations. Other cautionary notes are included in Document #4. One of the most frequent causes of confusion during the early moments of a game is the improper filling out of Message Forms.

Messages may be submitted by teams only during and at the end of a Move Period. In principle, all messages may be submitted at the close of the period, accompanied by a team summary. The latter, a brief counterpart to the team strategy paper, serves to guide the Control Team in its overall evaluation of the intentions of a given team. If desired, Control may also summon the Chairman of a team for an oral discussion of his country's strategy to supplement this.

In practice many teams tend to submit messages as quickly as they are written. Only in the cases where there is a legitimate request for Immediate Action, however, will Control ordinarily respond to messages submitted before the end of a Move Period. Legitimate requests for Immediate Action are usually restricted to requests for intelligence or instructions to envoys participating in an international conference. On occasion, however, the rules should be bent sufficiently to permit some useful messages to pass. This is necessary particularly when to delay an inter-team message through the complete Move Period and the succeeding Control Period would unnecessarily hold up the action of the exercise. There is much latitude for discretion on the part of Control in such matters, as is there on the acceptance or rejection of intelligence requests.

The flow of messages in a PME is schematically represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1

PME MESSAGE FLOW

```
        ┌──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┐
        │Team A│Team B│Team C│Team..│
        └──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┘

         ┌──────┬───────────────┬──────┐
Log In   │  In  │Message Center │ Out  │    Log if Control originated,
         └──────┴───────────────┴──────┘    pass to teams

                                            ┌ Approved Team and Control
                                            │ originated messages
All Messages┐
to Control  ┘                                 Messages returned with
                                              Control action

┌──────────┐    ┌───────────────────────┐    1. Review all messages
│ Control  │◄───│                       │    2. Determine necessary
│  File    │    │       Control         │       action
└──────────┘    └───────────────────────┘

Action  ┐
Complete┘

              ┌ 1. Press Release
              │ 2. Sitrep              World Times

              ┌───────────────────────┐
              │  World Times Editor   │
World Times   └───────────────────────┘
```

2. The Briefing Session

A Political-Military Exercise generally commences with the assemblage of all participants for a preliminary Briefing Session. If the teacher has utilized an earlier class period to run over the procedural arrangements with the students, this session may be kept very short. Introduction of the Control Team and other persons who may be present and able to assist students as advisors is the principal agenda item. Advisors, often graduate students, are specifically instructed not to make strategy for the teams, but to serve as resource persons if individual teams desire some aid. Advisors may sometimes serve as messengers, but it is the responsibility of individual teams to make sure that their messages reach the Message Center.

The Briefing Session may be used to answer any last minute procedural enquiries, make final administrative announcements, and to emphasize certain rules. The latter should include a reminder that each team's headquarters are to be considered secure and that all intelligence operations must be mounted by means of messaged requests to Control. (This does not apply, however, to papers left lying about in public places!) The session closes with distribution of the final scenario and the teams retire to their individual headquarters to commence the first Move Period of the Exercise.

3. Team Move Periods

Following Parkinson's Law that work expands to fill the time available for it, Team Move Periods, however long, seldom provide an opportunity for participants to reflect upon their actions in what they consider adequate detail. Teams must digest the incoming information that arrives in the form of news reports and the Situation Report (Sitrep), as well as in messages from other teams and from Control. They must then determine the responses that they wish to make to developments and formulate these into specific actions to be set forth in messages. Thus planning must have taken place before the commencement of the exercise or during the Control Periods that intervene between periods of team action. In either case forthcoming events are unknown, and so a certain amount of contingency planning should be a part of this. As in the real world, however, the best laid plans are unlikely to keep up with events.

Besides determining strategy and writing up messages and the team summary, teams may be called upon to send a representative to an international organization meeting and may wish to arrange a diplomatic conferral with a representative of another team. Efficient use of the limited time available means a careful division of responsibility.

4. Control Periods

When the teams have submitted their moves Control must begin its tasks of evaluating the inputs, approving or disapproving moves, restructuring the scenario to take account of these actions, and determining the best means to communicate this to the teams.

In a rapidly paced game, Control teams usually find it easiest to convey most information to the teams by means of news stories published in the World Times. Many of these may represent information released by other teams. In writing the World Times, however, Control is entitled to exercise both its editorial and creative prerogatives, rewriting and updating a story to convey as much (or as little!) as Control wishes, as well as inserting its own stories. Newspaper stories are not to be regarded by the teams as authoritative occurrences in the game world. Therefore, it is usually necessary to provide teams with at least some accurate summary of developments, lest Control be flooded during the succeeding Move Period with intelligence requests for all sides. This is accomplished by placing definitive descriptions of events in a separate section of the World Times (provided these are to be shared by all participants) referred to as the Situation Report, of Sitrep. The Sitrep may be shortened by attaching the "Sitrep" label to individual stories or by simply indicating that the World Times is doing a responsible job of reporting and is therefore highly indicative of actual game world developments. The Sitrep may go into some detail about world events. A more elaborate description of developments in the Sitrep may be required if Control decides to advance the calendar by a substantial amount between Move Periods. In such an event it becomes more difficult for teams to extrapolate the impact of their actions during the intervening period. The World Times may also occasionally include a column of political commentary. These columns are ordinarily used by Control to attempt a sharpening and definition of the issues emerging in the exercise in order to help the participants to grasp the significance of developments.

Students occasionally require sledge hammer techniques to bring awareness of the implications of certain issues and actions. This may give Control serious problems in deciding how far to permit teams to pursue unrealistic moves. The beginning of a disastrous and disruptive strategy may appear as but a small cloud on the horizon. Even in cases in which Control can see what is to come, an attempt to sidetrack such action by subtle cues may fail. In one game, the U.S. team arrogated to itself intelligence functions that properly belonged to Control. At the outset, it was not clear that this was what had happened and Control was bewildered by extreme military preparations being made against Cuba. It

appeared that an aggressive U.S. leadership was engaging in a highly provocative strategy in order to end the Castro regime. In fact, the Americans had convinced themselves that another attempt was being made to emplace Soviet missiles on the island: an act Control could not confirm to any other participant since the Russians were doing no such thing. Attempts to message the U.S. in ways that would indicate that their intelligence was not valid failed to set matters right and, about the time that the President was being inactivated by means of the Twenty-fifth Amendment, it was necessary to expunge the events of two Move Periods from the game in order to get matters back under control. Although expunging is a technique available to Control, such an extreme case detracts excessively from the reality of the exercise.

In other instances, Control must consider a move to have taken place with poor consideration of its consequences. It is then Control's prerogative to bring these consequences home to the students by producing them. One Soviet team, in an ill-considered move to gain prestige, submitted a move launching an expedition to land on the moon. Since the scenario was set at a time when the Russians had not conducted the necessary preliminary space shots, there was a very high probability that something would fail. The Soviet Team was appropriately horrified when the next issue of the World Times reported that Jodrell Bank had monitored messages from the spacecraft indicating that mankind's first space disaster had occurred. In another case Control itself was guilty of an overreaction. In a hectic moment a Control member with a naval background decided to use the Sixth Fleet to show the Russians that the logistics of putting planes into Syria were rather more complicated than accounted for in the Soviet move. Assuming that the planes would have to be flown around Greece, down the Adriatic, and in across the Mediterranean, he usurped the powers of the U.S. team and had them shot down by units of the U.S. Navy. The incident was explained away as a garbled report of the accidental crash of the Russian plane after making a low pass over the fleet. (Six months later a Soviet intelligence plane buzzed an American ship in the North Atlantic and crashed into the sea!)

These examples are given to indicate that there is considerable latitude for Control to use in the orchestration of the game. It is probably most useful if gentle prodding through interpretive columns in the World Times or relatively subtle messages to the offending team can succeed in getting the students to perceive and rectify their errors. When necessary, however, Control should be prepared to utilize its full powers. It is the pedagogic purpose that must serve as the guideline in this.

Control must also determine whether the pace of the exercise is in need of change. If matters are developing too slowly, the calendar may have to be advanced rather more than usual between Move Periods, or Control may wish to undertake certain prodding moves by acting on behalf of one or more of the nations it controls. The opposite may happen, too, in which things are moving far to quickly for the teams to grasp developments.

Ticklish diplomatic negotiations may require several Move Periods with little time advance between them. In one game, the teams were permitted to struggle through two extended Move Periods attempting to arrange a Southeast Asia Peace Conference. Finally, it was necessary for Control to resolve the remaining issues being endlessly haggled over, and so the calendar was advanced and the conditions of the conference stipulated. The students then attempted some hard substantive bargaining while the home teams continued other diplomatic and military activities. The Conference had not quite fallen apart by the time it was necessary to "call" the game.

Specific rules concerning the advance of the calendar during each Control Period cannot be set forth, for this again is a matter of judgment: judgment that will improve with experience. The reader has already been warned that situations of "over-control" can have dysfunctional results in a student game. The longer Control advances the calendar, the more Control must intervene in the development of the new Sitrep. We can recall no student game in which the clock was advanced more than two weeks, and the usual range is a matter of one or two days.

Because there will be no Control Period to follow the last Team Move Period, it has been found useful to operate Control concurrently with the Move Period. This means that students may submit moves at any time during the Move Period and expect an immediate response from Control. All messages are passed immediately, and Control acts upon moves as necessary, responding with messages and publishing editions of the World Times as frequently as seems useful. This permits the teams to gain some idea of what direction their actions are moving matters during the final Move Period and, if there is some ambiguity as to the precise length of the period, the affects of the final deadline may be mitigated.

5. Termination and Debriefing

However ambiguous the scheduling can be made, the moment must finally arrive at which the exercise is terminated. In a one day game this often falls at a time of peak excitement and great tensio. . This is undoubtedly partially due to the tendency to play against the deadline, but a one day game at the usual pace of student exercises is about the period

necessary for the participants to gain facility with the technique and bring matters to a pinnacle of interaction. It is inevitable, therefore, that there is some disappointment that the game cannot be continued longer. For each team that would find an extension useful to its endeavors, however, another team would find frustration. In this, the PME faithfully represents the constant give and take of international politics and the continuing nature of its processes. Control, in any event, should give some attention in the Debriefing Session to the probable course of events as Control saw them developing.

A short period of time--fifteen minutes to one half hour--should intervene between the termination cf the game and the Debriefing Session. Teams prepare a report to be given by their chairman, outlining their perceptions of the developing exercise, their strategy, and an evaluation of their success in achieving their national objectives. Each member of Control will also wish to prepare notes for a commentary during the Debriefing.

The teacher will usually have an opportunity to discuss the game with his class at a later date, and so the best use of the Debriefing Session is in the interaction between students and the members of Control. The first order of business is the team reports. These will provide an additional basis for comment by Control members and will not be biased by prior knowledge of Control's overview. Following Control's comments, a period of open discussion is generally useful. The Game Director may wish to distribute an evaluative questionnaire at the end of the session.

The supplementary exercises run for this study were treated as precisely that: a supplement to the course. After the submission of the briefing paper, no further attempt was made to evaluate students in connection with the game, nor was additional written work required. Some attention should be given in classes following the exercise to relating the experience to the content of the course and to sorting out simulation artifacts from the more realistic aspects of the exercise for the students. It may be noted that many aspects of the game that may appear unrealistic do have real world analogs. The failure of a country to reply to an important message may not be entirely realistic, but its impact may be not unlike the use of communications channels that are outrun by events, or a bureaucratic failure. One is reminded of the real world attempt by Burundi to sever relations with the United States that failed to come to the attention of the Secretary of State because it was transmitted by post and the Burundi Foreign Office failed to affix an air mail stamp.

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If the teacher wishes to give further attention to relating the simulation to substantive course content, it is possible to assign a Debriefing Paper. This method was used in connection with the integral format and is discussed in Chapter IV. Certainly the simulation experience itself is unlikely to be of great instructional value without the constructive guidance of the teacher.

6. Common Problems

It is inevitable that problems will arise during the course of an exercise, and many of the likely ones have already been pointed out. The dangers of frivolous disruptions, poor preparation, improperly filled out messages that fail to communicate intent, excessive intervention by Control, and disruptively unrealistic team actions have all been noted. Some other cautionary notes follow.

There is a tendency for teams to seek excessive intelligence. The scenarios should explicate the world situation sufficiently that the well prepared team can comprehend and react to it. The further the exercise develops, of course, the more necessary it will be for the teams to seek intelligence from Control; but they should clearly understand that their intelligence can never be perfect and that Control will reject excessive intelligence requests, especially early in the exercise. Where ambiguities do exist, it is necessary that the teams verify Control's agreement with their interpretation of their data. In a futuristic scenario, for example, teams may be instructed that they may make reasonable extrapolations in the construction of their country's military posture. If these are not included in the final Team Summary, an early message to Control should establish the acceptability of their proposed force structure.

The discipline of written communication must be enforced during the exercise. Students find it time-consuming and frustrating not to have an immediate response to their messages. Unaccustomed to formulating a negotiating position in writing, they begin negotiations rather in way they would a conversation. When this does not give immediate results they demand a face-to-face conference. Although the game procedures provide for this, excessive conferrals will tax Control's capacity to monitor them and detract from the realism of the game. Some attention must also be paid to policing the rule against informal contacts between teams.

We have often tried to put the U.N. representatives in an isolated room and have them conduct all contact with their home team in writing. In principle, it would then be possible for them to use the U.N. as a diplomatic clearinghouse, as do many nations in the real world, sounding out

other delegates for the position of their country on a given
issue. This seldom is very successful, at least partially
because it is difficult to have a Control member continuously
in the U.N. room during the Move Periods. Students generally
do not comprehend the uses to which this function of the
U.N. can be put, fail to discuss anything, become bored and
restless. Once a plenary session has been held, they begin
to understand the necessity of backstairs diplomacy at the
U.N., however.

Care must also be taken that both Control and the in-
dividual teams find the serenity necessary to conduct their
decision-making in their headquarters. Division of the
exercise into Move and Control Periods was intended, among
other things, to prevent the need for constant running
hither and thither and constant invasion of team rooms by
messengers. This is also the reason that it is useful to
be able to separate Control headquarters from the Message
Center and duplicating facilities. Serenity, always in
short supply in a one day game in any event, is even less
possible during periods in which Control is acting concurrently
with the Team Move Period.

Control and the Game Director must especially beware of
what we have come to call the "Fiasco Syndrome." This usually
arises sometime around the second Move Period when mis- and
non-communication, administrative crises, unrealistic moves
and/or a failure of teams to interact seem overwhelming to
those with some degree of overview of the game. In short,
the entire operation appears to be turning into a fiasco, in
spite of all the careful planning that has gone on beforehand.
Do not panic! Much of the feeling is derived from hyper-
critical expectations on the part of those with some expertise:
i.e., Control members and the instructor. A student game is
most assuredly going to be anything but isomorphic with the
real world. We have found even at moments when we were con-
vinced that the operation was a complete disaster, that stu-
dents were having a marvelous time. Far more important,
they were learning precisely what it had been hoped they might
learn: the complexity of international relations, the problems
of decision-making, the necessity and imperfections of intelli-
gence, and that all the reason and good will in the world did
not assure the easy resolution of conflicting national
interests. At one such moment, the Fiasco Syndrome was
dissipated as a student passed the writer in the hall saying,
"Gee, now I know what the book meant about the uses and
limitations of the U.N. in a crisis!" Clearly the game can be
stalled or disrupted by a variety of factors, but the Director
should not overract, particularly on the basis of unrealistic
expectations.

IV. RUNNING AN INTEGRAL EXERCISE

The procedures for operating an integral exercise are, mutatis mutandis, very similar to those of the supplementary game. Some of the alterations have been mentioned in the discussion of the different formats in Chapter II, and appropriate editorial changes have been incorporated in the documents of Appendix II. Only minor modifications have been made in Document #4, the Scheme of the Game. The principal differences lie in scheduling problems, both of the exercise and the course; the combination of the Director and Control functions; the types of scenarios selected; and the methods of relating the exercise to the substantive course student.

A. Scheduling

Appendix II includes syllabi for two courses on which the experiences reported here were based. The first is an Introduction to International Relations for the general student, while the second was a course on national security policy. Two sessions of the international relations course were taught on a quarter calendar, while the national security course was given once on a semester basis. The syllabus for the international relations course was designed to cover materials dealing with basic concepts as well as giving attention to specific contemporary problems, a section likely to be very sensitive to the interests of the individual instructor. The national security syllabus is more specialized in its approach.

In determining the way in which the PME experience could best be coupled to a course in international relations, it was decided that a maximum emphasis should be put upon student responsibility and exploration of the field. The core assignments were therefore held to a minimum on the assumption that the students would engage in individual research and reading in their preparation for the games. Similarly, no set schedule was given students for the readings, except that they were told to read the assignments as quickly as possible and to refer back to them as the course progressed. It was suggested that the readings dealing with basic concepts--the nature of the international system and foreign policy decision-making--be done prior to the first exercise, and the more specialized topics be read in time for the second. A mid-term examination schedule can be formulated accordingly, although that particular discipline was not enforced during the experiment. The reasoning behind this was that the proper time for student evaluation was after the students had had an opportunity to test their reading knowledge against the simulation experience. This was particularly true in seeking conceptual comprehension

and in compensating for the varying role and research experience gained during the course. Final examinations should be structured and graded taking these variations into account. In order to assist in the research a special bibliography keyed to the syllabus topics was provided to students, although some found its bulk intimidating. It is also unfortunately the case that the general student in a large university is not always accustomed to unprogrammed reading and research.

Neither under the quarter nor under the semester calendar was it possible to schedule more than two exercises during the course. It is necessary to spend a minimum of two to three weeks guiding the students through the more basic material and organizing them for the first exercise. In fact, the work load for such a course is far from evenly distributed throughout the semester. The basic readings plus research for the first exercise place heavy demands upon the student during the early weeks of the course, fortunately a time when other courses are generally not so time consuming. With the exercises themselves consuming about three weeks apiece, there was little enough time remaining for critique and evaluation. As mentioned earlier, we were concerned that under the quarter calendar there was too much pressure for effective guidance of the students during the early part of the course.

For the PME itself, the Team Move Periods must be scheduled to fit the available class time and facilities. Our quarter system experience was at Ohio State, where the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory was scheduled during the regular daytime hours of the course, which was also scheduled five days a week. After some initial experimentation, the best arrangement appeared to be to hold two Move Periods per week, each extending over a two day period. During gaming sessions the class met at the Laboratory on Mondays and Tuesdays, then on Thursdays and Fridays. The fifty minute hour of a Monday-Wednesday-Friday schedule was too short for a useful Move Period.

The semester-length course was conducted at Case Western Reserve University where no Laboratory facility was available. A group of classrooms was therefore reserved on Tuesday and Thursday evenings and the class met for ninety minute Move Periods. Keeping in mind the desirability of an open-ended game, backing an exercise up against a vacation period was avoided, since to break the operation over a one or two week absence destroys the continuity. No definite end point was scheduled, although students were aware of the general limits.

B. Control

In an integral exercise, the teacher/Game Director must usually also undertake the Control function. This gives certain advantages in the added coherence that one mind can bring to the tasks, but a large exercise can provide more inputs at the end of a Team Move Period than one person can conveniently handle during the intervening break. If a teaching assistant is available this will naturally make things much easier, but it will also increase the cost of the course.

Assistance was, in fact, available during the international relations courses, but not for the national security course. In the latter case, we experimented with putting several students on the Control team. Following a Move Period, Control would review the team inputs and the instructor indicated the issues and themes that needed to be followed up. The student members then collected the messages relevant to their tasks and formulated Control responses. These were submitted to the teacher by the morning of the next gaming session and he edited them and had the necessary clerical work done, including running off the World Times. This appeared to work very well, keeping the work load within reasonable limits, adequately controlling the exercise, and giving the student Control members a perspective on the operation that they found useful and instructive. During the debriefing sessions they were able to communicate some of this to the rest of the class.

C. Scenarios

In the international relations course we attempted two rather different types of scenarios. The second exercise in each course was a conventional crisis scenario with a geographic focus: in fact, using the situation in Vietnam in both cases. For the first exercise, we tried a more general international politics game, taking the scenario from the contemporary world situation and dispersing the teams around the world. (The exercise illustrated by the documents in Appendix II was played by the national security course and was a crisis scenario with a future setting.)

The thinking behind the general international politics game was that the exercise should serve to illustrate general concepts of the course rather than focusing student attention upon the features of international crisis and the accompanying threats of force that do not, in fact, make up the bulk of international relations. Team assignments were made with a view to giving a range of different experiences to the students: super powers, large powers, and small powers; Communist and non-Communists; Western and non-Western; allied and neutralist; developed and underdeveloped. In order to give students a

variety of perspectives, these assignments were then taken into account as far as possible in making team assignments for the second exercise.

We had conflicting ideas about whether it would be better to keep teams together throughout the course, giving them different nations to represent in each game, or to break them up after each exercise. In practice, there was only one occasion in which the initial groupings worked sufficiently well together to permit us the luxury of trying the first alternative. Its principal disadvantage lay in the difficulty in giving different members of the class a crack at the leadership positions, since the groups tended to continue the same group relationships established by the initial assignment. They also minimized their experience with different functional areas of decision-making as a consequence. There is a difference in being defense minister for a large nation as opposed to a small one, but not so great a difference as being defense minister one time and foreign minister another. The preferred mode appears to be to split the teams up after each exercise, therefore.

With no particular crisis to focus their attention on in the general game, students find something out about the diversity of national interests and the problems of orchestrating global foreign policies. The game also tends to generate a most adequate set of examples that can be cited to illustrate the wide variety of concepts necessary in the study of international relations.

Five or six teams, dealing with widely dispersed international problems, and interacting more with Control (which plays the vast majority of nations in the world) than with each other, can cause problems, however. Even without focusing the exercise on Vietnam, the interactions of the United States, the Soviet Union and Australia concerning Southeast Asia can be considerable. In the example cited here, Control was simultaneously confronted with a Venezuelan effort to enlist the Vatican, the United States, and a variety of other nations in an international effort to contain the population explosion. Control did its best to cope with these and other issues, but the Venezuelans were quite angry by the end of the exercise at both Control and the U.S. team. Neither had placed the population problem high enough on their agenda for action!

Student evaluations split almost evenly three ways on whether the crisis-focused game was preferred (17), the general game (13), or each had its strengths and weaknesses (14), with the crisis game marginally ahead. The general game was viewed as more realistic and less militaristic, while the

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crisis game was more coherent and exciting. Several students felt that the general game had not gone on long enough. Given the heavy demands it made of Control, we had a somewhat different perspective!

D. Relating to Course Work

A different approach was taken in relating the integral simulation to the work of the course and in the evaluation of the students. The briefing paper was reduced in significance and largely filled the role of a control on student effort. Each student was asked to turn in only a brief summary of his preparation, and this was used to ascertain that each was pulling his share of the load. On the one occasion in which this was omitted some teams had serious difficulties with slacking off by some of their members.

Instead, a debriefing paper was assigned to supplement the debriefing discussion that followed the exercise. Students were specifically charged with the responsibility of relating the game experience to their readings and other substantive materials dealing with the course in this paper. A summary of events or of the team's strategy was not acceptable to meet this assignment.

For the paper following the first general international politics game, it was found useful to have students spend a major portion of their effort in appraising the relative realism of the exercise. It was thus necessary for them to think carefully about the world as they understood it, the world of the simulation, and the world as represented in their readings. They were also asked to evaluate the impact of different variables upon international relations as they had perceived them in the simulation and compare their evaluation with the readings. An example of this assignment is given in Appendix II.

In the case of the crisis-focused game it is more difficult to determine in advance what the debriefing paper topic should be. Our practice was to await the evolution of the exercise and draw up the assignment either just before or just after its termination. It is then possible to see what aspects of the game can most usefully be incorporated into the assignment in order to assure substantive discussion by the students. An example from the course on national security is given in the Appendix.

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In most other respects, the reader will find that the guidelines given in Chapter III on the supplementary game are appropriate for the integral format. The more leisurely pace of the latter and the smaller number of participants and administrative staff make it far less chaotic than a one day operation. Constant use of the technique can place heavy demands upon the instructor in his Control function, but with experience in the technique, these demands do not exceed normal class preparation time.

V. STUDENT RESPONSE AND EVALUATION

It should be again emphasized that the primary objectives of this project were in design and development of the Political-Military Exercise, and not in rigorous evaluation of the PME as a teaching device. To assist in the design problem, however, questionnaires were administered to the student participants following their experience with gaming. The schedule given to students taking the course in which the integral format was used is given in Appendix IV. The form shown there is that used for the international relations course: minor modifications were made for the national security course.

The questionnaires were not intended to be methodologically sophisticated and many of the questions were directed at the administrative arrangements for the game. Where students comments seemed to be valid criticisms they were incorporated into the procedures for operating a PME that have been given in the preceding chapters. Student views concerning the experience cannot be taken to represent the instructional value by any objective criteria, even when they are specifically directed to this. We report some of the questionnaire results here in hope that they may be of assistance to those interested in evaluating simulation techniques.

Sixty-eight students responded to questionnaires having participated in courses with the integral format. Twenty-eight of these were from the national security course. The first three questions dealt with their impressions of the learning experience. (Students engaging in the supplementary exercise were given a simpler questionnaire and only the first question was comparable to that asked of the integral format participants. The responses to question #1 were very similar to those reported here.)

Fifty-six of the students (82%) said that they felt that their participation in the PME had taught them things that could not be learned from usual classroom work: only three (4%) responded with a flat "no." Three others responding "no" hedged their response by indicating that, although they did not feel that they had learned things that could not have been taught by usual classroom methods, they thought the PME was more effective. This does not mean that the majority had necessarily learned what the instructor desired to teach. Indeed, two students decided that the PME had taught them that theory and rationality were inapplicable in international relations, hardly the organizing theme of the course.

Of those mentioning more positive experiences, the three areas most frequently mentioned were.

1. The complexity and the processes of state policy-making

2. The complexity of the international system and the difficulties involved in forming coherent theories.

3. The importance and difficulty of international communication.

The frequent reference to complexity is related to other experiences with simulation. It has been reported that participants tend to appreciate the complexity and interdependence of the environment and feel better equipped to control it.[1] Other areas mentioned were the impact of decision-making on the world; insight into diplomatic practice and functions; and reinforcement and clarification of "textbook principles." Several students mentioned that they had encountered a certain degree of self-discovery as a consequence of the group dynamics of the exercise.

Asked to list several concepts about which they felt they had learned most from the PME, students listed a wide variety of non-standardized topics. A coding effort resulted in the following groupings, listed in the order of frequency with the number of students mentioning concepts in each group given in parentheses.

Communications (27)
Bargaining relationships (18)
Power, force and coercion (16)
Balance of power (12)
Decision-making (11)
National interest (8)
Deterrence (8)
Complexity of international system (7)

Unfortunately, the groupings do not represent tight, well defined concepts; nor does the fact a student mentioned such concepts mean that what he learned would test out on an examination as acceptable achievement.

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[1]Cleo H. Cherryholmes, "Some Current Research on Effectiveness of Educational Simulations:...," The American Behavioral Scientist, October 1966, p. 6.

Of somewhat greater interest were the results of the question asking students to rate the PME on a five point scale in comparison to other classroom techniques encountered in their education. The results of that question are given in Table II.

TABLE II

"Compared to other classroom techniques encountered in your education, how would you rate the PME for:"

	1	2	3	4	5	Avg. Rating
a. Teaching facts	9	14	28	15	1	2.8
b. Teaching concepts	1	5	18	25	19	3.8
c. Teaching theory	0	8	17	30	10	3.6
d. Integrating the above	0	7	22	25	13	3.7
e. Motivating the student	0	5	11	20	31	4.1

*1 = Poor; 3 = Average; 5 = Superior; N = 67

The fact that the highest score was on motivation is entirely consistent with earlier findings concerning simulation.[2] The stimulation of interest on the part of students remains the greatest proven strength of the gaming technique. It is also gratifying to the experimenter that the PME was rated above average on all scales except the teaching of facts. Students clearly think that the technique is superior on several dimensions that are relevant to the desired affects of an educational experience. One interesting feature of this was that the science and engineering majors who participated in the course on national security rated the PME differently on b, c, and d than the general curriculum students who participated in the international relations course. The science and engineering students rated b as 4.4, c as 4.0, and d as 4.1, while the Ohio State students rated them 3.5, 3.4 and 3.4, respectively. They were in agreement on the teaching of facts and on motivation.

There are three identifiable variables that may have affected this: majors, course content, and student capabilities. During the project all students participating in the national security course at Case Western Reserve University were drawn from one of the university's former components, Case Institute of Technology, and were as mentioned, science or engineering

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[2]Ibid., pp. 5-7

majors. It is more difficult to categorize the Ohio State
students, who were drawn from throughout the university.
However, only seven per cent were science or engineering
majors, and fifty-three per cent were political science,
international studies, or other related social science
majors. The differences in course content has already been
made clear. Definitive empirical data are not available
for the comparison of student capabilities, but Case
Institute students average well in excess of 600 on the
College Entrance Examination Test scores, and over sixty
per cent were in the top ten per cent of their class in high
school. Unless most extraordinary factors entered into the
class enrollment, there are undoubtedly major variations
between the student groups here.

Although there is no significant difference between the
two groups in their perceptions of the motivation engendered
by the PME, it is possible that the additional motivation
distorted the Case students' perceptions of the concepts,
theory and integration dimensions. The subject matter lay
outside their areas of primary interest and familiarity, and
so they may have been less critical on these dimensions than
the Ohio State students, who had more facility with the theory
and concepts of social science. This does not explain the
equally critical views of both groups on the teaching of
facts, however.

It is not at all clear what students were assessing on
the teaching of facts dimension. The general standard on
this is probably the matter of acquiring the "facts" necessary
to pass an examination. Because examinations are given on a
universalistic basis, it is undoubtedly true that the PME is
inefficient as the student surveys his reference group.
During an exercise, as has been pointed out, students demon-
strate a remarkable depth of factual knowledge about certain
aspects of the scenario focus, and they almost certainly
retain as much of this data as they would other circumstances.[3]
Much of it is specialized by their role assignment and there-
fore not the kind of information usually demanded for a class
examination. It seems doubtful given the evidence of added
interest that the PME is less efficient than other teaching
methods, although there is no reason to believe that it is

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[3]Cherryholmes' survey of the available research concludes
that no significant difference exists in the learning or re-
tention of facts and principles from participating in a simu-
lation as opposed to conventional classroom activities.
Ibid., p. 6.

more so. From the student viewpoint, however, the facts learned may be less relevant to their immediate needs: i.e., to pass an examination. The situation is not different in this respect from other teaching situations, although the problem may be exaggerated. As Siegel has pointed out, learning is idiosyncratic: "classes do not learn; students learn...."[4] In the end, however, classes are examined.

It is also true that standard examination practices do little to separate factual background, conceptual organization, and theoretical relationships. It is entirely possible, indeed, probable, that most students are led to deal with all three largely on a rote basis. That is, they memorize a percentage of the data of a subject, and then memorize its abstractions and models. Facility in linking materials is usually the product of longer and more specialized study than the average student gives to more than a very limited sector of the body of human knowledge. Whether the Political-Military Exercise accomplishes any more of this than other classroom methods will require additional research that must begin by attempting to formulate more useful criteria of the learning experience than are generally available to the educator at present.

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[4]Laurence Siegel, "The Contributions and Implications of Recent Research Related to Improving Teaching and Learning," in Ohmer Milton and Edward J. Shoben, Jr. (eds.), Learning and the Professors (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1968), p. 142.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This research was not constituted to reach definitive conclusions concerning the use of the Political-Military Exercise in the classroom. As a development project, its principal conclusions have been incorporated into the procedures suggested in Chapters III and IV for two different ways in which the PME can be used in the teaching of political science courses dealing with international relations and foreign policy.

These are not to be construed as definitive procedures that are not to be subjected to innovation and improvisation. There are alternative methods by which the gaming technique can be tied into other classroom work, both in the use of other simulations and in variations on the PME theme. The procedures set forth in this report have been tested, however, and in some cases alternatives have been rejected in the development process. As a consequence, the principal admonition to be made to the experimenter is to keep the game itself flexible. The PME appears remarkably unaffected by variations in scheduling and logistics, but it is sensitive to attempts to structure the simulation in more abstract ways.

In one experiment conducted during this project an attempt was made to combine some of the more structured aspects of the Inter-Nation Simulation with the reality orientation of the PME. The Move Periods were divided up into periods devoted specified activities, including internal team conferrals and several types of external conferences. The internal team structures were given specific roles such as chief decision-maker, foreign service officer, military and trade advisors; all similar to the procedures recommended here, but pre-determined by the Game Director. Finally, Control structured its own operations in such a way that each team dealt specifically with a single member of the Control Team.

The immediate consequence of this was the disappearance of the "Fiasco Syndrome," for the exercise functioned with remarkable smoothness. A more unfortunate affect was that the student representatives merely recited a national policy position and then stared at one another in the conference sessions rather than bargaining. The reasons for this were not clear: they may have been related to the course function (an introduction to political science); to the conference focused nature of the game structure; or to the role structure. There appeared to be more institutional role-playing than

national decision-making. The result was that the exercise
resembled the traditional "mock" United Nations meeting
rather than a political game. Games without at least the
attempt to negotiate and bargain are, after all, games
without politics: i.e., "non-political games."

The PME procedures recommended here, on the other hand,
appear to reinforce "national" identities of the teams, at
least partly by simulating the physical and psychological
barriers between governments through the enforced isolation
of the teams and reliance upon a minimum of face-to-face
conferences. As a consequence, it probably minimizes the
difficulties engendered by institutional perspectives in in-
ternal governmental decision-making. Bloomfield and Whaley
have noted that the team's sense of reality and identity is
independent of artifical cues such as national costumes worn
by participants or nationalistic icons displayed in the team
headquarters and seems to arise from the content of the simul-
ation itself.[1]

We have therefore not recommended carefully programmed
procedures in this attempt to set forth the administrative
requirements of operating a PME. The broad framework presented
here should eliminate some of the time and expense that have
made it so difficult for persons without experience in this
type of simulation to develop the procedures and use it.

With the balance of available evidence suggesting that
simulation has a more positive than negative impact in its
pedagogical applications, the availability of the procedural
arrangements in a managable form may lead to more widespread
use of the techniques. Of the two methods of using the
Political-Military Exercise presented here, we find no objective
way of recommending one over the other. As outlined in
Chapter II, each appears to have its advantages. There is
an excitement and intensity of experience in the supplementary
game that cannot be found in other classroom methods. What
the integral format loses in intensity, it may make up in care-
ful consideration of the materials involved. That is the
crucial matter: widespread use of any instructional device
must ultimately rest upon a careful and objective appraisal
of the costs and benefits that it provides. We have attempted
here to lower the costs: an attempt should now be made to
determine the benefits.

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[1]Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton S. Whaley, "The Political-
Military Exercise: A Progress Report," Orbis, Vol. VII (Winter
1965), p. 867.

A principal utility of the PME in teaching seems to us
to be its ability to juxtapose disciplined theoretical
thinking (provided that the teacher t] rusts this to the fore)
with "reality" oriented data as the student attempts to re-
spond to the situation posed by the simulation. A classroom
PME does not correspond to reality in any predictive sense,
as Cohen has pointed out.[2] It is the crudest of models with
a host of unprogrammed theoretical underpinnings. It is,
however, a situation in which student and teacher may place
themselves in order to test their understanding of the sub-
ject matter against their percept. ons of reality. The design
phase of the PME is, in this sense, a constant undertaking,
conforming to Sidney Verba's suggestion that one of the
most valuable contributions that simulation can make to
theory-building is in forcing the designer to make explicit
what may have been implicit assumptions about the subject
matter.[3] Theory-building has a definite place in the class-
room.

At its best, the game setting is an opportunity for the
teacher to pose significant issues of contemporary inter-
national relations in a situation in which the variables affect-
ing them and their relationship to the student's experience
is clarified. At its worst, it may be a frivolous waste of
time. It is primarily up to the teacher to prevent this from
happening.

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[2] Bernard C. Cohen, "Political Gaming in the Classroom,"
Journal of Politics, Vol. 24 (May 1962), pp. 378-79.

[3] Sidney Verba, "Simulation, Reality, and Theory in
International Relations," World Politics, Vol. XVI (April
1964), p. 499.

Appendix I

DOCUMENTS FOR A

SUPPLEMENTARY EXERCISE

APPENDIX I: INTRODUCTION

The documents used in the operation of a supplementary Political-Military Exercise are presented in this appendix. A standardized numbering system was used during this project, although all documents are not necessary, and some are optional depending upon the presentation of the scenario. The documents are presented here as examples and may require some editing to conform to local conditions, even in the case of standardized forms. A case in point is certain material in Document #4, the Scheme of the Game, that refers to special equipment available in the Laboratory used at Ohio State. It has been left in the text as an example, but enclosed in brackets.

In the listing below, the desired lead time for each document's distribution is given in parentheses: i.e., the number of days before the commencement of the PME that the document should be available to participants. Documents #1, 2, 3, 5, and 7, and any special bibliography will require adaptation to the chosen scenario. Documents #4, 6, 8, and most of #7, as well as the Message Forms and Log are well standardized. Documents #2, 5, and 8 may be treated as optional. (See Chapter III for further discussion of the documents.)

Supplementary Exercise Document List

PRELIMINARY SCENARIO

Summary of the World Situation

The following is a summary of the world situation in the Spring of 1968. Unless specifically mentioned in this sitrep, matters should be assumed to be much as they are as of today and, unless specifically contradicted by this sitrep, the New York Times of December 2, 1966 will represent the state of affairs in all unmentioned matters.

The Vietnam conflict seems to have reached a stalemate with the American "reduced build-up" of U.S. forces announced in late 1966. American bombers continue to pound targets in the North and have been able, even with reduced frequency of missions, to limit infiltration along the Ho Chi Minh trail. The North Vietnamese continue to infiltrate men and supplies successfully enough to support guerilla warfare and occasional operations by regular North Vietnamese forces. The Viet Cong continue to control substantial portions of the countryside and village population while the Saigon government and its allies appear to hold the upper hand militarily by containing the conflict.

The Saigon Constituent Assembly has drawn up a constitution, held elections and established representative institutions. The success of the national pacification program, however, remains problematical. Recent intelligence reports have indicated that Hanoi may be massing forces on its border for a possible last, all-out attempt to regain the military advantage.

In Europe, the new NATO headquarters is an impressive building but President DeGaulle continues to block meaningful integration of Western defenses. With the British reaching a decision to commence negotiations on Common Market membership, the French delegation continues to block British entry. The British economy seems to have weathered the worst of the deflationary period but has a long way to go to restore former confidence in the Pound. Erhard has survived serious party crises of late 1966 and early 1967 but is expected to step down shortly.

President Johnson continues to implement Great Society programs in spite of Republican gains in '66. Progress is slow but some legislation is getting through. Inflationary pressures on the American economy seem to have eased and the economy shows continued strong growth. The burden of the

Vietnamese war continues to be felt, however, not only
economically but politically with the continuing and occasionally
catastrophic casualty rates borne by American forces. Senator
Kennedy of New York recently underscored a growing national
anxiety in noting that, as long as "we wage war in Vietnam
we will not effectively wage war on the poverty of our cities,
of our youth, of our aged. All these will take second place
to the war effort."

The 21st General Assembly has voted to accredit the Peking
delegation to its general session. The United States was able
to work out a compromise which guaranteed the Taiwan govern-
ment a seat in the Assembly using the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics-Ukrainian SSR-Byelorussia SSR as a model. Both the
Peking and Taiwan governments would be accredited to the
Assembly. The Peking seat, however, remains vacant, having
been shunned and denounced in the Hsinhua, the Communist Chinese
press agency, as "absurd, outrageous...there is only one China!"

October, 1967, marked the convening of a World Conference
of Democratic Peoples in Moscow in celebration of the fiftieth
anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution. The significance of
the conference is still being analyzed by Western observers.
Several points have become clear. First, the Soviet Union
obviously exercises effective control over Eastern Europe in
spite of an apparent disengagement of Soviet economic and
military commitments there and, overall, the Eastern Europeans
continue to line up with the Russians. One of the surprises
of the conference was the pro-Russian position of North Korea
and Mongolia, both of which had previously chosen a more
neutral policy.

The Soviet nuclear display included an impressive array
of ICBM and short-range missiles. Their anti-missile missile
was unveiled but Western analysts have not calculated its
effectiveness yet. Certainly, this display made China's test-
ing a year ago of various short-range surface-to-surface and
surface-to-air missiles seem crude indeed. Intelligence reports
from Hong Kong indicate, however, that full scale production
of such weapons have been underway in China since those tests.

The conference was a very heated affair with the Soviets
and Chinese clashing throughout. The Russians were able to
postpone a full plenum until the last week. The Chinese
delegation, headed by Chiang Ching (Mrs. Mao) seized the floor
first:

> "The Bolshevik Revolution, like the Great Chinese
> Revolution is a great moment in history, shaking the
> world's masses to new hope and revolutionary struggle...
> but today this revolution has been betrayed by the
> revisionists cliques which have thrown down the mantle

of Marxism-Leninism in favor of collaboration with the
imperialist U.S. bandits who ravage, rape, and napalm
Vietnamese women and children with but a wink from
Moscow.

"These collaborators must be shown to the world
for what they are, sniveling, pompous, cowering before
the Wall Street bankers and Pentagon militarists. All
countries genuinely opposing this aggression must draw
a clear line of distinction between themselves and the
revisionists whose united action is a sell out of the
people of Vietnam and of the world!"

The assembly hissed and booed the Chinese as they walked
out followed only by the delegations from New Zealand, Ireland,
Netherlands, and the Albanians.

LATE NEWS BULLETINS:

Special Reuters Dispatch, New York Times, TOKYO: "Unusual
railroad schedules on the Trans-Siberian line have persisted.
Rumors continue of troop movements in USSR's Central Asia."

Special to the New York Times, HONG KONG: "Hsinhua re-
ported today a speech by Chen Po-ta, leader of the 'Cultural
Revolution' which called for a return to greatness of all
peoples of the Chinese cultural past. He pointed to the division
of these peoples by such imperialists as the Russian tsars...
he called for armies of cultural revolutionaries to carry the
struggle to these peoples. There were also reports by corres-
pondents in Peking of unusual military movements in Northern
Manchuria and Sinkiang.

*** ***

Pre-Game Assignment

I. Due November 21:   1000 words (4 typed pages)

1. Assess your team/country's interest and capabilities
in the current situation.

2. Assess the interests and objectives of other
interested parties, and their probable intentions and capabilities.

3. In the light of the above:

a. What are your objectives (assign priorities)?
b. Policy recommendations to handle the sit-
uation.
c. Contingencies with respect to the actions
of other parties.

II. Due December 2:   (morning)

A one-page team summary of your country's objectives and
strategy for dealing with the situation.

INTERIM SCENARIO

Excerpts from the World Times:

TOKYO: A group of tourists returning from a trip across the
Trans-Siberian Railroad, reported that Russians in Irkutsk
seemed to agitated over rumors out of Ulan Bator regarding a
demonstration in front of the Soviet Embassy. Rock hurling
demonstrators supposedly broke several of the Embassy windows
while the police simply stood by. There has been no mention
of the incident in TASS or the Mongolian news media.

MOSCOW: Pravda reported today the communique of the talks
now underway between Soviet officials and Premier Tsedenbal
of the Mongolian People's Republic. The communique emphasized
"the continued solidarity of the Unic ! of Soviet Socialist
Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic."

CONCORD, N.H.:   With the New Hampshire primary campaign well
underway, Vietnam seems to be developing into an important
issue. Richard M. Nixon, in an address to the New Hampshire
Veterans of Foreign Wars, expressed his "great concern for
the frustrating war in Vietnam.... The time has come for us
to demonstrate our willingness either to negotiate or fight
with all the resources at hand. Dragging this war out any
longer will only play into the hands of the Communists."

On the Democratic side, a group of liberals who are dis-
satisfied with Administration policy on Vietnam are reportedly
starting a write-in campaign for Senator Robert F. Kennedy.
Senator Robert F. Kennedy, however, has said he knows nothing
of such a campaign and would not endorse or authorize it if
there were one.

HONG KONG: Hung Chi, the Chinese theoretical journal, published
an article today that "China-watchers" are reading carefully.
The following are a few excerpts:

"The current Soviet revisionists have betrayed not only
the Great Russian Revolution but the World Struggle for National
Liberation as well. We have seen their true colors in Vietnam
where it is the Soviets who counsel defeat. 'Run from the
American imperialist forces!' they say. We have seen them rattle
rockets to terrify everyone but the Americans and their cohorts.
We have seen the Soviet revisionists shy from confronting the
evil of American imperialism in Latin American, Africa, and Asia.
...the current Soviet revisionists obviously see themselves as
resurrections of the Tsars and look for an empire at the expense
of Socialist nations on their borders...Just as the Tsars
divided and annexed the Middle Kingdom fearing a united China,
so the current Soviet leaders tremble at the natural historical
forces permeating Asia."

PEKING: At a meeting of representatives of China's "autonomous regions" Ulan Fu, the first party secretary of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, endorsed the solidarity of the Mongolian peoples with the Chinese Revolution. "We are the sons of Genghis Khan, the comrades of Mao Tse-Tung."

FINAL SCENARIO

Reports from the World Times

TOKYO: Broadcasts purporting to come from Radio Ulan Bator
have been monitored here. Spokesmen for the "Anti-Revisionists
and Pro-Rectification Movement" claimed that the Mongolian
people could no longer tolerate the corruption and excesses of
the revisionist puppet Premier Tsedenbal and his henchmen.
Instead the "progressive forces" are now leading the Mongolian
People's Republic in a great "Pan-Mongolian Cultural Revolution."
The Mongolian people will no longer tolerate foreign influences
on Mongolian soil."

PEKING: Hsinhua, the New China News Agency, today heralded
the struggle of the Mongolian people for "nationalism, independ-
ence, and anti-revisionism" as a sign of the impact of the
teachings of Mao Tse-Tung for all peoples who long for independ-
ence from foreign exploiters.

MOSCOW: (UPI) Foreign correspondents here have been unable to
reach Premier Tsedenbal for comment on the reported coup d'etat
in Ulan Bator. The Mongolian Premier was last seen here yester-
day by western observers.

SCHEME OF THE GAME

This document is intended to familiarize the participant in the Political-Military Exercise with the procedures used in the simulation. It should be studied carefully prior to the initial Briefing Session. The exercise will be composed of a Briefing Session, alternating Team Move and Control Periods, and a closing Debriefing Session.

The Briefing Session. The game will commence with a briefing session (see Document #5 for complete schedule and locations). The session will be devoted to the introduction of participating members of the faculty and staff as well as a discussion of the ground rules of the game. Final information on the development of the crisis will be provided at that time. Following the briefing, the teams will retire to their assigned headquarters and commence the exercise.

Team Move Period. During the Team Move Periods, the individual teams will consider the information made available to them concerning the development of the crisis and determine the diplomatic, political, military, etc., moves which they propose their country make to deal with the situation.

At the beginning of each Move Period, teams will receive information concerning the state of the world situation in three forms.

1. News reports (in the World Times): All information released publicly by individual teams or by Control (as well as possible "leaks") will appear in the newspaper with a dateline. As in the real world, this information may, or may not, be accurate. Teams may seek to verify such information by any means normally under the control of governments (checking with diplomatic personnel, allies, or conducting intelligence operations). Such efforts may, or may not, succeed.

2. Sitrep (Situation report): This will represent Control's restructuring of the situation to take account of the various team actions. Information included under this heading is reliable and Control will decline to respond to intelligence requests for information included or strongly implied in the sitrep. (N.B.: During the first Move Period only most exceptional requests for intelligence will be answered by Control. Teams should have ample information from the final scenario to formulate initial moves.) The Sitrep is used only insofar as it is necessary to elaborate or clarify information given in the news reports. News reports of Sitrep validity may be indicated as coming from exceptionally qualified sources.

3. _Messages_ (from other teams or from Control):
Particularly in the case of messages passed on from other
teams at the beginning of a Move Period, participants should
check these against the Sitrep. In some cases, Control may
have advanced the action further than the status of the
message as submitted by the originating team.

During the Move Period each team must consider the infor-
mation made available to them about the world situation and
determine what actions they wish their country to take in
order to deal with the situation. These actions may be diplo-
matic, military, economic, or political, etc., but they should
all be related to a coherent strategy designed to achieve
the national goals appropriate to the country represented
by each team.

Once the incoming information has been digested, and the
team has determined the actions necessary on its part, these
actions must be broken down into appropriate messages. As
many messages must be composed for each action as are necessary
to communicate the move to various interested parties according
to the originating team's intent. Different moves may require
a different number of messages. In one case, it may be
sufficient to communicate a national position by means of a
news conference or press release. Such messages, sent to
"Control" and thus described in the space for "Move Description"
(See sample messages and directions for completing the message
form on pages 4 and 5), will be printed in the World Times
and communicated to all teams. In other cases, the content
of a press release may tell only a small part of the story,
and special messages will be needed for Control and other teams--
allies or adversaries--giving each a different view of the
move. Note that in Examples 1 and 2 (see page 4) the same
act is communicated in several different ways by means of
multiple messages.

The team must decide in the case of each action how many
messages are necessary to communicate their intentions to each
interested party in a manner appropriate to their purposes.
In doing so, the team should remember:

1. Control must be made aware of all actions taken.
Until Control has seen and approved of actions they have not
occurred (troops have not been moved, aid has not been
delivered, etc.).

2. Control will see all messages passed as well as the
Team Summary (see below). Thus messages to Control need not
duplicate information otherwise available.

3. Control will not, as a rule, release to the newspaper
material contained in otherwise Confidential documents. Hence
a special message should frame the move in the way your team
wishes it released to the press, if it is to be general infor-
mation.

4. All messages must be described under Move Description, and this form must in all cases be one that is under the control of the government represented by the team.

The Move Period is for the purpose of each team's developing its strategy and putting its moves in the form of messages. At the end of the period, the team should submit to the Message Center:

1. A Team Summary: Described as such in the Move Description Space; this should present a general summary of the team's perception of the world situation and its strategy for dealing with it. In drawing this up, the team should consider:

a. The intentions of other countries.
b. The progress of events to date.
c. The team's interests in the present situation and its strategy for dealing with it.
d. Some expression of the team's possible future tactics in light of possible future developments in the world.

2. Messages: These cover the actions the team wishes to take as described above, and must include a message noting the results of any diplomatic conferrals that have taken place during the Period, a copy of which will be sent to the other party.

Other Notes:

All team moves may be made only during a Team Move Period.

The team captain or an assigned team member should keep a file of the team's moves and messages in sequence. For example, the United States team will begin in Move Period I with the team message number US-1, and continue the numbers consecutively through the game. Draft your messages on the form provided and keep this as the team's copy or keep the last page of the message form.

All confidential messages must be so labelled (CONFID.) and requests for Immediate Action by Control during a Move Period (intelligence requests or instructions to international organizations delegates) should carry the appropriate notation.

The international organization will meet in appropriate venue (U.N. General Assembly, Security Council, O.A.S., etc.) only if called. No international organization meetings will be called during Move Period I. The meetings take place during a Move Period [and are broadcast via television to the various team headquarters].

[Teams will be given the phone number of Game Central.]
If a team should have administrative questions about the
game or are confused regarding substance of Control actions,
it may request advice from Game Central at any time.

The Control Period. A Control Period follows each Team
Move Period. During this time the Control Team will examine
the moves submitted, rule on their plausibility, and restruc-
ture "reality" for the next move period. The calender will
generally advance between move periods.

The function of the Control Team will be to serve as
umpires, ruling on the plausibility of move, and to play roles
not allocated to the individual teams. They will also play
"nature," introducing new developments, "leaking" confidential
information, and so forth. Teams may also ask Control to fill
in gaps in their information but only when absolutely neces-
sary, addressing their messages to the appropriate national
source (e.g. Director of the CIA, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, the country's ambassador to a certain capital). The
World Times will normally provide you with all the information
reasonably available. These Control communications, the
sitrep, news releases, and messages, will serve as the team's
link to the new "reality" structured for the next Team Move
Period.

The Debriefing Session. At the close of the game there
will be a debriefing session in which short summary comments
will be solicited from the members of the Control Team and
Team Captains. The floor will then be thrown open for general
discussion of the game experience. Participants may be asked
to fill out a brief questionnaire to assist the evaluation of
the gaming experience.

***   ***

SAMPLE MESSAGE FORMS

Example 1:   Response to troop movements required three
              separate moves.

Move Description: URGENT CABLE FROM FOR. MIN. UAR TO FOR.
                     MIN. SYRIA

[X] Confidential   [ ] Immediate Action   To: SYRIA   From: UAR
                                                Time Sent: 10:05 A.M.
                                                Move Period: I
                                                Team Message No.: UAR-5

YOU HAVE 1 HOUR TO EFFECT A CEASE FIRE.   THIS INVOLVES PULL-
ING YOUR TROOPS BACK 10 MILES FROM THE PRESENT LINE OF COMBAT.
UNLESS YOU COMPLY WITH THESE TERMS WE WILL ASSUME A STATE OF
WAR EXISTS WITH THAT NATION NOT COMPLYING AND THE UAR WILL
ACT ACCORDINGLY WITH ALL MEANS NECESSARY.

Move Description: URGENT CABLE FROM DEF. MIN. UAR TO AIR
                     AND NAVAL COMMANDERS UAR

[X] Confidential   [ ] Immediate Action   To: CONTROL   From: UAR
                                                Time Sent: 10:45 A.M.
                                                Move Period: I
                                                Team Message No.: UAR-6

NAVY: ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR LAST THAT AMPHIBIOUS INVASION FORCE
HAS PUT TO SEA.   ON RECEIPT OF ORDERS TO EXECUTE OPERATION
STRIKE YOU WILL LAND ON PLANNED BEACHES OF SYRIA AND DRIVE
TOWARD DAMASCUS.
AIR: ON RECEIPT OF ORDERS TO EXECUTE OPERATION STRIKE YOU WILL
MOVE.   IN EVENT THE ABOVE STATED NAVAL OPERATION IS EXECUTED
YOU WILL SUPPORT IT AND CONTINUE SUPPORTING ALL LAND OPERATIONS.

Move Description: PRESS RELEASE

[ ] Confidential   [ ] Immediate Action   To: CONTROL   From: UAR
                                                Time Sent: 10:45 A.M.
                                                Move Period: I
                                                Team Message No.: UAR-7

CAIRO: RADIO CAIRO TODAY MONITORED AN URGENT MESSAGE FROM
RADIO AMMAN WHICH WAS SURROUNDED BY SYRIAN TROOPS.   RADIO
AMMAN WAS BROADCASTING AN URGENT PLEA FOR HELP AGAINST THE
AGGRESSORS FROM THE REST OF THEIR ARAB BROTHERS.   IT WAS CUT
OFF AFTER 20 MINUTES OF BROADCASTING.   THE UAR IS CONSIDERING
THE PLEAS AT THIS TIME.

<u>Example 2:</u> Response to UAR moves, by Israel.

Move Description: DIPLOMATIC COMMUNIQUE TO THE UAR AMBASSADOR
FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

☐Confidential ☐Immediate Action   To: UAR From: ISRAEL
Time Sent: 11:05 A.M.
Move Period: II
Team Message No.: ISRAEL-
13

ISRAEL CANNOT REMAIN PEACEFUL IF THE UAR TRIES TO TAKE OVER
JORDAN AS THIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR VERY EXISTENCE.

Move Description: PRESS RELEASE   To: CONTROL From: ISRAEL
Time Sent: 11:05 A.M.
Move Period: II
☐ Confidential ☐Immediate Action   Team Message No.: ISRAEL-
14

TEL AVIV: THE ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTRY MET IN SECRET SESSION
TODAY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MEETING IS TO CONSIDER A
MILITARY RESPONSE TO THREATS OF RADIO CAIRO THAT THE UAR MIGHT
TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE JORDANIAN CRISIS.

<u>Example 3:</u> Proposal to move military forces should be specific
and account for possible problems.

Move Description: URGENT CABLE TO COMMANDER OF USSR NAVAL
FORCE

☐Confidential ☐ Immediate Action   To: CONTROL From: USSR
Time Period: 11:12 A.M.
Move Period: II
Team Message No.: USSR-14

STATION 20 SUBMARINES IN EASTERN MEDIT. AREA FOR POSSIBLE
ACTION. AVOID ALL CONTACT WITH ANY FOREIGN NAVAL FORCE. AWAIT
FURTHER INSTRUCTION.

<u>GENERALIZED MESSAGE FORM</u>

Move Description[1]   To:[4]   From:[5]

  Confidential[2]   Immediate Action[3]
                                           Time Sent:[6]
                                           Move Period:[7]
                                           Team Message No.:[8]

(Text)   (Game Number)[9]

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1. Move Description should indicate the specific nature of your message and the particular agencies involved. It is not the administrative address, but must describe an action controlled by your team as a government.

2. Confidential should be indicated by checking the appropriate box in all cases in which the security of the message is required. Otherwise simply leave the box to the left of the word "Confidential" blank.

3. Immediate Action requests that Control deal with your message when submitted rather than waiting until the following Control Period. Ordinarily, only instructions to U.N. delegates and requests for intelligence will receive such consideration. If immediate action is required, check the box to the left of the words "immediate Action."

4. To can only apply to a.)Another team, or b.) Control. This address is for administrative purposes.

5. From can only apply to your team.

6. Time Sent should indicate the hour and minutes of the class period at which the message was submitted to Control, i.e. the actual clock time.

7. Move Period should be marked with the number corresponding to the particular Move Period of the exercise, such as I, II, III, IV, or V. The numeral alone will suffice.

8. Team Message No. is the number assigned by the team captain or designated team member which indicates the sequence of the message in the game. Use your team initials plus the number. Number consecutively through the entire game. For example, if your team sent 12 messages in Move Period I, the first message in II should be 13. Do not start over.

9. Game Number. Messages passed to teams will have a number stamped here to indicate its sequence in the game. This is an administrative device for Control records.

GAME ROSTER

Teams

United States   Room 108G
    Tomick (Chrm.), Michel, Drummond, Allison, Barnhill, Hinkle

Soviet Union   Room 108D
    Waters (Chrm.), Franks, Wiseman, Propper, Gore, Dean

Chinese People's Republic (CPR)   Room 108E
    Wagner (Chrm.), Sears, Appleman, Neff, Robinson

United Kingdom   Room 112B West
    Hartstein (Chrm.), Wolvoord, Hadlock, Litowitz, Horbaly

France   Room 112B East
    Hogan (Chrm.), Donahue, Kasprowski, Kolbe

Japan   Room 108F
    Hutchison (Chrm.), Mitz, Perring, Redman, Hise

***

Game Supervisor: H. Roberts Coward

Control: Bradley Richardson   Room 108C
        Edwin Fedder
        Andrew Axline
        Gene Rainey   Tel: 8

Game Administrators: Bonnie Steele
                Neil Richardson

Message Center: Neil Richardson   Room 108C

Team Advisors: Ed Menge
          Larry Peterson
          Richard Masek

U.N. Secretary-General/President   Room 110K

GAME SCHEDULE

Form a: Four Move Periods

9:00 A.M.	Briefing Session: Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, 404-B Seventeenth Avenue (under Stadium at Gate 22). Room 110K
9:30-10:30 A.M.	Team Move Period I. During this move period Control will organize its headquarters and accept moves for diplomatic consultation, requests for information, etc.
10:30-11:30 A.M.	Control Period.
11:30-12:30 P.M.	Team Move Period II. (N.B., closure of this move period will be prompt, since Control must adjourn to a working lunch: all moves must have been submitted to the Message Center by 12:30.)
12:30-2:00 P.M.	Teams: Lunch (individual arrangements). Control Period
2:00-2:45 P.M.	Team Move Period III.
2:45-3:30 P.M.	Control Period.
3:30-4:15 P.M.	Team Move Period IV. Control will accept and act on moves continuously.
4:30-end	Debriefing (evaluation and critique) session: Room 110K.

GAME SCHEDULE

Form b: Five Move Periods

8:30 A.M.	Briefing Session
9:00-10:00 A.M.	Team Move Period I
10:00-10:30 A.M.	Control Period
10:30-11:30 A.M.	Team Move Period II
11:30- 1:00 P.M.	Control Period (Lunch)
1:00-2:00 P.M.	Team Move Period III
2:00-2:30 P.M.	Control Period
2:30-3:30 P.M.	Team Move Period IV
3:30-4:00 P.M.	Control Period
4:00-5: - P.M.	Team Move Period V
c.5:00-end	Debriefing

[N.B.: A game paced as rapidly as this usually requires that
Control conduct at least a portion of its work concurrently
with the Move Periods throughout the game, using the Control
Period to catch up and summarize developments.]

GAME SCHEDULE

Form c: Two Day Game

Friday

4:30	Briefing Session.
5:00-6:30	Team Move Period I. (N.B., closure of this move period will be prompt, since Control must adjourn to a working dinner: all moves must have been submitted to the Message Center by 6:30.)
6:30-8:30	Teams: dinner (individual arrangements). Control Period. Control will meet for a working dinner, returning by 8:00 to produce the resulting documents.
8:30-9:30	Team Move Period II.
9:30-10:00	Teams adjourn for the night. Begin Control Period.

                    *   *   *

Saturday

8:00-8:30	Complete Control Period.
8:30-9:30	Team Move Period III.
9:30-10:30	Control Period
10:30-11:+	Team Move Period IV
11:30-end	Debriefing (evaluation and critique).

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MEMORANDUM TO CONTROL

The Political-Military Exercise (PME) is designed to be
a teaching tool of International Relations. Its teaching
benefits are three-fold: (1) to heighten the interest and
motivation of students; (2) to offer an opportunity for apply-
ing and testing knowledge; and (3) to give participants a
greater understanding of the world as seen and experienced by
the decision-maker. The participants' role playing is focused
upon a simulated crisis in a controlled world.

The Control team has two general functions to perform.
Control must act as:

a. <u>Referee</u>: Control observes, monitors, and referees
all moves proposed by the student teams. Only Control, as it
receives copies of all team messages, has an overview of the
crisis developments and can thereby judge the "realism" of a
move. In this capacity, Control may reject team moves which
appear to be unrealistic, and can leak information which was
intended by a team to be confidential. Therefore, as referee,
Control must act on all messages from the teams by:

1. Approving or rejecting them on the basis of realism.
2. Passing them on as indicated, holding, or leaking them.
3. Returning a message to the initiator with an explana-
tory note if necessary.
4. In the case of intelligence requests, explaining or
refusing to explain and supply the requested "facts."

b. <u>All forces in global politics not already represented
by teams</u>: Control will serve to represent all countries and
organizations not assigned to the teams, including domestic
political forces not controlled by the teams as governments.
In addition, Control represents "nature", introducing such
variables as weather conditions and advancing time. With its
unique overview of the world as modified by the teams, Control
is able to judge the utility of the direction which the game
is taking and can change or accelerate this direction.

As suggested above (b), Control has many tools with which
it may channel the flow of the game. As discussed below,
Control can employ any appropriate combination of three means
of communication to the teams in order to report its observations
of the game's progress, and to introduce its creative changes.
While directing the progress of the game, Control must be careful
not to "over-control" team actions. That is, Control may expect
the student teams to translate certain miscalculations into

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actions of questionable realism. Unless the action is grossly out of proportion or threatens to direct the game beyond the scope of student preparation, it is suggested that Control permit its occurrence, noting the error for a point of discussion during the Debriefing period. Indeed, one function of Control is to force the student teams to live with their mistakes.

Methods of Control's Communications

1. The World Times: The World Times is the international "newspaper" to be published by Control at the end of each Control Period. (It may be published, however, at any time during the game as needed.) Distributed to all teams, the World Times has two types of articles:

(a) General press releases which may or may not be reliable are to be published in the World Times. These releases will include materials which Control wishes to divulge in the paper, as well as materials which teams submit for newspaper release. (Throughout the game, each World Times edition will be numbered sequentially.)
(b) "SITREP" - Control's report of the current situation which the students will accept as authoritative and binding. In effect an updated scenario, the SITREP is used to augment news releases insofar as necessary. Its authoritativeness is not open to question and it may be used simply to indicate the authoritative nature of certain news stories. More detailed SITREPs are usually necessary when the calendar is advanced by a considerable period between Move Periods.

2. Messages to individual teams: These may be sent when information is only pertinent to certain teams, or when it is desirable not to release information indiscriminately. Control may most frequently use the messages to individual teams when it, representing a particular world force not otherwise assigned to students, wishes to communicate with a student team.

3. Laboratory Communications System: The laboratory offers two types of oral communication facilities: (a) The telephone is best suited to handling procedural concerns, particularly when Control only wishes to speak with a few of the teams. (b) The public address system permits Control to make general announcements directed at the entire audience of participants in the game.

Conferrals

Face-to-face conferrals among representatives of various teams may occur during the game but they should be controlled and limited. A member of Control should attend any conferral that is considered to be potentially significant. Also, the teams will probably request at least one meeting of an international organization to take place during Team Move periods.

It is Control's responsibility to judge the appropriateness
of the request for convening, to chair these international
organization meetings, and to represent countries relevant
to the convention but not represented by the teams. (See
special notes on p. 5.) However, if the student teams do not
request a meeting of the international organization by the
end of the third Team Move period, Control should seriously
consider calling such an assembly. At each such meeting, one
delegate or observer should be requested by the chairman to
write a summary of the proceedings for the World Times sub-
sequent issue.

Message and the Message Center

The Message Center serves as the clearing house for all
messages issued by Control and by the individual teams. Listed
below are the essential steps in the recording and processing
of messages. On receipt of a triplicate message form, the
Message Center assigns a game number to the message and enters
it in the log. If the message is:

From a student team:

1. For Control: Triplicate message form is submitted
to the Message Center and logged.
Message Center files white copy, passes the pink and yellow
copies to Control.
Control eventually files yellow copy, keeps the pink copy for
reference (because Control represents the recipient).

2. For Another team: Triplicate message form is
submitted to the Message Center and logged.
Message Center files white copy, passes the pink and yellow
copies to Control
Control files yellow copy, keeps the pink copy to be distributed
to its recipient team at the end of the next Control period
(if approved by Control).
EXCEPTION: Control will pass the pink copy on to the recipient
team immediately upon processing the message if Control concurs
with an initiator's request for Immediate Action.

From Control:

For another team: Triplicate message form is submitted
to the Message Center and logged.
Message Center files white copy, passes the yellow copy to
Control.
Control files yellow copy. The pink copy is put into the distribu-
tion system. (The pink copy is distributed immediately if
Control has initiated an Immediate Action message.

The Debriefing Period

At the close of the game, during the Debriefing session,
Control will be called upon to evaluate the student teams' per-
ceptions and actions. (Control members may wish to keep notes
for this purpose as the game progresses.)

The Division of Labor

Due to its several procedural and substantive tasks, Control may do well to consider delegating to its members certain basic responsibilities. The first such task should be to select a chairman who is prepared to coordinate Control activities as well as maintain a general perspective on the progress and evolution of the crisis situation. Other responsibilities to be meted out include:

1. Drafting messages from Control.
2. Handling telephone calls to and from Control.
3. Attending international conferrals and international organization meetings (which may occur concurrently.
4. Maintaining an accurate account of Control's decisions regarding incoming messages (whether requested information is granted, messages to other teams passed on, etc.).
5. Processing information for World Times releases.

Author's Note:

An additional page of special instructions to Control Team members should be added dealing with problems arising from a specific scenario. Additional background material (clippings, etc.) is often a courtesy to volunteer Control members. At least the following information is usually significant. The examples here are based upon the 3 December 1966 described in other documents.

1. Control may wish to keep in mind the principal roles it will be called upon to play in the crisis situation. The following roles are not played by individual teams and should be of consequence considering the scenario:

Outer Mongolia   North and South Korea
Albania   North and South Vietnam
India

Control is also responsible for the actions of all other political entities not played by a team.

2. The membership of the United Nations Security Council shall consist of the following nations if it is called into session:

France
China[1]
United Kingdom   plus ten others.[2]
United States*
U.S.S.R.*

*This nation is played by a student team; all other nations will be represented by Control.

[1]A formula for dealing with Chinese representation is often a necessary part of the scenario.

[2]The remaining nations may be taken from the contemporaneous real world membership, or may be adapted by the Game Director-- generally with a view to maximizing team participation in these meetings. The membership should nonetheless be consistent with diplomatic understandings regarding its distribution.

A BRIEF GUIDE TO FUNCTIONS AND PROCEDURES OF THE PRINCIPAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY*

I. THE SECURITY COUNCIL (U.N. Charter, Chapters V-VII)

The Security Council, consisting of five permanent members
(U.S., Britain, France, U.S.S.R., and Nationalist China) and ten
non-permanent members (Art. 23) has <u>primary responsibility</u> for
the maintenance of international peace and security. (Art. 24
(1)) The members of the United Nations are <u>bound to accept and
carry out</u> the decisions of the Security Council. (Art. 25)

A. Functions

<u>Pacific Settlement of International Disputes</u> (Ch.VI)
Parties to a dispute may not vote in decisions of the SC involv-
ing pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter VI of the
Charter. (Art. 27 (3)) The SC is empowered only to make re-
commendations for peaceful settlement, by definition not bind-
ing on the parties to a dispute.

1. The SC may call on the parties to a dispute to seek
a solution by negotiation, arbitration, or other peaceful
means. (Art. 33)

2. It may investigate any dispute or situation to see
if its continuance is likely to endanger international peace
and security. (Art. 34)

3. Such a dispute or situation may be brought to the
attention of the SC by any member of the United Nations, by
the General Assembly, by the Secretary-General, or by a dis-
putant non-member who accepts in advance the obligation of
peaceful settlement. (Art. 35, 11 (3), 99)

4. The SC may, at any stage of a dispute or situation,
the continuance of which is deemed likely to endanger inter-
national peace and security, recommend <u>procedures</u> or <u>methods</u>
of Settlement   (Art. 36(1)) and is encouraged as a general
rule to refer legal disputes to the International Court of
Justice. (Art. 36(3))

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*This document was originally prepared for the guidance of game
participants by the Department of Political Science at M.I.T.,
under the supervision of Prof. Norman J. Padelford.

5. The SC may recommend terms of settlement if it finds that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger international peaces and security. (Art. 37(2))

Preventive and Enforcement Action (Ch. VII)

The Security Council is empowered to make decisions as to preventive and enforcement action which the Members of the United Nations are bound to accept and carry out. (Art. 39, 25)

1. The SC determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, and makes recommendations or decides on measures of enforcement to be taken. (Art. 39)

2. Before doing so, the SC may call upon the parties to a dispute to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary. (Art. 40)

3. The SC may decide on measures to enforce its decisions not involving the use of force, such as the severance of economic or diplomatic relations. (Art. 41)

4. If these prove inadequate, the SC may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. (Art. 42)

5. A Military Staff Committee composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the five permanent members is available to advice and assist the SC in the application of armed forces. (Art. 47)

6. The SC designates the members, some or all, to carry out the peace enforcement action decided upon. The members are bound to render mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council. (Art. 48, 49)

7. The SC shall encourage pacific settlement of local disputes by regional arrangements organized to deal with such matters. (Art. 52-54)

8. The SC may ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on any legal question. (Art. 96)

The Charter (Art. 43) requires all members to negotiate special agreements with the SC for the purpose of making available to the SC armed forces and other assistance requisite for peace enforcement. The failure to conclude any such agreements makes it impossible for the SC to exercise its peace enforcement powers in the manner originally anticipated. As a transitional arrangement, pending the coming into force of such special agreements, the five permanent members of the SC, after consultation, are to take joint action on behalf of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security (Art. 106)

Several provisions of the Charter reserve certain
national prerogative:

(1)   the inherent right of individual and collective self-
defense, pending measures taken by the SC (Art. 51)

(2)   the prohibition of interference by the United Nations
is essentially domestic matters, although without prejudice to
enforcement measures taken by the SC (Art.2(7))

(3)   the freedom to take action against the enemy states
of World War II when such action is taken as a "result" of
that war (Art. 107)

B.   _Voting_   (Art. 27)

Each member of the SC has one vote.   (Art. 27(1))

1.   Decisions on _procedural_ matters are made by an affirma-
tive vote _of any nine members_.   (Art. 27(2))

2.   Decisions on _all other matters_ are made by an affirmative
vote of nine members including the concurring votes of all five
permanent members, except that a member must abstain from vot-
ing in decisions concerning the pacific settlement of a dispute
to which it is a party.   (Art. 27(3))

3.   Abstention by a permanent member is _in practice_ not
regarded as constituting a veto.

4.   _Absence_, occurring on the occasion of the Korean
resolutions of June, 1950, was assimilated to abstention and
therefore regarded as not constituting a veto.   This action
was protested as illegal by the absent permanent member
(the U.S.S.R.).

5.   The following matters, according to the Joint Statement
of the Sponsoring Powers of 1945, are regarded as procedural
in the SC.

      (a)   adoption or alteration of rules of procedure;
      (b)   determination of the method of selecting its
           President;
      (c)   its self-organization for continuous functioning;
      (d)   selection of time and place of meetings;
      (e)   establishment of special bodies to perform its
           functions;
      (f)   invitations to non-members of the SC to participate
           in affecting their interests;
      (g)   invitation to parties to disputes to participate
           in their discussion.

In addition, questions of placing matters on the _Agenda_ and
removing them are _in practice_ treated as _procedural_.

6. The question of whether a matter is procedural or substantive is according to the Joint Statement of the Sponsoring Powers, a substantive question. A limited means of escaping this "double veto" lies in the application of Rule 30 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the SC, which permits a ruling by the President of the SC on a point of order to be overruled by a majority of any seven members when the matter is generally recognized as procedural.

C. Sessions (Art. 28; Provisional Rules of Procedure, Ch. I)

1. The SC is so organized as to be able to function continuously, and a representative of each member must be present at all time at the seat of the United Nations. (Art. 28(1))

2. Meetings are otherwise held at the call of the President. The President must call a meeting at the request of any member, or whenever a dispute or situation is called to the attention of the SC by any member of the United Nations, by a party to a dispute.

D. Agenda (Provisional Rules of Procedure, Ch. II)

1. The Provisional Agenda for each meeting of the SC is drawn up by the President of the SC, and communicated in advance by the Secretary-General to each member.

2. The items to be included under the Agenda are indicated in Rules 6-12 of the Provisional Rules of Procedure of the SC.

E. Presidency (Provisional Rule of Procedure, Ch. IV)

1. The Presidency of the SC is held for periods on one calendar month in turn by members of the SC in the English alphabetical order of their names.

2. The President presides over meetings of the SC and represents it as an organ of the United Nations.

F. Secretariat (Provisional Rules of Procedure, Ch. V)

1. Secretarial service is provided by the Secretary-General.

2. The Secretary-General may make oral or written statements to the SC concerning any question under consideration.

G. Conduct of Business (Provisional Rules of Procedure, Ch. VI)

1. The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak.

2. The SC may appoint a commission or rapporteur for a specific question.

3. If a representative raises a point of order, the President shall immediately state his ruling, which if challenged, is immediately submitted to the SC and may be overruled. (Rule 30)

4. Proposals, resolutions, amendment, and substantive motions are normally placed before the representatives in writing.

5. The precedence of motions is as follows: to suspend; to adjourn; to postpone; to amend; principal motions and draft resolutions relative to the subject at hand in order of their submission.

6. Motions or draft resolutions may be put to a vote without having been seconded.

7. A motion or draft resolution may be withdrawn before it is voted upon. If seconded, the seconder may require that it be put to a vote.

8. The SC may invite any Member of the United Nations, not a member of the SC, to participate, without vote, in any discussion affecting its interests. (Art. 31)

9. The SC shall invite any state, party to a dispute, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, to participate, without vote in the discussion of the dispute. (Art. 32)

10. The SC may invite members of the Secretariat or other persons to provide it with information or other assistance.

11. The SC may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary. (Art. 29)

II. THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY (U.N. Charter, Ch. IV)

The General Assembly consists of all the Members of the United Nations (Art. 9). Lacking the decision powers of the SC, the GA is empowered to make recommendations of varying degrees of moral persuasiveness.

A. Functions

1. The GA may discuss any matters within the scope of the Charter and, except as to a dispute or situation with which the SC is currently dealing, make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations or to the SC. (Art. 10)

2. The GA may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security and may make appropriate recommendations of the Members of the United Nations or to the SC. (Art. 11(1))

3. It may discuss any question of peace and security brought before it by any Member, by the SC, or by a non-Member state party to a dispute, which accepts in advance the obligation of peaceful settlement. <u>Unless</u> the SC is dealing with such question, the GA may make recommendations. If "action" is necessary, the question is referred to the SC. (Art. 11(2))

4. The GA may call the attention of the SC to situations likely to endanger international peace and security. (Art. 11 (3))

5. The GA may make recommendations as to a dispute or situation with which the SC is dealing only if the SC so requests. (Art. 12(1))

6. If the SC, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, <u>fails</u> to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in a case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the GA, under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of November 3, 1950, will consider the matter <u>immediately</u> with a view to making appropriate <u>recommendations</u> to the Members for collective measures, including the use of armed force when necessary. To this end, an emergency session of the GA may be convened within 24 hours on the request of <u>any</u> seven members of the SC or of a majority of the Members of the United Nations. (Uniting for Peace Resolutions, Resolution "A")

B. <u>Voting</u> (Art. 18; Rules of Procedure, Rules 84-97)

Every Member of the United Nations has one vote in the GA. (Art. 18)

1. Decisions on "important questions" are made by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. These questions include recommendations with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. (Art. 18)

2. Decisions on other questions including matters of whether a question is "important" or not, are made by a simple majority of the members present and voting. (Art. 18(3))

C. <u>Sessions</u> (Art. 20; Rules of Procedure, Ch. I)

1. The GA meets in regular annual sessions beginning each September.

2. Special sessions may be called by the Secretary-General at the request of the SC or of a majority of the Member States. (Art. 20)

3. Emergency sessions may be called, under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, as indicated above (II, A, 6).

D. **Agenda** (Rules of Procedure, Ch. II)

    1. The Provisional Agenda for a regular of special session is drawn up and communicated to the Members in advance.

    2. The items to be included under the Agenda are indicated in Rules 12-24 of the Rules of Procedure.

E. **Presidency** (Rules of Procedure, Ch. V)

    1. A President and seven Vice-Presidents are elected by the GA each session.

    2. The President presides over plenary meetings of the GA.

    3. The President does not vote but may appoint another member of his delegation to vote in his place.

F. **General Committee** (Rules of Procedure, Ch. VI)

    1. The General Committee comprises the President and Vice-Presidents and the chairmen of major committees.

    2. It assists in drawing up the Agenda, reviews the progress of the Assembly, makes recommendations for furthering such progress, and generally assists the President.

    3. It does not decide political questions.

G. **Secretariat** (Rules of Procedure, Ch. VII)

    1. Secretarial service is provided to the GA by the Secretary-General.

    2. The Secretary-General may make oral or written statements to the GA concerning any questions under discussion.

    3. The Secretary-General, with the consent of the SC, notifies the GA at each session of any matters regarding international peace and security being dealt with by the SC and notifies the GA when the SC ceases to deal with such matters.

H. **Conduct of Business** (Rules of Procedure, Ch. XII)

    1. The GA, in case of emergency special session, meets in the plenary session and directly considers the matter proposed in the request for the session.

    2. A majority of the members constitute a quorum.

    3. The President shall call upon representatives in the order in which they signify their desire to speak. The President may call a speaker to order if his remarks are irrelevant.

7. Proposals and amendments are normally introduced in writing and circulated in advance of the meetings by the Secretary-General.

8. A motion may be withdrawn before it is voted upon. It may be reintroduced by another member.

9. The GA may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary. (Art. 22) The procedure of committees and subsidiary organs of the Assembly is set forth in Rules 98-134 of the Rules of Procedure.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (U.N. Charter, Ch. XIV; Statute of International Court of Justice)

The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. Its Statute is an integral part of the United Nations Charter. (Charter, Art. 92)

1. The 15 judges are chosen without regard to nationality, but no two may be nationals of the same state. The judges are elected by simple majorities of both the SC and the GA who are enjoined by the Statute to make sure that the main forms of civilization and principal legal systems of the world are represented in the Court. (Statue, Art. 2, 3(1), 4(1), 8, 9. 10)

2. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court, including states which are not parties to the Statute on conditions laid down by the SC. (Statute, Art. 34(1), 35(2))

3. Any party to a case before the Court undertakes in advance to comply with its decision. If a party fails to comply, the other party may have recourse to the SC. (Charter, Art. 94)

4. Decisions are binding only on the parties concerned and in the particular case. The judgment of the Court is final and without appeal. (Statute, Art. 59, 60)

5. All questions are decided by a majority of judges present, the quorum being nine. (Statute, Art. 55)

6. The SC or the GA may request an advisory opinion on any legal question. (Charter, Art. 96(1)) In practice, only the GA has done so.

7. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specifically provided for in the Charter or in treaties and conventions in force. Disputes as to jurisdiction are settled by decision of the Court. (Statute, Art. 36(1), 36(6))

8. States that are parties to the Statute may, if they choose, accept as to all states accepting the same obligation

the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in stipulated cate-
gories of legal disputes. Such acceptance may be on condition
of reciprocity or for a limited time. (Statute, Art. 36(2),
36(3))

9. The Court, whose function is to decide disputes in
accordance with <u>international law</u>, applies:

(a) international conventions;
(b) international custom;
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized
        nations;
(d) judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly
qualified publicits of the various nations, as subsidiary means
of determing rules of law.

The Court may decide a case <u>ex aequo et bono</u> if the parties
agree to this. (Statute, Art. 38)

IV. THE SECRETARIAT (U.N. Charter, Ch. XV)

The Secretariat consists of a Secretary-General and such
staff as the United Nations may require. The Secretary-General
is the chief administrative officer of the United Nations,
appointed for five years by the GA on the recommendation of the
SC. (Art. 97)

1. The Secretary-General, or an authorized deputy, acts
in that capacity at all meetings of the GA, the SC, and other
specified organs of the United Nations, and performs, such
other functions as are entrusted to him by these organs (Art. 98)

2. The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of
the SC any matter which in his opinion may threaten international
peace and security. (Art. 99)

3. The Secretary-General and the staff shall not seek or
receive instructions from any government or any authority except
the United Nations. They must refrain from any action which
might reflect on their position as international officials
responsible only to the United Nations. (Art. 100(1))

4. Each Member of the United Nations is bound to respect
the exclusively international character of the responsibilities
of the Secretary-General and the staff and not to seek to in-
fluence them in the discharge of their responsibilities.
(Art. 100(2))

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Kahin, George McT. Major Governments of Asia. 2nd Edition. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960).

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also

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Clippings from the New York Times which will be added as needed.

SAMPLE MESSAGE FORM

Move Description:

To:

From:

Time Sent:

Move Period:

Team Message No:

☐ Confidential

☐ Immediate Action

MESSAGE LOG   Page____

Game Message No.	Originating Team						Control

Appendix II

SYLLABI AND DOCUMENTS

FOR THE INTEGRAL FORMAT

APPENDIX II: INTRODUCTION

This appendix consists of three sets of documents.   Two
sets are syllabi used in courses involving use of the integral
PME format.   The first syllabus is for an introductory course
in international relations and was used under the quarter
calendar system.   A supplementary bibliography keyed to the
topical organization of the course and giving Library of Con-
gress call numbers is included.   The other course deals with
national security policy and was taught under the semester
calendar.   As noted in the text of the report, the calendar
system has less to do with the organization of the syllabus
than with the pace of the course.

The third set of documents follow the same numbering system
used in Appendix I, with several omissions.   The standardized
forms have been modified to indicate the longitudinal extension
of the exercise over a number of class periods and the substi-
tution of ordinary classroom space for the complex equipment
of a laboratory.   The game illustrated by Documents #1 and 3
used students as members of the Control Team.   A student ac-
count of its development is given in Appendix III.

Because the general international politics game mentioned
in Chapter IV does not require a Preliminary Scenario, an
example of a scenario using the Vietnam focus for a contempor-
ary exercise is given.   A possible debriefing assignment for
the general game follows.

Integral Exercise Document List

Syllabus For

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

This section of Political Science 530 will be an experiment with the use of a variety of simulation known as the Political-Military Exercise (PME) in the teaching of an introductory course in international relations. The content of such a course is usually designed to meet the needs of two audiences. It aims at providing the general student with a background that will help him to follow international relations and the nation's foreign and defense policies as a citizen, while giving the student who may wish to delve more deeply into this area a familiarity with some of the terms and concepts used in the study of international relations.

Because this is in the nature of an experiment, the exact design of the course will remain flexible throughout the quarter. Following a brief introductory period, students may expect extensive use of the PME as a day-to-day part of their classroom work. In the exercise, or "game," students will be placed on teams representing the policy-makers of various nations in the world. Exercises will begin with a scenario representing the state of international relations for game purposes, often involving a crisis precipitating event. The teams will then simulate the actions and reactions of the nations that they represent. On days when the "play" of an exercise is in progress, the class will meet at the Behavioral Sciences Laboratory, 404B West 17th Avenue, which is located under the east side of the stadium. Separate documents and briefing will be given to the class concerning the nature of the Political-Military Exercise and its procedures.

Enrollment in the section is limited and must be stabilized at an early date, and students seeking a "spectator" course are not encouraged to take this course. Extensive preparation and independent reading will be expected of those taking the course; student research and initiative will be stressed. The rewards, both in learning and in interest, should be commensurate with the efforts required; but the success of the course will in no small way be dependent upon the efforts and attitudes of the students. The student who sloughs off or otherwise causes problems cannot expect sympathetic treatment. Grades are generally based upon two or more "Debriefing" papers, analyzing the experience of the exercises run during the quarter, and an examination covering the assigned readings.

The textbook for the course is Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics, 2nd Ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1967) which students should purchase. Current international relations will be sufficiently important to the course that students will also be held responsible for keeping themselves up to date on international developments. Either the daily New York Times or the Sunday Times "News of the Week in Review" are excellent for this purpose.

Course Schedule

The first two to three weeks of the quarter will be devoted to introducing the student to the nature of the international system and the problem of national policy-making. During this period students should digest as quickly as possible the assigned readings under topics I and II, and begin sampling related materials from the "Suggested and Supplementary" readings in the attached bibliography. Starred (*) items in the assigned readings and copies of many books listed in the supplementary bibliography will be found in the Reserve Book Room of the Main Library. Call numbers are listed where available for books in the Library.

During the remainder of the quarter, the class will turn to the procedures for the Political-Military Exercise and a number of PME's will be run focusing upon various contemporary problems in the international system. These problems will be drawn from the topics included in the bibliography, and class-work will consist of both required common readings and independent research needed to carry on the activities of the individual teams.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

I. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

A. International Relations and International Politics

Readings: Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, The Dynamics of International Politics, 2nd Ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1967). (Text) Parts I, II, and IV.

*Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Chapters 1, 3, 11-14.

B. International Law and Organization

Readings: Padelford and Lincoln, op. cit., (Text) Part V.

*Julius Stone, "Law, Force and Survival," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 4 (July, 1961), pp. 549-59.

*Louis Henkin, "Toward a 'Rule of Law' Community," in Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock, American National Security (New York: The Free Press, 1965), pp. 310-17.

*Grenville Clark, "World Order: the Need for a Bold New Approach," ibid., pp. 318-23.

*Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Management of Power in the Changing United Nations," in ibid., pp. 290-95.

United Nations Charter (in Text).

II. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND POLICY-MAKING

Readings: Padelford and Lincoln, op. cit. (Text), Part III.

*Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," in Berkowitz and Bock, op. cit., pp. 146-53.

*Gabriel A. Almond, "Public Opinion and National Security Policy," in ibid., pp. 187-92.

McNamara, Robert S., Speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Montreal, May, 1966.

*Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Vital Interests and Objectives of the United States," in U.S. Air Force Academy, Department of Political Science, American Defense Policy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 13-21.

III. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIOAL RELATIONS

Readings: *American Defense Policy, op. cit., Chapter 2
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(Unconventional War).

Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!"
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*Henry S. Rowen, "The Future of General War," in
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*Bernard Brodie, "The Anatomy of Deterrence," in
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*Robert E. Osgood, "The Theory of Limited War," in
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*Klaus Knorr, "Unconventional Warfare:...," in
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*Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (Cambridge:
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*U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations,
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JX 1308   Padelford, Norman J., and George A. Lincoln, <u>The</u>
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Halperin, Morton, <u>Contemporary Military Strategy</u> (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1967).

UA 23 H 59
Hitch, Charles J. and Roland N. McKean, <u>The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

UA 939.3 H 7
Hsieh, Alice L., <u>Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era</u> (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Spectrum Books, 1962).

UA 23 H 898
Huntington, Samuel P., <u>The Common Defense</u> (New York: University Press, 1961).

UA 23 K 195
Kaufmann, W.W., <u>The McNamara Strategy</u> (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

E 835 K 5 1961 a
Kissinger, Henry, <u>The Necessity for Choice</u> (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1962).

UA 10 K 63
Knorr, Klaus, <u>The War Potential of Nations</u> (Princeton, N.J.: (Princeton University Press, 1956).

BF 637 N 4 S 3
Schelling, Thomas C., <u>The Strategy of Conflict</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).

U 162 S 61 1963a
Sokolovskii, Marshal V.D., <u>Soviet Military Strategy</u> (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

UA 770   Wolfe, Thomas W., <u>Soviet Strategy at the Cross-</u>
W 6   <u>roads</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
               <u>1964</u>).

        B.   Strategic Nuclear Power

UA 11   Brodie, Bernard, <u>Strategy in the Missile Age</u>
B 7   (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
               Press, 1959).

U 162   Kahn, Herman, <u>Thinking about the Unthinkable</u>
K 25   (New York: Horizon Press, 1962).

UF 767   _____, <u>On Thermonuclear War</u> (Princeton, N.J.:
K 3 1960   Princeton University Press, 1960).

UA 11   Snyder, Glen H., <u>Deterrence and Defense: Toward a</u>
S 56   <u>Theory of National Security</u> (Princeton, N.J.:
               Princeton University Press, 1961).

        C.   Counterinsurgency and Limited War

          Eckstein, Harry, <u>Internal War</u> (New York: The Free
               Press/ The Macmillan Co., 1963).

U 240   Galula, David, <u>Counterinsurgency Warfare</u> (New York:
G 3   Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

UA 11   Halperin, Morton H., <u>Limited War in the Nuclear</u>
H 36   <u>Age</u> (New York: John Wiley, 1963).

UA 23   Osgood, Robert E., <u>Limited War</u> (Chicago: University
O 8   of Chicago Press, 1957).

U 240   Paret, Peter and John W. Shy, <u>Guerrillas in the 1960's</u>
P 3 1962a   (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

        D.   Arms Control, Disarmament and Peace-Keeping

JX 1974   American Assembly, <u>Arms Control</u> (Englewood Cliffs:
A 48   Prentice-Hall, 1961).

          Bechoeffer, Bernard, <u>History of Arms Control Since</u>
               <u>1945</u> (Washington: The Brookings Institution,
               1961).

          Bennet, D.W., <u>United Nations Forces</u> (New York:
               Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

JX 1981   Bloomfield, Lincoln P., ed., <u>International Military</u>
P 7 B 55   <u>Forces</u> (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1964).

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JX 1974   Brennan, Donald G., ed., <u>Arms Control, Disarmament,</u>
B 7   <u>and National Security</u> (New York: George
             Braziller, 1961).

JX 1974   Bull, Hedley, <u>The Control of the Arms Race</u> (New York:
B 73 1965   Frederick A. Praeger, 1961).

DT 658   Burns, Arthur Lee, and Nina Heathcote, <u>Peace-Keeping</u>
B 8   <u>by U.N. Forces: From Suez to the Congo</u> (New York:
             Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).

JX 1954   Claude, Insi L., Jr., <u>Swords into Plowshares</u>, 3rd Ed.
C 51964   (New York: Random House, 1964).

JX 1974   Falk, Richard A., and Richard J. Barnet, eds.,
H 26   <u>Security in Disarmament</u> (Princeton: Princeton
             University Press, 1965).

JX 1974   Lefever, Ernest W., ed., <u>Arms and Arms Control</u>
L 42   New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

             _____, <u>Crisis in the Congo</u> (Washington: The
             Brookings Institution, 1966).

          Rossner, Gabriella, <u>The United Nations Emergency</u>
             <u>Force</u> (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

UA 11   Schelling, Thomas C., and J.H. Halperin, <u>Strategy</u>
S 27   <u>and Arms Control</u> (New York: Twentieth Century
             Fund, 1961).

          Spanier, John W. and Joseph L. Nogee, <u>The Politics</u>
             <u>of Disarmament</u> (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
             1962).

JX 1974   Wolfers, Arnold and Others, <u>The United States in a</u>
W 34 1966   <u>Disarmed World</u> (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
             Press, 1966).

E.   International Cooperation, Integration and Alliances

D 845   Birrenbach, Kurt, <u>The Future of the Atlantic</u>
B 5   <u>Community</u> (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963).

D 847   Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., <u>The Soviet Bloc: Unity and</u>
B 8 1961   <u>Conflict</u> (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
             1960).

JX 1954   Deutsch, Karl W., <u>Political Community and the North</u>
D 46   <u>Atlantic Area</u> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
             University Press, 1965).

D 854   Furniss, Edgar S., Jr., The Western Alliances:
F 8   Its Status and Prospects (Columbus: The Ohio
                 State University Press, 1965).

HC 165   Gordon, Lincoln, The Alliance for Progress (Cambridge:
G 59   Harvard University Press, 1963).

D 844   Herter, Christian A., Toward an Atlantic Community
H 4   (New York: Harper & Row, 1963). For the
                 Council on Foreign Relations.

HC 241.25   Hinshaw, Randall, The European Community and American
U 5 H 5   Trade (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

HF 1455   Humphrey, Don D., The United States and the Common
H 9 1964   Market, Rev. Ed., (New York: Frederick A.
                 Praeger, 1964).

D 845   Kissinger, Henry A., The Troubled Partnership
K 5   (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

             Krause, Lawrence B., ed., The Common Market: Progress
                 and Continuity (Englewood Cliffs: Printice-
                 Hall, 1964).

JX 4005   Liska, George, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of
 L 5   Interdependence (Washington: Johns Hopkins
                 Press, 1963).

UA 646.3   Mulley, F.W., The Politics of Western Defense
M 8   (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962).

DT 431   Nye, Joseph S., Jr., Pan-Africanism and East
N 9   African Integration (Cambridge: Harvard
                 University Press, 1963).

UA 646.3   Osgood, Robert E., NATO, The Entangling Alliance
0 7   (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1962).

UA 646.3   Stanley, Timothy W., NATO in Transition: The Future
S 7   Atlantic Alliance (New York: Frederick A.
                 Praeger, 1965).

D 843   Wilcox, Francis O., and H. Field Haviland, eds.,
W 46 1963a   The Atlantic Community (New York: Frederick

E 744   Wolfers, Arnold, ed., Alliance Policy in the Cold
W 85   War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959).

<u>Syllabus For</u>

<u>TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY</u>

The concept of national security is complex, but the focus of this course is suggested by the first topic on the reading list: National Security and the Spectrum of Violence. The course will examine the varieties of violence currently extant in international conflict, relevant strategies and the impact of technology upon these, and the relationship between violence or the threat of violence and national interests and goals. Although a course in international relations is not a prerequisite to this course, its design is such that little classroom time can be spent on the fundamental concepts involved. The student lacking background in this area is advised to avail himself of one of the general texts on international politics as independent reading. The Cleveland Textbook Store has been asked to stock Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, <u>The Dynamics of International Politics</u>, 2nd Edition (New York: Macmillan, 1967), which will serve this purpose well.

Approximately one-third of the course will be devoted to one or more simulations of the Political-Military Exercise variety. In the exercise--or "game"--students will be placed on teams representing the policymakers of various nations in the world. Exercises will begin with a scenario representing the state of international relations for game purposes, often including a crisis-precipating event. The teams will then simulate the actions and reactions of the nations that they represent. Scheduling and administrative arrangements will be discussed in class, and separate documents and briefings will be given to the class concerning the nature of the PME and its procedures.

The design of the course, particularly in the PME, relies heavily upon independent reading and preparation by the student, and some compensation for this has been allowed in the assigned readings. Students are expected to get the assignments read as quickly as possible and to refer back to them as the semester progresses. The sooner the professor is satisfied that the class has grasped the major concepts presented in readings, the more time will be available for the simulations.

Grades will be based upon a short briefing paper and a longer evaluation paper for each exercise and examinations on the reading. The exact number and balance will be determined by the scheduling of the simulations. The usual practice is two exercise papers and a final exam. Because the Exercises are a communal effort, failure to keep up with related assignments will detract from the experience for everyone and will be penalized.

READING LIST

The following books are required for the course. They are all available in paperback editions.

Raymond Aron, <u>The Great Debate</u> (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1965).

C.E. Black and T.P. Thornton (eds.), <u>Communism and Revolution:</u> <u>The Strategic Uses of Political Violence</u> (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964).

Morton H. Halperin, <u>Contemporary Military Strategy</u> (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967).

Arnold L. Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior," Bobbs-Merrill Reprint, PS-393.

T.C. Schelling, <u>Arms and Influence</u> (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

* * *

Two other hardbound books will be available for those wishing to purchase them. Padelford and Lincoln has already been mentioned: the Kahn and Wiener book will be on reserve in the library, but some students may want a personal copy.

Norman J. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, <u>The Dynamics of</u> <u>International Politics</u> (New York: Macmillan, 1967) 2nd Edition.

Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Weiner, <u>The Year 2000</u> (New York: Macmillan, 1967).

* * *

The attached reading list indicates a rough schedule for the semester in conjunction with the reading assignments. Starred items (*) are available on reserve in the library. Additional readings and research materials may be found in the Supplementary Bibliography[1]. Where known, the Supplementary Bibliography lists the Library of Congress call number.

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[1] Not included in this report.

READING ASSIGNMENTS

I.   Introduction: National Security and the Spectrum of Violence.

Readings: *Arnold Wolfers, "'National Security' as an Ambiguous
             Symbol," in Morton Berkowitz and P.G. Bock,
             American National Security (New York: The Free
             Press, 1965), pp. 43-53.
          Morton Halperin, Contemporary Military Strategy,
             Chapters 1-6.

II. Strategic Nuclear War.

Readings: Halperin, op. cit., Chapter 7.
          Raymond Aron, The Great Debate, entire book.
          Arnold Horelick, "The Cuban Missile Crisis:...,"
             Reprint, entire.

III. Limited War.

Readings: Halperin, op. cit., Chapters 8-11.
             *Robert E. Osgood, "The Theory of Limited War," in
                Berkowitz and Bock, op. cit., pp. 90-97.

IV. Insurgencies and Counterinsurgency Warfare.

Readings: Halperin, op. cit., Chapter 12.
          C.E. Black and T.P. Thornton (eds.), Communism and
             Revolution, Chapters 1-3, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15.
          Lin Piao, "Long Live the Victory of People's War!"
             (To be distributed)

Exercise I: Vietnam.

Paper: Evalution paper due April 8th.

SPRING VACATION.

V. Violence and International Politics.

Readings: Halperin, op. cit., Chapter 13
          T.C. Schelling, Arms and Influence, entire book.

VI. Technology and National Security: Impact and Prospect.

Readings: *Warner R. Schilling, "Scientists, Foreign Policy,
             and Politics," in Berkowitz and Bock, op. cit.,
             pp. 162-75.
          *Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000,
             Chapters I, II, V-IX, (pp. 1-65, 75-86, 221-385).

Robert S. McNamara, Speech to the American Society
of Newspaper Editors, Montreal, May 1966 (To
be distributed).

Exercise II: A Future Scenario.

Paper: Evaluation paper due May 17th (tentative).

VII.   Summary and Review.

PRELIMINARY SCENARIO

The Political-Military Exercise will take place with a
May, 1975 setting. In addition to this scenario, reasonable
extrapolations consistent with the scenario and with Kahn and
Wiener's (The Year 2000) standard world will be accepted and
generally passed by Control. All such additions, however,
must be cleared before they may be treated as a part of the
game world.

Many changes have occurred during the years from 1968 to
1975, but the world does not appear different in revolutionary
ways. In the United States, a hard fought campaign between
Hubert Humphrey and Nelson Rockefeller in 1968 led to a Republican
victory in the November election. President Rockefeller was
sharply challenged in 1972 by Robert Kennedy, but was re-elected
by a safe, if narrow, margin. The prospects are not yet clear
for the 1976 election, but many pundits are betting on a
battle between New Yorkers---a Lindsay-Kennedy race.

The Rockefeller Administration has focused U.S. attention
on internal problems and, although the country has not turned
entirely inward, America's international role has been subdued.
Internally, the problems of the cities and race relations have
continued to plague the nation and the Administration's efforts
are not regarded as unqualified successes. Nonetheless, if
things have not improved markedly, neither have they deterio-
rated. The President's supporters regard this as a great
accomplishment, while his detractors take an understandably
different view.

Internationally, U.S. foreign policy has been guided by
the maxim that "the U.S. helps those who help themselves."
The Vietnamese conflict has never really been solved, but the
new Administration encouraged the de-escalation of the conflict
and a shift of responsibility to the Vietnamese. Eventually,
an attempt was made by the Saigon regime to woo elements of
the N.L.F. away from the Communists in a coalition arrangement
à la Laos. This worked to some extent, but the arrangement
broke down à la Laos, too, and South Vietnam remains a desultory
battleground between Communist and "Nationalist" forces. The
U.S. has continued to supply aid to the Saigon regime, but has
phased out most of its military effort. Elsewhere, the U.S.
has offered aid and technical assistance to developing countries,
but with the explicit understanding that this must be in the
context of national efforts at development.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have acquired
a light Ballistic Missile Defense system, but maintain an
uneasy tacit arrangement that has avoided massive deployment
by either. The existing systems are effective only against
a small nuclear power. Attempts to gain general acceptance
of an Anti-Proliferation Treaty failed to win universal
approval but the Test Ban Treaty has remained in effect.

In Europe, a post-Gaullist government in France has con-
tinued t e General's policy of emphasizing French "grandeur"
but has modified some of its more militant aspects. As a
consequence, the Common Market appears to be moving again
very tentatively, and associated status has been granted to a
number of other European nations, including Britain.

China, too, has had a change of leadership following the
death of Chairman Mao. Thus far, the post-Mao alliance between
Lin Piao and the pragmatic element of the CPC has maintained
an uneasy balance, concentrating on internal development and
repairing the damage of the "Cultural Revolution" to China's
developmental programs. The rhetoric remains noisy and militant
about the outside world, but the actions have been fairly re-
strained. China has resumed its attempts to gain diplomatic
influence throughout the underdeveloped world in competition
with the Soviet Union and the United States. The frenetic
efforts of the 'sixties have given way to the somewhat more
low-keyed action of the 'seventies. The succession crisis has
not yet occurred in China, however, and so the future role of
China remains unclear. A "Two China's" formula was finally
accepted in the United Nations in 1973, after both Mao and
Chiang had passed from the scene. Peking now sits in the
Security Council, but Taiwan has a seat in the General Assembly.
A somewhat confusing political formula was used suggesting
that the arrangement resembled the multiple seats of the
Soviet Union in order to avoid confronting either Chinese
regime with a definitive statement of separation and independence.

In the Middle East, the stalemate emerging from the 1967
war has continued as the Arabs have refused to negotiate on
terms acceptable to Israel. The Suez Canal was reopened in
1969 with the tacit acquiescene of the Israelis, who still
occupy Sinai. Israeli ships pass through the canal, but under
a charter arrangement so that the Israeli flag is not technically
flown during the passage. The Israelis have been moving
gradually toward the consolidation of the Arab population in
the former Jordanian territory on the West Bank, but the
political status of this Arab "state" has not yet been established.
The Arab states have not achieved a real sense of unity yet,
although they continue to defer to the leadership of President
Nasser of the U.A.R. Hussein has maintained his position by
delicate balancing, but has become more militant with the
passing years. Other shifts of regimes have occurred, but
the relative balance remains similar to that of previous years.

In Yemen, the U.A.R. has removed its troops and after a
period of struggle between Royalists and Radicals, a
stabilized arrangement in the middle of the road has emerged.
Russian influence has continued to grow in the area, but in
competition with the Chinese and the Americans, along with
the French. The U.S. remains largely viewed as a supporter
of Israel. Israel has continued an aggressive foreign policy
with considerable support and assistance to emerging African
states. Recently, Nasser has been making militant state-
ments calling for another round of the "Holy War against
Israel," and many diplomatic observers are concerned at the
possibility of another Middle East crisis. There have been
some signs that Israel has been preparing for this contingency
by intensive development of nuclear capabilities, including
the possibility of a bomb.

FINAL SCENARIO

Exercise #2

THE WORLD TIMES

JERUSALEM: The Israeli Foreign Minister announced today, that
"With deep regret, Israel feels compelled to exercise her
rights as a sovereign nation and is therefore giving notice
to all other parties of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of her
intention to withdraw from the Treaty. In accordance with
the terms of Article 4, the withdrawal will be effective
three months from today. Israel regrets that 'extraordinary
events,' threatening the security of the Jewish nation, compell
the Government of Israel to reserve the option of providing
for the security of the state by whatever means are required.
It is not the present intention of this government to engage
in the testing of nuclear weapons. However, those familiar
with the history of the Middle East during the past eight
years will recognize that the peace and security of the area
continues to be threatened by nations that refuse to live with
their neighbors. As a nation devoted to the principles of
international law and justice, Israel wishes to conduct the
business of assuring the security of the country in accordance
with those principles. It is the fervent hope of the Government
of Israel that it will never become necessary to test or to
use weapons of mass destruction. The choice is not up to Israel,
however."

NEW YORK: Spokesmen for the American Jewish Committee expressed
their alarm at the development of events in the Middle East.
"Israel's very strong action today demonstrates that few have
appreciated the seriousness of the situation in that area.
It is hoped that the U.S. government and other nations around
the world will now take seriously the threats for a 'fourth
round' emanating from the Arab leadership."

WASHINGTON: Administration spokesmen were not available for
comment on today's developments in the Middle East. The U.S.
government has long opposed nuclear proliferation and has
attempted to persuade Israel not to construct atomic weapons.
Observers here believe that Israeli atomic science is highly
developed and it is likely that working models of weapons are
already on hand, but not yet tested. The purpose of the Israeli
announcement today remains unclear, however. Some believe this
only signifies intention to continue to develop nuclear weapons
and that eventually Israel will test bombs, but possibly under-

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ground in Sinai.   Others believe that the Israelis hope to
shock the world into active participation in a Middle East
settlement by their announcement, and, although ready to test,
hope for a political arrangement over the coming months.
The three month waiting period represents a dangerous period,
but it has been pointed out here that, if Israel has operational
bombs, it would not constitute "testing" to use such a weapon
in the event of an attack.   Some have referred to this as the
"Touch me--test you" policy as an interim means of deterring
an Arab attack.   Israel presumably has several possible means
of delivering such a weapon.   The recent purchase of fifteen
FB111s, manufactured on license from West Germany, gives one
adequate system (although the Soviet Union has provided numerous
SAM missiles to the Arab states).   Israel also developed the MD
620 MRBM with France, but has been unable to obtain production
by the French.   Negotiations are believed underway for production
of this missile by either British or Swedish industry.   New
SAAB "Viggen" aircraft are also being phased into the Israeli
air force, replacing the Mirage III fighters.

        Some have speculated that the ongoing renovation of the
Israeli armed forces appears to have slowed down and not kept
a satisfactory balance with the arming of the Arab states.
The Israeli army is generally believed to be better organized
and to have better morale than the Arab armies.   Many improve-
ments have been made in the Arab forces, however, and the
Soviet Union has provided large amounts of modern arms.   A
sharp Arab response to the Israeli announcement could set off
a major war again.   Chinese competition with the Soviet Union
for leadership in the area and access to oil concessions would
put great pressure on the Soviet Union to intervene.   The U.S.
reaction is unknown, but it must be remembered that next year
is an election year, and few American politicians feel prepared
to ignore the "Jewish vote."   Mayor Lindsay's chances at the
Presidency are partially based on his strength in heavily Jewish
New York City.

CAIRO: President Nasser denounced "the aggressive and threaten-
ing acts of the Zionist Imperialists" and called for an Arab
mobilization to be ready for "instant action against the
aggressors."   He said that the U.A.R. had no choice but to re-
gard the Israeli announcement as an aggressive act against the
Arab peoples.

JERUSALEM: Political news overshadowed the rapid progress being
made on the reconstruction of the Temple in Jerusalem, begun
last month.[1]

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[1]Inserted at the request of the Israeli team.

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SCHEME OF THE GAME

This document is intended to familiarize the participants in the Political-Military Exercise with the procedures used in the simulation. It should be studied carefully prior to the initial Briefing Session. Each exercise will be composed of a Briefing Session, daily Team Move Periods, and a Debriefing discussion.

The Briefing Session. Each game will commence with a Briefing Session. The session will have two purposes. First, questions concerning procedures of the game or variations will be explained and clarified. Second, the session will include the distribution to all teams of the most recent developments of the world situation or other announcements concerning the scenario. The following class meeting will become Team Move Period #1, although the briefing may be shortened for the second exercise.

The Team Move Periods. During the Team Move Periods, the individual teams will consider the information made available to them concerning the development of the scenario and determine the diplomatic, political, military, and economic moves which they propose their country make to deal with their situation.

At the beginning of each Move Period, teams will receive information concerning the state of the world situation in three forms.

1. News reports (in the World Times): All information released publicly by individual teams or by Control (as well as possible "leaks") will appear in the newspaper with a date-line. As in the real world, this information may, or may not, be accurate. Teams may seek to verify such information by any means normally under the control of governments (checking with diplomatic personnel, allies, or conducting intelligence operations). Such efforts may, or may not, succeed.

2. Sitrep (Situation report): This will represent Control's restructuring of the situation to take account of the various team actions. Information included under this heading is reliable and Control will decline to respond to intelligence requests for information included or strongly implied in the Sitrep. (N.B.: During the first Move Period only most exceptional requests for intelligence will be answered by Control. Teams should have ample information from the final scenario to formulate initial moves.) The Sitrep is used only insofar as it is necessary to elaborate or clarify information given in the news reports. News reports of Sitrep validity may be indicated as coming from exceptionally qualified sources.

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3. Messages (from other teams or from Control): Particularly in the case of messages passed on from other teams at the beginning of a Move Period, participants should check these against the Sitrep. In some cases, Control may have advanced the action further than the status of the message as submitted by the originating team.

During the Move Period each team must consider the information made available to them about the world situation and determine what actions they wish their country to take in order to deal with the situation. These actions may be diplomatic, military, economic, or political, but they should all be related to a coherent strategy designed to achieve the national goals appropriate to the country represented by each team.

Once the incoming information has been digested and the team has determined the actions necessary on its part, these actions must be broken down into appropriate messages. For each action, as many messages must be composed as are necessary to communicate the move to various interested parties according to the originating team's intent. Different moves may require a different number of messages. In one case, it may be sufficient to communicate a national position by means of a news conference or press release. Such messages, sent to "Control" and thus described in the space for "Move Description" (see sample messages and directions for completing the message form on pages 4, 5, and 6), will be printed in the World Times and communicated to all teams. In other cases, the content of a release may tell only a small part of the story, and special messages will be needed for Control and other teams--allies or adversaries--giving each a different view of the move. Note that in Examples 1 and 2 (see page 4) the same act is communicated in several different ways by means of multiple messages.

The team must decide in the case of each action how many messages are necessary to communicate their intentions to each interested party in a manner appropriate to their purposes. In doing so, the team should remember:

1. Control must be made aware of all actions taken. Until Control has seen and approved of actions they have not occurred (troops have not been moved, aid has not been delivered, etc.). Do not be coy with Control. Attempting to conceal your purposes from Control will only add confusion to the exercise and may ultimately frustrate your own objectives.

2. Control will see all messages passed as well as the Team Summary (see below). Thus messages to Control need not duplicate information otherwise available.

3. Control will not, as a rule, release to the newspaper material contained in otherwise Confidential documents. Hence a special message should frame the move in the way your team

wishes it released to the press if it is to be general infor-
mation.

4. All messages must be described under Move Description,
and this form must in all cases be one that is under the control
of the government represented by the team.

The Move Period is for the purpose of each team's develop-
ing its strategy and putting its moves in the form of messages.
At the end of the period, the team should submit to Control:

1. A Team Summary: Describe as such in the Move Descrip-
tion space, this should present a general summary of the team's
perception of the world situation and its strategy for dealing
with it. In drawing this up, the team should consider:

a. The intentions of other countries.
b. The progress of events to date.
c. The team's interests in the present situation and
its strategy for dealing with it.
d. Some expression of the team's possible future tactics
in light of possible future developments in the world.
N.B.: The Team Summary is not just a summary list of
the messages sent, but must indicate the background and intent
of the team's moves.

2. Messages: These cover the actions the team wishes to
take as described above, and must include a message noting the
results of any diplomatic conferrals that have taken place
during the Period. A copy of conferral memoranda will be trans-
mitted to the to the other participant(s) as a means of
verification.

(Both Team Summaries and Messages are to employ the
message form.)

Other notes:

1. All team moves must be made only during a Team Move
Period.

2. The team captain or an assigned team member should
keep a file of the team's moves and messages in sequence.
For example, the United States team will begin Move Period I
with the team message number US-1, and continue the numbers
consecutively through the game. Include team summaries in
the numbering sequence.

3. All Confidential messages must be so marked in the
box next to the word "Confidential." Requests for immediate
action by Control during a Move Period (intelligence requests
or instructions to international organization delegates) may

be held for submission at the end of the Move Period.

4. The international organization will meet in appro-
priate venue (U.N. General Assembly, Security Council, O.A.S.,
etc.) only if called. No international organization meetings
will be called during Move Period I. The meetings take place
during a Move Period and an observer may accompany the team's
representative to report important developments to team
headquarters.

The Control Period. A Control Period occurs between each
Team Move Period. During this time Control will examine the
moves submitted, rule on their plausibility, and restructure
"reality" for the next move period. The calendar will generally
advance between move periods by a time determined by Control.

The function of Control will be to serve as umpire--ruling
on the plausibility of moves, to play roles not allocated in
the individual teams, and to play "nature," introducing new
developments, "leaking" confidential information, and so forth.
Teams may also ask Control to fill in gaps in their information,
but only when absolutely necessary, addressing their messages
to the appropriate national source (e.g., Director of the CIA,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the country's ambassador
to a certain capital). The World Times and Sitrep will nor-
mally provide teams with most of the information reasonably
available. The Control communications, the Sitrep, news
releases, and messages, will serve as the team's link to the
new "reality" structured for the next Team Move Period.

The Debriefing Session. The development of events during
the game will be discussed by the assembled participants and
the teacher. These sessions will ordinarily take place in the
regular classroom, and represent the principal means by which
the game experience is to be linked with the substantive
material of the course. Each team will be asked to make a
brief presentation of its overview of the development of the
exercise, the objectives the team pursued, and an assessment
of the team's success in achieving these objectives.

*   *   *

SAMPLE MESSAGE FORMS

<u>Example 1:</u> Response to troop movements required three
separate moves.

Move Description: URGENT CABLE FROM FOR. MIN. UAR TO FOR.
MIN. SYRIA

[X] Confidential [ ] Immediate Action   To: SYRIA From: UAR
Time Sent: 10:05 A.M.
Move Period: I
Team Message No.: UAR-5

YOU HAVE 1 HOUR TO EFFECT A CEASE FIRE. THIS INVOLVES PULL-
ING YOUR TROOPS BACK 10 MILES FROM THE PRESENT LINE OF COMBAT.
UNLESS YOU COMPLY WITH THESE TERMS WE WILL ASSUME A STATE OF
WAR EXISTS WITH THAT NATION NOT COMPLYING AND THE UAR WILL
ACT ACCORDINGLY WITH ALL MEANS NECESSARY.

Move Description: URGENT CABLE FROM DEF. MIN. UAR TO AIR
AND NAVAL COMMANDERS UAR

[X] Confidential [ ] Immediate Action   To: CONTROL From: UAR
Time Sent: 10:45 A.M.
Move Period: I
Team Message No.: UAR-6

NAVY: ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR LAST THAT AMPHIBIOUS INVASION FORCE
HAS PUT TO SEA. ON RECEIPT OF ORDERS TO EXECUTE OPERATION
STRIKE YOU WILL LAND ON PLANNED BEACHES OF SYRIA AND DRIVE
TOWARD DAMASCUS.
AIR: ON RECEIPT OF ORDERS TO EXECUTE OPERATION STRIKE YOU WILL
MOVE. IN EVENT THE ABOVE STATED NAVAL OPERATION IS EXECUTED
YOU WILL SUPPORT IT AND CONTINUE SUPPORTING ALL LAND OPERATIONS.

Move Description: PRESS RELEASE

[ ] Confidential [ ] Immediate Action   To: CONTROL From: UAR
Time Sent: 10:45 A.M.
Move Period: I
Team Message No.: UAR-7

CAIRO: RADIO CAIRO TODAY MONITORED AN URGENT MESSAGE FROM
RADIO AMMAN WHICH WAS SURROUNDED BY SYRIAN TROOPS. RADIO
AMMAN WAS BROADCASTING AN URGENT PLEA FOR HELP AGAINST THE
AGGRESSORS FROM THE REST OF THEIR ARAB BROTHERS. IT WAS CUT
OFF AFTER 20 MINUTES OF BROADCASTING. THE UAR IS CONSIDERING
THE PLEAS AT THIS TIME.

Example 2: Response to UAR moves, by Israel.

Move Description: DIPLOMATIC COMMUNIQUE TO THE UAR AMBASSADOR
FROM THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

☐ Confidential   ☐ Immediate Action

To: UAR From: ISRAEL
Time Sent: 11:05 A.M.
Move Period: II
Team Message No.: ISRAEL-
13

ISRAEL CANNOT REMAIN PEACEFUL IF THE UAR TRIES TO TAKE OVER
JORDAN AS THIS WOULD JEOPARDIZE OUR VERY EXISTENCE.

Move Description: PRESS RELEASE

☐ Confidential   ☐ Immediate Action

To: CONTROL From: ISRAEL
Time Sent: 11:05 A.M.
Move Period: II
Team Message No.: ISRAEL-
14

TEL AVIV: THE ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTRY MET IN SECRET SESSION
TODAY. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MEETING IS TO CONSIDER A
MILITARY RESPONSE TO THREATS OF RADIO CAIRO THAT THE UAR MIGHT
TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE JORDANIAN CRISIS.

Example 3: Proposal to move military forces should be specific
and account for possible problems.

Move Description: URGENT CABLE TO COMMANDER OF USSR NAVAL
FORCE

☐ Confidential   ☐ Immediate Action

To: CONTROL From: USSR
Time Period: 11:12 A.M.
Move Period: II
Team Message No.: USSR-14

STATION 20 SUBMARINES IN EASTERN MEDIT. AREA FOR POSSIBLE
ACTION. AVOID ALL CONTACT WITH ANY FOREIGN NAVAL FORCE. AWAIT
FURTHER INSTRUCTION.

GENERALIZED MESSAGE FORM

Move Description[1]

Confidential[2]   Immediate Action[3]

To:[4]   From:[5]

Time Sent:[6]
Move Period:[7]
Team Message No.:[8]

(Text)

(Game Number)[9]

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1. Move Description should indicate the specific nature of your message and the particular agencies involved. It is not the administrative address, but must describe an action controlled by your team as a government.

2. Confidential should be indicated by checking the appropriate box in all cases in which the security of the message is required. Otherwise simply leave the box to the left of the word "Confidential" blank.

3. Immediate Action requests that Control deal with your message when submitted rather than waiting until the following Control Period. Ordinarily, only instructions to U.N. delegates and requests for intelligence will receive such consideration. If immediate action is required, check the box to the left of the words "Immediate Action."

4. To can only apply to a.) Another team, or b.) Control. This address is for administrative purposes.

5. From can only apply to your team.

6. Time Sent should indicate the hour and minutes of the class period at which the message was submitted to Control, i.e. the actual clock time.

7. Move Period should be marked with the number corresponding to the particular Move Period of the exercise, such as I, II, III, IV, or V. The numeral alone will suffice.

8. Team Message No. is the number assigned by the team captain or designated team member which indicates the sequence of the message in the game. Use your team initials plus the number. Number consecutively through the entire game. For example, if your team sent 12 messages in Move Period I, the first message in II should be 13. Do not start over.

9. Game Number. Messages passed to teams will have a number stamped here to indicate its sequence in the game. This is an administrative device for Control records.

GAME ROSTER-Exercise #2

<u>Soviet Union (SU)</u>   Room 405
    Jordonek (Ch.), Craig, Gost, Trembly

<u>United States US</u>   Room 408
    Tuttle (Ch.), Bocianowski, Courtney, Merrill, Otto

<u>Chinese Peoples' Republic (CPR)</u>   Room 409
    Hruska (Ch.), Freund, Polinski, Weisbruch

<u>Israel</u>   Room 406 or 427
    Sterba (Ch.), Newman, Orbanes, Schwarz

<u>Syria</u>   Room 423
    Langer (Ch.), Feldman, Hansen, Wallin

<u>United Arab Republic (UAR)</u>   Room 425
    Griffith (Ch.), Monasebian, Peckol, Rockhold

*   *   *   *

Administration

Game Director: Mr. Coward

<u>Control</u>   Mr. Coward   Room 402
    Barton, Border, Deckman

<u>International Organization Chairman</u>   Room 401
    Control member as needed and appropriate

<u>Membership of the U.N. Security Council, 1975</u>

Britain	Australia	Netherlands
China*	Colombia	Rumania
France	Congo (Kinshasa)	Thailand
Soviet Union**	Iran	U.A.R.**
United States**	Mexico	Zambia

* See Scenario: Document #1
** Played by active teams. All others played by Control.

DEBRIEFING ASSIGNMENT

Exercise #2

The impact of science and technology upon national and inter-
national security was evident in many ways during the second
PME. The importation of advanced conventional weaponry by
Middle East states, the presence of Soviet and American forces,
the Israeli acquisition of nuclear weapons technology, and the
Chinese attempt to station missiles in Egypt are all examples
of such impact.

Drawing upon the game experience (and again being certain
to distinguish between realistic and unrealistic aspects of this!),
write a six-eight page paper discussing some aspect of the inter-
action between technology and other factors (military, economic,
psychological, political, social, etc.) bearing upon national and
internation security.

Narrow your focus to some specific aspect of this very
broad topic and go into it as deeply as possible within the
constraint of the assigned length of the paper. Two thousand
words is not a long paper, and the most economic use of the
available space and wordage will be necessary. Do not waste
your space with superficial allusions to a variety of relevant
aspects of the problem. The grade will be based on the evidence
presented that you have thought out carefully some particular
aspect rather than presenting "filler" glossing over the general
topic. The generality is designed to give you some flexibility,
but places the burden of organizing the paper on the student!

Use footnotes where relevant, and try to relate your think-
ing to the readings in the course as well as to other materials
you may wish to bring to bear on the subject. The paper is due
on May 27th or 28th (the earlier the better!), and your credit
will suffer if the paper is received later than the 28th.

3

SCENARIO

The second political exercise will focus upon the situation in Southeast Asia, and the world situation will be that of the contemporary world (The New York Times, etc.). Depending upon developments arising prior to the commencement of the game, a final scenario may be distributed at that time including some significant change moving events toward a crisis situation.

Each team must be prepared to submit to Control at the commencement of the exercise a summary of the team's objectives and its strategy for dealing with the situation as the team perceives it.

A special bibliography on Vietnam is attached.

GENERAL INTERNATIONAL POLITICS PME

DEBRIEFING ASSIGNMENT

In preparation for a post-exercise discussion of the first game of the quarter, students should prepare a four-to-five page paper for submission dealing with the following:

A.   An appraisal of the aspects of the exercise regarded as most realistic and most unrealistic. (For separate class discussion, prepare a list of questions about matters you may want clarified or discussed in some detail.)

B.   A discussion of the most important factors bearing on international politics and the conduct of foreign policy that you have learned from the exercise. This should represent an explicit attempt to relate the events of the game to your readings--both assigned and supplementary.

This paper will substitute for a mid-term exam and will be graded on the basis of whether it represents a thoughtful consideration of the task and demonstrates adequate background preparation. It should not be a virtuoso display of encyclopedic knowledge, nor an exaggerated expression of enthusiasm for gaming.

Appendix III

NEWSPAPERS AND STUDENT HISTORY

OF A MIDDLE EAST EXERCISE

APPENDIX III: INTRODUCTION

        This Appendix is a game history of the exercise that
developed from the scenarios in the preceding appendix.
The simulation was run during May of 1968, and the history
was written by one of the student participants, a member
of the Israeli Team. His narrative is interspersed here
by the World Times and Sitreps of the actual game. The
reader should recall that Control also has the prerogrative
of passing messages along or originating messages on its
own.

        The original scenario, although set seven years into
the future, held to as many of the contemporary features
of the Middle East situation as seemed reasonable in order
to keep matters in hand. Subsequent headlines always have
a way of showing how conservative such extrapolations are,
and it is important that the reader be aware of the actual
date of the simulation, recalling that it is not the function
of instructional games to predict, although students are
inevitably fascinated by predictive aspects of the exercises
in which they have participated. It should also be remembered
that this was a student game, run with undergraduates with
little background in political science or international re-
lations. The developments described here afforded many
topics for discussion during the post-game Critique. The
most notable of these was probably the overestimation of
Chinese capabilities--both by the Arab teams in their shift
away from the Soviet Union to the much more problematical
Chinese as allies, and by the Chinese in their commitment of
troops in India and along the Soviet border while engaged in
a Middle Eastern adventure.

A Game History of Political-Military Exercise 1968/#2

by

William Sterba

The scenario for the Political-Military Exercise dealing with a Middle East crisis was adapted from the multifold trend presented in The Year 2000 by Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener.[1] Certain adaptations were made to allow for changes that could have conceivably occurred in the eight years between the date of play (May, 1968) and the period of the scenario (May, 1975). The crisis began when Israel unilaterally withdrew from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. (See Appendix II: Documents #1 and #3.)

After removing itself from the provisions of the treaty, Israel went into a secluded state for the first period of the game. Directives were sent preparing a testing program for its newly developed nuclear technology. The attitude of the Israeli leaders was that the acquisition of a nuclear deterrent to offset the superior size of conventional Arab forces was worth the risk of world condemnation, even if world opinion was reacting hastily to Israeli actions. The United Arab Republic (UAR) and Syria responded immediately to the Israeli action, calling for condemnation of Israel in the United Nations. They requested increased military assistance from the Soviet Union and a renewed pledge of support from the same power. The Soviet Union (SU) was not about to give support to the Arab states on a carte blanche basis and hastily began arranging a conference with the United States (US) to discuss mutual problems in the Middle East.

Both the US and the SU took the view that renewed hostilities in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab powers would not resolve the problems existing in that portion of the world. Hence, the United States was attempting to gather as much information as possible about the crisis to make an evaluation of actions necessary to prevent actual hostilities. Conferences were arranged with the Soviet Union and Israel to determine what action the US should take.

The Chinese People's Republic (CPR) adopted the strategy of attempting to spoil any and all plans of the Soviet Union and the United States. Offers were made by the CPR to the Syrians and to the UAR to provide them with MRBM's and nuclear

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[1](New York: Macmillan Co., 1967).

warheads under the command and control of CPR technicians.
Syria replied in the negative to this offer at this time,
but the UAR only acknowledged the offer, sending no return
statement. The only other move made at this time concerning
military systems was an investigative attempt by the Israelis
to find a firm to manufacture the French/Israeli-designed
MD620 MRBM. Inquiries were sent to aerospace firms in Sweden.
American and Soviet fleet units began to converge on the
Eastern Mediterranean to increase readiness for prospective
trouble in the area, while Chinese troop build-ups were
ordered on the Sino-Indian border as a diversionary tactic
by the CPR.

The results of these moves emerged as the following
World Times and Sitrep during the first Control Period.

THE WORLD TIMES

Second Edition

United Nations, N.Y.: An emergency meeting of the U.N.
Security Council has been called at the request of the
Soviet Union to consider the threat to the peace in the
Middle East. The meeting will take place at Noon (7:30,
Game Time).

DAMASCUS: Syrian officials denounced the "outrageous threats
of the Zionist expansionists," and threatened "most serious
actions" if the "Israeli imperialists" are not stopped.
Observers believe that the language was stronger than might
have been expected and may imply a degree of support for the
Syrians by the Soviet Union. How far that commitment may
go is not clear.

ISTANBUL: Units of the Soviet Navy have been seen passing
through the Dardenelles and Bosporus into the Mediterranean.
Their destination is not known, but the numbers are too great
to be explained by routine shifting of naval units.

ALEXANDRIA: Several Soviet ships have anchored in Alexandria
harbor and were welcomed by enthusiastic demonstrations by
the Egyptians.

AMMAN: King Hussein announced that in response to the threaten-
ing posture of Israel and in accordance with President Nasser's
call to the Arab nations to prepare to defend themselves, he
was ordering the mobilization and alert of Jordan's military
forces. He called upon his people to remain stalwart during
this period of crisis.

JERUSALEM: Reports reached here of several firing incidents
having taken place along the Israeli-Jordanian border.

WASHINGTON: Authoritative sources here have expressed concern
about the confusing response of the Soviet Union to the present
Middle East crisis. Deployment of Soviet naval units implies
direct involvement, and the strong Syrian response, believed
attributable to Soviet encouragement, has detracted from the
credibility of Soviet professions of desire for a peaceful
solution.

STOCKHOLM: It is believed that Israeli representatives here are
attempting to open talks with the Swedish aerospace industry
for production of the French/Israeli-developed MD620 MRBM.

CAIRO: The Government here announced that it had received a "gra-
tifying response" to its call for Arab unity and that most Arab
states had agreed to hold a meeting of the Arab League at the
earliest opportunity. It is not known when most Arab leaders

will feel able to leave their home capitals under the current crisis situation.

NEW DELHI: Officials here are concerned at reports of Chinese troop concentrations near the Indian border in Assam.

BAGHDAD: Observers here and throughout the Moslem Middle East have noted substantial diplomatic activity between representatives of Communist China and numerous governments in the area. Some have speculated that the Chinese are attempting to interest the Arab nations in stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory as a deterrent to an Israeli nuclear capability. It is not know what terms the Chinese would exact for such an arrangement. Here in Baghdad, rumors turn on the subject of oil, and it is thought that the Chinese may be trying to gain assured access to Middle East oil supplies.

HONG KONG: The New China News Agency announced that China was beginning construction of two large shipbuilding facilities in Canton and Tienstin. The yards will be capable of producing both naval and merchant marine vessels. New oil refineries are also planned in Shangai and Tientsin.

TOKYO: Shipping industry sources report contacts from Mainland China seeking leases on a number of oil tankers.

MOSCOW: The Soviet Union today condemned the recent decision by Israel to back out of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Using strong diplomatic language, the Government said that "such actions can only lead to a recurrence of the war of 1967." In such a case, the statement went on, "the Soviet Union has no choice but to continue support of the Arab nations in their struggle against the forces of imperialism."

JERUSALEM: Sources here indicated that there has been a mixed reaction to an invitation to selected Jewish leaders to attend a conference in Jerusalem in June to discuss plans for the reconstruction of the Temple. Although there has been some recurrence of the flow of volunteers to assist Israel--still a trickle and not nearly on the scale that occurred in 1967-- many leaders appeared to feel that it would be necessary for them to attend to fund raising efforts and consultation with political leaders of their own countries in this time of crisis.

WASHINGTON: Concerned American Jewish leaders were reported to have been assured by the State Department that the United States would continue to strive for peace in the Middle East and was vitally concerned with the security of Israel. It was intimated that more forthright guarantees of Israeli security might be forthcoming provided that Israel cancelled its withdrawal from the Test Ban Treaty. The U.S. position appears to regard the possibility of nuclear weapons in the Middle East as a major threat to the balance of power and the stability of the area.

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TEL AVIV: Israel appears in a tense mood, but has not yet undertaken any major military mobilization in the current crisis. It is not known whether this is an attempt to prevent over reaction by Arab states, several of which have already mobilized.

SITREP: No additional information to report.
          Move Period II will take place on S+3 days.

The second Move Period of the exercise was characterized by diplomatic moves by all contending sides. The Soviet Union presented a resolution before the Security Council at the United Nations condemning Israel for its aggressive actions. A counter-proposal by the United Kingdom also condemned the Israeli action, but did so with less severity. Neither resolution was able to be passed by the Security Council. The contending powers in the Middle East mobilized their armed forces during this period, further increasing the tension in the area. Despite its more dangerous position, Israel mobilized after Syria and Jordan had already done so.

The Arab states continued their strong pressure on the Soviet Union for more advanced military systems, and increased shipments of conventional material. The Arabs also adopted the position of playing the Soviet Union against the Chinese in their attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Trade agreements were made by both Syria and the UAR with the CPR, albeit of a tentative nature. Soviet action was now designed both to prevent further hostilities in the area and to block increased Chinese diplomatic leverage in the Middle East. The United States at this point had increased naval strength in both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean, while Chinese actions along the Sino-Indian border were becoming increasingly more aggressive and visible. Sino-Soviet relations were undergoing increasing strain, and there were Soviet troop movements along the Sino-Soviet border.

Israeli action at this point was limited to further negotiations with the Swedish aerospace industry and a conference with the United States. Requests for increased aid were made to the US, which surprisingly granted nearly everything demanded by the Israeli team with no reciprocal demands. United States action at this point was still limited to applying diplomatic pressure on the contending sides to prevent open hostilities. US pledges to Israel were accepted with skepticism by the Israeli leaders, since the United States refused to become directly involved in any conflict in the Middle East, even if it meant the destruction of the state of Israel. The United States accepted Israeli assurances that withdrawal from the Test Ban Treaty did not necessarily mean that atmospheric tests were planned. The demand that Israel never actually test a nuclear weapon was never in fact made by the United States at this opportunity.

The ensuing Control Period reported developed as follows.

THE WORLD TIMES

Third Edition

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.: The Security Council has met several
times to consider the Middle East situation, but has not yet
been able to agree upon any action. At the initial session,
two competing resolutions were submitted to the Council. One,
sponsored by the Soviet Union sharply condemns Israel, while
the other, sponsored by the United Kingdom, aims at a compromise
move by the Council. The Soviet resolution reads:

> Whereas, the Government of Israel has unilaterally
> reached a decision to begin testing nuclear weapons, and,
> Whereas, the security of the world required the
> cooperation of all nations to prevent a nuclear holocaust,
> Whereas, the decision of Israel is a danger to
> international cooperation in keeping the nuclear peace
> and ignores the demands of the peoples of the world to
> end nuclear testing, now therefore,
> The Security Council condemns Israel for this
> action and affirms its intent to take whatever steps
> are necessary to preserve international peace and security
> in the Middle East.

The U.K. resolution reads:

> Whereas, recent developments in the Middle East
> represent a clear and present threat to the stability
> and peace of the world, now therefore:
> The Security Council reaffirms its previous resol-
> utions on this area calling for a peaceful settlement of
> outstanding disputes and the restoration of the terri-
> torial integrity and independence of all states in the area,
> Calls upon all parties to refrain from actions
> that will enable the restoration of the integrity of all
> international agreements affecting the area.

The U.K. resolution is clearly designed to make Council action
more acceptable to Israel and her supporters, but no clearcut
pattern has emerged in the eleven days of discussions that
have gone on since the first Council meeting. It is believed
that the Soviet proposal has the support of Rumania, Zambia,
and the U.A.R., while the U.K. resolution is supported by
The Australians, the Colombians, and Thailand. The positions
of China, France and the U.S. are not clear. Another meeting
is tentatively scheduled for today (8:00, game time).

MOSCOW: Informed sources here believe that the Kremlin is
very concerned by a major Chinese diplomatic offensive in
the Middle East. Rumors of Chinese offers to Middle Eastern

nations range from trade agreements through mutual defense agreements, nuclear guarantees, to outright gifts of nuclear weapons. It is doubtful that the Russians will be willing to offer nuclear weapons to the Arabs, but they are believed to be engaged in a counter offensive to deny the Red Chinese inroads into the Middle East.

STOCKHOLM: Although it is believed that the Swedish government is under pressure from the Russians, contacts have continued here between Israeli representatives and the Swedish aerospace industry.

TEL AVIV: The Israeli government has announced the first phases of complete mobilization have been completed over the past week and that the Israeli armed forces are in a state of readiness to deal with any Arab attacks. News correspondents have been denied access to Sinai except in military convoys. The government claimed that this was to prevent disclosure of their troop dispositions to the Arabs.

CAIRO: Shipments of SAMs and other air defense equipment are reported to have arrived here from the Soviet Union. Contacts between the Government and representatives of the Chinese Peoples' Republic have been also reported.

AMMAN: Sources have reported increased Soviet aid flowing into Jordan.

DAMASCUS: There are rumors here that the Soviet Union has offered to establish a massive pilot training program for the Syrian Air Force.

MANILA: At least one carrier and several other vessels are believed to have left the Western Pacific for the Bay of Bengal.

ADEN: Ships calling here report having sighted several warships, believed to be U.S. in the Arabian Sea. Two Soviet destroyers are also reported to have transited the Suez Canal during recent days, one passing through with each daily convoy in each direction. It is believed that the Soviet presence is designed to prevent an Israeli closure of the canal.

NAPLES: Units of the Sixth Fleet have departed this and other Mediterranean ports and are believed to have joined other units in the eastern Mediterranean.

WASHINGTON: President Rockefeller held a news conference today and announced that, following conferrals with Israeli leaders, he saw little option but to accept their decision to withdraw from the Test Ban Treaty, although he did so with reluctance. He also condemned the aggressive positions taken by the Arab

governments and charged that it was basically China that was attempting to disrupt the peace in the Middle East. In a sharp attack, he refused to blame the Soviet Union or the Arabs for the mounting tension, but said that the Chinese were playing a very dangerous game in which others stood to pay for China's losses.

TOKYO: Reports have reached here of a worsening of Sino-Soviet relations in recent days. Competition for influence in the Middle East and differences on Chinese actions in the Far East are adding to the strains between Moscow and Peking.

WASHINGTON: Several members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed alarm at rumors of a "deal" between Washington and Tel Aviv. It is believed that Israel has so-licited extensive military aid from the U.S. on the grounds that Arab supplies from the Soviet Union have threatened a permanent shift in the balance toward the Arabs. Although the Senators are sympathetic to the Israeli cause, they have pointed out to journalists that U.S. involvement in the Middle East and acquiescence to the apparent Israeli drive for nuclear weapons would represent a twofold reverse in recent U.S. foreign policies. "A blank check for Israel hardly seems consistent with the Administration's foreign policy as we have had it explained in recent hearings," said one influential senator.

NEW DELHI: The Government of India has claimed large Chinese troop movements near the Sino-Indian border in Assam. Indian troops in the area have been alerted and the Government announced that additional mountain-trained forces would immediately be dispatched to the area. The Chinese objectives remain unclear, but Indian officials fear another push to claim Indian territory while the world is preoccupied with the Middle East

SITREP: The time of the Third Move Period is S+14 days.
No additional information is required for the Sitrep.

The third Move Period was characterized by an increasingly military posture on all sides, and by an increased tendency by all the contending nations to take risks to satisfy national ambitions. The Soviet Union deployed six attack fighters, equippable with nuclear weapons, to the airports at Damascus and Cairo. The UAR mobilized its forces, and began to conduct overflights of the Sinai region. Israeli refusal to allow UAR reconnaissance aircraft to penetrate Sinai caused the UAR military to review this practice, with the result that overflights of the area were discontinued. The Soviet Union was instrumental in this because of their reminder to the UAR that their continued support was contingent on the defensive nature of the military actions taken by the UAR. Provocative actions against Israel that might cause a sharp response by the Israeli military were to be avoided if Soviet support was to be forthcoming in the crisis. The Soviet Union was also conducting further negotiations with the United States on a method to stop the continuing crisis in the region.

The United States was still strengthening its naval forces in the region, particularly in the Indian Ocean. Pledges were given to India guaranteeing support against continued Communist Chinese aggression in the Assam region. The Chinese had committed themselves to a complete take-over of Assam, and were continuing their push into the region. Despite warnings from their intelligence agency, the Chinese decided to increase their commitment to the take over of Assam by sending in another 100,000 troops and building new roads into captured territories. Soviet maneuvers on the Sino-Soviet border had assumed massive proportions at this point, and were continuing despite threats from the Chinese. The Chinese were increasing aid to insurgent groups in Yemen and Aden, with an eye toward taking and holding these regions leading to the Suez Canal. The Chinese also pressured North Korea and North Vietnam to increase hostilities in their regions to occupy US attention.

Israel brought her military units up to full strength at this point, assuming that the UAR would have mobilized by now. Final preparations for a forthcoming nuclear test were being executed, and the security precautions taken by the Israeli armed forces and news services reached an all-time high. Despite intelligence reports from military satellites passing above the Sinai, neither the American nor the Soviet teams deduced that a nuclear test was in the offing in the Sinai Desert. Israel also increased its pressure on the American team for the aid that was supposed to be arriving. Israel had been offered, and had accepted, a blank check for aid, despite protestations by the American President that this was not intended. Israel also passed as little information to the US as possible concerning her negotiations with Sweden over the construction of an

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MRBM.   At the same time, Israeli leaders decided that further negotiations with the Swedish aerospace firms would be fruitless, and new contacts with the governments in Bonn, London, and Tokyo were ordered.   A decision by Israel to rescind its withdrawal from the Test Ban Treaty was seriously being considered by the Israeli leadership, but the decision to act in that direction was deferred until a later period.

Control responded to these moves with the following World Times.

THE WORLD TIMES

Fourth Edition

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.: The Security Council has met several
times to deliberate the developments in the Middle East, but
has been unable to agree upon any action. Although the Soviet
Union amended its harshly condemnatory resolution in order to
appeal to other nations concerned over the prospective spread
of nuclear weapcns, the measure attracted only five votes in a
showdown in the Council chamber. The U.K. compromise resolution,
supported by the U.S. in spite of a number of provisions dis-
pleasing to Israel, also failed. Many countries abstained on
both resolutions--the first because of its harsh wording was
unable to attract countries prepared to vote against the
Israelis because of concern over nuclear weapons in spite of
long diplomatic ties, the second because of the sharp positions
of inadequacy taken by the Arab states and the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, the U.A.P. charged the Israelis with possession of
a sizable nuclear arsenal and demanded in a draft resolution
that the U.N. place observers in the Sinai region and the Negev.
Discussions at U.N. Headquarters have continued, but no vote
has been taken. It is believed that the Council's attentions
may be diverted at any moment to the growing crisis on the Sino-
Indian border.

WASHINGTON: The President denied at a news conference that the
United States had granted a "blank check" to Israel. He con-
ceded that the U.S. had been in close contact with the govern-
ment in Tel Aviv, but pointed out that such contacts were
normal and did not represent a "special relationship" with
Israel. The U.S. regarded the current crisis as "extremely
dangerous" the President said, and expressed hopes that it could
be quickly contained and that the Chinese threat to the Middle
East and elsewhere could be eliminated.

PEKING: The Chinese Government announced a new five year food
production plan and new industrialization programs. Increased
agricultural productivity and the benefits of technology in
communication, transportation, and defense are part of the plan.

NEW DELHI: Highly placed sources in the Indian government have
let it be known here that all-out resistance to any Chinese
attempt to encroach on Indian territory in Assam is planned.
Reports from Tezpur indicate a major buildup of Indian troops
moving northward to the contended area. Few major contacts
between the opposing forces are believed to have taken place,
but there have been reports that several Indian border posts
have been cut off by Chinese movements. The sharp response of
the Indian government and the delay in placing the matter before

the U.N. have led to speculation that U.S. military support may be forthcoming.

HONOLULU: Sources close to Pacific Fleet Headquarters report major redeployments of U.S. Naval units with dispatch of another aircraft carrier from the Western Pacific into the Bay of Bengal.

WASHINGTON: Members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee have indicated grave concern over recent world developments and the U.S. response to these. They are particularly concerned over the apparently deepening commitment of the U.S. in what may be "another minor Asian border squabble" between India and China, while the U.S. has apparently acquiesced to an Israeli determination to acquire nuclear weapons that "threatens a hornets' nest of instability in the Middle East." Although the Senators are divided on whether the U.S. should apply more pressure on the Israelis to abandon their nuclear ambitions or support the Israelis in the face of continued Arab harrassment and growing strength, they appear to agree that the Middle East should take priority over Asia.

STOCKHOLM: Contacts between Israeli representatives and the Swedish aerospace industry have continued here, although the Swedish government is believed to be under mounting pressures from the major powers to forbid any agreement on MRBM production for Israel.

TEL AVIV: The Israeli Government has continued to limit the presence of foreign newsmen in the frontier regions of the country, including occupied Sinai. Officials are silent as to the reason for this other than to express concern for the correspondents' safety. It is assumed that the security of troop deployments is involved. Meanwhile, several shipments of arms, ammunition and oil have arrived in Haifa from the United States.

CAIRO: A general mobilization has been extended to include the calling up of more reserve units.

WASHINGTON: Several members of Congress criticized the U.S. shipments of oil and arms to Israel as likely to lead to an extensive military involvement in the Middle East and as inflaming an already tense situation.

DAMASCUS: Six Soviet MIG31s have arrived at the Damascus airbase, apparently from a Russian carrier, but coverage by reporters was restricted. It appears that the planes will remain at Damascus.

CAIRO: Six Soviet MIG31s have landed at Cairo airport. There is no indication as to their length of stay.

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NEW YORK: A large rally was held in Central Park supporting the recent Israeli actions. In speeches before some 3-5000 people, Jewish leaders called upon the United States "to aid the beleaguered country of Israel, which faces possible extermination by the Arab hordes!" Spokesmen reported that other rallies were planned, as well as an extensive fund-raising drive.

LONDON: Official sources here have speculated that the arrival of Soviet aircraft in Egypt and Syria may have been designed to prevent an Israeli strike at the Arab air forces as in 1967. Such a strike would now probably involve the Israelis in a confrontation with the Soviet Union. It was also pointed out that such developments might force a more direct U.S. involvement, resulting in a confrontation between the two super-powers.

AMMAN: It has been reported that Communist China has made preliminary contacts here in an attempt to increase trade and economic relations.

TEHERAN: An economic trade mission from the Chinese Peoples' Republic has met with the Minister of Economic Affairs during the past week.

SANA: The National Unity Government here reported that guerrilla forces have attacked several Government outposts manned by Royalist forces in recent days. Chinese manufactured rifles have been captured.

RIYADH, Saudi Arabia: The Government of Saudi Arabia has taken a grave view of the guerrilla attacks in the neighboring country of Yemen. It is believed that a new civil conflict there could again involve intervention by the Saudis to prevent a Chinese sponsored leftist takeover.

CAIRO: In spite of an obvious eagerness on the part of Egyptian military men to continue attempts at reconnaissance flights over the Sinai desert, none have occurred since the incident nearly two weeks ago in which a U.A.R. plane was turned back by Israeli fighters. The Israelis attempted to force the plane out without resorting to weapons, but eventually fired on the recon plane when it persisted in its attempts to cross the Sinai peninsula, according to the pilots. It is believed that the failure to continue the flights may be due to Soviet pressures to prevent a dangerous incident.

LONDON: The Foreign Office is reported to be gravely concerned by the continuing insistence of Israel that it will withdraw from the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. The Israelis are believed to have attempted to reassure the U.K. that any testing would be conducted underground and would not violate the principles of the treaty in an effort to secure U.K. support in the U.N. Officials cannot explain, therefore, why the Israelis are so insistent on withdrawing from the treaty, a move that could

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de-escalate the crisis were they to retract it.

SITREP: The time of the Fourth Move Period is S+4 weeks.
         (Early June). No additional reports.

The fourth Move Period of the exercise produced significant events, the most important of which was the detonation by Israel of a nuclear device in the Sinai. The announcement of the test came at a meeting of the U.N. Security Council while the Israeli Minister for Defense was delivering an address concerning agreements with the UAR and Syria before the captured Arab territory of 1967 could be returned. The address was one of conciliation and fair-mindedness,[1] with the attitude that the Arabs could have their justice when the Israelis had their security assured. Meanwhile, Israel had opened direct secret negotiations with Syria and with the UAR. Unfortunately, the military faction in the UAR government was insisting on acquiring a nuclear capability, and the negotiations between the CPR and the UAR were assuming a more serious nature at this point.

The United States and the Soviet Union were increasing their levels of cooperation as the risks for each increased. Both of the super-powers were applying pressure on the CPR to desist in its efforts in Assam. The Soviet Union was applying pressure along its border with China, while the United States had stepped-up its assurances to India that US aid would be forthcoming if large territorial losses were pending in Annam. Both the US and the SU were confused by the recent Israeli nuclear test, and the United States was angry at the Israelis. Veiled threats against Israel were made by the United States because of its lack of foreknowledge of the test, but no inquiry had ever been made about forthcoming Israeli tests until the first had already been conducted. US action after this confirmed Israeli suspicions: the United States would not intervene with conventional forces even if it meant the destruction of Israel. Soviet actions were confirming similar suspicions held by the Arabs, and the Arabs increased their dependence on the CPR.

Control's response was as follows.

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[1]The student writer played on the Israeli Team.

THE WORLD TIMES

Fifth Edition

MOSCOW: An editorial in Pravda today declared that "any unpro-
voked nuclear attack on a fraternal state in the Middle East
would be dealt with at the same level by Soviet forces."
The Soviet Union reaffirmed its desire for a peaceful settle-
ment in the Middle East, but said that "unprovoked nuclear
banditry must be dealt a smashing rebuff by the peaceloving
states."

AMMAN: In response to Israeli charges, the Jordanian govern-
ment denied any complicity with the recent terrorist attacks
across the Jordanian/Israeli border. The Jordanians insisted
that Arab refugees from Palestine were responsible for the
attacks.

TEL AVIV: Israel has fully mobilized its armed forces.

DAMASCUS: Syrian defense officials have been in close contact
with representatives of the Soviet Union and are believed to
have accepted a Soviet nuclear guarantee against Israel.
Contacts have also continued on defense matters between the
Syrians and the Communist Chinese, but observers here believe
that little progress has been made.

LONDON: Informed sources here believe that the British govern-
ment is sounding out diplomatic opinion on the possibility of
agreement among countries possessing sophisticated aerospace
capabilities not to introduce advanced systems to the Middle
East. Now that widespread interest in acquiring nuclear
weapons is likely to result from Israeli possession of atomic
bombs, the British proposal would be an attempt to limit the
impact of nuclear proliferation by controlling delivery system
technology.

ATHENS: Reports from seismographic stations here, in Rome,
and Teheran indicate a quake in the vicinity of the center
of the Sinai Peninsula. The data are consistent with the
occurrence of an underground test of a 20 kt nuclear weapon
in the Sinai desert.

CAIRO: U.A.R. officials have indicated severe dissatisfaction
with Soviet Union's offer of a nuclear guarantee and are in
close contact with representatives of the Chinese Peoples'
Republic. The content and level of agreement in these
negotiations has remained a closely guarded secret.

WASHINGTON: The news of an Israeli nuclear weapons test appears
to have come as a complete surprise to the Administration,
which has claimed to be in very close contact with the Israeli
government during the past few weeks of crisis. Several

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members of Congress have demanded an investigation of the U.S. intelligence network, which apparently failed to provide government leaders with information of a forthcoming Israeli test. Others have expressed concern over reports that major shipments of conventional arms to Israel are in the offing. Several said that they feared that the prospect of both a nuclear and conventional buildup of Israel might panic the Arab states into precipitate action.

TEL AVIV: Although there has been no official comment from the Government, this capital remains calm and somewhat smug over the news indicating a successful nuclear test in the Sinai desert. Meanwhile, the Israeli government is believed to be continuing contacts with both the Swedish and Japanese aero-space industries on possible missile building programs. Some observers believe that the Japanese are now much more sympathetic to the Israeli attempt to acquire a nuclear deterrent.

MOSCOW: Analysts here see a widening of the Sino-Soviet rift over recent developments in Assam. Experts do not foresee Soviet intervention in the area, but the Russians are believed prepared to tacitly accept U.S. guarantees to India.

NEW DELHI: Chinese troop buildups are believed to be continuing in the area of northern Assam. The Indian Army is airlifting mountain troops to the area in an attempt to head off what appears to be a major territorial grab by the Chinese and Government sources have let it be known that they are prepared to call in other forces to repel the Chinese if this should prove necessary. It is generally thought that the "other forces" referred to may be U.S. naval air forces currently in the Bay of Bengal. Meanwhile, tumultuous debate in the Lok Sabha was highlighted by demands that the Government initiate a crash nuclear weapons program in order to offset the Chinese military threat.

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y.: The latest Security Council attempt to deal with the Middle East situation was interrupted by the news that a nuclear explosion had occurred in the Sinai region. Immediately following the announcement, the Israeli delegate announced his government's willingness to rescind its notice of a withdrawal from the Test Ban Treaty. The Council then adjourned in a state of confusion, with most of the pending business before it outdated by events. It is not known when the Council will take up the Middle East again, and thus far neither India nor China has requested a meeting on the Far East.

WASHINGTON: The Pentagon announced several major naval move-ments by U.S. forces. Units of the 7th Fleet have moved into the Eastern Mediterranean, units of the 7th Fleet including two aircraft carriers into the Bay of Bengal, and Units of the 8th Fleet are located immediately south of the Arabian Peninsula in the Arabian Sea.

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GENEVA: It is rumored here that tentative contacts have been made here between representatives of Syria and Israel.

TOKYO: Chinese nuclear power was emphasized today with detection of a weapon believed to be thermonuclear in nature in a remote area of Kansu province. The test was conducted above ground, and appeared to be about 3 MT in yield.

MOSCOW: The Soviet government announced today that it had joined several unmanned spacecraft in orbit above the earth. It is believed that this may be the first of several orbiting spa stations that may be part of an advanced military observation system.

WASHINGTON: Following a meeting between the President and Congressional leaders, the Congressmen came away looking grim. The impression of reporters was that the situation developing in the Middle East and in India may be far more serious than even the most pessimistic believed. Several Congressmen speculated that only the most careful cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union could prevent a major world blow up at this time. Observers at the United Nations have also suggested that the two super-powers may be moving toward some sort of concerted action.

SITREP: The time is S+5 weeks.

News Analysis, By Walter Restwick.

    The rapid developments in the Middle East, compounded by Chinese adventurism in India, appear to have opened the Pandora's box of nuclear proliferation. It now appears doubtful that all the king's horses and all the king's men can close the box up again--and the prospect is for the spread of nuclear technology in coming years beginning with those countries most capable of building weapons immediately. In this light, the Israeli reaffirmation of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty appears a feeble and futile gesture that will accomplish little. Indeed, the life span of the Treaty can now probably be numbered in months, if not weeks.

    Meanwhile, in the Middle East, attention is focused upon what the Arabs may do in order to counter the Israeli nuclear test (in occupied Arab territory!). Some have suggested that the Arabs may move on Nasser's long time threat to strike against Israel in the event of a nuclear move to eliminate the Israeli capacity before it can developed to any extent, on the theory that "one bomb does not a deterrent make." The Israeli positions are well defended, however, and the Soviet Union appears to be exercising some restraining influence on Arab leaders. Another option might be for the Arabs to accept a nuclear guarantee from one or more nuclear powers (already offered by the Soviet Union). It has been pointed out, however, that the sanctity of such a guarantee always remains suspect,

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and, in any event, the Arabs would probably seek to acquire
nuclear weapons of their own as quickly as possible to assure
their own people. A third possibility is that the Arabs
might attempt to acquire nuclear weapons as quickly as
possible from a third power. Neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union have been willing to provide such assistance
hitherto, however. In any event, the situation is unstable
and the lid on the box can probably not be closed again,
even through the U.K. proposal to embargo delivery system
technology.

Tension increased dramatically during the fifth Move Period due to persistent indications that the UAR and the Chinese had come to an agreement about stationing nuclear-armed missiles on UAR territory. The Chinese viewed this as an excellent opportunity to make inroads into the Middle East, and were displaying themselves as the only true friends that the Arab nations had. Chinese offers were designed to increase the dependence of the Arab nations on Chinese military authority and to supplant the Soviet Union as the major ally of Arab nations. The major action taken by the Chinese during this Move Period was the shipment to Port Said of MRBMs equipped with nuclear delivery systems. They also persisted in their attempt to "recover" Assam.

Israel viewed this post-test period as the best time to begin direct negotiations with its Arab neighbors. The major concern of Israeli leadership was to communicate the intended use of its newly acquired nuclear weapons. Repeated attempts were made to assure the Arab nations that the Israeli nuclear force was intended for a purely deterrent role, and would be used only when the annihilation of Israel was threatened. Negotiations between the UAR, Syria, and Israel, begun at the close of the exercise, seemed to indicate that the stalemate which had existed for thirty years might end.

The United States was still insisting that the Israeli test had disrupted delicate negotiations that the US had been conducting with the Arab countries, although further investigation indicated that no meaningful negotiations of any sort had begun until after the Israeli test. The United States was also alarmed by reports from Japan that an agreement between Israel and Japan concerning the delivery of an MRBM/IRBM system to Israel had almost been finalized. An intelligence report that a nuclear delivery system was being shipped to the UAR by the CPR was delivered to both the US and the USSR, and each team simultaneously decided to pass the intelligence reports to the other. At this point, both super-powers endorsed a UK resolution to prevent the introduction of advanced weapons systems into the Middle East. The Move Period ended with the United States and the Soviet Union making a joint announcement at a U.N. Security Council meeting that any vessel or aircraft carrying advanced weapons systems into the area would be turned, and those refusing to turn away would be sunk or shot down. The exercise was closed immediately after this announcement, before any action could be taken by other participants in the exercise.

Appendix IV

PME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

PME EVALUATION QUESTIONNAIRE

This questionnaire is to assist in the evaluation of the political-military exercise as a teaching tool. Please answer each question as concisely as possible -- use the back of the paper if necessary to complete a response. You need not sign your name, but please enter the teams (countries) of which you were a member here.

_____
(Teams)

1. Do you feel that participation in the Political-Military Exercises taught you things that could not be learned from usual classroom work? If yes, what in particular?

2. Compared to other classroom techniques encountered in your education how would you rate the PME for:

	(poor) 1	2	(average) 3	4	(superior) 5
a. Teaching facts	___	___	___	___	___
b. Teaching Concepts	___	___	___	___	___
c. Teaching Theory	___	___	___	___	___
d. Integrating the above	___	___	___	___	___
e. Motivating the student	___	___	___	___	___

3. List three concepts dealing with international relations about which you feel you learned most from the Political-Military Exercise.

4. As administered during this quarter, did you find the work load
heavier than usual _____
about average _____
lighter than usual _____?

5. a. Did you feel that the international organization/
conference arrangement was a useful one in the exercises?

   b. Did you participate in UN or conference floor
activities (i.e., at the table)?

   c. Have you suggestions for improving this arrangement?

6. Did you prefer one day____or two day____move periods?
(check one)

   Comments:

7. Did you prefer daily____or alternate day____move periods?
(Alternate day move periods refer to leaving at least one
vacant day between move periods).

8. Should the exercise be interrupted more often for class
discussion?

9. Was the duration of the exercises too short_____
                                  about right_____
                                  too long_____?

10. Between move periods, do you feel that Control moved up
the time and development of the exercise too little_____
                                  about right_____
                                  too much _____?

11. Do you think Control intervened in the exercise too
                              little_____
                          about right_____
                          too much _____?

12. Did you prefer having Control confine its actions to the
time between periods____or concurrently with the move periods
____?

13. Did you prefer the general game____or the crisis-focused
game____?

   Comments:

14. If you had your choice between taking a course with the
exercises integrated into the classroom and one with an exercise
held as a supplementary "one shot" activity, which would you
prefer?
        Integral____   Supplementary____   Other:

15. How would you like to see the debriefings improved?

16. What was your feeling about the balance between lectures, discussion (and debriefings) and gaming in the course?

17a. Did you make use of the supplementary bibliography?_____

How could the bibliography/syllabus be improved?

17b. Did you use the clipping file_____a great deal;_____ some; or _____not at all?

Comments:

17c. Have you other suggestions for administrative improvements?

18a. What major weaknesses do you see in the classroom use of the Political-Military Exercise?

18b. What would be your overall evaluation of the experience of the quarter?

19. Additional comments and suggestions.

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ABSTRACT

The report deals with experience using the Political-Military Exercise (PME)·variety of gaming, or simulation, in courses concerning international relations, foreign policy, and national security. Two methods of operating the simulation are presented: a one or two day game to supplement regular classroom techniques; and an integral format in which the PME substitutes for normal classroom activity during a major portion of the course. Documents used in running the two types of exercise are presented programmatically, and the report will serve as a handbook for those wishing to use the PME in the classroom.