R E P O R T R E S U M E S

ED 018 821 CG 001 445

PSYCHOLOGICAL VERSUS SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ETHNOCENTRISM.

BY- CAMPBELL, DONALD T. LEVINE, ROBERT A.

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSN., WASHINGTON, D.C.

PUB DATE SEP 67

EDRS PRICE MF-$0.25 HC-$0.88 20P.

DESCRIPTORS- *ANTHROPOLOGY, AREA STUDIES, *ETHNIC GROUPING, ETHNIC RELATIONS, *ETHNIC STEREOTYPES, *GROUP DYNAMICS, THEORIES,

A COOPERATIVE CROSS-CULTURAL STUDY OF ETHNOCENTRISM IS BASED UPON DATA COLLECTED BY ANTHROPOLOGISTS IN VARIOUS GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS. EACH ANTHROPOLOGIST SPENT TWO MONTHS COLLECTING DATA ON TRADITIONAL INTERGROUP RELATIONS, STEREOTYPES, AND HYPOTHETICAL CORRELATES OF RELATED SYMPTOMS OF ETHNOCENTRISM. SOCIETAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES ARE EXAMINED. THE FOLLOWING, RELATED TO SOCIETAL LEVEL THEORIES, ARE PRESENTED--(1) CRITICISM OF THE MIXING OF SOCIETAL AND INDIVIDUAL LEVELS OF ANALYSIS, (2) GLUCKMAN'S ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF INTERDISCIPLINARY RELATIONS IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE AUTHOR'S VIEW OF THE USE OF LEVELS OF ANALYSIS, (3) PRINCIPLES OF REALISTIC GROUPS-CONFLICT THEORY, (4) THE PREDICTION OF GROUP PROCESSES FROM PRINCIPLES OF INDIVIDUAL PSYCHOLOGY, AND (5) EXTERNAL CONFLICT AND HOSTILITY AS A PROJECTIVE SYMPTOM OF INTERNAL PROBLEMS, RATHER THAN AS A PRODUCT OF INTERGROUP PROBLEMS. SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES, WHICH ARE DEFINED AS THEORIES EXPLAINING PREJUDICE THROUGH PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OPERATING IN A SOCIAL CONTEXT, CENTER AROUND THE FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION DISPLACEMENT THEORY. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THIS THEORY AND SOCIAL-LEVEL PROPOSITIONS RELATED TO IT ARE DISCUSSED. THIS PAPER WAS PRESENTED TO THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION MEETING (WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 1967). (PS)

Notes for American Psychological Association Meeting, September, 1967
Washington, D.C., Symposium on Psychological Motivation & Political Tension

PSYCHOLOGICAL VS. SOCIOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS OF ETHNOCENTRISM

by

Donald T. Campbell
Department of Psychology
Northwestern University

Robert A. LeVine
Department of Anthropology
University of Chicago

(Excerpts from Campbell, 1967)

Professor Robert A. LeVine and I are directing a "Cooperative cross-cultural study of ethnocentrism," (Campbell & LeVine, 1961; LeVine, 1965). With support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, this project enables cooperating anthropologists in a wide sampling of world locations to spend two additional months in the field collecting comparable data on traditional intergroup relations, stereotypes, social distance taboos, and hypothetical correlates of such symptoms of ethnocentrism. An 85 page field manual (LeVine & Campbell, 1965) which has gone through several revisions in response to earlier field work, guides the data collection.

Twenty-two sets of data have already been collected. There are data on three North American groups: the Eskimos and Naskapi Indiana of Northern Quebec and the Shushwap Indians of British Columbia; on seven African groups: the Gusii (where my own three months of field work were done, as LeVine's guest), Luo, Kipsigis and Embu of Kenya, the Kofyar and Higi of Northern Nigeria, and the Gola of Liberia; on nine groups in the Pacific: five from New Guinea, Micronesians from the Nukoro Atoll, Central Australian Aborigines, and the Tao-tsug and Badjau sea gypsies of the Sulu Archipelago in the Philippines; and on three Asian groups: Central and Amdo Tibetan refugees in North India and the Nepalese. Other studies are scheduled or in the planning stage. We can look forward eventually to having data on perhaps 35 groups.

This is my second venture into cross-cultural psychology by means of field manual anthropology. The first is reported in Segall, Campbell and Herskovits (1966). The general inspiration comes from the successful use of the Human Relations Area Files as by Whiting and Child (1953; Campbell, 1961) to test social-psychological hypotheses. But not all topics of interest, including intergroup relations, are adequately covered in the older ethnographies. In addition, current styles of anthropological research lead to very specialized reports, and hence fail to replenish the all-topic ethnographies which are the backbone of the Human Relations Area File. Cooperative collection of new data for specific purposes seems essential to the full use of this methodology. While our data fall far short of the quality we aspire to, they are at least more comparable and complete than could be achieved in any other way.

Supporting the choice of content in the field manual, and hopefully providing the inspiration of relevance to our collaborators, is a propositional inventory (Campbell & LeVine, 1965; LeVine, 1965; Campbell, 1965; LeVine, 1966b; Campbell & LeVine, 1968). In this we have attempted to survey a gamut of social science theories, focusing on those predictions which our own study might verify. We have divided these into "societal" theories and "psychological" theories, though in each instance trying to cross that gap by explicating the psychological implications of societal theories and the sociological assumptions of psychological ones. At the societal level are: "Realistic Group Conflict Theory," "Reference Group Theory," "Social-Structural Theories of Conflict in Anthropology," "Theories of Cultural Evolution," "Theories of Systems and Boundaries," and "Stress-Strain Factionalism Theory." The psychological or socio-psychological theories include "Frustration-Aggression-Displacement Theory,"

"Other Theories of Psychoanalytic Origin," "Balance and Congruity Theories," "Transfer and Reinforcement Theory," and "Perception of Outgroup Attributes," (Campbell, 1967, pp. 1-3)

- - - - -

(Excerpts from Campbell & LeVine 1965)

Societal Level Theories

In the theoretical developments that follow, a considerable portion will involve psychological considerations, considerations of man's individual and biological nature, processes of individual learning, perception, and motivation. These psychological factors (albeit in conjunction with social-organization factors) will be employed to predict such social-level phenomena such as intergroup relations and common stereotypes of neighboring outgroups, rather than being used for the prediction of individual differences i uch reactions.

There have recently been a number of explicit reactions against both psychologizing and the mixing of societal and individual levels of analysis. Abel (1941), White (1949), Bernard (1957), Newcomb (1960), and Faris (1962), among others, have explicitly affirmed the inadequacy and irrelevancy of psychological level explanations, usually with the frustration-aggression-displacement theory as an example. Some quotations will illustrate this point of view:

> Warfare is a struggle between social organisms, not individuals. Its explanation is therefore social or cultural, not psychological (White, 1949, p. 132). To attempt to explain war by appeal of innate pugnacity would be like explaining Egyptian, Gothic, and Mayan architecture by citing the physical properties of stone (White, 1949, p. 131). Explaining the forces which lead a particular individual to become a warrior or a soldier to be pugnacious and aggressive no more explains why that individual's tribe or nation is fighting another nation than a knowledge of the chemical composition of a boulder reveals the reasons why it rolls down hill when pushed (Newcomb, 1960, p. 321). . . . many prominent and influential investigators of intergroup interaction

> made an early choice of the wrong path in seeking the explanations in the processes of individual psychology and psychoanalysis . . . Part of the difficulty appears to lie in defects of knowledge and theory in the above fields, but the more important part stems from failure to recognize the nature of collective processes (Faris, 1962, p. 43).

Without implying agreement with such statements, and while recognizing that societal-level theories regularly invoke psychological processes, the treatment of theories which follows the societal-level theories are presented first. (Campbell & LeVine, 1965, pp. 29-30)

(New Material)

Gluckman's (1964) excellent analysis of the problem of interdisciplinary relations in social science research is so important as to require consideration here. We accept, as inevitable, his emphasis upon the necessity of delimitation in any empirical research, and find appropriate his distinctions among circumscription, incorporation, abridgment, compression, and naïvety. Particularly useful are his detailed discussions of instances of overstepping the limits of naiveté on the social-psychological boundary in the work of Freud, Malinowski and Kluckhohn. And on this boundary we would endorse in part the objections, cited above, (White, Faris, etc.,) to psychologists overreaching themselves in the study of intergroup conflict when they give unquestioned causal priority to the psychological, describing intergroup conflict as but a projective symptom of internal psychological problems.

What we disagree with in the quotations from White et al., is the implications that in science, each level of analysis must be studied in isolation from others, and that the appropriate theory for each must involve only concepts stated at that one level. This is not Gluckman's position, but his emphasis on the necessity of each scholar's keeping his nose out of other scientists' business may support such a doctrine of isolationism. Actually, however, Gluckman's detailed bad examples of overstepping the limitations of naiveté are accompanied by specific calls

for cross-disciplinary research, as for psychological data comparing people living in a witchcraft society and those not, as indicting Malinowski and Kluckhohn for not collecting the relevant psychological data their analyses assumed, etc. His position is one of rejecting efforts where naïvety about the neighboring field has lead to naive error in presumptious excursions into that field. He does not seem to reject those studies in which there is a competent cross-disciplinary relating which pays attention to the facts and laws of each.

Our own point of view may be epitomized by the phrase non-reductive congruence. It is assumed that there are delineable multiple levels of analysis at which the collation of empirical regularities and the proposing of laws might take place. No one of these levels has a priori status as the optimal starting point. Thus if we take molecule, cell, organism, and social organization as levels, inquiry can start at any level, and this inquiry can proceed independently of other levels. In particular, no level need wait on the perfection of a lower one. Thus statistical genetics could proceed without waiting for biochemistry, thus learning theory could develop without waiting on neurophysiology, thus a chemistry of combinatorial laws among elements need not wait on an adequate science of sub-atomic particles. Especially need it be said that sociology need not be postponed until an adequate psychology is achieved. Thus there exists among the achieved and potential sciences a optional autonomy.

But it is also our position that theories at any one level will have inexorable implications for the other levels. In the asymptotic perfection of the theories, there will be a congruence among theories, so that the "true" theories at any one level have no implications contradictory of the "true" theories at any other level. For example, though learning theory be developed quite independently of neurophysiology, and learning theory

sets limits on the possible neurophysiologies, broad and non-specific though these limits may be. The "true" neurophysiology must be capable of sustaining the kind of memory and elicitation processes required in the "true" learning theory. While the day is not yet here, we can imagine one learning theory being rejected in favor of another on the grounds of compatibility with the facts of neurophysiology, and vice versa for neurological theories.

Similarly, we argue that each sociological theory sets limits on possible psychologies -- it implies the psychological processes that sustain it. Thus realistic-group-conflict theory in predicting certain group reactions to group threats, predicts the psychological or individual reactions concomitant to sustaining that group reaction. Thus a psychological theory implies the collective group effects concomitant with it. The restraints of cross-level implication may be very broad. There may, for example, be many neutophysiological models congruent with even the most complex set of laws of learning. There may be many psychological theories compatible with the most refined data on group reaction to group threat. But some restraint is none the less there.

The autonomy of levels spoken of above is optional. Just because a level can be investigated in isolation, this is no grounds for so restricting investigation. On the contrary, in the successful sciences, those achievements which we think of as explanatory theory most regularly involve a crossing of levels, relating laws at one level to those of another. Thus currently, the relating of structural biochemistry to genetics is a field of exciting scientific advance, and relating cellular neurophysiology to memory and learning promises similar advances for the future.

One model for such interrelationships is already with us and must be rejected -- this is the reductionist view that there is a hierarchy of the levels of analysis, and that within this hierarchy, the "more basic" levels explain the higher ones. Under this program one expects eventually the laws of sociology to be subsumed under laws of psychology, the laws of psychology to be subsumed under the laws of physiology, and these under chemistry, and these under subatomic physics. Thus it has been proposed that laws of sociology might be stated in terms of laws of subatomic physics. This we reject in principle, particularly as it implies a causal priority to the "more basic" level, defining "more basic" as more molecular. One of long standing observations of biology, and one of the theoretical achievements of cybernetics, is the observation that larger system parameters can control subsystem variables, can "cause" them in the same sense that a change in setting of a thermostat can "cause" a change in room temperature.

- - - - -

(Excerpts from Campbell & LeVine 1965)

Realistic Group Conflict Theory

Most of those who have rejected psychological explanations have espoused a point of view which is here called the Realistic Group Conflict Theory. This theory assumes that group conflicts are rational in the sense that groups do have incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources. Such "realistic" sources of group conflict are contrasted with those psychological theories which see intergroup conflicts as displacements or projective expressions of problems that are essentially intragroup or intra-individual in origin. Among those who have articulated such a point of view are Sumner (1906), Davie (1929), White (1949; 1959),

Sherif (1953; 1961), Coser (1957), Bernard (1957), Newcomb (1960), and Boulding (1962). Not all of these eschew psychological explanations; for example, Coser and Boulding do not, nor does Sherif except for the displacement-projective ones. But for all, realistic sources of group conflict are a primary emphasis. Much of the elegant elaboration of the theory has to do with the course of conflicts, with the formation of coalitions, with the optimal strategies in conflict, with relative payoffs, and with other features not transferable to the present setting (viz., Bernard, 1957; Boulding, 1962). Many other features, more descriptive than deductive perhaps, are highly relevant and are enumerated below. (Campbell & LeVine, 1965, pp.30-31)

Typical "propositions," given expanded treatment in the basic manuscript, are as follows:

1. Real conflict of group-interests causes. Intergroup conflict.
2. Real conflict of interests, Overt, active or past intergroup conflict, and/or Presence of hostile, threatening, and competitive outgroup neighbors, which collectively may be called Real Threat, cause Perception of threat.
3. Real Threat causes Hostility to the source of threat.
4. Real Threat causes Ingroup solidarity.
5. Real Threat causes Increased awareness of own ingroup identity.
6. Real Threat increases the Tightness of Group Boundaries.
7. Real Threat reduces Defection from group.
8. Real Threat increases Punishment and Rejection of Defectors.
9. Real Threat creates Punishment and Rejection of Deviants.
10. Real Threat increases Ethnocentrism.

11. The more dissimilar an ingroup's economy from that of its outgroups collectively, the less ethnocentric.

12. The ingroup will show the least ethnocentric hostility toward the outgroup with the least similar economy.

13. Groups exploiting natural resources in short supply will be more ethnocentric.

14. Those groups most isolated from their outgroups will be least ethnocentric.

15. The nearer outgroups should be the targets of the most ethnocentric hostility.

While these propositions are societal, they imply corresponding psychological principles. Referring to principle 4, above:

(Excerpts from Campbell 1965)

The observation that outgroup threat to the ingroup increases individual hostility toward the outgroup and individual loyalty to the group is certainly one of the most agreed-upon observations of descriptive, non-experimental social science. It is so ubiquitously observed, including our own personal experiences in wartime, as to seem to need no explanation. Yet it is not predictable from the individualistic hedonism of modern learning theory, Lewinian topology, cognitive-congruity theory, or psychoanalysis, particularly when attention is called to individual willingness to fight and die for the ingroup.

This willingness to risk death for group causes is, of course, a rare commodity in peacetime and in sophisticated society. As descriptions of the nonlethal character of much primitive war show (Davie, 1929; Turney-High, 1949), it may also be a rare commodity in more tradition-bound societies. Yet it is present, and it is one of the things which makes lethal war possible. Even the urban sophisticates, whose daily experiences

leave them unable to believe that such motives exist, find themselves willing to die for novel causes, if not for shopworn ones. And such willingness to die bears little relation to the likelihood of success of the cause in question. For substantial minorities, if not majorities, the mottoes "better a dead hero than a live coward," "better a dead ingrouper than a live outgrouper," "better a dead Ibo than a live Yoruba," "better a dead Moslem than a live Christian," "give me liberty or give me death," and "better dead than red" are genuine sentiments to be backed by action. So ubiquitous (if not universal) is this attitude, so important is its role in making wars possible, that one joins Freud in agreeing that it must be something basic in man's social nature. Agreement with Freud as to the importance of the problem does not of course commit one to his solution of postulating a generally disfunctional death wish. Instead, one looks to the obvious group-level functionality of such attitudes. (Campbell, 1965, pp. 292-293)

Both sociologists and psychologists today give precedence to the psychological in explaining the social. On psychological grounds we can predict that aggregates of persons become more and more a social group the longer they are left together, definite movement in this direction occurring in a two-hour small-groups laboratory session. Thus the development of group consensus or norms is presaged by a number of psychological mechanisms. Principles of observational learning and/or conformity lead to the prediction that on those problems discussed and reacted to, the person-to-person similarity will increase. Principles of cognitive dissonance predict that those members expressing the most dissident opinions will have the most persuasive messages addressed to them because of the motivating effects their discordant opinions have on their listeners. This furthers the homogenization of opinion. Increased interaction under normal conditions increases interper-

sonal liking, thus generating a group loyalty, etc. Even a division of labor or a turn taking can be predicted from the mutually extinguishing effects of responses that produce collisions. In such a manner, group processes can be predicted from principles of individual psychology.

A thorough study of the individual psychology of termite workers, queens, and soldiers would in a similar way lead us to predict, on the basis of purely individual motives and reactions, the emergence of collaborative effort, mutual feeding and grooming, group reaction to an invasion of ants, etc. But in this latter case we would not be tempted to view the group-level product as an accidental implication of processes basically individual--we would instead see the individual motivations as being what they are just because of the group functionality and its survival value. May not the same be said--in part at least--for the individual psychological motivations of the human being? (Campbell, 1965, pp. 302-303)

_ _ _ _ _

(Excerpts from Campbell & LeVine 1965)

One of Coser's points that makes external conflict and hostility a projective symptom of internal problems--rather than a product of intergroup problems, will be enumerated here. <u>False Perceptions of Threat from Outgroups cause increased ingroup solidarity and outgroup hostility</u>. He notes that leaders may seek out an enemy or create a fictitious one just to preserve or achieve ingroup solidarity (Coser, 1957, p. 105-106). This is certainly one of the most ubiquitous observations on the exploitative opportunism of nationalistic politics. White has stated it thus: "Hostility toward a foreign power or toward a minority group within a society is often an effective means of unifying a nation. In times of national emergency or crisis, therefore, a nation may attempt to achieve

inner unity and solidarity by fomenting hostility towards a foreign power--an old trick--or against a minority group within its gates--also an old trick" (1949, p. 137). Boulding (1962, p. 162) notes the principle. Rosenblatt, (1964, p. 133) in a review of parallel principles in ethnocentrism and nationalism, provides these citations to this principle: Alexander (1951, p. 281), Allport (1933, Ch.VII), Bay et al. (1950, p. 8, 93 ff.), Braunthal (1946, Ch. IV); Gilbert (1950, pp. 28-30), Hayes (1926, Ch. III), Hertz (1944, p. 218), Machiavelli (1947, p. 65); Murdock (1931); Pillsbury (1919, Ch. III); Royal Institute of International Affairs (1939); Simpson and Yinger (1958, p. 114); Skinner (1959, pg. 8); and Znaniecki (1952, pp. xiv-xv).

While this principle does not involve real threat, it does involve an opportunistic exploitation of the major principle of Realistic Group Conflict Theory and hence will be retained in this section as the final proposition. Its utilization in the internal competition of individuals for political control needs attention. White, in the citation above, neglects this in reifying the group as actor deciding to unify itself. A further point worth noting is that this internal solidarity mechanism plays a role in the escalation of conflict due to the fact that the outgroup is an eavesdropper on internal communication and takes such mobilization activities as a threat against itself. Furthering this "arms-race" effect are those external words and acts of belligerent intransigency which an insecure leader says and does for the benefit of his internal ingroup audience and his political acceptance by them.

Thus the major proposition of Realistic Group Conflict, extended to its "artificial" exploitation in the solution of internal problems, brings us around to a position in which intergroup conflict becomes a "projective"

product of internal problems--at the social level if not the psychic. (Campbell & LeVine, 1965, pp. 50-51)

- - - - -

While the "Frustration-Aggression-Displacement Theory" is highly individualistic in its derivation, and does indeed make ingroup conflict in some sense merely "projective symptom" of intra-psychic conflict, yet a full statement of it involves societal-level assumptions.

Excerpts from Campbell & LeVine 1965)

Sociopsychological Theories

Frustration-Aggression-Displacement Theory

Under this heading we will place the bulk of theories since 1930 explaining prejudice through <u>psychological</u> factors operating in a social context. Most of these theories are of Freudian inspiration, although Freudian theory also generates other theories of prejudice (viz., Jahoda, 1960; Alexander, 1941). The concept of scapegoating epitomizes these theories. We will borrow primarily from the version developed by Dollard (Dollard et al., 1939; Dollard, 1938). Berkowitz (1962) reviews the present status of the theory as does McNeil (1959), Buss (1961), and Yates (1962). The theory has no doubt been independently invented, part by part if not as a whole, elsewhere. The theory of the authoritarian personality (Adorno et al., 1950) overlaps when extrapolated away from their context of individual differences into our context of group differences, although we find it convenient to treat it separately below. MacCrone (1937, p. 251), drawing from Freudian theory along an independent line states the theory concisely: "The greater the discipline of group life, its repressions, privations, and exactions either in the form of moral, religious, or economic sanction, the greater we can expect its aggressiveness to become at the expense of some other group or groups." It is the theory offering the biggest problem to the planners of peace insofar as it implies that

the removal of external threat in the international scene would not be sufficient to remove threateningness and the perception of threat. To cite MacCrone (p. 252) again: "The existence of the outgroup covers the ingroup against the risks of internal conflict and aggressiveness. If we could imagine a state of affairs in which such a group did not exist, it would become necessary to invent one, if only to enable members of the ingroup to deal with conflicts, internal and external, without wrecking their own group."

Background principles

In presenting Frustration-Affression-Displacement Theory, we shall first outline principles which underly it, principles which for the most part are not at a level which can be directly tested by ethnographic data. Following this will be a series of derived propositions at a level where testing with data from the Ethnocentrism Study seems possible.

As this is the first of the psychological theories to be presented, it seems important to note that it is not a purely psychological theory, but makes assumptions about social structure and cultural traditions. Because of our interest in articulating the societal and the individual levels of theory development, the social-level propositions have been noted as such.

1) Individuals are naturally narcissistic, self-centered, focused upon gratifying their own needs, except as socialization has modified these tendencies.

2) (A sociological principle) Social life requires the partial restraint, inhibition, suppression, repression, or frustration of individual impulses and desires. This is true not only in infancy during the socialization process, but also in adult cooperation and coordination.

Ingroup discipline, self-denial, postponement of gratification, hard work, self-sacrifice, restraint on covetousness of one's neighbors' goods and women, all are frustrating. One of the remarkable features of this theory is that it posits that such "good" things as group life, ingroup peace, and cooperative coordination are frustrating to the individuals concerned. One of the probable reasons for the attractiveness of the theory is that people have found this so in specific instances but have tended to interpret them as specific deviations or wickedness in something that should be in general purely good and rewarding. It comes to them as a novel yet compellingly true insight that their specific troubled instances are samples of the general case rather than exceptions.

The sequence in anthropological interpretation of such a peaceful people as the Zuni shows a parallel development. Ruth Benedict's influential early description (1934) stressed the extreme ingroup peace, with the high level of cooperation and absence of competition promoting an exemplary kind of mental health worth imitating by those of us living in more competitive cultures. Later reports (summarized by Barnouw, 1963) have stressed the strong internal conflicts and interpersonal hostilities present in Zuni society. (Campbell & LeVine, 1965, pp. 97-99)

- - - - -

6) (A sociological principle) The stimulus objects most regularly contiguous when impulses are blocked and hopes frustrated are other members of one's social group, particularly those in authority and those with whom one has to cooperate or coordinate the most. Most frustration comes from ingroup members. For the child, this will be his parents; for an adult, his spouse, supervisors, subordinates, and fellow workers. LeVine (1962) has demonstrated that witchcraft accusations between cowives (pre-

sumably a reaction to frustration) are more frequent the more contact the cowives have with each other (see also Campbell, 1961, pp. 335-338).

7) Learned anticipatory pain from aggressive acts can, if strong enough, inhibit the aggressive act. This principle refers to the "avoidance" component in the Miller and Dollard (Miller, 1944; Dollard and Miller, 1950) approach-avoidance conflict model.

8) (A ciological principle) The expression of aggression against the direct sources of restraint reduces societal coordination, interferes with collective action, is incompatible with complex division of labor and authority systems. It follows, therefore, that complex coordinated societal systems will occur only where there are restraints on such direct expression of retaliatory aggression. (The sanctions involved in doing this will generate more hostility as in point 8.3 above.) The presence of such complex, coordinated social systems thus presumes a functional social evolution of disciplinary mechanisms suppressing such expression. (Campbell & LeVine, 1965, p. 101)

- - - - -

14) (A sociological principle) Groups institutionalize the displacement of hostility and aggression onto outgroups. Presumably by a trial-and-error of customs over the ages of group development, there has been a selective retention of systems whereby groups specifically indoctrinate their young in against which displacement targets to vent their hostility. Four lines of thought make such traditions understandable, and give different expectations for the content of such teachings. The first two represent traditionalized representations of the generalization-inhibition displacement model.

REFERENCES

Abel, T. The element of decision in the pattern of war. American Sociological Review, 1941, 2, 853-859. Ref. p. 30.

Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. The authoritarian personality. New York: Harper, 1950. Ref. pp. 15, 21, 97, 108, 109, 161.

Alexander, F. Our age of unreason. (Revised ed.) Philadelphia: Lippencott, 1951. Ref. pp. 38, 50.

Allport, F. H. Institutional behavior. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1933. Ref. p. 50.

Barnouw, V. Culture and personality. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1963. Ref. p. 99.

Bay, C., Bullvag, I., Ofstad, H., & Tonnessen, H. Nationalism: a study of identifications with people and power. Oslo: Institute for Social Research, mimeographed, 1950. Ref. p. 50.

Benedict, Ruth. Patterns of culture. New York: Houghton-Mifflin, 1934. Ref. p. 99.

Berkowitz, L. Aggression: a social psychological analysis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962. Ref. pp. 38, 97, 99, 100, 103, 105.

Bernard, J. Parties and issues in conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1957, 1, 111-121. Ref. pp. 30, 31.

Bernard, J. The sociological study of conflict. In J. Bernard, et al. (Ed.) The nature of conflict. Paris: UNESCO, 1957, pp. 33-117. Ref. pp. 30, 31.

Boulding, K. E. Conflict and defense: a general theory. New York: Harper, 1962. Ref. pp. 31, 40, 50, 92.

Braunthal, J. The paradox of nationalism. London: St. Botolph, 1946. Ref. p. 50.

Buss, A. The psychology of aggression. New York: Wiley, 1961. Ref. pp. 97, 100.

Campbell, D. T. The mutual methodological relevance of anthropology and psychology. In F. L. K. Hsu (Ed.) Psychological anthropology: approaches to culture and personality. Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1961, pp. 333-352. Ref. pp.7, 28, 78, 101.

Campbell, D. T. Stereotypes and the perception of group differences. American Psychologist. Pennsylvania: The American Psychological Association, Inc., 1967, (22), pp. 817-829.

Campbell, D. T. Ethnocentric and other altruistic motives. In D. LeVine, (Ed.), The Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1965. Lincoln, Neb.; University of Nebraska Press, 1965.

Campbell, D. T., & LeVine, R. A. A proposal for cooperative cross-cultural research on ethnocentrism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1961, 5 (1), 82-108.

Campbell, D. T., & LeVine, R. A. Propositions about ethnocentrism from social science theories. Mimeographed, Department of Psychology, Northwestern University, 1965.

Campbell, D. T., & LeVine, R. A. Ethnocentrism and intergroup relations. In Abelson, R. P., Aronson, E., McGuire, W. J., Newcomb, T. M., Rosenberg, M. J., & Tannenbaum, P. H., (Eds.), Cognitive Congruity Theories. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968 (in press).

Coser, L. A. Sociological theory: a book of readings. L. A. Coser & B. Rosenberg (Eds.) New York: Macmillan, 1957. Ref. pp. 31, 34, 36, 37, 47, 49, 50, 59.

Davie, M. R. The evolution of war. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1929. Ref. pp. 31, 73, 76.

Dollard, J. Hostility and fear in social life. Social Forces, 1938, 17, 15-25. Ref. pp. 22, 97, 102, 104, 123.

Dollard, J., Doob, L. W., Miller, N. E., Mowrer, O. H., & Sears, R. R. Frustration and aggression. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939. Ref. pp. 97, 105.

Faris, R. E. L. Interaction levels and intergroup relations. In M. Sherif (Ed.) Intergroup relations and leadership. New York: Wiley, 1962, pp. 24-25. Ref. pp. 30, 104, 123.

Gilbert, G. M. The psychology of dictatorship. New York: Ronald Press, 1950. Ref. pp. 16, 50.

Gluckman, M. (Ed.) et. al. Closed Systems and Open Minds. Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1964.

Hayes, C. J. H. Essays on nationalism. New York: Macmillan, 1926. Ref. pp. 38, 50, 73.

Hertz, F. Nationality in history and politics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Ref. p. 50.

Jahoda, M. Race relations: a psychoanalytic interpretation. In Symposium on man, race, and Darwin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960. Ref. p. 97.

LeVine, R. A. Witchcraft and co-wife proximity in southwestern Kenya. Ethnology, 1962, 1, pp. 39-45. Ref. pp. 101, 116.

LeVine, R. A. Outsiders' Judgments: an ethnographic approach to group differences in personality, Southwestern Journal of Anthropology, 1966, 22 (2), 101-116.

LeVine, R. A. Socialization, social structure, and intersocietal images. In H. Kelman (Ed.), International behavior: a social psychological analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965.

LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. Ethnocentrism Field Manual. Multilithed, University of Chicago, Committee on Human Development, 1965.

MacCrone, I. D. Race attitudes in South Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1937. Ref. pp. 78, 97, 104, 123.

Machiavelli, N. The prince. New York: Crofts, 1947. Ref. p. 50.

McNeil, E. B. Psychology and aggression. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1959, 3, 195-293. Ref. p. 97.

Murdock, G. P. Ethnocentrism. In E. R. A. Seligman (Ed.) Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. V. New York: Macmillan, 1931, pp. 613-614. Ref. pp. 16, 22, 38, 50, 73.

Newcomb, W. W. Toward an understanding of war. In G. E. Dole & R. L. Carneiro (Eds.) Essays in the science of culture. New York: Crowell, 1960, pp. 317-336. Ref. pp. 30, 31, 43.

Pillsbury, W. B. The psychology of nationality and internationalism. New York: Appleton, 1919. Ref. pp. 38, 50.

Rosenblatt, P. C. Origins and effects of group ethnocentrism and nationalism. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 1964, 8, 131-146. Ref. pp. 16, 24, 38, 50, 73.

Royal Institute of International Affairs. Nationalism. London: Oxford University Press, 1939. Ref. pp. 38-50.

Segall, M. H., Campbell, D. T., & Herskovits, M. J. The influence of culture on visual perception. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1966.

Sherif, M. & Sherif, C. W. Groups in harmony and tension. New York: Harper, 1953. Ref. pp. 31, 34, 47, 48, 91.

Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., Sherif, C. W. Inter-group conflict and cooperation: the robbers' cave experiment. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961, Ref. pp. 31, 34, 36, 37, 47, 49.

Simpson, G. E. & Yinger, J. M. Racial and cultural minorities. (Revised Ed.) New York: Harper, 1958. Ref. pp. 38, 58.

Skinner, G. W. The nature of loyalties in rural Indonesia. In G. W. Skinner (Ed.) Local, ethnic, and national loyalties in village Indonesia. New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1959, pp. 1-11. Ref. p. 50.

Sumner, W. G. Folkways. New York: Ginn, 1906. Ref. pp. 2, 4, 6, 13.

Turney-High, H. H. Primitive war. Columbia, S. C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1949. Ref. pp. 73, 76, 113.

White, L. A. The science of culture: a study of man and civilization. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1949. Ref. pp. 30, 34, 43, 50, 68, 69.

White, L. A. The evolution of culture: the development of civilization to the fall of Rome. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959. Ref. pp. 31, 43, 68, 69.

Whiting, J. W. M., & Child, I. L. Child training and personality: a cross-cultural study. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1953.

Yates, A. J. Frustration and conflict. New York: Wiley, 1962. Ref. p. 97.

Znaniecki, F. Modern nationalities. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952. Ref. p. 50.