Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.4.	Is Israeli bureaucracy a problem for most returning students?			
65/	1	yes	57.6	1114
	0	NA	42.4	820
Q.4.	Is Israeli bureaucracy a problem for you?			
66/	1	yes	48.8	943
	0	NA	51.2	991
Q.4.	Is finding interesting work a problem for most returning students?			
67/	1	yes	44.0	851
	0	NA	56.0	1083
Q.4.	Is finding interesting work a problem for you?			
68/	1	yes	52.3	1012
	0	NA	47.7	922
Q.4.	Is Israeli inefficiency a problem for most returning students?			
69/	1	yes	46.2	893
	0	NA	53.9	1041
Q.4.	Is Israeli inefficiency a problem for you?			
70/	1	yes	36.6	708
	0	NA	63.4	1226
Q.4.	Is financing return transportation a problem for most returning students?			
71/	1	yes	31.9	617
	0	NA	68.1	1317
Q.4.	Is financing return transportation a problem for you?			
72/	1	yes	32.4	627
	0	NA	67.5	1305
Q.4.	Is military reserve commitment a problem for most returning students and for you?			
73/	1	for most	14.4	278
	2	for me	6.6	127
	3	for most and for me	3.3	63
	0	NA	75.8	1464

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve household and car duty allowance?			
5/	1	yes	32.6	630
	0	NA	67.4	1304
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get household and car duty allowance?			
6/	1	yes	67.4	1304
	0	NA	32.6	630
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve a loan for return transportation?			
7/	1	yes	19.1	370
	0	NA	80.9	1564
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get a loan for return transportation?			
8/	1	yes	42.8	828
	0	NA	57.2	1106
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve a grant for return transportation?			
9/	1	yes	8.8	171
	0	NA	91.2	1763
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get a grant for return transportation?			
10/	1	yes	41.9	810
	0	NA	58.1	1124
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve govt. assistance to find a suitable job?			
11/	1	yes	31.7	614
	0	NA	68.2	1320
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get govt. assistance to find a suitable job?			
12/	1	yes	47.4	917
	0	NA	52.6	1017
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve salary supplement?			
13/	1	yes	6.0	117
	0	NA	93.9	1817

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get salary supplement?			
14/	1	yes	18.2	352
	0	NA	81.7	1581
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve mortgages with low interest?			
15/	1	yes	17.0	330
	0	NA	82.9	1604
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get mortgages with low interest?			
16/	1	yes	51.2	991
	0	NA	48.8	943
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve a business or work loan?			
17/	1	yes	5.1	98
	0	NA	94.9	1836
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get a business or work loan?			
18/	1	yes	21.9	424
	0	NA	78.0	1510
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve exemption from military obligations for one year?			
19/	1	yes	7.3	142
	0	NA	92.7	1792
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get exemption from military obligations for one year?			
20/	1	yes	25.0	483
	0	NA	75.0	1451
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve a guaranteed income for 6 mo. after your return to Israel?			
21/	1	yes	8.9	172
	0	NA	91.1	1762
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get a guaranteed income for 6 mo. after your return to Israel?			
22/	1	yes	28.2	545
	0	NA	71.8	1389

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve a loan for initial adjustment expenses?			
23/	1	yes	9.1	176
	0	NA	90.0	1758
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get a loan for initial adjustment expenses?			
24/	1	yes	26.8	519
	0	NA	73.1	1415
Q.5.	As a returning student do you feel you deserve any other type of assistance?			
25/	1	yes	12.6	244
	0	NA	87.4	1686
Q.5.	As a returning student would you like to get any other type of assistance?			
26/		Always punch zero.		
Q.6.	What do you estimate to be the percent of Israelis who decided not to return to Israel?			
27-28/	01	100%	0.0	0
	02	90%	0.7	13
	03	80%	3.5	67
	04	70%	8.5	165
	05	60%	11.5	223
	06	50%	15.5	299
	07	40%	13.5	261
	08	30%	19.9	385
	09	20%	9.1	177
	10	10%	3.6	69
	11	0%	0.2	3
	00	no answer	14.0	272
Q.7.	What are the chances that you will stay in U.S. permanently?			
29-30/	01	100%--definitely return to Israel	41.8	809
	02	75%	18.6	360
	03	50%	10.4	201
	04	25%	3.1	61
	05	0%	6.6	128
	06	25%	2.9	57
	07	50%	3.4	65
	08	75%	7.2	140
	09	100%--definitely stay in U.S.	3.6	70
	00	NA	2.2	43

Col.	Punch			%	N
Q.8.	Where would you prefer to live?				
31-32/	01	100%	Israel	52.4	1013
	02	75%		18.2	353
	03	50%		8.3	161
	04	25%		2.9	57
	05	0%		4.3	83
	06	25%		1.4	28
	07	50%		3.0	58
	08	75%		2.5	49
	09	100%	U.S.	2.8	55
	00	NA		4.0	77
Q.9.	Do you find it difficult to decide whether or not to return?				
33/	1	very difficult		11.2	216
	2			6.6	128
	3			7.1	138
	4			2.7	52
	5			9.9	192
	6			3.0	59
	7			6.0	117
	8			11.5	223
	9	very easy		34.6	670
	0	NA		7.2	139
Q.10.	Do most Israeli students you know plan to return to Israel and when?				
34/	1	in coming year		0.6	12
	2	within 3 years		29.0	561
	3	within 5 years		11.9	231
	4	don't know when-- but they <u>will</u> return		37.2	720
	5	not sure they will		14.4	279
	6	sure they won't		2.0	40
	0	NA		4.7	91
Q.11.	Is it difficult to get permanent residence status?				
35/	1	very difficult		6.8	132
	2	slightly diff.		19.7	381
	3	not diff.		7.1	139
	4	don't know		56.2	1088
	0	NA		9.9	192
	9	multp. ans.		0.1	2

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.12. Would it be difficult for you?				
36/	1	very difficult	3.9	76
	2	slightly diff.	10.7	208
	3	not diff.	32.9	636
	4	don't know	38.4	743
	0	NA	13.8	268
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	3
Q.13. What is your personal experience regarding attitude of consular officials?				
37/	1	positive	45.5	881
	2	negative	21.7	421
	3	no contact	25.3	490
	0	NA	6.5	125
	9	multp. ans.	0.8	17
Q.13. What is your personal experience regarding attitude of Academic Section?				
38/	1	pos.	36.3	703
	2	neg.	3.0	58
	3	no contact	53.7	1038
	0	NA	6.8	131
	9	multp. ans.	0.2	4
Q.13. What is your personal experience regarding attitude of Jewish Agency?				
39/	1	pos.	6.9	134
	2	neg.	5.1	98
	3	no contact	79.9	1546
	0	NA	8.0	154
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2
Q.13. What is your personal experience regarding attitude of other officials?				
40/	1	pos.	5.1	98
	2	neg.	5.5	106
	3	no contact	25.1	485
	0	NA	64.2	1242
	9	multp. ans.	0.2	3
Q.14. Is your general unhappiness in Israel a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?				
41/	1	yes	20.0	387
	0	NA	80.0	1547

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.14.	Is the higher standard of living in U.S. a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
42/	1	yes	55.7	1077
	0	NA	44.3	857
Q.14.	Are better job opportunities in U.S. a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
43/	1	yes	66.0	1275
	0	NA	34.1	659
Q.14.	Is a lack of Israeli patriotic sentiment a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
44/	1	yes	5.4	104
	0	NA	94.6	1830
Q.14.	Is the Protectzia system a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
45/	1	yes	28.4	550
	0	NA	71.6	1384
Q.14.	Is Israeli provincialism a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
46/	1	yes	19.5	378
	0	NA	80.5	1556
Q.14.	Is the fact that Israel is a small country a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
47/	1	yes	8.2	159
	0	NA	91.8	1775
Q.14.	Is marrying an American spouse a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
48/	1	yes	24.7	477
	0	NA	75.3	1457
Q.14.	Is being impressed by American power a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
49/	1	yes	7.4	144
	0	NA	92.5	1790
Q.14.	Is lack of privacy in Israel a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
50/	1	yes	12.3	238
	0	NA	87.7	1696

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.14.	Is discrimination in Israel a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
51/	1	yes	4.9	95
	0	NA	95.0	1839
Q.14.	Are family pressures in Israel a possible reason that would determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
52/	1	yes	2.8	54
	0	NA	97.2	1880
Q.14.	Is there any other reason that would possibly determine your remaining permanently in U.S.?			
53/	1	yes	14.0	270
	0	NA	86.0	1664

Personal Background

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.1.	**Sex**			
54/	1	male	80.8	1563
	2	female	18.7	361
	0	NA	0.5	10
Q.2.	**Your age**			
55-56/		write age in yrs.		
	00	NA		
Q.3.	**Did you serve in Israeli army?**			
57/	1	yes	90.0	1723
	2	no	10.3	199
	0	NA	0.6	12
Q.4.	**What is your permanent rank?**			
58-59/	01	private	23.4	452
	02	P.F.C.	0.7	13
	03	Corporal	17.9	347
	04	Sergeant	41.2	410
	05	Staff Sgt.	3.5	67
	06	Master Sgt.	1.4	27
	07	Sergeant-Major	0.2	3
	10	2nd Lt.	5.3	102
	11	1st Lt.	12.1	234
	12	Captain	1.5	29
	13	Major	0.3	5
	14	Lt. Colonel	0.2	4
	15	Colonel	0.0	0
	16	Brigadier General	0.0	0
	17	Major General	0.0	0
	00	NA	12.5	241
Q.5.	**Where were you born?**			
60-61/		see country code		
	00	NA		
Q.5.	**When did you come to Israel?**			
62-63/		last two digits of year		
	00	NA		

Col.	Punch	
Q.6.	In what country was your father born?	
64-65/		see country code
	00	NA
Q.6.	When did your father come to Israel?	
66-67/		last two digits of year
	00	NA (born in Israel)
	99	immigrant but year unknown
Q.7.	In what country was your mother born?	
68-69/		see country code
	00	NA
Q.7.	When did your mother come to Israel?	
70-71/		last two digits of year
	00	NA (born in Israel)
	99	immigrant but year unknown

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.8.	Were you a member of Youth Aliyah?			
5/	1	yes	6.6	127
	0	NA	93.4	1807
Q.8.	Were you a member of a Kibbutz?			
6/	1	yes	20.3	392
	0	NA	79.7	1541
Q.8.	Were you a member of a Moshav?			
7/	1	yes	3.0	57
	0	NA	97.0	1876
Q.8.	Were you a member of a youth movement?			
8/	1	Hatzofim	25.3	490
	2	Hatnoa Hmachdet	10.2	197
	3	Hanoar Hoved	11.5	223
	4	Hashomer Hatzair	7.8	151
	5	Machnoth Havlem	4.0	77
	6	Betar	1.2	24
	7	Bnai Akivah	4.7	91
	8	Maccabi	3.5	68
	9	Other youth group	4.9	94
	0	NA	26.8	519
Q.9.	What is your father's occupation			
10/	1	professional requiring Univ. ed.	16.4	317
	2	owner or mgr. of large firm, high level admin. or army or police officer	12.1	234
	3	owner or mgr. of med. sized firm, technical worker, mid-level army or police officer	30.2	585
	4	workshop owner	5.3	102
	5	shopkeeper, low-level admin.	14.1	273
	6	skilled worker, army or police NCO	9.9	192
	7	unskilled worker	2.3	45
	8	farmer	6.3	122
	9	other	2.1	41
	0	NA	1.2	23

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.10. What was your father's highest ed. level?				
11-12/	01	no formal ed.	4.6	90
	02	Cheder	6.0	117
	03	less than 8 yrs. elem. school	3.6	69
	04	grad. elem. school	13.2	255
	05	some HS--did not matric.	20.3	392
	06	Yeshiva	6.9	133
	07	Tech. school	3.9	76
	08	Matriculation Cert.	9.1	176
	09	Seminary (Teacher's, Social Work)-- but no degree	8.7	168
	10	Univ. degree or more	20.7	401
	00	NA	2.7	53
Q.11. To the best of your knowledge did your father aspire to more ed.?				
13/	1	yes	56.6	1033
	2	no	35.1	677
	0	NA	11.2	216
Q.12. Are your parents religious?				
14/	1	very orthodox	4.1	79
	2	religious	13.2	255
	3	traditional	35.5	686
	4	irreligious	42.4	820
	5	anti-religious	2.8	54
	0	NA	1.0	20
	9	multp. ans.	1.0	20
Q.13. Are you religious?				
15/	1	very orthodox	0.9	18
	2	religious	4.5	87
	3	traditional	27.7	535
	4	irreligious	55.0	1065
	5	anti-religious	7.3	142
	0	NA	3.6	69
	9	multp. ans.	0.9	18
Q.13. Was your father in the Zionist movement in diaspora?				
16/	1	yes	56.7	1096
	2	no	24.7	478
	3	don't know	11.9	231
	0	NA	6.6	128

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Why students come to and remain in the US may be explained by a variety of factors related to conditions in their home country versus conditions in the US. The strength of these operative factors was determined by the application of reason analysis to three groups: Israeli students and alumni population in the US, Israelis who have studied in the US but returned to Israel, and Israelis who have received all their higher education in Israel. To measure the extent of brain drain, basic demographic and educational characteristics of students were examined. Population lists were compiled, and Israelis who had returned from study abroad, as well as Israeli potential employees and persons occupying key positions in the educational system were interviewed. Based on these interviews, a systematic questionaire was designed and administered to the entire known Israeli student and alumni population in the US. A 67 percent response justified a rigorous analysis of its findings. A comparison of Israeli economic development with that of Japan and India indicates that a nation bent on social and economic growth must amplify its human capital, partly through foreign influence. But it must simultaneously build an institutional framework that maximizes its investment in human talent. If the level of individual skill matches that of economic development, the cost of non-return becomes directly related to a nation's commitment to and ability to effect social change. (JS).

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

THE NON-RETURNING FOREIGN STUDENT:

THE ISRAELI CASE

Paul Ritterband

BUREAU OF APPLIED SOCIAL RESEARCH

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The Bureau of Applied Social Research is an instrument of Columbia University's Graduate Faculties for training and research in the social sciences. The Bureau has for many years served as the research laboratory of the Department of Sociology, and it also facilitates social research by students and faculty of other departments and schools of the University. The Bureau's governing board includes representatives from all of the University's social science departments and several professional schools.

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THE NON-RETURNING FOREIGN STUDENT:

THE ISRAELI CASE

Research Project No. 6-1273

Paul Ritterband

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Columbia University
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PREFACE

The non-returning Israeli student study was initiated by the Israel Government Bureau for Professionals, of the Ministry of Labor, whose job it is to facilitate the return of Israeli students and to increase, where possible, the number of those who return to Israel. In the course of his work, Avraham Ben-Zvi, the Director of the IGBP in the United States, found that there was too little known about why Israelis came to the United States to study and why they did or did not return. To help him deal more effectively with his problems he turned to the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University to conduct a study of the Israeli student and alumni population in the United States. The first phase of the study was based upon the files maintained by the IGBP on the known Israeli student and alumni population in the United States and was funded by the Israel Ministry of Labor. The information contained in those files was coded and machine processed and served as the take-off point for a more detailed study using a more extensive research instrument. To the best of my knowledge this is the only study which was initiated by a country concerned about its brain drain problem.

The second phase of the study was financed by the United States Office of Education. The interest of the USOE was based upon a general concern over the brain drain felt in United States Government circles and particularly on that phase of the brain drain which was attributable to the non-returning student problem. In addition to financial support given by the United States Government which greatly facilitated the study, and of which I am most appreciative, I wish to take the opportunity to acknowledge the considerable help given by the following persons:

In Washington: Dr. Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Department of State: Dr. Francis J. Colligan, Mrs. Elinor P. Reams, Mrs. Jean B.

Dulaney, and Dr. James Moss; U. S. Office of Education: Dr. R. Robb Taylor, Mr. Kenneth Neubeck.

In Israel: Mr. Dan Krauskopf, Executive Secretary of the U. S. Educational Foundation in Israel; Mr. Lawrence Laurens, Second Secretary of the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv; Ministry of Labor: Mr. Hanoch Smith, Director; Miss Hannah Sereni, and Mr. Yehoshua Fuxdaminsky.

At Columbia University, I benefitted from the continued intellectual stimulation given by Professor Charles Kadushin through the life of the project; the incisive comments of Professor Amitai Etzioni were significant in the development of this report and contribute to my continued work in the area. Dr. Simon Herman and Professor Joseph Ben-David of the Hebrew University were both most generous in giving their time in helping to develop the research.

The first problem was that of developing proper population lists. Three sources were used and cross checked to determine the completeness of our population. These were:

1. The files of the Israel Government Bureau for Professionals and the Israel Student Organization.
2. The Annual Census of the Institute of International Education.
3. The student visa lists developed jointly by the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv and the United States Educational Foundation in Israel.

The extent of similarity among the three sources gave us a sense of assurance that we indeed had a rather complete list of the Israeli student population and that there would be no systematic bias in the kinds of persons who might be missing from one or more of the lists. While the lists were being developed and cross checked, I spent some time in Israel interviewing Israelis

who had returned from study abroad as well as potential employers and persons occupying key positions in the Israeli educational system. These interviews gave us some qualitative understanding of the nature of the Israeli student-problem and were crucial in the development of a systematic questionnaire which was administered to the entire known Israeli student and alumni population in the United States. The questionnaire went through several drafts and was then pretested in its entirety on thirty Israeli students in the New York area. The students were then interviewed to check on possible ambiguities of the questions and their responses, and once we were satisfied that the items were clear and that they would in all likelihood cover the major dimensions of the problem, the questionnaire was mailed to the entire population during the first week of May, 1966. Follow-up mailings continued through the summer and fall, and we had useable questionnaires from 67% (N=1934) of the population. Various internal checks did not indicate any non-response bias, thus we felt justified in going ahead with the analysis contained herein.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On the 17th day of June in the year 1621 Czar Michael of Russia wrote to King James I of England saying:

> Whereas about 18 years past, in the time of the Emperor and greate Duke Burris Pheodorowich of all Russia there was wnt into your Majesties Dominiones fower young gentlemen of our Kingdome . . . to trayned upp in the English and Lattin tongs and soe to be retorned againe and delivered to the Lordes of our Counsell . . . [and these young men had been] . . . deteyned and kept in England against their wills. . . .[1]

Evidently Michael was not satisfied with the action taken by James to repatriate the Russian "exchange students" so that on the 4th day of January 1622 the Russian Ambassador to England underscored the Czar's words with a petition to the Privy Council where he added an explanation of the non-return of the Russian students, attributing their reluctance to "the long troubles in our Country of Russia." Of the original four students, two had since died, one was resident in Ireland, and the fourth did agree to meet with the Russian Ambassador but still refused repatriation. (It ought to be noted that the young man had taken an English bride during his sojourn in England.) The matter then came to the attention of Sir John Merrick, the English Ambassador to

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[1] S. Konovalov, "Anglo-Russian Relations, 1620-4," in S. Konovalov, ed., Oxford Slavonic Papers, Vol. IV, as cited in William W. Brickman, "The Development of Education in Tsarist Russia," in George Z.F. Bereday et al., eds., The Changing Soviet School (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960).

Russia, who wrote to the Privy Council indicating that he feit tha that might properly be done had been done and now Merrick "humbly besought the Kinges Majestie that he [i.e., the Russian student] m not (against the law of Nationes) be forced out of the land."[1]

The Anglo-Russian correspondence of the seventeenth centur figures many of the vexatious issues relating to the non-returning foreign student which have appeared during the past decade. The p lels include the use of training abroad as an instrument of develo human capital, the imputation of personal and structural motives f return, the dilemma of national interests and private rights, the understanding and strain which develops between governments as a r of non-return, and the loss felt by the sending country.

Though it is clear that at present American educational an political authorities clearly favor various forms of educational e for a good part of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries there w siderable opposition to the idea of Americans studying in Europe. Georgia legislature disenfranchised for a period of three years an Georgian who studied abroad.[2] Study abroad was held to be rather tionable by Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington opposed the im tion of foreign scholars to serve as the nucleus for a new institu in the United States.[3]

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[1]Konovalov, Ibid.

[2]William W. Brickman, Introduction to the History of Inte national Relations in Higher Education (New York, 1960), pp. 138 (Mimeographed.)

[3]Ibid., pp. 139 ff.

Charles W. Eliot of Harvard wrote:

> Prolonged residence abroad in youth, before the mental fibre is solidified and the mind has taken its tone, has a tendency to enfeeble the love of country, and to impair the foundations of public spirit in the individual citizen. This pernicious influence is indefinable, but none the less real. In a strong nation, the education of the young is indigenous and national. It is a sign of immaturity or decrepitude when a nation has to import its teachers, or send abroad its scholars.[1]

Problem

As of 1963, it was estimated that there were "more than 60,000 foreign students on our campuses. In one decade the number has increased by 75 per cent. If the present trend continues, the number will reach 100,000 by 1970."[2] While only representing a small proportion of all the aliens resident in the United States at any one time, these students occupy a unique place on two counts:

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[1]Eliot's comments were in the form of a letter to Birdsey Northrop in which Northrop attacked what he believed to be the dangerous practice of some American families in sending their children to Europe for some of their education. Northrop published his essay along with letters from various leaders in American education. Northrop's essay and the letters of response have been republished, with a new introduction by Stewart Fraser, The Evils of a Foreign Education or Birdsey Northrop on Education Abroad (Nashville, Tennessee: International Center, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1966).

[2]Committee on the Foreign Student in American Colleges and Universities, The College, the University and Foreign Student (New York, 1963). The estimate presented in the document cited was based upon tabulations made by the Institute of International Education. A comparison of current IIE data with visa lists made available by the Embassy of the United States of America in Tel Aviv and the files of the Israel Government Bureau for Professionals in New York City has shown that IIE has underestimated the number of Israeli students in the United States by approximately 20 per cent. Assuming that the underestimation of Israelis is not a function of any particular characteristic of the Israeli population, a realistic estimate for the number of foreign students in the United States as of 1965 would be some 110,000 to 120,000.

a. They are often the intellectual elite of their native countries.

b. The assumption underlying American student exchange programs is that they will return home after they have completed their training in the United States.

It is by now quite well known in both educational and diplomatic circles that many of the foreign students do not in fact return to their homelands.[1] The training they have received in the United States, which is viewed by governmental officials both here and abroad as a form of foreign aid and a contribution of the United States to friendly powers, is often not used to fulfill these aims.[2] Though in terms of the total number of students in residence at American universities the foreign students are but a small fraction,[3] to our friends abroad they are the most visible aspect of the American higher education. The foreign student is thus the major link between the American system of higher education and those of other nations of the world.

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[1]Cora DuBois, Foreign Students and Higher Education in the United States (American Council on Education, 1956); Committee on Educational Interchange Policy, The Foreign Student: Exchangee or Immigrant? (May, 1958); Education and World Affairs, The Foreign Student: Whom Shall We Welcome? (New York, 1964); George V. Haniotis, "An Exercise in Voluntary Repatriation in Greece," OECD Observer, No. 11 (August, 1964); "Inter-Agency Task Force of the Council on International and Cultural Affairs," The Problem of the Non-Returning Exchange Visitor, CEC Paper, No. 10 (April 23, 1965); NAFSA Newsletter, Vol. IX, No. 6 (February 15, 1958).

[2]"Inter-Agency Task Force . . .," op. cit.

[3]An analysis of data collected by the National Opinion Research Center in 1961 has shown a foreign student input of 1.5% in the American undergraduate population. Data collected by NORC on graduate students in American Universities in 1963 shows a much higher proportion of foreign students, reaching 27% among graduate students in civil engineering.

Whether one views the education of foreign students in American universities from the perspective of creating good will for the United States, or one sees it as the training of skilled minds for a world in ferment, the problem of the non-returning student is a source of embarrassment to the United States. The Department of State has shown interest in the problem and has conducted a large scale project on exchange visitors which has been most helpful in the conduct of the research reported herein.[1] The project of the State Department has gathered basic demographic, rather than motivational, socio-psychological, and sociological data. The gathering of subjective data on the problem is best left to social and psychological researchers, who will be able to ask the right questions and will not inhibit their respondents by creating fears of governmental power, possible deportations and the like.

The Israeli student and alumni population offered a signal opportunity to the researcher interested in foreign students. The Government of Israel has gone farther than any other government in gathering complete data on its nationals who have studied or are now studying in the United States. The Institute of International Education has informed us that they are using the procedures of data collection and organization developed by Israel as a paradigm for other nations interested in working on the problem. The representatives of the Ministry of Labor of Israel, who are responsible for this work, have

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[1] "Inter-Agency Task Force . . . ," op. cit.

offered complete cooperation to IIE and any nation which wishes to learn from its efforts. A considerable amount of money and effort has been expended by Israel to rationalize its system of maintaining up-to-date information on its nationals in the United States, and as will be indicated further, they too have been extremely helpful in the development of this research.

As we have attempted to indicate, much is at stake in the way of national development and American interests in the question of the non-returning foreign student. Education and World Affairs, a privately funded educational policy organization, poses our problem well for us in the title of their pamphlet, The Foreign Student: Whom Shall We Welcome?[1] Decisions have been made by American universities, the American government, foreign governments, fellowship granting agencies, without adequate information on who the foreign students are, why they are here, will they return home, and will they have been properly trained for productive work in their countries of origin. We cannot expect to answer all of these questions with complete thoroughness, but we do believe that we can illumine the darkness considerably through the research presented in the following chapters.

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[1] Op. cit.

Related Research

There is a large body of research on foreign students[1] but very little information specifically on the determinants of their coming to the United States and of their returning home once they finish their period of study. Cormack, in an excellent survey of the research literature on foreign students,[2] lists ninety-nine Masters' essays and Doctoral dissertations on foreign students. When classified, these studies show the following distribution:

Psycho-social adjustment of the foreign student and appreciation of the United States	61
Academic skills, particularly language skills and academic achievement	14
Adjustment upon returning home and reflections on the United States after having returned home	6
Determinants of non-return	2
Miscellaneous and unclassifiable	16
TOTAL	99

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[1]U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Cross-Cultural Education: A Bibliography of Government Sponsored and Private Research on Foreign Students and Trainees in the U.S. and Other Countries, External Research Paper (Washington, D.C.: April, 1965). An extensive bibliography on all aspects of educational exchange has been produced by William W. Brickman, "Selected Bibliography of the History of International Relations in Higher Education," Paedagogica Historica, Vol. V, No. 1 (1965). A rather full listing of works on all aspects of the "brain drain" will be found in Brain Drain and Brain Gain, Research Policy Program (Lund, Sweden: 1967).

[2]Margaret L. Cormack, An Evaluation of Research on Educational Exchange (Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 1962).

By and large the concern of the major published works has been with attitude change "towards members of racial, religious, or national groups in situations of intergroup contact."[1] More recently, scholars and practitioners have begun to speculate on another critical aspect of foreign study, namely the skilled manpower implications of study abroad.[2] The work of scholars has been supplemented by journalistic pieces of varying worth.[3] It has become more and more evident that, irrespective of national wealth in terms of natural resources or hard currency, a critical element in national development is Human Capital,[4] a significant cadre of well-trained minds. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of the output of the university in terms of

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[1]Claire Selltiz, June R. Christ, Joan Havel, Stuart W. Cook, Attitudes and Social Relations of Foreign Students in the United States (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1963), p. ix.

[2]The Foreign Student: Exchangee or Immigrant?, op. cit.; The Foreign Student: Whom Shall We Welcome?, op. cit.; Haniotis, op. cit., "Inter-Agency Task Force . . . ," op. cit.; Charles Kidd, "The Growth of Science and the Distribution of Scientists Among the Nations," Impact, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1964); Nuri Mohsenin, "The Lost Student: Cause and Cure," Overseas, Institute of International Education, Vol. 3 (April, 1963).

[3]Burton M. Halpern, "New Exodus, Israel's Talent Drain," The Nation (May, 1965); Yehudah Kasten, "Kiruv V'lo nidui . . ." (Attraction rather than alienation--to repatriate Israeli experts from abroad), HA-ARETZ (Tel Aviv, June 25, 1965); Allan Keller, "Life in Norwegian Eden Full of Strange Facets," New York World Telegram and Sun, June 17, 1965; Eliahu Salpeter, "Yisraelim K'yoshev keva . . ." (Israelis as permanent residents in the United States), HA-ARETZ (Tel Aviv: September 20, 1964).

[4]Gary Becker, Human Capital (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

skilled researchers, practitioners and citizens.[1] It is abundantly evident to even the most casual student of world affairs that economic and social development in our time is to a very large, albeit unspecified, extent a function of the human factor. It might be interesting to speculate as to why researchers have not heretofore focused upon the manpower implications of educational exchange, but that would lead us too far afield. We shall, rather, attempt to present the relevant findings from those studies which contain any data or reasonable speculation on the problem.

If one were to characterize the empirical literature on foreign students as it relates to the determinants of non-return, one might say that it is at times quite interesting; but because of the exploratory character of the research, inadequate conceptualization, inadequate or incorrect study design and improper and scanty samples, whatever results exist must remain for us as hypotheses rather than as confirmed findings. These hypotheses will be made clear in the course of our discussion of the literature, and further on we shall indicate how our study design will permit us to go beyond that which already exists.

Who studies abroad and why do they go?--A host of factors have been suggested to explain why students go abroad to study without regard to the particular nation in which they choose to study. It has been suggested that some of those who study abroad had been inadequate

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[1] William V. Consolazio, "The Fiscal Dilemma of Academic Science," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February, 1965).

students at home,[1] and that universities often not being able to evaluate records from abroad have accepted foreign students who, by reasonable standards, are not college material. Other students are trapped by the quantitative inadequacy of their national universities.[2] That is, their records ought to permit them to enter a good university at home but facilities simply do not exist. There are others perhaps, particularly the sons of the local aristocracy, or upper class, who see study abroad as either a lark or as a kind of "finishing school." For them, the foreign diploma is a mark of social prestige rather than of honest academic accomplishment.[3] For some, their ambitions outstrip the local facilities. Their interests cannot be met at home simply because their subject is not taught or is inadequately taught. We may presume that if adequate facilities were available at home, many of those studying in the United States would not be here. Of course it is not within the power of a small or underdeveloped nation to offer all of the academic specialties which one finds in the United States. Differentiation is in part a function of sheer size and resources so that the situation whereby some students are abroad because of the unavailability of facilities at home may not be remediable. However, it is necessary that we distinguish these various types from one another if we are to deal with the non-returning foreign student effectively.

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[1]The Foreign Student: Whom Shall We Welcome?, op. cit.

[2]William H. Sewell and Oluf M. Davidsen, Scandinavian Students on an American Campus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1961); Halpern, op. cit.; Haniotis, op. cit.; Keller, op. cit.

[3]Richard D. Lambert and Marvin Bressler, Indian Students on an American Campus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1956);

Why do they come to the United States?--Given the decision to study abroad, why does the student choose to come to the United States? In case after case we note that before the second World War the United States was not one of the major "receiving" nations for foreign students. There has been a clear shift in the direction of the flow of foreign students.[1] In part this is a result of America's becoming the scientific center of the world. As of the beginning of this decade, 40 per cent of the foreign students in the United States were in the natural sciences while in the rest of the OECD nations the average figure was 20 per cent.[2] The Israeli distribution in the United States is heavily skewed towards the sciences. One can expect this situation to grow in the future as a parallel to the movement of graduate scientists to the United States.[3]

Others have been told by their compatriots that as a student in the United States one can support oneself by working part time, an

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Iraj Valipour, "A Comparison of Returning and Non-Returning Iranian Students in the United States," unpublished Ed.D. thesis, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1961.

[1]John W. Bennett, Herbert Passim, and Robert K. McKnight, In Search of Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1958); Lambert and Bressler, op. cit.; Sewell and Davidsen, op. cit.

[2]Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education (1962), III: The Challenge of Aid to Newly Developing Countries; IV: The Planning of Education in Relation to Economic Growth; V: International Flows of Students.

[3]Derek J. De Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).

option which is not as readily available elsewhere in the world.[1] Periodically one reads of students who are expelled from the United States for being a bit too eager in their pursuit of employment opportunities resulting in their violation of their student visa provisions. Such was the case with a group of Japanese students who were working at the Nippon Club. This factor is probably quite important for the Israelis since, by virtue of having relatives in the United States and the scarcity of skilled manpower in the field of Jewish education, many Israelis are able to find part-time employment so that they can subsist in the United States while studying even without the aid of fellowships. These opportunities would not be available to them if they were to study in Europe.

There is another group who, in a sense, are not bona fide students at all but rather immigrants who see their student visa as the first step in acquiring citizenship or at least permanent residence in the United States.[2] They often drift from school to school, frequently one jump ahead of the immigration officials until they are compelled to leave the country, or through marriage or other legal devices, are able to remain in the United States. We have no idea how numerically important this group is within the Israeli student community, but there is no question that it is an important group in terms of Israeli ideology and values. Israel sees itself as a country of immigration, not

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[1] DuBois, op. cit.

[2] Ibid.; The Foreign Student: Whom Shall We Welcome?, op. cit.

emigration. Despite some evidence of ambivalence towards immigrants, the dominant mood is still that of viewing immigration positively and emigration negatively.[1] The young Israeli who wishes to leave the country permanently or for a long sojourn must legitimate his trip in terms of national needs if he is to avoid the negative sanctions which are applied to those whom the Israelis call by the pejorative term, "Yordim," literally "those who go down" with the clear implication of "defector." The student status supplies such legitimation for the Israeli who wishes to go abroad.

In sum, one would expect to find different motivational and valuative behavioral patterns by academic field in regard both to study abroad and returning home within the Israeli student community in the United States as a function of the opportunities for study available in the several fields in Israel. We should also expect to find differentials based upon the student's academic performance among those taking their higher education in Israel, and the propensity to return among those who have gone abroad to study. There is some evidence that those who have come to the United States to study are atypical in comparison with their compatriots who remained at home. They have shown a greater contact with western and/or American institutions, and their value patterns tend to be less traditional and show some degree of dissonance with the national value patterns.[2] But here, as well as in

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[1] Aharon Antonovaky, "Political and Social Positions in Israel," AMOT (Tel Aviv: June-July 1965), pp. 11-12, Hebrew.

[2] Ralph L. Beals and Norman D. Humphrey, No Frontier to Learning (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957); Bennett, Passim and McKnight, op. cit.; Valipour, op. cit.

other comparisons of this sort made in the empirical literature, the comparative population is missing. As the author of the Mexican study puts it, "It is quite possible, in the absence of any control data, that the characteristics enumerated above may be common to university students in Mexico as well as those who study in the United States. If that is true, the data do not help us to understand why particular students come to this country."[1] The caveat stated here is equally applicable to all other comparisons made in the literature between those who have come to the United States and those who have studied at home.

Who goes home?--The decision to return home after the American sojourn is in all likelihood as complex as the original decision to come to the United States. The initial perspectives, commitments, and values may well have been changed during the period of the student's stay in America. Ideally, one would want to have a panel study of a cohort of students from the time they first began to think about coming to America, up to and including the time they return to their native lands and either stay there or, perhaps after a short period, return to the United States. Such a panel is obviously enormously complex and not feasible, and no researcher has attempted to conduct a panel study of such long duration with a widely scattered population which tends to be geographically mobile.

As we indicated above, at the time of the inception of this research, only two studies had been concerned with the determinants of

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[1] Beals and Humphrey, op. cit., p. 46.

non-return per se, and both of these studies suffer from very serious methodological flaws both in terms of logic and sample size.[1] The one study that actually asked the question of a reasonable sample (n = 318) found that of those responding, one-quarter intended to remain in the United States.[2] Though the raw figures for the responses to the non-return question were included in the appendix of the work, no percentages were run since the author was not interested in the correlates or determinants of non-return. Unfortunately, the data cards of that study have been lost so that analysis of these data could not be carried out.

Here, as in the former section, the differential of determinants of return tend to be inferential because the design of the studies did not permit direct evaluation. There is some suggestion that those of a higher socio-economic background show a greater tendency to return.[3] That this should be the case conforms to other data on the relationship of social mobility to geographical mobility.[4] Bendix and Lipset, quoting a Swedish mobility study, note that ". . . for virtually all status groups geographical mobility is highest for the upwardly mobile, intermediate for those in occupations similar to their fathers,

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[1]Grace Scully, "An Exploratory Study of Students from Abroad Who Do Not Wish to Return to Their Country," unpublished Ed.D. thesis, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1956; Valipour, op. cit.

[2]Richard T. Morris, "National Status in Foreign Students' Adjustment," The Two Way Mirror (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1960).

[3]Sewell and Davidsen, op. cit.; Valipour, op. cit.

[4]Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962).

and lowest for downwardly mobile persons."[1] Whether the phenomenon described actually exists among foreign students, and is a correlate or determinant of non-return, remains to be demonstrated rigorously. If the relationship between social and geographical mobility actually does exist, it still requires explanation in terms of the specifying variables.[2] Several equally reasonable and plausible theories might explain the phenomenon.

In general, explanations of non-return are based upon a variation of the push-pull pattern, conditions in the home country vs. conditions in the United States, with some authors looking at one side of the coin and others at the other side. There is the suggestion that the American-educated foreign national may be educated beyond the capacity of his country to employ him effectively.[3] In addition, the non-returnee may fear a nepotistic system where his leverage is slight; others emphasize the much higher American standard of living.[4] There is the suggestion that the non-returnee becomes alienated from his nation and his prospective professional peers at home by coming to the United States too young and staying too long.[5] Each of the factors

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[1]Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., p. 160n.

[2]Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, The Language of Social Research, Section II (New York: The Free Press, 1955).

[3]Scully, op. cit.; J. M. van der Kroef, "Asia's Educated Unemployed," in Eastern World (November, 1961).

[4]Scully, op. cit.; Gregory Henderson, "Foreign Students: Exchange or Immigration," National Association for Foreign Students Affairs Newsletter (November 15, 1964); Mohsenin, op. cit.

[5]Kidd, op. cit.

mentioned may play some role independently or in concert with one another. The problem of this research is to evaluate the strength of each of them where they are operative and to specify the conditions under which they are operative.

Objectives

The primary objective of the study will be to ascertain the primary determinants of students coming to the United States and their subsequent return or non-return to their countries of origin. Among the questions to be dealt with are:

a. The relationship between academic field and study abroad, and non-return.

b. The relative strength of the American "pull" and the native country's "push" as determinants of the process.

c. Factors which contribute to the alienation of the foreign student from his native culture.

d. The relationship between the processes of social mobility and the phenomenon of foreign study, and non-return.

e. The relative opportunity structures in the two countries.

f. The role of internalized national ideology as a factor facilitating return.

g. What policy proposals should be made to facilitate the return of the foreign students and to create a more rational policy of acceptance of foreign students.

Procedures

General design.--The primary methodological orientations of the study will be those of elaboration and reason analysis. Reason analysis has been used to study personal influence,[1] geographic mobility,[2] decisions to undertake psychotherapy,[3] and many other areas of social behavior. Reason analysis is most appropriate when "one wants to know how an action came to be--what steps were taken, what the actor thought he was doing, how he felt about it, and what outcomes he expected . . ." When this is what the researcher is looking for, ". . . then no technique other than reason analysis can be used."[4]

The analysis has been applied to three populations:

i. The Israeli student and alumni population in the United States.

ii. Israelis who have studied in the United States and who have returned to Israel.

iii. Israelis who have received all of their higher education in Israel.

Group i has been used to get at the determinants of coming to the United States and intentions of returning parallel to the Morris Study.[5] Group ii has been analyzed to determine the validity of the

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[1]Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence (New York: The Free Press, 1955).

[2]Peter Rossi, Why Families Move (New York: The Free Press, 1955).

[3]Charles Kadushin, "Individual Decisions to Undertake Psychotherapy," Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1958), pp. 379-411; Charles Kadushin, Why People Go to Psychiatrists (forthcoming).

[4]Charles Kadushin, "Reason Analysis," International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1968).

[5]Morris, op. cit.

conclusions reached covering the determinants of non-return by comparing the correlates of repatriation among those who have performed the act with the correlates of expected return to Israel. Group iii has been used to develop baselines for the analysis of reasons for coming to the United States.

CHAPTER II

WHY DO THE ISRAELIS COME TO THE UNITED STATES TO STUDY?

Anyone who has ever carried on a conversation with a small child is aware of the inadequacy of any answer to the question "Why?". A child is perfectly capable of developing an infinite regress of "whys" which are sure to exhaust the patience of Job. To some measure, the infinite regress is justified in that causal chains do proceed backward in time and ramify laterally without limit. However the infinite series of "whys" is uneconomical.[1] In any analysis, there comes a point where the increment of knowledge gained through asking a further question is

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[1] Merton has dealt with the problem of problem-finding and has commented on the inadequacy of the model whereby the word "why" is appended to a declarative sentence as a means of problem formulation. He has written that

> "If routinely affixing an inquisitive "Why?" to an established fact or event were all that is needed at the outset to institute a significant problem in science, then such men as Darwin and the many other scientists who have testified to the difficulty of seeing a problem would stand self-condemned as hopelessly opaque and slow-witted." (Robert K. Merton, "Notes on Problem Finding in Sociology," in Robert K. Merton, Leonard Broom and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., eds., Sociology Today [New York: Basic Books, 1959], pp. xi.)

If what Merton writes is true where some of the facts are known and the task of the researcher is to frame the next set of questions which will build most fruitfully on that which is already known, then a fortiori where the basic facts are not known. All research is to some measure a fishing expedition, but woe to the fisherman who casts his net into unknown waters with no knowledge of tides and currents which can make or break him.

not worth the effort invested to gain the information. The question "why" must be asked in terms of some a priori sense of the most productive lines of inquiry. Certain lines of inquiry are excluded from the outset as being irrelevant to the purposes of the questioner or researcher. In effect, a set of dimensions is developed in the mind of the questioner which serves as a framework for the asking of the question "why?". Without the set of dimensions, or an accounting scheme, one is set adrift on an infinite sea of facts which bear no clear logical or empirical relationship to one another.[1]

In our analysis of the reasons which Israelis give for coming to the United States as students, we have restricted our questions to a finite set of dimensions. Why Israelis come to the United States as students is obviously related to other questions, e.g., their choice of occupation. Not all occupations require higher education. Why did they choose a given occupation which did require higher education which in turn brought them to the United States? We cannot, and will not assume that their motivational process went along in a linear fashion where they first chose an occupation and, finding that their chosen field required university training, then decided to come to the United States. It has been demonstrated that many students do not attend university for purposes of vocational training but rather it is expected of them by friends and family, or because they simply are intellectually curious. However, one could say that intellectual curiosity might be better served by conversations with great minds and periodic visits to

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[1]Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, op. cit., Section V B.

a good library. With this assumption, going to school itself becomes a part of our analysis, and it would be necessary to inquire into the motives for attending school rather than apprenticing oneself to a journeyman or intellectual master. We shall not be inquiring into the reasons for attending school in general, nor the reasons for choosing a particular occupation.[1] We shall begin with their being in the United States on student status as a given fact and shall examine their motives for being here in terms of some of the aspects of Israeli educational and social structure which motivated their coming.

In developing the accounting scheme which would cover the relevant dimensions of the analysis, it has been necessary to keep three related factors in mind. First, we must distinguish between official motives and private reasons. The sponsors of educational exchange, if one takes the public statements of policy seriously, are motivated by one or more factors which we have found to be irrelevant for the students who actually participate in educational exchange. Some have talked of increasing international understanding; others of inhibiting the development of world communism; still others of developing human capital. It may well be that educational exchange does perform these and other functions which correspond to official motives. However, qualitative interviews with the students themselves have demonstrated that the official motives for promoting and supporting educational exchange are completely unrelated to the motives of the students themselves. This brings us to

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[1]This problem is handled in Chapter IV.

our second concern, namely that of distinguishing motives, either public or private, from consequences. In the Aristotelian doctrine of causality, the telos of a thing or process is itself one of its causes. In other words, function, either latent or manifest, is part of causality. However, we are interested in the motives of which the actor is aware and which he feels have caused him to do what he has done. And finally, we must examine motives of which the actor is aware and in turn can be understood in terms of social structure and process. Our task is to be able to distinguish types of motives and actors which may be understood in the light of the facts of social life of Israel and the United States and the position of the actor in the two social structures.

As in all reason analysis, we are dealing with those who have performed a given act. In usual cross sectional survey analysis, the key dependent variable is the performance vs. non-performance of an act. The analyst's task is to lay bare the determinants of performance or non-performance. In a reason analysis the task is to distinguish among types of actors, all of whom have performed the act in question. All of the people in our population have come to the United States and have been students here some time during their sojourn in the United States. In reason analysis, the analyst examines the several paths which have led to the same act.

Various methods with rather different degrees of empirical rigor have been employed in the conduct of a reason analysis.[1] We have presented the respondents with a list of twenty-four reasons for coming to

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[1] Lazarsfeld and Rosenberg, op. cit., Section V C.

the United States and have asked them to indicate the extent to which each of these reasons is applicable to them. Persons who indicated that they came because their parents migrated to the United States were removed from the study population. Those who said they came because their spouse decided to study in the United States were removed from the analysis of this section on the grounds that they did not themselves engage in a decision process. The analysis proper then begins with twenty-two reasons which were developed as indicators of the five dimensions of the accounting scheme. The accounting scheme in turn is based upon qualitative interviews with Israeli students in the United States and Israeli and American officials who advise and deal with Israeli students. The dimensions of the accounting scheme are as follows:

A Perceived superiority of the American academic system,
B Academic financial facilitation (stipends and scholarships),
C Personal academic inadequacy,
D Non-academic financial facilitation,
E Ulterior, i.e., non-academic reasons.

In Table 2.1 we present the items as they appeared in the questionnaire, identifying them with the dimensions of the accounting scheme which they represent.

If we were to handle each reason dichotomously and generate all of the logically possible patterns of reason, we would arrive at 2^{22} or 4,194,304 distinct patterns of reason, a clearly unmanageable situation! If we were to operate with the five dimensions as variables and again define each of them dichotomously, we would generate a property space containing 2^5 or 32 possible cells, a considerable improvement over the

TABLE 2.1

QUESTIONS IN REASONS BATTERY BY
ACCOUNTING SCHEME DIMENSIONS

1.	American university scholarship	B
2.	Israeli government scholarship	B
3.	American government or foundation scholarship	B
4.	Easier to support myself while studying in U.S.	D
5.	Reparation funds	D
6.	I did not receive a scholarship in Israel	C
7.	Relatives promised financial aid	D
8.	Unable to study my field in Israel	A
9.	I wanted to study in a particular U.S. school	A
10.	Unsure of what I wanted to study	E
11.	At my level, training in U.S. is superior to that in Israel	A
12.	At my level, it would take less time to earn degree in U.S. than Israel	A
13.	In my field, an American degree is worth more in Israel than Israeli degree	A
14.	I was not accepted by university in Israel	C
15.	I don't have matriculation certificate	C
16.	I feared I would not be able to get into a university in Israel because of limited openings	C
17.	I wanted to see the world	E
18.	I wanted to leave family pressures	E
19.	I was seriously considering migrating and I thought it best to try first as a student	E
20.	I came as a tourist and decided to stay	E
21.	Friends in Israel advised me to study in U.S.	E
22.	Experience in my work is important and the only way to get it is by a student visa	A

2^{22} situation but still rather cumbersome. Further, by immediately moving from the twenty-two individual items to the five dimensions, we are assuming that the items actually do fit the accounting scheme model which has been posited. Thus, both for reasons of determining the fit between the model of the accounting scheme and the empirical relationship of the items, and to further reduce the property space if possible, we shall examine the actual relationship of the twenty-two items to one another. We have not yet arrived at the point where we can examine the relationship of reasons to social structure; we still must determine the relationship of the reasons among themselves. To do this we have utilized the correlation matrix which indicates the pattern of relationship among the twenty-two reasons.

Using McQuitty's method[1] we find that the reasons fall into three main clusters. Cluster I is derived from an empirical collapsing of dimensions A and B; Cluster II from dimensions C and D; and Cluster III corresponds to dimension E of the accounting scheme.

FIGURE 1

ITEM CLUSTERS USING McQUITTY'S METHOD



[1]Louis L. McQuitty, "Elementary Linkage Analysis for Isolating Orthagonal and Oblique Types and Typal Relevancies," Education and Psychological Measurement, XVII, No. 2 (Summer 1957).

With the exception of items 19 and 20, the empirical data do correspond to the a priori model, thus we can reduce the property space to 2^3 cells. To do this we rearrange the correlation matrix and calculate the extent to which each item contributes to the tightness of its own cluster, as measured by its mean intra-group correlation, and the extent to which it generates cross-group relationship, as measured by its mean inter-group correlation. In effect, we are attempting to minimize the intersection of the three clusters so that the clusters of items will more closely approximate pure types. In examining the determinants of patterns of reasons, we should find rather clear relationships between clusters of reasons and their social determinants. Table 2.2 presents the mean within-group, and across-group correlations of each of the twenty-two items. The within-group correlation is underlined.

Inspection of the list found in Table 2.2 reveals six items which make for some fuzziness of boundaries for the three clusters. Operationally, in order to reduce fuzziness or overlap between groups, we shall remove these items and recalculate the within-group and across-group correlations. The results of these calculations are presented in Table 2.3. A comparison of the mean correlations in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 indicates a distinct refinement of the dimensions.

We find that in the main the correlations of the items within groups are increased and the correlations across groups are decreased. The strengthening of the pattern of correlations of the individual items also appears in the pattern of correlations of the clusters. In

TABLE 2.2

MEAN CORRELATIONS WITHIN GROUP AND ACROSS GROUPS FOR THE TWENTY-TWO ITEMS IN THE REASON ANALYSIS

Reason #	Clusters I	II	III
1	.074	-.063	.011
2	.026	-.037	-.022
3	.038	-.015	.012
4	.008	.112	.102
5*	.024	.039	.042
6*	.055	.068	.076
7	-.021	.092	.067
8	.067	-.023	-.024
9	.107	.004	.058
10	-.005	.018	.133
11	.165	.000	.075
12*	.060	.042	.068
13	.139	.035	.075
14	-.043	.061	-.014
15	-.038	.106	.008
16	-.033	.094	.038
17*	.048	.035	.178
18	.015	.050	.125
19*	.010	.032	.036
20	-.033	.046	.057
21*	.060	.077	.103
22	.095	-.007	.012

[Those items which show themselves to be empirically problematic are marked with an asterisk.]

TABLE 2.3

MEAN CORRELATIONS WITHIN GROUPS AND ACROSS GROUPS FOR SIXTEEN ITEMS IN THE REASON ANALYSIS

Reason #	Clusters I	II	III
1	.085	-.097	-.046
2	.029	-.049	-.032
3	.043	-.040	-.001
4	-.006	.155	.093
7	-.032	.120	.063
8	.077	-.047	-.048
9	.107	.000	-.010
10	-.011	-.008	.107
11	.165	-.035	.001
13	.128	.034	.014
14	-.043	.089	-.019
15	-.042	.110	.019
16	-.041	.141	.019
18	.009	.041	.104
20	-.048	.072	.079
22	.105	-.025	-.025

Table 2.4 we find the pattern of correlations of the clusters prior to the removal of the items which contributed most to the overlap and after the removal of these items.

TABLE 2.4

WITHIN GROUP AND ACROSS GROUP CORRELATIONS OF THE REASON CLUSTERS FOR TWENTY-TWO ITEMS AND FOR SIXTEEN ITEMS

Twenty-two Items

	Cluster		
Cluster	I	II	III
I	.086		
II	-.008	.074	
III	.029	.045	.135

Sixteen Items

	Cluster		
Cluster	I	II	III
I	.093		
II	-.032	.130	
III	-.017	.035	.099

The final pattern of reasons indicates three basic clusters which we have termed:

academic stars = Cluster I = dimensions A and B

also rans = Cluster II = dimensions C and D

ulterior = Cluster III = dimension E

By removing the items which generate the greatest part of the overlap between the clusters, we find that the graphic representation (using Kruskal's method)[1] of the pattern of reasons (Figure 2) has become very clear. Indeed, we do seem to have rather distinct reason analysis indices which will permit us to analyze the motives of the Israeli students as determined by the structure of the Israeli educational system and some of the more generalized aspects of Israeli social structure. The final test of the reason analysis dimensions is in their utility in discriminating successfully among the several paths to schooling in America and to account for the selection of the paths in terms of the facts of Israeli life. Clusters I and II have been treated as mutually exclusive through a simple arithmetic reduction of the attribute space; Cluster III is analyzed in terms of another set of determinants in the last section of this chapter. Therefore, excluding those who gave none of the sixteen reasons, each respondent may be located along two dimensions:

(1) Academic motives:

  (a) academic star,

  (b) also rans.

(2) Ulterior motives:

  (a) ulterior motive present,

  (b) ulterior motive not present.

---

[1] J. B. Kruskal, "Multidimensional Scaling by Optimizing Goodness to Fit to a Nonmetric Hypothesis," Psychometrika, Vol. 29 (March, 1964), pp. 1-27, and (June, 1964), pp. 115-129; and "Nonmetric Multidimensional Scaling: A Numerical Method," pp. 28-42.

FIGURE 2

MDSCAL PLOT OF REASONS FOR STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES



Reasons

The Israeli educational system is based upon a mixture of public and private initiative and populist and elitist educational doctrine and practice. The basic pattern of education antedates the establishment of the state. Under the mandate, the Jewish community of Palestine, with some limited help from the mandatory government, supported a system of education through high school. The university system was created and supported in partnership with the Jewish communities in the diaspora.[1] With independence in 1948 the basic pattern of education was maintained. The Education Act of 1949 made the voluntary system of universal primary education both compulsory and free. High school education has been supported in part by the central government, in part by local government (municipalities), and is in part dependent on tuition fees.

On the elementary level some form of education is available for the entire population. The system of higher education enrolls a very large proportion of the relevant age cohorts,[2] and the number continues to increase year by year. The elitist pattern shows itself most clearly on the level of secondary education. The comprehensive high school, which is characteristic of American secondary education, is unknown in Israel. In moving from the eighth grade to high school, the student

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[1] On the structure of education in Israel during the mandatory and early state period and some of the relevant bibliographic references, see J. Ber-David, "Professions and Social Structure in Israel," in Roberto Bachi, ed., Scripta Hierosolymitana (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1956), Vol. II, pp. 126-152.

[2] For details, see Chapter VII, pp. 151 ff.

either chooses or is assigned to one of several secondary school options, among which the academic high school is the major road to higher education. Data analyzed for the period 1950-57 shows the following pattern of tracking and drop-out from the first grade on to entrance into the system of higher education:

> Of every 100 who entered elementary school, 84 completed the eighth grade.*
>
> Of every 100 who completed the eighth grade, 73 went on to some secondary education of whom 34 entered non-academic secondary schools and of whom 39 entered an academic secondary school.
>
> Of every 100 who entered an academic secondary school, 51 reached the twelfth grade and 48 sat for the matriculation exam.
>
> Of every 100 boys who passed the matriculation examination, 90 entered university.
>
> Of every 100 girls who passed the matriculation examination, 80 entered university.[1]

*Maximum estimate

More recent data on the proportion of the relevant population which entered the twelfth grade in an academic high school show an increase from 9.8% in 1959 to 13.5% in 1963. However, the "democratization" of high school education has by no means kept pace with the increase in university enrollments.[2] There are those who suggest that the current

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[1] H. V. Muhsam et al., The Supply of Professional Manpower from Israel's Academic System (Jerusalem: Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, March 1959), Hebrew with English summary, pp. v-ix.

[2] Uri Hurwitz and Malkah Yavneh, The Development of Manpower in the Scientific and Technological Professions in Israel (Jerusalem: The National Council for Research and Development, 1964), in Hebrew, p. 29. (Mimeographed.)

high school structure in Israel is a major obstacle in the development of a rational manpower policy.[1] Whether this is true or not is open to question. What seems to be clear, however, is that the structure of secondary education can be a stumbling block for the individual. The type of high school attended is a key determinant of the motives of those who come to study in the United States.

Table 2.5 clearly demonstrates that having attended a non-academic high school clearly limits one's access to higher education, while attendance at an academic high school facilitates entrance to a university in Israel. The major filter mechanism through which the high schools control access to higher education in Israel is the matriculation examination. During the academic year 1966-67 among students in the universities in Israel, 75% held a standard Israeli matriculation certificate, 11% had passed the examination as an external student, 10% held a foreign matriculation certificate, and 4% held some other certificate.[2] Thus, excluding those who hold a foreign matriculation certificate, 95% of the students in universities in Israel hold an Israeli matriculation certificate which in the vast majority of cases was earned in course, while among those studying in the United States the comparable figure is 79%. Among those in the United States who hold a matriculation certificate, 26% may be classified as having come

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[1] Eli Ginzberg, Manpower Surveys, Fourth Report on Manpower in Israel (State of Israel, Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning Authority, 1 December 1964), pp. 5-8. (Mimeographed.)

[2] Statistical Bulletin of Israel, Supplements Volume XVIII, No. 4 (Jerusalem: The Central Bureau of Statistics, April 1967), in Hebrew, p. 120. (Mimeographed.)

TABLE 2.5

TYPE OF HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED BY REASON
FOR STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES

Reason	Type of High School Attended					
	Academic	Agricultural	Externe[1]	Vocational	Other[2]	Abroad
Academic star	71%	62%	53%	40%	56%	65%
Also ran	26	34	43	58	42	35
No academic reason	3	5	5	2	2	-
N	(734)	(110)	(89)	(134)	(273)	(109)

NA, for type of high school attended = 165

[1]matriculation examination not taken in course

[2]normal schools, Yeshivot, n.e.c.

to the United States because their way to further education was blocked in Israel as compared with 60% of those without a matriculation certificate.

The matriculation examination is taken as a matter of course by the students in the twelfth grade in the academic high schools. Some of the agricultural high schools prepare students for the matriculation examinations, while in the vocational trend the matriculation examination is a minor option. The effect of the matriculation certificate within the major secondary school options is shown in Table 2.6.

The different pattern of motives which was found in Table 2.1 between those who had attended academic and agricultural schools is fully explained by the differential likelihood of having received a matriculation certificate in the two school types. In the case of the vocational schools, the difference is in part explained by the matriculation certificate but in part remains unexplained. An additional explanation is found in the level of performance of the students in the two trends.

Since demand for university places exceeds the supply, the candidate for matriculation in higher education in Israel is essentially competing with his fellow students for entrance. Assuming that the student possesses a valid matriculation certificate, he is judged on his level of achievement on the matriculation examination and in certain faculties must pass an entrance examination (termed a concourse) over and above the matriculation examination. Table 2.7 demonstrates that the level of performance on the matriculation examination generates a differential pattern of motives.

TABLE 2.6

TYPE OF HIGH SCHOOL BY MATRICULATION CERTIFICATE
BY REASON FOR STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES

Reason for Studying in the United States	Matriculation Certificate:	Type of High School: Academic		Agricultural		Vocational	
		Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Academic star		74%	43%	76%	40%	52%	29%
Also ran		23	55	20	56	46	69
No academic reason		3	2	5	5	2	3
N		(671)	(58)	(66)	(43)	(48)	(80)

NA on matriculation examination = 12

TABLE 2.7

MATRICULATION EXAMINATION SCORE, BY REASON FOR STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES AMONG THOSE WHO ATTENDED HIGH SCHOOL IN ISRAEL AND EARNED A MATRICULATION CERTIFICATE

Reason for studying in the United States	Matriculation Examination Score			
	9-10	8-8.5	7-7.5	6-6.5
Academic star	87%	79%	63%	53%
Also ran	12	18	33	42
No academic reason	1	3	4	5
N	(86)	(385)	(424)	(115)

NA on matriculation = 22
NA on matriculation score = 32

The lower the student's grades on the matriculation examination, the more likely he is to indicate that he came to the United States because his way was blocked in Israel. There have been those who have argued that the matriculation examination is a less than adequate predictor of later academic achievement, and this indeed may be so.[1] However, the data presented do show that academic achievement, as measured by the matriculation examination, does operate powerfully within the Israeli academic system. This is a theme which we shall have occasion to return to further on in the analysis. Table 2.7 also suggests that academic achievement is positively related to academic motives. The

[1] Leah Orr, "The Reliability of Israeli Matriculation Examinations," Megamot, Vol. 14, No. 4 (August 1966), Hebrew. Michael Hen, Rina Doran and Gad Yatziv, "Do the Matriculation Examinations Predict Success in the Universities?," Megamot, Vol. 12, No. 5 (March, 1963), Hebrew.

lower the level of achievement reported on the matriculation examination, the more likely is the student to report that he had no academic motive for coming to the United States and was motivated by essentially ulterior factors.[1]

Since the matriculation examination is largely geared to an academic curriculum, those who have taken the matriculation examination without adequate academic preparation on the secondary level show a lower level of performance on the examination. Among graduates of the academic high schools, 53% report an average matriculation examination score of 8 or above while the comparable figure for vocational school graduates is 32%. Among those who have taken the examination as external students, that is outside of the regular secondary school structure, the figure is 19%. Comparing the pattern of motives of academic and vocational school graduates with the distribution of matriculation examination scores standardized on the total population of the two types of schools, we find that that part of the differential pattern of motives which was not accounted for by the presence or absence of a matriculation certificate is accounted for by the level of accomplishment on the matriculation examination of students who are graduates of the two types of schools.

In sum, the effect of the high schools attended on the patterns of motives of Israeli students in the United States has appeared in

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[1]On the relationship between academic achievement and the commitment to academic norms, see William J. Bowers, Student Dishonesty and its Control in College (New York Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1964), p. 94 et passim. (Mimeographed.)

Tables 2.5, 2.6 and 2.8. Taking the extreme cases, the differential in Table 2.5 was 32 percentage points between academic high schools and vocational high schools on the proportion who have come to the United States because they could not meet Israeli academic standards. In Table 2.6 we found that the differential was reduced to 14 percentage points among those without a matriculation certificate, and 23 percentage points among those with a matriculation certificate. In Table 2.8, we took into account the level of performance of the students on the matriculation examination in the academic and vocational trends and found that the difference in pattern was reduced to 18 percentage points.

TABLE 2.8

ACADEMIC OR VOCATIONAL HIGH SCHOOL ATTENDED IN ISRAEL, BY MATRICULATION SCORE, BY REASON FOR STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES, STANDARDIZED ON THE TOTAL POPULATION OF THE TWO TYPES OF SCHOOL

Reason for studying in the United States	Type of High School	
	Academic	Vocational
Academic star	73%	60%
Also ran	21	39
No academic reason	4	1
N	(671)	(48)

The Israeli educational system offers little in the way of second chances for those who do not make the grade the first time around. The winnowing out of the academically weaker students continues throughout their term in the university. Among those presenting

some academic reason for being in the United States and who have not earned any degree in Israel, 52% indicate that they came to the United States for a second chance while the comparable percentage for those who hold a bachelor's degree is 11%, and for those who hold a graduate degree it is 4%. Within the university, the student's performance on the undergraduate level is a good predictor of his motives for coming to the United States. Undergraduate performance is a key factor in the decision of the academic authorities as to whether the student will be permitted to go on with graduate work in Israel. Table 2.9 shows the effect of baccalaureate grades on the pattern of motives.

TABLE 2.9

HIGHEST DEGREE ISRAEL BY GRADES ON BA BY RFS (ALSO RAN)

	% Also ran		
	Highest degree Israel		
Grades on BA	None	BA	MA or more
High	44 (192)	5 (76)	1 (96)
Low	55 (711)	13 (220)	5 (111)

NA BA grades = 208

Tables 2.5 through 2.9 show very clearly that for many of the Israeli students in the United States motives expressed when the student is in his twenties are based upon decisions made when he was in his teens. Given a highly pyramidal educational structure, where the

demand for higher education far exceeds the supply, a significant portion of the Israeli students are in the United States not because of the academic or intellectual superiority of the American academic system but rather because the wide range of schools in the United States offers second and third chances for those who could not catch the brass ring on the first go-around in Israel. The Israeli educational system demands a high level of performance and demands that its standards be met consistently throughout the student's academic career. This latter point is essentially the burden of Table 2.9.[1] The implications of these rigorous standards for the issue of the "brain drain" will be taken up in Chapter VII.

Occupational Choice and Reasons for Study in the United States

From 1961 through 1964 the number of places in all Israeli institutions of higher learning increased at a rate of 20% per annum compounded, however the rate of increase in science and technology was only that of 10% per annum compounded.[2] The much smaller rate of increase in the number of students admitted into the faculties of natural science and engineering is not a function of lack of interest in these fields on the part of students but rather is the result of administrative

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[1]Comparisons of the level of achievement in mathematics of Israeli students with their age peers in twelve developed countries show that the Israelis have the highest level of achievement among the thirteen countries. For details, see Torsten Husén, ed., International Study of Achievement in Mathematics, Vol. 2 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 21-35.

[2]Hurwitz, op. cit., p. 20.

decisions on the part of the authorities which have resulted in restricted access to these faculties.[1] A far larger proportion of academically qualified (i.e., in terms of their matriculation examination) are rejected in the faculties of natural science and engineering.[2] The situation in medicine has been most critical where it has been estimated (prior to the opening of the new medical school associated with Tel Aviv University) that only one in six of the applicants has been accepted.[3]

It is difficult to know exactly to what factor or factors the different patterns of development in the several faculties may be attributed. On the one hand, there has been historically a prejudice in favor of humanistic studies in Israeli higher education.[4] On the other hand, the costs per student vary considerably by faculty. A recent report of a government commission gave the following cost estimates per student by faculty:

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[1] Report of the Committee for the Development of the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Science (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, February 1965), in Hebrew, p. 6. (Mimeographed.)

[2] Hurwitz, op. cit., pp. 10-15; Muhsam, op. cit., pp. 51-53.

[3] On some of the issues in the Israeli medical "brain-drain," see M. Prywes, "Sojourns and Emigration of the Graduates of the Medical School to the United States," Medicine, LXXII, No. 8, p. 311, Hebrew.

[4] Norman Kaplan, The Educational Exchange Program: A Pilot Study of Its Impact on Israeli Institutions of Higher Learning (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, December 1965), especially pp. 26-39. (Mimeographed.)

Faculty	Costs per Student[1] (in Israeli pounds)
Humanities and social science	1,930
Law	1,240
Mathematics and natural science	6,880
Agriculture	9,300
Medicine	19,380
Engineering	5,641

If the goal has been to increase the number of places in universities irrespective of manpower needs, it would make sense to make the greatest increase in those areas where the cost per additional student would be lowest. Again, however, it is impossible to know the extent to which the cultural tradition or economic calculations were the determining factors in uneven expansion of the system of higher education.[2]

We have demonstrated that the structure of education in Israel is a prime determinant of motives of Israelis studying in the United States. Is it the case that those faculties in Israel which show the

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[1] Report of the Committee on Higher Education (Jerusalem: October 1965), Hebrew, p. 20. (Mimeographed.)

[2] At the time of this writing, the government supplies over half of the operating budget of the institutions of higher learning. The extent to which government participation ought to give the government the right to oversee university expansion in terms of government-defined manpower needs is currently being debated both within government and university circles. For the basic factors in the argument see the symposium published in the August 1967 issue of The University, pp. 46-57, Hebrew.

highest propensity to come to the United States do so because of limited opportunities in Israel? Table 2.10 presents the pattern of motives for each of the major areas of study.

The most striking finding in Table 2.6 is that of the three fields in which the demand for places far exceeds the supply; it is only engineering which shows a marked difference in the pattern of reasons among the students. As to medicine, although it is a very crowded field in Israel, the United States has not been, at least in recent years, a center for doctoral studies in medicine. The Israeli who is not able to gain admission to a medical school in Israel is likely to turn to Switzerland, Austria or Italy. In the period from 1951 to 1963 there were only 1,200 foreign students in American medical schools (i.e., 1% of the medical school population) of whom 2% were Israelis .[1] It is not a matter simply of Israelis not being able to enter school in Israel which brings them here but rather, in addition, the realistic possibilities of entering school here. As to natural science and engineering faculties, both of which are very circumscribed in Israel, it is only engineering which demonstrates a pattern largely different from those of the other professions. Possibly the problem of engineering may not lie in the discrepancy between supply and demand of places but may be understood in terms of some other characteristic of the engineering profession and/or would-be engineers.

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[1] "Foreign Students in U.S. Medical Schools," datagrams, Association of American Medical Colleges, Vol. 5, No. 6 (December, 1963).

TABLE 2.10

OCCUPATION--FIELD OF STUDY--BY REASON FOR STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES

Reason for studying in the United States	Business	Medicine	Social Science	Nat. Sci. & Mathematics	Humanities Education & and Arts	Engineering
Academic star	71%	76%	68%	68%	65%	50%
Also ran	26	24	31	31	28	48
No academic reason	3	-	2	2	7	2
N	(180)	(86)	(225)	(271)	(220)	(527)

Other = 27

NA on occupation = 78

The answer to the problem of the engineers largely lies in the early training of potential engineers. Those who have attended the academically weaker high schools strongly tend towards engineering as their field of study, as is shown in Table 2.11

Engineers are less likely to have the basic matriculation document without which entrance into the Technion is impossible. Beyond that, even among those who do hold a matriculation certificate, engineers tend to have a lower level of academic qualification than their colleagues in the natural sciences. Among those who attended an academic high school, 62% of the natural scientists scored 8 or better on their matriculation examinations while the comparable figure for engineers is only 46%. Taking into account the academic competence of engineers and natural scientists, we find that much of the remaining difference between the two fields is accounted for by their different level of accomplishment.

Table 2.12 demonstrates that, holding grades constant, the difference within fields is greater than the difference across fields. The different level of intellectual achievement, and perhaps values, will become significant for us further on in Chapter VI. The pattern of a greater difference within fields than across fields holds in the case of every occupational field except business administration. The pattern holds in every field in which there is a viable Israeli alternative, and those who do not take the Israeli alternative choose the United States as their second-chance option. In the case of business administration, the level of instruction in Israel has been rather

TABLE 2.11

TYPE OF HIGH SCHOOL BY OCCUPATION--FIELD OF STUDY

	Type of High School				
Occupational field	Academic	Vocational	Agricultural	Other	Externe
Engineering	29%	69%	19%	35%	43%
Medicine	5	2	6	4	5
Natural Science and Mathematics	18	2	33	14	10
Social Science	16	5	11	13	18
Business	14	7	8	9	6
Humanities, Education and the Arts	13	10	17	17	11
Other and None Indicated	4	5	6	8	8
N	(734)	(134)	(110)	(273)	(89)

High school abroad = 109

NA on High School = 165

TABLE 2.12

OCCUPATION--FIELD OF STUDY, BY MATRICULATION GRADES BY REASON FOR STUDYING IN THE UNITED STATES AMONG THOSE WHO HAVE PASSED THE MATRICULATION EXAMINATION IN AN ACADEMIC HIGH SCHOOL

Reason for studying in the United States	Matriculation examination grades:	Occupation: Engineer 8 and over	Occupation: Engineer 7.5 and less	Occupation: Science 8 and over	Occupation: Science 7.5 and less
Academic star		80	51	83	64
Also ran		20	45	16	32
No academic reason		0	4	1	2
N		(89)	(103)	(81)	(50)

NA grades = 7

primitive until very recently. Business administration had its beginnings in Israel in 1957 as a non-degree granting program, organized by the United States Operations Mission. It is only since 1964 that a degree program has been developed, and the field is still struggling for academic respectability within the structure of the Mitteleuropa conservative intellectualism of Israeli academic life. Thus it is that the pattern of motives in business administration shows little or no difference among academic high school graduates when stratified by matriculation score grades. Since business administration has been academically rather weak in Israel, we expect to see a rather different picture in a few years when business administration becomes a reputable part of the Israeli university system.

TABLE 2.13

MATRICULATION SCORE BY REASONS FOR STUDY IN THE UNITED STATES RESTRICTED TO GRADUATES OF ACADEMIC HIGH SCHOOLS WHO HAVE STUDIED BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES

Reason for studying in the United States	Matriculation Examination Grade: 8 and over	7.5 and less
Academic star	90%	89%
Also ran	5	9
No academic reason	5	2
N	(41)	(45)

NA on grades = 6

One last part of the highly structured traditionalist academic system in Israel is that of the high level of specialization which is characteristic of both Israeli high schools and universities. On the university level, the student is required to study two majors. The broad-based liberal arts background which is characteristic of American education is unknown in Israel, though there are some who would want to move Israeli higher education in that direction. Specialization is also characteristic of the high school system. At the end of the tenth grade in the academic high schools, the student must choose a megama, i.e., academic trend or major. The basic trends are Réal (i.e., physical science and mathematics), biological sciences (which is rather similar to the Réal option in terms of its emphasis on natural science and mathematics), humanities and social science. The last two are self-explanatory. In the main, the student's choice of university subject(s) is congruent with his high school major. However, what is the result of a shift in interest? Does the student who has emphasized the sciences in high school find himself at a loss if he later decides on the humanities or social sciences? To what measure, if any, does an incongruent pattern of choices on the high school and university levels lead to the students being at a competitive disadvantage in going on with his education in Israel.

Table 2.14 demonstrates that the student who moves from the humanities and social sciences to the natural sciences and engineering suffers from a very small disadvantage. The student who shifts in the opposite direction finds that his chances have actually been improved.

TABLE 2.14

ACADEMIC HIGH SCHOOL ONLY
(% also ran)

	High school major	
	Humanities and Social Science	Realit and Bio. Science
Engineering and Natural Science	33 (48)	30 (279)
Humanities and Social Science	27 (128)	17 (63)

One would have to conclude that, at least in regard to the question of access to higher education, early specialization within the academic high school presents no particular problems.

Ulterior Reasons for studying in the United States

In several tables in the preceding section, we found that there were students who were motivated entirely by non-academic factors. Educational exchange served as a way of leaving an uncomfortable situation at home and/or offered the opportunity to see the world. Most of those who have expressed ulterior reasons for coming to the United States have also expressed some academic motives as well, and their motives tend strongly to be located in the also-ran category, as was shown in Figure 2.

In terms of the relationship of ulterior reasons with the academic-occupational sectors, we find that those who express ulterior reasons are less committed to their professions. Among those who indicate a marked preference for their current occupational choice,

19% indicate that they were motivated, at least in part, by ulterior factors in contrast to 26% of those who would consider another profession. This finding is congruent with the earlier findings which demonstrated that academic achievement was correlated with academic motives. As a general rule, ulterior reasons motivate those students who have less in the way of responsibilities and commitments in Israel and who are more subject to discomforting pressures in Israel.

TABLE 2.15

DETERMINANTS OF ULTERIOR REASONS FOR COMING TO THE UNITED STATES

	% Ulterior Reasons for Coming to the United States	
Age at arrival	25 or under	26 or over
NA age = 38	27 (921)	14 (655)
Marital status on arrival	Not married	Married
NA marital status on arrival = 32	27 (515)	9 (1067)
Sex*	Female	Male
NA sex = 8	34 (266)	19 (1409)

*The sex differential is somewhat exaggerated since those who indicated that their spouse's decision to study in the United States was a factor for their coming to the United States were excluded from the reason analysis as mentioned above. Those removed were disproportionately married females. However a significant sex differential remains even when controlled for age and marital status on arrival.

Some of the demographic factors examined in Table 2.15 bear a strong relationship to one another so that in part the findings are further explicable in terms of these relationships. Those who are married upon arrival obviously tend to be somewhat older so that marital status on arrival accounts for part of the differential pattern by age of arrival.

TABLE 2.16

AGE AT ARRIVAL BY MARITAL STATUS ON ARRIVAL BY ULTERIOR REASON FOR COMING TO THE UNITED STATES

	% ulterior reason for coming to the United States	
Marital status on arrival	25 or less	26 or more
Married	14 (160)	7 (340)
Not married	29 (746)	21 (302)

NA marital status on arrival and/or age at arrival = 66

Where in Table 2.15 the difference between the two age groups was 13 points, when stratified by marital status on arrival the difference is reduced by about half. Thus age generates a network of responsibilities which in turn force one to offer hostages to fortune. Taking into account the three demographic characteristics simultaneously, we find that young unmarried females are the most likely to come for ulterior reasons (42%) while older married males are least likely (6%) The pattern conforms to that which would be expected in the way of differential susceptibility to familial pressures at home and willingness or ability to take risks without clear promise of gain.

CHAPTER III

THE PREDETERMINANTS OF RETURN TO ISRAEL

We shall be examining some of the major predeterminants of the Israeli student's decision to return to Israel or remain in the United States. By predeterminants is meant the early life experiences of the student, largely unrelated to formal education and occupation, which serve to encourage or inhibit repatriation. Less than 2% of the students have indicated that they were motivated by an overt wish to migrate (see Appendix D). Despite the fact that overt intentions of migration are rarely mentioned, it is quite reasonable to assume that there are life experiences which predispose the student to seek immigrant status once in the United States. In all liklihood, perhaps unbeknownst to the student, part of the decision process or better yet the framework for the decision process antedates his arrival in the United States. In the second section of this chapter we shall examine some of the mechanisms through which the predisposing factors operate.

The Home

Familial Zionist Background

The State of Israel as a political entity is the product of a multitude of historical factors among which was the activity of the Zionist movement. Of course not all those who participated in the

Zionist movement emigrated to Israel nor did all of those who did emigrate participate in the Zionist movement. However, one might expect that individuals who have grown up in Zionist homes would be more likely to have developed a commitment to Israel which would predispose them to return home. Among new immigrants to Israel in the 1950's, those who had been members of the Zionist movement in their countries of origin were far more optimistic about their prospects in Israel.[1] The question we raise is whether the commitments of the fathers are communicated to the children and if in turn these commitments are among the factors which determine return to Israel.

TABLE 3.1

PARENTAL ZIONIST BACKGROUND BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(Both parents born abroad only)

	Zionist Affiliations of Parents			
Probability of Return	Neither Parent	Father Alone	Mother Alone	Both Parents
High	37%	37%	43%	48%
Medium	20	22	24	17
Low	41	38	31	33
NA	1	3	3	2
N	(535)	(336)	(101)	(697)

Table 3.1 indicates that parental participation in the Zionist movement is a factor in the individual's decision to return to Israel.

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[1]Judith Shuval, Immigrants on the Threshold (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), Chapters 4 and 5.

Where there is only one Zionist parent, mother alone is efficacious while father alone is not. There are two possible sources for the differential effect of mother's over against father's participation in the Zionist movement, affording equally plausible explanations. The first is that since the mother plays the primary role in the socialization of the child her Zionist sentiments would be more readily communicated to the child than would be the father's. The other explanation refers back to the structure of Jewish life in Eastern Europe where the Zionist movement represented a break with Jewish religious traditionalism. European Hebrew literature prior to the first World War portrayed the Zionist woman as a rebel while picturing the Zionist man as a more conventional creature.[1] In Eastern Europe, the Zionist woman had to make a greater break with her traditionalist society than was the case for the Zionist man. The sex differential might well have been a difference of degree of commitment. The social price for participation in the Zionist movement was higher for women than for men, and so it is likely that a larger proportion of female participants in the Zionist movement were strongly committed to the Zionist movement than was the case for the men. Given the requisite data, the two theses could be tested by comparing the impact of the West European in contrast to East European Zionist women. Unfortunately there are too few cases of West European Zionist women married to non-Zionist men to permit further analysis.

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[1] Information supplied by Professor Isaac Barzilay, Columbia University (1967).

Social Class of Origin

It has been found by other investigators that the foreign student's propensity to return is related to his social class of origin. This has been shown to be the case among those coming from a western industrialized area, Scandinavia,[1] as well as among those who come from a traditionalist society, Iran.[2] The Israeli students manifest the same pattern.

TABLE 3.2

SOCIAL CLASS AS MEASURED BY FATHER'S EDUCATION BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(Full population, i.e., parents born abroad and/or in Israel)

Probability of Return	Less than Primary	Full Primary	Some or full High School	Some or full University
High	34%	41%	43%	45%
Medium	21	19	19	17
Low	42	38	37	35
NA	3	2	2	3
N	(276)	(255)	(777)	(569)

NA father's education = 57

The higher the social class as measured by father's education, the greater the inclination to return to Israel. Those investigations which have reported the social class-repatriation correlation have not

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[1]Sewell, op. cit.

[2]Valipour, op. cit.

explained the relationship. The relationship between social class and propensity to return is explicable in two ways. There is evidence that indicates that social class position generates differential access to the opportunity structure.[1] The higher the social class of origin, the greater the individual's access to persons of influence who could help the course of one's career. This thesis assumes that the stratification system either modifies or displaces an opportunity structure based upon training and ability, or indeed controls access to training and brings to bear particularistic criteria for career development. If this thesis were to explain the data, then the higher the social class of origin, the more the respondents would report access to persons who would be helpful in the course of one's career; such access in turn should explain the relationship between social class and propensity to return. The second thesis assumes differential socialization by social class. That is, the higher the social class of origin, the greater the commitment to the society as it is. The second thesis finds its explanatory factor in psychic rather than material rootedness.

In the aggregate, the Israeli students see the United States as a more open society in which particularistic criteria are less likely to operate in advancing one's career.[2] The opposite situation seems to be so well institutionalized in Israel as to have been given a name

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[1]Bernard Barber, Social Stratification (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1937), Chapter 10 et passim; Jean Floud, "Social Class Factors in Educational Achievement," in A. H. Halsey, ed., Ability and Educational Opportunity (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1961).

[2]See Appendix D.

borrowed from the Russian of the early Zionists. That term is Protectzia, now called by many of the younger Israelis, Vitamin P. Despite the student's perception of the ubiquity of protectzia in Israel, the claim to protectzia bears no relationship to their decision to return (Tau b = .017) nor does it relate to their social class backgrounds (Tau b = .001).

One way of testing the second thesis, namely that social class generates psychic rather than material rootedness in the society, is to introduce another factor which we have found to bear some relationship to psychic rootedness. A major struggle of the Zionist ideologues of Europe and the young Zionist community of Palestine was that of the relative priority of class and national identities. In Eastern Europe, among those Jews who had broken with religious orthodoxy, Zionism was the major nationalist option while Bundism was the major class option.

> Zionism is the movement of the Jewish bourgeoisie, as socialism is the movement of the worker masses in general and of all those who are interested that the workers should have a better life on this earth. And just as between the bourgeoisie and the worker there can never be any peace, SO CAN THERE NEVER BE ANY PEACE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND ZIONISM.[1]

In the intellectual climate in which Zionist ideology emerged, the class issue had to be dealt with, but the Zionists asserted that the class struggle would have to await the creation of an independent Jewish commonwealth. This position was taken even by Borochov, the most radical of the socialist Zionists, and of course was accepted by

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[1] Der Yiddisher Arbeiter, London, March, 1899, p. 6, cited in "The Evolution of the 'Bund' to 1903," Harold S. Rabinovitch, unpublished Master's essay, Columbia University, 1956, p. 79, emphasis in the original.

the more moderate socialists such as Syrkin.[1] In the early history of the Histadrut, it became necessary to decide whether the Histadrut would serve primarily as an instrument of national renaissance or of class struggle. The issue came to a head in the 1920's around the discussion of the admission of Arab workers into the Histadrut. It was clearly decided that the primary concern of the Histadrut was the national "revolution" rather than the economic-social revolution.[2] Where Zionist socialization did occur, one might well expect that social class position would cease to have subjective meaning. This was the fear of the Jewish socialists in Russia, expressed right after the failure of the revolution of 1905.

> The Congress considers Zionism a reaction of the bourgeois class to antisemitism and the abnormal legal position of the Jewish people.
>
> The Congress finds the ultimate goal of political zionism--the securing of territory for the Jewish people--in so far as it holds a small part of it--an act, which doesn't have a great significance and doesn't solve the "Jewish problem," and in as much as it lays claim to gather all the Jewish people or at least a significant part of it--is utopian and impracticable.
>
> The Congress believes that agitation of the Zionists foments national feeling and may hinder the growth of class consciousness.[3]

The Bundist fear was expressed in terms of traditional Marxist concern over class consciousness, which differs somewhat from the argument

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[1] For relevant extracts from the works of the Zionist theorists, see Arthur Hertzberg, The Zionist Idea (New York: Doubleday, 1959).

[2] Fred Sherrow, "The Arabs of Palestine as Seen Through Jewish Eyes," unpublished Master's essay, Columbia University, 1965, Chap. IV.

[3] Materiali k istorii Yevreiskava rabochevo dvizhenie (St. Petersburg: Tribun, 1906), p. 118, cited in Rabinovitch, op. cit., p. 95. Emphasis added.

developed here. The question relates to the conditions under which social class will determine behavior irrespective of whether or not the actor is consciously motivated by class position, i.e., does class correlated or determined behavior occur in the presence of strong national identity.

Our data suggest that the fear of the socialists was justified. Social class seems to have no impact in the presence of a Zionist background.

TABLE 3.3

SOCIAL CLASS AS MEASURED BY FATHER'S EDUCATION
BY PARENTAL ZIONIST BACKGROUND
BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(Both parents born abroad)

Per cent High Probability of Return

	Zionist Background	
Social Class	High	Low
High	47 (579)	40 (576)
Low	46 (219)	31 (295)

Ethnic Background

Israeli society is a society of immigrants in which one's ethnic background plays an important role in everyday life. The major ethnic division within the Israeli Jewish community is that between Europeans and Orientals. The Orientals have been called the "Second Israel." Whether justified or not, 29% of those of Oriental origin feel that discrimination is a problem for them as compared with 3% of those of

European origin. We had expected that the Orientals would be less likely to return to Israel, and our expectation is borne out by the data.

TABLE 3.4

ETHNIC BACKGROUND BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(Both parents foreign born only; ethnically exagomous marriages classified as Oriental)

Probability of Return	Ethnicity	
	Oriental	European
High	31%	43%
Medium	24	19
Low	45	36
NA	-	2
N	(104)	(1565)

Is it the fear of discrimination which keeps Orientals from returning home? In the words of one Oriental student: "In Israel I am black; here I am white." In the United States, all Israelis look alike. The distinctions which obtain in Israel between Oriental and European have no social meaning in the United States.[1] In point of fact, however, though the Orientals are more likely to express fears of ethnic discrimination, their fears do not explain their lower rate of return to Israel (Cramer's V = .118).

Two characteristics of the student's family background have been identified which are relevant to his decision to return to Israel;

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[1]On the importance of societal context in determining the meaning of social statuses, see Ralph Linton, The Study of Man (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936), Chapter 8.

namely, social class and parental Zionist background. Israeli census data show a much lower general level of education of Oriental immigrants than of European immigrants to Israel. Further, the Zionist movement was largely, though not entirely, a European movement. In the study population, 42% of those classified as Orientals report that their father's education included at least some high school training while the comparable figure for those of European backgrounds is 71%. Similarly, 19% of the Orientals report that they come from Zionist homes while 50% of the Europeans report Zionist homes. In the light of these factors, it is reasonable to expect that the differential propensity to return of the two ethnic communities may well be largely a function of social characteristics associated with ethnicity rather than some factor intrinsic to ethnicity itself. Given the very skewed pattern of the relationships with the associated characteristics and the large number of comparisons which one would have to make if one were to take into account each of the associated characteristics separately, the data for the two ethnic communities are presented in the form of standardized tables. That is, we are saying that if the Europeans had the same social class background and Zionist background as the Orientals, would there still be any difference in their propensity to return to Israel? (See Table 3.5.)

The data are clear in showing that the differential propensity to return is to a significant degree a function of factors associated with ethnicity rather than ethnicity itself. This is not to suggest that ethnicity has no meaning, but rather that much of its meaning is to be found in social characteristics which bear no intrinsic necessary

TABLE 3.5

ETHNIC BACKGROUND BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(Parental Zionism and social class
standardized on Oriental population)

	Ethnic Background	
Probability of Return	Oriental	European*
High	32%	38%
Medium	24	20
Low	45	40
NA	-	-
N	(101)	(1521)

NA SES = 47

*Rounding error

relationship with ethnicity. The roots of the differential rates of return by ethnic group are not to be found in present Israeli culture or social structure but rather in the history of the ethnic communities in their countries of origin.

The Social World beyond the Family

Urban-rural Differentials

Israel is a very heavily urbanized country, one of the most heavily urbanized of all of the industrialized nations.[1] The concentration of population in the cities has been a matter of concern to the

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[1]Emrys Jones, Towns and Cities (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 14.

government and efforts have been made to disperse the population. The government has been motivated largely by two issues: defense, and the development of the Negev and Gaille. A third issue relevant to the problem of the over-urbanization of Israel is that of social and cultural differences between urban and rural populations. The cities produce an Israeli who is somewhat different from his country cousin. Shock troops, career military officers, pilots and others engaged in hazardous national service are very disproportionately recruited from the rural population. As a general proposition, one would expect that the rural population might have stronger commitments to their society.[1] This expectation is borne out in Table 3.6.

TABLE 3.6

LOCATION OF HIGH SCHOOL BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Location of High School		
Probability of Return	City	Town or Village	High School Abroad, Geographically Unclassifiable, No Answer or No Report
High	42%	55%	32%
Medium	18	20	19
Low	38	23	46
NA	2	2	3
N	(1164)	(304)	(466)

[1]Louis Wirth, "Urbanism as a Way of Life," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 44 (1938).

Is the urban-rural difference a function of cultural ambiance per se, or is it in some way a function of the kinds of families found in the two areas? There is some positive relationship between social class and residence in a city and Zionist background and residence in a town or village, and the two factors moving in opposite directions cancel one another out, as it were, so that 69% of those from an urban background are classifiable as high Zionism-SES while 68% of those from a rural background are high Zionism-SES. Taking into account urban-rural settings jointly, the differential found in Table 3.6 is maintained.

TABLE 3.7

ZIONISM-SES OF PARENTS BY LOCATION OF HIGH SCHOOL BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(Per cent high probability of return)

	Location of High School	
Zionism-SES of Parents	City	Town or Village
High	46 (803)	59 (207)
Low	34 (361)	47 (97)

The Youth Movements

The youth movements in Israel have a long history, going back to the Zionist movement in Europe. The major youth movements existed in Europe before they came into existence in Israel, and in a sense they are repositories of the experiences of European Jewry in the days when

a Jewish commonwealth was a dream.[1] They are oriented toward pioneering values and they are national-patriotic movements. With the exception of the Tzofim (scouts) and the working youth movements, they are all tied to political parties in Israel.

The major movements and their party affiliations are listed below beginning with the non-communist left and through to the nationalist right.

MOVEMENT	PARTY
(Hatzofim	No party)
Hashomer Hatzair	Mapam
Machnoth Ha Olim	Achdut Avoda
Hanoar Haoved	Mapai-Achdut Avoda
Hatnoa Hamaochadet	Mapai
B'nai Akivah	National Religious Party
Maccabi	General Zionist
Betar	Herut

A typology has been constructed in which the several movements are classified along two dimensions: whether or not they are clearly ideological, and whether they tend to be pragmatic, or strident and rigid in their ideology. The classification of the youth movements parallels recent findings on the orientation of the leadership of the several parties toward the government which reflect the attitudes of the "ins" and "outs." However, participation in the government in turn seems to be a reflection of the extent to which the party is pragmatically

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[1] On the youth movements in Israel, see S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1956); for a discussion of Zionist youth movements in Europe, see Walter Z. Laqueur, Young Germany (New York: Basic Books, 1962), Chapter 9.

ideological and thus broad-based, rather than ideologically purist and thereby sectarian or strident.[1]

The classification follows:

Strident ideological	Hashomer Hatzair Betar
Pragmatic ideological	Hatnoa Hamaochedit Hanoar Haoved Machnoth Ha-Olim Beni-Akivah
Non-ideological	Hatzofim Maccabi

It may seem strange to find the far left and far right parties classified together, but both groups are associated with parties which have been, in the main, part of the political opposition rather than part of the government. Neither group has been noted for its willingness to develop pragmatic solutions for the political and economic problems of Israel, but rather have demanded that the state be governed by principles which they hold dear. We would expect them then, despite the strong loyalties to the movement which they engender, to be breeding grounds for dissatisfaction and vehicles for sharp dissent. (See Table 3.8.)

Participation in a youth movement in and of itself has no effect. Those who were members of a non-ideological movement or a strident ideological youth movement are no more likely to return home than are those who report no youth movement experience at all. The pragmatically

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[1]Lester G. Seligman, Leadership in a New Nation (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), particularly pp. 78-79.

TABLE 3.8

YOUTH MOVEMENT AND PROBABILITY OF RETURN

Probability of Return	Youth Movement: Non-Ideological	Pragmatic Ideological	Strident Ideological	No Youth Movement Reported
High	37%	49%	39%	40%
Medium	19	20	20	16
Low	41	28	39	42
NA	2	2	2	2
N	(558)	(588)	(175)	(613)

ideological youth movements however, in which about 30% of the population participated, do have a strong effect in the expected direction. Again we must raise the question as to whether or not this is the independent effect of the youth movements or whether there has been differential recruitment into the youth movements by familial background which accounts for Table 3.8.

TABLE 3.9

YOUTH MOVEMENT MEMBERSHIP BY PARENTAL SES-ZIONISM

Youth movement	Parental SES-Zionism: High	Low
Non-ideological	29%	29%
Pragmatic ideological	33	26
Strident ideological	11	6
No youth movement reported	28	39
N	(1287)	(647)

Persons of high SES-Zionist background are more likely to have participated in some youth movement and have tended to choose the pragmatic ideological and strident ideological groups. However participation in the youth movements shows its effect independent of home background.

TABLE 3.10

PARENTAL SES-ZIONISM BY YOUTH MOVEMENT MEMBERSHIP BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(Among those who report some youth movement participation, per cent who state that probability of return is "high")

	Youth Movement		
Parental SES-Zionism	Non-ideological	Pragmatic Ideological	Strident Ideological
High	40 (371)	53 (419)	38 (136)
Low	31 (187)	41 (169)	41 (39)

For the major options--that is non-ideological and pragmatic ideological youth movements--which comprise 91% of the cases, we find the independent effect of family background and youth group membership in the direction expected. In the case of strident ideological, familial characteristics largely disappear. We suggest that this may be a function of the very strong commitment to the group per se which these organizations demand of their members. Under these conditions, the youth group becomes a surrogate family, and family characteristics which have been relevant for less demanding groups no longer have any impact.

We have examined several social characteristics which we had reason to expect would bear some relationship to the student's decision to remain in the United States or to return to Israel. Taking into account his social class of origin, his parental Zionist background, his youth movement participation, and the urban or rural location of his adolescent years, we have constructed an index which we have termed the Background Socialization Characteristics (BSC) index. When all of the items are clustered and added, we find the following relationship between the index and the probability of return.

TABLE 3.11

BACKGROUND SOCIALIZATION CHARACTERISTICS INDEX
BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	BSC Index		
Probability of Return	High	Medium	Low
High	56%	39%	32%
Medium	18	19	19
Low	23	41	46
NA	2	2	3
N	(525)	(943)	(466)

Some evidence has been presented in this section to suggest very strongly that the background characteristics operate through some socialization mechanisms. If this is true, then we should be able to present some valuative or attitudinal measure which would explain, at least in part, the effect of the background factors. The elements which entered into the BSC index are rather diverse so that no one item fully captures

the impact of the characteristics. There are several subjective variables which explain small parts of the variance, however among all of the subjective variables, the variable which is most diffuse and pervasive shows the greatest degree of explanatory power. That variable is the significance of being an Israeli in the student's decision to return home or not.

TABLE 3.12

BSC INDEX OF THE FACT OF BEING AN ISRAELI AS AN INFLUENCE IN DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO RETURN BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(% High Probability of Return)

	The Fact of Being an Israeli is an Influence in Deciding Whether or not to Return	
BSC Class	Yes	No
High	60% (460)	21% (57)
Medium	45 (772)	9 (157)
Low	42 (314)	10 (133)

NA all on influences to return = 41

The Ways in Which the Background Socialization Characteristics operate to facilitate Return to Israel

Having identified a key set of childhood and adolescent circumstances and experiences which generate differential propensity to return, we turn now to an examination of the ways in which these factors operate. In order to account for the operation of the BSC index, we must take into account a peculiarity of the structure of the population of the Israeli students in the United States and the relationship of that peculiarity to length of time in the United States. During any given period, there are flows of students between the United States and Israel in both directions. The primary population of the study consists of the flows and stock in one direction only, namely from Israel to the United States. We do know the basic demographic and educational characteristics of those Israeli students who returned to Israel during the period 1965-66 and the length of their sojourn in the United States. These data have been analyzed in Appendix B where the patterns of actual returns have been compared with the expectations of return among those in the primary population. If we can reconstruct the return flow population, going back to an earlier period in time, we shall be able to identify more precisely the ways in which the Background Socialization Characteristics actually operate.

Taking the population of those Israelis currently in the United States, the rate of projected return decreases as we go back in time. Similar findings have led other investigators to imply that there is

some causal relationship between time in the United States and the probability of return for any given group of foreign students.[1] However, this pattern is as likely to be artifactual as it is to be real.

TABLE 3.13

PERIOD OF ARRIVAL BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	64-66	62-63	60-61	59 and prior
High	60%	47%	30%	17%
Medium	18	24	21	11
Low	20	27	47	66
NA	2	2	2	3
N	(646)	(52?)	(306)	(435)

NA period of arrival = 24

For example, let us assume that in 1964, one hundred Israeli students had entered the United States of whom eighty were sure that they would return to Israel. By 1966, thirty students had returned to Israel and these thirty were all part of the group of eighty who initially were sure that they would return. The shift in stock would generate a false picture of erosion of intent to return. Translating this phenomenon into terms of rates of intent to return, we would find

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[1] Godwin C. Chu, Student Expatriation, A Function of Relative Social Support (Stanford, Calif: Institute for Communications Research, Stanford University, n.d.), pp. 14, 15. (Mimeographed.) Chu suggests "that student expatriation is more likely a result of being exposed to experiences abroad, rather than a matter of prior departure decision" (p. 15). See also Sewell, op. cit., p. 37.

that in 1964 80% of the Israeli students were sure of returning while by 1966 the figure is reduced to 71%, though in fact no erosion had actually occurred. Thus though the correlation between time in the United States and rate of intended return might be quite real, any inference of a causal relationship would be false. On examining the intentions of those who entered the United States during the period 1965-66, i.e., prior to the likelihood of erosion of intent taking place on a significant scale, we do find that probability of return is related to the total amount of time the student initially expected to remain in the United States.

TABLE 3.14

INITIAL TIME EXPECTED TO REMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(1965-66 cohort)

Probability of return	Less than one year	1-2 plus years	3-4 plus years	5-6 plus years	7 years or more
High	90%	73%	54%	51%	0%
Medium	10	9	27	30	0
Low	0	15	16	19	83
NA	0	3	3	0	17
N	(10)	(138)	(126)	(37)	(6)

NA initial time expectation = 3

From the very beginning, expected length of time in the United States is related to the probability of return. This suggests that the relationship presented in Table 3.13 may well indeed be artifactual rather than real. That is, those who expect to remain in the United

States for a rather long period are initially less sure that they will return to Israel, thus they remain in the "left-over" stock population and create the illusion of a real decay curve. When we examine the base figures for each period of entry partialled by the initial length of expected time in the United States, we find that the base figures go down most sharply when the outer limit of the initial time period is reached.

TABLE 3.15

PERIOD OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES BY INITIAL TIME EXPECTATION BY NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS IN THE RELEVANT CATEGORY

*Initial time expected to be in the U.S.	Number of respondents in each category (absolute numbers) '65-'66	'64	'63	'62	'61	'60	'59	'58**
1-2 years	138	118	64	45	27	28	19	19
3-4 years	126	144	129	111	55	46	32	25
5-6 years	37	45	59	72	63	44	33	29

*Less than one year, 7 years or more and permanent excluded = 170

**'57 and prior excluded

NA initial time expected to be in the United States = 16

Rows one and two in Table 3.15 are strikingly clear in demonstrating that the population base falls sharply at the point where those who should have gone home, i.e., in terms of their initial time projections, have gone home, offering further support for the thesis that the decay curve is artifactual rather than real. Row three is clearly not persuasive showing a rather random pattern of base figures by year of entry.

A further test of the thesis that the decay curve is artifactual rather than real entails our examining the probability of return by time of entry into the United States stratified by expected time in the United States. Following on Table 3.15, we should expect to find that "erosion" of intent shows sharply at the outer limit of the initial time projection.

TABLE 3.16

PERIOD OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES BY INITIAL TIME EXPECTED TO BE IN THE UNITED STATES BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

*Initial time expected to be in the United States	% high probability of return							
	'65-'66	'64	'63	'62	'61	'60	'59	'58**
1-2 years	73 (138)	75 (118)	56 (64)	53 (45)	30 (27)	25 (28)	16 (19)	11 (19)
3-4 years	54 (126)	58 (144)	56 (129)	50 (111)	46 (55)	30 (46)	41 (32)	36 (25)
5-6 years	51 (37)	33 (45)	36 (59)	42 (72)	25 (63)	32 (44)	24 (33)	31 (29)

*less than one year, 7 years or more and permanent excluded = 170

**'57 and prior excluded

NA initial time expected to be in the United States = 16

Table 3.16 presents a pattern strikingly similar to Table 3.15, suggesting further that the decay curve is artifactual rather than real, and implying that time in the United States is not a major factor in generating non-return but is rather a correlate of non-return. There is one further way of testing the causal as against the artifactual explanations of the relationship of time in the United States and

propensity to return. We shall attempt to reconstruct the stock of Israeli students in the United States from 1958 on and estimate the return flows from 1958 on. The most recent available data on the number of recipients of student visas is based on the tabulations for fiscal year 1964-65.[1] Taking 1964-65 as our base year, we will take into account the annual increase in the number of Israeli students coming into the United States. Our indicator of the number of students will be the number who receive student visas for each fiscal year. Thus, 1964 will be given the index number 100, and for each relevant prior year an index number will be calculated based upon the number of student visas issued to Israelis for that year as a percentage of the number issued for the base year 1964. We will assume that the proportion for each year of entry of the population which responded to the questionnaire has remained constant. Based upon the actual number of respondents for 1964 and assuming a constant hypothetical rate of response to the questionnaire, by year of entry, we shall estimate the number of Israeli students who would have responded, if none had

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[1]Since we have had to use 1964-65 as our base year rather than 1965-66, we have not been able to take into account the increase, if any, in the rate of flows into the United States during the period 1965-66. Thus it is quite likely that the index numbers computed to adjust for the secular increase of flows into the United States are lower than they should be. Furthermore, since the data were collected beginning with the closing period of the academic year 1965-66 and follow-up mailings continued through the summer and fall of 1966, in all likelihood, the study understates the rate of repatriation of those who stayed but one year. The data of the Ministry of Labour indicate that this group constituted a very significant part of the population (see Appendix B). Therefore, from these perspectives, the total estimated rate of return flows are probably underestimated for all years, though the annual pattern should not be affected.

returned home up to the time of the distribution of the questionnaire. Assuming that the difference between the hypothetical number of students in the study by period of entry and the number actually responding is the result of some students having returned home, we shall calculate an estimate of the proportion of each cohort which has already returned home. Taking those who are still here, we shall assume that all of those who are classified as high probability of return will return, and that half of those who are classified as medium probability of return will return, and that none of those will return who are classified as low probability or who have not answered the question on probability of return. Finally, we shall calculate an estimate of total rate of return for each year's cohort to determine if there has been any perceptible erosion of intent to return by period of entry. The relevant data and results of the calculations are presented in Table 3.17.

A conservative interpretation of Tables 3.15 through 3.17 would suggest that the decay curve pattern shown in Table 3.13 is to a very large degree (and we cannot state the extent with any precision) an artifact of the nature of the population rather than a pattern of the erosion of the intent to return generated by experiences undergone while the student is in the United States.[1]

Keeping in mind the nature of the population and the problem of artifactual and real decay curves, we return to our analysis of the ways in which the background socialization characteristics generate

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[1] A comparable issue will be dealt with in Chapter V where we shall be examining the effect of marriage to a non-Israeli while in the United States.

TABLE 3.17

RECONSTRUCTION OF TOTAL STOCK AND FLOWS
FOR THE PERIOD 1958 THROUGH 1965

	'65	'64	'63	'62	'61	'60	'59	'58
Number of respondents (base figure)	320	326	275	248	163	143	100	89
Number of student visas issued		562	552	522	492	456	396	337
Index number of student visas issued. FY 54-65 = 100		100	98	93	88	81	70	60
Estimate of size of reported population assuming that all years would have had the same pattern of response	320	326	317	300	284	262	226	193
Estimate of the proportion of the population already returned to Israel	0	0	13	17	43	45	56	54
Estimate of the remainder who will return presented as a percentage of the hypothetical original population	71	67	55	46	25	21	16	15
Estimate of the percentage of each cohort who will or have already returned	71	67	68	63	68	66	72	69

57 and prior excluded

differential patterns of intent and actual return to Israel. Initially, there is no perceptible difference by socialization class on initial time projection in the United States. Taking 1964-66 as our base period, we find that for those classified high on the BSC index the mean initial time expectation was 3.3 years, for those classified as medium it was 3.5 years and for those classified as low it was 3.4 years. However from the very outset, the BSC shows up rather strongly as a determinant of probability of return, and the initial differential is maintained (and actually increased somewhat) as we go back in time.

TABLE 3.18

PERIOD OF ENTRY BY BACKGROUND SOCIALIZATION CHARACTERISTICS BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(Per cent high probability of return)

Background Socialization Characteristics Class	Period of entry			
	1964-66	1962-63	1960-61	1959 & prior
High	68 (220)	56 (144)	43 (88)	36 (69)
Medium	57 (299)	45 (261)	25 (147)	16 (221)
Low	53 (127)	42 (118)	23 (71)	13 (145)

NA period of arrival = 24

The data in Table 3.18 indicate that we should expect that the BSC should generate differential rates of flow back to Israel. To determine whether or not this is so, we shall have to proceed inferentially in a manner not dissimilar to the analysis presented in Table 3.17. We shall assume that the years 1964 through 1966 are representative of all years in terms of the initial time projections of the

Israeli students. That is, taking the years 1964-66 as base years, we shall calculate the proportion in each of the BSC classes who are overstaying their initial time projections. Since we are concerned with comparison across BSC[1] classes rather than determining the actual rate of repatriation or of real as over against artifactual decay curves, we need not take into account the secular increase in the number of Israeli students arriving in the United States as was done in Table 3.17. Table 3.19 presents index numbers which, on a comparative basis across BSC classes, indicate the relative propensity to overstay the initial time projections. The index number is computed as a ratio where the numerator is the number of persons in the given BSC class who are still

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[1]There is no direct way of being sure that the proportion of students in each BSC class which entered in each of the preceding years has actually been constant, however our assumption is offered some support by external data. Occupational choice is in part a function of BSC class.

	BSC Class		
Occupation	High	Medium	Low
Natural science and mathematics	45%	33%	35%
Engineering	55	67	65
N	(237)	(472)	(207)

The annual census of foreign students conducted by the Institute of International Education published annually in Open Doors, shows that the proportion of Israeli students in the science and engineering fields has remained remarkably constant over the past ten years. Unless there has been a change in the pattern of recruitment to the scientific and engineering professions, the data support our assumption that the flows of students into the United States by BSC class has been relatively constant during the ten-year period.

in the United States beyond their initial time projection, and the denominator is the number of persons in the BSC class who during the period 1964-66 gave the same time period as their estimate of the number of years they will remain in the United States.

TABLE 3.19

INDEX OF PROPENSITY TO OVERSTAY INITIAL TIME EXPECTATIONS FOR EACH OF THE BSC CLASSES

	Initial time expectation					
	1-2 years			3-4 years		
	BSC classes					
Period of Arrival	High	Medium	Low	High	Medium	Low
1964-66 (base number)	81	120	55	109	118	43
1962-63	.38	.48	.38			
1960-61	.14	.23	.24	.29	.40	.49
1959 and prior	.23	.36	.60	.33	.55	.77

Mean propensity to overstay initial intent

Unweighted mean

BSC class		
High	Medium	Low
.25	.44	.50

Weighted mean

.28	.44	.51

In sum, the Background Socialization Characteristics operate through a diffuse commitment to Israel which in the aggregate shows a differential pattern of return. The differential pattern of return is

manifested both in terms of the intentions of those who are currently in the United States and in terms of the reconstructed behavior of those who have returned to Israel. On a purely empirical basis, the Background Socialization Characteristics are excellent predictors of return. It would seem that the answers to four questions, seemingly unrelated to the manifest issue, serve us well as a predictive index of the student's initial intentions and the extent to which his behavior is likely to conform to his initial intentions.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC FACTORS AND THE PROSPECTS OF RETURN

Popular wisdom, supported by a fair body of empirical research, has explained migration in terms of a set of economic determinants. There is probably considerable truth to the assertion that economic factors have been important causes of mass migrations from the time of the great westward movements out of the plains of central Asia through the European settlement of the New World. Large numbers of people on the edge of subsistence pulled up stakes and moved to new lands which offered the chance of a better life.[1] However, the new migration to the United States, of which the student expatriate is part, is not a migration of a subsistence population. The new migration is very disproportionately composed of highly skilled professional and technical workers and their families rather than the huddled masses celebrated by Emma Lazarus.[2] It remains to be seen whether the new migration can be explained in economic terms.

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[1] For a discussion of some of the economic determinants of migration and a partial bibliography of the relevant literature, see Tadeusz Stark, "The Economic Desirability of Migration," The International Migration Review (Spring 1967).

[2] An excellent description and analysis of the new patterns of migration to the United States may be found in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Fall 1966).

Analyses of migration have tended to deal with data which have been collected for official social bookkeeping purposes. Thus it is that economic motives have been inferred from relationships between the business cycle or potato crop and cycles of migration. The extent to which the migrants were conscious of economic factors influencing their decision remains unknown. Similarly, it is very difficult to know the social base of the migrant population and, even if known, to determine why particular classes in the population become migrants and others remain at home. In order to answer these questions, one must take into account the objective economic situation, the potential migrant's perception of those facts, and his moral judgments relative to the facts. The analysis which follows in these pages will follow this tri-partite model. The analysis will examine the assumption that explanatory models may be built positing equal economic rationality for all men, i.e., that all men wish to maximize their rewards and that the rewards which they seek to maximize are essentially the same. The data will demonstrate that the assumptions of ubiquitous economic rationality and shared economic values are both false and misleading, in regard to the problem of non-return.

Subject Perceptions of Economic Conditions

Two highly visible economic variables which, on an a priori basis, might be expected to influence migration behavior are the labor market and income. The labor market may be understood to mean the relationship of supply and demand for a given set or class of skills. It may also mean the ease with which one may leave a particular job

and move on to another one or the ease with which one may rise in a given firm or organization. The relative elasticity of the labor market is a function of institutional constraints such as the powerful labor movement in Israel, as well as free market factors.

TABLE 4.1

PERCEPTIONS OF THE LABOR MARKET
AND PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Labor market in your field	
Probability of return	Good to excellent	Fair to poor
High	46%	39%
Medium	20	18
Low	32	41
NA	1	2
N	(800)	(948)

NA on labor market = 186

Perceptions of the labor market in one's field do bear some relationship to the propensity to return offering some support for the economic determinants thesis. Another economic consideration relevant to the analysis is projected income. Perceptions of expected income in Israel, however, are totally unrelated to migration plans.[1] This

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[1]The estimates of incomes which have been presented by the members of the population seem to fall within a realistic range. The most recent data for income by education in Israel indicate a mean pre-tax income of 652 pounds per month for those with 12+ years of education as of 1963-64. The continued rise in salaries from 1963-64 through 1966 probably brings the figure rather close to the 800 I.L. per month median derived from the incomes estimated by the population. For further details, see Family Expenditure Study (Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1966), p. 43, text, Hebrew; tables Hebrew and English.

finding clearly runs counter to expectations. It may well be that the difference in incomes is so great between Israel and the United States that another one hundred or two hundred pounds per month in Israel is inconsequential as a motivating factor. For the person interested in a good income, no Israeli salary is adequate when compared with the American equivalent for the same job.

TABLE 4.2

PROJECTED STARTING SALARY (MONTHLY) IN ISRAEL BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Monthly Income in Israel in Israeli pounds	
Probability of Return	800 and under	Over 800
High	45%	44%
Medium	20	19
Low	34	37
NA	1	1
N	(722)	(680)

NA on income in Israel = 532

When asked to estimate the state of the labor market in their fields in Israel, or to estimate incomes in Israel, respondents are presented with questions to which there are factual answers. One could, with a fair degree of accuracy, grade the responses as right or wrong, or correct within a given margin of error. When asked about the factors which were consequential in the choice of occupations, there can be no right or wrong. We have moved from the world of fact to the world of

values. Examining the items now which were presented in the occupational value battery, we find the following pattern of association between each of the items and propensity to return to Israel.

TABLE 4.3

OCCUPATION VALUES BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(multiple response)

Occupational value	% yes	Tau b
1. Opportunity to contribute to the development of my field	54	.116
2. Good labor market	33	-.089
3. Work autonomy	71	-.005
4. Ample free time	10	-.047
5. Public service	33	.033
6. Creative work	74	.044
7. Good income	60	-.148
8. Public recognition	26	-.030
9. Preventing tension and hard work	6	-.059
10. Job security	17	-.008
11. Opportunity to develop ideas	72	.027

N = 1823

NA all = 111

Interest in a good income bears a particularly strong negative relationship with probability to return, while opportunity to contribute to the development of one's field has a strongly positive relationship to return. The relationship between the values and probability to return

is partly explicable in terms of the availability of these occupational rewards in Israel and the United States. Forty-four per cent of the population judged Israel to be equal, or superior to the United States for contributing to the development of the field while only 1% felt that Israel offered comparable or superior opportunities for a good income.

There is an internal logic to the pattern of relationship of the values among themselves. The eleven occupational values form three natural clusters in relationship to one another.

TABLE 4.4

CLUSTERS OF OCCUPATIONAL VALUES

2 = 7 - 8 extrinsic

3 - 6 = 11 - 1 - 5 intrinsic

4 = 9 - 10 non-work

The first cluster is oriented toward satisfactions which are generated on the job; these are intrinsic occupational values. The second cluster is oriented toward satisfactions which are made possible by work but are actually realized off the job; these are extrinsic occupational values. The third is oriented toward minimizing work; these are non-work occupational values. The relationship among the clusters becomes even more clear when we plot them on a graph which demonstrates that basically one dimension underlies the clusters (Figure 3).

FIGURE ~~1~~ 3

MDSCAL OCCUPATIONAL VALUES





Stress = 121

Reading from left to right we see work perceived as a reward, i.e., as a good in itself; work seen as a facility, i.e., as means to gaining rewards elsewhere (e.g., in the market place); work seen as punishment, i.e., as an activity to be tolerated and/or minimized. When we combine the elements in each cluster and determine their relationship to the probability to return to Israel, we find that return to Israel decreases as we move from left to right for the major clusters (Table 4.5).

Occupation and Rates of Return

The analysis up to this point has dealt with the perceptions, projections, and values of individuals without taking into account corroborative objective evidence. We do not know to what measure the economic evaluations of the respondents are psychological projections or realistic appraisals of the facts. To determine the relationship of the facts to the responses we will examine the patterns of responses in the light of objective data which exist for two professional groups, natural scientists and engineers. Natural scientists have a markedly higher propensity to return to Israel than do engineers (Table 4.6).

The finding is supported by the estimates of the Ministry of Labour of Israel, which have shown that the rate of emigration of engineers is higher than that of all other professions.[1] From a policy

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[1] Manpower Forecast, Supply, Demand and Suggestions for Equilibrium for the Years 1964 through 1969 (undated), p. 14, Hebrew. A recent U.S. Government publication has also found this to be true for Israel. See The Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers and Physicians, a staff study for the Research and Technical

TABLE 4.5

OCCUPATIONAL VALUE INDICES BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN



TABLE 4.6

OCCUPATIONAL GROUP (NATURAL SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS) BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Occupational group	
Probability of return	Natural science	Engineering
High	49%	36%
Medium	18	21
Low	31	41
NA	3	2
N	(304)	(823)

perspective this is very distressing for the government of Israel since it is felt that engineers are particularly important in the developmental process to which Israel is committed. The analytical problem is that of determining the cause(s) of the differential rates of non-return for the science and engineering occupational groups using those variables which have been introduced in this chapter. This analysis shall parallel that presented in the first half of the chapter.

Israeli government data indicate that engineers currently have, and can anticipate a considerably better labor market than can natural scientists.[1] It was shown above that a positive perception of the

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Programs Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967). Analysis of the Institute of International Education annual census of foreign students has shown that engineers have a higher rate of non-return than do natural scientists. See Robert G. Myers, "Study Abroad and the Migration of Human Resources" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967), p. 57.

[1] Manpower Forecast, op. cit., p. 13 et passim. Labor force supply and demand patterns are subject to relatively rapid change and

labor market is associated in the aggregate with a higher propensity to return. The behavior of the two professional groups is contrary to that of the aggregated behavior of individuals. This is not a function of systematic misperception of the objective reality, as is demonstrated in Table 4.7.

TABLE 4.7

OCCUPATION BY PERCEPTION OF GENERAL LABOR MARKET AND LABOR MARKET IN SPECIFIC FIELD
(Per cent perceive the labor market to be excellent to good)

	Occupation	
	Engineering	Natural science
Perception of general labor market in Israel	36 (704)	28 (242)
Perception of specific labor market in your field in Israel	46 (736)	27 (274)

NA general labor market = 181

NA specific labor market = 117

The perceptions of the general and specific labor markets have been presented simultaneously to determine whether or not we are dealing with a generalized economic optimism amongst engineers and a generalized pessimism among natural scientists. The far greater percentage difference between the two groups on the occupation-specific-labor markets suggests strongly that, while there is some halo effect,

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are rather difficult to measure. Discussions with Israeli and American labor economists and demographers support the findings of the Manpower Forecast.

the judgments on the specific labor markets seem to be more of a function of the objective reality rather than a psychological state.

The findings presented in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, in conjunction with the Israeli government labor force data cited above, present serious problems for free market labor force theorists. Given the assumptions of the rational economic model, one should expect that where there is a disequilibrium in supply and demand, the system should move toward equilibrium through migration or recruitment. Thus, since the natural scientists are in more of a buyers' market than are the engineers (and they correctly perceive this to be so), they, rather than the engineers, should be more likely to remain in the United States. On the contrary, we see that the system moves toward greater imbalance rather than approaching a state of equilibrium. The projected behavior of the population will contribute further to a sellers' market in engineering and a buyers' market in natural science.

Further, under the assumptions of a free market, where there is an imbalance in supply and demand, prices (here wages or incomes) should move to correct that imbalance. We have found that perceptions of incomes are unrelated to propensity to return so that we shall not look to possible wage differentials as predictors of likelihood to return. However, it is true that engineers at every degree level earn slightly more than do natural scientists,[1] and the scientists and

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[1] Ruth Klinov-Malul, The Profitability of Investment in Education in Israel (Jerusalem: The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, April 1966), p. 86. The data presented by Klinov-Malul cover the period 1931-1960 and show the indicated pattern consistently over that period. Data for the more recent period do not exist, however we have every reason to believe that the income differential has continued up to the present.

engineers in our population correctly perceive that scientists receive less than do engineers in Israel.

TABLE 4.8

OCCUPATION BY EXPECTED STARTING SALARY IN ISRAEL

Expected starting salary in Israel	Occupation	
	Scientists	Engineers
800 I.L. and under per month	50%	46%
Over 800 I.L. per month	50	54
N	(233)	(606)

NA on income projection = 288

It has been suggested, and it is a reasonable suggestion, that the differential rates of migration out of Israel of professional groups (see above) are functions of the structures of the professional settings. There is a considerable consensus on the high level of science in Israel in contrast to the low level of technology. It is, of course, very difficult to get at precise measures of the quality of science and technology, but inferential evidence coupled with the observations of expert judges can approximate hard data.

The low level of technology is attested to by several factors. The Technion, the Israel Institute of Technology, reports that the support for technological or applied physical science research comes primarily from foreign firms or governments.[1] One would expect that this

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[1] From comments of Mr. Alexander Goldberg, President of the Israel Institute of Technology, delivered at the annual meeting of the American Technion Society, November 6, 1966.

would be the case; Schmookler has demonstrated that the level of technology attained by a given industry in the United States is a function of economic rather than intellectual factors.[1] That is, the ability of a given industrial sector to utilize knowledge, and thus to be motivated to invest in research and development, is a function of market factors rather than of the state of knowledge in the science of the day. The development of science, in contrast, would seem to be a function of essentially endogenous factors.

Following Schmookler, Barzel has examined technological innovation in Israel as measured by the patent statistics.[2] He reaches the same conclusions as does Schmookler regarding the causes of technological innovation as shown by the relationship of patent activity and economic factors. Further, Barzel has shown that the very rapid increase in patent activity in Israel is almost entirely due to foreign patents which are locally registered, suggesting that technological innovation is bought from abroad rather than produced locally.

Conrad reports for Israel that ". . . Research expenditures in industry, already low in relation to expenditures in Japan and the U.S. [on a percentage basis, not in absolute terms], have been falling,

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[1] Jacob Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

[2] Yoram Barzel, Patents and Economic Activity (University of Washington, October 1966). (Dittographed.)

For additional discussion of some of the difficulties faced by technology and applied research in Israel, see Victor K. McElheney, "Israel Worries About Its Applied Research," Science (March 5, 1965). McElheney points to the paradoxical (from an American perspective) fact that agriculture is far more interested in technological innovation than is industry in Israel.

relative to turnover, from 1960 to 1963."[1] Interviews both with industrial entrepreneurs and scientific and technological researchers have led me to similar conclusions about the negative applied research climate which presently obtains in Israel. The relationship between academically based researchers and industrialists is characterized by mutual recrimination. Each party blames the other for the admittedly low state of applied or technological research in Israel. It would appear that an applied research climate does not exist either in industry or academe.

The situation in pure science stands in marked contrast with that which is found in technology. McElheney and Consolazio have independently commented on the very high level of pure science in Israel, particularly the life sciences.[2] Israel's competence in the natural sciences is attested to by the very high number of foreign scientists who engage in research at Israeli institutions. In 1964, eighty-one foreign scientists were in residence conducting research at the Weizmann Institute for a period of three months or more. That number becomes all the more impressive when we consider that in that same year the Weizmann Institute had a complement of only 210 scientists and 160 pre-doctoral fellows on its regular staff.[3] The flow of

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[1]Alfred H. Conrad, Report on Economic Technology, United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, August 28, 1966.

[2]Victor K. McElheney, "Fundamental Biology at the Weizmann Institute," Science (April 30, 1965); William V. Consolazio, "The Dilemma of Academic Biology in Europe," Science (June 16, 1961).

[3]The Weizmann Institute of Science, Scientific Activities 1964 (Rehovoth, Israel: undated).

scientists goes in the other direction as well. Taking the most recent data, during academic year 1965-66, 243 Israeli scholars were reported to be resident at American universities of whom 63% were in the natural sciences. The number of visiting Israeli scholars in the United States is far out of proportion to any meaningful base line, be it population, the number of scholars in the country, or any similar yardstick. Further, the proportion in science far exceeds the world average of 47% for that same year.[1]

The particularism and parochialism which one might well expect to find in the science of a small country seems to be sharply reduced by the two-way flow of scientific manpower.[2] Israeli science is a constituent member of the several "invisible colleges" which are relevant to its interests. Israeli science is capable of being a competent producer as well as a consumer of scientific knowledge. This is clearly not so in the case of technology or applied science. As stated above, technology receives little financial support. Some of the impact of the "poverty of technology" on manpower distributions is demonstrated in Table 4.9.[3]

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[1] Open Doors 1966, Institute of International Education (1966), p. 35.

[2] For a discussion of some of the problems of science in a small country, see Joseph Ben-David, "Scientific Endeavor in Israel and the United States," The American Behavioral Scientist (December, 1962).

[3] Daniel Shimshoni, "Israeli Scientific Policy," Minerva (London, Summer 1965).

TABLE 4.9

SCIENTISTS AND TECHNOLOGISTS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND IN INDUSTRY BY COUNTRY

Country	% of scientists and technologists engaged in research and development (industrial, governmental, university)	% of scientists and technologists employed in industry (all functions)	(year)
Israel	16	18	(1961)
U.S.	33	56	(1959)
U.K.	36	41	(1959)

Does the considerable difference in the relative states of science and technology in Israel account for the differential rates of repatriation of scientists and engineers? The logic of correlational analysis might well lead to the conclusion that the structural factors cited constitute the major component in the differential rates of return, and it clearly has the ring of plausibility. In order for the structural facts to be operative in the behavior of the actors, they must be translated into judgments or evaluations which motivate behavior. If the structural facts are indeed translated into motivating factors, then indicators of the evaluation of "state of the art" in a given field ought to be related to the probability of return and differentially related to the two professional groups.

From the perspective of the scientific or technical worker, the personal meaning of the state of the art in his field is to be found in the extent to which he can function as a professional. A measure of the extent to which work conditions meet professional

standards has been constructed using a set of indicators which parallel the intrinsic occupational value index discussed above. Each occupational value item has its parallel locus item in which the respondents have been asked to compare the United States and Israel in regard to a given work condition. The judgment requested is factual, not normative. The index which has been constructed is composed of those locus items which parallel the occupational values found in the intrinsic value cluster. The index takes on policy significance because of the judgments suggesting that much of the brain drain may be attributed to the stultifying work conditions to be found in the home country--which stand in contrast with the openness of the American work situation. Restricting ourselves to the science and technology population, we do find that the intrinsic occupational-locus-index is related to probability of return.

TABLE 4.10

INTRINSIC OCCUPATIONAL-LOCUS INDEX BY PROBABILITY TO RETURN
(Table restricted to those in the scientific and engineering professions only)

Probability of return	High	Low
High	50%	30%
Medium	22	19
Low	27	49
NA	1	2
N	(451)	(565)

NA on all occupational-locus items = 111

Since the occupational-locus index is interpreted as factual judgment, the issue is the extent to which the judgments within the two professional groups reflect the data on the professions presented above.

TABLE 4.11

OCCUPATION BY OCCUPATIONAL-LOCUS INDEX SCORE

	Occupation	
Occupational locus score	Science	Engineering
High	45%	44%
Low	55	56
N	(285)	(731)

NA = 111

The structural facts are not translated into differential judgments and it would be extremely unlikely that we would find that the perceptions of the state of the art might intervene between profession and probability of return; this we see in Table 4.12.

TABLE 4.12

OCCUPATION BY INTRINSIC OCCUPATIONAL-LOCUS INDEX BY PER CENT HIGH PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Occupation	
Occuational locus score	Science	Engineering
High	60 (127)	46 (324)
Low	38 (158)	27 (407)

NA on all occupational locus items - N = 111

Having largely exhausted the objective facility and reward systems operative in the two occupational groups as determinants of the differential propensity to return to Israel, and having found them all wanting, we turn to subjective determinants, namely values, which have no factual base. Studies conducted on American populations have demonstrated that there are value orientations which are characteristic of specific occupational groups.[1] They have demonstrated that the values held by individuals are powerful determinants of occupational choice. We have demonstrated that occupational values taken individually bear some relationship to propensity to return to Israel. Further, we have found that this relationship is supported by the judgments of the members of the population on the relative opportunity to actualize the values in Israel and the United States. Last, we have found that the values fall into natural clusters whose meaning is quite clear.

Analysis can now proceed along one of two lines, both of which are equally reasonable and proper. In the first, the clusters ma, be summed and an index constructed for each cluster. In the second, one item may be extracted and stand for the cluster as a whole. The second alternative has been found to be more fruitful and will be presented here. The relationship between the key value items and the occupational groups is shown in Table 4.13.

The distribution of occupational values is markedly different across the two occupational groups and becomes apparent when we compare

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[1]Morris Rosenberg, Occupations and Values (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957), Chapter II; James A. Davis, Undergraduate Career Decisions (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1965), Chapter 3.

TABLE 4.13

OCCUPATION BY OCCUPATIONAL VALUES
(Per cent on total for each occupational group)

Interest in earning a good income	Occupation: Science — Opportunity to contribute to the development of the field: Yes	Science: No	Engineering — Opportunity to contribute to the development of the field: Yes	Engineering: No
Yes	26 (a)	17 (b)	36 (a)	32 (b)
No	35 (c)	22 (d)	17 (c)	14 (d)
	N = 284		N = 773	

NA on all value items = 70

cells b and c (the minor diagonal) across the two groups. These represent the pure types in the typology of occupational values for the two clusters used. For both occupational groups they comprise approximately half of the respondents, and the proportions found in comparing the occupational groups are the mirror images of one another. Identifying cell b as the entrepreneurial value cluster and cell c as the professional value cluster, it is clear that those in natural science clearly are to be found far more in the professional cluster, while engineers are to be found in the entrepreneurial cluster. It seems that there is a self-sorting mechanism such that those oriented toward market rewards tend to be recruited to a field which is largely constrained by market

factors, and those oriented toward intellectual rewards move toward a field constrained by intellectual determinants. There is a congruence between a primary global characteristic of the institutional area and the values of persons recruited to the institution. This is particularly striking given the cognitive similarity of the two fields.

Examining the relationship of each of the patterns (cells a through d) to the probability of return, our interest will be focused particularly on the pure types which have been noted.

TABLE 4.14

OCCUPATION BY OCCUPATIONAL VALUES
BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(% high probability of return)

	Occupation			
	Science		Engineering	
Interest in earning a good income	Opportunity to contribute to the development of the field		Opportunity to contribute to the development of the field	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Yes	38 (73)	35 (49)	33 (282)	30 (250)
No	62 (99)	46 (63)	61 (129)	30 (112)

NA on value items = 70

We find that in three of the four comparisons (comprising 87% of the relevant population), the difference in probability of return has been reduced by more than half. In cell d where basic value items are absent, the relationship remains that found in Table 4.6. The

reduction in the variance, and thus the explanation, is most striking in the pure types as defined above in Table 4.12.

The pattern presented in Table 4.14 raises very interesting problems in public policy. It would appear from the perspective of national investment in human capital formation, that the very values which are associated with choosing engineering as a profession make for engineering being a high risk profession. It then may well be necessary to include the risk factor as one of the costs of training engineers. We shall be dealing with problems of the cost-benefit analysis more fully elsewhere. It is, however, apposite to note at this point that in computing the costs of training personnel for a given profession major, consideration is given to the direct costs of tuition and indirect costs which emerge out of deferred productivity. Where the risk of "mortality" can be determined (or reasonably estimated) for a given professional group, excluding market or utilization factors which might contribute to "mortality," assuming something approaching full labor mobility, the costs generated by the loss of manpower through migration should become part of the calculus of costs in the cost benefit equation.

CHAPTER V

THE CRUCIAL YEARS

In considering the relationship between age and migration, there are a host of factors which readily come to mind to explain the well-established regularity that propensity to migrate decreases with advancing age, and would lead us to expect older Israeli students to be more likely to return to Israel.[1]

One might well expect to find that the young are more adventurous and thus would be risk-takers, more willing to chance the hazards of a foreign culture. One might suggest that the ability to learn the demands of a new culture decreases with age, so that the individual knowing that his chances of acculturation to a new situation are rather bleak, opts to remain in his area of origin rather than risk failure.

Another explanation might point to the fact that older persons are more likely to be engaged in a network of social relationship which they find comfortable, and they are reluctant to lose the satisfactions gained from these relationships. One might argue that the individual calculates that the younger he is at the point of migration, the longer the period he has to amortize the social and pecuniary costs of migration; thus, even if the initial "costs" were the same for all persons

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[1]Becker, op. cit., p. 29n.

irrespective of age, the actuarial-amortization table would encourage the younger man to migrate far more often than the older man.

With little difficulty, one could generate additional explanations above and beyond those suggested above, and they might all have the ring of plausibility. Further, it is indeed obvious that more than one factor may be operative in any individual's calculation of the desirability of migration. While these all may be possible determinants, they seem to be more appropriate for a situation in which there is a greater age range than is the case in our study. The mean age at entrance to the United States of the Israeli students is twenty-six with a standard deviation of 5.6 years. The explanatory factors then are likely to be social characteristics which change when the student is in his twenties.[1]

Leaving aside speculations explaining the relationship between age and migration, we do find empirically that younger Israelis are considerably more likely to remain in the United States (Table 5.1).

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[1]In the case of the Israeli students, age has one further meaning which we need to take into account. The younger the student is upon his arrival in the United States, the more likely is he to have failed somewhere along the line in the Israeli educational system. This follows clearly from the pattern which we found in Chapter II where it became clear that the highly pyramidal Israeli educational structure was filtering students out all along the line, with the result that the more capable students remained in Israel for more of their education and came to the United States at a somewhat older age than did their academically less successful colleagues. In effect, the age on arrival in the United States is a crude measure of academic quality, and as we shall see, contributes to the situation whereby the academically more successful Israelis are far more likely to return home.

TABLE 5.1

AGE AT ARRIVAL BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Age at Arrival	
Probability of Return	25 or less	26 or more
High	35%	52%
Medium	21	16
Low	42	31
NA	2	1
N	(1065)	(825)

NA age at arrival = 44

Two social statuses can be identified which are highly related to age and are in turn related to probability of return, namely level of education achieved in Israel and the respondent's marital status. When we control for both of these factors, simultaneously, we find that the initial difference shown in Table 5.1 has all but disappeared (Table 5.2).[1]

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[1]We have resorted to the standardized table for two reasons. First, it presents the data in its most simplified form. If we were to run the table out fully we would have to make comparisons among eighteen combinations of age, marital status and level of educational achievement, that is age, age (2) x marital status (3) x level of academic achievement (3) = (18). Second, since the two explanatory factors are so closely related to one another and to the independent variable, we have found that there are too many cells with rather unstable percentage bases. In our further analysis we shall be taking each of the explanatory factors into account singly to demonstrate the mechanisms through which they operate.

TABLE 5.2

AGE AT ARRIVAL BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN STANDARDIZED ON MARITAL STATUS AND LEVEL OF HIGHER EDUCATION ACHIEVED IN ISRAEL

	Age at Arrival	
	25 and younger	26 and older
High	40%	46%
Medium	22	17
Low	37	36
NA	1	2
N	(992)	(777)

NA on marital status and/or age at arrival = 165

Higher Education and the Propensity to Return

In our first chapter we briefly discussed study abroad as a means of developing human resources, particularly where a nation was committed to the de elopment of new institutions. While in some cases the governments clearly controlled the flow of students abroad and their subsequent repatriation (see below, Chapter VIII), Israel has relied on essentially non-coercive instrumentalities to achieve the same end. A significant proportion of the Israeli students have work waiting for them in Israel prior to their leaving Israel, and these students are by far the most likely to return to Israel (Table 5.3).

TABLE 5.3

JOB WAITING IN ISRAEL BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Job waiting in Israel	
Probability of Return	Yes	No
High	75%	35%
Medium	8	21
Low	14	43
NA	2	2
N	(312)	(1463)

NA job waiting in Israel = 159

Having a job waiting for one in Israel is but to a minor extent a function of preference to return to Israel.[1] It is to a large measure a function of an imbalance between the supply and demand of particular skills and Israel's dependence upon foreign sources for the development of these skills. As a small country, committed to intellectual excellence, Israel suffers from two limitations in regard to the ability of the academic system to meet the skill requirements of the society.

The first is in reference to the degree of specialization which its size permits. It is axiomatic that division of labor is in part a function of the size of the system. Thus Israel cannot efficiently

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[1]The likelihood of having a job waiting was checked against preference to return to Israel and other subjective characteristics related to the propensity to return, and in each case the objective factors which we shall be analyzing in detail still were maintained as primary determinants of waiting employment. It is quite clear that the probability of having a job waiting is a function of objective characteristics.

train manpower for all of the skills for which the society presents a demand. As a matter of course, students of veterinary medicine are encouraged to study in the Netherlands because of similarities in the animal husbandry conditions and practices of the two countries. It would be folly for Israel to attempt to establish a school or faculty for the training of veterinarians given the rather limited annual increment needed in the profession. Similarly, it is the practice of the several institutions of higher learning in Israel, where basic instruction is offered in a given field, to encourage graduate students and/or post-doctoral fellows to spend a year to two in the United States for further training. The Department of Physics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem would encourage a student who is interested in solid state physics to take his Ph.D. at the Hebrew University and then proceed to the United States with the blessings of the Department for post-doctoral work. If the student is interested in astronomy, he is encouraged to do his doctoral work in the United States.[1]

Where Israel does offer training on the doctoral level, there are situations in which some students are encouraged to study abroad for their own benefit, and also for the benefit of the system. Professional specialization in Israel begins with matriculation for the bachelor's degree. The student is enrolled in a faculty (which is the major administrative unit in the university) and within the faculty, in a department, and then in some departments specialization continues on

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[1]Interview with Professor Bitan, Vice Dean, Faculty of Natural Sciences, the Hebrew University, December 1965.

into sub-departments or sections. Usually each department will have only one or two men of professorial rank, one of whom will be the chairman of the department. In effect, then, in many instances the student's academic life will be centered about one man, one point of view, one "school." It has been deemed advisable in some of these situations to send the student abroad, or for the student himself to choose to go abroad, so that he may learn other approaches to his discipline and bring them back to Israel. This mechanism also has the function of diminishing academic incest and the particularism which small systems tend to generate.

In the analysis of reasons for coming to the United States, we had noted constant filtering out of the poorer students by the high school and the university. It was clearly the better students who came to the United States as a first choice, motivated by the perceived superiority of the American educational system in regard to their field and/or degree level. The same factors which determine their motives for coming to the United States determine the likelihood of their having jobs waiting for them in Israel. Thus when examined by degree level, the higher the level of degree earned in Israel, the more likely are they to report a job waiting in Israel. Within degree level, the probability of having a job waiting for them in Israel is a function of academic achievement (Table 5.4).

As one goes up the academic ladder in Israel, grades become a more significant factor in determining the probability of a job waiting in Israel. It would appear that this is largely a function of the type

TABLE 5.4

HIGHEST DEGREE IN ISRAEL BY B.A. GRADES
BY JOB WAITING IN ISRAEL

	% Job waiting in Israel		
	Highest degree earned in Israel		
BA Grades	None	BA	MA or more
High	10 (207)	26 (85)	52 (115)
Low	8 (735)	16 (259)	32 (132)

NA grades on BA and/or job waiting in Israel = 401

of employer contemplated at each of the degree levels. The higher the level of degree held, the more likely is the person to indicate that he expects to work for a university. Among those without any degree in Israel, 29% indicate a desire to work for a university, while among those who hold a BA from an Israeli institution the figure is 42%, and among those with MA or more the figure is 62%. Universities in turn are the most likely to use grades as a discriminating factor in determining the extent to which a candidate for a position is suitable or not. Thus taking into account three major types of employers and examining the extent to which BA grades are a predictor of a job waiting among those students who hold a minimum of BA in Israel, the percentage difference between those with high and low grades for students interested in working for a university is 20 points, while in the case of the government it is 11 points and for private business it is 5 points. An additional factor may be the differential visibility of

academic competence on the several degree levels. Those who hold no degree in Israel show an insignificant differential (2 points). In all likelihood this is the case because of the low visibility of American academic accomplishment to the potential Israeli employer, coupled with the greater difficulty in evaluating American academic accomplishment given the wide range of institutions in the United States many of which are quite unknown in Israel.[1]

In part, the relationship between academic accomplishment and work waiting for the student is further mediated by the student's relationship with his professors in Israel. Of those without any degree in Israel 13% report consulting with Israeli professors prior to coming to the United States, as compared with 44% for those with a bachelor's degree and 68% of those with a master's degree or more. Examining the pattern of consultation, we find that among those with a minimum of a bachelor's degree, consulting with Israeli professors is in part a function of the student's level of accomplishment as measured by his reported grade average (Table 5.5).

Not all of those who received advice from Israeli professors report that advice to be helpful, and their response to the advice of Israeli professors is reflected in part in the extent to which they have jobs waiting for them. Among those who consulted with their professors in Israel and who found the advice helpful, 29% had jobs waiting for them, 21% of those who did not find the advice of Israeli professors

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[1]Interview with Shimon Kalir, an executive of the Argaman Textile Company in Israel, December 1965.

TABLE 5.5

AMONG THOSE WITH A MINIMUM OF A BA IN ISRAEL
DEGREE BY GRADE AVERAGE BY % CONSULT
WITH PROFESSORS

	% consult with professors	
	Degree level	
Reported grade average	BA	MA or more
High	53 (88)	73 (121)
Low	41 (268)	65 (138)
NA grades	7	55

helpful had jobs waiting for them, and 12% of those who did not consult Israeli professors at all had jobs waiting for them. Thus it is, that integration into the Israeli academic system is a function of the level of degree earned in Israel and the student's academic record, and is expressed in the student's conferring with Israeli professors about his academic plans and having conferred, finding the professor's comments helpful. Integration into the academic system in turn means that the student is more likely to have a job waiting for him in Israel. Students who are encouraged to study abroad by their academic advisors, or who go abroad with the support of their departments, would be far more likely to have jobs waiting for them than would be the case with those whose decision to go abroad for studies was entirely their own.[1]

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[1]Interview with Prof. Leiv, Chairman, Department of Physics, Hebrew University, December 1965.

Marital Status and Probability of Return

Table 5.2 demonstrated that marital status did intervene between age and the probability of return and empirically explained the relationship between the two factors. In attempting to explain what it is about marital status that affects probability to return, two distinct sets of comparisons will be made using the single students as the base line for each comparison. First, the impact of marriage to a non-Israeli will be studied and then the impact of marriage to an Israeli. Ideally, the analysis requires panel data to control for self-recruitment to the three marital states. Given the limitations of cross-sectional data, the analysis will have to move somewhat inferentially.

Marriage to a non-Israeli.--At the very beginning of this document, we cited the case of the Russian students who had remained in Britain to the dismay of their own governments. Among the students there was one who had married a British subject, and it was inferred that his marriage inhibited his returning home. The theme of the "seductive" foreign woman who ensnares the guileless foreign student has surfaced again and again. How much truth is there to the concern? It is a fact that those who marry non-Israelis are far less likely to return to Israel (Table 5.6).

The simple relationship between citizenship of spouse and probability of return does not give warrant for saying that the non-Israeli spouse causes non-return, i.e., were it not for the foreign spouse, the student would be likely to return to Israel. It is equally plausible to suggest that a process of self-selection is at work in the choice of

TABLE 5.6

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

Probability of Return	Israeli	Non-Israeli	Single, Widowed, or Divorced
High	54%	22%	37%
Medium	17	14	26
Low	29	61	33
NA	1	3	4
N	(917)	(439)	(450)

NA spouse citizenship = 128

a foreign mate. Those who marry non-Israelis may do so by virtue of their having been in the United States for a relatively longer period of time. In Chapter III we noted that a good deal of the apparent decrease of the rate of probability of return to Israel is a function of selective recruitment back to Israel. Thus it may be that those who are married to non-Israelis initially did not expect to return to Israel and thus became part of the stock of non-returnees in the United States; in the natural course of events they married, and by sheer propinquity they married Americans. In comparing the probability of return by period of entry for each of the marital states, we do find that, though initially there is some difference between those who are single and those who are married to non-Israelis, as we proceed back in time, the initial difference essentially disappears. (Among those married to a non-Israeli, there is no difference in propensity to return by spouse's religion.)

TABLE 5.7

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE BY PERIOD OF ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

% High Probability of Return

	Period of entry into the United States			
Spouse Citizenship	'64-'66	'62-'63	'60-'61	'59 and prior
Israeli	73 (326)	57 (272)	41 (138)	22 (170)
Non-Israeli	37 (63)	35 (80)	21 (95)	13 (196)
Single, widowed, divorced	48 (199)	38 (140)	19 (54)	14 (52)*

NA period of arrival and/or marital status = 149

*Note that for the SWD and non-Israeli spouse groups, the '64-'66 and '59 and prior cohorts are practically the mirror image of one another in the pattern of their base figures.

The base figures in Table 5.7 give support to this interpretation by showing that the proportion of those married to non-Israelis does increase markedly over time in the United States. The issue of the influence of the foreign spouse can be analyzed in yet another way. As one would expect, where the student reports that his spouse has offered advice on whether or not to return to Israel, the citizenship of the spouse is a good predictor of the nature of the advice. However, taking advice into account, it remains that those who are married to non-Israelis are far less likely to return. This factor is particularly significant where no advice is reported from the spouse.

TABLE 5.8

CITIZENSHIP OF SPOUSE BY SPOUSE ADVICE BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

% High Probability of Return

	Spouse Citizenship		
Spouse Advice	Israeli	SWD	Non-Israeli
Return to Israel	65 (483)		51 (87)
No advice	42 (324)		21 (178)
Remain in the United States	22 (67)		8 (152)
Mean	53 (874)	37 (430)	23 (417)

NA for all advice and/or spouse citizenship = 213

The evidence available suggests very strongly that the foreign spouse is not a real bar to return, but rather that marriage to a non-Israeli follows upon a disinclination to return to Israel.

Marriage to an Israeli

Table 5.8, in addition to supporting the thesis that the consequences of marriage to a non-Israeli are largely a function of self-recruitment to that marital state, also shows that when the Israeli student is married to an Israeli, the added incentive to return home is a function of the advice of the spouse. When the student is married to an Israeli and does not report advice from the spouse to return to Israel, the probability of return is only slightly higher than that of someone who is not married at all. The table then

suggests that the greater propensity to return to Israel, which is found among those married to Israelis (i.e., greater in comparison with the SWD category), is not a function of the type of person who is married but inheres rather in the wishes of the spouse and the willingness of the student to accede to the wishes of the spouse. It is clear that among all sources of advice, the advice of the spouse shows the greatest impact in the zero-order correlation.

TABLE 5.9

SOURCES OF ADVICE BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN (RESTRICTED TO THOSE MARRIED TO AN ISRAELI)

Impact of advice is expressed in terms of Cramer's V

Source of Advice	Cramer's V
Spouse	.212
Israeli employers	.133
Israeli professors	.125
Israeli friends in Israel	.110
American friends	.088
Relatives in Israel	.086
American relatives	.077
American employers	.076
American professors	.075
Israeli friends in the United States	.074

The base figures in Table 5.8 show that spouse's citizenship is an excellent predictor of the direction of the advice which the spouse will give if any is given at all. It also is the case that men are

more likely to report advice to return to Israel than are women. Among those married to an Israeli, and who report their spouse's advice on the question of whether or not to return, the men report advice to return in a ratio of 9 to 1 while for the women it is only 3 to 1. (Among those married to non-Israelis, the non-Israeli wife is more likely to express a desire to "return" to Israel than is the non-Israeli husband.)

The explanation of the sex difference will have to be somewhat inferential. Assuming that some of the characteristics associated with sex status are the same irrespective of the specific mate, we shall examine some of the factors which the individuals indicate influence their decision to return to Israel or not. That is, since we do not have paired data for each married couple, we shall assume that in this regard the modal responses of men and women will be found to be the same among those who are in the population of the study and the spouses who have not completed a questionnaire. For each factor an index number has been calculated in the following way:

$$\frac{\text{Return to Israel - remain in the United States}}{\text{no influence at all}}$$

In the aggregate, men are more oriented towards careers in the United States and women are more oriented toward social and familial relations in Israel (Table 5.10).

TABLE 5.10

SEX BY INDEX OF INFLUENCES TO RETURN TO ISRAEL
AMONG THOSE MARRIED TO AN ISRAELI

	Index Number	
Influence	Male	Female
Job opportunities in Israel	+0.091	+0.185
Job opportunities in U.S.	-1.501	-0.440
Family in Israel	+6.653	+7.500
Family in U.S.	-0.009	-0.037
Friends in Israel	+1.941	+1.716
Friends in U.S.	-0.081	-0.133
Feeling of strangeness in U.S.	+0.861	+1.218
Feeling of strangeness in Israel	+0.008	-0.022
Israeli-American income differential	-1.710	-0.842

In sum, the initial age differential shown in Table 5.1 is fully explicable in terms of the ties to Israel which are generated by the individual's age-associated statuses, namely the position in the educational system and the presence of a key "influential." Age in and of itself has no social meaning in this context, other than that of controlling the likelihood that the individual will occupy the key statuses in question.

CHAPTER VI

LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING

The alien who comes to the United States for purposes of studying becomes involved in a complex institutional and legal network whose purpose it is to facilitate his academic career, supervise his sojourn, and encourage or enforce his repatriation.* "A rough count, and probably an oversimplified count, of the Federal departments concerned with international education would suggest that there are about twenty-four or twenty-five, and it may well be that there are forty."[1] Three major cabinet offices--State, Justice and Health, Education, and Welfare--play critical roles in his sojourn in the United States. The role of the college or university is in part defined by statute, in part established by administrative procedure, and in part subject to negotiation among the parties, i.e., the student, the government, and the university. A large body of legislation, administrative rulings and judicial findings serves to establish the rights and responsibilities of the student and his institutional role partners. In this chapter we shall be

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*The analysis presented in this chapter is largely restricted to persons who initially received student or exchange visas. The several acts of Congress and the judicial and administrative decisions deal with these categories almost exclusively. For additional information on visa distributions, see Appendix D.

[1]From remarks of Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, in The International Migration of Talent and Skills (IMTS), (October 1966), p. 74.

examining the legal and institutional setting of the Israeli student, particularly as they affect the problem of non-return.

The legal status of the foreign student is paradoxically both simple and complex. The law would appear to be simple and straightforward. Since the second World War, there have been three basic pieces of legislation which have prescribed the rights and obligations of the foreign student.[1] The most recent codification of the legislation defines a student as

> . . . an alien having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning, who is a bona fide student qualified to pursue a full course of study and who seeks to enter the United States temporarily and solely for the purpose of pursuing such a course of study at an established institution of learning or other recognized place of study in the United States, particularly designed by him and approved by the Attorney General after consultation with the Office of Education of the United States, which institution or place of study shall have agreed to report to the Attorney General the termination of attendance of each nonimmigrant student, and if any such institution of learning or place of study fails to make reports promptly the approval shall be withdrawn . . .[2]

The relevant passage from the United States Code is cited to give some sense of the range of definitional problems and organizational complexities which face those who are charged with the administration of the statutes. The law indicates that a student must have no intention of abandoning his home country if he is to qualify for an educational visa. The burden of proof is on the student to certify that he does

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[1] P.L. 80-402, The United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948; P.L. 84-555, Exchange Visitors - Immigration Status, 1956; P.L. 87-256, Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961.

[2] U.S. Code, 8, 1101, 15, F.

not intend to become an immigrant in that

> Every alien shall be presumed to be an immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular office, at the time of application for a visa, and the immigration officers, at the time of application for admission, that he is entitled to a nonimmigrant status under section 1101 (a) (15) of this title.[1]

It is of course very difficult for the consular office to measure intent. One would expect that those who wish to use the student visa as an illicit form of immigrant visa would be unlikely to indicate their true intent to the consular officer or the immigration officer despite the fact that misrepresentation in application for an American visa carries with it the possible penalty of being permanently barred from admission to the United States.[2] However, since it has been relatively simple to obtain a student visa and rather difficult to obtain an immigrant visa from Israel, one would expect that a pattern of institutionalized evasion of the intent of the statutes would emerge. Only 2% of the respondents, in listing their reasons for coming to the United States, indicate that they came on student visas with the initial intention of becoming immigrants once they arrived in the United States. However, we have found that among those who came to the United States during the period 1965 through 1966 (i.e., from a few days to one year prior to having filled out the questionnaire) a significant number express doubts about returning to Israel or are quite sure that they are not returning, suggesting that a pattern of institutionalized evasion does exist and can be located.

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[1] U.S. Code, 8, 1184, b.

[2] Interview with the Second Secretary of the United States Embassy in Tel Aviv, Israel, December 1965.

TABLE 6.1

MARITAL STATUS ON ARRIVAL BY HIGHEST DEGREE
ISRAEL BY PROBABILITY RETURN
(Student or Exchange Visa only; 1965-66 cohort only)

	Marital Status on Arrival			
	Not married		Married	
	Highest degree			
Probability of Return	None	BA or more	None	BA or more
High	52%	59%	72%	73%
Medium	22	18	16	16
Low	22	20	12	10
NA	4	2	-	1
N	(82)	(49)	(25)	(88)

NA marital status on arrival = 76

The second major definitional problem concerns the school. In most cases it would appear that the certification of the school is not particularly problematic. On the college and university level, accreditation of the school by the regional accrediting body is considered prima facie evidence of the suitability of the institution to receive and train foreign students. However, there are cases in which the status of the school is somewhat ambiguous, or indeed the student has no intention of studying in a formally organized school but rather plans to enter into a private relationship with a master or mentor.[1] It is

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[1]For example, see U.S. v. Tod, C.C.A.N.Y. 1924, 297 F. 172 on whether a school of business may qualify as an academic institution for the purposes of educational exchange. See too Interim Decision #1371, "Matter of Franklin Pierce College; Petition for Approval of School,"

in such cases that the interpretation of the statutes becomes difficult and at times perhaps even contrary to the intent of the legislation. For example, Father Feeney, the well-known Roman Catholic heretical priest, wished to accept aliens as students at his St. Benedict's Center. Among the applicants was a small group from Spain. The Office of Education knew full-well that it would be extremely unlikely that young men trained by a priest under ban would either wish to or be able to return to Spain. Not being sure of what they ought to do, the Office of Education turned to the Archdiocese of Boston for its opinion. The Archdiocese refused to comment. As far as the Church was concerned, officially, Father Feeney and St. Benedict's Center were non-existent as Catholic entities and as such they were of no concern to the Church. In closing its eyes to the religious problem, which after all was politically very sensitive, the Office of Education in effect had to ignore the compelling circumstantial evidence that the students in question were de facto immigrants from the very outset.[1]

We are concerned primarily with the ways in which the institutional and legal arrangements facilitate or inhibit the repatriation of the foreign student. Legislation and policy statements have been framed making assumptions about the ways in which law and other social institutions operate in the area we are analyzing, and it is our task

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in Administrative Decisions Under Immigration and Nationality Laws of the United States, Volume 10, in regard to the academic facilities requisite for the approval of a school's application to accept foreign students under the law.

[1] IMTS, p. 82, supplemented by my notes.

to determine whether or not the assumptions which have been made are correct or not.

For the person who wishes to study in the United States, there are two major visa program options, the student visa and the exchange visitor visa.[1] The claim has been made by the Department of State that the Exchange Visitors Program is a minor factor in the brain drain. It is the contention of the Department that

> Government-sponsored Exchange Visitors or J visa holders . . . do not appear to be contributing significantly to the Drain. They are required to leave this country for a minimum of two years upon completion of their stay here [emphasis supplied]. . . Less than 3% of all Exchange Visitors, Government and private, have received waivers of the two year residence requirement . . . Non-sponsored students, or those who come on their own, so to speak, are more apt to stay. Approximately 9% of them adjust their status and remain permanently in the United States.[2]

The data presented by the Department of State for comparing relative rates of non-return for the two visa programs are based upon the proportions of students in each program who have adjusted their status from that of student to that of permanent resident or immigrant. Our data indicate essentially the same pattern using the same variable employed by the Department of State.

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[1]For a full description of the various visa programs, see M. Robert Klinger et al., Manual of Immigration Regulations and Procedures Affecting Nonimmigrants for Foreign Student Advisers (Washington, D.C.: National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, 1966).

[2]"The Brain-Drain - Position Taken by the Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs," memorandum dated February 21, 1967, in Some Facts and Figures on the Migration of Talents and Skills, prepared by the staff of the Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, undated.

TABLE 6.2

INITIAL STUDENT OR EXCHANGE VISA BY CURRENT VISA

	Initial Visa	
Current Visa	Student	Exchange
Student	61%	1%
Exchange	2	85
Permanent resident	23	8
U.S. citizen	12	4
Other	3	2
N	(1095)	(281)

Though the rate of adjustment of status which we find for Israel is greater than that found by the Department of State for all countries, it is interesting to note that the ratio of adjustment of status for the student and exchange visas is almost precisely the same in the two sets of data. Both Department of State data and our data show that the ratio of adjustment of status for exchangees in contrast with students is approximately one to three.

We shall be discussing the process of adjustment of status a bit further on in greater detail. It is sufficient for us at the moment to note that the adjustment of status is a less than ideal measure of non-return. While adjustment of status is associated with non-return, there are students who intend to return who have adjusted their status to that of permanent resident and indeed to that of United States Citizen, and others who have not adjusted status as yet but who intend to remain in the United States and will presumably one day adjust their status. Furthermore, adjustment of status has a somewhat different meaning for recipients of exchange as against student visas (Table 6.3).

TABLE 6.3

INITIAL STUDY OF EXCHANGE VISA BY PRESENT VISA BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Initial Visa					
	Student			Exchange		
	Current Visa			Current Visa		
Probability of Return	Student	Permanent Resident	U.S. Citizen	Exchange	Permanent Resident	U.S. Citizen
High	51	21	7	68	10	0
Medium	23	20	7	12	14	0
Low	24	56	86	18	71	100
N.A.	2	3	1	2	5	0
N	(665)	(246)	(133)	(239)	(21)	(10)

NA current visa = 62

If our study were restricted to the use of official statistics dealing with adjustment of status, then we would of course develop a line of analysis similar to that which has been used by the Department of State. However, since we do have information on the students' intentions, it is clearly preferable to use such data fully and merely note the congruence of some of our findings with those of the Department of State. It is the case that those who receive exchange visas are far more likely to indicate that they will be returning to Israel than those who have received student visas.

TABLE 6.4

INITIAL STUDENT OR EXCHANGE VISA
BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

Probability of Return	Initial Visa	
	Student	Exchange
High	39%	59%
Medium	20	12
Low	39	26
NA	2	2
N	(1095)	(281)

The recipient of an exchange visa is subject to far greater legal restrictions than is the case with a student visa recipient. The exchangee must be able to demonstrate that his leaving the United States at the completion of his studies would impose exceptional hardship to

himself or his spouse or children (when they are permanent residents or citizens), or he must find a Federal agency which is prepared to certify that his leaving the United States would not be in the public interest. If he cannot meet these seemingly stringent demands of the law, he must leave the United States for a period of two years before he may return and apply for permanent residence.[1] The procedure for acquiring permanent residence status for the student is much simpler. He is not subject to the restrictions which face the exchangee. The differential difficulty of adjusting status for the two visa types which is written into the law is recognized by the students.

TABLE 6.5

INITIAL VISA (STUDENT AND EXCHANGE ONLY) BY DIFFICULTY OF ADJUSTING STATUS FOR SELF

	Initial Visa	
Difficulty of adjusting status	Student	Exchange
Very difficult	5%	29%
Somewhat difficult	24%	29%
Not at all difficult	72%	42%
N	(563)	(76)
DK	388	152
NA	144	53

Perhaps more striking than the pattern of responses in Table 6.5 is the pattern of non-response. Among exchange visa recipients,

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[1] P.L. 87-256, 109, e.

54% indicate that they don't know how difficult it is to adjust status while another 19% did not answer. Among student visa recipients, the comparable figures are 35% and 13%. The extremely high rate of ignorance (particularly among exchangees) suggests very strongly that factors extraneous to the legal restrictions are operative here which account for the differential return rates of the two visa programs.

In the main, exchange visa recipients are the most highly qualified academically. Thus it would appear that the exchange visitor's program acts to protect the interests of the sending countries by assigning an exchange visa to those who are most highly qualified, thus ensuring their return home.

TABLE 6.6

HIGHEST DEGREE ISRAEL BY B.A. GRADES
BY STUDENT OR EXCHANGE VISA

	Per cent Exchange Visa		
	Highest degree Israel		
B.A. Grades	None	B.A.	M.A.
High	16 (156)	24 (71)	53 (106)
Low	6 (549)	17 (192)	35 (113)
NA grades	142	5	42

In so far as the human capital model is developed from physical capital models, this would appear to be a perfectly rational policy. In the equity market, return on investment is usually a function of risk. The higher the prospects of return on an investment, the greater

the risk, and the more the investor would feel constrained to hedge his risk. However, the extension of the physical capital model to all aspects of human capital blurs an important distinction. We have demonstrated that those with the highest human capital value are self-hedged by virtue of having jobs waiting for them in Israel. Thus it comes as no surprise to find that the issuance of an exchange visa rather than a student visa is a function of having a job waiting for one in Israel; 12% of the student visa recipients report a job waiting for them as compared with 44% of the exchange visa recipients. Furthermore, the administrative discretion which is written into the educational exchange acts actually is exercised by the students themselves rather than the consular officials who issue the visas.

Since so much discretion resides in the hands of the students, and in fact those who have jobs waiting for them are far more likely to accept an exchange visa, the exchange visitors program works as well as it does not because of any provisions in the law but rather because of the pattern of self-recruitment which the loose construction of the law permits. When we control for the key factor which determines the pattern of self-recruitment, we find that the law has no significant impact at all.[1]

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[1]The exaggerated importance accorded to statute has been commented upon by Eugen Ehrlich in his Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, Walter L. Moll trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1936). Ehrlich writes, "The effect of state norms for decision is usually very much over-estimated. The whole matter hinges upon action by the parties, who very often fail to act together. Often the statute remains unknown to a considerable part of the population . . ." [emphasis added], p. 368.

TABLE 6.7

INITIAL VISA BY JOB WAITING
BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

	Initial Visa			
	Student		Exchange	
	Job waiting for you		Job waiting for you	
Probability of return	Yes	No	Yes	No
High	74%	34%	80%	44%
Medium	10	21	6	17
Low	14	42	12	38
NA	2	2	3	1
N	(122)	(896)	(119)	(151)

NA on job waiting = 88

In September 1961, Congress noted that there were administrative shortcomings in the educational exchange programs, and legislation was framed and passed which was designed to strengthen the terms of the exchange visa.[1] Under the laws of 1956 and 1948, exchangees were not given separate and unique visa classification but were construed as a subset of the more general student visa (Visa F). Under the terms of the new legislation, exchangees were given a new visa classification (Visa J), and administrative loopholes were removed so that the exchange visa could not be used as a covert form of immigrant visa. To test the efficacy of the more restrictive legislation, we shall look at those

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[1] 87th Congress, House Report No. 1094.

students who entered the United States from 1962 through the spring of 1966.

TABLE 6.8

INITIAL VISA BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
FOR THE 1962 THROUGH 1966 COHORTS

	Initial visa	
Probability of return	F (student)	J (exchange)
High	53%	68%
Medium	23	12
Low	23	18
NA	1	2
N	(545)	(220)

We note of course that the differential in probability of return between the two visa types is less among the more recent arrivals. This is a function of time-erosion phenomenon identified in Chapter III. Among J visa recipients 70% initially expected to remain in the United States for less than three years, compared to 18% among F visa recipients. However, some measure of difference remains and it is that difference which we wish to examine. If the legislation of 1961 has actually been more effective than the act of 1956 then we would expect to find that when we replicate Table 6.7, the initial relationship between visa type and probability of return remains (Table 6.9).

It is clear from Tables 6.7 and 6.9 that the early legislation and the more recent framing of the law are quite irrelevant to the problem of non-return. The seeming effectiveness of the legislation appears

TABLE 6.9

INITIAL VISA BY JOB WAITING FOR YOU
BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN

(1962 through 1966 cohorts only)

	Initial visa			
	F		J	
	Job waiting for you		Job waiting for you	
Probability of return	Yes	No	Yes	No
High	80%	47%	80%	56%
Medium	9	26	6	18
Low	8	26	12	24
NA	2	1	2	2
N	(96)	(449)	(110)	(110)

because of the pattern of job allocation and visa self-recruitment. A distinction has been made in law which does not exist in fact.

The Role of the Department of Justice in Facilitating Repatriation

As was indicated above, among the U.S. government agencies which are involved in educational exchange, the most significant are those which are responsible to the Department of Justice, the Department of State and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. We have dealt with the major responsibilities of State and Health, Education and Welfare, and now will focus on Justice, particularly the Immigration and Naturalization (INS), with some reference to the other agencies.

It is the task of the INS as the authorized deputy of the Attorney General to supervise the sojourn of all aliens in the United

States. In the case of students and exchange visitors, the INS is responsible for the adjudication of requests for adjustment of status. In this latter role, the Department of Justice must work in concert with the Department of State in cases of adjustment of status of exchange visitors. However, the Department of Justice may overrule positions taken by the relevant officers of the Department of State and has done so in the past.

> If an opinion has been solicited from our State Department representatives abroad in the country to which this alien is to return, while it would be a factor to be considered by us in our determination, it would not be a governing factor.[1]

In the case of a person who holds a student visa, the adjustment of status is relatively simple and straightforward. Since the time of the McCarran Walter Act, in most cases he would be found admissible as a third preference immigrant.[2] In the case of a person holding an exchange visitor's visa, the procedures are more complex. As was noted above, the exchange visitor who wishes to receive a waiver of the two-year residence requirement must demonstrate that leaving the United States "would impose exceptional hardship upon the alien's spouse or child (if such a spouse or child is a citizen of the United States or a lawfully resident alien)."[3] or it must be demonstrated that the waiving of the requirement would "be in the public interest."[4]

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[1]Comments of Mario Noto, Associate Commissioner for Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, in IMTS, p. 95.

[2]Immigration and Naturalization Act as amended, 203 (a) (3).

[3]P.L. 87-256, 109, e.

[4]Ibid.

The broad construction of the law inevitably leads to conflicting definitions and provides for considerable latitude in the way the law is actually administered. The INS has stated that in the case of exchange visitors, marriage to an American national in and of itself does not qualify the exchange visitor to adjust his status to that of permanent resident, and it has been asserted that "such waivers are not easy to obtain unless exceptional circumstances are shown."[1] However, the INS has taken the position that it must:

> . . . apply the rule with some liberality, being very anxious to serve the cause of human beings because we are dealing with the impact the return can conceivably have in causing irreparable damage or injury to the lives or professions of these people.[2]

The Department of State has taken a much firmer line on adjustments based upon a U.S. governmental agency claim that the applicant for waiver possesses essential skills whose loss would be contrary to the American public interest. The Department of State has pressed for uniform standards among all the Government agencies which have established

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[1]Charles Gordon, "Ameliorating Hardships under the Immigration Laws," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CCCLXVII (September, 1966), 91.

[2]Comments of Mario T. Noto, op. cit. An attorney specializing in immigration procedures indicated that an exchange visa recipient who has one American dependent has, in practice, a 50-50 chance of adjusting his status. If the exchangee has two American dependents, he is assured of adjustment of status. An official of the Institute of International Education indicated that a female exchangee married to an American resident or citizen would find no difficulty in adjusting status to permanent resident. For a digest of recent cases involving applications for waivers on J visa recipients, see Interpreter Releases, prepared by the American Council for Nationalities Service, XLIII, No. 9 (March 15, 1966). This issue of Interpreter Releases gives one a sense of the way the administrative proceedings actually interpret "exceptional hardship."

waiver review boards. The difference in attitude towards interpretation of the law is reflected in the fact that 83% of the recipients of waivers received them through claims (which were accepted by the INS) of exceptional hardship.[1] It would seem apparent that the INS is oriented toward the needs (and presumably the desires) of the persons involved: the Department of State has been oriented toward the maintenance of the integrity of the program of educational exchange.

The Role of the School in Facilitating Repatriation

The role of the school begins when the school, having accepted the foreign student, then certifies as to the acceptance through issuing an I-20 or DSP-66 form to the student which the student then presents to the local U.S. consular official as a document supporting his application for a student or exchange visa. The form is an official government document which serves as one of the instruments controlling the entrance of alien persons into the United States. In effect then, though the school is a non-governmental agency, it serves as an instrument of control insofar as it certifies to the ability of the candidate to pursue a course of study in the United States and thus to enter the United States. In order for the school to be, as it were, licensed to facilitate entry into the United States, the school in turn must be certified as a legitimate educational institution by the Attorney General in consultation with the U.S. Office of Education, as was discussed above.

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[1] Calculation based upon data presented in Some Facts and Figures on the Migration of Talents and Skills, op. cit., p. 88.

In terms of the major interest of this study, the crucial question for us is what if any role is played by the school in facilitating or inhibiting the repatriation of the Israeli student. The college or university has no legal obligation to encourage the repatriation of the student, nor does it have any legal power to persuade or force him to return home. However, the Department of State feels that

> The U.S. Government should encourage selected American colleges and Universities, with large concentrations of foreign academic visitors from developing countries which are experiencing skilled manpower shortages, to stimulate the return of these visitors.[1]

Up to now, there is no evidence that the Government has actually attempted to encourage the colleges and universities to stimulate the repatriation of their students, and further there is no evidence that the universities themselves have the slightest interest in doing so.

The comments of one foreign student advisor are particularly revealing:

P.R. Do you or does your office facilitate a student's adjustment of status from F visa to immigrant status?

*F. We collect the documents. This gives the look of university approval to it. We work at maintaining good relations with INS.

P.R. Do you ever discourage students from adjusting status?

F. Only if we feel that the application will be rejected. We attempt to maintain an excellent working relationship with INS and facilitate their [the students'] dealings with them.

P.R. Does the foreign students' office feel any oblication to repatriate students?

*P.R. = Paul Ritterband; F = Foreign Student Adviser

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[1] Ibid., p. 6.

F. I myself don't. . . . It's an interesting question. . . .

P.R. Is it ever raised at staff meetings?

F. No, this would seem to be an invasion of someone's privacy. . . .

Those data which have been collected on the attitudes and practices of foreign student advisers indicate that the interview cited represents the usual pattern among foreign student advisers.[1] The advisers seem to be constrained by client-centered social work norms.

When we come to the academic rather than the administrative part of the university, we find that when any advice at all is given on the subject of repatriation, the students report that their professors are far more likely to suggest that the students remain than return. In this the behavior of the professors mirrors the reported behavior of all other Americans. Professorial advice is not randomly distributed, but follows a pattern which one would expect based upon reasonable assumptions concerning the workings of the academic system. First, one would expect that superior graduate students, as measured by their grades, would be most likely to have been noticed by their professors, and thus would be more likely to be the recipients of professorial-avuncular advice. Second, one would expect that professors would tend to be committed to the development of their field rather than to the development of another nation. Thus, one would be led to expect that those students who would be more likely to contribute to the development

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[1]Comments of Furman A. Bridgers, former president of the National Association of Foreign Student Advisers, in IMTS, pp. 101-102.

of the field would be most likely to be advised to remain in the United States. All of this is demonstrated in Table 6.10.

TABLE 6.10

HIGHEST DEGREE IN ISRAEL BY BA GRADES BY U.S. PROFESSORS' ADVICE

		Highest Degree in Israel					
		None		B.A.		M.A.	
U.S. Professors' Advice	Grades	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Return Israel		2%	3%	5%	2%	2%	2%
Remain U.S.		36	17	38	23	37	33
No advice		62	80	57	75	61	66
N		(212)	(768)	(81)	(258)	(114)	(127)

NA grades and/or all advice = 374

Table 6.10 also seems to demonstrate some further unanticipated effects of the filter system which operates in Israeli higher education in that as one goes up the academic ladder in Israel, the range of talent attending a given level decreases. Thus it is that at the higher levels of training we find the differences decrease rather sharply between those with high and low grades in regard to reporting American professorial advice. At the higher levels, the Israeli students have been filtered through a very demanding system in which their weaker colleagues have been cast aside. It is to this effect of the Israeli educational system that American professors seem to be responding.

Our findings are given further support by a recent study at the Pennsylvania State University which found that the university itself

was the largest employer of non-returning foreign students.[1] We would certainly expect this finding if we assume that the primary commitment of faculty members is to their discipline, and that their prestige within their discipline (and the welfare of their discipline) is enhanced by being able to recruit and cultivate able students who will eventually become their junior colleagues.

We have demonstrated that having received professorial advice and receiving advice to remain in the United States are both related to self-reported academic accomplishment, which in turn has been shown to be related to the student's initial visa. It follows that exchange visa recipients are more likely to have received advice from their professors to remain in the United States, as is demonstrated in Table 6.11.

TABLE 6.11

INITIAL VISA BY ADVICE OF AMERICAN PROFESSORS

	Initial Visa	
Advice of American Professors	Student	Exchange
Return to Israel	3%	0%
Remain in U.S.	25	38
No advice reported	72	65
N	(1042)	(265)
NA all on advice	53	16

Table 6.11 is particularly striking in the light of the special obligations assumed by the Secretary of State and the several educational

[1] Unpublished internal study, Pennsylvania State University, 1965.

institutions in admitting persons under the terms of the exchange visitors act. It points to the fact which underlies our entire discussion of the legal status of the foreign student, namely that each of the several institutions, both public and private, which deal with the foreign student, marches to the beat of a different drummer. It would seem that Department of State exhortations are doomed to failure by virtue of disparate needs and orientations of the institutions which bear responsibility for the students and exchangees. In terms of the present legal and administrative structure, any increase in the flow of repatriation will have to be achieved by the sending country rather than the United States.

CHAPTER VII

INCREASING THE RATE OF REPATRIATION OF ISRAELIS TO ISRAEL

It is the stated policy of the Israeli government, and the wish of the Israeli population, to increase the rate of repatriation of Israelis abroad. The wish to do so is motivated both by moral and economic considerations which we have discussed elsewhere. The steps which have been taken by the government of the United States, which also has declared its desire to maximize the rate of repatriation of all foreign students, have not been successful because of the nature of the law, the administrative proceedings, and the divergent interests of the several institutions and organizations which deal with the foreign students. Thus barring some change in American policy and/or procedure in regard to foreign students, it would seem that the burden of increasing the return flow of students devolves upon the sending countries.

Assuming that some measure of non-return is inevitable, our concern becomes that of attempting to diminish the flow at the lowest cost rather than adopt draconian measures which would stop the flow completely. Any measures taken by the Israeli government and society to decrease non-return would have to be consistent with other policies of the society and state. Thus, Israel could not forbid exit from the country and still consider itself an open society. Similarly, Israel

could not adopt the policy which has been taken by some other states who will allow married students to go abroad only if they leave their wives at home. In solving its brain drain problem, Israel must find its solution within the limits established by other norms, institutions, and conditions of the society.

In Chapter V we had noted that the rate of non-return is negatively related to the level of education achieved in Israel. This being the case, would it not then make sense for Israel to increase the number of university places available so that fewer of its students would be forced to go abroad for their education and be subject to the blandishments of a far wealthier society? This solution assumes that non-return of students is a joint probability, that is, the probability that the student will go abroad and second that the student, if abroad, will not return. If the number of students going abroad can be decreased, then clearly the total loss can be decreased.[1] This argument gains support from the fact that, relative to its university population, Israel has a very high number of students studying in the United States.[2] However, also relative to size, as of 1960 Israel ranked third in the world, following only the United States and the Soviet Union, in the number of persons in the relevant age cohort who were in attendance at institutions of higher learning in the country.[3] Since that period, the number of

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[1]Assuming, of course, that an increase in the supply of skills will not create an oversupply of skills which will generate further brain drain.

[2]See Maddison, loc. cit.

[3]Ibid.

Israelis matriculated in college and universities has increased at a very rapid rate.[1]

TABLE 7.1

NUMBER OF STUDENTS ENROLLED IN ISRAELI INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER LEARNING BY ACADEMIC YEAR

	Academic year				
	'62-'63	'63-'64	'64-'65	'65-'66	'66-'67
Number of students	13,838	15,617	18,368	21,756	26,714
Of whom, Doctoral candidates	705	798	852	977	821

Source: Statistical Bulletin of Israel, Supplements, Volume XVIII, 4 (Jerusalem, April 1967), p. 114, Hebrew.

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[1]The level of educational attainment of native born Israeli Jewish adults (age 25 or over) who were in the labor force as of 1961 is higher than that of European born Israeli Jews and considerably higher than the comparable cohort in the United States as shown in the United States census of 1960. Occupational Shifts in Manpower Requirements (State of Israel, Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning Authority, October 1966), p. 17. (Mimeographed.)

The pattern of educational achievement raises serious question as to the validity of Thorsten Veblen's observations in his "On the Intellectual Pre-eminence of the Jews in Modern Europe," in Max Lerner, ed., The Portable Veblen (New York: The Viking Press, 1948), pp. 467-479.

Since the university population is overwhelmingly of European origin, while those of European origin constitute only half of the population, the "true rate" of European Jewish participation in higher education is approximately twice that shown in the tables. It would seem that Veblen's structural etiology of Jewish intellectualism, at least in the short run, has shown itself to be too deterministic. The European Jewish intellectualist tradition seems to be very much alive in Israel, at least as indicated by the pattern of higher education in Israel. This is so much the more interesting given much of the clearly anti-intellectual, Tolstoyan-romantic back-to-the-land ideology of much of the early Zionist movement. It would seem that cultural traditions have some considerable autonomy from major structural shifts and new ideological patterns.

In the past few years, several new institutions of higher learning have been opened, including the Tel Aviv University, the Haifa University and the University of the Negev. It is clear that further expansion of the university system would be extremely difficult, both in terms of the additional costs involved and the shortage of qualified staff.[1] Table 7.1 demonstrates rather dramatically that the sharp increase in potential BA's in the academic pipeline is not paralleled on the doctoral level. Serious question also exists as to whether or not Israel would be able to absorb many more university trained persons into its labor force. If increased investment in education resulted in aggregate under-utilization of the skills generated, then obviously the investment would be a poor one indeed. Further, as we noted in Chapter II, those who come to the United States to study because of the imbalance between supply and demand of university places tend clearly to be the poorer students. Further expansion of the system would perforce mean that additional funds would be invested in persons of lesser

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[1]Letter from Professor Yisrael Dostrovsky, Director of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission and Professor of Physics at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot, to Professor Gideon Carmi in regard to the development of a new university in the Negev, February 10, 1967:

"You are certainly aware of the fact that there is currently little enthusiasm in the country for the further expansion of the number of centers of higher education, in a period when the established institutions are running into difficulties and when there is the feeling that perhaps there may already have been an over-expansion. (Note the controversy on the opening up of a University in Haifa.) However, in regard to the establishment of the University of the Negev, and the need to bring higher education and culture to the southern part of the country (with all of its implications in regard to the dispersion of population and the conquest of the wastelands) these limitations become irrelevant. On the contrary, in regard to this subject [i.e., the University of the Negev, ed.] there will be joint public and governmental support."

value, and the social return on the investment would in all likelihood decrease. As was noted in Chapter II, the recent expansion of the university system took place largely in the humanities and related fields. If cost considerations were to play a crucial role in any future expansion, it is clear that expansion would occur in law and the humanities, perhaps leading to the situation currently found in many under-developed countries where there is an over-production of "gentlemen" and an under-production of the skills necessary to develop the society.

In part, as we noted in Chapter II, inability to enter the Israeli university system is a function of early tracking into schools which are not designed to prepare for university training. It may well be that some of those who are tracked out of the academic high school system would do rather well in university if given the proper opportunity. However, changing the tracking system and moving toward the comprehensive high school would not solve the disequilibrium; rather, in all likelihood it would exacerbate an already difficult situation by causing more of a bottleneck at the point of movement from high school to university. Improvement in the predictive validity of the matriculation examinations or the development of some completely new instrument of university selection might make for a better utilization of university places which are currently available, but would not increase the supply of places open to students.

The Israel student organization journal published an article linking the problem of repatriation with the compensation of Israeli students for having relieved the Israeli government of the burden of

supporting them during the period of their education.[1] The argument presented by the author is rather simple and on the face of it rather attractive. Since the government did not pay for the education of the student who studies abroad, then it owes the student some part of that sum saved and ought to repay the student with certain privileges upon his return. We tested the student's suggestion as to its utility in increasing the rate of repatriation.

In testing this thesis, we have assumed that in order for a policy to be effective in increasing the rate of repatriation, it would increase repatriation on the margin. Thus, we have assumed that at a given level of preference to return to Israel, the differential in rate of probability of return between those making the demands upon Israeli society and those not making those demands, would be a measure of the utility of meeting the demands of the students. We find in Table 7.2 that the meeting of students' demands, whatever its "equity justification" would have little impact on increasing the return flow.

Following the same model, we have examined a set of problems which Israeli students say they encounter when they are considering their return to Israel. Our analysis is concerned with the extent to which the solution of one or more of these problems would increase the return flow of Israelis. We have assumed that it is reasonable to restrict our analysis to those who have expressed a high preference to return to Israel. The students' problems are thus viewed as conditions

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[1] Zvi Benenbaum, "Professionals U.S. and Israel," Igeret La Student (New York, February, 1966), pp. 10-12.

TABLE 7.2

COMPENSATION DEMANDED BY PROBABILITY OF RETURN
(all high prefer to return)

	Number of Compensations Demanded	
Probability of Return	0	1 to 10
High	70%	60%
Medium	14	19
Low	15	20
NA	1	1
N	(421)	(592)

which impede the return of those who wish to return, where the solution of the problem would then permit the Israeli to act in the direction of his preference. A measure of the effectiveness of a given policy in regard to the solution of the problems is constructed, dealing only with those who have indicated high preference to return, and then by taking into account the proportion of the population which indicates that the particular item is a problem, and those who have not so indicated. The index numbers which appear in Table 7.3 are the product of the percentage difference between the groups who indicate that the item is a problem and those who do not, multiplied by the proportion of the population which indicates that it faces the problem.

In choosing which of the "problems" he ought to solve, the policy-maker ought to first examine Table 7.3 where the projective relative significance of each of the problems is indicated. The second consideration is the extent to which each of the problems is indeed

TABLE 7.3

PROBLEM OF RETURNING: INDICES OF EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM (All based on high prefer return)

Problem	
Appropriate job	.074500
Housing	.067281
Israeli bureaucracy	.061664
Israeli inefficiency	.035048
Financing return transportation	.028431
Military reserve commitment	.017500
Customs duty	-.021436

soluble and, if it is soluble, at what social and/or economic cost. The third consideration is what if any differential effectiveness can be shown within the various subgroups within the population by type of problem.

Table 7.3 shows that finding an appropriate job, housing and Israeli bureaucracy are three most pressing problems, the solution of which would in all likelihood increase the rate of repatriation rather significantly. There is a sharp break between the third and fourth problems, so that it is reasonable to restrict our discussion to the first three items.

Proceeding up the list, bureaucracy presents very special difficulties. Complaints about bureaucracy are absolutely endemic in Israel. There is a large non-governmental bureaucracy in the Histadrut and Jewish Agency, inherited from the days of the mandate, which still

performs quasi-governmental functions alongside a highly politicized government civil service. There have been various attempts to cut back on the size, influence and non-professional character of the bureaucracy, evidently with some success. However, the Israeli bureaucracy remains, and it would seem unlikely that the Augean stables will be cleaned in order to repatriate a few more students. Too many interests, too much of the social structure of the country, are tied in with the status quo to expect that there will be rapid change in this area. The problem is too broadly based to make it readily amenable to solution for those policymakers whose primary task is the narrow one of increasing the rate of repatriation of Israeli students in the United States.[1]

The housing problem, which is mentioned by a significant number of students, is a product of the peculiar housing market in Israel. Rental housing is rare and in order to purchase a house or flat, one must usually be able to put down more than half of the total cost of the housing unit. Thus if the price of an apartment or house were 45,000 Israeli pounds, the purchaser would have to have 22,500 Israeli pounds in hand at minimum and then assume a mortgage obligation for the balance at an interest rate of approximately 12 to 15%, unlinked to the cost of living or a somewhat lower rate of interest linked to the cost of living. Various schemes have been worked out in Israel for parents to put away funds for the purchase of their children's homes, just as parents in the United States save for their children's education.

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[1]On some of the problems of Israeli bureaucracy and references to the relevant literature, see Lester G. Seligman, op. cit., Chap. 4.

The problem is not specific to the Israeli students in the United States but is faced by all Israelis. Some few employers have developed special arrangements for their staff members whether they have been educated abroad or at home, e.g., the Negev Institute for Arid Zone Research and the Weizmann Institute of Science; however, most employers do not have a standing policy for aiding their employees in the solution of the housing problem. If a special program were to be developed to aid the Israelis who have studied abroad, it in effect would discriminate against those Israelis who have continued their studies at home. This would obviously create inequities and resentment, particularly in a society traditionally committed to egalitarian norms. In all likelihood, the housing problem faced by the potential returnee cannot be solved in isolation from the similar problem faced by the Israeli who has studied at home.

The employment situation creates certain problems for the Israeli studying abroad which are not shared by the Israeli studying at home. The Israeli student studying in Israel can easily contact potential employers and be interviewed by them on the spot. While still a student, he is in a position to check out the job market personally and thus has considerably more maneuverability than the Israeli abroad who searches for a job through the mails and other impersonal contacts. Israeli students in the United States have complained bitterly about the relative indifference shown to them by potential Israeli employers. They have said that their letters are not answered or when they are answered, the response is often, "Come home and we shall see what is available." It is clear from the data presented in Appendix D that the experience of

the Israeli students in the United States shows that a personal approach to a potential employer is by far the most effective way of finding a job, and it is equally clear that such an approach is less available to the Israeli studying abroad than it is to the Israeli studying at home. It would seem that it would be possible to develop programs to improve the job-searching situation of the Israeli abroad, without offering added inducements or privileges to him which might be perceived as unjust to those who have elected to study at home.[1] However, any program for handling the employment situation will have to operate within the limits set by characteristics of potential employers and employees.

In Chapter V we had noted that those who had jobs waiting for them were far more likely to return, and that having a job waiting was, to a large measure, a function of structural factors rather than being solely voluntaristic. Perceiving finding an appropriate job as a problem is obviously negatively related to having a job waiting for one in Israel, 19% of those who report that they have a job for them

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[1]Greece has instituted a program for repatriating its students abroad, offering the returnees premium wages for a two-year contract. The only information available on the program is found in George Haniotis, "An Exercise in Voluntary Repatriation in Greece," OECD Observer (Paris, August 1964). Haniotis' article describes the inception of the project but does not indicate whether or not it has been successful. The Government of India had established a National Manpower Pool which guaranteed a reasonable income, while they looked for appropriate jobs in India, to Indian students who had studied abroad. The Indian program has failed on two counts. First the number who returned has been rather small. Second, a very large proportion of those who did return had not found employment, and continued on the rolls of the manpower pool without engaging in productive work. For a description of the Indian attempt, see S. P. Awasthi, "An Experiment in Voluntary Repatriation of High Level Technical Manpower--The Scientists Pool," Economic Weekly, Vol. XVII, No. 38 (Bombay, September 18, 1967).

expect to experience difficulty in finding an appropriate job; 61% of those who do not have a job waiting for them expect to experience that difficulty. Would it not make sense then to have a position waiting for each student who wishes to have a position waiting for him, and has the necessary qualifications, prior to his going abroad? As sensible as such a proposal might seem, it would, in all likelihood, not prove to be workable given the differential ability of the several sectors of the economy to implement the program. In order to be able to give reasonable assurance about a job, let us say some two to four years hence, an organization or firm would have to be able to engage in long-range manpower planning. We would hypothesize that the ability to engage in such planning would be differentially distributed in the several sectors of the economy, based upon the following factors which are somewhat related empirically but are analytically separable.

Scale: The larger the organization, the longer the lead time it would need between plans and execution, since scale tends to mean complexity and the attendant need for coordination and planning.[1] Thus large organizations are more likely to make long-range commitments, including manpower commitments. Further, scale reduces the cost of error in relative terms.

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[1]On the meaning of Organization Size, see Morris Zelditch, Jr. and Terence K. Hopkins, "Laboratory Experiments with Organizations," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., Complex Organizations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), p. 470.

Profit Orientation: Where an economic error is made, a non-profit organization should be able to absorb the consequences more readily by virtue of the non-pecuniary standards used in measuring its success. Economic error is neither as visible nor as consequential in a non-profit organization, so that the non-profit sector should be able to take greater economic risks.

Monopsonistic position: Insofar as an organization incurs some costs in holding a position open for a worker who will join the organization in the future, the organization would like to be able to be reasonably sure that the worker will indeed eventually take the position, thereby enabling the organization to recoup its investment (made either through direct payment or through opportunity costs) when the worker joins the organization. The more monopsonistic the organization in regard to the specific skills which the worker has, the lower its risk that some other unit in the system would be able to employ the worker, and the more likely would it be that the organization could recoup its investment.[1]

The structural effects which have been hypothesized do seem to show their impact. Among those who expect to work for private industry, 6% have positions waiting for them, while the comparable figure for government is 16% and for universities 18%. These differentials are maintained when we control, for degree level achieved in Israel, occupational choice and expressed preference to return to Israel. The

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[1]Becker, op. cit., Chapter 2.

lack of a job is perceived to be a problem in just about the same proportions in each of the economic sectors; the lack of a job is perceived to be a problem for 64% of those interested in private firms, 67% of those interested in universities, and 63% of those interested in working for the government.

Since the employment problem cannot be solved completely on an a priori basis, it will be necessary to attempt to effect a solution once the student is in the United States, or to find some way of having the student return where the risks of finding a position are assumed by the student. In part the problem devolves upon the student, i.e., he must expend some effort in finding a position. As measured by the number of means he has indicated he will attempt, where he does not have a position waiting for him, the amount of effort he is willing to expend is a function of his early socialization.

TABLE 7.4

BSC INDEX BY NUMBER OF MEANS WILLING TO TRY TO FIND A JOB RESTRICTED TO THOSE STUDENTS WHO DO NOT HAVE JOBS WAITING FOR THEM

Number of ways of trying to find a job	BSC Index Class		
	High	Medium	Low
High	55%	47%	41%
Medium	24	31	32
Low	21	23	27
N	(399)	(740)	(333)

Another factor relevant to the solution of the job problem is the student's flexibility in defining what is an appropriate position. The elasticity of the labor market tends to be considered as an objective structural fact based upon supply and demand factors. However, where persons could perform a particular set of tasks and decide to withhold their labor from the market because of some personal calculations, they are in effect generating labor market inelasticity. In so far as relative levels of self-imposed labor market inelasticities can be socially located, it simplifies the task of those who are attempting to find jobs for the students. The basic data for this problem are found in Table 7.5

TABLE 7.5

HIGHEST DEGREE EARNED IN ISRAEL BY JOB WAITING
BY NUMBER OF POTENTIAL EMPLOYERS

Per cent two or more employers

	Highest degree earned in Israel		
Job waiting	None	BA	MA or more
Yes	37 (115)	33 (63)	27 (123)
No	60 (967)	67 (285)	79 (170)

NA number of employers and/or job waiting = 211

Table 7.5 essentially makes two points; the first is that the higher the level of education achieved in Israel, the more likely is the report of a job waiting for one in Israel to mean a precise commitment. Thus as we read from left to right, we find that the

proportion indicating that they are interested in more than one potential employer decreases where a job is waiting for the student. The second row of the table indicates that where a job is not waiting for the student, the student's flexibility increases with education in Israel. In terms of policy this suggests the utility of focusing one's efforts in getting jobs for Israeli students on those who have had some higher education in Israel. It is also the case that the solution of the job problem would probably generate differential effects by level of degree achieved in Israel. Using the same index developed for Table 7.3, the index of problem solution effectiveness for those without higher degrees in Israel is .057, for those who hold a BA from Israel .100, and for those with a graduate degree from Israel it is .118. By concentrating on the job-seeking problems of graduate students, Israel will achieve several advantages:

1. Level of education achieved in Israel is in large part a function of academic accomplishment, thus by repatriating students with more education in Israel, Israel will in effect be receiving back a considerably higher level of human capital, both in terms of the quantity (as measured by years of school in Israel) and quality as measured by academic performance.

2. The higher the level of education achieved in Israel, a solution of the job problem is more likely to influence the student to return home.

3. By virtue of the greater flexibility of the graduate students, it will be simpler to solve their problem. If we assume for a

moment that the labor market is equally elastic or inelastic for all Israelis, then those who express greater personal elasticity by virtue of their willingness to work for more than one type of employer will in effect differentially compensate for the structural inelasticity of the labor market.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COSTS OF BRAIN DRAIN: TOWARDS A SOCIO-ECONOMIC MODEL

Estimates of the impact of the brain drain have ranged from those which view brain drain as, if anything, a positive good to the drained country[1] to those attributing the lack of national economic and social development to the brain drain more than any other factor.[2] If we are to advance beyond empty rhetoric toward some reasonable assessment of the costs (and possible benefits) of the brain drain, variables must be delineated and related in a model which will permit reasonable men to make estimates based upon reality rather than fantasy.

All discussion of the brain drain begins with the assumption that education bears some relationship to productivity. While there is evidence that under certain conditions education serves to remove the

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[1] Herbert G. Grubel, "Non-Returning Foreign Students and the Cost of Student Exchange," International Education and Cultural Exchange (Spring 1966); Herbert G. Grubel and A. D. Scott, "The International Flow of Human Capital," American Economic Review, Vol. LVI, No. 2 (May, 1966).

[2] "Famine, riots, and politics grab headlines, but she [Mrs. Indira Gandhi] thinks beyond them to another problem: India's 'brain drain.' 'Many of our bright young people go to the U.S. to study and stay because there are more opportunities there. Obviously, we cannot match the U.S. in opportunities for research or facilities. That's where ideals come in. We've been criticized for putting ideals above pragmatism, but it's only devotion to ideals which can persuade people to give up an easy life, come back and identify with the problems here'." Look, July 12, 1967.

educated from productive roles,[1] it would appear that by and large education does in fact contribute to productivity.[2] The simplest model which has been developed for the measurement of the economic effects of the brain drain is based upon the measurement of the private returns to education. The model assumes that the productivity of a worker may be measured by his income, and proceeds to examine the relationship between education and private returns. The model assumes that wages = productivity and perforce assumes equilibrium.[3] We have reason to believe that a set of socioeconomic factors make the model inappropriate and thus vitiate the utility of the model.

Equilibrium Assumption

The equality, W = MP, is taken to be true only under very restricted circumstances, i.e., that of a firm operating at equilibrium in a free market where both capital and labor are oriented towards the maximization of profit or wages. We have already demonstrated that it is not correct to assume that all men are equally oriented toward

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[1]Neil J. Smelser and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Social Structure, Mobility and Development," in Lipset and Smelser, eds., Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), pp. 1-50.

[2]For discussions of the relationship between education and economic productivity, see Theodore W. Schultz, The Economic Value of Education (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963). Schultz' volume contains an excellent bibliography on the subject.

[3]Grubel, op. cit.; Myers, op. cit. For a discussion of the major methods for measuring the economic value of education, see William G. Bowen, "Assessing the Economic Contribution of Education: An Appraisal of Alternative Approaches" in Seymour E. Harris, ed., Economic Aspects of Higher Education (Paris: OECD, 1964).

profit maximization. We have found that scientists as a professional group are considerably less oriented toward market rewards than are engineers, and thus explained the differential rates of return to Israel of the two professions. Further, it has been stated that there is a differential interest in pecuniary rewards in the several sectors of the economy. Universities, research institutions, and public service organizations are able to compete for manpower in the market because they are able to offer non-pecuniary rewards which potential recruits consider to be important. It has been demonstrated that the actual rates of compensation of persons in the public and quasi-public sectors are actually lower than those in the private sector.[1] It is true that some of the compensation received by those in less remunerative sectors can be translated into their economic equivalents, but that is precisely the point. Part of the productivity of workers in the academic sector is compensated by collegial approbation, prestige, autonomy, and other factors which do not consume the physical capital stock of the society. Thus in the case of non-profit maximizing firms and/or workers, it is reasonable to expect that $MP \neq W$ and for them wages are an inadequate measure of productivity.

From at least the time of Max Weber, it has been a sociological truism that a society can reward (or punish) along more than one

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[1]John Marsh, Jr. and Frank P. Stafford, "The Effects of Values on Pecuniary Behavior: The Case of Academicians," The American Sociological Review, Vol. 32, No. 5 (October, 1967). See too Larry Resen, Salaries and Incomes of Engineering Teachers 1964 (New York: Engineers Joint Council, 1965). These data are even more striking when we consider that the better students enter academic careers. Davis, op. cit.

dimension. In so far as a society is able to orient its members toward non-pecuniary rewards, while they remain strongly committed to work, the society is in a better position to engage in capital formation. Weber's analysis of the rise of rational bourgeois capitalism and its relationship to the Protestant Ethic is a special case of the more general case of capital formation. Where men are oriented toward the performance of their tasks because of normative or social considerations, rather than pecuniary considerations, the probabilities of developing a surplus of capital are enhanced. Lest the point be misconstrued, it is necessary that we add that there is every reason to believe that non-pecuniary rewards have finite limits in any given society in the same way that is true of pecuniary rewards.[1] Thus though it is possible and desirable for a society to generate rewards which do not consume capital stock, such as patents of nobility or scientific prizes, these too have their limits. It is in the nature of rewards that they be ranked hierarchically, that is, that there be judgments of better and worse. Where rewards are generated in a profligate fashion, we should expect to find an inflation in non-pecuniary rewards comparable to that which occurs when the money supply exceeds the supply of goods. We should therefore expect that when non-pecuniary rewards are generated at too rapid a rate, there will be a debasement of these rewards in a way similar to the debasement of currency which occurs in a monetary inflation. Further, since we have found a correspondence between occupations and

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[1] Work currently done by Jonathan Cole and Stephen Cole at the Bureau of Applied Social Research on the reward system in the natural sciences presents initial confirmation of this assumption.

their associated values across national boundaries (i.e., engineers and scientists in our Israeli population and an American student population), it well may be that there is an ineluctable relationship between occupational values and occupations cross-nationally at a given level of development. If this relationship is more than fortuitous in the case of Israelis and Americans, it strongly suggests that there will be a limit in the extent to which societies can implant occupational values in its young which will be congruent with the rewards which are available in the society. In so far as the society is limited in its ability to both socialize towards appropriate values and recruit to a given set of occupations simultaneously, then we would expect that some strain should emerge based upon the discrepancy between modal rewards desired by given occupations and the society's ability to meet the desires. One possible result of the discrepancy might be differential rates of migration by values and/or occupations associated with values, as has been demonstrated here.

The Recapture of Investment in Education or Training within an Equilibrium System

A rapid reading of the "Help Wanted" section of The New York Times reveals a large number of advertisements which indicate that the potential employer is prepared to offer his prospective employee a training program as part of his job. Many firms have gone far beyond on-the-job trainee programs and are now sending some of their employees to schools and universities for extended periods of time with the company assuming tuition costs and maintaining the employee on the payroll.

At first blush, it would appear that the behavior of the firm is economically irrational in that it is paying wages without receiving the productivity of the worker in turn. It would seem that the disequilibrium which has been created would clearly drive the firm into bankruptcy in rather short order. Becker's reformulation of the wage-marginal productivity equilibrium takes into account training offered or subsidized by the firm which the firm will recoup as revenues at a future date. In other words, in the short run, there will be a disequilibrium where W > MP. Over the longer term the equilibrium will be reestablished. As Becker has put it,

> Training [i.e., on-the-job training provided by the firm] might lower current receipts and raise current expenditures, yet firms could profitably provide this training if future receipts were sufficiently raised or future expenditures sufficiently lowered. Expenditures during each period need not equal wages, receipts need not equal the maximum possible marginal productivity, and expenditures and receipts during all periods would be interrelated.[1]

We can now reason a fortiori from the position of the profit-maximizing firm under non-monopsonistic conditions to that of the total society operating under a markedly different set of constraints. The firm is constrained to recapture its expenditures in a reasonably short period of time. Becker, following Marshall in regard to delays of a generation or more, noted that "profit-maximizing firms in competitive industries have no incentive to grant such wages,"[2] i.e., wages which exceed productivity projected over the near term. Time has rather

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[1] Becker, op. cit., pp. 9-10.

[2] Ibid., p. 35.

different meaning for a total society than it has for a profit-maximizing, non-monopsonistic firm. The society as a whole can tax its citizens now for the support of currently unprofitable enterprises which it would expect to be profitable at some much later date in time. We would expect, therefore, that where nations are strongly committed to programs of national economic development, research and development will be largely supported by the government or quasi-public bodies, such as universities, which do not operate within the constraints of profit maximization. In the case of Israel, this is precisely what is occurring.[1]

The time dimension is analytically comparable to the specific-general education distinction which Becker makes. The less monopsonistic the firm, the less willing would it be to offer on-the-job training which can be used by a competing firm unless the firm is able to induce the workers to pay for their training by means of lower wages at the early stages of their employment. These payments would constitute opportunity costs to the worker in so far as they share in the costs of the development of their human capital.

The key variable in Becker's model is that of the probability of the firm's recapturing its investment in training through increased productivity. It is thus reasonable to expect that the task of general education will devolve upon the state or other public or quasi-public bodies in that they represent, and are responsible to, the common good

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[1]Shimshoni, op. cit.

rather than the good of any one organization or firm. Long before the notion of human capital became current, social theorists as well as men of affairs saw that general education was an obligation of the total society made necessary by the demands made upon the individual by his roles of worker and citizen. The revenues accruing to general education became, at least in part, the property of the commonwealth.[1]

The costs of education which is conducted in schools are paid for in several ways. There are the direct costs which are met by tuition fees and taxes. There are the indirect costs, i.e., opportunity costs, which, from the perspective of the individual, constitute part of his investment in his own human capital.[2] Private opportunity costs are clearly vislble to the individual, and he can calculate the earnings foregone during the period in which he is at school. However, there is an element of social investment in education which is not easily measurable, though no less real. A crude measure of the social opportunity costs would consist of the number of years of non-productive life multiplied by the costs per year. The costs per year would in turn include the costs of feeding, clothing, and socializing the individual. From this perspective we would conclude that society as a production machine would operate most efficiently under the conditions

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[1]T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (New York: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 90 ff.

[2]Estimates of direct and indirect costs of education in Israel may be found in Yehudah Grunfeld and Yoram Ben-Porath, "The Measurement of Educational Capital in Israel," The Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel: Fifth Report 1959 and 1960 (Jerusalem: August, 1961), p. 149. Comparable data for four countries are presented in Schultz, op. cit., p. 29.

where it acquired mature workers (that is, adult workers who require little or no additional training or socialization) and would be able to export these workers when they are no longer productive. To a large measure the first condition was achieved by Israel, particularly prior to the Oriental Jewish migration, in that it received fully formed productive adult workers without having to invest, as a society, in social opportunity costs.

In so far as we can assume equilibrium within the society, the existence of social costs which are not directly borne by the individual suggests the existence of social returns which are not directly captured by the individual. Bowman has defined and explicated the social-individual returns distinction in the following fashion:

> The distinction [i.e., between private and social returns to education] is not one of opposites. In fact, since all returns accrue ultimately to individuals, we could state the formal identity: aggregate social return equals the sum of its individual components. However, if we add what you get from your education to what I get from mine but disregard how my education affects yours, or vice versa, the above identity will not exist. The total social return may be larger or smaller than the sum of individual returns viewed in isolation from each other unless a correction for these interactions is made.[1]

Perhaps Bowman seems to be pressing a truism here, but if this is so, it is a truism that is often lost to view. An illiterate ragpicker in the United States will have a higher real income than a man with a similar job in India, in part, because of the contributions of

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[1]Mary Jean Bowman, "Social Returns to Education," International Social Science Journal, XIV, No. 4 (1962). For a less technical presentation of the social returns to education, see Burton A. Weisbrod, "Measuring the Economic Effects of Education," in Student Financial Aid and National Purpose (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1962).

non-illiterates to the U.S. economy. Both men perform the same task, yet they are differentially compensated, based upon the greater general affluence of one society, which is in turn a function of the edge the United States has in the economic mix of land, labor, and capital.

By focusing on the interactive effects of investment in education, we see that the removal of a given class of persons of high education not only affects the aggregate income of the society but diminishes the individual absolute income as well. The clear inference then is that men do not receive incomes equal to their contribution to output in isolation from the output of others and, further, that to conceptualize the problems in terms of marginal returns of necessity leads to a false conclusion.

The classical or neoclassical position, by virtue of its atomistic perspective, sees the economy--and incidentally society as a whole--as the sum of a finite number of discrete units rather than as a system of interdependent parts. It thus reduces the problem of brain drain, and more specifically the non-returning foreign student, to a non-problem by its conceptual scheme rather than through empirical analysis. This issue is met in part by pointing to losses incurred through replacement costs. However, replacement costs are underestimated, particularly for underdeveloped countries where the basic institutions for creating the replacements do not exist.

From an economic perspective, what is lost through marginal analysis is externalities, i.e., non-compensated production. From the sociological perspective, what is lost is a view of society as a system,

i.e., a complex of interpenetrating parts operating within some boundary. To borrow from folk wisdom, one cannot properly ask the utility of a nail. If the lack of the nail makes for the lack of the shoe and thus the horse, soon the nail is worth a kingdom. This extreme situation exists in fact in some of the underdeveloped parts of the world.

On Calculating the Costs of Brain Drain outside of the Strictures of Marginal Utility

Up to this point, we have been largely considering the calculation of costs of non-return in the context of an economy operating within the assumptions of marginal utility. In the case of nations lacking certain of the basic institutions and capitalization of an industrial society, and committed to the development of those institutions and the development of capital resources, the simple model is quite inadequate. The distinction which has been made between developing and developed nations is relevant to our calculations of costs of the brain drain.

In a recent article Perkins pointed to differences in the implications of the brain drain for the developed and developing areas of the world. In 1945 Europe lay in ruins. Its physical capital had been destroyed by war. However,

> . . . the rebuilding of the European infrastructure and the new visions of economic and political integration that ensued were made possible, first and foremost, by modern men whose experience with the prewar economic structure could serve as a blueprint for action. Europe did not have to be invented; it only had to be remembered.[1]

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[1] James A. Perkins, "Foreign Aid and the Brain Drain," Foreign Affairs, XLIV, No. 4 (July, 1966).

What of societies which have no memories? What of nations which lack some of the basic institutions for modernization and development? The loss of skilled manpower from such societies not only removes the production of the individuals involved but it inhibits or prevents the development of the basic institutions of a mature society. Europe had both the human capital and the institutional structure for the reconstruction of its science and technology. This clearly is not the case in the underdeveloped world.

A reasonable calculation of the costs of brain drain must take into account the problem of the development of the institutions necessary for social and economic take-off. These institutions constitute part of the infra-structure of development. The institutional orientation raises certain questions in regard to viewing manpower as discrete units. The presence of "n" scientists and technologists in a system tells us little about the potential productivity of these workers. Ben-David has demonstrated how differences in institutional structure in science have profound effects on the productivity of the scientists.[1] The development of the requisite institutions for optimal utilization of the human capital present in the society is not accomplished without considerable effort and expense. Where a society is committed to the development of human capital and the institutions which would permit proper exploitation of human capital, one would expect that the product

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[1]Joseph Ben-David, "Scientific Productivity and Academic Organization in Nineteenth Century Medicine," in Barber and Hirsch, eds., The Sociology of Science (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962).

of the individual worker would increase as the institutions become more fully developed. Thus, we would expect that the product of those who enter the new institutions at an early stage of the development of the institutions would, in large measure, be laying the groundwork for those who come after them, i.e., they are generating social capital.

It is not suggested that the development of the requisite institutions is simply a matter of national will. Given the commitment to the development of the institutions, one must take into account the structurally given factors which tend to facilitate or inhibit the institutions. That is, the problem cannot be viewed in terms of the economic determinants and will of the state and people alone. One must consider the extent to which the already-present institutional patterns in the society permit the development of those institutions necessary for the full exploitation of the human capital potential of the society. For example, it had long been believed that industrialization contributed to the development of the nuclear family at the expense of the extended family. More recent work suggests rather strongly that just the reverse is true, namely that in the United States the nuclear family was the modal type of family organization prior to the industrial revolution in the United States, and that the pattern of family organization actually facilitated industrialization.[1]

As a response to the institutional argument presented in the case of science, it has been asserted that science is an international

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[1]Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., "Industrialization and the American Family: A Look Backward," American Sociological Review, Vol. 31, No. 3 (June, 1966).

institution, hence the work of the expatriate scientist remains available to his country of origin; thus what appears as a loss is at very least economically neutral.[1] Indeed, by working in a country in which science has greater support, the productivity of the scientist is greater and thus his expatriation may actually constitute a "profit" to his country of origin. This argument makes certain assumptions about the transferability of science and the "logic" of choice of research areas, which I believe do not conform to the facts.

Science is an international enterprise where research is facilitated by personal contact and interaction. Scientists working in a given area maintain their contact with one another and with the latest trends in their field, not through the journals but rather through their membership in an "invisible college" of peers.[2] The competent returnee is part of such a "college" and relates his country's science to the worldwide scientific system. If he does not return, his country may well be cut off from the most fruitful lines of inquiry.

There is considerable evidence that the choice of research problem is not simply dictated by the needs of science. The distinction often made between pure science, with its disinterested commitment to the truth, and applied science, with its concern for the solution of practical problems, simply does not hold up under analysis. It has been demonstrated that pure scientists have often dealt with and solved

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[1] Grubel, op. cit.

[2] Derek J. De Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science (New York : Columbia University Press, 1963).

particular "technological" problems of their countries.[1] The brilliant non-returnee may well make a contribution to all mankind which could not be accomplished with the equipment and environment of his native country. It is, however, equally possible that, were he to return home, he could contribute mightily to the solution of peculiarly local problems, where the benefits for mankind as a whole might be rather small but the benefits to his native land might be enormous.

It might be argued that the fruits of "applied science" are transferable and thus as long as there are some scientists in the sending country who are part of an invisible college, research conducted in another country would become available to them. The development of hybrid corn has been hailed as a major agricultural innovation which has been enormously profitable to the United States. It is cited as a major case in discussions of the profitability of investment in research.[2] It has been found, however, that the results of American research in hybridization have not transferred to other nations. Despite the fact that the United States is quite willing to provide other nations with seed and instruction, American hybrid corn has been found to be unsuitable for the agricultural conditions obtaining in many other countries, thus the research is not transferable.[3] Agricultural

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[1] Robert K. Merton, "Science and Economy of 17th Century England," in his Social Theory and Social Structure, revised and enlarged edition (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).

[2] Zvi Grilliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related Innovations," The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 66, No. 4 (August 1958).

[3] The New York Times, August 10, 1967, p. 16.

research must be carried out taking into account the special conditions in the given country.

A second global characteristic which is important in our analysis is that of the amount of physical capital available per worker. In the aggregate, it is clear that productivity is in part a function of physical capital resources available per worker. The increase in capital goods is not merely quantitative but reflects qualitative changes in terms of the complexity and sophistication of the apparatus and the demand that the apparatus generates for a high level of human capital. Viewed from the perspective of the scientifically or technologically sophisticated worker, the existence of complex capital goods enhances his opportunity to fully exploit his investment in human capital. It has been suggested that the qualitative and quantitative increments in physical capital have increased the demand for human capital in the United States in the recent past, concurrent with a decreased demand for less skilled workers.[1] Over the long term, we should expect the demand for human capital to increase, and we should expect both the private and social profitability of investment to increase as the store of physical capital is increased.[2] Underlying this notion is the assumption, in part borne out by evidence, that

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[1]David M. Blank and George J. Stigler, The Demand and Supply of Scientific Personnel (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1957), pp. 63-64.

[2]In the case of Israel, this factor is particularly important given the very rapid rate of increase in the amount of physical capital available per worker. See A. L. Gaathon, Capital Stock Employment and Output in Israel; 1950-1959 (Bank of Israel Research Department, Special Studies, No. 1).

human and physical capital are complementary rather than alternative factors of production. Thus we are led to think of

> . . . an "investment unit" which has as its components both human and physical capital, each of which lends value to the other, without which neither has economic value. The steel mill or the chemical plant is only a public monument until it is complemented with people who can make it work, just as a technician is only a pair of unskilled hands in the absence of capital equipment which complements his skill.[1]

Israel has a rather egalitarian wage structure which has been often attributed to the existence of a socialist ideology and the institutional power of the Histadrut. An alternative explanation, and one which I believe to be more persuasive, is to be found in the ratio of human capital to physical capital in the country. During the period from 1950 to 1960, the amount of physical capital per worker (in constant dollars) more than doubled, while the stock of human capital per worker decreased due to the migration of large numbers of Jews from Arab lands. During that period, the private profitability per capita increased, and there is some suggestion that social returns increased as well.[2] It would seem that the period saw a factor mix which made for fuller private and social exploitation of human capital. Where the society is overcommitted to human capital at the expense of physical capital, we would expect that much of the human capital would be wasted. Unfortunately, we cannot generate even approximate parameters of the

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[1]Neil W. Chamberlain, "Training, Human Capital and the Transfer of Technology," in Spender and Waroniak, eds., Transfer of Technology to Developing Nations (Washington, D.C.: Howard University; Department of Economics, December, 1966), p. 195. (Mimeographed.)

[2]Gaathon, op. cit., p. 2.

optimum human physical capital mix. Were such parameters available, they would be enormously helpful in developing strategies for national social and economic development.

It would be helpful, I believe, for the understanding of the problem of calculating the costs of the brain drain if we were to turn to case studies which illumine the problem.

The Japanese Case

Japan had developed an indigenous science and technology prior to the "opening" of Japan and the Meiji restoration (1868).[1] Japan had developed its own system of mathematics, Wasan, under traditional auspices. However, with the restoration, Japan rejected its own scientific tradition and opted to open itself to Western science and technology. Under the terms of the Charter Oath, Japan committed itself to a policy whereby "knowledge shall be sought throughout the world, in order to establish firmly the foundation of the Empire. . . ."[2] The introduction of science was accomplished through a two-pronged attack.

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[1] See particularly Hideomi Tuge, Historical Development of Science and Technology in Japan (Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkokai, 1961) and Eri Yagi, "How Japan Introduced Western Physics in the Early Years of the Meiji," in Scientific Papers of the College of General Education, IX, No. 2 (University of Tokyo, December, 1959).

[2] Masao Watanabe, "The Early Influence of American Science on Japan," in Symposium on the International Relation of American Science," Proceedings of the Xth International Congress of History of Science, I (1962). Concurrent with the development of human capital, Japan engaged in a successful campaign of physical capital formation. On this, see Bruce F. Johnston, "Agricultural Productivity and Economic Development in Japan," Journal of Political Economy (December, 1951). Japan remains committed to a program of physical and human capital formation. See The Economist, May 27, 1967, pp. 10-15.

On the one hand, European and American scholars were recruited to Japan to begin the teaching of Western science. In the early days of the Meiji restoration, from approximately 1870 through 1890, Japanese science was organized around the language of instruction of the foreign professors rather than by specialty. In this sense, we may say that the level of institutionalization of science in Japan was rather low. Western science was still to some measure a foreign graft on a Japanese tree.

At the same time that foreign nationals were "imported" into Japan to teach the new sciences, Japanese young men were sent abroad to learn Western science and culture. It is estimated that in 1872, but four years after the restoration, 380 young Japanese were studying abroad, some on government stipend, others at their own expense. In 1873, the Ministry of Education recalled all of the Japanese who were studying abroad on the grounds that there was evidence that their activities were not in the best interests of the advancement of learning in Japan. In 1873 the Ministry of Education initiated the policy of choosing those young Japanese scholars who were to be sent abroad, and this policy and procedure "became the main channel by which modern natural science was brought into Japan."[1]

While Japan was engaged in sending its students abroad to learn the new science, she simultaneously developed the local institutions which could absorb this new "human capital" and would best exploit their knowledge and skills. It seems quite clear that this was a

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[1]Tuge, op. cit., p. 101.

carefully coordinated government policy, initiated and executed from above. Scientific societies, universities, and research institutes proliferated during this period.[1] There is, however, absolutely no indication that the returning Japanese scientists received any additional compensation for their additional skills. This was not the case with foreign technicians, who were imported on temporary contracts to develop railroads, machine shops, telegraph systems, and many of the other critical artifacts of an industrial society, who were compensated far above the going rates for "locals."

During the nineteenth century, Japanese science was still rather immature. It is suggested that Japan's emergence as a distinct scientific power, i.e., autonomous rather than colonialist as it had been in its early days, did not occur until the third decade of this century.[2] In other words, it took some sixty years to develop mature scientific institutions and an adequate supply of human capital, through the means described above, to develop Japan as a serious scientific nation. The scientific and technological payoff, in both intellectual and economic terms, on the investment in the development of human capital had to wait for between two to three generations.

If one were to measure the costs of student non-return in terms of the lost productivity of the individuals during the early period of national development or the development of a given sector, one might well find that the costs so calculated would be rather low since the

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[1] Tuge, ibid.

[2] Eri Yagi, op. cit.

institutional arrangements necessary for a high level of production were not present, thus the productivity per worker was low. However, given the extended time period necessary to develop the scientific and technological infrastructure, one would be incorrect in measuring the costs of non-return in terms of productivity lost during the early period. The returning student is part of the scientific infrastructure. His output is not directly marketable. One must view his efforts as part of investment rather than as measurable production. Therefore, to assess properly the costs of academic brain drain, one must look at later production with and without the investment of human capital gained through study abroad as one of the input factors. In graphic terms, the picture would appear somewhat as shown on the accompanying chart.

FIGURE 4

$$\text{Efficiency} = \frac{\text{Output}}{\text{Input}}$$



Both curves I and II represent the ratio of output to input over time. Curve I, which is the graphic representation of the Japanese case, indicates that over a given period of time the scientific establishment shows a rather low level of efficiency in terms of output-input ratio. However, once the basic institutions are created and the "critical mass" of human capital is developed, and local science becomes plugged into the local economy and technology, there is an enormously rapid growth in the efficiency of science as viewed as an instrument of production.

Curve II, which represents the situation where foreign experts are imported to perform specific tasks, indicates a much higher rate of efficiency at the early stages of development but is overtaken once local science reaches its takeoff point. The curves represented here are meant to be only schematic and suggestive, but the formulation does lend itself to empirical analysis and offers the instruments whereby nations may make a choice when facing the alternative of importing foreign science technology as against the development of an indigenous science and technology.

Our argument then, in regard to Japan, is focused on two issues. The first is that of the development of externalities over time. The elimination of the time perspective forces one to false conclusions. The Japanese case suggests the value of examining delayed social returns on investment in human capital. The second is the willingness of the home country to develop institutions appropriate to the skills of the returning student. As indicated above, Japan followed an extremely

rational course, which eventuated in its development of a high level of scientific development. Through factors too complex to enter into here, Japan was able to create the appropriate institutional structure to exploit properly its new human capital. There is no implication that this is the natural course of events.

If we turn for a moment to India, we see that events may take a completely different turn.

The Indian Case

Shils reports that the institutional structures are woefully lacking which would permit an Indian "takeoff" in the direction of developing a Western science.[1] In a sense a cultural revolution comparable to that which occurred in Japan never occurred in India. Traditional Indian education, with its de-emphasis of creative research, was in part displaced and in part supplemented by the English model, particularly that of the classic gentlemen's education, which has a non-research orientation.[2] Prodigious efforts have been made by both the government and private bodies to develop the institutional framework which is a disideratum of creative scholarship and science; yet the results have been extremely disappointing. Independent research has not yet been institutionalized; university positions are few in number,

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[1]Edward Shils, The Intellectual Between Tradition and Modernity: The Indian Situation, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Supplement I (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton and Co., 1961).

[2]Japan had switched from the American model which had been, in turn, fashioned in the English mold to the German model in the late 1880's. On this see Watanabe, op. cit.

poorly compensated, and particularistic; and political considerations are operative in those institutions which do exist.

The controversy over the tenure of Dr. P. K. Kichlu as director of the National Physical Laboratory in India served as a focal point for the discussion of India's failure to build the institutional structure necessary to assure the development of indigenous science which would in turn facilitate the development of the country.[1] It has been asserted that Indian scientific organizations

> . . . governmental or universities, seem to be out of touch with the fresh air of rational discussions by their peers outside the organizations concerned. . . . There is no wide understanding of scientific issues. . . . Science in India as in other spheres of our activities is characterized by widespread bickering and strife, endless discussions most of which are pointless. Scientists appear still to be divorced from national life. This builds up sizeable resistance among the lay public against increased expenditures for science in India.[2]

Indian science then seems to have neither the institutional structure, nor the constituency which could support reform in the structure and fund its activities properly. It has not developed the autonomy necessary to a productive scientific establishment and is bogged down in local politics. The returning Indian student, in the main, is either recruited into government service or is fated for a career of genteel penury and scientific sterility.

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[1] S. K. Kichlu, Why Did Dr. P. K. Kichlu Resign from the National Physical Laboratory? (New Delhi: Nalanda Press, 1965), D-30 NDSE Part I. See too (unsigned) "Frankly Speaking, Lessons of the Kichlu Episode," in Vijnan Karmee XVII, no. 5 (May 1965).

[2] (Unsigned), "The National Physical Laboratory," Science and Culture, XXXI (India, March 1965).

The Japanese-Indian contrast points to the need for the two-pronged attack. A nation bent on a course of social and economic growth must develop its human capital, and some of this development must come through foreign influence on indigenous personnel. At the same time it must build the institutional framework which will permit the maximization of the investment in human capital. The comparison of the Japanese and Indian cases indicates that, in assessing the relative costs incurred in brain drain, one must look at the rest of the social system and not focus on the marginal productivity of aggregated individuals alone. Where a nation is prepared to undertake institutional changes which will permit the returning student to begin to develop his field, the costs of non-return will be much greater than effecting the institutional changes which will place the returnee in a potentially productive environment. In other words, holding individual skill and national development level constant, the costs of non-return are a direct function of the commitment of the nation to social change and its ability to carry out such change.

Some Israeli Implications on the Ways of Calculating the Costs of the Brain Drain

On one level, any Israeli who has not returned to Israel after the completion of his education in the United States or who migrates abroad after completing his training in Israel, takes with him an Israeli investment without offering much in the way of prospects of repaying that investment. However, the real costs incurred are a function of the professional workers' utility and the extent to which his skills can be produced at home and thus replace the loss of skills.

Recent changes in the Israeli society and economy underscore the need for particular skills which cannot be produced in Israel.

There was some pressure to develop the Israeli aircraft industry prior to the Six Day War in June. This pressure has been increased manyfold and now there will be at least two new major branches of the aircraft industry in Israel, namely acquisition of the Rockwell Standard Executive Jet production and the new Jet Engine plant established by Sidlowsky at Beit Shemesh. The motives for the establishment of new plants in aircraft and the expansion of Bedek (Israel aircraft industries) are clearly both political and economic. In order to develop these industries, Israel must bring into the country manpower which has been trained abroad. Israel does produce some few aeronautical engineers but she cannot possibly meet the new demand. Further, Israel now needs engineers with production experience which has not been available in Israel. Since the aircraft production industry did not exist, one cannot possibly define the additional workers needed and supplied as workers on the margin. Where the industry has not existed the margin cannot exist.

Israel could hire foreign engineers to develop the industry, but they would have to pay at least thre. times the going Israeli wage, with all of the economic and moral problems which such a break in the wage structure would imply. Further, foreign technicians usually remain only on a relatively short-term contract so that there would be a high turnover in key personnel. For all of these reasons, plus security and political considerations, Israel is best advised to

repatriate her nationals. The returning Israeli aeronautical engineer would receive a salary not terribly disparate from that received by a civil engineer in Israel, who never had been abroad, who is part of an ongoing industry, and who can be created by Israeli educational and training facilities. If we were to use marginal productivity criteria (operationally measured in wages), we would have to say that the productivity of the civil engineer and the aeronautical engineer are pretty much the same, though this is obviously not the case.

The pattern which has developed so rapidly in the aircraft industries is paralleled, perhaps less dramatically, in other areas of the society. In Chapter VII we saw that Israel is not producing enough Ph.D.'s tc man her universities and even if she were able to, it would be desirable to have some academic manpower study abroad, particularly in the United States. As the Histadrut moves from basically normative-political considerations in the employment of managerial staff for Histadrut-capitalized industries, the need for technically trained management will grow, yet Israel still is producing few university-trained management people. Professional managerial personnel do not represent an increment on the margin. They are part of a major institutional shift currently occurring in Israel.

There seems to be a shift of policy in Israel from that of the importation of capital, through remittances of various sorts, to the establishment of new high-value added industries with both capital and know-how obtained at least partly from abroad. The most visible part of the shift in emphasis is the establishment of Israel Industrial

Services, as a spin-off from the government and managed by the Israel Discount Bank, and the development of the Israel Research and Development Corporation by a group of American scientific entrepreneurs. Both of these organizations are oriented toward the support of new, technologically sophisticated industries which will have to make demands on the skill market. These demands can only be met through the repatriation of Israelis who have gained skills in the United States not obtainable in Israel

APPENDIX A

ESTIMATE OF THE RATE OF NON-RETURN OF ISRAELI STUDENTS

In Chapter III, an estimate of the real as opposed to artifactual character of the erosion of the intent to return to Israel was constructed, which also served as an estimate of the rate of non-return. It was suggested that the calculated rates of return were probably understated given certain characteristics of the data. An alternative estimate is offered here. The Immigration and Nationalization Service has prepared tables presenting the number of student visa (F) adjustments for the fiscal years 1962 through 1964. Analysis of the data of the study has shown that the median and mean period is four years for adjustment of status from that of student to permanent resident. For each of the years for which there are data on the adjustments of status, the denominator in the ratio of adjustments to recipients is the fiscal year four years prior to the year of adjustment. The relevant data are in Table A-1.

The data in Table A-1 show an adjustment rate of 29% for the three-year period. Since any student who wishes to remain permanently in the United States must adjust his status from that of student to permanent resident, the rate of adjustment is a maximum for the rate of non-return for the native-born Israeli population. In Table 6.3,

TABLE A-1

F VISA RECIPIENTS AND F VISA ADJUSTMENTS OF STATUS AMONG ISRAELI STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES WHO WERE BORN IN ISRAEL

F Visa Recipients		F Visa Adjustments	
Fiscal year	Number of recipients	Fiscal year	Number of recipients
57-58	265	61-62	71
58-59	271	62-63	117
59-60	351	63-64	73
TOTAL	887	TOTAL	261

we found that of those who had entered the United States on student visas and held permanent resident status at the time of completing the questionnaire, 21% were self-classified as high probability of return, with another 20% who were medium probability of return. If all of those who are classified as high return, and no others return, then the actual rate of non-return is 24% (i.e., .29 - [.29 x .21]). If we entertain the same assumption used in Chapter III, namely that half of those classified as medium probability of return will return, then the rate of non-return is 21% (i.e., .29 - [(.29 x .21) + (.29 x .20/2)]).

On the one hand, the estimates of rates of non-return are understated since the INS data refer only to those born in Israel, and those in the study population who were born in the diaspora have a somewhat higher rate of non-return. On the other hand, the study population is restricted to Israeli Jewish population, and it is the judgment of the adviser to students at the American Educational Foundation in Israel that Israeli Arabs have used the educational exchange program as a form

of covert migration and thus have a very high rate of non-return. This factor would make the estimates developed of non-return overstated for the Israeli Jewish population. Taking all factors into account, the rate of non-return for F visa recipients is probably 25% $\pm$ 5%, and the rate of non-return for J visa recipients is somewhere between one-third to one-half of that for F visa recipients.

APPENDIX B

RETURNEES 1965-67

The data in the following tables were collected by the Israel Government Bureau for Professionals in New York City and were analyzed jointly by the I.G.B.P. and the author. The data are presented to test the validity of the projected behaviors which are presented in the main body of the text. The reader may compare the results of these tables with their parallels in the main body of the text.

In the I.G.B.P. data, greater effort was expended in collecting full information on those Israelis who had completed a minimum of a BA in Israel. Thus the population base for the tables in Appendix B is unrepresentative of the total population in terms of age, marital status, and number of years in the United States. Since the percentages are being run with the demographic characteristic as the base, the skewness of this population will not be relevant except in Table B-1. Rates of return are presented as per cent of the relevant stock in the United States.

TABLE B-1

NUMBER OF YEARS IN UNITED STATES AMONG
THOSE WHO RETURNED TO ISRAEL

Number of Years in U.S.	Absolute Number of Returnees	% of Total Returning	Cumulative % of Total Returning
1	29	7	7
2	90	21	28
3	88	21	49
4	75	18	67
5	50	12	79
6	36	8	87
7	17	4	91
8	22	5	96
9	6	1	97
10 or more	7	2	99

N = 424

NA = 8

[NA's are excluded in all of the tables in Appendix B.]

TABLE B-2

AGE AT ARRIVAL BY RETURN TO ISRAEL

	Age at Arrival	
	26 and Younger	27 and Older
Stock in U.S.	403	2004
Return flow to Israel	18	380
% return	4	19

TABLE B-3

OCCUPATION BY RETURN TO ISRAEL

	Mathematics and Natural Science	Engineering
Stock in U.S.	501	801
Return flow to Israel	125	93
% return	25	12

TABLE B-4

MARITAL STATUS BY RETURN TO ISRAEL

	Israeli Spouse	SWD	Non-Israeli Spouse
Stock in U.S.	1064	843	550
Return flow to Israel	243	101	62
% return	23	12	11

42-50 אנא כתוב במספר מלים מהי הרגשתך לגבי חזרתך לישראל.

51-58 אנא כתוב במספר מלים מה לדעתך צריכה המדינה לעשות כדי להחזיר עד כמה
שיותר ישראלים ארצה.

74-75/06

יט. האם בן/בת זוגך היה/היתה אי פעם אזרח/ית ישראלי/ת, מבלי להתחשב באזרחותו/ה הנוכחית.

כן ... ם לא ... ם אני רווק/ה .....ם אני גרוש/ה .....ם

29 אני אלמן/ה .....ם

כ. באיזו דת חונך/כה כעלך/אשתך?

יהודית .....ם

נוצרית .....ם

30 דת אחרת, פרט _____ ם

כא. לפי אומדנך בכמה זמן תאריך את שהותך בארה"ב לאחר גמר לימודיך? (אם כבר סיימת כמה זמן מאז הסיום תשהה בארה"ב?).

1. אחזור מייד לאחר גמר הלימודים..... ם
2. עד חצי שנה..... ם
3. מחצי שנה עד שנה וחצי..... ם
4. משנה וחצי עד שנתיים וחצי..... ם
5. שנתיים וחצי עד שלוש וחצי שנים..... ם

31 6. יותר משלוש..... ם

כב. מהם הגורמים להארכת שהותך בארה"ב לאחר גמר לימודיך?

	מתייחס אלי אך לא גורם חשוב	מתייחס אלי וגורם חשוב
32 1. התמחות במקצוע	ם.....	ם
33 2. חסכון כסף לדיור	ם.....	ם
34 3. חסכון כסף לכלי בית	ם.....	ם
35 4. חסכון כסף למכונית	ם.....	ם
36 5. חסכון כסף כדי לשלם מכס	ם.....	ם
37 6. הקלות במכס ובמסים	ם.....	ם
38 7. מחכה לתשובות על עבודה מתאימה	ם.....	ם

39 כג. הואל לסמן את מספר הגורם החשוב ביותר: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

כד. כשאתה חושב על עתידך, האם אתה אופטימי?

1. אופטימי מאד ..... ם
2. אופטימי..... ם
3. לא אופטימי כלל .... ם

40

כה. האם אתה שבע-רצון, באופן כללי, השנה יותר מאשר בשנה שעברה?

41 יותר שבע-רצון.....ם פחות שבע-רצון.....ם ללא שינוי.....ם

יד. ציין על הסולם שלפניך אם אתה מרגיש את עצמך יותר ישראלי או יותר יהודי. בסולם שלפניך 9 מדרגות. בצידו האחד מצויינת המלה "יהודי" ובצידו השני המלה "ישראלי". סמן את מקומך בסולם ע"י ציון x פעם אחת בלבד בתוך הדרגה המתאימה להרגשתך. ככל שתסמן x קרוב יותר אל ה"ישראלי" פרושו שאתה מרגיש את עצמך יותר ישראלי מאשר יהודי, וככל שתסמן x קרוב יותר אל ה"יהודי" פרושו שאתה מרגיש את עצמך יותר יהודי מאשר ישראלי. סמן x ברווח ולא על הקווים.

18 יהודי ישראלי

טו. ציין על גבי הסולם שלפניך אם אתה מרגיש את עצמך יותר יהודי מאשר אדם פרטי, או יותר אדם פרטי מאשר יהודי.

19 אדם פרטי יהודי

טז. ציין על גבי הסולם שלפניך אם אתה מרגיש את עצמך יותר ישראלי מאשר אדם פרטי או יותר אדם פרטי מאשר ישראלי.

20 אדם פרטי ישראלי

יז. ציין על גבי הסולם שלפניך אם אתה מרגיש את עצמך יותר ישראלי מאשר אמריקני, או יותר אמריקני מאשר ישראלי.

21 אמריקני ישראלי

יח. להלן מספר הנחות המתייחסות לישראל וליהודים. הואל לציין את דעתך על כל אחת מהן.

	הנני מאשר הנני מאשר הנני שולל הנני שולל אינני זאת בהחלט זאת ____ זאת ____ זאת בהחלט יודע
1. ישראל היא ביתו הלאומי של העם היהודי.	22 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2. כל יהודי חייב לחיות בישראל.	23 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
3. "ירידה" מישראל, תופעה שיש לגנותה.	24 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
4. ישראל היא מרכז תרבותי לעם היהודי.	25 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
5. ישראל הינה המקום היחידי בעולם בו יהודי יכול לנהל חיים נורמליים.	26 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
6. גורל משותף מאחד את היהודים.	27 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)

ט. מהו משלוח ידו העקרי של אביך (באם נפטר משלוח ידו האחרון)

1. מקצוע חופשי או טכני הדורש השכלה אוניברסיטאית.....□
2. בעל עסק או מפעל גדול, מנהל או פקיד בכיר, קצין צבא או משטרה מסגן אלוף ומעלה.....□
3. בעל או מנהל עסק או מפעל בינוני, פקיד בינוני, קצין צבא או משטרה עד סגן אלוף, מקצוע חופשי, טכני, או אמנותי.....□
4. בעל בית מלאכה.....□
5. מסחר זעיר, זבן, סוכן, פקיד בדרגה נמוכה.....□
6. פועל מקצועי, עובד שרותים בעל מקצוע, צבא הקבע או משטרה עד קצונה.....□
7. פועל בלתי מקצועי, רוכל, עובד שרותים בלתי מקצועי, בלתי קבוע.....□
8. חקלאי.האם הוא ____ עצמאי או _____ שכיר.....□
9. משלוח יד שלא הוזכר לעיל, הואל לפרט _____.....□

י. מהי רמת ההשכלה של אביך?

1. ללא השכלה רשמית .....□
2. "חדר" בלבד.....□
3. פחות מ-8 שנות בי"ס יסודי.....□
4. סיים בי"ס יסודי.....□
5. השכלה תיכונית בלי תעודת בגרות..□
6. ישיבה.....□
7. בי"ס טכני (כגון חקלאי) ...□
8. בעל תעודת בגרות.....□
9. סמינר, בי"ס לעבודה סוציאלית, כלומר למד במכללה אך לא קבל תואר.....□
10. בוגר אוניברסיטה ומעלה.....□

יא. לפי מיטב ידיעתך, האם שאף אביך לחינוך גבוה יותר משהשיג? כן...□ לא ...□

יב. האם הוריך

1. דתיים מאד.....□
2. דתיים.....□
3. מסורתיים.....□
4. אינם דתיים.....□
5. מתנגדים לדת.....□

יג. האם הינך

1. דתי מאד.....□
2. דתי.....□
3. מסורתי.....□
4. אינך דתי.....□
5. מתנגד לדת.....□

יג. האם הוריך היו חברים בתנועה ציונית בגולה?

אביך	כן ... □ (1)	לא ... □ (2)	איננני יודע ... □ (3)
אמך	כן ... □ (1)	לא ... □ (2)	איננני יודע ... □ (3)

יד. להלן מספר גורמים המשפיעים על ישראלים להשאר בארה"ב לצמיתות. הואל לציין את אלו החשובים <u>עבורך</u>:

41 1. אי שביעות רצון כללית בישראל.....☐
42 2. רמת חיים גבוהה יותר בארה"ב.....☐
3. אפשרות מקצועית טובה יותר בארה"ב,
43 (מבלי להתחשב בסיבות כלכליות) .....☐
44 4. חוסר רגשות פטריוטיים לישראל.....☐
45 5. שיטת הפרוטקציה.....☐
46 6. פרובינציאליות בישראל .....☐
47 7. מדינה קטנה.....☐
48 8. נשואין לאמריקאי/ת.....☐
49 9. התפעמות מהעוצמה האמריקנית בהשוואה לישראל הקטנה.....☐
50 10. חוסר הפרטיות - כל אחד מעורב בענייני זולתו.....☐
51 11. הפליה עדתית בישראל.....☐
52 12. לחץ משפחתי בישראל.....☐
53 13. גורם אחר שלא הוזכר לעיל, הואל לפרט _____☐

<u>רקע אישי</u>

54 א. מין:- _____ 1.זכר...☐ 2.נקבה...☐

55-56 ב. גילך:- _____שנים

57 ג. האם שרתת בצ.ה.ל. 1.כן ...☐ 2.לא ...☐

58-59 ד. אם כן מהי דרגתך הקבועה:- _____

60-61 62-63 ה. באיזו מדינה נולדת? _____ שנת העליה _____

64-65 66-67 ו. באיזו מדינה נולד אביך _____ שנת עליה _____

68-69 70-71 ז. באיזו מדינה נולדה אמך _____ שנת עליה _____

74-75/05 ח. האם היית חבר באחד מהארגונים הרי"מ?

5 עלייה נוער .....☐
6 קבוץ .....☐
7 מושב .....☐
8 תנועת נוער (איזו תנועה) _____

ז. מהם <u>הסיכויים</u> שחשאר בארה"ב לצמיתות? הואל לציין ב-x את מקומך בזרוג הר"מ:

29-30

אחזור לבטח לישראל	100%	75	50	25	0	25	50	75	100%	אשאר לבטח בארה"ב

ח. באיזו מדינה היית מעדיף לחיות?

31-32

ישראל	100%	75	50	25	0	25	50	75	100%	ארה"ב

ט. האם הינך מתקשה להחליט אם לחזור לישראל או להשאר בארה"ב?

33

החלטה קשה מאד										החלטה קלה מאד

י. האם רוב הסטודנטים והאקדמאים הישראלים בארה"ב המוכרים לך-

1. מתכוננים לחזור לישראל תוך השנה הקרובה.....□
2. מתכוננים לחזור לישראל תוך השלוש השנים הקרובות.....□
3. מתכוננים לחזור לישראל תוך חמש השנים הקרובות.....□
4. לא בטוחים, לפי שעה, <u>מתי</u> יחזרו לישראל, אך מתכוננים לחזור.....□
5. לא בטוחים אם יחזרו.....□
6. בטוחים שלא יחזרו.....□

34

יא. האם נתקל הישראלי בקשיים בהוצאת "כרטיס ירוק"?

35

קשי רב .... □ קשי מסויים ....□ ללא קשי ....□ איננני יודע...□

יב. מה בנוגע אליך, האם היית נתקל בקשיים בהוצאת "כרטיס ירוק"?

36

קשיים רבים ... □ קשיים מסויימים ... □ ללא קשיים ... □
איננני יודע ... □

יג. מהו יחסם של עובדי הציבור הרשומים מטה לפי <u>נסיונך האישי</u>?

	<u>חיובי</u>	<u>שלילי</u>	<u>לא נפגשתי</u>
1. הקונסוליה	□	□	□
2. הלשכה לאקדמאים	□	□	□
3. הסוכנות	□	□	□
4. מוסדות ישראלים אחרים (פרט)			
_____	□	□	□
	(1)	(2)	(3)

37
38
39
40

ד. כשאקדמאי עומד בפני החלטה הסופית לחזור לישראל, האם מהווים הגורמים הבאים בעיה רצינית עבורו? מה בנוגע אליך, האם אלה בעיות רציניות עבורך? סמן כל המתייחס אליך.

	בעיה עבור רוב האקדמאים החוזרים	זאת תהיה בעיה עבורי	
1. מכס	☐	☐	61-62
2. דיור	☐	☐	63-64
3. הבירוקרטיה הישראלית	☐	☐	65-66
4. מציאת עבודה מעניינת	☐	☐	67-68
5. אי יעילות מנהלית הקיימת בישראל	☐	☐	69-70
6. מימון הוצאות החזרה לישראל	☐	☐	71-72
7. שרות מילואים בצ.ה.ל	☐	☐	73-74

75/04

ה. האם לדעתך חייבת ממשלת ישראל ו/או מעבידים ישראלים לעזור לאקדמאים החוזרים בבעיות הר"מ. סמן כל המתייחס אליך. הינך רשאי לסמן יותר מתשובה אחת לכל שאלה.

	כאקדמאי חוזר מגיע לי	הייתי רוצה לקבל	
1. הקלות נוספות במכס על כלי בית ומכונית	☐	☐	5-6
2. מתן הלוואה לכיסוי הוצאות הנסיעה ארצה לאקדמאי חוזר ומשפחתו	☐		7-8
3. מתן מענק לכיסוי הוצאות הנסיעה ארצה לאקדמאי חוזר ולמשפחתו	☐		9-10
4. עזרה ממשלתית למציאת משרה מתאימה	☐	☐	11-12
5. תוספת במשכורת בהשוואה למשכורתם של של ישראלים שלא למדו בחו"ל	☐	☐	13-14
6. משכנתאות וריבית נמוכה	☐	☐	15-16
7. מתן הלוואה להקמת מפעל או עסק	☐	☐	17-18
8. פיטור לשנה משרות מילואים בצה"ל	☐	☐	19-20
9. הכנסה מובטחת לששת החודשים הראשונים לאחר שיבתו של האקדמאי	☐	☐	21-22
10. מתן הלוואה לכיסוי הוצאות התאקלמות	☐	☐	23-24
11. עזרה אחרת שלא הוזכרה לעיל (אנא פרט). _____			25-26

ו. לפי השערתך מה אחוז הישראלים שהחליטו לא לחזור לישראל? (סמן x למעלה).

27-28

0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100%

העתיד לבוא

א. בחשבך על חזרתך לישראל, כיצד הינך מושפע מהגורמים הבאים?

	גורם לחזרה לישראל	אין כל השפעה	גורם להשאר בארה"ב
1. אפשרויות עבודה בישראל	☐	☐	☐
2. אפשרויות עבודה בארה"ב	☐	☐	☐
3. משפחה בישראל	☐	☐	☐
4. משפחה בארה"ב	☐	☐	☐
5. ידידים בישראל	☐	☐	☐
6. ידידים בארה"ב	☐	☐	☐
7. הרגשת זרות בארה"ב	☐	☐	☐
8. הרגשת זרות בישראל	☐	☐	☐
9. הבדלי אפשרויות הכנסה בין ישראל וארה"ב	☐	☐	☐
10. גישתו/ה של בעלי/אשתי	☐	☐	☐
11. חינוך ילדי	☐	☐	☐
12. העובדה שאני ישראלי	☐	☐	☐
13. אתגר במקצועי בישראל	☐	☐	☐
14. אתגר במקצועי בארה"ב	☐	☐	☐
15. גורם אחר (אנא פרט) _____	(1)	(2)	(3)

ב. בשאלה הנ"ל אנא סמן את גורם ההשפעה החזק ביותר:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 -- להשאר בארה"ב

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 -- לחזור לישראל

ג. מי מהאנשים הבאים הציע לך להשאר בארה"ב ומי מהם הציע לך לחזור לישראל?

	הציעו לחזור לארצה	הציעו להשאר בארה"ב	לא הציעו לי
1. מרצים אמריקנים	☐	☐	☐
2. מרצים ישראלים	☐	☐	☐
3. קרובים אמריקנים	☐	☐	☐
4. משפחה קרובה בארץ	☐	☐	☐
5. אשתי/בעלי	☐	☐	☐
6. ידידים אמריקנים	☐	☐	☐
7. ידידים ישראלים בארה"ב	☐	☐	☐
8. ידידים ישראלים בישראל	☐	☐	☐
9. מעבידים אמריקנים	☐	☐	☐
10. מעבידים ישראלים	☐	☐	☐
	(1)	(2)	(3)

טז. בשאלה "סו" הינך מחבקש לסמן את הדרך הנראית כיעילה ביותר ע"ר.

56 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

יז. האם הוחסרה דרך כלשהי בשאלה "סו" הנראית לך כיעילה עבורך? אנא הסבר בקצרה:

66 _____

74-75/03

יח. ישראלים משווים את ישראל וארה"ב בשטחים רבים. הואל להשוות את ישראל וארה"ב לגבי כל אחד מהנתונים הבאים:

	ישראל עדיפה על ארה"ב (1)	ארה"ב עדיפה על ישראל (2)	שוות (3)	
1. שוק עבודה טוב	☐	☐	☐	5
2. אפשרות להוסיף לפתוח השטח	☐	☐	☐	6
3. חופש פעולה במקצוע	☐	☐	☐	7
4. כמות הזמן הפנוי לבלוי	☐	☐	☐	8
5. עזרה לציבור או עזרה לחברה בכללה	☐	☐	☐	9
6. מקוריות ועבודה יוצרת	☐	☐	☐	10
7. הכנסה כספית טובה	☐	☐	☐	11
8. הערכה ציבורית	☐	☐	☐	12
9. המנעות ממתח ועבודה מייגעת	☐	☐	☐	13
10. בטחון סוציאלי	☐	☐	☐	14
11. הזדמנות לפתוח רעיונות	☐	☐	☐	15
12. מקום לחינוך ילדי	☐	☐	☐	16
13. רמת חיים	☐	☐	☐	17
14. חיי חברה	☐	☐	☐	18
15. קשרי משפחה	☐	☐	☐	19
16. חופש מחשבה וחוות דעת	☐	☐	☐	20
17. רמה תרבותית	☐	☐	☐	21

יט. לפי אומדנך מה תהיה המשכורת החודשית (ברוטו) ההתחלתית שתקבל עבור משרה מקבילה במקצוע בארה"ב ובישראל?

22-25

26-29 משכורת חודשית בארץ _____ ל$ משכורת חודשית בארה"ב _____

כ. לפי מיטב ידיעתך, האם תוכל להעזר בקשרים הר"מ בהתקדמותך בקריירה בארץ?

קשרים אישיים	קשרים משפחתיים	קשרים פוליטיים	
כן ☐	כן ☐	כן ☐	30-32
לא ☐	לא ☐	לא ☐	

יג. אלו מהנתונים הבאים חשובים לך לבחירת מקצוע? (הואל לסמן כל חשובה המתייחסת אליך).

1. אפשרות לעזור לפתוח השפח.....	☐	41
2. שוק עבודה טוב.....	☐	42
3. חופש פעולה במקצוע.....	☐	43
4. כמות הזמן הפנוי לבלוי.....	☐	44
5. עזרה לציבור או עזרה לחברה בכללה.....	☐	45
6. מקוריות ועבודה יוצרת.....	☐	46
7. הכנסה כספית טובה.....	☐	47
8. הערכה ציבורית.....	☐	48
9. המנעות ממתח ועבודה מייגעת.....	☐	49
10. בטחון סוציאלי.....	☐	50
11. הזדמנות לפתוח רעיונות.....	☐	51
12. כל האמור לעיל אינו מתייחס אלי.....	☐	52

יד. הואל לסמן בעגול את מספר הנתון החשוב ביותר <u>עבורך</u>.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 — 53-54

טו. להלן מספר דרכים למציאת עבודה בישראל כפי שהוצעו על ידי סטודנטים ישראלים. מה נסיונך ו/או תכניותיך לגבי כל אחת מהן.

	נסיתי דרך זו ומצאתיה כיעילה	נסיתי דרך זו ומצאתיה כלא יעילה	לא נסיתי אך מתכוון לנסות דרך זו	לא נסיתי ואינני מתכונן	אינני יודע	
1. ביקור בישראל ופגישות עם מעבידים לעתיד.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	55
2. באמצעות קשרים אישיים.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	56
3. חדוש קשרים עם מרצי לשעבר	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	57
4. פניה ללשכה לאקדמאים בארה"ב....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	58
5. חדוש קשרים עם מעבידים לשעבר.	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	59
6. התכתבות עם מעבידים ישראלים, (שאינני מכיר).....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	60
7. מתן מודעה בעתון ישראלי.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	61
8. פניה לחברות אמריקניות עם סניפים בארץ.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	62
9. פניה אל סוכנות פרטית.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	63

ח. מקצוף המיועד:
הואל לציין את מקצוף המיועד בלבד, מבלי להתחשב בלימודים או עבודה בהווה אשר אינם שייכים ישירות למקצוע.

15-13 _____

ט. מהי הרגשתך לגבי מקצוף המיועד? (הואל לציין תשובה אחת).

1. הנני מעדיף מקצוע זה על כל מקצוע אחר. ..... ☐
2. יכולתי לבחור אלטרנטיבה שונות. ..... ☐
3. הייתי מעדיף אלטרנטיבות אחרות. ..... ☐ 16

י. בבחירת מקצוע האם חשבת על מצב שוק העבודה בישראל?

כן ..... ☐ לא ..... ☐ 17

יא. להלן רשימת מעבידים למיניהם. כשתחיל בעבודה מלאה במקצוף, מי מהר"מ עלול להיות מעבידך, או אם הינך עובד בעבודה מלאה במקצוף, מי מהר"מ מעבידך הנוכחי. (ענה תשובה אחת אם ידוע לך מי מעבידך לעתיד; ולא סמן מספר אפשרויות).

1. חברה פרטית..... ☐ 18
2. חברה ציבורית (כולל חברה ממשלתית והסתדרותית)..... ☐ 19
3. עסק משפחתי..... ☐ 20
4. עצמאי או שותפות מקצועית..... ☐ 21
5. מוסד מחקרי..... ☐ 22
6. מכללה..... ☐ 23
7. בי"ס יסודי או תיכוני..... ☐ 24
8. כל מוסד חינוכי אחר (כגון בי"ס טכני)..... ☐ 25
9. בית-חולים, מרפאה, מוסד סוציאלי וכו'..... ☐ 26
10. ממשלה..... ☐ 27
11. מעביד או כל מוסד שלא הוזכר לעיל (פרט) _____ ... ☐ 28

יב. הואל לציין את חשיבות העובדות הרשומות מטה לגבי השגת עבודה במקצוף והתקדמות בקריירה מקצועית בישראל ובארה"ב.

	ישראל			ארה"ב		
	חשוב מאד	חשוב	לא חשוב	חשוב מאד	חשוב	לא חשוב
1. יכולת.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ 29-30
2. קשרים משפחתיים.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ 31-32
3. תואר אקדמאי.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ 33-34
4. נסיון בשטח.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ 35-36
5. קשרים אישיים.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ 37-38
6. קשרים פוליטיים.....	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐ 39-40

ט. לו היתה לך אפשרות בחירה כיום האם היית מעדיף ללמוד בישראל?

	לקראת תואר ראשון (BA)	לקראת תואר שני (MA)	לקראת תואר שלישי (PhD)
60	כן ..... ם	כן ..... ם	כן ..... ם
61	לא ..... ם	לא ..... ם	לא ..... ם
62	איני יודע.. ם	איני יודע.. ם	איני יודע.. ם

י. בשורות הבאות הואל לפרט את השכלתך עד כה. אם למדת במספר מוסדות לקראת תואר מסויים, הואל לציין את כולם. אם הפסקת את לימודיך לזמן מה וחזרת לאותו מוסד לקם השלמת התואר, ציין זאת בנפרד. אם רכשת יותר מ-ב.א. או מ.א. אחד, ציינם בנפרד (אנא ציין את שם המכללות והמדינות בארה"ב

רמה אקדמאית	שם המוסד	מדינה - אם בארה"ב שם המדינה	חוג עיקרי (מייג'ור)	בין התאריכים	קבלת תואר
סמינר	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
ביה"ס טכני	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
ב.א./ב.ס.	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
מהנדס	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
מ.א./מ.ס.	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
משפטים	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
דוקטורט	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_
פוסט דוקטורט	_____	_____	_____	__19-__19	כן_/לא_

63-71

4-75/02

עבודה ומקצוע

א. האם עבדת במקצוע בישראל טרם בואך לארה"ב? כן ..... ם לא ..... ם 5

ב. אם כן, כמה שנים עבדת במקצוע? _____ 6-7

ג. האם הינך בחופשה ללא תשלום ממקום עבודתך? כן ..... ם לא .... ם 8

ד. האם מחכה לך מקום עבודה בישראל? כן .....ם לא .....ם 9

ה. האם הנך עלול להתקל בקשיים במציאת עבודה מתאימה בישראל?

1)כן ..... ם 2)לא ..... ם 10

ו. מה לדעתך מצב שוק העבודה בישראל בכל המקצועות?

1)מצויין ..... ם 2)טוב מאד ..... ם 3)טוב ..... ם

4)משביע רצון.. ם 5)גרוע ..... ם 11

ז. מה לדעתך מצב שוק העבודה בישראל במקצוע?

1)מצויין.....ם 2)טוב מאד.....ם 3)טוב.....ם

4)משביע רצון....ם 5)גרוע .....ם 12

רקע חינוכי

45 א. האם השלמת תיכון בישראל?

1. כן ..... ☐ 2. לא ..... ☐

46-49 ב. הואל לציין את שם התיכון בו למדת ומקומו.

_____

50-51 ג. באיזו שנה סיימת את התיכון? 19/____

ד. באיזו מגמה למדת?

1. הומנית..... ☐
2. מדעי היהדות .... ☐
3. ביולוגית ..... ☐
4. פדגוגית ..... ☐
5. מדעי המזרח ..... ☐
6. מדעי החברה (סוציולוגית) ☐
7. ראלית ..... ☐
8. מגמה שלא הוזכרה לעיל, (הואל לפרט)..... ☐

52 ה. האם קבלת תעודת בגרות?

כן ..... ☐ לא .....☐

53 ו. אם כן, באיזו שנה קבלת תעודת בגרות ? 19/____

54-55 ז. מה היו ציוניך בתעודת הבגרות? (נסה להזכר.), אנא סמן התשובה בעגול.

56 ממוצע כללי (א) 10, 9½, 9, 8½, 8, 7½, 7, 6½, 6, 5½, 5, 4½ (או פחות)

57 ציון באנגלית (ב) 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3

58 ציון במתימטיקה (ג) 10, 9, 8, 7, 6, 5, 4, 3

ח. מה היה ממוצע הכללי בלימודיך לקראת תואר ראשון (B.A.,B.S.). אם הנך עדיין לומד לקראת תואר ראשון, הואל לציין את ממוצע מתחילת הלימודים עד עכשיו. (כולל הסמסטר הנוכחי).

	בישראל				בארה"ב
	האוני' העברית	טכניון	אוני' תל-אביב	אוני' בר-אילן	
59	1.מעולה ☐	☐	☐	☐	A ☐
	2.טוב מאד ☐	☐	☐	☐	A- ☐
	3.טוב ☐	☐	☐	☐	B+ ☐
	4.כמעט טוב ☐	☐	☐	☐	B ☐
	5.מספיק ☐	☐	☐	☐	B- ☐
	6.מספיק בקושי ☐	☐	☐	☐	C+ ☐
	7.לא מספיק ☐	☐	☐	☐	C ☐

1. הזכר נא בדעותיך וגישתך לנושאים למיניהם הר"מ, בהגיעך לארה"ב ובהשוואה לעכשיו. הואל לציין באם חל מפנה רב או מועט בגישתך והערותיך. אם לא גבשת דעה על נושא מסויים, השאר ריק.

	גבר/ה מאד	גבר/ה מעט	נשאר/ה כפי שהיה	פחת/ה מעט	פחת/ה מאד	
1. שמירת דת	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	32
2. הכרה יהודית	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	33
3. התמסרות למקצועי	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	34
4. עניין בהכנסה טובה	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	35
5. הזדהות עם יהדות הגולה	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	36
6. קשר להורים	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	37
7. ההכרה הישראלית	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	38
8. אמונה בסכויי ההתפתחות של ישראל	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	39
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	

7. האם יש לך חֲבֵרָה ישראלית כאן?

1. כן ..... ☐
2. לא ... ☐ 40

ח. אם אין לך חֲבֵרָה ישראלית, האם היא חסרה לך?

1. כן ..... ☐
2. לא ..... ☐ 41

ט. מה סוג האנשים מהר"מ עמם הינך מעדיף לצאת ומה סוג האנשים עמם הנך יוצא במציאות? סמן תשובה אחת בכל טור.

	מעדיף לצאת	יוצא במציאות	
1. ישראלים	☐	☐	
2. יהודים אמריקנים	☐	☐	
3. אמריקנים לא יהודים	☐	☐	
4. לא חשוב לי	☐	☐	42-43

י. האם לדעתך דומים ישראלים ויהודים מחוץ-לארץ אלה לאלה בתכונותיהם ובהתנהגותם?

1. דומים מאד..... ☐
2. דומים..... ☐
3. דומים במידה מועטה. ☐
4. אינם דומים כלל.... ☐ 44

חיים בארה"ב

א. באיזו תכיפות הנך קורא עתונים ישראלים בארץ ובארה"ב?

	בארץ	בארה"ב	
1. כל יום	☐	☐	
2. לפחות פעם בשבוע	☐	☐	
3. פעם בשבועיים עד פעם בשבוע	☐	☐	
4. פחות מפעם בחודש	☐	☐	
5. אף פעם	☐	☐	16-17

ב. אלו מהדרכים הר"מ משמשות לעדכונך בהתפתחות מקצוף בישראל?

1. העתונות הפריודית	☐	18
2. עתונים מקצועיים	☐	19
3. התכתבויות עם מקצוענים או מעבידים	☐	20
4. התכתבות עם משפחתי	☐	21
5. התכתבות עם ידידים	☐	22
6. דרך אחרת שלא הוזכרה, איזו _____	☐	23
7. האמור לעיל אינו מתייחס אלי	☐	24

ג. באיזו תכיפות הינך מקבל מכתבים מחבריך או משפחתך בישראל? סמן תשובה אחת בכל טור.

	מידידים בישראל	ממשפחה בישראל	
1. לפחות פעם בשבוע	☐	☐	
2. פעם בשבועיים עד פעם בשבוע	☐	☐	
3. פעם בחודש עד פעם בשבועיים	☐	☐	
4. פחות מפעם בחודש	☐	☐	25-26

ד. האם בקרת בישראל בזמן שהותך כאן?

1. כן ☐ 2. לא ☐ 27

ה. כידוע לך רבים הישראלים העובדים במוסדות יהודיים אמריקנים בזמן לימודיהם. האם החזקת באחת המשרות הר"מ? אם כן, הואל לציין את תגובתך למשרה או למשרות בהן התנסת. סמן תשובה אחת לכל סוג משרה.

	משרה כנ"ל	כנ"ל ונהנתי	לא היתה לי היתה לי משרה כנ"ל ולא נהנתי	
1. מורה בבי"ס יומי-יהודי	☐	☐	☐	28
2. מורה בבי"ס עברי אחה"צ או של יום א'	☐	☐	☐	29
3. משרה במחנה קיץ יהודי	☐	☐	☐	30
4. מדריך בתנועת נוער יהודי בארה"ב	☐	☐	☐	31

יד. עם מי מהר"מ הינך מתגורר עכשיו ועם מי גרת בהגיעך לארה"ב? סמן תשובה אחת בכל טור.

	בהגיעי לארה"ב	עכשיו
1. עם סטודנט(ים) ישראלי(ם)	☐	☐
2. עם קרובים אמריקנים	☐	☐
3. עם קרובים או ידידים שהגרו לארה"ב	☐	☐
4. עם אשתי/בעלי	☐	☐
5. עם סטודנט(ים) אמריקני(ם)	☐	☐
6. עם סטודנט(ים) זר(ים) לא ישראלי(ם)	☐	☐
7. הנני גר לבדי	☐	☐
8. לא הוזכר לעיל, אנא פרט _____	☐	☐
	(5)	(6)

5-6

טו. מה סוג האשרה שהיתה ברשותך כשהגעת לארה"ב?

1. סטודנט....☐ 3. חילופין....☐
2. תייר.....☐ 4. מהגר.....☐
5. אשרה שלא הוזכרה לעיל, פרט _____

7

טז. מה סוג האשרה שברשותך כיום?

1. סטודנט....☐ 4. מהגר.....☐
2. תייר.....☐ 5. אזרחות אמריקנית...☐
3. חילופין...☐
6. אשרה שלא הוזכרה לעיל, פרט _____

8

יח. מה היה תאריך החלפת סוג האשרה?

1. לא החלפתי .....☐
2. החלפתי בשנת _____ בחודש _____

9-10
11-12

יט. האם חשבת אי פעם על אפשרות לימודים באירופה במקום בארה"ב?

כן.....☐ לא.....☐

13

כ. מדוע העדפת את ארה"ב על אירופה?

_____

_____

14

יג. רבים הגורמים המניעים סטודנטים ללמוד בארה"ב. הינך מתבקש לעבוד על הרשימה הר"מ ולסמן את התשובה הקרובה ביותר להרגשתך או לדעתך על כל גורם מסויים המוזכר. אם התשובה מתייחסת אליך במידה כלשהי, סמנה בטורים 1 ו-2.

	מתייחס אלי (1)	מתייחס אלי ומאד חשוב לי (2)	
1. הוצעה לי תמיכה או מילגה ע"י המוסדות הבאים:			
א. מכללה אמריקנית	☐	☐	45
ב. ממשלת ישראל	☐	☐	46
ג. מוסד אמריקני או ממשלת ארה"ב	☐	☐	47
2. נראה היה לי שקל יותר לממן את לימודי בארה"ב מאשר בישראל	☐	☐	48
3. פיצויים מגרמניה	☐	☐	49
4. לא הוצעה לי מילגה בישראל	☐	☐	50
5. קרובים בארה"ב הבטיחו לעזור במימון לימודי	☐	☐	51
6. לא היתה אפשרות ללמוד את מקצועי בישראל	☐	☐	52
7. רציתי ללמוד במכללה מסויימת בארה"ב	☐	☐	53
8. לא הייתי בטוח בבחירת שטח הלימוד	☐	☐	54
9. לקראת התואר שאני לומד, רמת הלימוד בארה"ב עולה על זו שבישראל	☐	☐	55
10. לקראת התואר שאני לומד, נראה היה לי שהשלמת התואר תהיה קצרה יותר בארה"ב מאשר בישראל	☐	☐	56
11. במקצועי, תואר ממכללה אמריקנית עולה ערכו בישראל על תואר ממכללה ישראלית	☐	☐	57
12. לא התקבלתי לפקולטה בישראל	☐	☐	58
13. אין לי תעודת בגרות	☐	☐	59
14. חששתי שעקב מספר המקומות המוגבל במקצועי במכללות בארץ לא אוכל להתקבל שם	☐	☐	60
15. רציתי לצאת לעולם הגדול	☐	☐	61
16. רציתי להפסר מלחץ משפחתי לתקופה מסויימת	☐	☐	62
17. חשבתי ברצינות על אפשרות הגירה, ונראה היה לי שמוטב להיות בארה"ב כסטודנט תחילה	☐	☐	63
18. בעלי/אשתי החליט/ה ללמוד בארה"ב	☐	☐	64
19. הורי הגרו לארה"ב	☐	☐	65
20. הגעתי לארה"ב כתייר והחלטתי להשאר למטרת לימודים	☐	☐	66
21. ידידי בארץ יעצו לי ללמוד בארה"ב	☐	☐	67
22. התמחות בארה"ב חיונית במקצועי והדרך היחידה להשיג זאת היא באמצעות ויזה של סטודנט	☐	☐	68
23. גורמים אחרים(הואל לפרט) _____			69

	כן, ועצתם לי עזרה	כן ועצתם לי לא עזרה	לא התייעצתי
5. ידידים ישראלים שלמדו בארה"ב	□	□	□
6. הקונסול האמריקני לענייני תרבות	□	□	□
7. הורים	□	□	□
	(1)	(2)	(3)

ח. מה היה התואר האקדמאי הגבוה ביותר אליו שאפת כשהגעת לארה"ב? סמן אחד התוארים הר"מ.

(1) ב.א. □ (3) ד"ר □

(2) מ.א. □ (4) שונות (אנא פרט) □

ט. מה התואר האקדמאי הגבוה לקראתו ה[illegible]ך לומד עתה, או מתעתד ללמוד?

(1) ב.א. □ (3) ד"ר □

(2) מ.א. □ (4) שונות (אנא פרט) □

י. ישראלים טוענים שהסבות הר"מ מהוות גורם לדאגה בטרם בואם לארה"ב, וגם בזמן שהותם כאן. הינך מתבקש לציין כל דבר שהיה וכל דבר שעתה מהווה סיבת דאגה לך. הינך רשאי לסמן מספר תשובות בכל טור.

	גרם לדאגה טרם בואי לארה"ב	גורם לדאגה עכשיו
1. שליטה בשפה האנגלית	□	□
2. חינוך ילדי	□	□
3. הסתגלותי לשיטת הלימודים במכללה האמריקנית	□	□
4. אנטישמיות	□	□
5. התאקלמות בעלי/אשתי בארה"ב	□	□
6. אבדן הקשר עם משפחתי	□	□
7. אבדן הקשר עם ידידי	□	□
8. הסתדרות מבחינה כספית	□	□
9. בדידות בזמן שהותי בארה"ב	□	□

יא. מהרשימה הנ"ל (שאלה "י") מהי הסיבה הראשונה במעלה לדאגה טרם בואך לארה"ב? (סמן את המספר בעגול). 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

יב. מהרשימה הנ"ל (שאלה "י"), מהי הסיבה הראשונה במעלה לדאגה עכשיו?

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

בואך לארה"ב

5-6
7-8

א. מתי הגעת לארה"ב? בשנת _____ בחודש _____

ב. כשהגעת, כמה זמן תכננת להשאר בארה"ב? (סמן תשובה אחת).

1. פחות משנה.....☐
2. שנה או יותר, אך פחות משלוש שנים.....☐
3. שלוש שנים או יותר, אך פחות מחמש שנים...☐
4. חמש שנים או יותר, אך פחות משבע שנים....☐
5. יותר משבע שנים.....☐
6. תכננתי להשאר לצמיתות.....☐

9

ג. לפי השערתך, כמה שנים בסה"כ תהיה בארה"ב?

1. פחות משנה.....☐
2. שנה או יותר, אך פחות משלוש שנים.....☐
3. שלוש שנים או יותר, אך פחות מחמש שניט...☐
4. חמש שנים או יותר, אך פחות משבע שנים....☐
5. יותר משבע שנים.....☐
6. תכננתי להשאר לצמיתות.....☐

10

ד. האם אתה בטוח בתשובתך לשאלה "ג" ?

1. בטוח מאד.....☐
2. בטוח.....☐
3. לא בטוח.....☐

11

ה. מה היה גילך כשלראשונה <u>חשבת</u> על אפשרות לימודים בארה"ב?
ציין הגיל בשנים: _____

12-13

ו. מה היה גילך <u>כשהחלטת</u> ללמוד בארה"ב?
ציין הגיל בשנים: _____

14-15

ז. לפני בואך לארה"ב האם החיעצת, אישית או בכתב, במוסדות או באנשים הבאים?

	כן, ועצתם עזרה לי	כן ועצתם לא עזרה לי	לא החיעצתי	
1. קרן החינוך ישראל-ארה"ב	☐	☐	☐	16
2. מרצים אמריקנים בישראל	☐	☐	☐	17
3. מרצים ישראלים בישראל	☐	☐	☐	18
4. ידידים או קרובים אמריקנים	☐	☐	☐	19

(המשך שאלה "ז" בעמ' הבא)

ה ו ר א ו ת

שאלון זה הוא בדבר נסיונך ותכניותיך. תשובותיך הגלויות הכרחיות ותסייענה - (א) לתיכנון החינוך הגבוה בארץ.
(ב) לתיכנון כח-אדם אקדמאי בארץ.
(ג) להגשת עזרה לסטודנטים ואקדמאים בארה"ב.

1. המספר הרשום על דף זה הוא לשמוש משרדי <u>בלבד</u> כל התשובות תשמרנה <u>בסודיות גמורה בהחלט</u>.
2. מלוי השאלון ידרוש ממך בין מחצית לשלשת-רבעי השעה. נא שים לב להוראות כל שאלה, לפני השיבך עליה. ברוב השאלות הינך מתבקש להשיב בסימן בלבד, אך במקרה ורשימת התשובות האלטרנטיביות אינה מבטאת את ההשובה שברצונך להשיב, כתוב אותה בשוליים בבקשה.
3. ברוב המקרים אל תשים לב למספרים, אלא אם נתבקשת בפירוש להשתמש בהם. רובם נקבעו לצורך העיבוד במיכון.

APPENDIX D

Card I.

Coming to the United States

Col.	Punch			%	N
Q.1.	Year of your arrival in US.				
	5-6/		last two digits of year		
		65....	1965		
		00....	no answer		
Q.1.	Month of arrival				
	7-8/	01	January	9.8	189
		02	February	4.3	83
		03	March	3.1	60
		04	April	2.1	40
		05	May	2.6	51
		06	June	6.4	123
		07	July	9.4	181
		08	August	21.9	423
		09	September	22.5	436
		10	October	5.0	96
		11	November	4.3	83
		12	December	6.7	130
		00	no answer	2.0	39
Q.2.	When you arrived how long did you intend to remain in US?				
	9/	1	less than a year	3.3	64
		2	one year or more or less than three years	27.1	525
		3	three or more or less than five	40.0	774
		4	five or more, but less than seven	22.4	433
		5	more than seven	4.0	78
		6	I planned to remain permanently	1.4	28
		0	no answer	1.6	32
Q.3.	What is your present expectation as to the total number of years you will stay in US?				
	10/	1	less than one year	0.9	18
		2	one year or more, but less than three years	12.5	242
		3	three or more but less than five	23.3	451
		4	five or more, but less than seven	26.8	519
		5	more than seven	25.2	487
		6	permanently	8.2	159
		0	no answer	3.0	58

Col.	Punch		%	N

Q.4. Are you sure of your answer to the previous question?

11/	1	very sure	36.7	710
	2	sure	38.8	750
	3	not sure	23.1	447
	0	no answer	1.3	26

Q.5. How old were you when you first thought of studying in US?

12-13/		age in years
	00	no answer

Q.6. How old were you when you decided to study in US?

14-15/		age in years
	00	no answer

Q.7. Before coming to US did you consult with Amer. Ed. Org. in Israel?

16/	1	yes--helpful	5.6	108
	2	yes--not helpful	3.9	75
	3	no	60.0	1161
	0	no answer	30.5	590
	9	more than one answer	0.0	0

Q.7. Before coming did you consult with American professors in Israel?

17/	1	yes--helpful	10.0	193
	2	yes--not helpful	2.7	52
	3	no	56.7	1096
	0	no answer	30.7	593
	9	more than one ans.	0.0	0

Q.7. Before coming did you consult with Israeli professors in Israel?

18/	1	yes--helpful	22.4	433
	2	yes--not helpful	5.5	107
	3	no	44.8	869
	0	no ans.	27.0	523
	9	more than one ans.	0.2	4

Q.7. Before coming did you consult with American friends or relatives?

19/	1	yes--helpful	31.8	616
	2	yes--not helpful	8.2	158
	3	no	39.5	764
	0	no ans.	20.3	393
	9	more than one ans.	0.2	3

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.7.	Before coming did you consult with Israeli friends who had studied in US?			
20/	1	yes--helpful	43.8	848
	2	yes--not helpful	6.8	131
	3	no	28.2	546
	0	no ans.	20.9	405
	9	more than one ans.	0.2	4
Q.7.	Before coming did you consult with American Cultural consul?			
21/	1	yes--helpful	7.2	140
	2	yes--not helpful	3.9	75
	3	no	52.9	1023
	0	no ans.	36.0	696
	9	more than one ans.	0.0	0
Q.7.	Before coming did you consult with Parents?			
22/	1	yes--helpful	32.2	622
	2	yes--not helpful	5.6	109
	3	no	33.0	639
	0	no ans.	29.1	562
	9	more than one ans.	0.1	2
Q.8.	What was the highest degree you intended to work for when you came to U.S.?			
23/	1	BA	26.1	505
	2	MA	28.4	550
	3	Dr.	28.6	553
	4	Other	6.0	116
	5	Post-Doct.	4.3	83
	0	no ans. or not studying	6.4	125
Q.9.	What is the highest academic degree you are presently studying for or intend to study for?			
24/	1	BA	6.0	309
	2	MA	25.2	489
	3	Dr.	32.8	634
	4	Other	6.1	118
	5	Post-Doct.	4.7	91
	0	no ans. or not studying	15.0	291
Q.10.	Fluency in English <u>concerned me before</u> coming to US.			
25/	1	yes	43.9	849
	0	no ans.	56.1	1084
Q.10.	Fluency in English <u>concerns me now</u>.			
26/	1	yes	6.3	122
	0	no ans.	93.7	1811

Card I.

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.10.	Education of my children concerned me before coming to US.			
27/	1	yes	7.8	151
	0	no ans.	92.2	1782
Q.10.	Ed. of my children concerns me now.			
28/	1	yes	20.5	397
	0	no ans.	79.5	1536
Q.10.	My ability to cope with an American U. concerned me before coming.			
29/	1	yes	29.6	573
	0	no ans.	70.4	1361
Q.10.	My ability to cope with an Amer. U. concerns me now.			
30/	1	yes	3.5	67
	0	no ans.	96.5	1867
Q.10.	Anti-semitism concerned me before.			
31/	1	yes	4.6	89
	0	no ans.	95.4	1845
Q.10.	Anti-semitism concerns me now.			
32/	1	yes	3.4	65
	0	no ans.	96.6	1869
Q.10.	My spouse's adjustment to US concerned me before coming.			
33/	1	yes	8.6	167
	0	no ans.	91.4	1767
Q.10.	My spouse's adjustment concerns me now.			
34/	1	yes	3.5	68
	0	no ans.	96.5	1866
Q.10.	Uprooting myself from my family concerned me before coming.			
35/	1	yes	21.4	414
	0	no ans.	78.6	1520
Q.10.	Uprooting from family concerns me now.			
36/	1	yes	24.9	482
	0	no ans.	75.1	1452

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.10.	**Uprooting from friends concerned me before coming.**			
37/	1	yes	23.6	457
	0	no ans.	76.3	1476
Q.10.	**Uprooting from friends concerns me now.**			
38/	1	yes	25.2	487
	0	no ans.	74.8	1446
Q.10.	**Financial adjustment concerned me before coming.**			
39/	1	yes	58.5	1131
	0	no ans.	41.5	803
Q.10.	**Financial adjustment concerns me now.**			
40/	1	yes	23.2	448
	0	no ans.	76.8	1486
Q.10.	**Loneliness in US concerned me before coming.**			
41/	1	yes	20.1	389
	0	no ans.	79.9	1543
Q.10.	**Loneliness in US concerns me now.**			
42/	1	yes	11.3	219
	0	no ans.	88.7	1715
Q.11.	**My greatest concern before coming to US was...**			
43/	1	fluency in English	16.4	318
	2	my children's ed.	3.1	61
	3	coping with an Amer. U.	7.0	136
	4	Anti-semitism	0.3	6
	5	Spouse's adjustment	2.0	38
	6	uprooting from family	6.8	131
	7	uprooting from friends	2.3	44
	8	financial adjustment	40.2	777
	9	loneliness in US	3.7	72
	0	no ans.	18.1	351

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.12. What is your greatest concern now?				
44/	1	fluency in Eng.	2.3	45
	2	my children's ed.	13.3	258
	3	coping with an American U.	1.1	22
	4	Anti-semitism	0.6	12
	5	Spouse's adjustment	1.4	28
	6	uprooting from family	15.8	306
	7	uprooting from friends	7.2	140
	8	financial adjustment	19.0	368
	9	loneliness in US	4.6	90
	0	no ans.	34.4	665
Q.13. Reason for study in US... American U scholarship				
45/	1	applies	6.4	124
	2	applies & impt.	11.9	230
	0	NA	81.7	1580
Q.13. RFS... Israeli govt. scholarship				
46/	1	applies	1.2	23
	2	applies & impt.	1.2	24
	0	NA	97.6	1887
Q.13. RFS... Amer. govt. or foundation scholarship				
47/	1	applies	3.7	71
	2	applies & impt.	3.4	65
	0	NA	93.0	1798
Q.13. RFS... Easier to support myself while studying in US				
48/	1	applies	13.2	255
	2	applies & impt.	12.1	235
	0	NA	74.7	1444
Q.13. RFS... reparation funds				
49/	1	applies	0.9	18
	2	applies & impt.	0.5	11
	0	NA	98.5	1905
Q.13. RFS... I did not receive a scholarship in Israel.				
50/	1	applies	6.4	124
	2	applies & impt.	2.5	48
	0	NA	91.1	1762
Q.13. RFS... relatives promised financial aid				
51/	1	applies	7.1	137
	2	applies & impt.	3.7	72
	0	NA	89.2	1725

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.13. RFS... unable to study my field in Israel				
52/	1	applies	12.5	241
	2	applies & impt.	20.8	403
	0	NA	66.7	1290
Q.13. RFS... I wanted to study in a particular US school.				
53/	1	applies	9.8	189
	2	applies & impt.	5.8	113
	0	NA	84.4	1632
Q.13. RFS... unsure of what I wanted to study				
54/	1	applies	4.8	93
	2	applies & impt.	0.9	18
	0	NA	94.3	1822
Q.13. RFS... at my level, training in US is superior to that in Israel.				
55/	1	applies	12.2	236
	2	applies & impt.	19.6	379
	0	NA	68.2	1319
Q.13. RFS... at my level it would take less time to earn degree in US than Israel.				
56/	1	applies	8.1	157
	2	applies & impt.	6.6	127
	0	NA	85.3	1650
Q.13. RFS... in my field an Amer. degree is worth more in Israel than Israeli degree.				
57/	1	applies	10.5	204
	2	applies & impt.	9.3	179
	0	NA	80.2	1551
Q.13. RFS... I was not accepted by university in Israel.				
58/	1	applies	4.5	87
	2	applies & impt.	4.6	89
	0	NA	90.9	1758
Q.13. RFS... I don't have bagrut (certificate).				
59/	1	applies	7.8	151
	2	applies & impt.	4.1	79
	0	NA	88.1	1703

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.13.	RFS... I feared I would not be able to get into a Univ.in Israel because of limited openings.			
60/	1	applies	6.1	119
	2	applies & impt.	4.4	86
	0	NA	89.4	1729
Q.13.	RFS... I wanted to see the world.			
61/	1	applies	32.7	622
	2	applies & impt.	15.9	307
	0	NA	52.0	1005
Q.13.	RFS... I wanted to leave family pressures.			
62/	1	applies	5.9	114
	2	applies & impt.	2.2	42
	0	NA	91.9	1778
Q.13.	RFS... I was seriously considering migrating and I thought it best to try first as a student.			
63/	1	applies	1.1	21
	2	applies & impt.	0.6	12
	0	NA	98.3	1901
Q.13.	RFS... my spouse decided to study in US.			
64/	1	applies	2.4	47
	2	applies & impt.	3.4	66
	0	NA	94.1	1821
Q.13.	RFS... my parents emigrated to the US.			
65/	1	applies	0.0	0
	2	applies & impt.	0.0	0
	0	NA	100.0	1934
Q.13.	RFS... I came as a tourist and decided to stay.			
66/	1	applies	6.1	118
	2	applies & impt.	1.4	28
	0	NA	92.4	1788
Q.13.	RFS... friends in Israel advised me to study in US.			
67/	1	applies	11.7	226
	2	applies & impt.	2.2	42
	0	NA	86.1	1666

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.13. RFS... experience in my work is important and the only way to get it is by a student visa.				
68/	1	applies	6.1	117
	2	applies & impt.	7.3	142
	0	NA	86.6	1673
Q.13. RFS... other reasons				
69/	1	applies	18.7	361
	0	NA	80.9	1564

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.14.	With whom did you live <u>when you first came</u> to US?			
5/	1	Israeli students	10.9	210
	2	Amer. relatives	14.2	275
	3	friends/relatives who migrated to US	4.2	81
	4	spouse	36.4	704
	5	Amer. students	7.9	152
	6	non-Israeli foreign students	1.9	36
	7	I live alone	10.6	205
	8	not listed (specify)	6.4	123
	9	more than one answer	5.3	103
	0	NA	2.3	45
Q.14.	With whom do <u>you now live</u>?			
6/	1	Israeli students	4.1	79
	2	Amer. relatives	0.9	18
	3	friends/relatives who migrated to US	0.8	16
	4	spouse	65.4	1265
	5	Amer. students	5.0	97
	6	non-Israeli foreign students	1.4	28
	7	I live alone	14.3	277
	8	not listed (specify)	3.5	67
	9	more than one answer	1.3	25
	0	NA	3.2	62
Q.15.	Status of visa you held <u>when you arrived</u> in US.			
7/	1	student	56.2	1095
	2	tourist	16.3	316
	3	exchange	14.5	281
	4	immigrant	6.7	129
	5	other (specify)	5.3	102
	0	NA	0.6	11
Q.16.	Status of visa <u>you now hold</u>.			
8/	1	student	44.2	854
	2	tourist	0.3	5
	3	exchange	14.1	273
	4	immigrant	23.6	456
	5	US citizenship	12.2	237
	6	other (specify)	4.8	93
	0	NA	0.3	16

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.17. Year of change of visa status				
9-10/		last two digits of year		
	99	no change		
	00	NA		
Q.17. Month of change of visa status				
11-12/	01	January	4.0	77
	02	February	2.9	57
	03	March	2.6	51
	04	April	2.5	49
	05	May	2.4	47
	06	June	3.1	60
	07	July	2.4	46
	08	August	3.3	63
	09	September	3.9	76
	10	October	2.7	52
	11	November	2.4	46
	12	December	2.0	38
	99	no change	53.3	1030
	00	NA	12.5	241
Q.18. Have you ever thought of studying in Europe?				
13/	1	yes	39.3	760
	2	no	56.1	1086
	3	NA	4.5	88
Q.19. Why did you prefer the US to Europe?				
14/	1	answer	79.2	1531
	0	NA	20.8	403

Life in the United States

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.1.	With what frequency did you read Israeli newspapers in Israel?			
16/	1	daily	2.7	52
	2	weekly	87.0	1683
	3	bi-weekly	7.6	147
	4	monthly	0.8	15
	5	never	0.2	3
	0	NA	2.7	52
	9	multp. ans.	0.9	17
Q.1.	With what frequency do you read Israeli newspapers in the US?			
17/	1	daily	4.5	87
	2	weekly	45.8	886
	3	bi-weekly	19.8	383
	4	monthly	24.3	471
	5	never	3.3	64
	0	NA	1.9	36
	9	multp. ans.	0.4	7
Q.2.	Do you keep up with developments in your field in Israel through periodicals?			
18/	1	yes	30.8	595
	0	NA	69.2	1339
Q.2.	Do you keep up with developments in your field in Israel through professional journals?			
19/	1	yes	23.2	448
	0	NA	76.8	1486
Q.2.	Do you keep up with developments in your field in Israel through correspondence with professionals or employers?			
20/	1	yes	18.5	357
	0	NA	81.5	1577
Q.2.	Do you keep up with developments in your field in Israel through corresp. with family?			
21/	1	yes	31.7	613
	0	NA	68.3	1321
Q.2.	Do you keep up with developments in your field in Israel through corresp. with friends?			
22/	1	yes	44.7	865
	0	NA	55.3	1069

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.2.	Do you keep up with developments in your field in Israel in any other way? (specify)			
23/	1	yes	7.4	144
	0	NA	92.5	1789
Q.2.	Nothing applies to me.			
24/	1	yes	18.9	365
	0	NA	81.1	1568
Q.3.	How often do you receive letters from friends in Israel?			
25/	1	weekly	11.5	223
	2	bi-weekly	13.5	261
	3	monthly	26.3	509
	4	less than monthly	38.0	735
	0	NA	10.5	204
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2
Q.3.	How often from family in Israel?			
26/	1	weekly	58.6	1134
	2	bi-weekly	22.8	442
	3	monthly	11.1	215
	4	less than monthly	4.4	85
	0	NA	2.6	51
	9	multp. ans.	0.4	7
Q.4.	Did you visit Israel during the time you were in US?			
27/	1	yes	39.4	760
	2	no	59.2	1142
	0	NA	1.4	28
Q.5.	Did you have a job as a teacher in a Jewish day school in US?			
28/	1	no	56.7	1096
	2	yes--pleasant	4.4	86
	3	yes--unpleasant	2.3	44
	0	NA	36.4	705
	9	multp. ans.	0.2	3
Q.5.	Did you have a job as a teacher in afternoon Hebrew schl. or Sunday schl.?			
29/	1	no	48.9	946
	2	yes--pleasant	21.1	409
	3	yes--unpleasant	12.7	245
	0	NA	16.6	321
	9	multp. ans.	0.7	13

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.5.	Did you have a job as a counselor in Jewish summer-camp?			
30/	1	no	51.7	1000
	2	yes--pleasant	12.8	247
	3	yes--unpleasant	3.4	65
	0	NA	31.8	615
	9	multp. ans.	0.7	7
Q.5.	Did you have a job as a Jewish youth group leader?			
31/	1	no	54.5	1055
	2	yes--pleasant	4.1	80
	3	yes--unpleasant	1.4	28
	0	NA	39.7	768
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2
Q.6.	Since arriving in the US have you changed your attitude towards religious observance?			
32/	1	greatly increased	3.8	73
	2	increased somewhat	16.4	318
	3	same	61.8	1196
	4	decreased somewhat	6.1	118
	5	greatly decreased	3.8	73
	0	NA	8.0	154
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2
Q.6.	Since arriving in the US have you changed your attitude towards Jewish identity?			
33/	1	greatly increased	18.5	357
	2	increased somewhat	27.8	537
	3	same	44.3	857
	4	decreased somewhat	2.1	40
	5	greatly decreased	0.6	12
	0	NA	6.7	129
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2
Q.6.	Since arriving in the US has your commitment to your profession changed?			
34/	1	greatly increased	38.5	744
	2	increased somewhat	12.9	250
	3	same	32.7	632
	4	decreased somewhat	1.9	36
	5	greatly decreased	0.9	17
	0	NA	13.1	253
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.6.	Since arriving in the US has your interest in making a good living changed?			
35/	1	greatly increased	19.5	378
	2	increased somewhat	26.1	505
	3	same	41.2	798
	4	decreased somewhat	1.6	32
	5	greatly decreased	0.5	9
	0	NA	11.0	212
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.6.	Since arriving in the US has your identification with diaspora Jewry changed?			
36/	1	greatly increased	13.6	263
	2	increased somewhat	26.9	521
	3	same	34.0	657
	4	decreased somewhat	9.4	181
	5	greatly decreased	3.7	72
	0	NA	12.3	238
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2
Q.6.	Since arriving in the US have you changed your attitude towards your parents?			
37/	1	greatly increased	13.1	253
	2	increased somewhat	11.8	228
	3	same	56.2	1087
	4	decreased somewhat	8.2	157
	5	greatly decreased	1.8	34
	0	NA	9.1	175
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.6.	Since arriving in the US have you changed your attitude towards Israeli identity?			
38/	1	greatly increased	5.8	113
	2	increased somewhat	18.7	361
	3	same	47.3	914
	4	decreased somewhat	10.7	208
	5	greatly decreased	1.3	26
	0	NA	5.8	113
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	1
Q.6.	Since arriving in the US have you changed your attitude towards Israeli development?			
39/	1	greatly increased	11.4	220
	2	increased somewhat	14.1	273
	3	same	51.6	997
	4	decreased somewhat	13.0	251
	5	greatly decreased	2.4	47
	0	NA	7.4	144
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.7.	Do you have an Israeli "circle"?			
40/	1	yes	77.8	1505
	2	no	21.1	408
	0	NA	1.0	20
Q.8.	If not, do you feel the lack?			
41/	1	yes	13.9	269
	2	no	12.6	243
	0	NA	73.5	1421
Q.9.	Whom do you prefer to go out with?			
42/	1	Israelis	27.1	524
	2	American Jews	5.0	96
	3	American non-Jews	3.0	40
	4	irrelevant	41.4	800
	0	NA	16.0	309
	9	multp. ans.	8.5	165
Q.9.	Whom do you actually go out with?			
43/	1	Israelis	22.1	427
	2	American Jews	9.4	182
	3	American non-Jews	4.3	84
	4	irrelevant	23.6	456
	0	NA	7.1	138
	9	multp. ans.	33.4	647
Q.10.	Do you think that Israeli and diaspora Jews are similar in personal characteristics and behavior?			
44/	1	very similar	0.7	14
	2	similar	15.7	303
	3	similar to a limited extent	46.2	894
	4	not at all similar	32.8	634
	0	NA	3.9	75
	9	multp. ans.	0.6	13

Educational Background

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.1.	Did you complete high school in Israel?			
45/	1	yes	78.2	1512
	2	no	20.1	388
	0	NA	1.7	33
Q.2.	What is the name & location of your high school?			
46-49/		see code for high schools in Israel		
	0000	no ans.		
Q.3.	In what year did you graduate from high school?			
50-51/		last two digits of year		
	00	NA		
Q.4.	What was your major field?			
52/	1	Humanities	24.1	466
	2	Religious studies	1.3	25
	3	Biology	9.0	174
	4	Pedagogy	1.9	37
	5	Oriental studies	0.7	13
	6	Social science	3.9	75
	7	Realit	34.9	674
	8	Other (specify)	15.3	296
	9	Multp. ans.	0.9	17
	0	NA	8.1	157
Q.5.	Did you matriculate?			
53/	1	yes	75.3	1456
	2	no	20.6	398
	0	NA	3.9	76
Q.6.	In what year did you matriculate?			
54-55/		last two digits of year		
	00	no ans.		

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.7. What were your average matriculation scores?				
56/	1	9½ or 10	2.5	49
	2	9	7.1	137
	3	8½	13.4	260
	4	8	15.8	306
	5	7½	16.3	316
	6	7	13.6	263
	7	6½	5.8	112
	8	6	2.7	52
	9	5½	0.1	3
	0	NA	22.5	436
Q.7. What were your English scores?				
57/	1	10	2.1	41
	2	9	6.4	124
	3	8	14.4	279
	4	7	20.8	402
	5	6	23.1	446
	6	5	7.0	135
	7	4	0.8	16
	8	3	0.3	5
	0	NA	25.1	486
Q.7. What were your Math scores?				
58/	1	10	10.2	197
	2	9	15.7	303
	3	8	21.8	421
	4	7	16.5	319
	5	6	10.5	203
	6	5	2.1	40
	7	4	0.6	11
	8	3	0.0	1
	0	NA	22.7	439
Q.8. What were your average marks for your first degree in Israel or US?				
59/	1	excellent or A	5.9	114
	2	very good or A-minus	16.4	317
	3	good or B-plus	32.1	621
	4	almost good or B	15.0	291
	5	sufficient or B-minus	10.5	203
	6	inadequate or C-plus	3.9	76
	7	fail or C	1.0	15
	0	N.A.	15.2	295
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.9. For the first degree would you prefer to study in Israel?				
60/	1	yes	41.2	795
	2	no	22.2	429
	3	don't know	15.7	303
	0	NA	20.9	404
Q.9. For the second degree would you prefer to study in Israel?				
61/	1	yes	13.5	262
	2	no	43.1	833
	3	don't know	18.1	349
	0	NA	25.2	486
Q.9. For the third degree would you prefer to study in Israel?				
62/	1	yes	10.0	194
	2	no	39.6	765
	3	don't know	21.1	408
	0	NA	29.2	564
Q.19. Last University in Israel				
63/	1	Hebrew U.	23.4	453
	2	Technion	13.3	258
	3	Weizman Inst.	0.5	9
	4	Tel Aviv U.	1.5	30
	5	Bar Ilan	1.3	26
	6	Teachers Inst.	4.7	91
	7	Technical School	2.3	44
	8	Agriculture	0.3	5
	9	Others	1.7	33
	0	no ans. (or did not study in Israel)	50.9	985
Q.10. Highest degree received in Israel				
64/	1	Diploma	7.4	144
	2	BA-BS	14.3	276
	3	Engineer	3.8	73
	4	MA-MS	10.8	209
	5	Ph.D.	3.6	69
	6	MD	1.7	33
	7	Post-Doct.	0.2	3
	8	Law (LLB)	0.7	14
	9	Did not receive any degree in Israel	6.0	117
	0	NA (or did not study in Israel)	51.5	996

Col.	Punch		%	N

Q.10. Year received degree in Israel or graduated in Israel

65-66/		last two digits or year		
	00	NA		

Q.10. Last profession studied in U.S.

67-69/		see profession code		
	000	NA		

Q.10. Highest degree studied for in U.S.

70/	1	Diploma	2.3	45
	2	BA-BS	23.4	450
	3	Engineer	0.5	9
	4	MA-MS	19.3	372
	5	Ph.D.	19.7	379
	6	MD	0.5	10
	7	Post-Doct.	7.4	142
	8	LL.B.	0.3	6
	0	NA	26.6	511

Q.10. Did you receive degree?

71/	1	yes	30.7	590
	2	still studying	36.7	704
	3	no	3.0	58
	0	NA	29.5	567

Card III.

Job and Profession

Col.	Punch			%	N
Q.1.	Did you work in your field in Israel?				
5/		1	yes	49.2	951
		2	no	48.2	932
		0	NA	2.6	51
Q.2.	How many years?				
6-7/		01	one month to one year		
		02	2 years		
		03	3 years		
		04	4 years		
		05	5 years		
		06	6 years		
		07	7 years		
		08	8 years		
		09	9 years		
		10	10 years		
		00	NA		
Q.3.	Are you on leave of absence from a job in Israel?				
8/		1	yes	10.2	198
		2	no	72.5	1403
		0	NA	17.1	331
Q.4.	Are you already set up with a job?				
9/		1	yes	16.2	313
		2	no	76.1	1472
		0	NA	7.7	149
Q.5.	Do you think it will be difficult for you to find a suitable job in Israel?				
10/		1	yes	41.0	794
		2	no	42.0	812
		0	NA	16.9	326
Q.6.	What is your opinion of the general labor market in Israel?				
11/		1	excellent	0.5	7
		2	very good	3.9	76
		3	good	25.2	488
		4	fair	41.6	805
		5	poor	13.6	264
		0	NA	14.8	287
		9	multp. ans.	0.3	5

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.7.	What is your opinion of the labor market in your field in Israel?			
12/	1	excellent	4.7	91
	2	very good	11.9	230
	3	good	24.8	479
	4	fair	26.0	503
	5	poor	23.0	445
	0	NA	9.3	179
	9	multp. ans.	0.4	7
Q.8.	Your anticipated career field			
13-15/		see field code		
	000	NA		
Q.9.	What is your feeling regarding your field?			
16/	1	strongly prefer	71.3	1378
	2	could be tempted by one or more alternatives	21.1	408
	3	I would prefer one or more alternatives	2.3	45
	0	NA	4.4	85
	9	multp. ans.	0.9	17
Q.10.	In choosing your field did you consider job opportunities in Israel?			
17/	1	yes	39.3	759
	2	no	57.0	1102
	0	NA	3.7	72
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) a private firm?			
18/	1	yes	39.4	762
	0	NA	60.6	1172
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) a public firm?			
19/	1	yes	28.2	545
	0	NA	71.8	1389
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) a family firm?			
20/	1	yes	2.9	56
	0	NA	97.1	1878
Q.11.	Do you expect to work in private practice or professional partnership?			
21/	1	yes	19.8	383
	0	NA	80.2	1551

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) a research inst.?			
22/	1	yes	36.2	701
	0	NA	63.7	1233
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) a university?			
23/	1	yes	39.8	770
	0	NA	60.2	1164
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) an elementary or high school?			
24/	1	yes	9.4	182
	0	NA	90.6	1752
	9	Mult. ans.	0.0	0
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) some other educ. inst.?			
25/	1	yes	4.8	94
	0	NA	95.1	1840
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) hosp..clinic or social agency?			
26/	1	yes	11.9	230
	0	NA	88.1	1704
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.11	Do you expect to work for (in) the govt.?			
27/	1	yes	23.9	463
	0	NA	76.1	1471
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.11.	Do you expect to work for (in) some other area? (specify)			
28/	1	yes	5.0	96
	0	NA	95.0	1837
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.12.	Is <u>ability</u> important in <u>Israel</u>?			
29/	1	very impt.	50.3	972
	2	impt.	35.4	685
	3	not impt.	3.7	72
	0	NA	10.6	205
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.12.	Is <u>ability</u> important in <u>U.S.</u>?			
30/	1	very impt.	75.7	1465
	2	impt.	13.2	255
	3	not impt.	1.1	22
	0	NA	9.9	192
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.12.	Are family connections important in Israel?			
31/	1	very impt.	19.6	380
	2	impt.	23.8	460
	3	not impt.	30.0	580
	0	NA	26.6	514
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.12.	Are family connections important in U.S.?			
32/	1	very impt.	6.0	116
	2	impt.	17.0	329
	3	not impt.	48.1	931
	0	NA	28.8	557
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	1
Q.12.	Is an academic degree important in Israel?			
33/	1	very impt.	51.7	1000
	2	impt.	33.0	638
	3	not impt.	4.1	80
	0	NA	11.1	215
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	1
Q.12.	Is an academic degree important in U.S.?			
34/	1	very impt.	70.3	1360
	2	impt.	16.5	320
	3	not impt.	1.8	35
	0	NA	11.3	219
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.12.	Is professional experience important in Israel?			
35/	1	very impt.	49.1	950
	2	impt.	36.6	708
	3	not impt.	3.7	71
	0	NA	10.6	205
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.12.	Is professional experience important in U.S.?			
36/	1	very impt.	62.0	1193
	2	impt.	24.2	468
	3	not impt.	2.9	56
	0	NA	11.2	216
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	1
Q.12.	Are personal connections important in Israel?			
37/	1	very impt.	47.4	916
	2	impt.	32.4	627
	3	not impt.	5.6	109
	0	NA	14.6	282
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0

Card III.

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.12.	Are personal connections important in U.S.?			
38/	1	very impt.	23.5	455
	2	impt.	42.6	824
	3	not impt.	14.9	288
	0	NA	18.9	366
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	1
Q.12.	Are political connections important in Israel?			
39/	1	very impt.	27.5	532
	2	impt.	21.1	409
	3	not impt.	28.7	555
	0	NA	22.6	438
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.12.	Are political connections important in U.S.?			
40/	1	very impt.	3.4	66
	2	impt.	10.3	200
	3	not impt.	58.7	1136
	0	NA	27.5	532
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.13.	Is opportunity to develop the field important in your choice of occupation?			
41/	1	yes	50.6	979
	0	NA	49.4	955
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.13.	Is a good labor market important in your choice of occupation?			
42/	1	yes	30.8	595
	0	NA	69.2	1339
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.13.	Is work autonomy important in your choice of occupation?			
43/	1	yes	66.9	1294
	0	NA	33.1	640
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.13.	Is ample free time important in your choice of occupation?			
44/	1	yes	9.7	188
	0	NA	90.3	1746
	9	Mult.ans.		
Q.13.	Is public service important in your choice of occupation?			
45/	1	yes	31.2	604
	0	NA	68.8	1330
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0
Q.13.	Is creativity important in your choice of occupation?			
46/	1	yes	69.9	1352
	0	NA	30.1	582
	9	Mult.ans.	0.0	0

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.13.	Is good income important in your choice of occupation?			
47/	1	yes	56.2	1087
	0	NA	43.8	847
Q.13.	Is public recognition important in your choice of occupation?			
48/	1	yes	24.4	472
	0	NA	75.6	1462
Q.13.	Is preventing tension and hard work important in your choice of occupation?			
49/	1	yes	5.8	113
	0	NA	94.2	1821
Q.13.	Is social sec. important in your choice of occupation?			
50/	1	yes	16.2	314
	0	NA	83.8	1620
Q.13.	Is an opportunity to develop ideas important in your choice of occupation?			
51/	1	yes	67.8	1311
	0	NA	32.2	623
Q.13.	None of the above applies to me.			
52/	1	yes	4.0	77
	0	NA	96.0	1857
Q.14.	Which is most important to you in your choice of a career?			
53-54/	01	opportunity to develop the field	5.9	114
	02	good labor market	3.5	68
	03	work autonomy	15.3	296
	04	ample free time	0.5	9
	05	public service	5.6	108
	06	creativity	30.1	582
	07	good income	8.0	155
	08	public recognition	0.1	17
	09	preventing tension and hard work	0.3	6
	10	social security	1.3	26
	11	opportunity to develop ideas	12.5	242
	12	none of above applies	1.3	26
	00	NA	11.6	225
	99	multp. ans.	3.0	58

Col.	Punch		%	N

Q.15. Are you preparing to find work by visiting Israel and meeting prospective employers?

55/	1	yes--effective	7.1	138
	2	yes--ineffective	5.0	96
	3	no--but will	36.5	706
	4	no--won't	15.0	290
	5	don't know	20.4	394
	0	NA	16.0	309
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	1

Q.15. Are you preparing to find work through personal connections?

56/	1	yes--effective	11.0	213
	2	yes--ineffective	3.4	66
	3	no--but will	32.4	627
	4	no--won't	12.2	236
	5	don't know	20.9	404
	0	NA	20.0	387
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	1

Q.15. Are you preparing to find work by renewing contacts with former professors?

57/	1	yes--effective	5.0	97
	2	yes--ineffective	2.0	38
	3	no--but will	14.0	96
	4	no--won't	26.8	518
	5	don't know	20.8	403
	0	NA	31.4	608
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0

Q.15. Are you preparing to find work by contecting academic section of Ministry of Labor in U.S.?

58/	1	yes--effective	4.6	89
	2	yes--ineffective	7.6	148
	3	no--but will	36.7	709
	4	no--won't	12.5	241
	5	don't know	19.1	370
	0	NA	19.4	375
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2

Q.15. Are you preparing to find work by renewing contacts with former employers?

59/	1	yes--effective	4.9	95
	2	yes--ineffective	2.4	47
	3	no--but will	14.8	286
	4	no--won't	28.0	541
	5	don't know	19.5	378
	0	NA	30.3	587
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.15.	Are you preparing to find work by corresponding with Israeli employers that you don't know?			
60/	1	yes--effective	2.8	55
	2	yes--ineffective	4.0	77
	3	no--but will	33.8	653
	4	no--won't	16.4	318
	5	don't know	21.1	409
	0	NA	21.6	418
	9	multp. ans.	0.2	4
Q.15.	Are you preparing to find work through want ads in Israeli papers?			
61/	1	yes--effective	0.0	1
	2	yes--ineffective	0.2	4
	3	no--but will	7.8	150
	4	no--won't	37.1	718
	5	don't know	25.0	483
	0	NA	30.0	578
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.15.	Are you preparing to find work by contacting American firms with branches in Israel?			
62/	1	yes--effective	0.7	13
	2	yes--ineffective	1.9	36
	3	no--but will	24.8	480
	4	no--won't	22.5	436
	5	don't know	24.8	480
	0	NA	25.3	489
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.15.	Are you preparing to find work through a private employment agency?			
63/	1	yes--effective	0.5	9
	2	yes--ineffective	0.3	5
	3	no--but will	9.6	185
	4	no--won't	30.7	593
	5	don't know	30.2	584
	0	NA	28.8	558
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.16.	What way do you think would be most effective for you in finding work?			
64/	1	visiting Israel	28.6	553
	2	personal connections	13.3	258
	3	contacts with former professors	5.2	100
	4	contacting empl. sectn. of Min. of Labor	11.1	215
	5	contacts with former employers	6.1	117
	6	corresponding with Israeli employers I don't know	7.0	135
	7	Israeli newspaper want ads	0.9	17
	8	contact Amer. firms	4.4	85
	9	private employment agency	1.0	20
	0	NA	22.4	432
Q.17.	Any other way? (describe)			
65/	1	yes	14.6	282
	0	NA	85.4	1649

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.18. Compare Israel and U.S. regarding good labor market.				
5/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	2.4	46
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	90.0	1734
	3	same	4.4	86
	0	NA	3.5	68
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.18. Compare Israel and U.S. regarding opportunity to develop the field.				
6/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	28.1	543
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	50.3	972
	3	same	16.0	309
	0	NA	5.6	108
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2
Q.18. Compare Israel and U.S. regarding work autonomy.				
7/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	10.6	206
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	52.3	1011
	3	same	27.8	537
	0	NA	9.3	179
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	1
Q.18. Compare Israel and U.S. regarding ample free time.				
8/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	24.2	468
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	45.9	888
	3	same	22.8	441
	0	NA	7.1	137
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.18. Compare Israel and U.S. regarding public service.				
9/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	50.7	981
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	7.5	146
	3	same	29.0	561
	0	NA	12.7	246
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.18. Compare Israel and U.S. regarding creativity.				
10/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	15.4	298
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	34.7	671
	3	same	40.7	788
	0	NA	9.0	174
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	3

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding good income.			
11/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	0.8	15
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	95.8	1852
	3	same	0.9	17
	0	NA	2.6	50
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding public recognition.			
12/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	28.8	557
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	22.4	433
	3	same	37.3	721
	0	NA	11.5	222
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	1
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding the avoidance of tension and hard work.			
13/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	33.4	647
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	17.6	340
	3	same	37.7	730
	0	NA	11.1	216
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	1
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding social security.			
14/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	56.0	1084
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	20.3	392
	3	same	15.7	303
	0	NA	7.9	152
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	3
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding opportunity to develop ideas.			
15/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	10.5	204
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	45.2	875
	3	same	36.2	701
	0	NA	7.8	151
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	3
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding children's education.			
16/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	79.6	1539
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	5.0	96
	3	same	8.1	157
	0	NA	7.2	139
	9	multp. ans.	0.2	3

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding standard of living.			
17/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	1.3	26
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	93.7	1813
	3	same	1.8	35
	0	NA	3.1	60
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding social life.			
18/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	75.7	1465
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	4.5	88
	3	same	15.7	303
	0	NA	3.9	76
	9	multp. ans.	0.1	2
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding family relations.			
19/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	86.4	1671
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	2.0	38
	3	same	7.6	147
	0	NA	4.0	77
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	1
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding freedom of thought and ideas.			
20/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	17.3	335
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	23.2	447
	3	same	53.6	1036
	0	NA	5.8	112
	9	multp. ans.	0.2	3
Q.18.	Compare Israel and U.S. regarding cultural level.			
21/	1	Israel superior to U.S.	29.9	578
	2	U.S. superior to Israel	25.6	496
	3	same	37.3	721
	0	NA	6.9	133
	9	multp. ans.	0.3	5

Q.19. What do you estimate your starting salary in Israel would be?

22-25/ e.g., 800 il.--code is 0800

0000 NA

Q.19. What do you estimate your starting salary in U.S. would be?

26-29/ e.g., $800--code is 0800

0000 NA

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.20. Will personal connections assist you in advancing your career in Israel?				
30/	1	yes	59.9	1159
	2	no	30.8	595
	0	NA	9.3	180
Q.20. Will family connections assist you in advancing your career in Israel?				
31/	1	yes	23.8	460
	2	no	63.1	1220
	0	NA	13.1	254
Q.20. Will political connections assist you in advancing your career in Israel?				
32/	1	yes	14.7	285
	2	no	71.8	1388
	0	NA	13.5	261

Your Future

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how do job opportunities in Israel influence you?			
33/	1	influence to return to Israel	30.9	597
	2	no influence	31.0	600
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	30.6	592
	0	NA	7.3	142
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how do job opportunities in U.S. influence you?			
34/	1	influence to return to Israel	0.5	10
	2	no influence	35.5	687
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	55.0	1064
	0	NA	8.9	172
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how does family in Israel influence you?			
35/	1	influence to return to Israel	81.1	1569
	2	no influence	14.4	279
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	0.4	8
	0	NA	4.0	77
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how does family in U.S. influence you?			
36/	1	influence to return to Israel	2.7	52
	2	no influence	71.1	1375
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	10.7	208
	0	NA	15.5	299
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how do friends in Israel influence you?			
37/	1	influence to return to Israel	61.0	1180
	2	no influence	32.4	626
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	0.0	1
	0	NA	6.6	127

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how do friends in U.S. influence you?			
38/	1	influence to return to Israel	0.8	16
	2	no influence	74.6	1442
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	12.8	248
	0	NA	11.8	228
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how does feeling of strangeness in U.S. influence you?			
39/	1	influence to return to Israel	43.1	835
	2	no influence	48.8	944
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	0.4	7
	0	NA	7.5	146
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how does feeling of strangeness in Israel influence you?			
40/	1	influence to return to Israel	3.4	66
	2	no influence	68.3	1322
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	5.5	107
	0	NA	22.7	439
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how do differences in Israeli-American income potential influence you?			
41/	1	influence to return to Israel	0.6	12
	2	no influence	33.0	638
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	59.0	1139
	0	NA	7.5	145
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how do spouse's feelings influence you?			
42/	1	influence to return to Israel	32.7	633
	2	no influence	26.6	514
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	14.2	275
	0	NA	26.4	510

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how does your children's education influence you?			
43/	1	influence to return to Israel	70.9	1371
	2	no influence	11.2	216
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	2.3	44
	0	NA	15.7	303
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how does the fact that you are an Israeli influence you?			
44/	1	influence to return to Israel	79.9	1546
	2	no influence	15.3	296
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	0.0	1
	0	NA	4.6	90
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how does professional challenge in Israel influence you?			
45/	1	influence to return to Israel	32.2	623
	2	no influence	39.9	772
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	8.4	163
	0	NA	19.4	376
Q.1.	When you think about returning to Israel, how does professionsl challenge in U.S. influence you?			
46/	1	influence to return to Israel	0.8	15
	2	no influence	46.4	897
	3	influence to remain in U.S.	31.6	612
	0	NA	21.1	408

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.2.	Which is the strongest determinant to remain in U.S.?			
47-48/	01	job opportunities in Israel	5.3	102
	02	job opportunities in U.S.	23.4	453
	03	family in Israel	0.5	9
	04	family in U.S.	1.3	26
	05	friends in Israel	0.2	3
	06	friends in U.S.	1.2	23
	07	feelings of strangeness in U.S.	0.1	2
	08	feelings of strangeness in Israel	0.6	12
	09	Israeli-Amer. income differences	21.2	410
	10	spouse's feelings	5.6	109
	11	my children's education	0.6	11
	12	the fact that I am an Israeli	0.5	10
	13	professional challenge in Israel	0.2	3
	14	professional challenge in U.S.	6.9	134
	15	other reason	2.3	44
	00	NA	25.5	494
	99	multp. ans.	4.6	89

Card IV.

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.2.	Which is the strongest determinant to return to Israel?			
49-50/	01	job opportunities in Israel	4.3	83
	02	job opportunities in U.S.	0.3	5
	03	family in Israel	18.8	363
	04	family in U.S.	0.1	2
	05	friends in Israel	1.3	26
	06	friends in U.S.	0.0	0
	07	feelings of strangeness in U.S.	4.8	93
	08	feelings of strangeness in Israel	0.3	6
	09	Israeli-Amer. income differences	0.3	5
	10	spouse's feelings	1.7	33
	11	my children's education	9.9	191
	12	the fact that I am an Israeli	38.5	745
	13	professional challenge in Israel	2.1	41
	14	professional challenge in U.S.	0.0	1
	15	other reason	1.8	34
	00	NA	11.1	215
	99	multp. ans.	4.7	91
Q.3.	Did American professors advise you to return to Israel or remain in U.S.?			
51/	1	advised to return to Israel	2.1	41
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	23.2	448
	3	did not advise	58.4	1130
	0	NA	15.6	302
	9	multp. ans.	0.7	13
Q.3.	Did Israeli professors advise you to return to Israel or remain in U.S.?			
52/	1	advised to return to Israel	16.3	315
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	2.4	47
	3	did not advise	63.0	1219
	0	NA	17.9	347
	9	multp. ans.	0.3	6

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.3.	Did American relatives advise you to return to Israel or remain in U.S.?			
53/	1	advised to return to Israel	2.9	57
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	34.0	659
	3	did not advise	46.6	902
	0	NA	16.0	311
	9	multp. ans.	0.3	5
Q.3.	Did Israeli relatives advise you to return to Israel or remain in U.S.?			
54/	1	advised to return to Israel	60.3	1167
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	3.3	64
	3	did not advise	23.6	456
	0	NA	12.1	235
	9	multp. ans.	0.6	12
Q.3.	Did your spouse advise you to return to Israel or remain in U.S.?			
55/	1	advised to return to Israel	30.2	585
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	11.7	226
	3	did not advise	29.5	571
	0	NA	28.1	545
	9	multp. ans.	0.4	7
Q.3.	Did American friends advise you to return to Israel or to remain in U.S.?			
56/	1	advised to return to Israel	1.6	32
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	37.4	724
	3	did not advise	44.4	858
	0	NA	15.8	305
	9	multp. ans.	0.8	15
Q.3.	Did Israeli friends in U.S. advise you to return to Israel or to remain in U.S.?			
57/	1	advised to return to Israel	12.5	242
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	17.2	332
	3	did not advise	51.3	992
	0	NA	16.4	318
	9	multp. ans.	2.6	50

Col.	Punch		%	N
Q.3.	Did Israeli friends in Israel advise you to return to Israel or to remain in U.S.?			
58/	1	advised to return to Israel	35.7	691
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	8.4	163
	3	did not advise	39.5	764
	0	NA	14.6	283
	9	multp. ans.	1.7	33
Q.3.	Did American employers advise you to return to Israel or to remain in U.S.?			
59/	1	advised to return to Israel	0.4	8
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	38.7	749
	3	did not advise	45.1	872
	0	NA	15.8	305
	9	multp. ans.	0.0	0
Q.3.	Did Israeli employers advise you to return to Israel or to remain in U.S.?			
60/	1	advised to return to Israel	20.2	391
	2	advised to remain in U.S.	1.4	28
	3	did not advise	60.3	1167
	0	NA	17.7	342
	9	multp. ans.	0.3	6
Q.4.	Is customs duty a problem for most returning students?			
61/	1	yes	63.9	1235
	0	NA	36.1	699
Q.4.	Is customs duty a problem for you?			
62/	1	yes	45.4	878
	0	NA	54.6	1056
Q.4.	Is housing a problem for most returning students?			
63/	1	yes	65.0	1258
	0	NA	34.9	676
Q.4.	Is housing a problem for you?			
64/	1	yes	56.6	1095
	0	NA	43.4	839