

R E P O R T R E S U M E S

ED 016 715

UD 004 710

POLICY FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS--COMPENSATION OR INTEGRATION.

BY- COHEN, DAVID K.

PUB DATE NOV 67

EDRS PRICE MF-\$0.25 HC-\$1.68 40P.

DESCRIPTORS- *SCHOOL INTEGRATION, *RACIAL ATTITUDES, *COSTS, *ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT, *COMPENSATORY EDUCATION PROGRAMS, STAFF IMPROVEMENT, EDUCATIONAL POLICY, PUBLIC SCHOOLS, TEACHER RECRUITMENT, SOCIAL CLASS, RACIAL SEGREGATION, STUDENT TEACHER RATIO, NEGRO TEACHERS, DISADVANTAGED YOUTH, NEGROES, EDUCATIONAL COMPLEXES, MORE EFFECTIVE SCHOOLS

IN CHOOSING BETWEEN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND SEGREGATED COMPENSATORY EDUCATION, POLICY MAKERS MUST CONSIDER THE CAUSES OF THE EDUCATIONAL RETARDATION OF NEGRO YOUTH AND THE SOCIAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND FISCAL COSTS OF EACH POLICY. RESEARCH HAS SHOWN SOCIAL CLASS AND THE RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE SCHOOLS RATHER THAN "CULTURAL DEPRIVATION" TO BE THE MAJOR CAUSE OF ACADEMIC FAILURE AMONG NEGRO YOUTH. TO COUNTERACT THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF A COMPENSATORY EDUCATION PROGRAM IN SUCH A SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT, EDUCATORS WOULD HAVE TO INSTITUTE CHANGES IN THE SCHOOL'S ORGANIZATION, LIKE DRAMATICALLY REDUCING TEACHER-PUPIL RATIOS. HOWEVER, EVEN IF IN ALL ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT TITLE I PROJECTS THIS RATIO WERE REDUCED TO 6 TO 1, THE COST OF INSTRUCTION WOULD INCREASE FROM \$.5 BILLION TO \$8.6 BILLION. AND DESPITE INCENTIVES ABLE TEACHERS ARE NOT INCLINED TO TEACH IN SEGREGATED COMPENSATORY EDUCATION PROGRAMS. SUCH PROGRAMS PERMANENTLY ESTABLISH RACIST ATTITUDES AMONG NEGRO AND WHITE STUDENTS AND PERPETRATE RACIAL SEPARATISM IN HOUSING AND OTHER LIVING PATTERNS. ONLY A POLICY OF SCHOOL INTEGRATION--ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL SCHOOL IMPROVEMENT--CAN MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR THE NEGRO TO GAIN ACCESS TO THE SAME EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES AS WHITES. EDUCATIONAL PARKS COULD POSSIBLY SATISFY BOTH REQUIREMENT. THIS PAPER WAS PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICA'S CITIES, SPONSORED BY THE U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WASHINGTON, D.C., NOVEMBER 16-18, 1967. (LB)

04710

POLICY FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: COMPENSATION OR INTEGRATION?*

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE
OFFICE OF EDUCATION

Prepared by
David K. Cohen, Visiting Associate
Joint Center for Urban Studies for Harvard and MIT
for the
National Conference on Equal Educational Opportunity
in America's Cities
sponsored by
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, Washington, D.C.
November 16-18, 1967

It sometimes seems that national policy on critical public issues is not so much decided as backed into. Such appears to be the case with problems of education in the cities, chief among them school segregation.

For nearly a decade urban education has been the focus of national attention, and problems of race always have been prominent. Although some civil rights groups have shifted their demands from desegregation to school improvement, race still is the leading issue. As in past years, the leading public policy question currently appears to be whether to take students and school attendance patterns as they are, and seek to improve Negro achievement by improving educational quality in the existing schools, or to desegregate schools and thus improve educational opportunities for Negro students.

Although the debate goes on at all levels, there is less ambiguity the further one recedes from the federal scene. Most urban school systems are firmly committed to compensation as the remedy for

*This paper was prepared for the United States Commission on Civil Rights Nov. 16-18 1967 Conference on Equal Educational Opportunity. It is not for other publication without permission.

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL OFFICE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

ED016715

014 400 37

the achievement gap; this seems to be more uniformly true the larger the cities. The federal position never has been quite this clear. To judge by the various speeches and statements of officials in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, there is a general view that school segregation is harmful to all children, that it does Negroes specific educational damage, and that it should be eliminated. But federal practice, most clearly embodied in Title I of the 1965 Elementary and Secondary Education Act, reflects local priorities; the act provides unprecedented funds to improve education in the existing segregated schools.

Although there is every sign that this effort will continue and be expanded, the speeches and statements decrying segregation continue. More funds are directed to segregated schools, but the public position against such segregation remains. It is likely that--all other things being equal--come the end of the Vietnam war a Democratic or liberal Republican administration would seek legislation to increase substantially existing expenditures on ghetto schools. One easily can imagine the maintenance of an anti-segregation public posture while--in response to federal and local pressures--increasingly large amounts of federal funds are channeled into ghetto schools. Since the Congress might well allocate these new funds for school construction--thus fixing more segregation upon the existing ghettos--and since a whole new bureaucracy with a vested interest in certain approaches to "cultural deprivation" is being created, the stakes are considerable. If, as it seems, a policy is in being or very nearly has been created, it will have major conse-

quences for some time to come. The issues involved merit careful consideration.

The arguments for assigning high priority to compensation and low priority to desegregation rest upon three related judgments:

- (1) For the time being at least, the political climate is unfavorable to any efforts to desegregate schools;
- (2) Desegregation--especially in the older and larger cities--also is unfeasible from a fiscal and administrative point of view. The intergovernmental arrangements, and the costs of busing and/or school construction, are simply too great;
- (3) In any event, desegregation is not really appropriate. The problem of racial disharmony is not nearly so acute as the problem of Negro underachievement; the latter is a result of cumulative deprivation which requires improved education, not racial mixing.

For one or more of these reasons it is argued that major efforts should be directed at improving the academic competence of Negro students in existing schools. Compensation is advanced as an alternative policy to desegregation, one which is more appropriate educationally, politically more likely to be accepted, and probably cheaper and easier to implement. It is put forward as a practical policy which can provide immediately workable remedies for Negro underachievement. Desegregation is regarded as a visionary and long range solution, a policy which will have to wait for more funds, more intergovernmental flexibility, and more likelihood of white acceptance.

It is on the basis of these claims that the existing programs are justified or attacked, and new approaches recommended. To further

complicate the matter, conclusive data are not available on some of the major questions. But policy is being made, and it is on the basis of these claims, and what data there are, that the alternatives must be evaluated. Is compensation a more appropriate, and politically more likely remedy for unequal educational opportunity?

The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the social, economic, and political requirements for effective segregated compensation are much greater than existing programs or policy discussions suggest. From a fiscal point of view they are likely to be of roughly the same order of magnitude as a policy of desegregation and substantial educational improvement. And the social damage likely to arise from a policy of segregated compensation raises serious questions about its desirability.

SCHOOL QUALITY AND THE IMPROVEMENT OF ACADEMIC COMPETENCE

Programs of compensatory education typically proceed on the assumption that children who experience academic retardation do so mainly because their preparation for school is seriously deficient. Poor children come to school with less well developed verbal skills, lower motivation, and less family support for academic success. They begin badly and do progressively worse.

Programs based on such a definition seek to make up for children's individual deficiencies by intensifying schools' educational services. A quick review of compensatory program descriptions, or for that matter the criteria for Title I ESEA eligibility, leaves little doubt that most educators and public men regard the children's de-

ficiency as the major educational problem.¹ Notwithstanding the many unimaginative compensatory programs, the underlying idea is in the tradition of liberal social reform: to make of the schools an instrument for removing the educational consequences of the social and economic inequities which society gratuitously imposes upon small children.

Some object to the view that children are deficient and must be adjusted to schools, and argue that there is at least an equal deficiency on the part of the schools. If children can be defined as "culturally deprived," they say, then schools must be described as institutionally deficient. But whether the deficiency is alleged to be the quality of the children or the quality of their schools, the basis of social reform is seen to lie in improving the schools.

There have been a few years of experience with such efforts; what have the results been?

By now the existing evidence is fairly well known: compensatory programs in schools isolated by race and social class have resulted in no substantial or lasting improvement in students' academic competence. Evaluations have been undertaken in a number of different school systems, on programs with different emphases, under varying conditions of expenditure for school improvement. The data are scarce and very imperfect, but the uniformity of results cannot be ignored.²

What accounts for this rather poor record?

The evaluations--and recent research--suggest two basic problems. First, compensatory programs misconceive the sources of

academic failure, locating them in individual children's "cultural deprivation." Second, there has not been a clear definition of the nature of the required changes in the schools' programs, or the magnitude of the costs.

With respect to the first: if we agree that poor children typically experience difficulty in school, does this imply that "cultural deprivation" is the main cause? Does it imply that improved instruction alone will eliminate the children's academic deficiencies? Not unless there also is a covert assumption that the only critical elements in children's formal education are the processes of interaction between parent and child, and between teacher and child.³

But there is strong evidence that this assumption is unwarranted. Everything we know, from research and as a matter of common experience, suggests that there is a third set of processes--those involving social and academic interaction among students--which have a powerful cumulative influence upon the development of academic competence.

For Negro students in urban areas the impact of these processes is apparent in the relationship between the social class and racial composition of student bodies and achievement. The Equality of Educational Opportunity survey, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, and a variety of earlier studies show that the racial and social class composition of student bodies is very closely related to student achievement.⁴

The "average" poor child who attends school with a substantial majority of children from more advantaged homes performs at a higher academic level than a poor child--similarly situated in all other re-

spects--who attends school with a majority of poor children.*

In addition to the negative effects of low social class schools, for Negro students there is a special effect of their racial composition. Even when their social class origin and the social class level of their schools are taken into account, those Negroes in school with a majority of white students perform at a higher level than those in school with a majority of Negro students.⁵

Most Negro children, of course, attend schools which are predominantly Negro and predominantly poor, and thus there is a double disadvantage. The consequences, viewed at the end of the children's school careers, are devastating--the overwhelming majority are academically crippled. The average Negro student in the Metropolitan Northeast enters grade 12 reading below the level of ninth grade whites.⁶ But the Negro student who is in school with a majority of advantaged children, and who has attended class with whites since the outset of his school career, experiences less than half this disadvantage.⁷ Only a tiny fraction of Negro students are in this last group.

Not all of the specific processes by which schools' social class and racial composition affect achievement have been established. But whatever they may be, none have been recognized as barriers to learning in the design and execution of compensatory education pro-

*The social class composition of schools affects children regardless of color, but it has particular implication for Negroes. A far greater proportion of urban Negroes than urban whites are poor. As a result, Negro children are much more likely than whites to attend school with a majority of poor children, and therefore are more often exposed to the handicapping effect of a "disadvantaged" student body.

grams. Can the theory and practice of compensatory education programs be so adjusted as to take account of the effects of student environments upon student achievement?

Some have said that the studies cited earlier show that the only way to deal with the effects of social class and racial segregation on achievement is to eliminate the segregation. None of the studies say this; indeed, it would be absurd to argue that under no circumstances could the effects of a weak student environment upon the development of academic competence be remedied in segregated situations. The lackluster results thus far are no basis for such a view. The question is not whether student performance could thus be improved, but rather how: with what programs, under what circumstances, at what level of investment, and with what major second-order effects?

This is not the place to discuss in detail all the specific program elements which will produce successful compensation; among other reasons, to do so would require a wide variety of successful programs, and they simply do not exist. But the research just discussed, and experience with some programs, do permit a few inferences about the elementary structural changes which probably would be required to provide the conditions for effective compensation.

It is important that discussion focus on structural changes in the conditions of learning, and not on unique personalities or programs. The latter may be informative, but policy must be framed in light of the broad changes which will allow most students, teachers, and principals to function more effectively. Only such changes can promote improvement for more than a few.

Most important, it would be necessary to abandon the educational practice which is based upon the naive idea that the major barrier to effective learning lies in individual students' cultural deprivation. If the student body is the immediate medium in which instruction and learning occur, its collective advantagement or disadvantagement can facilitate or impede intellectual growth. One change in school organization consonant with this would be very drastic reductions in the number of students assigned to every teacher. As long as each teacher must divide himself over twenty or thirty students, the low academic level of the class impedes effective learning. A weak student environment is a non-conductor inserted in the learning process. Until that obstacle is overcome the problems of individual children cannot be reached and remedied. The logical conclusion would be the tutorial situation--completely individual attention--where the teacher is the student environment.⁸

The More Effective Schools Program in New York City is the only compensatory program known to have made serious efforts in this direction. This program sharply reduced the number of students per teacher so as to intensify substantially the attention which could be devoted to individual students' needs. It cut the number of students per teacher by more than half (from 28.3 in 1963 to 12.3 in 1965), and as a result raised per pupil expenditures for instruction by a similar factor (from \$457 in 1964 to \$946 in 1965).⁹

The MES Program was a significant departure in compensatory education. No other program so dramatically intensified the instructional attention to individual children. If MES were to be made national policy, it would require roughly a nine-fold increase in the

annual Title I ESEA outlay for instruction--from about 60 to about 500 dollars per pupil. This would increase the total annual Title I instructional outlay from .5 to 3.5 billion.¹⁰

But there is no evidence that such a policy would change the relative position of advantaged and disadvantaged students. Students in the MES schools--after two years--exhibited the classical pattern of increasing academic retardation.¹¹ If a pupil-teacher ratio of 12:1 produces no improvement in academic competence, how closely must pupil-teacher ratios approach the tutorial situation before basic improvements would result? Let us assume that if pupil-teacher ratios reached 6:1, a point midway between the tutorial situation and present MES levels, substantial improvements in academic competence would become possible. This would require doubling the instructional cost per pupil of the MES program over present levels; nationally, such a policy would require a five-fold increase of teachers over the present level (about 28:1). If this were generalized to the present Title I ESEA pupil population, it would raise annual ESEA expenditures for instruction from .5 to about 8.6 billion dollars.¹²

There are two other related factors which must be considered. First, such a drastic reduction in pupil-teacher ratios would require an equally drastic increase in the supply of teachers. But the national supply of qualified teachers, as estimated by recent studies, may be as little as 50% of existing demand.¹³ Each September the major urban school systems open with less than their required complement of teachers, and each day their slum schools are short-staffed. The cost of college training required to provide one teacher for every 6 ESEA children would be about 5.8 billion.¹⁴

Second, although the MES program reduced pupil-teacher ratios drastically, it reduced average class size to only 20, from 28. Further reductions in class size would require the provision of additional space through construction of new classrooms. Although national surveys reveal a serious shortage of classroom space, let us assume that class size could be reduced by half (for the Title I ESEA target population), by building classrooms for only slightly more than one third of these students. This would cost roughly 6 billion.¹⁵

These estimates are very rough, but they suggest the rather substantial costs of reducing pupil-teacher ratios. The increase in annual expenditures for instruction alone would raise what presently is being spent annually on salaries for poor children's teachers from about 1.7 billion to about 8.6 billion, or from 8% to 43% of present total annual public school instruction expenditures for all children.¹⁶

But there is a second--cost related--difficulty with the MES and most other compensatory programs: drastic reductions in pupil-teacher ratios are a necessary but not a sufficient condition of effective compensation. To improve academic competence not only the conditions of instruction, but also its quality must be improved. The final evaluation of MES pointed out that:

Despite the . . . organizational changes, little has happened in the way of innovation or restructuring in the basic teaching process. Observers noted that a majority of lessons they saw could have been taught to larger classes with no loss in effectiveness. . . . All levels of staff noted that the basic weakness of the program, or their major disappointment with it, centered about the functioning of teachers, which they attributed to inexperience and lack of preparation.¹⁷

A more general way of putting this is that compensatory education programs have concentrated heavily upon the deficiencies of children, and neglected to give serious attention to the deficiencies of schools. So much has been made of the deprivations children are supposed to have inflicted upon the schools that hardly any serious thought has been given to the institutional deficiencies of schools which regularly are inflicted upon children.

What are the critical deficiencies? The best evidence available seems to show that the presence or absence of teachers with certain characteristics is closely related to the performance of disadvantaged students. Three teacher characteristics which show strong association with student achievement were the teachers' social class origin, their verbal ability, and the quality of their education.¹⁸ Disadvantaged students whose teachers rated high on these three criteria performed at higher levels than similarly situated students whose teachers rated low on the same criteria.

Our concern is the prospects for change in this distribution of teacher quality; it therefore is important to note that the existing pattern of inequity is an integral feature of the structure and status of schools, and of recruitment to and within the teaching profession. Change is not likely to be produced by brief workshops, or other such familiar programs of in-service training.

If the usual superficial efforts to improve teaching for the disadvantaged are not likely to yield substantial results, what would improve the quality of teachers' training?

As we have just seen it is very difficult to estimate the cost of effectively improving education. Let us assume the best: that college students in general and future teachers in particular are more sensitive to improvements in school quality than public school students, and that a 50% increment (about 600 dollars more per year) in existing expenditures for college education would very substantially increase the skills of future teachers.* If this increased expenditure was allocated to the education of the number of new teachers required to reduce ESEA pupil-teacher ratios to 6:1, it would cost about \$2.4 billion.²⁰

But many would argue that the more difficult question is how such improved teachers could be better distributed, so as to create a resource inequality in favor of predominantly Negro schools. The

* It is worth noting that the order of magnitude of this effort is about the same as the National Science Foundation's estimate of the cost of improving the quality of science teachers; the N.S.F. seems to believe that a full, intensive year of retraining is the best and most productive approach.¹⁹

existing suggestions for achieving such a redistribution illustrates the lack of serious thought which has been given to this basic aspect of effective compensation.

The suggestions fall into three categories: those which propose some system of salary incentives to attract teachers to "inner-city" schools; those which propose to capitalize on the so-called "Peace Corps spirit," of existing or potential teachers, to attract highly motivated individuals to ghetto schools; and those which assume that inequities in the distribution of teacher resources can be redressed only by improving the conditions of teaching in deprived schools.*

The first two proposals rest on the view that either the profit motive or missionary idealism will overcome social class and racial prejudice, and what are perceived as poor working conditions, to reverse the present maldistribution of competent teachers. There are no precedents for the hope that missionary idealism will be widespread. It exists in limited quantities, and although it is impossible to object to a dedication which is not patronizing, it simply is not an everyday quality. Wise policy cannot be made on the assumption that most people will be heroic.

The situation is no more encouraging with respect to the profit motive. There is no basis for the idea that of itself more money effectively stimulates improved teaching. It seems dubious that children's learning could be improved by offering "combat pay" to attract teachers to or hold them in deprived schools when, all other things being equal,

*This last is manifested in the inclusion of MES programs as a main demand of the A.F.T. in collective bargaining, along with more traditional items.

the teachers prefer to be elsewhere. After all, it is the children who constitute the "combat" condition for which the special pay is offered, and that is a poor basis for a productive student-teacher relationship. On the whole, there seems to be little hope either for a mercenary or a missionary approach to improving the distribution of teachers to slum schools.

The third proposal is more to the point. It is based on the assumption that present inequities in the distribution of teacher quality can be reversed only if the status of schools is sharply raised by dramatically improving working conditions. At a minimum this proposal recognizes that the problem of teacher maldistribution will not be solved by the voluntary action of individuals.

But the available evidence on its potential efficacy is not very encouraging. It suggests four major difficulties.

First, improving working conditions--reducing class size--for teachers in low-status schools deals with only one aspect of these schools' perceived status. There also is the matter of their students' color and class. Although we know little about the changes in job preferences which might be associated with improved working conditions, something is known about teachers' racial and social class preferences.

Even under very favorable conditions, only a tiny proportion of teachers express a definite preference for teaching in all or predominantly Negro schools. Negro and white teachers in predominantly Negro schools are a good deal less likely than those in predominantly white schools to want to remain in their present assignment. And the higher teachers' verbal ability the less likely they are to want to

remain in predominantly Negro--or predominantly working-class--schools. High ability Negro teachers in predominantly Negro schools are--of all teachers--the group most likely to be dissatisfied with their present teaching position.²¹ The better teachers, then, are least likely to prefer teaching in predominantly Negro, or blue-collar schools.²²

Second, the status of schools is ascribed in part on the basis of their students' performance, and this too is reflected in teachers' preferences. Teachers typically prefer to teach in an academic school oriented toward college preparation. And again, the higher a teacher's verbal ability the more likely he is to prefer such schools; the best qualified teachers are the least likely to prefer teaching in those schools which Negro children are most likely to attend.²³ The desired end result of improved teaching--high student performance--appears to be an important condition for recruiting improved teachers to schools in the first place.

Third, there is no evidence of basic change in these preference patterns in the future.* College students who plan to teach are no more likely to prefer teaching in predominantly Negro schools than experienced teachers. More than half of the whites express a preference for teaching only white students, and this is as true of high as of low ability students. Furthermore, over half of these college students--Negro and white--express a preference for an academic school, oriented toward college preparation. This seems to be somewhat more pronounced for high ability students. These preference patterns are

*These are data on the attitudes and preferences of non-Southern Negro and white college students.

as true of college freshmen as of college seniors.²⁴ If changed recruitment patterns are required to improve the quality of teaching in predominantly Negro schools, the existing data offer little promise.

This state of affairs, and recent developments in some cities and some civil rights organizations, have prompted suggestions for a policy of recruiting only Negroes to teach in ghetto schools. This, it has been argued, would remedy the problems which arise from white teachers' preferences. In fact this proposal represents nothing new in most of the older and larger cities; in most there already is substantial racial matching of teachers and students, and as city-wide student enrollments grow progressively more heavily Negro, so do the teaching staffs. Most Negro students, it seems, will attend schools with predominantly Negro faculties.²⁵

Unhappily, this may only have the effect of perpetuating the closed and inferior educational system which now exists in urban Negro ghettos. The effects of segregation are cumulative; its impact upon past generations is visited in a variety of ways, and with a vengeance, upon those of the present. Negro students who are taught by predominantly Negro faculties--whose education was segregated and inferior--now and in the foreseeable future are likely to be taught by faculties of relatively low verbal ability.*

The trend is unmistakable. As Table I shows, over two thirds of Negro teachers fall below the mean verbal ability scores

* Although verbal ability is by no means the only important attribute of teachers, it is an important one.

Table I. Teachers' verbal ability,
by race and experience.*

Teachers' experience	% who scored below white mean	
	Negro	White
10 years' or more experience	75.8	37.8
5-9 years' experience	69.7	31.6
5 or less years' experience	74.8	36.1
Future teachers: College seniors	75.5	46.7
Future teachers: College freshmen	85.4	43.5

*Source: Coleman, et al., op. cit., Table 4.5.1, 345.

of white teachers; only one third of white teachers fall below that mean score. This comparison is not weakened when older or more experienced teachers are contrasted to younger or less experienced teachers, nor is there any improvement for future teachers. These data offer little support for the idea that increased teacher-pupil racial matching will improve the quality of education in ghetto schools. They suggest rather that the cumulative effects of segregation will not be eliminated as long as the closed system from which they arise exists.

The data presented here do not show that changed patterns of teacher distribution to and within school systems are impossible. Indeed, the limited changes undertaken by the MES program did appear to improve teacher morale, and undoubtedly such programs would therefore change teachers' preferences and job choices to some extent.²⁶ But

there is a difference between changing some teachers' preferences and job choices, and the basic change in preferences and assignments which would be required before school systems could select the best candidates from an oversupply of applicants, all of whom wanted to teach in predominantly Negro schools. Merely stating the problem suggests the enormous barriers to basic change. It suggests that no program designed to reverse existing teacher distribution patterns can be effective unless it changes the major factors--in addition to working conditions--which determine schools' status and teachers' preferences; the schools' color, class, and achievement composition.

* * *

This does not exhaust discussion of effective segregated compensation--it merely suggests some of the leading problems. The first ten year cost for an effort such as that outlined above would probably be between 100 and 160 billion dollars. The calculations on which these figures are based are not precise, but are intended only to suggest in a rough way the order of magnitude. They suggest an order of magnitude which would require major reallocation of national social and budgetary priorities, and therefore of political priorities as well.²⁷ And there are other problems, illustrated by teachers' preferences, which would not as easily yield to fiscal formulation or economic solution.

This does not say that effective compensation in schools segregated by color and class is impossible. It only suggests the fundamental changes in the organization of schools and the production and

distribution of educational resources which probably would be required. It also suggests that little serious attention has been given to the elements of such a policy, or to its economic and social costs. Most policy discussion and formulation seems to have been carried out on the assumption that segregated compensation would provide a relatively easy remedy. All the evidence suggests that this is not so.

LIMITATIONS OF THE SEGREGATED COMPENSATORY APPROACH

In addition to these limitations, there are a few basic objections to a policy of segregated compensation. First, although there is direct and indirect evidence that integration will improve achievement, there is little such evidence for segregated compensation. Second, there is direct evidence that segregated compensatory programs will compound other major educational problems.

With respect to the first, it is not unfair to say that if policy were made only on the basis of available data, American schools would be desegregated. There is a fair amount of data which show a substantial performance increment associated with social class and racial desegregation.

The Equality of Educational Opportunity survey data, for one, show that Negro students who attended school with whites for most of their elementary career experience, on the average, less than half the academic disadvantage of those Negroes who have attended school only with Negroes.²⁸

Studies of elementary school desegregation in a number of

cities, for another, show achievement gains for Negro children placed in majority white schools over Negro children remaining in predominantly Negro schools. It may well be asked whether this is an effect of racial or of social class integration but given the present American social structure, the question is academic. There are so few middle class Negroes that social class desegregation for Negro children could not be accomplished without racial desegregation. ^{28a}

Finally, there is pretty convincing evidence that these school performance differences for Negro students are in fact related to specifically racial contexts and conditions. There is, for example, the fact that students' higher performance in interracial classrooms²⁹ is specifically related to the schools interracial climate. Negro and white students in schools with little or no reported interracial tension perform at higher levels than similarly-situated students in schools where considerable tension is reported.³⁰

Another bit of evidence along the same lines is the association between interracial acceptance and performance. Negro students in desegregated classrooms who report no interracial acceptance achieve at a lower level than those, in the same and similar classrooms, who do report such acceptance.³¹ Similarly, white students who are accepted in predominantly Negro schools perform at lower levels than those who are not.³² Just as acceptance in a predominantly white school facilitates Negro performance, acceptance in a predominantly Negro milieu has a depressing effect upon white performance. This evidence points to specifically racial conditions which affect

achievement. It suggests that in addition to the facilitating effect which predominantly white schools have upon Negro achievement for social class reasons, there also is a facilitating effect of racial composition, given interracial acceptance.³³

With respect to the second basic objection to segregated compensation: there is good evidence that schools shape children's racial preferences, and their interracial behavior as adults. Consider the attitudes and associations of Negro and white adults as they relate to the racial composition of the schools they attended as children. Those who attended racially isolated schools are likely to express fear, distrust, and hostility toward members of the other race. White adults who attended racially isolated white schools are more likely than those who attended desegregated schools to oppose measures designed to secure equal opportunity for Negroes. They are more likely to live in segregated neighborhoods, and to express a desire to continue living in such neighborhoods. Their children are more likely to attend all white schools, and they are more likely than "desegregated" whites to reject the idea of their children attending desegregated schools.

Likewise, Negroes who attended segregated schools not only are likely to fear and distrust whites, but they also are quite likely to express the idea that they would like to "get even" with them. There are manifestations of that in the cities every summer now. Negroes who attended segregated schools are much less likely than Negroes who attended desegregated schools to live in desegregated neighborhoods, and they are more likely to oppose sending their children to desegregated schools.³⁴

These differences are taken apart from the particular neighborhoods in which these adults lived as children, and apart from their relative poverty or affluence; we see here the racial effect of schools. A dramatic illustration of this is that high-status (college educated) Negroes who attended segregated schools are less likely to live in integrated neighborhoods than lower-status (high school educated) Negroes who attended integrated schools.³⁵

As racially isolated public schools shape children's values and attitudes they set the mold for adult associations. As they create and reinforce preferences for association only with persons of one's own race, they build the foundation for adult housing and school decisions. Governmental support of segregated schools creates and compounds residential segregation and governmental efforts to eliminate residential segregation will be impeded by the barriers created in racially isolated schools.

This evidence on the adult effects of education also bears on the effectiveness of the programs which seek to improve segregated schools. Let us assume that compensatory programs will make substantial improvements in Negro achievement. There still is a stronger relationship between students' interracial experience and their racial attitudes and preferences than between their academic performance levels and racial preferences. Students with high levels of academic competence who attend isolated schools are less likely to express a preference for desegregated schools and friends of the other race than those who do less well academically, but attend desegregated schools.³⁶ Improvements in academic competence are not likely to reduce the

schools' contribution to increasing segregation and racial friction. Even if programs of compensatory education could substantially improve academic competence in schools isolated by race and social class, the schools would continue to compound segregation, and thus intensify the specifically racial damage it generates for white and black Americans. Negro achievement is no more a remedy for segregation and the racism and separatism it produces than white achievement has been in the past.

All of this suggests again that any educational policy-making agency seeking to decide logically between integration and segregated compensatory education would choose integration. But in a sense this may be unfair; most of the school systems which have desegregated have not spent much more per pupil as a result. Their costs comprise mostly transportation, which is relatively inexpensive. But discussions of national policy--which must be geared closely to the larger metropolitan areas--must take a somewhat different tack. There are two important considerations.

First, there is the fact that although desegregation improves performance, it does not entirely eliminate the gap between the distribution of achievement for Negroes and whites.³⁷ This implies that educational improvement should be combined with desegregation.

Second, the racial and social class demography of the older and larger cities compels a metropolitan approach to school desegregation. There are not enough suburban Negroes to desegregate schools outside these central cities, and not enough affluent city whites to desegregate schools within them. The distribution of educational quality follows roughly these same lines, and this is another reason for making

substantial improvements in the quality of education in desegregated schools; without such improvements, it is dubious that suburban districts would become involved in large-scale cooperative arrangements with the central cities.

The schools most likely to meet the requirements for metropolitan attendance and substantially improved education are education parks. These larger schools--by consolidating pupil attendance and educational resources--would permit improvements in the quality of education, and desegregation. Studies suggest that the direct savings on construction-associated costs alone would be 15-20% over neighborhood schools, and that the educational benefits of consolidation would be manifold. Chief among them would be greater individual attention to students, and greater occupational specialization and diversification for teachers. Any educational institution which offers these two things in the context of a majority-advantaged student body, is likely to have few problems attracting and holding competent teachers.³⁸

How does such a policy compare with the costs of segregated compensation? The first ten years' cost, the cost of building education parks (including in the estimate twice as many advantaged children), of providing all with daily transportation, and of increasing per pupil expenditures by 500 dollars (about double present levels), might be as much as 20% more than the first ten years' cost of segregated compensation.³⁹

* * *

These comparisons are quite rough and some of the data are not very good. But public schools and public policy go on; despite some limitations of the data, they suggest a few conclusions.

First, it seems possible that the academic competence of Negro students can be improved--without desegregation--if certain structural features of their present school environment are radically altered. These changes, which probably would have to include very sharply reduced class size and pupil-teacher ratios, and very sharply improved teachers, would center upon compensation for the barriers to learning which educationally weak student environments pose. They would represent a basic revision in the theory and practice of educational compensation; school organization would have to be structurally changed to provide substitutes for the academic stimulation deriving from educationally rich student environments.

Second, such changes would be very costly in terms of fiscal and social effort. From a fiscal point of view, they would require an expansion of present ESEA allocations by twenty or thirty times, to between \$100 and \$160 billion in the first ten years of such an effort. Even half of this would require a major reallocation of national budget priorities. And the required changes would be difficult to accomplish in other ways. The barriers to changing the entire system of educational resource allocation--typified in the problem of teacher quality discussed above--are formidable; there are no plans on the horizon or programs in operation which seem likely to overcome these obstacles.

Third, there may not be a very substantial difference in the

order of magnitude of the costs involved for school desegregation. It seems that either policy would require very serious revisions, not only in the structure of schools and classrooms, but also in the organization of schools and the levels of investment in education. Whether we consider the matter from an educational or social perspective, the required investment will be much more than presently is allocated to educational improvement. Either policy would require far-reaching and fundamental change.

Given this rough fiscal parity, it is of particular importance that discussion of and choice between the two policies not be based simply on immediate fiscal or educational considerations. Policies often are implemented or rejected, and work or fail to work, for other than purely educational or fiscal reasons. Two questions are directly relevant. First, what are the major second-order effects--those not directly related to academic competence--of each policy likely to be? Second, what social and political considerations bear upon the likelihood of either policy working?

With respect to second-order effects, there is little doubt that desegregation is the more desirable alternative. Compensatory programs institutionalize segregation, and therefore compound racism in a number of important ways. First, by definition compensation maintains segregation in schools, and thus maintains institutions which produce racist and separatist attitudes and behavior. Second, such programs create ever larger bureaucracies with a vested interest in the maintenance of compensation--and thus segregation. Third, existing compensatory programs support a local tendency to build more

segregated white and Negro schools. If large quantities of new federal funds are made available for compensation--even in the unlikely event that none are allocated specifically for construction--they would lend enormous support to this tendency toward huge capital investments in segregation. As a result, what is now a difficult discussion would, for all practical purposes, become entirely academic.

It typically is argued, however, that these considerations are outweighed by the simple fact that a policy of segregated compensation is more workable--that is, politically and socially more practical and acceptable. But there is reason to believe that effective compensation will be very nearly as expensive as a policy of desegregation and educational improvement. The same legislators who oppose desegregation have in the past, do now, and probably would in the future oppose programs of massive sustained superior treatment for Negro children, or for the children of the poor. Perhaps more to the point, there is little reason to believe that legislators who represent Caucasian sections of metropolitan areas would be willing or politically able to support such massive unequal treatment. The probable costs of effective compensation throw a somewhat different light on its political feasibility.

This brings to mind the historic and political experience out of which the integration strategy in part evolved. The experience, in brief, was that even in crude tangible respects separate never was equal; an entire series of commitments to enrich the ghetto went unmet. The conclusion drawn from that experience was that the only politically feasible way to gain access to the same resources as whites

was to be there with them. This principle applies as well--or perhaps with even more political force--to the problem of establishing massive inequalities in favor of segregated Negroes.

The corollary of this principle is that desegregation is not a process in which every Negro gain implies a corresponding white loss. The political wisdom of the integration strategy is that it produces a situation which renders discrimination very much more difficult than does the segregated situation. The corollary in the case of education, is that every desegregated school should involve concrete and apparent improvements in educational quality for whites and Negroes. The education parks are perhaps the chief example of this, for they promise very substantial improvements in the quality of education for all children. If such a system of schools were built in a metropolitan area, whites who refused to send their children would have to reject better and higher status education in order to reject desegregation. This principle applies to their legislators as well. But as long as it is only a matter of ghetto improvement, whites can reject that, or maintain it at minimal levels, at no apparent or immediate cost to themselves. That has been the case for time out of mind, and in all probability will be the case with future programs of ghetto improvement.

When everything else is said, then, and all the educational and fiscal evidence is in, the most compelling reason for a policy of improved and integrated schools is that only this policy will make it politically feasible for the destinies of America's two separate nations to become bound up together. A policy of segregated compen-

sation cannot provide that binding tie; failing that, it can promise only the continuance of a segregated, closed, and inferior system of education for Negro Americans.

Footnotes

1. U. S. Department of HEW, The First Year of Title I, ESEA: The States Report, Washington, 1966. "In practice, the goal of Title I is to provide 'compensatory education' for the millions of schoolchildren whose crippling background offers them little hope for successful schooling" (vii).
2. The largest number of compensatory program evaluation was brought together by the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, in Racial Isolation in the Public Schools, Washington, 1967, Vol. I, 120-137 (thereafter cited as U.S.C.C.R.).

After reviewing the evaluations of various programs, none of which seemed to show any sustained academic improvement, the Commission concluded (139) that:

. . . the compensatory programs reviewed here appear to suffer from the defect inherent in attempting to solve problems stemming in part from racial and social class isolation in schools which themselves are isolated by race and social class.

The Commission report, however, noted proposals to double expenditures in city schools, and said that "short of such steps" compensation was unlikely to work (139-140).

The lack of sound evaluation and the lack of results are exemplified by and attested to by the California State Department of Public Instruction's report, The First Year of Title I, ESEA, (summary of 1965-66 Annual Report), Washington, 1966. The report assessed the success of projects conducted in 1,044 school

districts in the state. If only those projects which definitely require quantitative evaluation (reading improvement), are included, the report shows that only 2.6% showed "substantial" (statistically significant), gains in student achievement (8 and 15). If all projects are included, 2.3% showed "substantial" gains in student achievement. See also, Fox, D. J., Expansion of the More Effective Schools Program, New York City, 1967, 120-124.

3. This assumption underlies the current practice of compensatory education. It is perhaps best illustrated in a sentence from a joint publication of the U. S. Office of Education and the Office of Economic Opportunity, Education: An Answer to Poverty, Washington, (n.d.), 20.

If a three or four year-old child can be stimulated in a prekindergarten to learn the simple things he does not learn from his parents . . . he may get a head start on later success in school.

4. The relationship persists when the social class background and race of students is controlled. There are two studies which impressively document the relationship between school social class and student achievement: Coleman, J., et al., Equality of Educational Opportunity, Washington, 1966, shows that the educational background of students' classmates accounts for more variation in achievement than any other school-related factor (302-312). Even when teacher and school quality are allowed to "explain" as much variance as possible first, student body factors still account for a very substantial proportion of the total

between-school variance in achievement. (Table 3.25.3, 319).

Some objections have been raised to the cross-sectional character of the Coleman report, on the grounds that students' initial ability could not be measured and controlled. Alan Wilson, in Educational Consequences of Segregation in a California Community, 165-206, in U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, had the required longitudinal data; controlling on first grade I.Q. he found that by the 6th grade the cumulative social class composition of schools was as closely related to achievement as individual social class (Table 17, 181).

5. U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. I, 90. For a discussion of the measurement and analysis problems associated with this "racial composition effect," see Vol. II, 35-47.
6. U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, Table 4.2, 67. This also is true of other regions; Coleman, op. cit., 242, 243.
7. Because the appropriate variable in the Coleman survey data was mis-coded for grade 12 (see U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, 37, note 6), this measurement is possible only for grade 9; for that data, see U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, Table 2.2, 50.
8. This is suggested by a few other sources than the studies cited above on the effects of student environment. One is the experience of Project Headstart, which has small class size, and even lower pupil-teacher ratios. Another is the apparent success of some tutoring programs, notably the Homework Helper Program in New York City. Another, and perhaps most important, is that federal officials appear to be moving toward this position. The

Advisory Committee on Follow-Through, U.S.O.E., Preliminary Report, Washington, 6, lists as its second major criterion for Follow-Through programs a pupil-staff ratio of 7-9:1 (6).

9. Fox, op. cit., Appendix A, A2-A3, A8-A10.
10. This figure is arrived at by multiplying the total ESEA population (8 million), by the total MES increment per pupil over prior expenditures, which was roughly 500 dollars. The ESEA information was derived from U. S. Department of HEW, op. cit., v. This understates the cost, since New York City spends more per pupil than the national average on instruction.
11. Fox, op. cit., 63.
12. The total was computed as explained in Note 10, above.
13. National Education Association, Teacher Supply and Demand in Public Schools, 1966, Table 25, 50. This estimate is based on the "number of new teachers needed to immediately achieve a standard for minimum quality in the staffing of public-school classrooms" (29). For a full definition, ibid.
14. This was computed by figuring the number of additional teachers required to cover classes at 6:1. Eight million (ESEA) students $\div 6 = 1.3$ million teachers total, minus .26 million (at 30:1) = 1.0 million teachers. The U. S. Office of Education (Projections of Educational Statistics to 1975, Washington, 1966, 66), estimates the direct cost of producing an A.B. degree to be 5,800 dollars. The total was computed by multiplying this cost figure by the 1 million teachers required. Although it may seem unreasonable to suppose the need to train all these teachers, the

NEA (op. cit., 51), estimates suggest a continuing tendency for teacher supply to fall well below demand, even at existing pupil-teacher ratios.

15. This assumes a need for 200,000 classrooms, and a construction cost per classroom of 30,000 dollars. School Management (July, 1966) estimates that the average construction cost per classroom in 1965 was 43,700 dollars; the cost figure per classroom was arbitrarily reduced about 30%, to 30,000, to take account of smaller class size, and this cost figure was multiplied by the needed number of classrooms. No account was taken of rising construction costs, classrooms needing replacement, or classrooms needed to reduce class size nationally to 24. The Office of Education (Projections, 40) estimates the cost of meeting these needs by 1974-75 will be 29.5 billion. It seemed reasonable to assume that any construction beyond that would have to be financed by non-local sources.
16. There is no analysis of teachers' salary by students' socio-economic status, so the 1.7 billion figure was computed by dividing the ESEA pupil population (8 million), by the national pupil-teacher ratio (25:1) (U. S. Department of HEW, Fall 1965 Statistics of Public Schools, 3), and multiplying that by the average 1966-67 salary (\$7,119) (NEA, Estimates of School Statistics, 1966-67, Washington, 1966, 14).
17. Fox, op. cit., 122.
18. Coleman, et al., op. cit., 317, note. For a fuller definition of these three variables, 316-17.

19. The National Science Foundation is the only agency which has made a serious effort to improve teachers' competence--albeit in special subject areas--and it is important to note that they invest only about nine percent of their total annual budget for teacher training (3.5 million out of 36.5 million), in school-year in-service programs. Twenty-three million (nearly 70%) is invested in intensive summer institutes, and the remaining 10 million (about 20%) is invested in full-year, full-time training. The cost per teacher of each is, respectively, 250, 1200, and 6500 dollars. One of the main goals of the summer institutes is to provide teachers with an M.S., and four summer institutes (4800 dollars), are required for this. This seems to be a proper model for improving teachers' competence in other areas. Telephone interview with Dr. Russell Phelps, N.S.F., 10/18/67.
20. This was computed by multiplying the one million new teachers needed (see Note 14, above) by the cost of a 4-year, 50% improvement (2400 dollars). This is a very conservative estimate, as the preceding data on N.S.F. shows. It also is a gross underestimate of the cost, since it is figured only for the additional teachers needed, and thus does not take any attrition or market factors into account.
21. Coleman, et al., op. cit., Table 4.8.1, 350.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., Table 4.10.1, 350. For the ability control (which only was used for future teachers), Tables 4.11.6, 362; 4.11.8, 364.
24. Ibid., Tables 4.11.6, 362; 4.11.8, 364.

25. Ibid., 126; U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, Table A-2, 8-10.
26. Fox, op. cit., 120-1.
27. The Table below shows the method of computation for these figures.

<u>Item</u>	<u>Cost</u> (in billions)
Construction: 200,000 classrooms x \$30,000. <u>10 years total</u>	6.0
Teacher training (1 million teachers needed at 6:1 x \$5,800). <u>10</u> <u>years total</u>	5.8
Teacher salaries (\$7.1 billion per year at pupil-teacher ratio of 6:1). <u>10 years total</u>	71.0
Improving teacher qualifications. <u>10 years total</u>	<u>2.4</u> 85.2

That this is a very conservative estimate can be seen by comparing this total with the total based on the annual per pupil cost of Headstart, which is roughly 1000-1200 dollars. If a ten year total using this as a base is computed, the grand total would be 95-110 billion. And, if--as is almost sure--the estimates of teacher retraining and training were much too low (as Note 19 above suggests), and the construction estimates were too low (as Note 15 above suggests), the total could easily be 20 or 30 billion higher. Passow, in the Summary of his report on the Washington, D. C. public schools (New York, 1967) estimates the costs of effective compensation to be three or four times what presently is spent in advantaged school districts (25-26). This would about double my estimates.

28. U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, Table 2.2, 50.

- 28a. Three evaluations of school desegregation which merit attention are: Mahan, T. W., Project Concern, Hartford, Conn., September 1967, 47; Buffalo Public Schools, Buffalo, N. Y., Study of Achievement of Pupils Transferred to Achieve a More Desirable Racial Balance, March 1967; Philadelphia Public Schools, Philadelphia, Pa., The Effect of Bussing on Achievement, December 1966.
29. U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II; Tables 4.1-5.7, 66-92, suggest that even with very rigorous controls, the racial composition effect remains.
30. U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, Tables 6.1, 93; 6.2, 94; 8.12, 142.
31. U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, Table 6.9, 100.
32. Pettigrew, T. F., Race and Equal Educational Opportunity, paper presented at A.P.A. meetings, Washington, D. C. (9/3/67).
33. As the Tables cited in Notes 30 and 31 above show, desegregation will probably not have a positive effect unless at least certain minimal interracial conditions also are met.
34. This entire analysis is derived from the results of a survey published in U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. I, 112-13; Vol. II, 211-241.
35. Only the Negro adult survey data permitted control of neighborhood racial composition. This comparison is found at U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. I, Table 11, 113.
36. Singer, D., Interracial Attitudes of Negro and White Fifth Grade Children in Segregated and Unsegregated Schools. Ed. D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1966, Chapters III and IV.

37. The best available evidence for this is presented in the following Table, derived from U.S.C.C.R., op. cit., Vol. II, Table 2.2, 50. It presents 9th grade Negro verbal achievement scores (in terms of grade levels relative to whites), for the Metropolitan Northeast.

Parents' education	School average Parents' education	Earliest grade in class with whites	Percent white in class	
			None	Most
less than high school	less than high school graduate	1, 2, 3	-3.2	-2.1
		Never	-3.4	---
	high school graduate or more	1, 2, 3	-2.1	-1.3
		Never	-2.8	---
high school graduate or more	less than high school graduate	1, 2, 3	-3.0	-2.0
		Never	-3.3	---
	high school graduate or more	1, 2, 3	-1.6	-1.8
		Never	-2.6	---

38. For a collection of papers on this subject, and a good brief bibliography, see U. S. Commission on Civil Rights, Education Parks, Washington, 1967.

39. The following table presents the cost figures and the methods of computation involved.

Cost of construction: at current class-
room costs, for 20 million children (ESEA
population x 2.5) 34.4

Cost of transportation for 20 million
students (average per pupil cost, 1964-
65, 43 dollars; U.S.O.E., Digest of
Educational Statistics, Washington,
1965, 29). Ten year total9

Increase per pupil instructional ex-
penditure for 20 million students by
500 dollars per year = 10 billion.
Ten year total 100.0

Total 135.3