Inviting Argument by Analogy: Analogical-Mapping-Based Comparison Activities as a Scaffold for Small-Group Argumentation
ABSTRACT
This study invited small groups to make several arguments by analogy about simple machines. Groups were first provided training on analogical (structure) mapping and were then invited to use analogical mapping as a scaffold to make arguments. In making these arguments, groups were asked to consider three simple machines: two machines that they had built, used, and made measurements with and one that they had not yet studied. Finally, groups were to produce an argument in favor of the machine that worked most like another machine. Seven of these approximately 50-minute analogical-mapping-based comparison activities were given to 55 preservice elementary teachers working in 15 small groups over 7 weeks. When used as a scaffold for argumentation in small groups, these activities were found to generate a need for discernment, which allowed for simple machines and their parts to be understood in and connected to the context.
INTRODUCTION
In this study, we invited small groups of students to consider simple machines as analogues and to make arguments by analogy to learn about them. All simple machines are analogous in that they trade distance for force. We consider that asking students to make an argument by analogy is a form of scaffolding for student learning in this area. Analogies are commonly used in science and in everyday life as thinking and communication tools (Clement, 1981; Dunbar, 2001). Inviting explicit comparison of analogous scenarios or concepts has been shown to promote learning in individuals (Clement & Brown, 2008; Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Kurtz, Miao, & Gentner, 2001). However, relatively little research has been done on how analogies can affect group communication and argumentation (Bellocchi & Ritchie, 2011; Gadgil & Nokes, 2009). The contribution of the present study will be to provide discourse-analysis-based qualitative findings describing what this process of linking analogy and argumentation looks like, as well as how analogy scaffolds small-group argumentation.
Various physics concepts can be demonstrated with simple machines, including work, efficiency, friction, ideal mechanical advantage, and actual mechanical advantage (Hewitt, 1999; Roth, 2001). Although the machines look and function differently, they are all in fact analogous. Each allows for the trading of distance for force, usually with the effort force to move something being reduced and effort distance being increased. Past research has asked students to talk and make predictions about how a given simple machine will function, use the machine and make related measurements, and design applications for the machine (Glasson, 1989; McKenna & Agogino, 1998; Roth, 1996; Tucknott & Yore, 1999).
The rich, tangible context provided by student-constructed simple machines actually operating in the world has been shown to be a good way to encourage physics-based discourse, shared meanings, and use of deictics (i.e., context-dependent words such as here, there, this, and that, etc.). With these, students in groups can communicate by pointing at, using and refining simple machines, related understandings, and related language (Roth, 2001). Talking about, representing, constructing, combining, and designing applications for the machines can be good ways for students to learn technological- and engineering-design processes as well as the physical concepts related to them. Furthermore, simple machines require only basic mathematics. This helps students make predictions about how they will work (the required forces, positioning, etc.), which they can then test (Roth, 2001).
LITERATURE REVIEW
Analogies, for the purposes of this research, exist when relationships between dissimilar objects correspond or can be mapped back and forth, even though the physical components themselves are different (Gentner, 1983). Figure 1 (reprinted with permission; Tohill & Holyoak, 2000) provides an example of the process of analogical mapping. Although the features best correspond between the two people, if one turns to the relationships of objects in the scenario, one sees a different correspondence, that of function. Since the role of the person in the top scenario is to restrain the dog, he would best correspond to the tree in the bottom scenario. Other correspondences include dog to dog (both have the same role), and cat (top) to person (bottom) (both are being chased by the dog). Contrasting and mapping the scenarios as analogues makes the relationships (e.g., restraining, chasing, nonparticipant, etc.) in the scenarios salient.

Contrasting cases have the power to make salient certain features that might otherwise go unnoticed (Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 2000; Bransford, Franks, Vye, & Sherwood, 1989; Marton, 2006). For example, Bransford et al. (1989) found that in looking at a picture of a single house, people are unlikely to notice features such as the width of the chimney or of the door. When comparing pictures of six houses, however, these features become more apparent. The fact that there is a great deal of alignment between the houses makes the small differences salient. In short, comparison (or contrasting) of cases makes for easier noticing.
Such comparisons can yield other benefits too. Mussweiler and Epstude (2009) found that study participants who engaged in comparison to an information-rich standard could make faster decisions or judgments about a new situation, required less information about a new situation, thought more about an information-rich standard, and were better able to carry out secondary tasks at the same time. The authors conclude that comparison carries with it efficiency benefits when dealing with a new situation or concept. Thus, the question “What is it like?” (i.e., what is like it that I may already know?) can be a faster and more effective way to learn about a new place, concept, or idea than “Describe it to me, please.” These efficiency gains depend upon alignable features between the objects of comparison (Mussweiler & Epstude, 2009). But alignable features alone are not enough; rather, the differences make nuances more salient (Marton, 2006).
Analogies Naturally Scaffold Thinking
Analogical comparison can scaffold thinking to make a concept easier to understand or communicate. People use analogies spontaneously to think and communicate (Clement, 1988; Dunbar, 2001; Wong, 1993). For example, Clement (1981, 1988) invited experienced problem solvers to analyze a physics problem. Although they were not instructed to search their own background, Clement expected people to appeal to analogues from their past experiences to solve it. They did this, in fact, through an extended think-aloud process that produced correct reasoning via analogy. The author concludes that reasoning with analogies does not necessarily provide an immediate solution but has the potential to be effective over time. Furthermore, there is “reason to believe that some of these processes [of reasoning and conjecturing with analogies] are learnable, rather than being exclusively a product of genius” (Clement, 1981, p. 9).
Wong (1993) also found, among a class of preservice teachers, that “productive analogical reasoning can occur when the learners themselves assume primary responsibility for the task of generating, applying, and learning from analogies” (p. 1271). For instance, when participants were asked to explain the operation of a sealed syringe, they were found to appeal to self-generated analogies including the idea that air particles are analogous to BBs in a container, people moving in a room, or rubber balls inside the syringe (p. 1270). Participants reached into their past knowledge and experience to explain and understand the problem before them. This frequently resulted in the emergence of new questions, such as how to explain the fact that the syringe returns to its rest position when pulled out or even how to explain air pressure more generally.
In both Wong's and Clement's research, people were found to reason via an analogical reasoning process to understand and communicate ideas they did not fully understand. How have these findings been applied to science instruction? Many researchers have suggested that science students can be invited to use analogy as a process in the classroom (Duit, 1991; Else, Clement, & Rea-Ramirez, 2008; Wilbers & Duit, 2006). Analogies are commonly used as an explaining tool in science education (Brown & Clement, 1989; Coll, 2006; Fogwill, 2010; Heywood, 2002). For example, Brown and Clement (1989) argue for engaging “the student in a process of analogical reasoning in an interactive teaching environment” as opposed to “simply presenting the analogy in a text or lecture” (p. 237).
Various frameworks that have been developed to provide steps for the use of analogy in teaching and learning science (Else et al., 2008; Glynn, 1991; Treagust, Harrison, & Venville, 1998) all include language on analogy as an active process. For example, guidelines of Else et al. for working with analogies called for making “analogy as student-active as possible.” The Focus, Action, and Reflection guide for working with analogies has an “action” phase that consists of “mapping of shared attributes” and “showing students where the analogy breaks down” (Treagust et al., 1998, p. 92). The Teaching With Analogies model also addresses the importance of process; its step four instructs students to “map similarities” (Glynn, 1991, p. 230). These frameworks all implicitly suggest the importance of comparing and contrasting, which has been shown to benefit learning.
ANALOGICAL COMPARISON PROMOTES LEARNING IN INDIVIDUALS
Comparison of analogous scenarios has been shown to be beneficial for learning in varied research. Kurtz and Lowenstein (2007) found that inviting participants to compare two problems significantly increased the performance on a new analogous problem (compared with a control that had participants read only one problem and its solution). Similarly, Podolefsky and Finkelstein (2007) found that students who used two analogical models for sound waves—an abstract one and a concrete one—were three times more likely to “reason productively” about sound waves than those receiving only one model.
Diehl and Reese (2010) found that learning improved when they invited learners to consider elaborated chemistry analogies. Clement and Brown (2008) also found evidence of learning through analogical comparisons. Specifically, they engaged a student in a process of analogical reasoning about a misconception that was overcome. They noted that “by establishing analogical connections between anchoring situations and more difficult ones, students may be able to extend the range of their valid intuitions to initially troublesome target situations” (p. 140).
There are, however, some potential problems in learning with analogies (Else, Clement, & Rea-Ramirez, 2003; Harrison & De Jong, 2005; Zook & DiVesta, 1991). For example, individuals can make errors with analogies including overmapping (mapping correspondences where there are none), mismapping (mapping incorrect correspondences between elements), failure to map, and retention of base (better-known analogue) features (e.g., planets orbiting atoms) (Else et al., 2003, p. 8). Sometimes people have not benefited from analogies when they might have been expected to, without explicit guidance (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Marton, 2006).
ANALOGY USE IN GROUP COMMUNICATION
Despite the benefits for individual learning, few studies have been done on the use of analogies for communication purposes in groups (Bellocchi & Ritchie, 2011; Gadgil & Nokes, 2009; Savinainen, Scott, & Viiri, 2005). Those that have focused on communication within group settings show encouraging results (Bellocchi & Ritchie, 2011; Fogwill, 2010; Mason, 1996; May, Hammer, & Roy, 2006; Oh, 2011; Savinainen et al., 2005). Bellochi and Ritchie (2011) evaluated how “analogy shapes classroom discourse” during analogy-writing activities (p. 771). Through video analysis of groups engaging with an analogy for electricity, researchers looked at how they made meanings as they navigated the space between the analogies (Bellocchi & Ritchie, 2011). The researchers found a particular kind of talk when one word or sign was made by students to apply to analogous scenarios. The researchers called this “merged discourse” (p. 786). They found that most instances of merged discourse were conceptually correct and that this type of discourse “was observed only during analogical activities” (p. 785). This work is important because when students merge their discourse, they are borrowing conceptual structures from both analogues. By allowing the analogy to be negotiated socially, the same word can be used, understood, and articulated from the perspectives of both analogues and by different individuals, thus benefiting learning.
Similarly, Oh (2011) had groups of students compare analogues. Having evaluated and transformed (e.g., graphed and otherwise organized) the data for four typhoons, students formulated explanations for another typhoon's path (which was different from the typical path) that not only drew upon the four analogues, but also went beyond, combining and extending elements from all. Although the four analogues were insufficient for explaining the anomalous path, they were useful in other ways. Oh suggests that more opportunities for this type of reasoning should be provided given that this is what “professional earth scientists are actually engaged in” (p. 429). Groups that are able to compare analogues have shown the ability to go beyond them in reasoning about new, related concepts.
These and other studies (Fogwill, 2010; Mason, 1996; May et al., 2006; Savinainen et al., 2005) describe the benefits of allowing groups the time and space to compare or even generate analogies. Fogwill (2010) found that “Imperfect students’ analogies stimulated much more discussion than would any more perfectly mapped analogy provided in a text or a by a teacher” (p. 259). May et al., 2006found that even third graders in the United States could generate and modify analogies in response to others’ arguments, and shortcomings perceived by others.
Small-group use of analogies has not been without its limitations, however. Yerrick, Doster, Nugent, Parke, and Crawley. (2003) found that although analogies provided a focal point for student group activity, without guidance students used them incorrectly or proposed others that were incorrect. This in part agrees with the work by Else et al. (2003), who found that individual students could overmap, mismap, or fail to map aspects of an analogy.
More research is necessary to evaluate the role of analogies in small-group communication and learning (Bellocchi & Ritchie, 2011; Gadgil & Nokes, 2009). This is important given that analogy use and argument by analogy are both commonly used to aid in understanding and communication, even in everyday interactions (Brewer, 1996; Dunbar, 2001). Inviting students to make an argument by analogy holds promise in developing further understanding in this area.
The Importance of Argumentation and Scaffolding
To understand the nature and process of science, students must understand the process of argumentation that gives rise to scientific knowledge (Driver, Newton, & Osborne, 2000; National Research Council, 2007; National Research Council, 1996). Without understanding this process, students can perceive science as a body of facts that are self-evident and self-establishing. While engaging in argumentation, students should be doing activities that center on communicating, interpreting, and justifying scientific evidence with an eye toward understanding the scientific concept in question (Jimenez-Aleixandre, 2008). They can thus increase their understanding of the specific content to be argued as well as about science more generally. Although argumentation is important, it seems that learners do not discuss well or argue about what they do not understand (von Aufschnaiter, Erduran, Osborne, & Simon, 2008). They need to be supported in the argumentation process, and scaffolding is one way to do this.
The term scaffolding relates to the Vygotsky (1978) zone of proximal development, which is the theoretical space between what a novice can do without assistance versus what he or she can do with assistance from abler peers. Scaffolding of novices, or in this case science learners, means to temporarily support them to achieve a higher performance than they could achieve alone. It is expected that later, the learners will be able to perform unaided at the higher level (Mascolo, 2005; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976).
Scaffolding need not be provided directly by another person who is present. Rather, it can be embedded into the environment to support a novice. One way of doing this is to structure and problematize science content for students (Reiser, 2004). To problematize content means to make it a situation in need of resolution as opposed to presenting it outright. (Note that this use of “problematizing” differs from other uses in such fields as technological design in which students come to form, understand, and articulate a problem to be solved.) Structuring content, on the other hand, involves making a task more doable by breaking it into steps. The two can be in tension at times; to structure too much can be to problematize too little, and vice versa. The goal of task-embedded scaffolding (i.e., structuring and problematizing) is to channel and focus student attention and action (Pea, 2004). When scaffolded well by problematizing and structuring content, student attention will be focused and channeled throughout the task.
With respect to scaffolding argumentation specifically, various strategies have been attempted, with encouraging results. One strategy is to scaffold students with computer software that can prompt students to attend to data in a specific order or that can arrange, represent, or graph data (Walker & Zeidler, 2007; Zembal-Saul, Munford, Crawford, Friedrichsen, & Land, 2003). Another is to provide students with various prompts or criteria for making their arguments (Jimenez-Aleixandre, 2008).
METHODS
Design Rationale
Scaffolding students’ argumentation in science can improve their argumentation skills as well as their content learning (Walker & Zeidler, 2007; Zembal-Saul et al., 2003). Analogy and argumentation, when put together, have the potential to yield benefits. Analogy serves as a scaffold for exploring new concepts in rich, mappable contexts. If groups are invited to make an argument by analogy, this work hypothesized, they may be scaffolded and better able to learn content through argumentation. Simple machines can be regarded as natural analogues that lend themselves well to this type of activity.
This project explores the scaffolding of argumentation with analogical-mapping-based comparison activities. Specifically, students in small groups were invited to make an argument by analogy about simple machines that are all, to various extents, analogous in function. This study specifically asked: What does it look like when argumentation and analogy are blended in the study of simple machines? How do comparison and analogical mapping affect communication and learning? What problems do students have? These questions were answered using the method of discourse analysis.
Context
This research took part in a science elective course for preservice teachers at a large research university. The three-hour-per-week course met twice weekly and had the dual aim of teaching science concepts via inquiry and designing inquiry-based activities. This research took place during the 8-week unit on simple machines in which simple machines were offered together as part of guided inquiry activities in a course for preservice elementary teachers to learn the science content, and to learn how to create and teach with guided inquiry lessons. Small groups of students built, used, modified, and made measurements of levers, pulleys, inclined planes, gears, and other simple machines. These activities asked small groups of about four students each to build the machines using Legos®. They were then used to lift something of known weight while students measured and recorded effort force, resistance force, and their corresponding distances. Various quantities could then be calculated. Questions embedded within the activity prompted students to summarize what they had learned about the simple machine under study. Finally, students designed a way to apply a combination of machines to lift a prescribed load. Class discussions, notebooking, and test questions generated reflections on the guided-inquiry, lesson-design principles employed.
Fifty-five students from three sections (14 groups of about four students each) elected to take part in the study, agreeing to be videotaped and have their written work used as data. The instructors were Betsy (two sections) and Mark (one section), both of whom had taught the course or a similar one for about one year prior. They helped to design the specific interventions.
Activity Development
When learning about simple machines, students are often given the chance to use the machines and asked to make measurements of and compare input and output forces and distances (i.e., effort force, resistance force [or load], effort distance, and resistance distance) (e.g., Hewitt, 1999; Roth, 2001). Then, in making, applying, and representing a given simple machine in various configurations (e.g., varied: loads, mechanical advantages) and/or varied simple machines (e.g., a pulley and a lever), students are guided toward a notion of mechanical advantage (as the multiplier through which effort and resistance forces and effort and resistance distances relate) (Hewitt, 1999; Roth, 2001).
The class in which this research took place did this as well. But from past semesters’ experience, even with about 8 weeks to build, use, and compare simple machines, the instructors had observed that students did not see the connections between all simple machines (i.e., all have calculable mechanical advantages, trade distance for force, have effort forces and distances, move a resistance through a distance, are to various degrees analogues to one another, etc.). Since the design of the course repeated not only simple-machine science content (and other science content) but also guided-inquiry lessons, the course allowed for machine–machine and lesson–lesson comparisons. Thus, it was unfortunate that the instructors felt that students were not achieving coherent understanding of the simple-machine content. For example, they were sometimes able to calculate ideal mechanical advantage for one machine but not for another, in spite of the similarities. The synergy hoped for from the repeated use of simple machines was not achieved. To address these concerns, this study focused on the simple-machine content of the course rather than the guided-inquiry pedagogical aspect. By inviting students to make an argument by analogy and to have us scaffold those arguments with an invitation (and training) to compare and map the simple machines as analogues, it was hoped that a more coherent understanding could be developed in which one machine's structure and function could support the students’ learning of other machines.
Activities were created to address this by inviting explicit comparison between simple machines by asking, “Is this (first) simple machine more analogous to this (second) simple machine or more analogous to that (third) simple machine? Why?” Figures 2-4 show actual handouts used for this research. During these activities, groups were asked to make an argument for a better analogue from among two possibilities: “Is science concept X more like possible analogue-concept A or possible analogue-concept B?” They had prior familiarity with two of the three concepts. The third was new to them. Before doing the activity in Figure 3, for example, students had already built, used, and made measurements with the pulley and the first-class lever, but they had not yet used or studied the wheel and axle.



The specific goal of this research was to learn and describe how small groups of students engage in argumentation when they are scaffolded with analogy-based comparison activities. By asking students to make an argument in favor of one simple machine as a best analogue, the simple-machine content was problematized, and by asking students to use analogical mapping to make that argument, it was structured.
The instructors and the principal investigator designed the activities to offer simple-machine juxtapositions that had the power to make important underlying concepts salient and invite student reflection on superficial similarities through the analogical mapping process and subsequent argumentation. For example, consider the shape- and position-based similarities between the lever and the inclined plane in Figure 4. They look similar, as do the wheel-and-axle and pulley in Figure 3. In both cases, however, these are not the best analogues. One must look deeper than shape or orientation. In spite of superficial shape similarities between the pulley and the lever (Figure 3), one looking to analogically map the axis of rotation of the wheel and axis would find a stronger analogue in the lever's fulcrum than anything the pulley might offer. While the pulley might seem to have a fulcrum (or perhaps more than one), these are quite different from those found in the other machines; they do not map well to the first-class lever, as they are not good analogues. Also, the wheel's radius affects the machine's mechanical advantage in a way that is analogous to the length of the effort arm of the lever—as both increase in length, the effort force required to lift is reduced. It was thought that analogical-mapping-based comparison activities such as this have the potential to scaffold this process of looking deeper in a systemic one-by-one way in which elements of one machine are considered in relation to another's.
Implementation
Student groups were trained to do analogical mapping by doing simple analogical-mapping activities (e.g., Figure 1) during the unit on simple machines. The training activities, each lasting about 15 minutes, were done in small groups, and then discussed as a whole class over two class periods. After the training, students in their groups completed, as in past years of the class, inquiry-based labs on simple machines in which they built, used, and made measurements. Interspersed with these, once per week, groups would do an analogical-mapping-based comparison activity, such as those in Figures 2-4, which would introduce a new machine not yet otherwise studied. (See the timeline in Table 1.) These took 30 to 60 minutes. After these activities, the small groups presented posters (roughly the same format as the handouts) with their analogical maps and final arguments to the rest of the class. Then, the whole class would discuss the groups’ arguments and analogical maps and any problems they had doing them.
I. Week 1 |
a. Tuesday |
i. Participants Sought, Permission Forms Provided, Training 1—Comparative |
Argumentation Task 1—Dog Scenario |
b. Thursday |
i. Pretest |
ii. Students Build, Use, and Make Measurements with an Inclined Plane |
II. Week 2 |
a. Tuesday |
i. Training 2—Comparative Argumentation Task 2—General Science Concept |
ii. Comparative Argumentation Task 3—Inclined Plane vs. Screw |
b. Thursday |
i. Students Build, Use and Make Measurements with a 1st Class Lever |
III. Week 3 |
a. Tuesday |
i. Students Build, Use, and Make Measurements with All Classes of Levers |
b. Thursday |
i. Comparative Argumentation Task 4—Lever vs. Wheel and axle and inclined plane |
IV. Week 4 |
a. Tuesday |
i. Students Build, Use, and Make Measurements with Pulleys |
b. Thursday |
i. Comparative Argumentation Task 5—Pulley vs. Couch Lifters |
V. Week 5 |
a. Tuesday |
i. Comparative Argumentation Task 6—Wheel and axle vs. Pulley and Lever |
b. Thursday |
i. Students Build, Use and Make Measurements with Pulleys 2 |
VI. Week 6 |
a. Tuesday |
i. Students Build, Use, and Make Measurements with Gears |
b. Thursday |
i. Test Review Discussion |
VII. Week 7 |
a. Tuesday |
i. Comparative Argumentation Task 7 Part 1 of Unit Test—Screw Jack vs. |
Inclined Plane and Wheel and Axle |
b. Thursday |
i. Part 2 of Unit Test on Simple Machines |
Data Collection and Analysis
Data were collected during the analogical-mapping-based comparison activities in the form of video and audio recordings, individual students’ written analogical mapping tables, and posters of small groups. From among all 15 groups doing all activities, 48 hours, 38 minutes, and 6 seconds of video data were collected—an average of 43 minutes per group per activity. Because of equipment issues, one group's data were not transcribed for two of the activities. Only the video relevant to the research was transcribed. Side conversations longer than about five utterances and long periods of silence were not transcribed. Teacher comments and directions to the class were transcribed only once (as opposed to on each group's recording). This resulted in 24 hours and 21 minutes of transcripts. Transcripts were made by the principal researcher in StudioCode® and then pasted into Microsoft Excel.
The idea units within “reasoning sequences” (Pontecorvo and Girardet, 1993) were used as the unit of analysis for the transcripts. These are parts of the student argumentation in which “particular epistemic actions (or subactions) are performed” (p. 370) and only one thing is discussed. They last from two utterances (many seconds) to several dozen (several minutes). Within these reasoning sequences, Pontecorvo and Girardet (1993) offer the term “idea units,” which they refer to as “the smallest units in which the discourse is analyzed” (p. 370). An utterance may have zero to several idea units. Reasoning sequences were identified and highlighted in all transcribed data. These were reviewed by two instructors and the principal researcher together over several meetings to determine any patterns that could be labeled with codes. Next, they were shared with, critiqued, and modified by the other authors of this paper. Finally, they were applied to all data and evaluated again by the researchers. Disagreements were resolved through discussion.
The importance of discernment was noted by the researchers after reviewing videos and transcripts for early activities. Discernment for our purposes meant differentiating one thing (in this case one simple-machine element) from another. When it was not present, miscommunications between group members usually resulted. When it was present, communication was less problematic.
RESULTS
- discern definitions and descriptions for simple-machine elements (parts, components, and related concepts such as effort force or resistance distance), which were important to be successful in making arguments by analogy;
- go beyond superficial features of the machines in their argumentation to deep structural principles.
Most of the groups’ overall machine-level arguments (machine X is most analogous to machine Y) were correct. (Note that some activities did not have only one correct argument (e.g., Figure 4).) Correct arguments ranged from 14 of 14 groups (activity in Figure 2) to 9 of 14 (activity in Figure 3). Since the sample size was only 15 groups, no significant effect sizes can be offered on student learning about simple machines. Also, pre- and posttests considered the 8-week unit as a whole (daily pre- and posttests were not done due to time limitations). In spite of the fact that most arguments were correct, no group found the analogical-mapping-based comparison activities to be without need for argumentation. The following discourse analysis focuses on this argumentation.
In early simple-machine-based activities, researchers noted that students were not sufficiently discerning with their words. For example, students used the word “effort” in lieu of a more discerning “effort force” or “effort distance.” And they used “threads” (of a screw) instead of “thread length.” In the first two activities based on the simple machine, none of the groups discern in any of the ways just mentioned. This resulted in miscommunications and misunderstandings. Analogical-mapping-based comparison activities require discernment to be completed well. To make an analogical correspondence between two simple machine elements, one needs to know what exactly those elements are, and why they correspond. It is easy to see how lack of discernment can lead to miscommunications and frustration in these activities. For example, if one student uses the word “effort” to mean “effort distance” and another uses it to mean “effort force,” a communication problem will result.
Not only were misunderstandings caused by insufficient discernment noted in the transcripts, they were also evident in whole-class discussions after the activities. As a result, the instructors and the principal investigator decided to discuss this with students as a recurring problem and invite students to become more discerning and pay attention to how they might do this more effectively in their small-group conversations. First, two reasoning-sequence excerpts of groups having a miscommunication due to insufficient discernment will be presented. Discourse analysis will show that these eventually ended in frustration either with an incorrect analogical correspondence or with a decision not to make one. Next, two reasoning-sequence excerpts from later activities will be given, of groups engaging in explicit discernment and making a correct analogical correspondence.
Miscommunications Resulting from Insufficient Discernment
The group in the following reasoning sequence had a miscommunication caused by insufficient discernment in an early activity in which they were comparing an inclined plane to a screw. In this case, this group considers a correspondence between the resistance distance of the inclined plane and an analogue element of the screw. By not discerning the differences between “resistance,” “resistance force,” and “resistance distance,” communication about these features was hindered. Even physically pointing to these on the actual machines did not resolve the miscommunication issues, as the excerpt will show. First, however, some explanation is in order. See Figure 5. The upper and lower parts of Figure 5 are positioned similarly to show how they align analogically. (Note: the groups did not receive this labeled diagram.) The length of the screw shaft and the “resistance distance” as labeled on the inclined plane both represent the distance that a load would move up (imagine a block of wood moving up the screw while turning or conversely, the screw moving down into it). The force from friction and the need to split the wood would impart a resistance force on the screw. This means that although the load would travel along a larger distance (along the ramp length labeled “effort distance”) at reduced force, it has really moved much less in terms of useful distance (just the vertical distance from the ground). This vertical distance or height of the inclined plane (or length of the shaft of the screw) can be called “resistance distance.” The word “resistance” itself means essentially the same thing as load.

It is important to point out that the term “resistance distance,” however, is different from the word “resistance.” In the case of the inclined plane, the “resistance” would be the weight of the load at the bottom left. For the screw, the “resistance” would be something into which the screw was being turned—a wall for example. Both these resistances would exert a force on their respective machines, which can be called a “resistance force.” Thus, it is important to distinguish between “resistance,” “resistance distance,” and “resistance force,” as these are different things.
In the reasoning sequence below, group members Serena and Sheri use the word “resistance” to mean “resistance force,” whereas Evan uses it to mean the “resistance distance.” In the transcript, ideas relating to resistance are italicized for emphasis. The group begins talking about the screw:
00:20:16:47 | Serena | I think the resistance is gonna be whatever it's going into. |
00:20:22:08 | Evan | The shaft would be— |
00:20:22:87 | Serena | But that's the resistance. |
00:20:25:17 | Evan | Is the shaft not the resistance? |
00:20:31:11 | Serena | I don't think so. |
00:20:32:21 | Sheri | I think this (points along resistance distance on inclined plane) would be like the shaft |
00:20:36:38 | Serena | Yeah |
00:20:35:82 | Evan | Why would that be like the shaft? |
00:20:36:68 | Sheri | I don't know. Cause it's constant. |
00:20:38:59 | Evan | Yeah but—the only reason thee—the threads are—have to do with the effort distance is cause they're going up the shaft. So, I feel like—the shaft would have to do with this piece (points to resistance distance on inclined plane) |
00:20:50:77 | Serena | But that's not gonna be—but that's the resistance |
00:20:51:23 | Sheri | But that wouldn't be resistance |
00:20:52:40 | Evan | That's not what the piece is called. |
00:20:56:62 | Serena | Yeah huhh [like uh huh] |
00:20:54:98 | Sheri | Yeah. It is. |
00:20:55:49 | Serena | It's resistance |
00:20:56:94 | Evan | That would also be the explanation. |
00:20:58:06 | Serena | But it wouldn't be resistance—the shaft isn't |
00:20:59:15 | Sheri | The wall would be resisting the threads. |
00:21:03:45 | Evan | How is it— |
00:21:11:29 | Evan | Why are you talking about wall? |
00:21:12:76 | Sheri | I don't know. Cause I don't see how anything else makes sense. |
00:21:14:24 | Serena | Like whatever it's going into it's gonna be resisting the effort. |
00:21:17:94 | Sheri | Yeah. And, I'm assuming it's going into a wall. |
00:21:20:93 | Evan | But that's not what it's at. There is no wall in this picture. |
00:22:05:39 | Sheri | (overlapping) I don't care what we write. I don't understand this. |
Serena starts off stating the “resistance is gonna be whatever [the screw is] going into.” This is partially correct. A wall or a board, etc., puts a resistance force on the screw. She and other group members, however, do not discern that “resistance,” what they are saying, is different than “resistance distance” or “resistance force.” Evan follows up with “The shaft would be…”. Although grammatically incomplete, he does bring up the “shaft.” This is appropriate, since the shaft length of the screw corresponds analogically to the resistance distance of the inclined plane.
In this analysis, inferences must be made about some of the meanings intended. However, given the benefits of hindsight, correct scientific understanding, the fact that students seemed convinced of their respective positions, and that student argumentation positions are correct if interpreted in this way, these assumptions are reasonable.
Evan is influential in this argumentation, yet he is unable to hold sway without proper discernment between “resistance” and “resistance distance.” Serena reiterates, “But that's the resistance.” Evan, likely knowing that the shaft length relates to the resistance distance but insufficiently discerning, asks, “Is the shaft not the resistance?” Serena answers, “I don't think so.” Note that he also is insufficiently discerning with the word “shaft.” It is likely that he means “shaft length,” as these would correctly correspond analogically.
Sheri continues, stating, “I think this (she points back and forth along the resistance distance on inclined plane) would be like the shaft.” Unfortunately for Sheri, none of the other group members directed their attention to her physical pointing during her use of deictic language (context-dependent language including pointing; e.g., this, here, that, there). Serena agrees, stating, “Yeah.” Again, this is nearly correct, but it again lacks discernment. Note that Sheri's use of “this” and her pointing along the inclined plane where the resistance distance is, suggest that she is talking about—but not saying—the resistance distance. Sheri's word, “resistance,” is not sufficiently discerning. Had she said that “resistance distance” was like the “shaft length,” this would have been correct and discerning. It is likely, since Sheri referred to “the shaft” of the screw and pointed to the resistance distance of the inclined plane, that she thought she was conveying this correct idea.
During the next few utterances, the opportunity for discernment was provided; however, it did not happen. Evan asks, “Why would that [resistance distance, as Sheri had mentioned] be the shaft?” Sheri states, “I don't know cause it's constant.” This is an unclear response to Evan's question. Evan states, “Yeah but—the only reason thee—the threads are—have to do with the effort distance is cause they're going up the shaft. So, I feel like—the shaft would have to do with this piece [points to resistance distance on inclined plane].” This utterance has two important functions. First, Evan situates the new potential correspondence within another previously agreed upon one (not shown in this reasoning-sequence transcript)—that of the length of the screw thread and the length of the inclined plane (or effort distance). This attempt to give support to the new correspondence might have been effective. Evan even hedges somewhat with his use of a less-than-specific “the shaft would have to do with this piece.” The “would have to do with” suggests the need for further discernment through argumentation. Evan still has not uttered the term resistance distance, though he has pointed along it on the inclined plane, but here again, as with Sheri's earlier use of deictic language, none of the group members direct their eyes to where Evan is pointing. Thus, although communication might have benefited because of it, it does not.
Evan believes the group is talking about resistance distance, or the distance a resistance is moved. Sheri and Serena believe the group is talking about resistance force, the force applied by the resistance, such as a wall. At utterance 00:21:11:29 Evan questions their right to assert that a wall exists when it is not pictured. The argumentation continues on this idea for about 54 seconds (not shown due to space limitations). And finally, the reasoning sequence ends in dissatisfaction when Sheri states, “I don't care what we write. I don't understand this.”
The frustrating ending for the group is unfortunate, especially since there were many assertions that would have been correct had more discernment been used. Nonetheless, given the near correctness of their assertions, it is all but certain that all three members maintained key correct understandings (a fourth member was present and paying attention but did not participate during this reasoning sequence).
This reasoning sequence is representative of a class of such miscommunications caused by insufficient discernment that occurred in every one of the 15 groups. Some were longer. Some were shorter. But the key elements were the same: lack of discernment in communication causes a miscommunication. While doing the same activity, all but four groups had nondiscernment-caused miscommunications nearly the same as the one analyzed here (i.e., dealing with resistance). All groups, however, had at least one miscommunication due to lack of discernment.
MadeleineOh no—if like the threads were larger, it'd take more effort to screw it into something.
Madeleine took “larger” to mean “a thicker screw,” whereas another group member took it to mean longer threads (and thus finer) on the same screw shaft, which would reduce the effort force; and another member took this to mean farther apart (requiring more effort force). The word “larger” is insufficiently discerning. Only four groups (of 15) made this particular correspondence between “threads” and “effort distance” without problem or apparent miscommunication. Nonetheless, these four groups show that some groups did accept an analogical correspondence even with an insufficiently discerning word choice without much apparent difficulty.
These activities and their use of analogical mapping and simple machines easily allowed for and permitted the determination of nondiscernment-based miscommunications. Many aspects of simple machines had similar or closely related terms (e.g., resistance distance and resistance force, effort arm, effort distance, and effort force) that, when combined with nondiscerning word choice, can allow space for miscommunication. This limited space combined with the benefit of hindsight, complete transcripts, and knowledge of correct analogical correspondences, made identification of such miscommunications possible as shown in the previous analysis.
Instruction Toward Discernment: Prompting a Shift
During the activities, the instructors and the principal investigator were walking around the room. From listening to student small-group argumentation and the subsequent whole-class discussions, it became evident that lack of discernment was a problem. In the first activity on simple machines, as mentioned earlier, all groups made a correspondence between the “threads” (instead of “thread length”) of a screw and the “effort length” on their posters. Not even the two groups that were helped by instructors used “thread length” on their posters. Instructors addressed this. For example, after students shared their posters with their analogical maps and arguments with the whole class, the instructors commented that all groups had used the word “threads” when making a correspondence to the “effort distance” (or in some cases just “effort”). They stated on that day that “thread length” would have been more appropriate as “threads” are a concept or idea, whereas “thread length” can be measured. Instructors made similar mentions to individual groups about the need to differentiate between “effort distance” and “effort force” and other related terms during following activities as well.
Reasoning Sequences from Activities Showing Explicit Discernment
In the following section, two reasoning-sequence excerpts of groups showing explicit discernment will be shown and analyzed. In the first reasoning sequence, the group argues about a correspondence between the effort forces in both the lever and the wheel and axle. Although groups had measured and used the concepts they are about to discuss (effort force and effort distance) in earlier lab activities, the concepts remained problematic. The activities, as will be shown, invite the group to discern the difference. The handout for this activity is shown in Figure 2. Interestingly, the term “effort forces” relates to all simple machines in the same way (i.e., the distance over which the hand applies the input force). Nonetheless, the group needed to engage in argumentation to confidently make the connection and locate these on the different machines. The group was able to do this due to the explicit discernment made between “effort force” and “effort distance.”
Beth begins the reasoning sequence by suggesting a relationship between the “hand pulling down” and the “hand pushing down.” (Figure 6 provides a superimposed lever and wheel illustrating the concepts in this reasoning sequence.) She states, “Well.—Let's stick to the lever and the wheel-and-axle—because I think the hand pulling down could be equal to the hand pushing down so maybe the effort. See now what do you call that?” In this last phrase, Beth explicitly directs the group's focus to what they should call “that.” Here again we see the use of deictics in Beth's “that.” The rich context provided by the simple machines comes to the fore. At the beginning of the reasoning sequence, the contextual “that” becomes a seed for further discernment when combined with her question on what to call it. In her utterance, she had also used the word “hand” to center her thoughts on “effort.” Consider the rest of the excerpt given below.
00:12:15:35 | Beth | Well—Let's stick to the lever and the wheel-and-axle—because I think the hand pulling down could be equal to the hand pushing down so maybe the effort. See now what do you call that? |
00:12:32:42 | Bree | Effort force.—Right? |
00:12:32:58 | Melissa | Yeah. |
00:12:34:02 | Beth | Wow. Look at you! |
00:12:36:52 | Bree | Yeah. I know. Sometimes I get them right. |
00:12:38:00 | Beth | What would you call that on the other one, effort force? |
00:12:42:81 | Bree | Yeah. Actually. |
00:12:46:56 | Beth | I'm just gonna put hand coming down, hand pulling in parentheses. |
00:12:52:67 | Bree | They're both effort forces right? |
……….. | ||
00:13:28:25 | Dory | But is there a difference between effort and effort distance? I think there is. |
00:13:33:72 | Melissa | There's effort force and effort distance |
00:13:32:97 | Bree | Yeah. So I don't know which one it is. |
00:13:34:11 | Melissa | Well that's effort distance (points along effort distance). Effort force is what—the force that it takes to pull the thing up the effort distance. |

Picking up on Beth's question, Bree offers “Effort force. (2 s) Right?” The next three utterances convey confidence in Bree's assertion. Melissa follows with, “Yeah.” Next, Beth adds, “Wow. Look at you!” Bree then states, “Yeah. I know. Sometimes I get them right.” The “effort force” has been correctly discerned and the term appropriated and the group members know it.
The next few utterances serve to verify the fact that the label applies to both hands, not just one. (The “hands” can be seen in Figure 2.) Beth asks, “What would you call the other one, effort force?” And Bree says, “Yeah. Actually.” Then Beth apparently hedges somewhat; perhaps the words “effort force” might be insufficiently discerning. She says, “I'm just gonna put hand coming down, hand pulling in parentheses.” Bree, in spite of her previous utterance, solicits further verification; “They're both effort forces, right?” Combined with the previous several utterances, perhaps this utterance was made to further convince other group members of the correctness of her idea, or perhaps it was made to refute Beth's need for the additional detail “in parentheses.”
After about 36 seconds of unrelated dialogue, Dory, who had not yet spoken in this reasoning sequence, sought additional discernment in asking, “But is there a difference between effort and effort distance? I think there is.” Melissa responds, “There's effort force and effort distance.” Interestingly, once the discernment between “effort distance” and “effort force” had been offered, Bree seems to question her prior utterances stating, “Yeah. So I don't know which one it is.” It is possible that when she had stated “effort force” in her earlier utterance that she did not realize there was an “effort distance”. Or, maybe she simply did not mentally juxtapose the two. More likely, however, she did not know what exactly was best represented by the hand (see Figure 2). Melissa reaffirms her initial assertion stating, “Well that's effort distance (points along effort distance). Effort force is what—the force that it takes to pull the thing up the effort distance.” This utterance comes full circle in answering the question posed by Beth in the first utterance: what to call it. Melissa offers an important final discernment with deictics (i.e., pointing and using “that's”) between “effort distance,” “effort force,” and just “effort,” the earlier used word, which is unclear.
The comparison activity and related instruction scaffolded the students’ discourse toward the discernment of a definition for effort force in context as can be seen in this reasoning sequence. First, Beth began the sequence using context-specific language and the word “hand” in an attempted correspondence that suggested that these might relate to “effort.” She then asked for more discernment around the word “effort.” Bree then offered “effort force.” Dory explicitly next asked the group to discern between “effort” and “effort distance.” Melissa offered further discernment to Dory's “effort,” stating there's “effort force” and “effort distance.” Finally, Melissa offers a clearly discerned and pointed out definition of both “effort force” and “effort distance.”
The analogical-mapping-based-comparison activities created a need for discernment and a context within which it could take place. Both simple machines offered a perspective from which to view “effort force” (and “effort distance”). In addition, the coconstructions made possible between group members allow for easy changes back-and-forth between those two perspectives.
A Second Example of Discernment
The next excerpt, from Haley, Nathan, Audrey, and Jenn, shows another example of explicit discernment. The group is engaged in argumentation on the same activity (Figure 2) as the group in the previous excerpt. They are attempting to find simple-machine element correspondences between the lever and the wheel and axle.
Audrey begins by asking, “The fulcrum and—the—the thing–isn't that the same as the (points to wheel-and-axle) pivot point. Not pivot point. The center of the thinger.” Consider the transcript below.
00:10:37:00 | Audrey | The fulcrum and—the—the thing—isn't that the same as the (points to the wheel-and-axle) pivot point. Not pivot point. The center of the thinger |
00:10:46:59 | Haley | Yeah |
00:10:47:81 | Audrey | Wheel and axle |
00:10:48:63 | Haley | So the fulcrum—Should we just call it that the thinger? (laughs) |
00:10:57:11 | Audrey | There has to be a smarter word for that. Center thingy. Come on Nate. We need your big words here |
……………….. | ||
00:35:22:13 | Haley | Ok. The fulcrum and the center are the same because— |
00:35:26:44 | Audrey | Because that's like the pivot point of the—machine |
Audrey's utterance serves two functions. First, she introduces a possible correspondence between the lever's fulcrum and the wheel. Next, she questions her own use of “pivot point” as an acceptable term to make a correspondence to the lever's fulcrum. The word “thinger” combined with deictic pointing also promoted the need for discernment early in the reasoning sequence. This questioning makes it acceptable to the rest of the group to engage in discernment around finding a better term. Her questioning of the term also allows her to save face should a better term emerge from further argumentation. Haley agrees, stating, “Yeah.” Audrey tries to clarify with, “Wheel and axle.” It is not apparent whether this was a question or a statement.
With Haley's “So the fulcrum—Should we just call it that the thinger? (laughs),” the dialogue next turns explicitly toward discernment. Clearly, “the thinger” is insufficiently specific to correspond with the fulcrum. Audrey states, “There has to be a smarter word for that. Center thingy. Come on Nate. We need your big words here.” The contiguous reasoning sequence ends here. The group did, however, take up the matter in a follow-up reasoning sequence when attempting to write final choices on poster paper for sharing approximately 25 minutes later, offering a final two utterances. Haley states, “OK. The fulcrum and the center are the same because…” to which Audrey responds, “because that's like the pivot point of the… machine.” The simple machine element in question would best be called the axis of rotation. The members of the group likely had heard this term at some point before. Regardless, their definition was exact and well discerned, pointed out, and referred clearly to the axis of rotation in spite of the use of different words.
Although the argumentation in the end yielded a product much like the one in the first utterance, the “center” of the wheel and axle or the “pivot point” of the wheel and axle are specific and unique enough to not be confused with any other element. Therefore, it is considered that discernment took place between the words “thinger,” “pivot point,” and “center.” And although “pivot point” ultimately was adopted, the other terms, as well as the physical pointing, added to the communication and discernment process.
DISCUSSION
- discern definitions and descriptions for simple machine elements (parts, components, and related concepts such as effort force or resistance distance), which were important to be successful in making arguments by analogy.
- go beyond superficial features of the machines in their argumentation to deep structural principles.
Reasoning sequences showed that the invitation to use analogy and analogical mapping scaffolded groups in their argumentation toward discernment of definitions and descriptions. Encouraging analogical argument, as has been done here, has been found to promote discernment. Discernment has played a key role in doing analogical-mapping-based comparison activities. Furthermore, students’ discourse went beyond superficial appearances toward deeper structural and functional principles. Concepts as opposed to appearances were discussed. This is emphasized more by what was not said than what was said.
In the first example, insufficiently discerning word choice for the description of a simple-machine element that led to miscommunication and a frustration marked an ending to the reasoning sequence. In the final two examples, explicit discernment was noted early in the reasoning sequences, when after nondiscerning terms had been uttered, the need for discernment (e.g., “what would you call that?,” “how would you say that?,” etc.) or discerning terms that build on what was already said were offered (e.g., “I'd call that a…,” “In this case it would be effort force, not just effort,” etc.). The reasoning sequences with discernment ended in a confident choice for an analogical correspondence.
The utterance, “[e]ffort force is what—the force that it takes to pull the thing up the effort distance,” from reasoning sequence three, came at the end of the sequence and shows that students did gain understanding. This is all the more compelling since students had measured dozens of examples of effort distances and effort forces (with a ruler and a spring scale), recorded them, and used them to answer questions. An argumentation process in the group still needed to take place to arrive at this understanding. If students had not earlier reached an understanding on what “effort force” and “effort distance” were, then what about the elements of simple machines that had not earlier been measured? What about the fulcrum of a lever or the axis of rotation of a wheel-and-axle, for example? It is safe to say, for reasons similar to those just discussed, that these were not well understood prior to the analogical mapping activity. They needed to be discerned and defined, and this was not unproblematic. In the final reasoning sequence, Haley and Audrey offer the following coconstruction at the end, “OK. The fulcrum and the center are the same because—because that's like the pivot point of the—machine.” The collaborative process of analogical-mapping-based argumentation had a product—understanding—articulated in that utterance. Students considered elements of simple machines, labeled them, and argued about them to make an analogical correspondence.
Through the argumentation-by-analogy process, multiple machines and individuals provide multiple perspectives, which can benefit learning by offering different understandings and points of view of a given concept. Without problematizing and structuring student learning in this way, a fulcrum might otherwise be just a vocabulary word to be memorized. Through discernment, by contrast, a fulcrum buttresses and contextualizes an axis of rotation, and an effort arm buttresses and contextualizes a wheel's radius.
The representative reasoning sequences analyzed have shown that the analogical-mapping-based activities both problematized and structured the simple-machine content for students, the very components of scaffolding adopted for the purposes of this research (Reiser, 2004). The excerpts included showed problematization, since the analogical-mapping-based comparison activities and their requisite final arguments (e.g., machine X works more like machine Y) generated a need for the small groups to identify, and label in proper order, the elements of simple machines (e.g., fulcrum, effort distance, effort arm, resistance force, etc.) to make analogical correspondences between those elements. The analogical-mapping-based comparison activities structured content as well. Students were provided a systemic approach to identify and label elements of simple machines. Thus, students were able to use and point to one simple machine as a reference point to investigate another. On the basis of the discourse analysis here, it is presumably easier to state that a lever's “fulcrum” is like a “pivot point” of a wheel-and-axle and point these out (as the group used in the last reasoning sequence analyzed) than it would be to come up with an absolute definition for a fulcrum. By making the task doable in this way, the activity is structured for students.
The instructors, of course, played an important role in the activities. First, they offered analogical-mapping training to students. This was necessary in order for students to first have a good idea of how to identify elements of a scenario and make and explain an analogical correspondence. Also, the activities did not sufficiently structure the content by themselves, as indicated by the lack of discernment in some activities. Therefore, instructors also socially scaffolded students by making them aware of the need to be more discerning. Given the natural need for discernment to accomplish the activities, they provide good environments for learning to be discerning.
What was not discussed was also important. For example, no groups were found to attend to extraneous features such as color or relative size. Also, despite the same superficial positioning of the inclined plane and the lever shown in the handout in Figure 2, no groups made this correspondence. Superficial appearances were simply not important in making correspondences. All of the reasoning sequences analyzed in this paper showed students dealing with concepts that were pertinent to the task of analogical mapping and argumentation. This is further evidence that student attention was focused and channeled over the time on task, which is our definition of scaffolding.
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
By blending argumentation and analogy, this research has provided a way to make analogy a process, as many researchers have recommended for science education (Brown & Clement, 1989; Else et al., 2003; Gentner et al., 2003; Glynn, 1991; Heywood, 2002; Nashon, 2004; Theile & Treagust, 1991; Treagust et al., 1998; Wilbers & Duit, 2006). Inviting argument by analogy offers a way to scaffold argumentation for students in order for them to learn the content. The simple machines used in this research, although not literally the same, had analogous structures. Contrasting and comparing them through argumentation made features important, noticeable, and salient. Alignable structure is not enough, however; the differences needed to be explored. Analogical mapping allowed for this.
Various frameworks for using analogy in instruction in science education are in alignment in the way they stress the process of analogy (Else et al., 2003; Glynn, 1991; Nashon, 2004; Treagust et al., 1998). This study has contributed to the knowledge of what can happen during that process, what some of the problems are (i.e., nondiscernment), and possible ways to improve the use of analogy (e.g., encourage discernment, attend to differences between analogues, inviting arguments based on analogy, and involved groups of students).
Although research has shown that reasoning and communicating by analogy is common and effective (Brewer, 1996; Clement, 1981; Dunbar, 2001; Wong, 1993), few studies have focused on how analogies can influence classroom discourse (Bellocchi and Ritchie, 2011; Gadgil & Nokes, 2009). This study showed the argumentation process with its deictic and coconstructed utterances playing out in the rich simple-machines-as-analogues context, requiring discernment and shared meanings.
This study also contributes to the literature on the argumentation process in science education. (Before discussing this further, however, it is important to note that given the conceptual nature of the arguments, categories such as evidence, claims, warrants, backing, etc., based on the work of Toulmin (1958) [still commonly used] are not present.) For example, Jimenez-Aleixandre (2008) suggests that students should be “active producers of justified knowledge” and to accomplish this, student roles should include generating products or answers, choosing among competing explanations, backing claims, distinguishing good from poor arguments, talking science, and persuading peers (pp. 96-7). She also suggests that students should “generate products or answers.” In the present work, students did this in two ways. First, they made analogical comparisons between elements of simple machines (e.g., a fulcrum of a lever is like the axis of rotation of the wheel-and-axle). Second, they made a principal argument between two simple machines, asserting them to be most analogically alike (e.g., a wheel-and-axle works more like a lever than it does a pulley). Criterion 2, “choose among two or more competing explanations,” is particularly relevant, given that the overall goal is to make an argument about the best analogue from two possible analogues. Criterion 4, “use criteria to distinguish good from poor arguments,” occurred when students undertook the discernment process about elements from simple machines as in the final two reasoning sequences analyzed. Finally, criterion 6, “persuade others” is also relevant. The need for discernment is particularly central to the process of persuasion of one's peers.
There are several limitations to this work, including that the results may not be generalizable to a larger population, those more experienced in science may be more efficient at discernment, and nonelementary education majors may perform argumentation qualitatively differently. Of course, individuals also vary in their skills necessary to engage in discernment. In addition, the activity was not the most time efficient. Repeated interactions with analogical mapping as well as instructor guidance were necessary in order for some groups to show discernment; early attempts resulted in frustration for many students. This may not make for a good efficiency/effectiveness balance in many classrooms. Developing the analogical-mapping-based comparison activities took time. Finally, given the small sample size, instructor participation in answering questions, and the lack of data separation from other simple-machine activities, statistically significant results cannot be offered.
Although the model of activity researched here is not necessarily amenable to all science content (some science concepts are not readily comparable), similar opportunities exist for analogical comparative small-group argumentation around case comparisons, analogous laboratory experiments, learning about canonical analogies (e.g., solar-system-atomic model, electricity and water, etc.), and core ideas in science in various contexts (e.g., energy transfer, evolution, etc.).
Analogical-mapping-based comparison activities might also be relevant to research on learning progressions, which deal with the order in which content can be best learned and taught over time (National Research Council, 2007). The analogical-mapping-based comparison activities might be offered over a longer time frame, over various courses or years with ever more sophisticated models, content-explanation-analogies, or analogues. This aligns with what Bruner (1968) called the “spiral curriculum,” in which content recurs again and again over time but in a slightly different form (e.g., more sophisticated models) and/or with different surrounding content.
To map and compare, as was did here, is to inherently make connections, which was the goal of the instructors. Such connection making also allows for one simple machine to lend structure (or not, as the case may be) to another simple machine, reducing the tension between problematizing and structuring to focus and channel students’ attention and argumentation in the space between the analogues.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Mark Merritt, Elizabeth Larcom, and Richard Duschl for their input in this work.