

ED 031 505

24

TE 499 925

By-Rieselbach, Leroy N.

The Behavioral Approach to the Study of Politics: An Overview, Occasional Paper No. 3.

Indiana Univ., Bloomington, High School Curriculum Center in Government.

Spons Agency-Office of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C. Bureau of Research.

Bureau No-BR-5-0643

Pub Date May 69

Contract-OEC-6-10-274

Note-81p.

EDRS Price MF-\$0.50 HC-\$4.15

Descriptors-American Culture, *American Government (Course), *Behavioral Sciences, Behavior Patterns, Behavior Theories, Citizen Role, *Civics, Curriculum Development, Leadership, Political Issues, *Political Science, Political Socialization, Psychology, Secondary Education, Social Sciences, *Social Studies, Social Systems, Sociology

Prepared by the Indiana University High School Curriculum Center in Government, this paper presents a brief but comprehensive introduction to the main characteristics of a behavioral approach to American politics. The first of four parts sets forth assumptions and requirements implicit in a behavioral approach and elucidates the relationship between science, political science, and political behavior. The second part explains one formulation of a behavioral perspective--the "field approach"--which conceives of the individual as a biological and human entity existing within social and cultural environments. The third part suggests how the field approach can make the political behavior of the American citizen more intelligible by emphasizing the relevance of four factors: political culture, sociology, psychology, and socialization. The fourth part applies the same four categories of the field approach to the behavior of political leaders, both formal and informal. (See TE 499 926 for a description of the Center's experimental course in American political behavior.) (LH)

ED031505

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE
PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS
STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDUCATION
POSITION OR POLICY.

The Behavioral Approach to the Study of Politics: An Overview

By Leroy N. Rieselbach

Occasional Paper No. 3

The High School Curriculum Center in Government
Indiana University
1129 Atwater Avenue
Bloomington, Indiana 47401

May, 1969

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS
COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED
BY *Project Director of*
H. S. Curriculum Ctr. in Govt.
TO ERIC AND ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING
UNDER AGREEMENTS WITH THE U.S. OFFICE OF
EDUCATION. FURTHER REPRODUCTION OUTSIDE
THE ERIC SYSTEM REQUIRES PERMISSION OF
THE COPYRIGHT OWNER."

Copyright by Indiana University Foundation

TE 499925

This paper is a part of Project No. H-223 made possible by a contract between the U.S. Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Indiana University Foundation by authority of P.L. 81-152, Title III, Section 302 (c) (15) and P.L. 83-531.

Preface

While this paper is intended primarily for high school teachers of civics and government, others who have been seeking a brief, yet comprehensive, introduction to the behavioral study of politics may find it useful. This paper will ultimately comprise one section of the teacher's guide for an experimental course in American Political Behavior that has been developed by the High School Curriculum Center in Government at Indiana University. The course, American Political Behavior, is undergoing pilot trials and evaluation during the 1968-69 academic year with approximately two thousand students in 41 schools drawn from all regions of the nation. American Political Behavior was designed to serve as an alternative to existing high school civics courses. The course utilizes a micro approach to the study of American politics and government, as it focuses upon the political activities of individual Americans, both as citizens and as official and unofficial political specialists or leaders. A glance at the course materials quickly alerts social studies teachers to the differences between this course and typical civics courses that stress the formal, legal structures of government.*

An effort to introduce a social scientific or behavioral approach to the study of politics in the schools encounters a number of problems. Not only do teachers lack suitable materials for students -- we hope the American Political Behavior course is a partial remedy to this problem -- but

*It is not possible to provide in this paper the reasons that led to the design of the course in American Political Behavior. Readers who wish to learn about our assumptions should request a copy of Howard D. Mehlinger's The Study of American Political Behavior (High School Curriculum Center in Government. December, 1967 [mimeo].).

also teachers have not been taught to view politics through the perspectives of social science. As courses in political behavior multiply in the colleges and universities, it may be that future civics and government teachers will be more adequately prepared for this responsibility. Nevertheless, new undergraduate college courses will not contribute to the retraining of existing teachers. Moreover, it is doubtful that in-service institutes, valuable as they may be, can reach all the teachers who lack social science training for the study of politics.

We hope that this brief introduction to the behavioral study of politics will enable those teachers who will teach the course in American Political Behavior to have greater confidence in their ability to handle the unfamiliar concepts and approaches successfully. We fully expect that the teachers will learn more about the behavioral approach than will their students the first time they teach the course. Nevertheless, it seems important that teachers have some opportunity to learn about the assumptions, premises, and style of the behavioral persuasion before they teach the course to others.

We were fortunate that Professor Leroy Rieselbach, a member of the Department of Government at Indiana University and a student and teacher of political behavior, agreed to write this essay. Not only is Professor Rieselbach a well-established scholar who utilizes behavioral approaches in his own research, but Professor Rieselbach taught our pilot teachers in an NDEA summer institute at Indiana University in 1968. Therefore, Professor Rieselbach had an opportunity to test the ideas contained in this paper with the high school teachers attending the institute.

The reader should know that we imposed a number of constraints upon Professor Rieselbach. These constraints stemmed from our desire to use

this essay in the teacher's guide for the American Political Behavior course. Therefore, we asked him to be brief, yet to cover the topic as completely as possible. Secondly, we asked that he not use space to compare the behavioral approach to other approaches to the study of politics. The principal purpose of the essay is to inform the reader about one approach, presumably one less familiar to him than others. Finally, we asked Professor Rieselbach to organize his essay around the topics to be treated in the American Political Behavior course. Some readers familiar with the behavioral study of politics may find that some topics they think should have been treated were ignored; others might have preferred a different organization for the essay. We frankly do not know whether Professor Rieselbach would have organized his essay differently or would have treated additional topics if he had not been bound by our constraints. We appreciate very much his willingness to conform to the structure of the American Political Behavior course.

Finally, we decided to disseminate the essay as an occasional paper from the Center, for two reasons. Each year we receive hundreds of inquiries from civics and government teachers who are searching for ways to improve their courses. Encouraged by the interest of many teachers who wish to modernize their courses, we decided to make this essay generally available to civics and government teachers. We believe that many teachers who know nothing about the behavioral approach to politics and who may never use our course may nonetheless profit from this paper. Secondly, we think a circulation of this kind affords us the opportunity to gain a critical review from many readers with quite different kinds of experience and backgrounds. Their views will be considered in any

future revision of the essay prior to its inclusion in the teacher's guide and its publication.

Shirley H. Engle, Chairman

Howard D. Mehlinger, Director

Table of Contents

I. Science, Political Science, and Political Behavior.	3
(1) Science as Explanation	5
(2) Science Rests on an Empirical Foundation	7
(3) Science Produces Generalizations	8
(4) Science is "Value Free".	10
II. The Field Perspective on Political Behavior	16
III. The Political Behavior of American Citizens	23
(1) Political Culture.	23
(2) Political Sociology.	28
(3) Political Psychology	37
(4) Political Socialization.	45
IV. The Behavior of Political Leaders	52
(1) Formal Leaders	53
(2) Informal Leaders	62
V. A Concluding Note	74

THE BEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW

It is no longer controversial, or even very startling, to assert that the study of government and politics in the United States has been profoundly influenced by something called the political behavior approach. Many students of public affairs are no longer willing merely to chronicle past events or to speculate about the past and the future. Rather, they seek to describe and understand the world in realistic terms; in contemporary language they attempt "to tell it like it is" with respect to American politics. Put another way, the behavioral political scientist proposes to supplement the contributions of law, history, and philosophy to political understanding by providing information about how and why individuals act in political situations.

The hallmark of the behaviorist's effort to understand political reality is his adoption of the closest possible approximation of the methods of natural science. The social scientist feels that, using his formulation of the scientific method, he can gain new insights into the workings of the American system of government. The object of his study is the individual citizen: what he believes about politics, how he behaves politically, and how he comes to think and act in particular ways. The results of such investigations may require a reassessment of what we believe to be true, of the "conventional wisdom." For example, our textbooks and political oratory often tend to glorify the democratic system for its opportunities for popular participation and its high levels of citizen involvement in politics. Yet, students of voting behavior have repeatedly produced impressive evidence that the average American brings a lack of interest and information to the consideration of political matters. Such findings illustrate what studies of the world as it is can tell us about the true nature of political activity.

To repeat: the behavioral approach to the study of politics seeks to use, wherever possible, the methods of science to discover as much as possible about the ways in which political life is, in fact, lived. From such information, the scientist may suggest improvements in that political life, but in his capacity as scientist he seeks to find the "whats" and "whys" of the political world. It is evident that the introduction of the "behavioral persuasion" has to a substantial degree reoriented political science; the approach has become a basic part of the mainstream of political study.¹

If the acceptance of the efforts of the behaviorists has introduced an element of realism into our store of information about politics, it must surely be desirable for us, as teachers of social science, to pass these new perspectives and discoveries along to our students. College curricula increasingly offer courses with behavioral emphasis at the undergraduate as well as the graduate level. There seems to be no logical reason why high school students should not share the discoveries of the political scientists, both behavioral and more traditional. On this assumption, the present paper is designed to provide an introduction to the rationale, methods, and applications of the behavioral approach.

The essay consists of four sections. The first sets forth the basic assumptions underlying the behavioral approach. Here the effort is to present, admittedly at a rather abstract level, the requirements which the use of the behavioral method imposes on the student of politics. With an understanding of behaviorism behind us, we turn secondly to a consideration

¹An essay reflects this newly won centrality. See Robert A. Dahl, "The Behavioral Approach: Epitaph for a Monument to a Successful Protest." American Political Science Review 55:763-772, 1960. Note especially the article's subtitle.

of one formulation -- "Field Theory" or, preferably, the "Field Approach" -- of a behavioral perspective on political activity. Finally, we will suggest in sections three and four that this field perspective serves both to promote an understanding of the political thought and action of ordinary citizens and to help account for the behavior of political leaders.

I. Science, Political Science, and Political Behavior.

Robert A. Dahl has captured the essence of the approach in saying that it is "an attempt to improve our understanding of politics by seeking to explain the empirical aspects of political life by means of methods, theories, and criteria of proof that are acceptable according to the canons, conventions, and assumptions of modern empirical science."² Thus, political behavior, as the phrase is used here, defines a way to study politics and is not a subject to be studied or taught. While our focus in this paper will be on the relevance of the behavioral orientation for the study of American politics, it should be clear that behaviorism can be used, with equal profit, to analyze behavior in other countries or to attempt to understand the relations among nations. Nor, it is worth repeating, is the behavioral approach the only way to investigate questions about politics; it is, rather, one way that may, along with other approaches, help speed the search for political knowledge.

Since, however, it is the positive emphasis on the "science" in political science which most clearly distinguishes the behaviorist from his more traditional colleagues, it seems important to begin our discussion of the behavioral approach by considering the nature of science. At the most

²Ibid., p. 767. For a full treatment of the approach, see Heinz Eulau, The Behavioral Persuasion in Politics. New York: Random House, 1963.

general level, science may be defined as "a systematic search for knowledge of the universe and its contents."³ Underlying all science, natural and social, is an assumption of determinism, an assumption, that is, that there are patterns to the way things happen. To put it another way, science assumes that events are not unique, but rather that classes of occurrences are sufficiently alike so that to know something about one event is to know something about another similar event. Just as the natural scientist seeks to discover the factors that cause physical or chemical reactions to take place, the social scientist seeks to isolate the things that may cause particular forms of human behavior to occur. With respect to the latter, the determinist assumption suggests, to take one example, if we can identify the factors that predispose individuals to vote for the Republican candidate in one election, we should be able to specify those who are most likely to vote Republican in subsequent elections. More specifically, we assume that people do not make up their minds anew at each election, but instead use similar reasoning processes to arrive at similar voting decisions in successive elections. Thus to know what things lead to Republican voting at one point in time is also to know what things will most probably lead to the same choice later.

Of course, it is true that human behavior is not as regular as the behavior of atoms and molecules, but this does not vitiate the central point: Human action is not random and, though the laws of behavior may have to take a different form (as we shall see below) in social science, laws of behavior do exist. There appear to be patterns or regularities in the behavior of man, and the social scientist seeks to discern and

³Eugene J. Meehan, The Theory and Method of Political Analysis. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1965, p. 28.

record such patterns. And in his effort to identify these regularities, the behaviorist employs as much of the methodology, as many of the procedures, of natural science as he can.

All science, social or natural, shares certain basic characteristics.⁴ Among these attributes, and sufficient to indicate the central tendencies of science, are the following:

(1) Science as Explanation. Science seeks to explain what goes on in the world; that is, it attempts "to discover and formulate in general terms the conditions under which events of various sorts occur, the statements of such determining conditions being the explanations of corresponding happenings."⁵ Put in more colloquial terms, the scientist searches for relationships of cause and effect. The cause "explains" the effect; knowing the cause (or causes) permits us to say "why" the effect happened.

In the social sciences, it is often difficult to separate cause and effect. Frequently, the best we can do is to discover that certain things go together, that they are correlated. Thus, for instance, it seems clear that a relationship exists between higher social status (i.e., the possession of a college education, a prestige occupation, a good salary, and the like) and a preference for Republican candidates. We cannot tell whether having high status "causes" Republicanism or having Republican inclinations produces the motivation to achieve high status, but we can say that the two

⁴The following relies heavily on Ibid., pp. 31-49. For other views on science and the philosophy of science and their relevance to the study of politics, see Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical Analysis. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960; Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry. San Francisco: Chandler, 1964; and Quenton Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960.

⁵Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1960, p. 4.

tend to go together.⁶ The establishment of a relationship, then, does not guarantee a clear-cut explanation of why the relationship exists. The goal of social science, however, remains that of trying to move toward statements of cause and effect relationships.

This last point suggests that we must be careful to distinguish between explanation and prediction. In the natural sciences, experiments can be conducted under laboratory conditions, and the relationships established can reasonably be expected to occur again under similar conditions (e.g., two parts of hydrogen combine with one part of oxygen to form water). The ability to explain how water is formed provides the ability to predict the conditions under which it will be formed in the future. In social science, however, the link between explanation and prediction is by no means as clear. It is known, for example, that since 1932 those with a Republican party preference have constituted a minority of the American electorate.⁷ Predicting on the basis of this fact, we would have forecast Democratic victories in each presidential election since then, and we would have been wrong in both 1952 and 1956. We can account for these inaccuracies in terms of the personal appeal of General Eisenhower as well as public concern about the war in Korea. More generally it appears that short-term forces (candidates and issues) led enough Democrats to desert their party to bring about a GOP triumph. Thus we can explain why, contrary to our expectations, the Republican

⁶ Bernard R. Berelson et al., Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Political Campaign. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954, pp. 54-59; and Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter. New York: Wiley, 1960, Ch. 13.

⁷ Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of a Normal Vote." In Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order. New York: Wiley, 1966, pp. 9-39.

candidate was elected on these occasions, but this explanatory ability will not let us predict in advance when short-term forces and what short-term forces are likely to produce another minority victory. In short, explanation does not always lead to prediction in social science.

(2) Science Rests on an Empirical Foundation. Science, to produce valid explanations, must deal with facts, must deal with the world as it is. Factual data make up the raw material of science, which tries to explain why certain observed facts (events and occurrences of all kinds) exist. Any explanation which science puts forward must rest on a factual base and must be capable of being tested against fact. That is, before we accept an explanation as correct, we must have "proof" -- factual evidence in support of the explanation. It is not enough merely to assert that the upper class prefers the Republican Party; we must investigate the members of this class, by taking a survey, for instance, to see whether they do favor Republican candidates to a meaningfully greater extent than do members of other social classes. If it is "fact" that such a relationship exists, then we can think seriously about accepting the explanation that social class standing is a "cause" of Republicanism (but not necessarily the only one).

Here, too, social science is at a relative disadvantage when compared with natural science, for the data required to generate explanations may not be available. The facts may be inaccessible. With the secret ballot, we cannot be sure how a person votes; we must rely on his report of his preference, and his report, intentionally or inadvertently, may be incorrect. Similarly, a government official's decisions are most often made in private, and it is virtually impossible to look inside his mind and discover his "real" motivation for deciding as he did. Does a political candidate espouse some position because he believes it to be wise or because

that stance will win him votes? This is a question, and there are many others like it, to which an adequate answer may be very hard to obtain for lack of accessible data. The behavioral scientist, while recognizing that data may be hard if not impossible to get, nonetheless insists that it is essential to make every effort to get the best possible data, to build the best possible empirical base for his explanations.

(3) Science Produces Generalizations. Scientific explanations grounded in empirical data take the form of generalizations and theories. A generalization is a statement which links facts, provides explanations, suggests causes. In the natural sciences, generalizations are of the form, "If A occurs, then B will occur," or "A causes B." While social science would like to discover such universalistic generalizations (where the relationship between "A" and "B" is invariant, that is, where A always leads to B), more frequently it must settle for probabilistic generalizations, where A leads to B a specified proportion of the time. For instance, not all individuals in the upper social class prefer Republican candidates (as a universalistic generalization would imply); rather the accepted generalization states that, in about 70 percent of the cases, those of upperclass status support Republicans rather than Democrats. Abstractly put, probabilistic (or statistical) generalizations take the form, "If A occurs, then B will follow X percent of the time," or "X percent of A is also B." The proponents of the behavioral approach, recognizing that human action will never be completely predictable, believe that there do exist statistical regularities and their research efforts are directed at uncovering these.

A theory is a generalization about generalizations; that is, a theory relates and explains general statements much in the same way that generalizations relate and explain facts. Looked at from the opposite

perspective, pieces of evidence (data) are combined and explained by generalizations, and the latter fit together and are explained by theories. The most powerful form of theory is the deductive theory which consists of axioms from which are deduced more specific statements which, in turn, can be verified by empirical test. Euclidean geometry, with its axioms and postulates leading to the deducing of testable theorems, is one example of the deductive structure.

Much more could be said about the attributes of theory,⁸ but it is clear that powerful deductive theories are at least temporarily beyond the capacities of social science. Contemporary behavioral scientists, possessing probabilistic tendency statements rather than universalistic generalizations, have been more successful in producing factor theories. A factor theory is one in which the simultaneous presence of a set of factors leads to a specific occurrence: "If A, B, and C, then X (80 percent of the time)." This kind of formulation moves beyond a simple generalization, suggesting that the occurrence of some behavior is the result of (is "caused" by) the set of factors identified.

The analysis of voting turnout, i.e., the decision to go to the polls and vote, by the authors of The American Voter, illustrates the use of factor theories.⁹ Campbell and his associates discovered that five factors were associated with turnout: (1) interest in the campaign, (2) concern over the outcome of the election, (3) a sense of political efficacy, i.e., a feeling that one's vote is important and can affect the outcome, (4) a sense of citizen duty, i.e., a feeling that each citizen has an obligation

⁸See the works cited in note 4, above.

⁹The following is drawn from Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 101-107.

to cast his ballot on election day, and (5) the strength of the individual's preference for his political party. Each of these factors leads to increased participation in elections, but when all are operative, some clear differences emerge. In 1956, for instance, among those influenced by all five factors (those who were very interested in the election, cared a good deal who won, felt their vote was important, felt a strong obligation to vote, and felt an intense preference for their political party), 96 percent voted in the presidential election; among those affected by none of these factors, only 22 percent cast their ballots. In short, each of the factors contributes to turnout, but when all are present, turnout reaches its peak.

(4) Science is "Value Free." Science seeks to establish generalizations and theories which help to explain reality; it does not pass judgment on whether that reality is "good" or "bad." We may conclude that high levels of support for Republicans from those on the upper rungs of the socioeconomic ladder is desirable or undesirable (depending on our own values); science, as science, seeks only to determine whether such a relationship exists, and it does so without regard for the question of whether such a relationship should or should not exist. This is an example of what philosophers of science have called the "fact-value distinction." Science is concerned with the former, the facts, and not with value judgments about those facts.

This is not to say that values play no part at all in science. Personal preferences may influence what topics a scientist chooses to investigate; his feelings of right and wrong may lead him to focus on some particular problem. The ethical neutrality postulate of science, however, demands that the conducting of research itself be immune to the influence of values. Similarly, values will influence what one makes of a relationship, what proposals one bases on the relationship, but values

should not affect the determination of the existence of the relationship.

Science, then, can but should not be used to surround one's own beliefs with an aura of "scientific truth." Public opinion polls, for instance, can describe the views of the citizenry accurately or they can be "rigged" to indicate popular support for some particular point of view. Not all users of surveys have matched the widely known Gallup and Harris polls in their unbiased efforts to plumb public sentiments. For instance, in 1964, two incumbent Californian Congressmen sought to determine the views of their constituents on a proposal to raise the salary of members of the House of Representatives.¹⁰ One asked the residents of his district:

A bill is now pending before Congress which would increase the salary of members of Congress from \$22,500 to \$32,500 per year. Do you favor this 44 per cent increase in congressional salaries?

The other inquired:

Do you approve the recommendation of a Presidential Commission to raise congressional salaries to \$32,500?

In the light of the stress on a "44 per cent increase" in the first question and the emphasis on a "Presidential Commission" in the second, it is not surprising that the first Representative found many constituents opposed the bill and voted against it while the latter discovered support for a salary increase. The incident suggests how the wording of questions may affect responses to them and may bias the quality of information gathered by a supposedly scientific technique. True science, being value-free, tries to assess opinion rather than to demonstrate support for

¹⁰See David A. Leuthold, Electioneering in a Democracy. New York: Wiley, 1968, p. 55, for a description of this incident.

someone's desired goal.

By way of summary, we may say that behavioral scientists, as scientists, seek (1) explanations of and predictions about events in the real world. These explanations should (2) be built on an empirical base, (3) be cast in the form of generalizations and theories, and (4) be value-free (or ethically neutral) in character. The behavioral scientist advocates and aspires to these goals, but he recognizes that he cannot achieve them completely. He knows, given the character of human behavior, that his explanations are likely to be incomplete and that, rather than permit him to predict the future, they may merely give him a few clues on which to base an "educated guess" about things to come. He knows also that needed data (facts) may be unavailable and that factor theories, not full-blown theories, may be the best he can produce. Despite these limitations, social scientists feel that by emulating the scientific method to the greatest possible degree, they can uncover more of the regularities of human behavior than have previously been set forth. In this way they hope to advance our understanding of the social (including political) behavior of man.

To this point, our discussion has focused on some general characteristics of the scientific approach as applied to human behavior. While this is not the place for an extended treatment of the details of scientific method, some comments about the process by which social scientists conduct research may be in order. To begin, we should recall our earlier discussion about the difficulties inherent in constructing theories. We noted there that deductive theories, those which form generalizations by deduction from axioms and postulates, are generally beyond the reach of political scientists. Instead researchers tend to look for factor theories, sets of variables which, taken together, permit a greater understanding of

some particular form of behavior. (The example of a factor theoretical approach to voting turnout was presented above; see pages 9-10.) Political analysts, thus, devote more energy to seeking generalizations linking one or a few factors to behavior than they expend in theorizing in the deductive sense. This means that theories, when they are formed, are more likely to be created by combining generalizations discovered one at a time than to be "invented" by a single researcher. More simply, theories are likely to emerge from the combination of existing generalizations rather than to precede the formulation of such generalizations.

This focus means that we can characterize much behavioral science as "hypothesis-testing." An hypothesis is a suspected or conjectural relationship among concepts or variables. The terms concept and variable, though often used interchangeably, have somewhat different meanings. The former has been defined most simply as "an abstract idea generalized from particular instances" (Webster's Third Dictionary). Thus, the concept "desk" refers to those pieces of furniture, whatever their size, shape, color, etc., whose primary purpose is to provide a flat surface for writing. Similarly and more relevant to politics, the concept "social class" refers to the various statuses in society (e.g., middle class, working class, upper class) an individual may occupy. One hypothesis that has received substantial attention from behavioral scientists is that social class is related to political preference, that is, variations in social standing go together with consistent variations in political opinion.

When we turn to variables, on the other hand, we move to a level of greater specificity. It is here that we encounter the requirement of science that our relationships meet the test of a confrontation with empirical data. A variable is nothing more than an element which can assume several different values. A number of different variables are available to measure

the concept of social class, for example. The upper class presumably is better off financially, so annual dollar income can be used to assign individuals a rank on the social ladder. Likewise, higher education and a prestige occupation are frequently characteristics of those in the higher levels of the class hierarchy; therefore, years of schooling and/or type of job can be taken as indicators of status. The variables of income, education, and occupation taken singly or in combination may be used as measures of social class. Our hypothesis can now be amended to state that social class as measured in a precisely specified manner is related to political sentiment, also measured by clearly defined procedures.

In stating hypotheses people commonly make a distinction between independent and dependent variables. The speculation about a possible relationship frequently assumes a cause-effect sequence: the independent variable is the assumed cause of the dependent variable. In the example above of the hypothesis relating class and partisan preference, the independent variable, social class, is presumed to influence the dependent variable, choice between the parties. Specifically the hypothesis states that the higher the social status the greater the tendency to prefer the Republican party, its candidates, and its stands on issues of the day. The attributes of high status are presumed to "cause" a liking for Republican alternatives. In operational terms, we may investigate to see whether those of higher educational attainment or with greater income do express preferences for Republican nominees and issue positions.

This process of moving from an abstract hypothesis toward a set of procedures to test the hypothesis is often designated "operationalism," or the process of "operational definition." It refers to the assigning of meaning to a concept by specifying the exact procedures (operations)

which are used to measure the concept (or more accurately the variable which serves to link the concept to reality). An hypothesis, then, states a speculative relationship among variables, and operationalism defines the procedures by which the terms of the hypothesis are given meaning. Such operational specification permits successive tests of an hypothesis to be performed in a manner designed to promote confidence in the test results. If differing procedures are used, we cannot tell whether differing results reflect differences in procedures or differences in the relationship itself.

In addition to this attempt to avoid the pitfalls of inconsistent definition and usage, political scientists also seek to establish relationships independent of possible contaminating factors. This is the social science equivalent of the kinds of control over outside forces available to the natural scientist in his laboratory. For example, we may establish the relationship between social class and political views by conducting an opinion survey in Indiana. In this simple case we cannot tell whether class or residence in the Midwest accounts for preferring the Republican party. Before we can assert the relationship with confidence, we must be sure that region of residence is not contaminating our findings. To gain this certainty, we must "control" for region. This can be done by performing the same test, using the same operations, in other regions of the country. If in each case high status continues to be associated with Republican leanings, we can assert that the relationship is unaffected by regional considerations; it exists in all parts of the nation.

If our hypotheses are verified, that is, if the conjectured relationship is found to exist with the potentially contaminating forces controlled, we are in a relatively strong position to elevate our finding to the status

of a generalization (or, as some writers prefer, a law).¹¹ It is generalizations, as we have seen, that are the goals of science and that imaginative and inventive minds may combine into theories. The hypothesis-testing process, then, is the hallmark of contemporary behavioral science. The social scientist, seeking laws and theories, proposes hypotheses relating concepts and variables, defines these concepts and variables in operational terms to facilitate empirical tests of the hypotheses, and seeks to control for other variables which might impair a true test. In these ways, he endeavors to approximate the methods of science as closely as he can and to obtain results in which he can have a maximum degree of confidence.

II. The Field Perspective on Political Behavior.

The previous section has suggested, very briefly and in abstract terms, some of the basic aims and methods of social science. Here we shift our focus to the application of social science to the study of politics. The individual emerges at the center of attention; groups are viewed as little more than collections of individuals. The behavioral political scientist seeks to uncover the causes of, or influences on, individual belief and activity. To do so, he looks for all the possible relevant variables (factors) which affect individual behavior. Put more formally, he seeks generalizations which link any of a very large number of independent variables to the dependent variables of citizen opinion and political behavior.

¹¹Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965, p. 31. For other treatments of the methods of social science, see Claire Seltiz et al., Research Methods in Social Relations. New York: Holt, 1959; and William J. Goode and Paul K. Hatt, Methods in Social Research. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952.

The field approach or perspective is one, but by no means the only, way to sort out the multitude of potentially influential variables.¹² This approach conceives of the individual as a biological and human entity existing within social and cultural environments.¹³ It suggests that to understand behavior it is necessary to look at the individual and at the situation he is in at the time he must choose among alternative behavior possibilities. The field perspective attempts to take into account all major forces that may shape what a person thinks, says, or does. These potentially relevant forces can be subdivided into three broad categories: (1) cultural, (2) sociological, and (3) psychological or personal. In addition, every individual undergoes a socialization or learning process in which he is taught the things society deems appropriate for him to know and act upon. Let us examine each of these elements of the field in more detail.

In the first place, each individual exists within a given culture, that is, within "a system of norms shared by the members of society," one that includes "the prescriptions and proscriptions indicating how things should be done or should be appraised."¹⁴ As Americans, we live within a culture that directs us to behave politically in certain expected ways. To cite one example, our culture impels us to participate actively in politics; as "good citizens," we are expected to vote, to know something about

¹²The bulk of this and the succeeding four paragraphs are drawn, often verbatim, from the editors' Introduction to Leroy N. Rieselbach and George I. Balch (eds.), Psychology and Politics: An Introductory Reader. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, pp. 4-6.

¹³A recent and thorough explication of the field orientation is J. Milton Yinger's Toward A Field Theory of Behavior. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 74.

the issues, to contribute financially to the "party of our choice," and so forth. A person's political behavior, then, may reflect to some extent the culture in which he lives.

Beyond the dictates of culture, an individual's beliefs and behavior are bound up in the network of social groupings of which he is a part. He may belong to some primary groups -- those of which he is more than merely a formal member, in which he is an active participant, and with whose members he interacts on a personal and relatively spontaneous basis. Many Americans, for example, are deeply committed to church, ethnic, labor union, veterans', and many other types of voluntary associations. In addition to these more immediate memberships, individuals are members of secondary, or categoric, groups. They do not meet face to face with their fellow members but belong by virtue of their own position in society -- socioeconomic status, adherence to some religious denomination, employment in a particular occupation -- to broad class, religious, occupational, and other groups. What is important here is that a person may develop ways of thinking and acting which are appropriate to his membership in groups of this sort. He may learn how to approach a topic from his fellow members or he may feel social pressure to adjust his views and behavior and make them more consistent with group standards, thus protecting his own status within the group. In either case, however, what he does politically and otherwise will bear the imprint of his involvement in various positions in the social world of which he is a part.

But an individual is by no means a helpless pawn being pushed and pulled by cultural and social forces. Rather he is a distinct, autonomous person, whose behavior, while influenced by the cultural and social situations in which he finds himself, will reflect the kind of individual he is. What he is, in part, is determined by his biological make-up.

His physical powers and his intelligence will be limited by his natural endowments, that is, by his genetic inheritance. No parents, however doting and devoted to their child, can make a genius of a son or daughter whose IQ is near 80. A person's biological attributes, in short, impose limitations on the ways in which he may develop.

Within these limits, however, individual development may proceed along a nearly infinite variety of paths. As he matures, the individual discovers how to deal with the environment in which he lives; he comes to develop characteristic modes of responding. Recognizing this fact, implicitly at least, we refer to people who shy away from social contacts, who prefer isolation to the company of others, as introverted, or we label as aggressive those who respond to frustrating circumstances by striking out violently at the perceived source of their discomfort. What this means is that the individual brings something of himself to his behavior. Yinger refers to this as the individual's character -- "what he brings into the behavioral situation"¹⁵ -- while other writers use the term "personality" to convey the same meaning. Whatever word is used, the fact remains that these attributes of the individual, like the cultural and social factors discussed above, must be considered in attempts to understand and explain political activities of Americans.

People are not born with developed personalities any more than they have knowledge of cultural or group norms and expectations at birth. The impact of culture and group as well as the development of personality takes place through a learning process known as socialization. As Roberta Sigel

¹⁵Ibid., p. 141.

puts it:¹⁶

Political socialization is the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes, and behavior accepted and practiced by the on-going political system.

* * * *

Viewed this way political socialization would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including not only explicitly political learning but also nominally non-political learning which affects political behavior such as the learning of politically relevant social attitudes and the acquisition of politically relevant personality characteristics.

Therefore, we must examine the process by which dispositions to act are acquired, that is, the process of political socialization, in any attempt to generalize about the influence of culture, group, and personality on political behavior.

The notion of role provides a convenient way to see the simultaneous influence of culture, social structure, and personality operating through the socialization process. Colloquially, we speak of individuals playing roles with respect to some audience. More formally, role may be defined as "the rights and duties, the normatively approved patterns of behavior" for people in given positions in society.¹⁷

Role, thus defined, has both social (or structural) and cultural attributes. A position refers to a specific place in a social structure. The rights and obligations of a position tend to be formalized and codified. A number of ways of behaving are required or forbidden by law, or

¹⁶Roberta Sigel, "Assumptions About the Learning of Political Values. In Roberta Sigel (ed.), "Political Socialization," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 361:1-9, at p. 2, September, 1965. The second quoted passage is from Fred I. Greenstein, "Political Socialization," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: Crowell Collier, 1967.

¹⁷Yinger, Toward A Field Theory of Behavior, p. 99.

some set of rules, to the occupant of a position. Violating these rules will, of course, lead to the invoking of formal, legal sanctions. In cultural terms, a role consists of a set of norms or expectations about how the person who takes the role should act. Those who occupy roles learn that there are some things which they are expected to do, some things which they must refrain from doing, and that those who violate the norms, while not subject to formal sanctions, may be punished informally. They may be ignored, socially ostracized, or generally deprived of the rewards which successful role-playing brings.

A distinction must be made between role and role behavior. Role defines how the role-player, whoever he may be, is expected to behave. Role behavior consists of what a particular player of the role actually does. The behavior he exhibits may or may not match what others expect him to do, how they expect him to play the role. Inappropriate behavior may occur for a number of reasons. In the first place, the occupant of a role may be personally incapable of meeting demands of the role. We are all familiar with people who seem temperamentally unsuited for certain roles (e.g., husband or wife, group member, citizen, and the like), and when such individuals are thrust into such roles, their personalities will render it difficult for them to behave appropriately. Secondly, the occupant of a role may not know what behaviors are expected of him, and he may act in unacceptable fashion until he is socialized, until he learns the behaviors which those with whom he must deal expect of him. In this socialization process, the role player may discover that there is no agreement about how he should behave. The people with whom he must interact do not agree on what is proper activity for him to engage in. In fact, he may be confronted by incompatible expectations. His role may require him to deal with two or more sets of people, each of which wants him to perform different and

incompatible actions. Part of the socialization process involves learning how to cope with such varying expectations. For these reasons, role behavior may depart from the norms and expectations which define the role.

We may illustrate some of these points by examining the role of teacher. A classroom teacher, first of all, must work within the limits set forth in his contract and in the operating rules of his school. These comprise the formal aspect of his role, and violations will expose him to formal penalties. At the same time, the teacher must meet the expectations imposed by a number of audiences -- his students, their parents and the larger local community, his fellow teachers, and his school administrators. The feelings of these groups about what should go on in the classroom will create for the teacher difficult and perhaps controversial choices about, among other things, the curriculum -- what topics to emphasize, whether to deal with contemporary political issues, etc. -- and about rules of student conduct. Each teacher will learn about the demands of these audiences and may develop successful ways of dealing with them. As a result of his socialization, he will discover how to adapt his behavior to these formal and informal pressures. Unsatisfactory adaptation may reflect personality; the teacher may possess personal needs which outweigh for him the necessity of "learning the ropes" in his school.

In short, the concept of role provides a way of visualizing the four classes of variables -- cultural, social, psychological, and socializing -- which the field approach singles out for attention. Role behavior will be an adjustment of the demands of culture, group, and personality. The behavioral political scientist seeks generalizations which link variables from each of these categories to political activities of individuals. The value of the field perspective is that it helps to ensure that research will at least consider each class of factors, will examine all potentially

relevant forces, in its search for generalizations with explanatory and predictive value.¹⁸

III. The Political Behavior of American Citizens.

In this section we will use the field orientation to structure a discussion of some of what political behaviorists think they have learned about the political beliefs and actions of Americans. Here we cannot cover the voluminous literature on many of these topics, but can only illustrate the ways in which the field approach categories serve to focus attention on potentially important variables.¹⁹ Because many studies have been done, however, does not mean that most of the work of understanding political behavior is finished. Many questions remain unanswered. Many others have been treated only in partial fashion; much work is required to see whether generalizations established in one group or in one part of the country hold in other groups and regions as well. If we visualize the understanding of political behavior as a giant jigsaw puzzle, we can say that only a few of the pieces have been put in place; much is still to be done. Nonetheless, much has been accomplished, and we will review some of the most interesting results which students of politics have achieved.

1) Political Culture. Political culture, it will be recalled, is

¹⁸It should be obvious that the field approach is not a theory. Rather, it is an orientation, a way of organizing the questions to be asked about political behavior. The approach does not make predictions about relationships; it merely suggests that the important relationships in political science may relate variables from all four of its basic categories to behavior. It remains for empirical research to specify the precise nature of these relationships.

¹⁹For recent attempts to review in systematic fashion much of the behavioral research, see Robert E. Lane, Political Life. New York: Free Press, 1959; and Lester W. Milbrath, Political Participation. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965.

"the pattern of individual attitudes toward politics" held by citizens,²⁰ the widely shared orientations -- values, norms, and expectations -- about how politics is, and should be, carried on. These views, while very general and vague in character, provide the broad context within which more specific political activity is conducted. These beliefs and practices impose a set of expectations on those who share in the culture; citizens will be reluctant to act in ways which violate the norms. Recent events make clear that not all Americans subscribe to the dictates of our political culture, and that the content of the culture may be changing. However, it appears from present evidence that there exists a basic set of beliefs about politics which may influence contemporary political behavior.

William C. Mitchell has summarized these beliefs and has set out the elements of "the American belief system," as follows:

Politics is a "low" form of activity; it is to be minimized; private action is preferable to politics.

Political power is evil; the American system of government is designed to prevent concentrations of power. But use of power is approved in time of crisis (e.g., in war or depression).

Rational-legal authority is preferred; power vests in offices not in men; laws apply equally to all men.

Citizenship is a duty; the "good citizen will participate in the affairs of his community.

²⁰Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966, p. 50. For other general discussions of political culture, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture. Boston: Little, Brown, 1965, Ch. 1; David M. Potter, People of Plenty: Economic Abundance and the American Character. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954; and Bernard Hennessy, Public Opinion. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1965, Ch. 10.

Americans feel ambivalent toward compromise; they stress both principle and accommodation, the former on basics, the latter on subsidiary issues.

Action is justified in the name of the public interest; responsible behavior seeks to advance the public good.

Politics is a game; rules are well defined; people want to see who wins, but seldom take part themselves.²¹

There is evidence to suggest that Americans respond to politics in these ways. Only a few political leaders -- the President, Senators, Supreme Court Justices -- seem to be accorded high prestige; few parents evidence elation at the prospect of a career in politics for their children. Our political oratory abounds with such phrases as "government of, by, and for the people," and a "government of laws, not of men." We have already noted the existence of a sense of citizen duty to participate in politics, at least to vote. At the same time, however, few citizens do more than vote; most are prepared to watch from a distance. Finally, observers of the American political scene have often noted the stress on principle, responsibility, the public (as opposed to private) good, and morality in political discussion coupled with pragmatism, bargaining ("log-rolling"), and compromise in political action.²² Such views as these constitute the orientation of the American political culture toward politics.

Another set of beliefs pertains to the "rules of the game," the accepted modes for conducting political affairs. Prothro and Grigg

²¹William C. Mitchell, The American Polity. New York: Free Press, 1962, pp. 105-121.

²²Such observations have long been commonplace. See, for example, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America. New York: Vintage Books, 1954, first published in 1835.

illustrate the widespread acceptance of the norms of majority rule and minority rights.²³ A minimum of 94.7 percent of those surveyed agreed with statements such as "Public officials should be chosen by majority vote," and "The minority should be free to criticize majority decisions." This broad general agreement on principles, Prothro and Grigg found, did not carry over to specific applications of the principles. More than half of those interviewed would bar a Communist from office even if he were "legally elected" or, despite a commitment to majority rule in the abstract, would limit the right to vote to those who pay taxes. Similarly, large numbers would reject certain specific applications of minority rights. In short, Americans pay at least lip service to vague notions about how democratic politics should be conducted, but they do not always apply these notions in specific situations.

One other formulation of political culture in America deserves mention here: David Riesman's views as set forth in his famous book, The Lonely Crowd.²⁴ Riesman suggests that orientations toward politics reflect basic character or personality types and he perceives an alteration in the American character type accompanied by changes in political style. In an earlier era, the "inner-directed" man was common; this individual had his goals implanted in him early in life and he continued to seek those goals as he matured. He was guided by a "psychological gyroscope" which kept him on course, in search of his life aims, despite changes in his external environment. He felt the need to produce, to achieve, to "be his own man."

²³James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy." Journal of Politics 22:276-294, 1960.

²⁴New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.

In politics, the inner-directed character manifests itself in the style of the "moralizer." As an individual with deeply held commitments to life goals, the inner-directed man sees politics, like other areas of endeavor, as something that he can manipulate in order to achieve his purposes. His sense of responsibility, his desire to achieve, led him to get involved in politics when he saw goals to be achieved by participation. This participation tended to be motivated by "indignation," by a sense of wrongs needing to be corrected. The job of the inner-directed type was to bring about desirable (moral) ends, in politics as in other fields.

In contemporary times, a new character type has emerged: the other-directed type.²⁵ In contrast to inner-directed man, the other-directed individual is moved by external rather than internal drives. His orientation is toward other people; he takes direction from them rather than from his own life goals. He derives satisfaction not from production or achievement but from the response of others to him. His psychological mechanism is like radar; he is attuned to what other people say and do, and his goals shift with changes expected of him.

The political manifestations of other-direction include the style of the "inside-dopester." Rather than a concern with setting things right, the other-directed inside-dopester seeks merely to understand politics, to be "in the know." He can satisfy his peers by the mere possession of knowledge, and he sees no need to participate actively in politics. He is a consumer rather than a producer, a spectator not an activist. His orientations are toward tolerance (not moralism) and he values sincerity

²⁵As Riesman makes clear, this is not a simple substitution of one type for another. Both inner- and other-directed types have existed throughout history. The point is that Riesman believes that in the modern era the latter has replaced the former as the most common character type.

rather than performance. He looks, in politics or elsewhere, for those who appear trustworthy, whose word can be taken at face value, whose knowledge is reliable.

In a word, conformity, the desire to get along, dominates the other-directed era. Thus, a bandwagon psychology permeates politics -- candidates urge voters to "get on board," not to be "left out," to "back a winner." The mass media emphasize images not issues. Political culture -- the basic orientations to politics, the approved ways of doing things -- rests on the other-directed character type.

In summary, whether we talk about political culture in terms of basic beliefs or dominant character types, the essential point remains the same. There exist, whatever their foundation, commonly held and accepted norms and expectations about politics, the ways it should be conducted, and the behaviors which are inappropriate. These values influence the way people act politically; they permit some things to be done, they virtually eliminate recourse to other forms of action. Political culture, then, vague and general though it may be, provides the context in which political behavior occurs. It delineates the outer limits of acceptable behavior; within these limits there remains substantial room for variation.

2) Political Sociology. Social factors may account for part of this variation. Though living within a national political culture, the citizen is more immediately involved in a network of group affiliations. He is part of a family, he probably holds a job, and he may very well belong to one or more voluntary associations. In addition, he will be a member of a number of what were labelled above as categoric or secondary groups, such as class, religious, and ethnic groups. All of these associations

combine to create a social "life style" for an individual,²⁶ a way of life which will affect his political beliefs and behavior. Each group, from the more intimate family to the more remote categoric associations, may have politically relevant norms, values, and opinions which it may impress upon its members, present and potential. Failure to act in keeping with group sentiments may destroy the possibility of satisfactory membership; thus if he values belonging to the group, the member may feel pressure to adjust his attitudes and activities in the direction of the group norms. Sociologists and behavioral political scientists have uncovered many relationships linking sociological factors to political behavior; some of these are reviewed here.

Social Class. Our earlier examples focused on social class, and, as indicated, position on the social ladder appeared to influence behavior. Status affects what people think politically. Taking education and occupation as the identifying marks of the upper class, we can see differences in political preferences among the social strata. For instance, the college educated consistently give more support to Republican presidential candidates than those who spent fewer years in school. In 1956, 69 percent of the college educated voted for Eisenhower, while 50 percent of those who had completed only grade school did the same. The comparable Republican percentages for 1960 are 61 and 45, and for 1964, 48 and 34.²⁷ Notice that the amount of support for Republicans varies by more than 20 percent, but that the relationship between the groups is constant: more

²⁶See Herbert McClosky and Harold E. Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty." American Political Science Review 53:757-776, 1959.

²⁷These data are from the Gallup Poll, as reported in Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, September 29, 1967, p. 194.

education leads to a greater proportion of Republican votes. Similarly, business and professional people (also presumably upper class) consistently support GOP candidates to a greater degree than do manual workers.²⁸ The upper class -- the better educated and those in prestigious business and professional occupations -- are also more likely to favor foreign aid and other international programs which involve this country in world affairs.²⁹

Similarly, status affects political participation. Milbrath, citing a number of studies, concludes that "no matter how class is measured, . . . higher-class persons are more likely to participate in politics than lower-class persons."³⁰ This is true of a variety of forms of participation. The upper class votes more frequently, solicits and contributes political funds more often, is more likely to work for a party or to run for office, and so on. In short, it is clear that the higher one is on the social scale, the greater the likelihood that he will become politically involved; this appears to be so because the defining characteristics of high status -- education, income, prestigious occupation -- provide those with high status the skills and resources -- verbal and communications skills, leisure time, available money -- that permit them to take part in the political affairs of community and nation.

Age. The Gallup Poll reports that younger voters prefer the Democratic Party to a somewhat greater degree than do their elders. In each of the elections between 1952 and 1964, voters under 30 years of age cast

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹See Michael Kent O'Leary, The Politics of American Foreign Aid. New York: Atherton, 1967, pp. 33-35; and Alfred O. Hero, Jr., Americans in World Affairs. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959, Ch. 5.

³⁰Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 116.

a smaller proportion of their votes to the Republicans than did those over 50.³¹ On the other hand, youthful voters tend to vote less frequently and to participate in other ways less often.³² Age appears to influence what one thinks as well as what one does. Hero reports that citizens under 30 are less likely than those above that age to consider international affairs important and thus worth much interest, less likely to have confidence in the United Nations as an instrument of peace, and more likely to expect war in the near future.³³

Sex. Women tend to vote more for Republican candidates than do men to a very slight extent.³⁴ What is interesting here is to note that what appears as a sex difference is explicable largely in terms of other variables: age, mortality rates, and region of residence.

. . . older people tend to vote Republican more often than do younger people. And there are substantially more older women than there are older men [because men die younger than women]. . . . Finally, in the South, women tend to vote considerably less often than men, and since most Southerners are Democrats, the non-voting female there is a non-voting Democrat. The combination of deceased Republican husbands and non-voting Democratic wives creates a disparity resulting in more Republican women voters. . . .³⁵

Thus there appears that there is little of the so-called women's vote based on special appeals of some candidates to females. When "controls" are

³¹As reported in Congressional Quarterly, September 29, 1967, p. 194. See also Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 151-153.

³²Warren E. Miller, "The Political Behavior of the Electorate." In Edward C. Dreyer and Walter A. Rosenbaum (eds.), Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1966, pp. 89-90; Campbell et al., The American Voter, Ch. 17; Milbrath, Political Participation, pp. 134-135.

³³Hero, Americans in World Affairs, pp. 81-83.

³⁴Congressional Quarterly, September 29, 1967, p. 194, citing Gallup Poll data; Miller, "The Political Behavior of the Electorate," pp. 87-89.

³⁵Ibid., p. 88.

used, most of the distinctions in the political behavior of the sexes disappear. Again, there do exist sex differences in political opinion: women are less involved with international issues, have less information about such questions, and are thus more likely to base their attitudes on emotional grounds.³⁶ This last seems to be a residue of the view that "politics is a man's business" coupled with the woman's greater concern with domestic -- home and family -- matters. Whatever the reason, sex remains a potentially relevant influence on political behavior.

Religion. Church affiliation seems similarly to be related to political thought and activity. Research has repeatedly found that Jews and Catholics tend to give more of their votes to Democratic nominees than do Protestants.³⁷ Further, "Jews are slightly more active in politics than Catholics who, in turn, are slightly more active than Protestants."³⁸ And, as before, there are differences among the religious groups in international outlook: Jews are highly international in their views; they are quite willing, on the whole, to see Americans involved in world affairs. Protestants rank next in support for international involvements, followed by Catholics.³⁹

It is difficult, however, to separate the effects of religion from those of class; these two factors tend to coincide. One study, for instance, found that, when status is controlled, differences in opinion among religious groups virtually disappeared. That is, differences between

³⁶Hero, Americans in World Affairs, pp. 83-86.

³⁷Gallup Poll data reported by Congressional Quarterly, September 29, 1967, p. 194; and Miller, "The Political Behavior of the Electorate," pp. 100-101.

³⁸Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 137.

³⁹Hero, Americans in World Affairs, pp. 69-81.

religious denominations tend to result from differences in status; the higher the status of the members, the greater their support for conservative and Republican causes. Jews, of course, are the exception; their high status goes hand-in-hand with liberalism.⁴⁰ To account for this finding, we may point to the high cohesion among Jewish groups, and thus infer strong liberal group norms to which the young are socialized. Also persecution or fear of persecution may lead to liberal views and high rates of political participation.

To this point, using the examples of partisan preference, attitudes toward foreign policy issues, and levels of political participation, we have attempted to indicate how secondary (categoric) group memberships are related to the political behavior of American citizens. Similar relationships have been found for such additional variables as race, ethnicity, urban-rural residence, size of community of residence, and region of residence.⁴¹ This sort of factor is useful in attempting to explain and generalize about many political phenomena including such things as support for right-wing political movements. To cite one instance, Lipset traces the sources of support in California for the John Birch Society and concludes:

⁴⁰ Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude." Public Opinion Quarterly 12:377-389, 1948.

⁴¹The works cited previously by Miller, Milbrath, and Hero, as well as the Gallup data reported by the Congressional Quarterly, are also relevant for these factors. Other important sources include Lane, Political Life; Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, Negroes and the New Southern Politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966; Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting." American Political Science Review 59:951-962, 1965; Michael Parenti, "Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification." American Political Science Review 61:717-726, 1967; and Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1967.

A supporter of the Society is more likely to be a Republican than a Democrat, to live in Southern California, to be better educated, and to be in a higher economic category. . . . [T]he small group of farmers in the sample seem to be the most strongly pro-Birch among the vocational categories. Differences between religious groups are small, although Catholics are somewhat less likely to back the Birch Society than are Protestants.⁴²

In short, we can determine the sociological foundations of political groups and political opinion.

But these are secondary groups; people "belong" to them only in the sense that they share some common categorization. What of the social units to which individuals belong in some more meaningful sense: family, work, and other primary groups? It should not come as much of a surprise to discover that these groups with which people affiliate closely have an impact on political behavior.

The Family. The family is probably the single most important influence on its members' beliefs and activities. One study concludes that the family is a "key" group

which transmits, indoctrinates, and sustains the political loyalties of its members. Voters who support the party favored by their families develop firmer and more consistent habits of party allegiance than voters who renounce the family's preference.⁴³

In the 1952 election, to cite some specific evidence, more than 90 percent of the married respondents in one survey reported that they had voted for the same candidate as had their spouses. In the same survey,

⁴²Seymour Martin Lipset, "Three Decades of the Radical Right." In Daniel Bell (ed.), The Radical Right. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963, pp. 356-357. See also Raymond E. Wolfinger et al., "America's Radical Right: Politics and Ideology." In David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press, 1964, pp. 262-293; and Nelson W. Polsby, "Toward An Explanation of McCarthyism." Political Studies 8:809-824, 1960.

⁴³McClosky and Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty."

about 85 percent of the unmarried respondents declared that their votes and those of their family had coincided.⁴⁴ Moreover, the nature of the family's political beliefs is important here. The more homogenous the outlook of the family, the higher its interest in politics, the more consistent its partisan preference, and the more closely knit it is, the greater is its impact on the beliefs of its members.⁴⁵ That is, the more important and positive an individual's family is for him, the greater is the likelihood that his views will conform to those of his immediate family.

Work and Peer Groups. While less powerful than the family, other primary groups, such as work and peer groups, have fundamental consequences for the political views of their members. In most cases, these groups operate to reinforce the political loyalties which the family instills. In other words, people tend to associate at work and socially with those who share their political sentiments. One survey, mentioned above,⁴⁶ discovered that nearly 85 percent of the respondents voted in a way consistent with their friends.

In addition, the nature of the job itself may help to shape the worker's outlook on life, including the political world. Lipsitz interviewed small samples of unskilled assembly line laborers, semiskilled relief and utility men, and skilled maintenance workers.⁴⁷ Those on the assembly line, without basic skills, performing a repetitive task, and with no real involvement with the total product, were much less satisfied with their

⁴⁴Angus Campbell et al., The Voter Decides. Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954, pp. 199-206.

⁴⁵McClosky and Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty."

⁴⁶Campbell et al., The Voter Decides, pp. 199-206.

⁴⁷Lewis Lipsitz, "Work Life and Political Attitudes." American Political Science Review 58:951-962, 1964.

jobs than were the more skilled workers. They were more fatalistic in their outlook; they were more likely to feel that wars and poverty were the inevitable conditions of mankind, that government is beyond the influence of ordinary men, and that long-range planning is likely to come to naught. Finally, assembly line operators had more radical political opinions; possessing less and feeling frustrated, they were more ready to try new ways to alter their life situations, to change the status quo.

The point of this discussion of primary groups is, to reiterate, that face-to-face contacts and interactions are powerful influences on political behavior. In the family, through their choice of friends, and on the job, people tend to find themselves in associations characterized by homogeneous political beliefs. Thus, they are exposed only to one point of view, and it should not come as a surprise to discover that they accept this pattern of opinion to an overwhelming degree. All of what they hear and see is consistent with what they believe and do, and they are unlikely to be exposed to many forces for change.

This stable and consistent pattern of political forces is not always the case, however, for some people are exposed to conflicting pressures. Upper class Catholics and Jews, Republican women who marry Democratic husbands, individuals whose life style varies widely from those of their parental families, these and many other sorts of individuals experience "cross-pressures," that is, the inconsistent appeals of their varied group attachments. Where the conflicts are unequal, as between an important primary group and more remote secondary affiliations, they "are more likely to be resolved in favor of the preferred group with the acceptance of its political norms."⁴⁸ Where the cross-pressures are more nearly equal, a

⁴⁸Lane, Political Life, p. 202.

number of behavioral possibilities exist. The individual may avoid making a choice; he may stay home on election day. Or he may attempt to moderate or minimize the conflict by finding some good on both sides or arguing that the group differences are not as large as some believe.⁴⁹ Finally, he may fail to "see" the conflict, that is, deny its existence, and proceed to act in keeping with the beliefs of one group.⁵⁰

In sum, the individual's place in society, in the social structure that his primary and secondary group affiliations define, exposes him to an influential set of political forces. His beliefs and behavior will reflect this social position.

3) Political Psychology. There is more to understanding behavior than noting cultural and social forces. The individual brings something of himself, his character or personality, into each situation he confronts. We shall use the term personality to refer to a person's characteristic mode of response, either in thought or in action, to a variety of external stimuli. We noted earlier the examples of the "introverted" and "aggressive" personality types. Personality attributes or traits refer to the significantly probable response that an individual makes to a broad range of events in his environment. We should note that in common usage trait names evoke particular images, that is, there are stereotypes of the introvert or aggressive person; here, however, our concern is only with those aspects of personality which we can study in a scientific fashion.

Attitudes, on the other hand, are manifestations of beliefs and feelings about specific objects (e.g., the Soviet Union, the Democratic Party,

⁴⁹This last is the strategy which candidate Hubert Humphrey seemed to be employing in his effort to heal the divisions over Vietnam policy which have divided the "hawks" and the "doves" in the Democratic Party.

⁵⁰Lane, Political Life, p. 203.

Richard Nixon). The behaviorist believes that it is likely that opinions reflect personality to some degree, but it is clear that this need not always be the case. For instance, if a man perceives a number of aspects of the world around him as threatening and responds by rejecting nations, organizations, and people and by proposing to deal harshly with them, we may infer that he is a "hostile" or "aggressive" personality type. A second man who expresses hostility toward a particular nation -- he may oppose the Soviet Union on the quite understandable grounds that it has subjugated the land from which his ancestors emigrated to the United States -- without displaying a generalized fear of all foreign countries (or other classes of stimulus objects) cannot be said to show more than a hostile view of Russia. In short, personality denotes a characteristic response pattern to a wide range of stimuli while attitude describes a particular response to a single object in the environment.

We are not asserting that personality, any more than culture of social structure, is the cause of political opinion or behavior, but merely that it may be a cause. It seems that, in general, the less structured a situation is, the more room there is for personality to influence the individual's response to that situation.⁵¹ The more the individual is hemmed in by cultural norms, by his own information and experience, by his own perceived self-interest -- whether social, economic, or political -- or by uni-directional pressures from his social position, the more likely is his behavior to reflect forces outside of the personality. In the absence of other cues, underlying personality traits have a higher

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 97-100; Fred I. Greenstein, "The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush." American Political Science Review 61:629-641, 1967; and Greenstein (ed.), "Personality and Politics." Journal of Social Issues 24, 1968.

probability of influencing behavior. On the other hand, a subject or event must be sufficiently important to evoke some response from the individual. Obviously there will be no investment of emotion in objects which are too remote to matter. Personality is more likely to be "engaged," and thus to be relevant to behavior, by topics which are important enough to require thinking about but about which there are few prescribed points of view.

Before proceeding to an examination of some relationships between personality and behavior, one point of clarification needs to be made. We must avoid the danger of confusing personality and pathology; to do so would be highly misleading. While some pathologies -- neuroses, psychoses, and the like -- may be expressed in political behavior, these are probably infrequent cases. What is important to realize is that normal people, no less than the abnormal, have personalities. Each individual, whether normal or not, develops a way of looking at and dealing with the environment in which he lives. These modes of responding differ for different people. The point to remember is that these patterns of response characterize all people, and that different patterns may lead to differences in political behavior.

While there remain some controversial issues about the measurement (in the scientific sense) of personality, nonetheless evidence which links personality attributes and behavior has begun to accumulate, and we will review some of it here.

Party Identification. One of the first political feelings which a child develops as he becomes exposed to the world of politics is a sense of belonging to, of attachment to, one of the two political parties. He learns "I am a Democrat (or Republican)" long before he knows much, if anything, about the parties and what they stand for. He comes to have a

deeply held identification, in a psychological sense, with his chosen political party. That this attachment is most often taken from the parental family, and probably with a minimum of rational calculation, should not cause us to underestimate the conviction with which it is held.⁵² Citizens tend to view the world of politics through lenses colored by party identification; party loyalty provides a starting place for evaluation of political events. Partisan choice influences the perception of candidates. More than two of every three voters know for whom they will vote by the time of the nominating conventions or earlier;⁵³ presumably they make these decisions on the basis of attachment to party. Along the same lines, it has been estimated that of the 27 million Americans who "couldn't be wrong" in supporting the 1964 candidacy of Barry Goldwater, no less than 20 million were Republican party identifiers who had no special passion for the Arizona Senator and who would have voted with equal feeling for Nelson Rockefeller, Richard Nixon, or any other candidate who adorned the Republican column of the ballot.⁵⁴

Party identification seems to influence positions on the issues as well as views of the candidates. Democrats tend to support issue stands of their party and Republicans do the same.⁵⁵ Party provides a point of

⁵² On the acquisition and influence of party identification, see Campbell et al., The American Voter, Chs. 6-7; Fred I. Greenstein, Children and Politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965; and Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President." Public Opinion Quarterly 24:632-644, 1960.

⁵³ Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 78.

⁵⁴ Angus Campbell, "Interpreting the Presidential Victory." In Milton C. Cummings, Jr. (ed.), The National Election of 1964. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966, pp. 273-275.

⁵⁵ See George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy." Public Opinion Quarterly 15: 601-623, 1951-52.

reference which serves as a substitute for thinking through each issue from scratch when it arises. The individual need not weigh and balance the facts, but need only ascertain where his party stands and adjust or formulate his own view accordingly. As Campbell et al. put it: ". . . [R]esponses to each element of national politics are deeply affected by the individual's enduring party attachment."⁵⁶ In short, party identification is acquired early and continues to occupy, for most citizens, a central place in political thought, serving as a basic point of organization. Most, if not all, other political events, including candidates and issues, are evaluated with reference to party identification.

Alienation.⁵⁷ A second personality characteristic which seems demonstrably related to political behavior is a feeling of alienation or estrangement. While there has been some confusion and controversy surrounding the use of the concept of alienation, it seems clear that at the core of the idea is the notion that an individual comes to feel detached from the world around him. He senses a lack of guidance from appropriate cultural values (normlessness); he believes himself to be incapable of influencing the world around him (powerlessness); and he feels cut off from that world (social isolation).⁵⁸ In short, because of his inability to see himself as a relevant member of society, the alienated individual cuts himself off from his environment, tending to be cynical about it and mistrustful of

⁵⁶Campbell et al., The American Voter, p. 128.

⁵⁷The following four paragraphs are adapted from Rieselbach and Balch (eds.), Psychology and Politics, pp. 7-9.

⁵⁸For attempts to sort out the various ideas central to the alienation concepts, see Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation." American Sociological Review 24:783-791, 1959; and Dwight G. Dean, "Alienation: Its Meaning and Measurement." American Sociological Review 26:753-758, 1961.

its members.⁵⁹

A number of studies show the alienated to behave in distinctive ways in the political arena. In general, they are less likely to care about politics, to discuss political affairs, or to be well informed about politics.⁶⁰ It follows from such findings that the alienated see less reason to participate actively in politics, for the fact of their cynicism, mistrust, and estrangement leads them to believe that their involvement would be pointless.⁶¹ Specifically, the alienated citizen is likely to stay home on election day rather than go to the polls and cast his ballot.⁶² Even when he does vote, the quality of his action appears to have a highly negative character. He is likely to view the electoral contest as a choice between evils and thus to vote against the greater evil, not for a candidate in whom he has some confidence.⁶³ Similarly, the alienated voter tends to oppose local bond issue referendums, apparently seeing no reason why the society at large should undertake such things as school and hospital

⁵⁹In a sense, alienation is the other side of the coin from political efficacy discussed earlier in connection with voting turnout. The efficacious citizen feels that his voice can be heard politically and he tends to get involved; the alienated person, feeling estranged, believes he has no influence over political decisions and often acts as if influence were impossible.

⁶⁰See, among others, Campbell et al., The American Voter; and Robert F. Agger, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning." Journal of Politics 23:477-506, 1961.

⁶¹Milbrath, Political Participation, pp. 78-81.

⁶²Cf. Kenneth Janda, "A Comparative Study of Political Alienation and Voting Behavior in Three Suburban Communities." In Studies in History and the Social Sciences: Studies in Honor of John A. Kinneman. Normal: Illinois State University Press, 1965, pp. 53-68; and Milbrath, Political Participation.

⁶³See Murray Levin, The Alienated Voter. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.

construction or fluoridation of local water supplies.⁶⁴

Authoritarianism. Another personality characteristic which has received substantial attention from political scientists is authoritarianism. Following the pioneering work, The Authoritarian Personality, by T. W. Adorno and his collaborators,⁶⁵ a number of studies have shown that authoritarians (those who make high scores on an attitude scale designed to measure this factor) differ from non-authoritarians (low scorers) in distinctive ways. The authoritarian individual is a person whose attitudes show, among other things, a willingness to submit to strong authority, a desire to dominate those seen as weaker, a tendency to view other people in terms of stereotypes, and a pervasive concern for power and toughness.⁶⁶

To take one example, it seems clear that authoritarians possess a rather distinctive view of the proper content of American foreign policy. They seem to prefer an isolationist course of action (that is, they are reluctant to see the United States too entangled in world politics);⁶⁷ they favor a more nationalistic (more uncommitted) policy posture.⁶⁸ A detailed analysis by Smith and Rosen showed that people who were isolationist in their policy orientations (or low in "worldmindedness") possessed

⁶⁴ John Horton and Wayne Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism: A Study of Defeated Local Referendums." American Journal of Sociology 68:485-493, 1962.

⁶⁵ New York: Harper and Row, 1950.

⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 224-242 and passim.

⁶⁷ Bernard Fensterwald, Jr., "The Anatomy of American 'Isolationism' and Expansionism. II." Journal of Conflict Resolution 2:280-309, 1958.

⁶⁸ Daniel J. Levinson, "Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy." Journal of Conflict Resolution 1:37-47, 1957; and Charles D. Farris, "Selected Attitudes on Foreign Affairs as Correlates of Authoritarianism and Political Anomie." Journal of Politics 22:50-67, 1960.

many of the attributes of authoritarianism. Those who rejected cooperative participation in world affairs were more likely to think in stereotypes, to see threats arising from external sources, to prefer compliance to independence, to be pessimistic about the future, and to admire as an ideal to be emulated a political-military type of person in preference to an artistic-humanistic model.⁶⁹ Finally, and more specifically, authoritarians have been found more likely than non-authoritarians to oppose American trade with the Soviet Union and the establishment of classes on Russian society in American schools;⁷⁰ to expect war, presumably with the USSR, in the immediate future;⁷¹ and to opt for extreme solutions to complex international problems.⁷² This evidence provides substantial support for the proposition that "personal authoritarianism constitutes an important inner source (though by no means the only source) of the disposition toward nationalist and related ideologies."⁷³

Self-Esteem. It is well known that some people have a confident

⁶⁹Howard P. Smith and Ellen Weber Rosen, "Some Psychological Correlates of Worldmindedness and Authoritarianism." Journal of Personality 26:170-183, 1958.

⁷⁰William J. MacKinnon and Richard Centers, "Authoritarianism and Internationalism." Public Opinion Quarterly 20:621-630, 1956.

⁷¹Farris, "Selected Attitudes on Foreign Affairs as Correlates of Authoritarianism and Political Anomie."

⁷²Robert E. Lane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice." American Political Science Review 49:173-190, 1955.

⁷³Levinson, "Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy," p. 44. It must be confessed that not all researchers share Levinson's confidence in the proposition. Many point to methodological difficulties in the work of Adorno et al. and others who followed their lead which require caution in attributing meaning to authoritarianism. The best statement of the criticisms is Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality." New York: Free Press, 1954. For a convenient summary of the arguments, pro and con, see Roger Brown, Social Psychology. New York: Free Press, 1965, Ch. 12.

outlook on life; they seem unworried about their own ability to master, or at least come to terms with, the environment in which they live. Others appear to be much more insecure, less certain that life does not hold some cruel fate in store for them. This trait, alternatively known as self-esteem, self-confidence, or ego strength, appears to be related to political behavior. It appears, for instance, that individuals who feel confident of their own ability to face life's challenges successfully (that is, who possess high self-esteem) are also confident of their nation's ability to survive the difficulties inherent in the world of international relations. At least those with strong egos are less likely to choose isolationism and more inclined to accept the risks which go with active involvement with the other nations of the world.⁷⁴ Likewise, those possessed with high self-esteem, with feelings of their own competence, find it easier to deal with other people and thus to participate more frequently in the activities associated with political campaigning.⁷⁵

To summarize, we can say that personality, like culture and social structure, seems to suggest a number of relationships to political thought and deed which are well worth investigating. It remains for research to describe the precise relationships between personality and behavior; our use of a field perspective serves only to remind us that the kind of individual we may be, the kinds of personality traits we have, may influence the kinds of political behavior we exhibit.

4) Political Socialization. Earlier we defined political socialization as the learning process by which the individual acquires tendencies

⁷⁴Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientations." In James N. Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press, 1967, pp. 51-110, esp. pp. 71-79.

⁷⁵Milbrath, Political Participation, pp. 76-78.

to act. He learns the norms and orientations of the political culture and he absorbs the expectations about his behavior that the groups to which he belongs hold. Political scientists have recently begun to inquire about the socialization process and have uncovered some of its central features.⁷⁶

It should be noted, first of all, that political learning, unlike classroom education, is unplanned and often unconscious. Few parents or group members consciously seek to inculcate a specific set of political values; rather the learning takes place in informal ways. By observation, intuition, or imitation, the child or new group member comes to sense the generally accepted pattern of thought, and he realizes, probably without much effort, that he will benefit from an adjustment to this pattern. Moreover, from a broader perspective, the socialization process is the means by which societies and groups perpetuate their own existences. To survive, an organization must keep alive its goals, norms, values, and appropriate procedures. This it can do by teaching the younger generation -- its children or its new members -- how they are expected to behave and what they are expected to accomplish.

Finally, it is worth noting that socialization occurs at all phases of the life cycle. As we will see, early childhood socialization is important to an understanding of adult political activity, but this should not obscure the fact that the learning of expectations about behavior

⁷⁶On socialization in general, see Sigel (ed.), "Political Socialization"; Herbert Hyman, Political Socialization. New York: Free Press, 1959; and Richard E. Dawson, "Political Socialization." In James A. Robinson (ed.), Political Science Annual 1966. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966, pp. 1-84. See also John J. Patrick, Political Socialization of American Youth: Implications for Secondary School Social Studies. Washington, D.C.: National Council for the Social Studies, Research Bulletin No. 3, 1967.

continues throughout life. Whenever an individual changes his location on the social class ladder; accepts a new job; moves to a new neighborhood, state, or region; or in any way takes on a new role, he will encounter a new set of expectations to which he will be socialized. The fact remains, however, that most is known about childhood political learning, and our discussion will focus on that period of life. For the sake of convenience, the summary which follows will treat three basic questions about socialization: what is learned (that is, the content of socialization), who teaches (that is, the agents of socialization), and the ways learning takes place (that is, the process of socialization).⁷⁷

The Content of Socialization. Children acquire their first political beliefs at a young age. These early orientations toward politics are largely feelings devoid of much supporting factual information. Children learn, in the early years of elementary school, that the United States is a good country,⁷⁸ that its leaders, especially the President, are kind and benevolent,⁷⁹ and that the citizen is the central figure in the political process.⁸⁰ These findings seem to apply to children in the urban areas of this country; recent evidence suggests that the children of rural Appalachia may have a much less favorable orientation toward the American

⁷⁷ On these topics, see the works cited in note 76; Greenstein, Children and Politics; and Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children. Chicago: Aldine, 1967.

⁷⁸ Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, Ch. 2.

⁷⁹ Ibid., Ch. 3 and Greenstein, Children and Politics, Ch. 3.

⁸⁰ Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, Ch. 4. See also David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Image of Government." In Sigel (ed.), "Political Socialization."

political system and its leaders.⁸¹ This suggests that a relatively isolated subculture such as Appalachia may socialize its children in a distinct fashion; it may teach a quite different set of norms and evaluations. Finally, it is worth repeating what was noted earlier: children identify with one of the political parties during the grade school period. Long before they can justify their choice, they declare their allegiance to the Republicans or Democrats. And this loyalty is highly resistant to change in later life.⁸²

The Agents of Socialization. Since so much political learning occurs so early in life, it is often assumed that the family is the major teaching instrument. This seems reasonable in light of the central position of the family during childhood. We noted above the importance of primary groups in fixing political opinion. Children tend to hold political views which coincide with those of their parents; as Campbell et al. point out, three out of four voters support the same political party as their parents.⁸³ In short, since the family is the crucial center of life for young people, it is not surprising that it has profound consequences for the political portion of that life. Where the family is damaged and disrupted, its influence is correspondingly reduced.⁸⁴

⁸¹Dean Jaras, Herbert Hirsch, and Frederick J. Fleron, Jr., "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture." American Political Science Review 62:564-575, 1968.

⁸²Campbell et al., The American Voter, Ch. 7; Greenstein, Children and Politics, Ch. 4; and Robert D. Hess and David Easton, "The Child's Changing Image of the President." Public Opinion Quarterly 24:632-644, 1960.

⁸³Campbell et al., The American Voter, pp. 146-149. On the general correspondence of opinion between parent and child, see Hyman, Political Socialization, Ch. 4; and Lane, Political Life, pp. 204-208.

⁸⁴Dawson, "Political Socialization," pp. 44-45; and McClosky and Dahlgren, "Primary Group Influence on Party Loyalty."

Recent research, however, has challenged the primacy of the family as the central socializing agent. Hess and Torney, while acknowledging that children learn partisan preference at home, argue that the elementary school is a more important socializer than is usually recognized.⁸⁵ Much of what the child learns regarding the operation of the political system he acquires from the school. Similarly, among high school students there is a lessened agreement between parent and offspring on such specific political issues as the federal government's role in promoting racial integration of schools.⁸⁶ It thus may be that the family is the prime source of general feelings of loyalty to nation and attachment to party, while on more concrete questions of policy and procedure the schools are a more salient source of political learning. The school may provide other opportunities not available in the family. For instance, there is evidence suggesting that those to whom the school presents the opportunity for discussion, for a meaningful exchange of views, and the right to challenge the views of those in authority develop a greater sense of political competence -- an ability to function effectively in politics -- which carries over into adult life.⁸⁷

Nor are other groups without influence on political learning, though their impact seems more to reinforce beliefs already held than to create new ones. We have already seen how individuals tend to live in an environment in which their primary and peer group associates share their political

⁸⁵Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, Ch. 5.

⁸⁶M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, "The Transmission of Political Values From Parent to Child." American Political Science Review 62: 169-184, 1968.

⁸⁷Dawson, "Political Socialization," pp. 49-50.

beliefs. The members of these groups tend to have similar life-styles and thus to possess similar outlooks. And where there is conflict between a primary group and a more distant categoric group, the former usually prevails. These secondary societal groups serve as reference points, places to look for guidance, rather than as immediate socializing agents.⁸⁸ Where change in accepted political belief does occur, the individual is most likely to alter his stand in response to personal, face-to-face contacts, though these influences may arise initially from distant secondary associations. That is, primary groups seem to mediate between secondary groups and the individual. Labor union families will teach the values, norms, and orientations which characterize the categoric group, union member, and so on. Children tend to develop orientations toward secondary groups and beliefs about politics which are consistent with one another. Where inconsistencies or cross-pressures do occur, as we have seen, the individual is likely to be less stable in his outlook, more likely to withdraw and become apathetic, or -- if a choice becomes necessary -- to decide in favor of the more immediate group.

Finally, since there has been much discussion in recent years about the role of the mass media, a word seems in order about the effects of the media as agents of political socialization. The available evidence suggests that the modern means of mass communication are neither the boon nor the threat that some analysts have asserted. In truth, the media serve a supportive not a creative function; because of the operation of a set of psychological processes, generally known as selective perception,

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 64.

the influence of the media in general is that of a reinforcer.⁸⁹ Individuals tend to expose themselves only selectively to media messages. They choose to "tune in" to those messages which support views they currently hold. Thus, a committed Democrat will watch his candidate on television or follow his candidate's campaign as reported in the press, but he is unlikely to pay attention to the campaign efforts of the opposition. Likewise, where an individual is exposed to both sides of an issue, he will often perceive only those facets of the message which are compatible with his own views, or, if made aware of both positions, after the passage of time, he will remember only what is in accord with his position (that is, he will retain selectively). In short, citizens select only what they want to attend to from the many messages of the mass media.

The Process of Socialization. Less is known about the processes by which political learning takes place. It does appear that age relates to the form of socialization. Children learn quickly but unevenly throughout the elementary school years, emerging by the eighth grade with a rather fully learned set of basic orientations.⁹⁰ Persons, the President especially, provide the first points of contact with politics; knowledge of the institutions of government comes later. Early learning seems to reflect feelings about parents and the home; only later does the child differentiate between the authority of parents and of the President or between

⁸⁹On the effects of the media, see Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication. New York: Free Press, esp. Chs. 1-5, 1960. See David O. Sears and Jonathon L. Freedman, "Selective Exposure to Information: A Critical Review." Public Opinion Quarterly 31:194-213, 1967, for a discussion of the selective exposure phenomenon.

⁹⁰Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, pp. 220-221.

the power of rules at home and laws in the nation.⁹¹ Finally, the socialization process is mediated by some sociological factors. The process differs among the sexes; girls, for instance, see politics more in personal terms, and more in narrow, immediate terms than do boys.⁹² Intelligence makes a difference as well; "children of high intelligence are more active, more likely to discuss political matters, more interested in current events; they have sense of efficacy and a greater sense of the importance of voting and citizen participation."⁹³

To conclude our treatment of the behavior of American citizens, we may suggest that the field perspective requires that we look at four broad classes of potentially relevant political factors -- culture, social structure, personality, and socialization -- in any search for the determinants of behavior. The review presented here leads to the conclusion that each category contains variables which are related to individual activity. Generalizations, and any theories which link them, it seems probable, will include factors from more than one class. Which relationships will actually comprise what theories we cannot now say; all we can do at present is to argue that in the search for an understanding of political life, we can ill afford to ignore any of the sets of elements to which the field approach directs us.

IV. The Behavior of Political Leaders.

If the categories of the field approach suggest where to look for possible determinants of citizen behavior, there is no reason to believe

⁹¹Ibid.

⁹²Greenstein, Children and Politics, Ch. 6.

⁹³Hess and Torney, The Development of Political Attitudes in Children, pp. 223-224.

that they should not be just as helpful in any effort to grapple with the influences on the behavior of political leaders. Leaders in American society come in many shapes, sizes, and varieties, and we cannot here do more than indicate, with a few examples, how the field perspective can help to structure our search for the causes of leadership behavior. Put another way, we seek to understand the roles, and the role behavior, of American political leaders. The present discussion will focus on formal and informal leaders.

1) Formal Leaders. Formal leaders, as used here, are those who occupy positions, established constitutionally or by statute, in the formal governmental structure. The category includes legislators, executives, bureaucrats, and judges. Such officials may be elected, such as the President and the members of Congress, or appointed as in the cases of the Secretary of Defense and a number of judicial officers. Formal leaders, of course, are found at the national, state, and local levels of government. The important point is that these roles, wherever found and however constituted, bear the imprint of cultural, social, psychological, and socialization forces, and the job of the political analyst is to establish which factors, in what sorts of situations, are related to the role behavior of different sorts of leaders. In what follows we will use the role of member of Congress to illustrate the form that such analysis might take;⁹⁴ it should be remembered, however, that the same treatment is perfectly appropriate for other formal leadership roles.

Culture. First, we need to note that the legislative role is a complex

⁹⁴The following treatment of the Congressional role draws heavily on Leroy N. Rieselbach, "Congress as a Political System." In Rieselbach (ed.), The Congressional System: Notes and Readings. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, forthcoming, 1970.

Representatives as well.⁹⁶ Among other Senatorial norms, Matthews notes the rule of "apprenticeship," by which junior legislators are expected to learn their trade in relative obscurity. The freshman Senator receives the least desirable committee assignments, and is expected to put in more than his share of time in the dull task of presiding over the Senate. He must follow the old adage of being seen but not heard in order "to listen and to learn." He is expected to show proper deference to his seniors in the Senate. Similarly, the new Senator will be taught the rule of legislative work, i.e., that it is appropriate to spend one's time working at the legislative tasks, in committee and elsewhere, out of the public eye. In the language of the Senate, the newcomer must learn to "be a workhorse, not a showhorse." Along these same lines, the congressman is to become a specialist, to develop sufficient expertise on some topic -- usually that dealt with by the committee on which he serves -- that he may be relied on to give sound advice. In return, he will be expected to defer to other experts in those areas in which he does not specialize. There are other norms, but these examples should be sufficient to indicate the kind of chamber-wide expectations which exist in Congress. What is more, those who conform to these folkways obtain rewards; they become members of the informal "inner club" in the Senate, and, in Matthews' view, are more effective legislators in that they seem to get more of the bills in which they are interested passed than do nonconformists.

Individual committees, as well as full chambers, have folkways, and

⁹⁶This paragraph is drawn from Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960, Ch. 5. Cf. also William S. White, Citadel. New York: Harper, 1956. For a dissenting view on the importance of norms, see Nelson W. Poleby, Congress and the Presidency. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964, pp. 32-41.

the two sets may pose difficult choices or role conflicts for legislators. For instance, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives has a set of norms which includes the expectation that committee members will act as the guardian of the Federal Treasury.⁹⁷ The Treasury is protected by the Committee cutting as many budget estimates submitted to it as it possibly can. At the same time, however, the full chamber expects that the programs it has authorized will receive funds from the Appropriations Committee. The Committee resolves this dilemma of a desire to cut budgets coupled with the expectation that it will support programs by pursuing a mixed strategy. The Committee most often appropriates less than is requested, but more than the program received in the previous fiscal year. That is, the program gets more money than it had previously, but less than those who run it claim is necessary. Here, then, is a clear-cut case in which the behavior of the Committee's members is influenced by the expectations of the full House and, at the same time, by those of the Committee itself.

To complete the picture of the importance of cultural expectations for an understanding of Congressional behavior, we may briefly note some other norms to which a legislator is exposed. He is a member of a political party, and there is the expectation that he will support the party whenever possible. Similarly, he will be expected to back the President, when they are of the same party, whenever he can in the interest of creating a "record" on which both can run at a subsequent election. Finally, the congressman acts in the shadow of the judiciary, especially the Supreme

⁹⁷ See Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration." American Political Science Review 56:310-324, 1962; and The Power of the Purse. Boston: Little, Brown, 1966.

Court, which has the authority to pass on the constitutionality of legislative actions.⁹⁸ Even these few examples should suffice to indicate the range of cultural norms, and the extent of inconsistency or conflict among them, which a congressman confronts in his efforts to play his legislative role.

Social Structure. Sociological forces are equally relevant to performance of the role of legislator, and influence behavior in a number of ways. There are, first of all, the formal rules of Congress which define what a lawmaker can do and how he must go about doing it. The rules define what a legislator must overcome to get legislation passed. He, and those who support him, must move a bill through a series of steps from introduction, through the committees, across the floor, probably through a joint House-Senate conference committee, and finally on to the President for his signature. Each step in this process is governed by the rules of the chamber. While this is not the place to discuss these rules,⁹⁹ it is important to recognize that the rules do create a social structure (or define the legislative institution) which controls in a formal fashion what the individual legislator can and cannot do.

Social structure in the broader sense is also important in understanding Congressional behavior. Each legislator brings with him to Washington a set of social relationships established prior to the start of his

⁹⁸This is an obviously superficial statement of a small sample of the points that could be made to illustrate the expectation patterns within which Congress operates. For more detail, consult any of the major texts on the legislative process. The best of these are William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogal, The American Legislative Process. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968; and Malcolm E. Jewell and Samuel C. Patterson, The Legislative Process in the United States. New York: Random House, 1966.

⁹⁹On the rules, see Lewis A. Froman, Jr., The Congressional Process. Boston: Little, Brown, 1967.

legislative service; he belongs to a political party, a variety of primary and secondary groups, and he has undergone an extensive process of socialization. Like any citizen, he possesses a set of political beliefs stemming in part from his position in society, and it is not reasonable to expect that he will forget or renounce all that he believes when he is elected to Congress and make up his mind anew on all the issues which he faces as a lawmaker. These beliefs will influence what he does in Congress. To take one example, they seem to help determine how he will vote on foreign policy legislation. Legislators of both parties who are Catholics are more inclined than their Protestant colleagues to support foreign aid legislation on the floor of the House of Representatives. Similarly, those who worked in business occupations prior to coming to Congress are more, and those with farm backgrounds less, favorable to foreign aid bills.¹⁰⁰

Finally, social structure has an indirect influence on the behavior of Senators and Representatives through social differences in the districts congressmen represent. There are 435 members of the House of Representatives, and they come from constituencies which differ greatly in social terms; some are urban, some rural; others vary in the degree to which they are rich or poor, northern or southern, well or poorly educated. These differences are reflected in differences in voting behavior. Returning to the example of foreign aid, we find that in recent years, districts populated by the financially better off, urban residents, located in the North, and especially in the Northeast, have elected congressmen who tend to vote most often for foreign aid. And this is true within each

¹⁰⁰Leroy N. Rieselbach, The Roots of Isolationism. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1967, Ch. 3.

of the political parties.¹⁰¹ In short, whether one talks about social structure in the narrow terms of Congress itself or in the broader perspective of the larger society, it appears that this structure relates to the performance of the legislative role.

Personality. Almost nothing is known about the influence of personality on legislative role-playing, largely because congressmen have not been available for assessment of their personalities. All that can be said is that there is no logical reason why personality may not be related to legislative behavior in ways similar to the fashion in which we have seen that it is related to word and deed among citizens. To cite one case, in 1946 the Legislative Organization Act which Congress passed created a Senate Committee on Government Operations which, in turn, established a Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Little was heard of the subcommittee until, in the wake of the 1950 elections, the junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph R. McCarthy, acceded to the chairmanship. Nothing else changed, the expectations about the subcommittee, its rules, all the objective circumstances were unaltered, yet under McCarthy's leadership the subcommittee became deeply involved in American politics to an unexpected extent. When the Senate censured McCarthy -- largely because he violated the cultural norms, not because of his anti-Communist beliefs -- and his power waned, the subcommittee reverted to the virtual anonymity which had characterized its pre-McCarthy existence, leaving as its legacy a new word -- McCarthyism -- for the American political vocabulary. In sum, the activities of the McCarthy Committee seem to have been the result of the personality of its chairman -- his desires, ambitions, whims, or other attributes -- more than any other factors. If this is true in this instance, it is certainly

¹⁰¹Ibid., Ch. 5.

possible that research might uncover other ways in which personality is related to legislative behavior.

Socialization. Much has already been said about the ways in which socialization appears to influence the way congressmen go about their jobs. Here we need only recapitulate briefly. Many of the opinions about government and politics which lawmakers bring with them to legislative service are learned through the socialization process in the same way as similar beliefs are learned by those who never seek elective office. Thus all that was said about socialization in the previous section of this paper is relevant here. Coming to Congress at a relatively advanced age, the freshman legislator must undergo socialization to the norms of his chamber as well. He must learn what others -- his constituents, party, colleagues, and those in the other branches of government -- expect him to do. In the Senate, newcomers who ignore the folkways are met with hostility and reduced prospects for acceptance and eventual influence.¹⁰² In brief, legislators have been, and continue to be, exposed to socializing experiences which shape how they will act out their legislative roles.

This discussion of the Congressional role should make clear that there is more to the passage of legislation than a simple recitation of the steps by which "a bill becomes a law" would indicate. Such a listing is limited to the formal, structural aspects of the process. As we have suggested, there are other factors -- culture, personality, and socialization -- which influence the behavior of congressmen. While a bill must be introduced, pass through the committee process, undergo debate and amendment on the floor -- and do so in the House and the Senate -- how individual

¹⁰² Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World, Ch. 5.

law-makers respond to their role in this process reflects their characteristics. The formal rules limit to an extent what they can do, but there remains for the legislators substantial room for choice in what they say, what amendments they introduce, how they vote, and so on -- all of which may be shaped by their social backgrounds, their personalities, and the extent to which they accept (or reject) the norms of the chamber. In short, knowing the process by which legislation is enacted tells only part of the story; we need to understand the influences on the ways in which individual congressmen operate within the rules as well before we can speak with confidence about the legislative process.

To summarize: formal leadership roles, as the discussion of the role of congressmen illustrates, are complex ones, involving a number of different aspects. The behavioral scientist seeks to discover the causes, or correlates, of the various behaviors which role-occupants perform. On the face of it, it appears that a full understanding of such behavior is unlikely to emerge without consideration of the four classes of factors -- cultural, social, psychological, and socialization -- which the field perspective singles out for attention.¹⁰³ Each of these sets of factors suggest foci for investigation of other formal leaders. Research on the President, bureaucrats, judges, state and local officials, among others,

¹⁰³ Space limitations preclude a full treatment of Congress and, of course, more than passing mention of other leadership roles. Some books worth examining on other formal roles include, on the Presidency, Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power. New York: Wiley, 1960; Clinton Rossiter, The American Presidency. Rev. ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1960; and Louis W. Koenig, The Chief Executive. Rev. ed., New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968. On the courts, see Glendon Schubert, Constitutional Politics, Part I. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960; John R. Schmidhauser, "The Justices of the Supreme Court: A Collective Portrait." Midwest Journal of Political Science 3:1-49, 1959; and Stuart S. Nagel, "Political Party Affiliation and Judges' Decisions." American Political Science Review 55:843-850, 1961.

will profit from analysis of a sort similar to that suggested in our discussion of congressmen. Considerations of space, not of importance, led to the use of the legislative example to illustrate the field approach; we contend that our understanding of other leadership roles could be enhanced by the use of the field point of view.

2) Informal Leaders. Precisely the same approach can be applied to a study of informal leaders in American life. It is a truism to say that power and influence are unequally divided in this country. Those who have responsibility for making political decisions -- the formal leaders -- must be given authority to carry out those decisions. But among those without formal positions in government, there is also an unequal dispersion of influence. Some citizens are better able than others to make their voices heard in the places where decisions are made. They are able to speak to, and for, large numbers of people and to assert authority on their behalf. It is these men and women who, without formal positions, can nonetheless influence, directly or indirectly, what those with legal power to act do who are the informal leaders in our society.

Informal leaders differ considerably in the numbers of people they can influence and the number of issues over which they can exert their influence. We may mention, to begin, those who have been designated as "opinion leaders." These individuals, found in all walks of life, are individuals to whom a fairly small number of others turn for guidance and information. The opinion leaders are much more attuned to the mass media than their associates and they pass on what they see and hear to the latter. Thus is established a "two step flow of communication" from

media to opinion leader to opinion follower.¹⁰⁴ Examples of opinion leaders would include the local minister or priest to whom parishioners turn for political advice, the shop steward who is influential with fellow-employees in his union, the corporate executive who relays messages to his neighbors in suburbia, or the office worker who passes on his views to others gathered around the water-cooler.

Opinion leaders tend, in sociological terms, to be much like those to whom they transmit their views. They have similar educational, occupational, income, and other attainments to their peers, but are distinguished from them in a psychological sense by their greater interest in and involvement with politics, and seemingly by their willingness to express themselves on political topics. In addition they are the sort who inspire confidence in and thus the acceptance of their sentiments by their followers. And, though there is no data on the point, it seems highly likely that opinions are passed on in a way in keeping with group culture.

Looking at the transmitting rather than the receiving end of the communications process reveals another set of informal leaders, those whom Rosenau has designated "opinion-makers."¹⁰⁵ Opinion-makers are individuals who, because of their positions in important organizations or because of their accomplishments, are called upon to circulate their views via the mass media to large audiences of people unknown to them personally. Thus

¹⁰⁴ On opinion leaders and the two-step flow, see Paul F. Lazarsfeld et al., The People's Choice, 2nd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 1948; Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence. New York: Free Press, 1955; and Elihu Katz, "The Two-Step Flow of Communication: An Up-to-Date Report on an Hypothesis." Public Opinion Quarterly 21:61-78, 1957.

¹⁰⁵ James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. New York: Random House, 1961; and National Leadership and Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

corporation executives, influential journalists, movie stars, athletes, and other well-known persons often give speeches, write articles, or make endorsements expressing opinions which will be heard, not necessarily because of what is said, but more likely because of who says them. The respect that such individuals command insures a hearing for their views, and the media will pick up these pronouncements and disseminate them widely. Opinion-makers may exert influence on one or many issues of a national or local variety, but within their range of expertise their voices will be heard and perhaps heeded. The influence of opinion-makers may be direct, as when a governmental official takes their views into account in making decisions, or indirect, as when their opinions are accepted by large numbers of citizens who in turn redirect them toward decision-makers.

Rosenau investigated one group of opinion-makers, those convened in the 1958 White House "Conference on Foreign Aspects of U.S. National Security." The Conference was an attempt to use the opinion-makers to mobilize support for the foreign aid program; the leaders were briefed on the program and it was hoped that they would use their access to the communications media to spread the word more widely, thus generating favorable sentiment toward the program. The participants in the conference tended to be professionals (corporate executives, university presidents, officers of voluntary associations, publishers and journalists, members of Congress) of a particular social character. The typical conferee was "a middle-aged, white, Protestant, upper-class male from the Eastern Seaboard, who has had extensive education and who is likely to be a businessman while at the same time holding a variety of unremunerated posts in

outside organizations."¹⁰⁶ The conferees did possess access to channels of communications and they were, on the whole, concerned about international affairs and favorably disposed toward the idea of foreign aid. Thus there was brought together in Washington a group that had the potential to act as opinion-makers; that many of them did not do so in this instance does not vitiate the point that there exist people who have the ability to influence the views of a wide range of others via the media of mass communications.

A third area in which there has been investigation of the role of informal leaders is the nature of "community power structure." The central questions here are which citizens of the local community have the power or influence to make their voices heard when local decisions are made, and over what range of decisions are they important. Without attempting to delve into the thorny methodological controversies which continue to rage with respect to the issue of community power, it is clear that two major answers to the question of who governs local communities have been advanced: the "elitist" and the "pluralist." The elitist position, in essence, argues that a small group -- the elite -- has sufficient influence to impose its choices on the much larger, but relatively powerless, mass of the citizens.¹⁰⁷ Members of the elite are drawn disproportionately from the upper classes; they hold prestige jobs, are financially well-off,

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 130.

¹⁰⁷ The classic statement of the elitist view is C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 1956, esp. Ch. 1. See also Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953. For a critique of this view, see Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model." American Political Science Review 52:463-469, 1958; and Raymond A. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of 'Community Power'." American Sociological Review 25:636-644, 1960.

are better educated, and have the reputation of being important people. These resources, so the elitist view holds, enable them to dominate the local decision-making process across a wide variety of different issues. Where the elite chooses to act, the elite is very likely to prevail.

On the other hand, while acknowledging that power and other resources are unequally divided in any community, the pluralist denies that any single elite is likely to dominate in all areas of decision-making. Rather there tend to be different groups exercising great influence on different topics. Thus, there are plural or multiple centers of power, no one of which can do much outside its own sphere of competence. For instance, in a study of New Haven, Connecticut, Dahl examined decisions in three areas: education, urban renewal, and political party nominations.¹⁰⁸ He found that there were identifiable groups of leaders in each issue-area, but there was virtually no overlap among these leaders. Only 1.5 percent of those involved were influential in all three areas.¹⁰⁹

It may be, of course, that both schools of thought are correct; some cities may be elite dominated, others may be ruled by pluralistic centers or authority. And variations in local political culture may account for the differing leadership patterns. That is, in some communities the norms and expectations may be such that only a few citizens assume leadership roles and the remainder defer to them. In other localities, there may be norms, leading to wider participation and a division of labor, which result in a more pluralistic pattern. This sort of speculation, of course, needs to be checked through specific empirical research efforts. Research on the personality factors which may lead individuals to seek influence on

¹⁰⁸Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 175.

the local level is also needed; little or nothing is known about any differences in character between influentials and others with similar social positions who choose to refrain from political activism. Nor is data available on the socialization of community leaders, though if the elite formulation is correct we may assume that as children the budding leaders learned the values of the upper classes and also that these same beliefs were reinforced in adult life through group associations.

As another example of the sorts of informal leadership which exist in America, and one about which a good deal has been written, we may look at the role of lobbyist or pressure group representative. The interest group is frequently portrayed as the villain on the American political stage, at worst buying and selling legislative votes, at best bullying and browbeating law-makers with threats of electoral sanctions.¹¹⁰ The call is repeatedly sounded for new legislation regulating the lobbyists in order to protect congressmen from interest group pressure. Recently, however, social science researchers have begun to examine the lobbying process more closely and their efforts have compelled a reexamination of some of the beliefs about the role of the interest group.

To begin with, the lobbyist works under a set of cultural norms which govern his relationship with the legislators, whom he seeks to influence, and the group for whom he works and on whose behalf he seeks to exercise

¹¹⁰On interest (or pressure) groups, see David B. Truman, The Governmental Process. New York: Knopf, 1951; Harmon Zeigler, Interest Groups in American Society. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964; H. R. Mahood (ed.), Pressure Groups in American Politics. New York: Scribner's, 1967; and Abraham Holtzman, Interest Groups and Lobbying. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

his influence.¹¹¹ In the association between the lobbyist and legislator, the upper hand belongs to the latter. The law-maker has the authority to influence governmental decisions and the lobbyist seeks to get him to use that authority in ways which advance the interest group's cause. In order to affect how this authority is used, the group representative must have access to the legislator,¹¹² that is, he must be able to get the ear of the congressman and persuade him of the merits of his group's position. Since, in reality, he has few if any sanctions to impose on the law-maker, access is crucial, and it is retained only on the suffrance of the legislator. Conduct which is in some way offensive will deny the lobbyist the access he needs so badly.

To put it another way, there exists a set of norms and expectations about the lobbyist role (the cultural element in that role) which if ignored will lead to a loss of access and a greatly reduced potential for influence. The lobbyist, when asked, asserts that his chief goal is to build a "trusting relationship" with the member of Congress.¹¹³ The lobbyist seeks to earn the respect of law-makers in a number of ways; he calls on the legislator in person, but only when it is essential to do so; to impose on the representative's valuable time too often is to risk engendering ill-will. These conversations with legislators are felt to be most effective when the lobbyist is pleasant, uses the "soft sell," is well versed on his topic, can present research results which are valuable

¹¹¹Much of what follows is drawn from Lester W. Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963; and Raymond A. Bauer et al., American Business and Public Policy, Part IV. New York: Atherton, 1963.

¹¹²Truman, The Governmental Process, pp. 264-270 discusses the concept of access.

¹¹³On the points, see Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists, Ch. 11.

in their own right, and leaves behind a brief, written statement of his point of view.

Such contacts are important to the law-maker as well as to the lobbyist. The Senator or Representative will often use an interest group; far from being the unwilling objects of "pressure," the member of Congress often initiates contact with lobbies and recruits their aid for his legislative goals. Given a desperate need for reliable information, the congressman may lean heavily on interest group research and information services. For his part, the lobbyist can earn the legislator's good will, trust, and hopefully his support by providing reliable data; should his efforts prove unreliable he would risk loss of access. In short, the ability to deny access permits the legislator to enforce the norms of his relationships with interest group representatives.

The lobbyist must deal with his employer -- the pressure group and its members -- as well. The latter hold expectations about what the former will accomplish but frequently do not provide him the resources to allow the attainment of their goals. Bauer and his associates discovered that lobbyists seeking to influence foreign trade legislation tended to be understaffed, under-financed, and short of knowledge and time.¹¹⁴ Moreover, much effort is often expended to convince the employers that a good job is being done; in circumstances of limited resources this effort may well detract from the ability to actually achieve the group's goals. The lobbyist, then, must conform to the normative expectations of both those who hire him and those whom he seeks to influence. These expectations go far to define the role of lobbyist.

Sociological factors are as relevant as cultural ones to any definition

¹¹⁴ Bauer et al., American Business and Public Policy, Ch. 23.

of the lobbyist role. Lobbyists, like other men and women, are influenced in their work by the social characteristics they acquire prior to employment by an interest group. Milbrath found that they came in the main from legal, governmental, research, and associational backgrounds.¹¹⁵ More than half of those he interviewed had not been active in politics; like many other upper-middle class, professional people, the bulk of the lobbyists chose their jobs in order to advance their own careers rather than for ideological or philosophical reasons. Their outlooks, however, surely must be colored to some degree by the positions in the social structure they have occupied in the past and hope to occupy in the future.

With respect to personality, lobbyists are only slightly different from other persons of comparable backgrounds who do similar professional work.¹¹⁶ Interest group representatives tend to have traits of dominance (i.e., the need to influence the course of events, to exert leadership) and self-confidence to a greater degree than other professional men. And they tend to be slightly less sociable -- surprisingly so, since the ability to deal effectively with other people would seem a prime requisite for lobby work -- and less efficient intellectually than comparable others. This is not to say that the lobbyists did not have the sorts of personality which would seem to facilitate their activities -- in fact, on the whole they can be characterized as "honest, agreeable, capable, well-informed, gregarious, manipulative, communicative, and persistent"¹¹⁷ -- but only that they are quite similar to professionals in other, unrelated

¹¹⁵ Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists, Chs. 4-5.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 97-108.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 98.

occupations. These traits lead lobbyists, like others of comparable training and interests, to seek esteem and recognition; rather than deriving satisfaction from skulking around in the corridors, they achieve pleasure from the knowledge that others accept them as competent professional persons.

It seems reasonable to assume that socialization also helps shape the lobbyist role. Lobbyists, no less than the occupants of other roles, carry with them the beliefs, values, and expectations taught to them in childhood. Speculation would suggest that these orientations would be like those of others from upper class backgrounds. Inevitably, there must be some learning which accompanies initiation into the role of group representative, that is, by observation or trial and error, the new lobbyist learns how to deal with legislators, how to earn their respect, and how to keep the lines of communication to law-makers open. In short, the same sorts of factor seem to define the lobbyist role as appear to be relevant for understanding other roles.

Finally, we may look briefly at another group of informal leaders, those who man the key posts in the political party organizations. While some party leaders hold formal positions as mayors or legislators, the great bulk of those who work for the parties -- as opposed to those voters who simply cast their ballots for their party's candidates -- perform informal roles. We refer here to those who serve as precinct or ward leaders or as campaign workers. In short, we consider as party leaders those citizens who are the active, participating party functionaries.

There can be little doubt that these party activists are influenced by a system of cultural norms. Their superiors in the party hierarchy will expect them to "get out the vote" on election day, to support the nominees of the organization, and to perform whatever services the party may ask of

them. The cultural patterns will in all likelihood differ from location to location; Mayor Richard Daley's Chicago Democratic "machine" is not the same as the Democratic organizations in Los Angeles or Detroit. But whatever the place, the party operations will be better understood if we examine the expectations under which the party leaders perform their tasks.¹¹⁸

Social structure needs to be considered as well. Local election laws will impose some limitations on the activities available to party leaders; some forms of behavior will be required of them, others will be forbidden. The activists' behavior will be conditioned further by the group affiliations they possess. Those involved in party work tend to come from families with a history of political participation and they tend also to possess above average social status. Thus to a great extent party actives have both the motivation, acquired from their primary group memberships, and the educational and financial resources commensurate within high social standing, to function effectively on behalf of the party organization.¹¹⁹

This is more true, in Detroit at least, of Republicans than of Democrats.¹²⁰ Moreover, among the high status party activists, lawyers are vastly overrepresented by comparison to their proportion within the total population.¹²¹ Party leaders, then, are not necessarily a good cross-

¹¹⁸ On political parties, see among others, V. O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups, 5th ed. New York: Crowell, 1964; Samuel I. Eldersveld, Political Parties. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964; and Frank J. Sorauf, Party Politics in America. Boston: Little, Brown, 1968.

¹¹⁹ Sorauf, Party Politics in America, pp. 92-96.

¹²⁰ Eldersveld, Political Parties, p. 52.

¹²¹ See among the many works on lawyers and politics, Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964.

section of the American electorate, and their backgrounds may incline them to behave in atypical ways; at the very least, the beliefs which they have learned from the groups to which they belong must be considered in any effort to explain how they do behave.

With respect to personal attributes, as with other informal leadership categories, little is known about the personalities of party leaders. A catalogue of motivations for the assertion of leadership is possible, however. Some individuals devote their energies to party leadership to acquire power, the ability to influence the course of events; this can be accomplished, among other ways, through the use of patronage, dispensing rewards to entice the recipients to follow the leaders' desires. Others get involved in order to gain material rewards -- money, jobs, contracts, and publicity -- for themselves. Still others obtain psychological rewards from participation; they get prestige, social acceptance, friendship, and other personal satisfactions from commitment to the cause of a party.¹²² Beyond these motivating forces, personality may have other effects. For instance, the authoritarian individual, given his feelings about authority, is less likely to find party leadership an attractive avocation. But when he does participate, his behavior is predictable: he emphasizes party discipline and organization and his position in the organization, he participates in fewer non-party groups than does his less authoritarian party colleague, and he tends to minimize the role of ideology in party activity.¹²³ Thus, while much additional research is required, it seems safe to suggest that personality may well be related to the behavior of party activists.

¹²² See Sorauf, Party Politics in America, pp. 82-90, on these points.

¹²³ Louise Harred, "Authoritarian Attitudes and Party Activity." Public Opinion Quarterly 25:393-399, 1961.

Finally, socializing experiences would also seem relevant. We have already noted that party leaders tend to be the children of politically involved parents; their socialization, thus, seems to teach them the value of party activity. We can also probably assume that other cultural and group norms incline some individuals to engage in political affairs. And it seems certain that new recruits learn, through observation and experience, the ways in which it is appropriate for party men to act. In sum, as with other informal leadership roles, party activists are influenced by a variety of factors, all of which need to be considered in any thorough analysis of the political parties and their leadership.

This cursory review of the positions of opinion leader, opinion-maker, community influential, group representative, and party leader suggests that we do not know even as much about these informal leadership roles as we have learned about the formal offices of government. In both areas much remains to be discovered, and the behavioral scientist works at exploring the heretofore uncharted aspects of political roles and role behavior. What has been suggested here is merely that the field perspective highlights a number of questions which must be asked if we are to maximize the confidence in the findings which research generates: what cultural norms and expectations influence behavior? How does an individual's position in the social structure shape his behavior? In what ways is personality reflected in behavior? In what ways does the socialization process inculcate the beliefs and values and shape the personality traits which, in turn, find reflection in political behavior? It is the answers to these questions which, from the point of view of the field orientation, should enhance our understanding of the realities of political life.

V. A Concluding Note.

In this essay, the effort has been made to set out briefly the main

characteristics of the movement known as the behavioral approach and to suggest why, in their concern with the real world, the behaviorists believe they have something to add to our store of political knowledge. Reduced to the barest minimum, the following general conclusions, each of which we have discussed in the preceding pages, have emerged.

1) The behavioral political scientist, emulating the methods and procedures of natural science to the greatest possible extent, seeks in the long run to develop theories which will permit him to explain and predict political phenomena and in the short run to verify generalizations linking variables to one another, generalizations which may themselves eventually be linked in theories.

2) The field approach, as one possible scheme for thinking about political behavior, emphasizes the potential relevance of four classes of factors -- cultural, social, psychological, and socialization variables -- for an understanding of how and why people behave and act as they do in political matters.

3) These categories of variables are potentially relevant for understanding the roles of citizen, formal leader, informal leader, as well as other forms of political involvement.

We have offered here no definitive treatment of any of these topics; the purpose has been only to illustrate how the behaviorist attacks his research problems and the form that some of his results take. When extended to wider ranges of problems and when carried out still more scientifically, behavioral research may well (and the behavioral scientist believes it surely will) enhance our ability to understand politics and, by expansion, to build a better society on the foundation of that understanding.